TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 8, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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f~ .
Confidential
~Illllllllll~~~u~lllllllllll
FORE~GN~
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~Illllll~uuuuiiii~~ll IIIII~I
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
~ Confidential
& MARCH 1972
(VOL. XXIII, N0. 10)
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This propaganda analysis report is bases ex-
clusively on material carried In communist
broadcast and press media. IL is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document con~sins information affecting
the national defense of the United States, .
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person !s pro-
hibited by law.
GCOUO I
[aluded irew eurs~netlt
derepradiep end
detlenihtetlee
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 MARCH 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Mayor Attention
i
PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP
Peking Resumes Low-Level Criticism of U.S. in Wake of Visit
1
Pyongyang Endorses Visit; Expresses Concern About Hanoi
4
PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA Offer Cautious Initial Appraisals
6
Budapest Examines Implications of Sino-U.S. Rapprochement
9
East German Media Belatedly Join in Soviet Bloc Attacks
INDOCHINA
10
DRV Attacks President's China Visit Without Reporting Event
12
DRV Comintern Anniversary Editorial Seems Aimed ax Peking ~
16
Communique on Sihanouk's DRV Visit Quotes Sino-U.S. Document
17
Air Strikes Against DRV Prompt Foreign M~.nistry Statement
19
VWP Secretariat Scores Failure to Disseminate Propaganda
22
~~ambodian PLAF Command Calls for "Liberation" of Kompong Thom
23
USSR-BANGLADESH
Mu3ibur's Visit Cements Close Ties with Soviet Union
24
MIDDLE EAST
Delayed Communique Sums Up Libyan Delegation's Moscow Talks
29
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS
USSR Presses Stock Measures, Broaches Issue of PRC Attendance
33
PRC AND BRITAIN
Peking Shows More Favorable View of British Military Policy
35
USSR-ROMANIA
Bucharest Plies Independent Course; *f,~scow Calls for Unity
37
USSR
collusion Charged Between Ukraine Nationalists aad Peking
39
Mzhavanadze Protege Attacked by Central Committee
40
CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Civil Po11ce Forces Attract Some Favorable Publicity .
41
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FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY FBIS TRENDS
8 MARCH 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 28 FEBRUARY - 5 MA.F.CH
Moscow (27ti7 items)
Peking (1500 items)
China
(10X)
12X
Domestic Issues
(46X)
43X
[Nixon Visit
(5X)
7X]
Israeli Incursion
(--)
11X
Luna 20
(6X)
12X
Into Lebanon
Bangladesh Prime
(--)
9X
Ni.xon Visit
(17%)
10X
Minister Rahman
in USSR
PRC-Ghana Diplomatic
Relations Restored
(--)
4X
Indochina
(10X)
6X
Indochina
(10X)
3X
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking dorneatlc and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item--redio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Toplca and events given mayor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Bome may have 1,een covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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PRESIDENT'S CNINA TRIP
PEKING RESUA'ES LOW-LEVEL CRiTICI~M OF U.S. IN WAKE OF VISIT
Amid the crosscurrents of reaction from its allies to President
Nixon's visit, Peking has not offered any authoritative comment
on U.S. policy while resuming low-level criticism of the United
States. There has been no report on the whereabouts of Chou
En-lai or of most of the Politburo members since Chou's return
to Peking on 29 February after seeing the President off in
Shanghai. Among those greeting Chou, only Li Hsien-nien snd
Li Te-sheng have made reported appearances since. Chang
Chun~chiao, the President's host in Shanghai, welcomed Sihanouk
to that city o1 5 March upon the princes return from Hanoi.
The brief report on Chang's toast at a banquet for Sihanouk
did not mention the United States, bur one of the slogans
shouted at the airport expressed support for the Indochinese
"war against U.S. aggression"--the standard formula which
had been softened in the point communique on the President's
visit.
Peking carried the faint communique on Sihanouk's Hanoi visit,
which contained an allusion to the Sino-U.S. communique, bur
it has sot reported a 4 March editorial by its Pyongyang ally--
the only communist capital to have endorsed Peking's invitation
to the President--calling the visit "a great victory" for the
Chinese and praising them for having maintained their "consistent
revolutionary principle." Despite its endorsement of the visit,
the North Korean editorial struck a discordant Note--to Chinese
ears--by attacking the United States for trying to create
dissension within the communist movement by continuing its
military actions in Vietnam while talking about peace.
Reflecting the strains between Peking and Hanoi arising out of
the President's visit, the Chinese avoided citing North Vietnamese
comment during the course of the visit, except for pickups of
protests against U.S. military actr.ons and reports on the
Indochina situation. In the first account of North Vietnamese
comment since before the visit, NCNA on 6 March summarized a
NHAN DAN editorial of that date hailing the point communique on
Sihanouk's stay in the DRV. But white thus again publicizing
Hanoi comment, NCNA omitted the harsher anti-U.S. passages in
the editorial, such as its characterization of the United States
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8 MARCH 'L972
as "the most malicious, stubborn, and dangerous enemy" of mankind
anal its attacks on the Nixon Doctrine. Predictably, NCNA omitted
the editorial's pointed assertion that the Indochinese peoples
do not entertain any "illusions" about the true nature of U.S.
imperialism.*
PRC COVERAGE OF VISIT In the absence of any direct commentary
on the President's visit, Peking has
conveyed its stamp of approval Both by the triumphal welcome
accorded Chou on his return to the capital and by rerunning
television coverage of the visit for five days after the
President's departure for home. Judging from the behavior of
the Canton television station, the decision to extend coverage
over this period was made only after the conclusion of the visit.
Canton TV announced on 29 February that its relay of Peking
television coverage of the visit--which had continued daily
sinre 22 February--would end that day, but on 1 March it
again relayed Peking and announced on the 2d that this would
continue until the 4~:h, The relays during this period included
reruns of film on the visit itself, bur the program on 1 March
poir..tedly juxtaposed a rerun o.f the President's meeting with Mao
and the initial television coverage of Chou's return to Peking.
Peking's last original reference to the visit was a report. on
the President's arrival back in Washington released by NC:JA
some 45 hours after the fact. The NCNA account reported that
the President gave a 10-minute television speech but provided
no details. Mentioning the presence u~ foreign diplomatic envoys
at the airport, NCNA took special note of the absence of the
"so-called 'ambassador' of the Chiang Kai-shek clique." In
the manner of NCNA's account of the President's departure for
China, which sought to underscore bipartisan support for the
trip, the report on his return took care to note the presence
of Congressional leaders of both parties at the airport and to
mention the President's briefing of leading members of Congress
from both parties the day after his return.
CRITICISM OF U.S. While Peking has resumed tow-level
criticism of the United States, there
have been no authoritative commentaries centering on U.S.
policie;z and no directly critical statements by Politburo-level
* The point communique on Sihanouk's visit and Hanoi's reaction
to the President's China trip are discussed in the IndochinE
section of this TRENDS.
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leaders. The Chinese have thus far ignored statements by
Administration spokesmen reaffir~aing U.S. commitments to the
ROC and have not reported Assistant Secretary Green's trip
to Asian capitals to explain the President's visit to allied
governments.
Peking's most polemical thrust at the United States since the
President's trip was contained in an address by An Chih-yuan,
the PRC delegate to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed, which was transmitted textually by NCNA on
3 March and widely broadcast by Radio Peking. After sternly
taking the two superpowers to task for using the seabed for
arms expansion and for refusing to heed the claims of Latin
American and other countries to wider territorial sea limits
and jurisdiction, An used this forum to reassert the PRC's
own territorial claims and rights to disputed islands and
other resources off the China coast. An attacked the United
States for colluding with Japan to include the Senkakus within
the scope of the Okinawa reversion agreement and denounced
American survey activities along ;.he continental shelf. The
Chinese delegate expressed "the utmost indignation" at these
"flagrant acts of aggression and plunder" and declared that it
is "absolutely impermissible for any foreign aggressor to poke
his fingers" into the seabed resources claimed by Peking.
An opened his discussion of Peking's claim to the disputed
islands with a standard charge that the United States is
"to this day Forcibly occupying China's territory Taiwan
province." Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, speaking at a
Moroccan Embassy reception on 3 March, also raised the Taiwan
question but did not mention the United States in that
connection. Chi pra!.sed Morocco for having opposed "two
Chinas" and other formulas objectionable to Peking. He
barely alluded to the United States in calling on the Arabs
to "guard against the schemes of the one or two superpowers."
Peking's effort to find c~nmion cause with third world countries
? also accounts for a sally against the United States by a
Chinese official at a 7 March banquet for a Chilean Socialist
Party leader. Wang Kuo-chuan, representing the Chinese
? People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries,
praised the Chilean Government for its "dust struggle against
L'. S. imperialist aggression and oppression" and for defending
its rights to 200-mile territorial waters.
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Peking has also resumed low-level repurts on U.S. economic
difficulties. A 6 March NCNA dispatch, citing a Commerce
Department announcement on the U.S. foreign trade def icit in
January, followed familiar 11nes in depicting American
competitive weakness and decline in the international economy.
PYONGYANG ENDORSES VISiT, EXPRESSES CONCERN ABORT HANOI
Tendering Pyongyang's approval of its Chinese ally's conduct
in receiving President Nixon, a 4 March NODONG SINMUN editorial
followed the lines of earlier North Korean comment in welcoming
the trip as a victory for the Chinese and in depicting the
President as having undertaken a "tour of mendicant diplomacy
with a white flag." While interpreting the trip as an act of
surrender by the United States and a defeat for its policy of
containment of China, the editorial notably refrained from the
personal invective directed against the President that has
marked Pyongyang's comment in past years. Noting that the two
sides pledged in the point communique to base their relations
on the principles of peaceful coexistence and to facilitate
further contacts, the editorial observed that it is "a good
thing" for countries to strive to normalize relations and to
seek a relaxation of international tension.
CC-NwIUNIST UNITY Notwithstanding this endorsement of the trip,
the editorial struck what may seem to Peking
a discordant note, and an echo of Hanoi's angry polemics, when it
accused the United States of seeking to foment communist
dissension by continuing its military actions in Indochina
while talking about peace. Without explicitly referring to the
President's trip in this connection, the editorial complained
that the United States is resorting to "a11 sorts of maneuvers"
to suppress the world revolutionary forces and is intensifying
the war in Vietnam. "This is a vicious challenge to the Vietnamese
people and, at the same time, a trick to create dissension among
the socialist countries," the editorial warned.
Pyongyang had previously alluded to the effect of the President's
trip on communist unity in a point communique on the visit to
North Korea last December by a "special envoy" of Sihanouk's
front, Ieng Sary, who himself had warned of U.S. "trickery"
and attempts to deny the rights of small countries in connection
with the President's trip. The communique pointed to a need to
strengthen mutual support and solidarity among anti-imperialist
forces at a time when the United States is attempting to
"disorganize them."
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In September, however, Hungarian President Losonczi received a
cool reception when he went to the DPRK to warn--presumably in
behalf of the Soviet bloc--about the dangers of attempts to
foment dissension among the communist countries. In a banquet
speech Losonczi had said his visit had been successful and
that a communique had been prepared that "faithfully reflects
the agreement of our aims," but no communique was ever
released. Pyongyang's accounts of his speeches during the
visit omitted his polemical remarks about communist unity,
~snd Korean speakers themselves avoided the subject.
While Pyor-gyang has sought to swim wieh the current of Sino-
U.S. detente, the 4 March editorial's warning about U.S. effcrts
to create communist discord suggests a nagging concern over
Hanoi's plight at a time when the biggest Aeian communist
country welcomes the enemy's chief. In previous years
Pyongyang had been stridently vocal about the need for other
communist countries to put the Vietnamese communist cause
above all others, and relations between Pyongyang and Peking
had become severely strained in the second half of the 1960's
over Chinese insistence on placing the needs of the rivalry
with Mcacow over those of the Vietnamese comrades.
Peking's failure to publicize the 4 March editorial contrasts
with its eagerness last Augusc to make use of Pyongyang's
endorsement of the invitation to the President. PRC media
had carried the full text of Kim I1-song's 6 Augusc speech
as well as a NODONG SINMUN editorial of 8 August lauding
Peking's demarche.
KOREAN SITUHTIGN The 4 March editorial, after welcoming the
Chinese statement in the point communique
expressing support for Pyongyang's eight-point Korean unification
program and for the demand to abolish UNCURK, called upon the
United States to back up its words about peace with concrete
deeds in Korea. The editorial demanded that the United States
withdraw its troops from Korea a:~d that the UN resolutions on
? Korea be revoked. Addressing the South Korean leaders, the
editorial called for talks between North and South and asked
the South Koreans to respond to Pyongyang's "dust proposals" for
peaceful unification. The editorial did not, however, mention
Kim I1-song's recent proposal on a North-South peace pact that
would not be contingent on a U.S. troop withdrawal.
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PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA OFFER CAUTIOUS INITIAL APPRAISALS
The closest Moscow has yet come to an authoritative appraisal of
the President's China visit in PRAVDA appears as part of Georgiy
Ratiani's "International Review" in the 5 March issue and is
notable for its gingerly approach to the key aspect of the visit
from the Soviet standpoint--the triangular Sino-Soviet-U.S.
relationship, which Moscow had largely avoided broaching head-
or. in comment prior ;:o and during the visit.
Ratiani's basic conclusion is that the mayor factor impelling
"Washington" toward rapprochement with Peking may have been
the "anti-Sovietism" of the Chinese course. The cautiously
hedged expression of this judgment and its placement in a
relatively inconspicuous place, in one section of the grab-bag
"International Review" rather Chan in a full-scale article
under a more authoritative byline, suggest that Moscow is
e.cill marking time on a definitive appraisal of the trip
'but felt con;~rained to come out with at least a preliminary
assessment on the pages of the party daily.
Ratiani leads into the subject of the trip cautiously with the
observaticn that the "initial results" are being "analyzed
througC~out the world," and his discussion draws for the most
part on U.S. press comments. He refers directly to the
Administration on his own authority only once, in the remark
that "both the Johnson Administration and the present
Administration" hsve persistently tried to save the
unsalvageable Sri Asia, despite counsel from "reasonable
voices" favoring a radical shift in Asian policy. The
article quotes AP for one reference to "an informed
Administration representative" and mentions the President.
by name only in quoting foreign sources.
Ratiani builds up to his basic conclusion with the argument
that "Washington decided in a presidential election year to
revise only a single element of its overall Asian and Far
Eastern policy that has existed since the time of General
MacArthur--that is, to 'build a bridge' in relations with
China." It is on grounds that "all other elements," including
policies on Indochina, Korea, and the maintenance of military
bases in Asia, remain unchanged that Ratiani says "it is
possible to supp~~se" that "Washington was urged toward such
a step more by the anti-Sovietism of Peking's course than by
concern for peace ~n this region."
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Ratiani uses proxy U.S. comment to caution the United States,
in effect, not to try to use its newly improved relations with
Peking as a bargaining counter against the Soviet Union. Thus
he points out that "those U.S. circles why^l. soberly assess the
situation" are "seriously alarmed" by such a prospect, and a~
documentation he invokes an observation by ';ian scholar Doak
Barnett: "If the U.S. Acmintstration decides to attempt to
establish close relations with the Chinese a~ "he expense of
relations with the Soviet Union, this may be fraught with a
threat." Ratiani adds: "Barnett does not conceal the fact
that he is talking about a threat to American policy itself."
Against the background of earlier, pervasive warnings in Soviet
and East European propaganda that a sellout of Hanoi might be
in the offing in the Sino-U.S. talks, Ratiani now suggests that
a "bargain" was concluded at Hanoi's expense. He cites the
CHRISTIAN SCIEN,.t; MONITOR for Chia view, quoting it as inferring
from the point comm~inique that President Nixon "suggested that
the United States will leave Taiwan if the Chinese will help
convince Hanoi to accept American terms--that is, essentially,
to capitulate." It is on grounds that "many other well-informed
American newspapers" hold the same view that Ratiani concludes
that "Washington has struck a bargain with Peking behind the
backs of *~~-_ 'Jietnamese and the other Asian peoples."
Contrasting Peking's alleged perfidy with Moscow's steadfastness,
he adds that the Indochinese peoples have "reliable friends,
who are rendering them firm and resolute support , and
only profound disappointment awaits those who ~:~ish to rectify
their affairs by zigzags in their policy without wanting
essentially to change it."
OTHER MOSCOW COMMENT A Washington-datelined dispatch by
Kondrashov in the government organ
IZVESTIYA on 3 March had also cited "the American press" for
the view that "the motive prompting the attempts to achieve
American-Chinese rapprochement has b.:en and remains the Peking
leadership's anti-Sovietism, which coincides with Nixon's
foreign policy interests." But Kondrashov aid not elaborate
this point. Much of his dispatch was devoted to a caustic but
essentially innocuous discourse on "television diplomacy,"
? taking note of the President's statement that his week in
China has changed the world and suggesting that the purpose
in an election year was to make the American voters believe
this was so. Kondrashov remarked: "It should be clear to the
Washington leaders that historical development is determined
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in no way by the visit to Peking, but by the fundamental
processes now taking place in the world, by the influence of
the revolutionary forces." In another passage Kondrasho?~
observed sarcastically that in the context of the recent
Sino-American talks, Peking's "'firm' support for the
people's liberation struggle now has approximately the same
kind of weight that Peking's nearly 600 serious 'warnings'
to American imperialism have had in the past."
The element of continued temporizing in Moscow's reaction was
reflected in the weekly commentators' roundtable over the Moscow
domestic service on the 5th, when panelist Mayevskiy noted
that "Western, and particularly American," observers were still
engaged in conjectures about the results of the trig "because,
as is known, the communique does not reveal the cuntent" of
the talks. Much of Moscow's comment since the release of the
communique has resorted to this gambit, suggesting that the
document concealed far more that. it divulged and quoting
U.S. newsmen's spE~culatioa to suggest that deals may have
been concluded--e3pecially on Indochina--without directly
and authoritative?.y associating the Soviet Union with this
charge.
Moscow's suspicious wait-and-see stance was typified by an
article on the trip by D. Volskiy in the Soviet weekly NEW
TIMES on 3 March, again using the line that the point
communique "gave no idea of the content of the negotiations."
Reaffirming the recurrent Soviet line that "the very fact
of the impLovement of relations between the United States
and China could be welcomed," Volskiy added: "The crux of
the matter is t,nder what conditions and on what basis the
U.S.-Chinese rapprochement takes place, what reel objectives
Peking and Washington are pursuing, and what form their
foreign policy practice will assume." Volskiy concluded
that "the future will show this."
Moscow's touchiness with respect to tr~.atment of President
Nixon was graphically illustrated on 7 March when TASS issued
a correction deleting an abusive epithet applied to the
President. The original version, under a London dateline,
began: "Smiles on China, bombs on In-lochina: This was the
recipe with which President tricky Dicky Nixon went to
China ." Some two hours later, TASS filed a correction
attributing the passage to the British CP organ ("Commenting
on President Nixon's trip to the PRC, the MORNING STAR
writes .") and deleting the derisive epithet.
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BUDAPEST EXAMINES IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-U~S~ RAPPROCFIEMENT
Hungarian comment on the President's China visit has sustained
the relatively measured Cone that: has diatinguishe4 it from the
rhetoric from Moscow's otY~ar hardlining allies, while playing
many of the same Chemes. The tone and content of Budapest's
approach is exemplifie? in a 5 March article in the party
daily NEPSZABADSAG over the signature of the paper's leading
commentator on international communist affairs, Ferenc Varnai.
After a lengthy discourse on considerations motivating the
"deep suspicion" that surrounds the talks between the leaders
of "U.S. imperialism" and "Maoism," Varnai embroiders the theme
that Peking is acting against its own interests in rebuffing
Moscow's overtures for better relations and in pursuing its
"unprincipled" rapprochement with Washington.
Varnai notes worldwide interest in how the visit will affect
China's relations with Moscow and with "the socialist world,"
commen".ing Chat the answer is not simple "becausE of the zigzage~
and unprincipled policies" pursued by Peking. At the same
time. he says, one "cannot exclude with complete certainty"
the possibility that the Chinese leadership will again respond
to Soviet initiatives, long on record, for improving relations.
Emphasizing that the onus is on Peking, Varnai concludes that
"the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries will not
miss a single opportunity which could facilitate an improvement
of relations with China," but that "only facts and deeds" can
be the criteria for fudging the situation.
Cautioning the Chinese on the pitfalls of letting themselves
be used by Washington, Varnai asks rhetorically what guarantee
the Chinese leaders have that they will be able to exploit the
recent "anti-Soviet encounter" with the President to their own
aJvantage and that they will not "become tools of the Americans."
He underscores China's isolation from the "socialist" world and,
on the score of China's economic problems, asks rhetorically
whether it was possible that the Chinese could 'nave learned
nothing from the experiences of third-wor1~3 countries and are
prepared to "sell themselves" to the United States.
In the 3 March issue of the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG, the
Hungarian news agency MTI's Moscow correspondAnt Pal Bokor had
described the Soviet reaction to the Preside.i-_'s China trip as
underscoring Peking's overriding mo*ives of "anti-Sovietism."
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The SovieL? Union, according to tt:e correspondent, has concluded
from the evidence so far that the trip served interests counter
to the cause of relaxing international tension. In the vein of
Varnai's article, Bokor cautioned the Chinese of the consequer:r_es
to their own "prestige" that could flow from "unprincipled
political moves."
Betraying a fear Chat Moscow and ~':s other allies have avoided
expressing in their comment, Bokor pointed .to the "danger to
the cause of world peace" from the possibility that the United
States, "under the pretext of trade links, may contribute
directly or indirectly to the militarization of China." Again
in the vein of Varnai's article he concluded that if, on the
other hand, the Sino-U.S. rapprochement should take on "a
positive meaning" in line with "the principles of peaceful
coexistence," then "this would necessarily also facilitate an
improvement i.n Soviet-Chinese relations."
EAST GERMAN MEDIA BEl~4TEDLY JOIN I N SOVIET BI OC A'1TACKS
After largely refraining from original comment during and
immediately after the President's China visit, East Berlin
media began to attack the trip on 2 March. The 29 February
Moscow TRUD article, also picked up by Prague but unpublicized
in Moscow's own broadcasC media, formed the peg for a commentary
in the 2 March issue of the semiofficial BERLINER ZEITUNG. The
author quoted TRUD to the effect that "it was precisely the
policy of 'Vietnamization' announced by Nixon in 1969 which
prompted the Naoist.s to invite the President to Peking" and
that "this policy suits the Chinese leaders. The thing is,
they want to utilize the American policy of pitting Asians
against Asians for their rig-power goals." It further quoted
TRUD in noting that en route home the PresidenC stopped off
in Guam, "from where U.S. aircraft loaded with napalm usually
take off for terrorise attacks against Vietnamese women and
children." The East German commentator assailed the
"tremendous escalation" of U.S. bombing in Indochina, remarking
that "not a single word about this could be heard from Mr.
Nixon's hosts," who cortinued "their hateful and sharp attacks
against the USSR."
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The party daily NEUBlS DEUTSCHLAND joined it the attack on the
3d and 4th. An article entitled "The Fog Lifts," on the 3d,
~oinad the East European chorus in saying "everything points
to the understanding between the Mao group and the U.S.
Administration being directed essentially against the Soviet
Union and the socialist community firmly linked to it." A
vitriolic article in the next lay's issue of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND,
entitled "Miscalculation of the.. Killers," was devoted entirely
to an attack on "the policy of genocide" allegedly pursued by
the United States in Indochina "without interference" from
Peking and "camouflaged" in the Sino-U.S. communique.
The semiofficial foreign affairs weekly HORIZONT, which had
carried the only original GDR commentary dv.ring the President's
visit in its last February issue (No. 9), added another iu
its first March issue (No. LO)--a commentary enCi.tled
"Conspiracy in Peking." In addition to c~++nterpoeing the
visit to stepped-up bombing in Indochina ~.nd scoring its
"anti-Soviet" aspect, this commentary ridiculed the
President's "euphoric outburst" about having changed the
world as "nonsensical ostentatious boasting."
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INDOCWIMA
Hanoi has continued to avoid any explicit mention of President
Nixon'e trip to China, but its disapproval hae been dramatically
demonstrated in DRV media during the past week. Hanoi on 2 March
took the occasion of the Ssd anniversary of the Comintern to issue
a NHAN DAN editorial--something it had not done even on Che 50th
anniversary--which pointedly noted the DRV'e role in working for
socialist unity and in struggling against "U.S. imperialism, the
number one enemy of mankind." A KHAN DAN Commentator article on
the 3d went so far as to quote some of the President'e~ atatementa
in China and passages from the Sino-U.S. point communique--identifying
them as from a "recent documenC'=-ae further evidence of U.S. duplicity.
This pattern has continued in subsequent propaganda, including the
DRV-Cambodian communique issued an the 5th at the end of Sihanouk's
visit to Hanoi, and most notably in a lengthy QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
Commentator article on the 8th.
U.S. air strikes against the DRV durirg the past week prompted a
6 March Foreign Ministry statement ae well as routine prot2ata by
the ministry spokeanan~ The flurry of propaganda quoting the
President's remarks in Peking says that hie "hypocrisy" regarding
a peaceful settlement in Indochina was pointed up by continued U.S.
air strikes.
Peking has originated no substantial camment on Indochina since the
President's arrival in Peking on 21 February. PRC media duly
reporte6 the text of the DRV-Cambodian communique and NCNA summarized
the supporting NHAN DAN editorial, though deleting its strongest
attacks on the President. Peking hae continued to carry Indochinese
propaganda on military action, including the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement on the recent U.S. air strikes. If past practice is
followed, a support+.ng PRC Foreign Ministry statement should be
forthcoming .
Moscow has continued to raise the spectre of a backstage Sino-U.S.
deal on Vietnam, and it promptly reported the 3 March NHAN DAN
Commentator article. Soviet support for the Vietnamese was
highlighted in publicity for the 25 February - 4 t4arch v iaits to
Hanoi of Minister of Culture Furtseva and Minister of the Maritime
Fleet Guzhenko.
DRV ATTACKS PRESiDENT~S CHINA VISIT WITHOUT REPORTING EVENT
NHAN DAN'S In his 3 March article NHAN DAN'e Commentator seemed
COMMENTATOR at pains to make sure his allusions to the President's
remarks in China and to the statements in the
Sino-U.S. communique were not missed. While continuing Hanoi's
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studied avoidance of any explicit mention of the President's
China visit, he took issue with the President's statements
"in a recent document"* regarding Indochinese self-determination
and the eight-point proposal as a basis for a negotiated
settlement. Commentator then went on to quote from the
President's speeches in China, ridiculing him for "also
ballyhooing the U.S. desire to remove thp, 'many wa118 still
existing in the world which divide nations and people ."'
Commentator obeerveri pointedly that at the same time that the
President was making these statements he "ordered intensified
air attacks on both zones of Vietnam."** The article was not
significantly harsher than the eerier of Commentator articles
in recent weeks when it deocribed the President as the "bellicose,
ferocious, ruthless, and tricky imperialist ringleader." But
these epithets are of more than passing interest because of the
implicit context of Sino-U.S. relations.
Commentator clearly Cook issue with the statements in the point
communique in which the PRC and the United States expressed
common posi.tion~: Thus he answered a rhetorical question by
saying it is "t?.S. imperialism" that ie "creating hegemony in
the Asia-Pacif is region." He also sniped at such paePages in
the communique as those on reducing the danger of military
conflict and on mayor countries avoiding collusion with other
countries. In posing his aeries of rhetorical questions,
Commentator also said it is "U.S. imperialism" that is
threatening the security and com:ritting aggression against
nations and is "sowing discord among the socialist countries and
the forces of revolution. and progress." He conci.uded Chat
"Nixon's universally known war crimes in Vietnam" se well as
other actions have shown that the "aggressive, bellicose,
ferocious, and obdurate nature of U.S. imperialism has not
changed a bit, that U.S. imperialism is the most dangerous
enemy, the number one enemy of all nations of the world."
* PRAVDA on 4 March published a lengthy account of the article
from its Hanoi correspondent which contained most of the
quotations from the communique and the President's speeches.
Strangely, it referred to "one" document rather than to a "recent"
document.
** Hanoi had seemed clearly to be signaling its displeasure to
Peking over the visit when it ignored a 19 February PRC Foreign
Ministry statement endorsing the DRV Foreign Ministry protest over
U.S. air strikes on 16-17 February. Hanoi finally acknowledged the
Chinese statement on 1 March--two days after the President's visit
ended .
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Commentator was more subtle in conveying Hanoi's displeasure
over Peking's statements on an Indochina political settlement
in the communique. Hie failure to mention the PRG proposal--
an unprecedented omission in any Hanoi discussion of a
political settlement--while stating Chat the Vietnamese and
the world public have "exposed" the true nature of the United
States' eight points may have been contrived to point up
Hanoi's annoyance over the passage in the communique in which
Peking supported the PRG stand but did not criticize the
U.S. position.
QUAN DOI NI-IAN DF~"J The Commentator article in the army paper
COMMENTATOR on the 8th--broadcast by Hanoi radio and
reviewed by VNA, like the NHAN DAN article
of. the 3d--was even more pointed than the NHAN DAN article in
its use of remarks made during the President's visit. Thus it
singled out, without attribution, a remark the President had made
on hie departure for Peking which Chou En-lai had "noted" in his
banqu;:~epeech on 21 February. Observing that 'Nixon ie doing his
beet to create a new image of U.S. imperialism," Commentator
declared: "He Said what the nations in the world and U.S.
imperialism must do ie find a way to see that we can have
differences without being enemies in war." Commentator followed
this immediately with the statement that "piously he called on
the latter to loin U.S. imperialism in 'a long march together on
different paths leading to the same goal of peace and justice "'--a
paraphrase .of some of the President's remarks at the banquet on the
21st.
The lengthy QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article was divided into sections on
Vietnamization, the eight-point peace plan, regional alliances, and
"attempts to blur the line between revolution and counterrevolution."
It was under the last section that Commentator placed the abovz
quotations. He went on ~o ridicule the President's remarks on the
future of children, remarking that "all this inflated rhetoric is
being made by a representative of U.S. monopoly capitalism,
notorious for his anticommunist activity, hi_s re~.etionary and
bellicose stand."
The army paper pointed to remarks by the President--statements in
fact made in Peking--which it said contradicted his foreign policy
report. It quoted him as stating, for example, that he did not
"seek the territory" of other countries, where in the foreign
policy report he had made it clear Chat "a leading American rile
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in world affairs continues to be indispensable." Some
statements Commentator attributed to the President were
actually drawn from the section of the Sino-U.S. communique
which spelled out agreed paeitione. Thus Commentator said
"Nixon boasted about 'respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all states' and 'nonaggression
against other states. "' The article also said "Nixon pleaded
Chat the United States did not 'seek hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific region. "'
The Commentator article's sharpest gab at Peking was in the
assertion that U.S. "imperialism" hopes to confuse the world's
people and lull the rovolutionary forces "by put~ing a coat
of peace on its bloody war paint and picturing U.S.
neocolonialism as an advocate of the 'future' of nations."
However, it added, "to the discerning eyes of the revolutionary
people in the world, U.S. imperialism has appeared, especially
through the reality of Vietnam, in its true light as the
international gendarme." Where the NHAN DAN Commentator on
the 3d had charged the United States with "sowing discord among
the socialist countries," the army paper's Commentator
concluded: "The sacred call of the world today is for the
strengthening cf the unity of the socialist countries."
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DRV CCY~11 NTERN ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL SEr'.~?IS A iMED AT PEK l NG
The 2 March NNAN DAN editorial on the 53d anniversary of the
fo~inding of the Comintern in effect prepared the groundwork for
Hanoi's exploitation of the President's statements in Peking and
the Sino-U.S. communique. That the issuance of an editorial on
the Comintern anniversary was merely a contrivance to take
issue with Peking* is pointed up by the fact that NHAN DAN has
not editorially marked previous Comintern anniversaries, not
even the 50th in 1969. The 50th anniversary was, however,
marked by an article in the party journal HOC TAP.
The editorial repeats--though in more moderate language--
argumente voiced during Hanoi's polemic with Peking laRt summer,
again stressing the necessity for all communist parties to hew
to policies of proletarian internationalism. It fellows up a
historical allusion to the Comintern's struggles against
"opportunism of all shades" with the painted assertion that the
Comintern made an "extremely great contribution" by bringing to
light the principle of associating working class interests with
the interests of the nation and "associating genuine patriotism
with proletarian internationalism." Bringing this principle into
the present context, the editorial later observes Chat the
Vietnamese peoples' struggle against the United States combines
"genuine patriotism with proletarian internationalism." It
repeats Hanoi's view that the United States is "enemy number
one of all nations" and argues that the task of creating a
worldwide "united front" against the United States is "an
urgent demand of our time."
In the wake of the 15 July announcement of the President's
planned China visit, Hanoi statements had pointedly suggested
that Peking was not abiding by the tenets of proletarian
internationalism; a 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article
went so far as to_ warn of the President's use of nationalism
within communist countries and to charge that "one of his
* The AFP correspondent in Hanoi reported ti-at additional
attention was drawn to the editorial because the first edition
of NHAN DAN on 2 March was withdrawn from the stands and a
second edition, containing the editorial, was later issued.
The AFP dispatch did not make clear whether the editorial
appeared in the first edition of the paper, and there is no
other available information un the contents of that edition.
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extremely insidious strategeme is to spread the poison of
chauvinism among the opportunists to divide serialist countries"
and communist parties. Hanoi's polemic with Peking on the issue
of proletarian internationalism had seemed to have been stilled,
however, when Pharr Van Dong, toward the end of hie November
visit to Peking, reaffirmed that the two countries' relations
were based on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism,"
thus implying that Hanoi's fears about Chinese policies toward
the United States had been assuaged.
The 2 March editorial strongly urges the strengthening of
socialist unity in a passage characterizing a slogan on the
strengthening of unity against imperialism a8 "the sacred appeal
of the era, the highest directive of the proletarian revolution
throughout the world." It goes on to declare that "communists
loyal to Marxism-Leninism" always strive to carry out this
slogan "in whatever place, at whatever period, and in whatever
circumstances."
The editorial adds that the North Vietnamese party has "done ins
utmost" to "defend the unity and cohesion of t:ie world. socialist
system" and communist movement "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism." But it does not 30 on to
recall the appeal in Ho Chi Minh?n testament for his p~~rty to
help restore socialist unity, nor does it echo previous DRV
pledgee to contribute to the restoration of unity. 8y contrast,
Pharr Van Dong, speaking at a 24 November banquet in Peking,
had quoted Ho's expression o# hope "that our pa:?ty will do its
best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among
the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarianism ." and added the conviction "that this profound
desire will be realized."
CONMUN I(~IIE ON S I HANOUK~ S DRV VISIT f~UOTES S I NO-U ~ S ~ DOCUMENT
The point communique on Sihanouk's 12 February - 5 March visit
to the DRV* elaborates on U.S. "perf idy and bellicosity" in
? terms that could be read as implicitly critical of Peking's
rapprochement with the United States and quotes from the point
communique on the President's China visit--without identifying
' it--in calling the U.S. statement on American withdrawal from
* Initial. propaganda on the visit is discussed in the
l6 February TRENDS, pages 13-15.
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Indochina "hypocrisy." A 6 March NHAN DAN editorial on the
DRV-Cambodian communique similarly quotes from the Sino-U.S.
document without attribution.
The DRV-Cambodian communique, dated 5 March, pointec:ly states
that "U.S. i.mperialiem is the cruelest, most obstinate, and
most dangerous enemy of the Indochinese peoples and of mankind
as a whole" and that its "aggre:~sive and bellicose nature has
not in the least changed, as proved by the 'Nixon Doctrine."'
In a later passage, of ter assailing the eight-point peace plan
divulged by President Nixon on 25 January, the communique
quotes from the Sino-U.S. communique when it sa;;? that "more
recently" the U.S. Administration has "hypocritically" declared
that in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United
States envisages the ultimate withdra~?al of all U.S. forces
from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination
of each Indochinese country. The next day's NHAN DAN editorial
alludes to the Sino-U.S. document in slightly different terms.
According to a Vietnamese-language radio report of the
editorial, it scores President Nixon's eight-point plan as a
"farce" which, like "the 'negotiated battlement' which Nixon
has dust announced ae the 'constant primary objective' of
thy: United States in Indochina," is merely calculated to mask
U..S. "neocolonialist designs" in Indochina. (A VNA English
version of the editorial makes the allusion to the Sino-U.S.
communique less pointed by ref erring to the negotiated settle-
ment which the President "calls" the constant primary objective
of the United States, where. the radio specifies that this
was something the President had "dust announced.")
"Categorically rejecting" the President's eight points, the
DRV-Cambodian communique demands that the United Staten give
"a positive response" to the "two key problems'' of the PRG's
sevo Dint solution. It again expresses support for Sihanouk's
23 r~: h 1970 five-point proclamation and the "poli.tical
program" of hie Front, and it reiterates the DRV's recognition
of Sihanouk as the Cambodian head of state and of his government
as the only legal and legitimate government of Cambodia. The
communique also supports the NLHS five-point political solution
of 6 March 1970. Af ter citing both sides' determination to
fight until victory, the communique reaffirms their loyalty
to the point declaration of the Indochinese people's summit
conference and recalls the conf erence pledge of "reciprocal
support."
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The Cambodian delegation arrived in Shanghai from the DRV on
5 March. Routine Hanoi propaganda on the trip had called it
an "unofficial visit" for the Tet holiday, where the 5 March
point communique calls it a "friendship visit." Sihanouk's
activities got relatively 11tt1e publicity during his
three-week stay in the DRV; the usual banquets and speeches
were omitted, perhaps to underscore the "unofficial" nature
of the visit. The trip had apparently been designed as a
show of Indochinese solidarity during President Nixon's visit
to Peking; it also provided Sihanouk with a pretext for being
absent from Peking during the President's visit.
The point communique says t:iat in Sihanouk's talks with the
DRV leaders, which took place in "an atmosphere of militant
solidarity, fraternal friendship, and total mutual conf idence,"
the two aides "held identical views on all questions discussed."
Similar characterizations had appeared in the communiques on
Sihanouk's two previous visits to the DRV--in Niay-June 1970 and
January-February 1971--as well as on the November 1971 visit of
Ieng Sary, who was also a member of Sihanouk's del.agation on the
recent vi;,it. According to the communique, Sihanouk met with
Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen
Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. During his last two visits he did
not see Le Duan or Truong Chinh, but Ieng Sary met with Le Duan.
Before Sihanouk left Peking, he told Western reporters that he
expected to confer with Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong
as well as with Vietnamese leaders, but communist media contained
no indication that Soupt-anouvong was in Hanoi.
AIR STRIKES AGAINST DRV PROMPT FOREIGN MINISTRY STATE~NT
The U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam since 1 March have
prompted two routine foreign ministry spokesman's stntements on
the 4th, another on the 5th, and a DR~1 Foreign N!inistry statement
on the 6th--a level at which t'znoi had last protested on
17 February.* On the 8th Hanoi issued anc+ther statement at the
spokesman's 1evF.l.
The foreign ministry statement charged that from 1 to 6 March the
United Staten "mobilized a large air force" to carry out "daily
attacks on many populous areas in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
* See the 24 February TRENDS, pages 24-28.
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provinces and in Vinh Linh area." But it did not repeat the
details of the strikes from 1 through 5 March which had been
recounted in the series of spokesman's statements, nor did it
say anything specifically about the strikes it said took
place on the 6th. The statement claimed that five planes had
been downed during the period, but neither it nor other
propaganda mentioned the capture of any pilots. (Hanoi on
the 4th said that on that day an F-4 had been sho~c down over
Quang Binh and an unmanned plane over Vinh Linh. On the 6th
Hanoi said that an unmanned plane intruding over Quang Binh
Province was downed and that two U.S. bets were downed by the
armed forces of Nghe An, bringing the total to 3,445.)
The foreign ministry statement paralleled earlier ones in
charging that the U.S. actions "constitute extremely serious
acts of war." It also restored the charg a--strangely absent
from the 17 February statement--that the strikes are "very
shameless violations of the U.S. commitment" to end the bombing
of the North. The statement echoed the language of the
29 December foreign ministry statement during the heavy,
sustained strikeb when it called o~~ "the governments and peoples
of the fraternal socialist countries and peace-.and justice-loving
countries to take resolute anti timely measures" to check
the U.S. "imperialists" ann "to increase their support and
assistance" to the Indochinese peoples.
Comment following up the statement came promptly in a Hanoi
radio commentary on the 6th and in QUAN DOI KHAN DAN on the 7th.
There is the usual reference to vigilance, with the army paper
declaring that since the end of December "our armed forces and
people downed nearly 40 U.S. aircraft and killed or captured
many aggressor pilots." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN also calls for
heightened vigilance, and it expresses determination to "smash
every destruction maneuver of the enemy, downing aircraft,
sinking warships and killing or capturing enemy commandos and
aggressor pilots in order to protect the people's security,
lives, and pzoperty." '-
NHAN DAN An 8 March NHAiJ DAN Commentator article pegged
CONN~IENTATOR to the foreign ministry statement, entitled
"Bloody Hands, Peaceful Words," pursues Hanoi's
pattern of quoting without attribution from President Nixon's
remarks in China and from the Sino-U.S. communique. In strikingly
vitriolic language, Commentator says that what is moat "brazen"
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is that "recently while Nixon was soaking hie hands in the
blood of the Vietnamese people, he noisily ballyhooed about
'peaceful negoL-iatio:~s' and about 'respect for the right to
self-determination' of the Vietnamese people ant} the people
of many other countries."
Commentator also scores the President's "boast" about his
concern for children and points out that many Vietnamese
children have been "killed, inured or disabled" or lost their
parents because of U.S. bombe; a radio commentary broadcast on
the 7th, decrying the loss of children in the air strikes,
also scores the President for "continuing to boast that he
'cares for future generations."' Calling the President "the
warmongering, bloodthirsty archimperialist," Cc-maentator says it
is clear that he is using bombs in. an attempt to force
negotiations on his terms. But the article co:rcludes that the
Vietnamese "have. always clearly understood U.S, imperialism. They
will never be afraid o~ deceived yy it."
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WVP SECRETARIAT SCORES FAIUIRE TO DISSFJ~IINATE PROPAGANnA
Hano1 media on 4 March publicized a North Vietnamese party (VWP)
Secretariat circular on the distribution and use of newspapers
along with a supporting NHAN DAN editorial. The circular, dated
24 February, expressed concerr. over "shortcoriin~;s" in the
distribution and use of papers, noting, for example, that
NHAN DAN has not been sent to all party chapters and that
newspapers are not r~:gularly res.: in many places. The extent
of the problem was illustrated in the Secretariat's complaint
that in acme delta provinces 5~~ percent of the township party
committees do not receive NHAN DAN and that even fewer papers
are delivered in the mountain areas. The circular pointed to
the role of the press in guiding, "persuading, educating, and
organizing" the party and people, and it urged that cadres,
party members, and members of mass organizations "acquire the
habit of reading newspapers and listening to the radio and
realize that the newspapers are their daily spiritual food."
The timing of she release of the circular could raise the
question whether its promulgation was relzted to Hanoi's
concern to propagandize its foreign policy position in the face
of President Nixon's trip to China. The circular did briefly
note that "in recent days" the press has--among ~thar things--
enasavored to increase its quality, to faithfully propagandize
the party's li*.es and policies, snd "to ref lect current events."
But ?ts main r~tress was on domestic issues.
The NHAN DAN editorial recalled that the Secretariat had
previously issued a circular on presR distribution on 13 December
1958. The issue of distribution was raised more recently at a
conference called by the Central Comaittee's Department of
Propaganda and Training, publicized in June 1969. The conference,
as reported in the 7 June 1969 NNAN DAN and the June issue of the
propaganda department's journal, TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANnA AND
TRAINING), discussed the nistribution of newspapers since the
a tart of U.S. bombing in 1965 and, like the current circular,
noted the need forimprovement in distribution and use of the
press.
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CAMI30DIAN PLAP COMMAND CALLS FOR ~~LIBERATION~~ OF KOMPON6 1ThIOM
An appeal for the "liberation" of the Cambodian town of Kompong
Thom was publicized on 29 February by AKI, the Sihanouk
government's news agency. The appeal, reportedly issued on
25 February by the Cambodian liberation army (CNPLAF) command
on tYie Kompong Thom front, reviewed alleged comm~~nist successes
in January and February. Claiming the overrunning of positions
around Kompong Thom, it noted Final.Ly that on the night of
24 February the garrison of Panhachi was encircled and that
government positions on aJ.1 sides of the city were surrounded
and con~cinuoualy attacked.
The appeal seemed mainly aimed at demoralizing government
forces and causing them tc defect. It predicted Chat it is
"inevitable" that the troops in the city of Kompong Thom,
completely cut off at-d short on supplies, "will be completely
annihilated in their turn." It also called for more rigorous
implementation of the CNPi.AF's plan of attack and asserted
that "the ci~y of Kompong 'T.hom will certainly ~.,e liberated."
The continuation of fighting in the Kompong Thom a,:ea was noted
in a 3 March AKI battle repor~: and a Hanoi broadcast to the
South on 7 March, and NCNA on the 7th briefly cited alleged
CNPLAF achievements in the area in recent weeks.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
a MaRCI~ 1972
USSR-BNNGLADESH
NUJIBUR'S VISIT CEP'~NTS CLOSE TIES WITH SOVIET UNION
Celebrating Soviet-Bangladesh friendship, recording promisee of
extensive Soviet aid and assistance to the new state, and calling
for an early negotiated settlement of the outstanding prahlems
of the South Asian subcont~.nent, the 3 March Soviet-Bangladesh
point "declaration"* marking the 1-5 March "official friendly
visit" to the Soviet Union of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh
Mu~ibur Rahman also provided for "regular political consultations"
and registered a virtual identity of views between the two stares
on a number of mayor international issues. Mu~ibur's visit, his
first as prime minister to a nation outside the subcontinent,
included three days of talks with Kosygin and otl-.er high-le?-el
Soviet officialb rind meetings with Brezhnev and Podgornyy. The
talks were variously described by Soviet media as having taken
place in a "warm," "friendly," or,"cordial" atmosphere. The point
declaration characterized the atmosphere as one of "cordiality
and mutual understanding."
The Mu~it?r-Kosygin talks appeared to consolidate Moscow's position
alongside India as principal patron of the new Bengali state. In
addition to Mu~ibur's visit and the point declaration, other
recent indications of closer Soviet-Bangladesh relations include
the disclosure by Moscow's domestic service on 25 February Chat
a regular Moscow-Dacca, ai_r route had been "recently inaugurated,"
a 2 March agreement on economic and technical cooperation, the
establishment on the same day in Moscuw--with Mu~ibur in
attendance--of a Soviet-Bangladesh Friendship Society, and a
3 March announcement of the opening of a two-way direct radio-
teletype line between the news agencies of the USSR and
Bangladesh. Also, there have been itt recent weeks a number
of exchange visits between the two countrica of various
political, social, and economic groups.
The visit received extensive Soviet propaganda attention--more
than twice that accorded Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
27-29 September stF:te visit to the Soviet Union and
significantly morn than t!~e publicity devoted to the
14-19 September visit of A~ghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir
Shah. Soviet media stressed Soviet aid and support for the
national liberation struggle of the people of Bangladesh,
* A point "declaration" stands a notch above a point "communique"
in importance.
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CONFZDEN'I'ZAL I~'BZS 'I'R ANDS
8 MARCFI 1972
sometimes to the extent of cred:.ting the Soviet role for the
. achievement of Bangladesh's independence. This was particularly
true of Moscow's broadcasts in Mandarin to Chinese listeners,
for whom Moscow has been contrasting a portrayal of Sino-
American conspiracy against the Bangladesh national liberation
struggle with the Soviet Union's principled support for that
movement. Soviet comment and reportage came close to depicting
Mu~ibur's visit to Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent as a tour
of gratitude to enable Mu~ibur to extend his people's thanks to
the Soviet people. Zndia's role in the liberation struggle
went virtually unmentioned in Soviet publicity for Mu~ibur's
visit.
BI1~4TERAL RELATIONS The principal focus of the point
declaration of 3 March, carried to full
by TASS on the 4th, is on bilateral relations, with emphasis on
expressions of Bangladesh gratitude to the Soviet Uniun for its
a1d and support during the struggle for independence, on Soviet
commitments of continuing economic aid and technical assistance,
and on "the further development of friendly relations and
fruitful cooperation" between the Cwo countries in the economic,
technical, scientific, cultural, "and other f ielde."
An emphasis on economic issues was indicated t., the participation
of such Soviet officials as N. K. Baybakov and V. N. Novikov,
both deputy premiere concerned with economic a~.fairs; S. A. Skachkov,
the Soviet aid official; and M. R. Kuzmin, first deputy minister
of Foreign Trade. Economic assistance is the subject treated
most extensively in the point declaration, G~'ich observes that
among the first steps in the development of Soviet-Bangladesh
cooperation were the signing of the trade agreement and th~:
establishment of bilateral sea and air communications. Noting
that "great attention was paid during the talks ~:o the questions
of expanding trade between the two countries oc? the basis of
equality, mutual benefit, and moat-favored-nation treatment,"
the declaration goes on to cite specific areas in which the
Soviet Union will provide economic and technicaS. assistance:
construction of a thermal power station, radio Broadcasting
stations, and other power plants; exploration for gas and
petroleum; reconstruction of the merchant marine and of
railway transport; development of sea fisheries; provision
of helicopters for improvement of air communications;
training of national cadres for various branches of industry
and a;riculture; and provision of consultative services on
problems of the reconstruction of indur~try. Agreeing to expand
bilateral trade, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness "to
purchase not only the goods traditionally exported by Bangladesh,
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CONI'IDI~NTZAi, C131S 'I'RI~NUy
8 MARCII 1972
In the political field the point declaration formalized Kosygin's
expression cf hope--made in a 1 MarcFi speech at a Soviet
Government. dinner for MuJibur--that the sheikh's visit "will
mark the beginning of direct contacts between the leaders of
our countries." Tlie declaration records an agreement "to hold
regular political consultations" at various levels of the two
governments "on all important matters involving the interests
of both states," the consultations to be effected "through
neetinge of leading statesmen and sending official delegations
and special. representatives of the governments, through normal
diplomatic channels, and in other forms."
Provisions of this nature have became a stock item?in point
communiques, statements, declarations, and treaties between
Moscow and noncommunist governments. Thus, the 9 August Soviet-
Indian treaty provides fir the maintenance of "regular contacts
with each other on mayor international problems affecting the
interests of both sides, through meetings and exchange of
opinions between their leading statesmen, visits by official
delegations, and special representatives of the two governments
and through diplomatic channels." The 27 May Soviet-UAR treaty
and communiques signed by Moscow with Canada and France in
October and with Denmark and Norway in December also call for
regular political consultations.
The feint declaration also called for the promotion of contacts
between Soviet and Bangladesh governmental and social organiza-
tions a~' for scientific, cultural, and other exchanges. That
Moscow may wish some form of cc~tact on the party level--as it
has with other noncommunist countries on close terms with the
USSR--is suggested by the presence st the formal talks of
B. N. Ponomarev, the CPSU secretary in charge of relations
with parties in noncommunist countries.
SOUTH ASIA Noting the "great attention" devoted in the talks
to "the situation existing on the subcontinent,"
the point declaration appeals for restraint by all outside
powers from interference in the subcontinent and for "an early
normalization of the situation in that region." It calls for
a "genuine political aettlen:pnt" through "negotiations between
the states directly concerned, without outside interference,
and having regard to the actual situation, on the basis of the
legitimate rights and interests of its people." The document
paints to the widespread diplomatic recognition of the People's
Re,ublic of :Bangladesh as "convincing evidence of the
realization of the situation actually obtaining in that area."
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CONFIDG~N'L'I:AL IBIS 7'RENUS
8 MAKCH 1972
Both eider refrained during the visit L?rom attacks on the
current Bhutto government of Pakistan, confining their references
to Pakistan to passing comments on the previous military
government of Yahya Khan. Thug, Kosygin in his 1 March speech
recalled the "campaign of frightful repression" of the Bengalis
carried out by "the former military administration of Pakistan,"
and a commentator on the 5 March international observet,~'
roundtable on Rad1o Moscow referred to "the Pakistani brasshate"
who had "inflicted great material damage on East Bengal."
Mu~ibur in his return speech on the let spoke only of "the
punitive forces." The point declaration contained no mention
of Pakistan.
There was less restraint evident in comment on the roles of the
United States and the PRC in the recent events on the
subcontinent. Kosygin in his 1 March speech referred to
Pakistan's support by "certain foreign forces"--not specifically
named--who "impeded a political settlement and took no heed of
the consequences for the East Bengali people or the Pakistani
people," adding that they "clearly counted on being able to
maintain the hotbed of tension for the purpose of warming their
hands at the fire of an internecine aar between the peoples of
the Hindustan peninsula." According to the point declaration,
the national liberation struggle of the people of Bangladesh
"revealed with utmost clarity not only the attitude of
different states to the dust cause of the people of Bangladesh
but also the true friends and the foes of the People's Republic
of Bangladesh as a new independent state." The declaration
appeals to all countries to "rebuff any attampts at interference
from outside" in the affairs of the subcontinent.
Recent Soviet comment has been explicit in denouncing Washington
and Peking for their roles in the struggle of the people of
Bangladesh. For example, a commentator on the 5 March
observers' roundtable recalled how the United States and the
PRC "acted against the dust struggle of the people of
Bangladesh for liberation and supported the dictatorial
regime of Yahya Khan and promoted the spread of the bloody
war in East Bengal," adding thaC the Sino-U.S. communique
on President Nixon's trip contained an "understanding on
maintaining the policy which is really-directed against the
Bangladesh people" and thus marked "another step" along the
road of Sino-American "cooperation against the Asian peoples."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS 'CRENDS
8 MARCIi 1972
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES The Joint declaration registers virtual
agreement between the two governments on
a number of maJor international issues. Stock Soviet lines are
endorsed in sections on Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
MuJibur--but nor Kosygin--had raised both of these issues i.n
his 1 March speech. Similarly, Bangladesh went on record in
support of the Soviet posit ton on a European security confe:-ence
and on arms control and disarmament measures, and it Joined the
Soviet Bide in condemning racia~u, apartheid "in all forms and
manifestations," and colonialism.
Marking a rare Soviet statement of its position on the issue
of territorial sea limits, the Joint declaration states that
the two aides "pronounced themselves in favor of the need to
establish the breadth of territorial waters in conformity with
the practice of the overwhelming maJority of states." In
another gesture to its guests, Moscow declared its support
for the request of Bangladesh "to be admitted to UN membership,"
BACKGROUND: Besides expounding on Soviet aia ,:nd support for
the Bengali people since the early days of their struggle,
Soviet media in the weeks preceding MuJibur's visit. emphasized
indications of a rapid development of Soviet-Bangladesh
friendship--aucl; as exchange visits by various groups--and
sought to depict a normalization of the situation in Bangladesh
and the stability of its governme,:t. Thus, Moscow carried a
number of interviews with Bangladesh officials who expressed
grxtitud~a for Soviet assistance and explained the basic policies
of the :sangladesh Government--land reform, nationalization of
economic enterprises, and the establishment of a socialist
economy. To Justify continued extensive economic aid to
Banl;ladesh, however, Soviet media have stressed the monumental
economic problems of the new regime, particularly in view of
the widespread destruction inflicted on the Bangladesh economy
by the Pakistani forCP.B over the past year. Moscow has also
taken particular note of the withdrawal of Indian forces from
Bangladesh and the return from India of the Bangladesh refugees.
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8 MARC}l 1972
IWIi1;~LE EAST
DEIJ~YED COMMUNI(aUE SKIS UP LIBYAN DEI.EGATIf~N'S MOSC04J TALkS
A belated ,:ommunique sums up the talks held in Moscow between
2:I Fobruary and 4 March by a Libyan Government delegation headed
'oy Economy and Industry Minister 'Abd as-Salem Jallud. The
visit was given meager publicity by Moscow, with only brief
accounts of the delegation'? activities and nc report of the
substance of the cipeeche6 exchanged during a luncheon on the 25th.
PRAVDA on the 6t1: said Jallud was seen off o~n the 4th. Moscow
radio on the 5th merely said the delegation had left, mentioning
no date or send-off ceremony,* and PIAVDA the same day tad
punted an article by N. Petrov sourly pointing out that an
"overtly provocative article" in the Libyan army paper AL-JUNDI
coincided with the delega;iun's official visit.
Text of the communique is not availaule from Moscow, which
released a TASS summary datelined the 8th. The summary
coincides in the main with the "text" broadcast by Tripoli
radio late on the 7th, with the exception of two passages,
juxtaposed in thy: TASS version, which do not appear in the
Libyan version. Also, a variation occurs in the sectioY~ on the
Mediterranean in which TASS says the sides demand the closing
down of all "imperialist" bases in the region while Tripoli
says "military" bases. It is unclear whether the Tripoli
omissions are deliberate or inadvertent. One missing section
is a routine passage on Indochina to which the Libyans presumably
would voice no objections. The other is a watered-down version
of the passage in the recent Soviet-Iraqi communique condemning
anticommunism and anti-Sovietism aimed at undermining Arab
solidarity and Arab-Soviet cooperation. This had been reduced
in the subsequent Soviet-Syrian communique to a ref erence to
the USSR and the socialist countries as the natural and sincere
friends of the Arabs and the importance of bolstering this
friendship and cooperation. Now TASS' version of the Soviet-
Libyan communique Bays the sides note the "great importance of
* Jallud arrived in Bucharest on the 5th for an official visit;
Libyan media had said the visit was expected to start on the 2nd,
but later reported that his departure from Moscow had been postponed.
It is conceivable that release of the communique was delayed until
the arrival in Libya on the 6th of delegation member al-Kharrubi,
who left Moscow on the 4th and stopped off in Cairo en route home,
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDL
8 MARCH 1972
friendship between the Soviet Union and the progressive Arab
forces" for the struggle against imperialism, colonialism,
and the "Zionist-Israeli aggression."
The Tripoli version Bays that "lengthy to lke" were held by the
delegation--which also included Mayor Mus tafa al-Kharrubi,
assistant chief of staff of the armed forces--with 8rezhnev,
Podgornyy, and Kosygin~ Libyan media reported that the Podgornyy
meeting lasted over five hours and Chat with 8rezhnev over
four hours. Both versions of the communique say the meetings
were held in an atmosphere of "mutual and eretanding and
frankness." Moscow's characterizations of the first meetings
suggest that the atmosphere may have progressively cooled:
Talks on the 24th led by Novikov, vice chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, were held in a "friendly atmosphere,"
:sccordirg to TASS, which said that the luncheon hosted by
Novikov on the 25th was "warm and friendly." The Kosygin
meeting on the 24th and Chat with Podgornyy on the 28th
were also described as friendly, but there was no characterization
of the conversation witt- 8rezhnev cn the 2d~
According to the Tripoli version of Che communique, the Libyan
side explained the "revolutionary measures" taken in Libya
since the 1 September 1969 revolution, and the Soviet aide
merely expressed support for Libya's "firm stand" regarding the
oil companies. Noting the opportunities for developing Libyan-
Soviet relations in the political, economic, cultural, technical,
trade "and other" fields, the communique says that an economic
and technical cooperation agreement was signed by the sides.
While a Tripoli radio report on the 4th gave no details in
announcing the signing of the agreement, TASS that day said it
provides for cooperation in prospecting, extracting and refining
oil, developing power generation and other branches of Libya's
econcmy, as well as prospecting for mineral deposits and gas,
and training Libyan national cadres.
The communique's passage on the Middle East routinely assails
the "Israeli Zionist egression" backed by imperialism and
condemns U.S. support for Israel, as well as denouncing Israel's
"expansionist" policy and actions in the occupied territories.
Given Libya's hardline position on the problem, there ie no
reference to Security Council Resolution 243 or to methods of
solving the issue. Moscow's standard formulation on the Paies-
tiniane is ropeated in the sides' express ion of support for the
Palestinian peoFle's struggle to "regain their lawful rights."
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8 MARCII l 9 7 2
In conclusion, the communique notes the acceptance of ~n
invitation from the Libyan Revolution Command Counc?l to
8rezhnev, Podgornyy, and Koe~-gin to pay official visits to
Libya, the dates of which will be fixed later,
JALLUD REMARKS IN Moscow's Arabic-language sarvice gave
ARABIC BROADCA.iTS somewhat more attention to the visit Chan
other media, reporting Jallud's arrival
remarks on the 23d, broadcasting a short commentary pegged to
the visit on the 24th, a..d carrying an interview with Jallud
on 4 and 6 March. In his arrival remarks, Jallud said the aim
of "this first contact" was to strengthen bilateral relations
in political and economic fields. The delegation, he said,
was looking forward to "political, economic, and military
results" and wanted to discuss all issues on which "we would
like to cooperate with the Soviet Union as a friend "
In the interview broadcast on 4 March Jallud described Soviet-
Libyan relations as those between "progressive revolutions."
Remarking that the Soviet Union had worked to strengthen Arab
combat capability and economic capacity, he added that "we
believe the Soviet Union ie capable of doing a lot more for
raising the combat capability" of the Arab worldo* In what
was apparently part of the same interview, broadcast on the 6th,
Jallud declared that the Moscow talks were "frank, clear and
usE~ul" and achieved "practical results" which "will become
known shortly."
In the only available account of the luncheon speeches on 25
February, as reported by the LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY (LNA), Jallud
said the deiegat~on came to explain Libya's views on world
problems and "how we think at~d acts" He added that all the
officials with whom the delegation had met were in agreement
with the Libyans "on certain viewpointso" As for the Middle
East problem, Jallud noted that the T,ibyan view was "quite
different from the opinions of many progressive forces" in
the world and also among the Arabs, and he declared that the
dispute "has gone beyond a peaceful settlement "
* Belgrade's TANJUG, in a dispatch from Beirut on the 6th,
noted "rumors in diplomatic circles" that agreement was reached
in Moscow on the sale of modern weapons to Libya, especially
MIG-23 aircraft. It cited the Beirut paper AN-NAHAR as
saying that Egyptian military experts accompanied the Libyan
delegation to Moscow, and that Libya may have put up the cash
for weapons which in the end will go to Egyptian troops.
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8 MARCH 1972
PRAVDA In a 5 March PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS,
ARTICLE N.. Petrov criticized the Libyan newspaper AL-JUNDI
for "swallowing anti-Soviet bait" of imperialist
propaganda by alleging that after the June 1967 war U~~S.
President Johnson and the Soviet premier "reached agreement
to maintain the Middle Eaet in a state of 'no war, no peace'
advantageous for the Soviet Union." AL-JUNDI, Petrov complained,
has "gone too far in this case." Petrov added that without
batting an eyelid the paper went on to say that "the nature
of Soviet??4rab relations is to keep 'the Arab world constantly
dependent on the USSR,' and so on and so forth." Anyone
pondering the paper's "fabrications" would legitimately ask if
this were not an inetanc slightly concealed designs by Chose
who want to restore imperialist colonial rule in the Arab East,
Petrov said.
Petrov called it noteworthy that the publication of this "overtly
provocative article" coincided with the Libyan delegation's
official visit to Moscow, and con^:luded that there are persons,
"even within Libya itself," who are out to drive a wedge of
mistrust between Libya and the Soviet Union.
While PRAVDA chose to chide the Libyans by singying out the
article in the army paper, Moscow may also have been indirectly
responding to Libyan criticism of the projected Soviet-Iraqi
treaty. A warning to Iraq against the dangers of concluding
such a treaty was issued by Libya on the 23d, as Jallud arrived
in Moscow. Subsequently, Tripoli radio on the 29th reported
that Prime Minister al-Qadhdhafi had refused to receive the
Iraqi ambassador to Cairo who had been sent to Libya to
explain Iraq's views on the treaty. Baghdad's ATH-THAWRAH,
in turn, said on 3 March that Iraq "normally does not explain
what it agrees on with its friends" except to the masses,
the Arab nation, and "to nationalist brothers and friends who
are not influenced by imperialist and suspect circles "
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8 MARCH 1972
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS
USSR PRESSES STOCK MEASURE~~ BROACHES ISSUE OF PRC ATTEND~WCE
In the pattern of its propaganda treatment of recent sessions of
the 26-nation Geneva disarmament conference, Moscow has devoted
negligible attention to the resumption of the talks on 29
February. In hie remarks at the opening ses3lon, chief Soviet
delegate Roshchin drew from the stock of familiar partial measures
in listing issues to be dealt with at the negotiations. As
reported by TASS, he said that a complete ban on chemical weapons
should get "priority attention," and he went on to note that other
agenda items are the banning of all nuclear tests, including
underground tests, further demilitarization of the seabed,
"measures toward nuclear disarmament," and prohibition of the use
of nuclear weapons. Roshchin concluded by reca111ng the Soviet
proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference and
appealing to the Geneva participants to contribute to the
preparations for such a gathering.
PRC, FRENCH Routine-level S~~viat propaganda included a
ATTENDANCE forsign-language commentary on 1 March by
Shalygin which was notable for an acknowledgment
that UN Secretary General Waldheim, in his remarks at the opening
session on the 29th, "stressed the significance of the participa-
tion of all nuclear states, including France and the PRC, in
disarmament talks." The TASS account of the 29 February session
had ignored both Waldheim's remarks and those of Mexican delegate
Robles, who was quoted in Western .news rp*orts as urging Chinese
participation and abandonment of the present situation in which
the United States and the USSR serve as pormarent cochairmen of
the conference.
Without mentioning the Geneva talks, a TASS commentary by Vasily
Kharkov on 3 March deplored the absence of any reference to
disarmament in the U.S.-PRC communique following President
Nixon's visit to China. The failure to treat this issue, the
commentary saia, "shows with fresh force Peking's reluctance to
participate in carbi?:g the arms race." Like other propaganda
since last summer, the commentary took tha Chinese to task for
their position on the Soviet proposals for a conference of the
five nuclear powers and for a world disarmament conference.
Moscow ~s on record over the years as endorsing Chinese
participation in disarmament negotiations. As recently as last
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0 MARCH 1972
December, Roshchin stated before the UN General Assembly's First
Committee Chat "any disarmament talkb should involve X11 nuclear
powers as well as all states with considerable military strength."
As reported by TASS, he did not mention the Geneva talks
specifically. Soviet media have routinely taken note of the
continuing French boycott of the conference since 1962 but have
given it no special play.
UPDERGROUND In his review of the Geneva conference agenda,
TEST BAN Shalygin mentioned Roshchin's stress on a ban on
chemical weapons as a priority issue and hie
appeal to the conferees to contribute to the preparations for a
world disarmament conclave. Shalygin also characterized a
comprehensive test ban as an "important question" at the talks,
rest~ting Moscow's long-held view that control over underground
tests must be by "national means."
Recent Soviet comment on the underground teat issue has been cast
largely in the pattern of the Shalygin commentary, calling for a
comprehensive ban based on national means of control. But an
article by Yu. Tomilin in the second issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA
ZHIZN for 1972 (signed to the press on 21 January) discussed the
problem in unusual detail. Belaboring U.S. reluctance to sign
a comprehensive test-ban accord and criticizing such partial
solutions as the British and Canadian proposal allowing underground
tests below a designated threshold, Tomilin endorsed Egypt's
August 1965 proposal to prohibit underground testa above a
magnitude of 4.75 on the Richter scale and place a moratorium on
tests below this threshold. Soviet spokesmen at Geneva and
elsewhere supported this proposal through 1966, but it has since
been largely ignored in Moscow media..
The Tomilin article was also noteworthy for a discussion of the
question of peaceful nuclear explosions. It stated that a ban
on testa "must not put an obstacle in the path of the use of the
power from nuclear explosions for peaceful, constructive purposes,"
and it recalled that U.S. and Soviet delegations had met three
times since 1969 to exchange opinions on the matter of peaceful
nuclear explosions. The three meetings--in April 1969, February
1970, and July 1971--were briefly reported by TASS at the time
but otherwise were given no Soviet publicity.
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PRC A[Vll BR I TA I N
PEKING SHOWS MORE FAVORABLE VIEW OF BRITISH MILITARY POLICY
Reflecting Peking's portrayal of Britain's international posture
as shif ting from the subservient "special relationship" with
Washington toward closer unity with other Weat European states
against Soviet and American dominance, NCNA's annual review of
the British Government's defense policy white paper was notably
more favorable in tone this year than the hostile comment that
characterized Chinese coverage of this subject in recent years.
In an 18 February NCNA account, the Chinese softpedaled past
charges accusing Britain of attempting to solidify colonial and
oppressive military policies against China's friends abroad.
Instead, discussing this year's white paper against the back-
ground of Britain's accession to the Common Market and its
moves toward enhancing West European unity "to counter superpower
control and intervention," NCNA played up current British
efforts to promote closer political and def erase relations among
West European nations.
In a sharp departure from the hostility previously voiced by
Peking toward Britain's membership in the NATO alliance, the
NCNA account avoided critical comment while highlighting
recommendations from the defense report calling for the
development of a stronger and more integrated military role by
the European members of the alliance. NCNA downplayed Peking's
past criticism of the U.S. role on the continent but took
special note of the white paper's call for continued military
vigilance in Weat Europe in response to "the unscrupulous arms
expansion by a certain superpower"-~tneaning the USSR.
In drawing a connection between growing economic relations among
the West European nations and the prospect for strengthening
military ties, NCNA cited the British report's praise for
progress made in recent bilateral talks on defense and point
research in arms production among West European states. The
a:count also cited the white paper's warning that more
extensive cooperation is necessary to insure that Europe's
security needs will continue to be met.
Concerning British military activities in Asia, NCNA muff led
attacks made in past years against London's efforts to retain
a military presence in the Indian Ocean and other areas east
CONFI~~~I
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of the Suez. Reporting on British military arrangements in
largely matter-of-fact terms, NCNA made a point of noting the
white paper's ~ustif ication Chat continued British military
efforts in such areas as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean
are needed because of the "potential threat" posed by Soviet
expansion. NCNA also noted the white paper's assertions that
Britain will maintain troops east of Suez to strengthen the
five-power defense arrangement in Southeast Asia and that a
continuing British maritime presence in the Indian Ocean helps
to maintain vigilance in Chat strategic area. Though NCriA
interpreted these moves ae an attempt to maintain Britain's
"remnant coloni.r~1 interests abroad" at a time of "rapid develop-
ment of the people's revolutionary struggles" in the third
world, the notably less polemical discussion of British
military plans suggests that Peking may be less eager than
before to insist on a rapid British withdrawal from areas where
the Soviets have been asserting their presence.
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USSR-ROMANIA
BUCHAREST PLIES INDEPENDENT COURSE: MOSCOW CALLS FOR UNITY
The discord between the Soviet Union and Romania over the permissible
limits of Bucharest's independent foreign policy seems to have
resurfaced. According to AGERPRES, Ceausescu received Soviet
Ambassador Drozdenko "at the letter's request" on 6 March for
talks that passed in a "comradely atmosphere"--a euphemism
suggestive of substantive differences. The talks came ?gainst
the background of reports on 1 March in the Western press, kept
out of Romanian media, that Romania has made the first formal
approach to the ~onnr.~n Market from a Soviet bloc country--in a
letter requesting inc~.uaion among the less developed countries
that are permitted to export some manufactured goods to Common
Market countries without paying duty. The Soviet-Romanian talks
also came against the backdrop of Romania's warm public praise
for the "positive" value of the President's trip to Peking.*
In an apparently related development, Podgorn~y used the occasion
of a ceremony in which he received the new ambassador from Romania
on 29 February to discourse pointedly on the need for "socialist
unity." According to the PRAVDA account of his remarks, Podgornyy
cited the need for "coordinated action" by the socialist states
"to frustrate imperialism's aggressive plans." He also stressed,
PRAVDA said, the need "for further extensive improvement of
political and economic cooperation within the framework of the
Warsaw Pact organization and CEMA" and declared that "the
implementation of the comprehensive program for ~.~ciallat economic
integration is particularly important in this respect."
Judging by the PRAVDA account, Romanian Ambassador Badrus made no
reciprocal bow toward economic "integration" or the need for a
"coordinated" foreign policy. He limited himself to a pledge of
Romanian willingness f~?r further "cooperation" with the Soviet
Union and to praise of Soviet foreign policy as "a prominent
f-actor" in the strengthening of world socialism and the pursuit
of peace .
* See the TRENDS of 24 February, page 16, and 1 March, page L0, for
summaries of Bucharest's reaction to the trip.
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Renewed Soviet unease over Romania's maverick behavior seemed
reflected in an attack on "nationalist trends in socialist
countries" by Bulgarian parry chief Todor Zhivkov, a nromine,.t
proxy spokesman for Moscow. The article appeared in issue
No. 3 of PRpBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM and was reprinted in
the Bulgarian party daily RABOTNZCHESKO DELO on l March.
Arguing that one's attitude toward the Soviet Union is the
"touchstone of proletarian internationalism," Zhivkov said
"it ie no secret to anyone that grave nationalistic trends
existed and still exist in some socialist countries--trends which
not oni; provide favorable ground for the flourishing of right
and leftwing revisionism and endanger the socialist victories
of the working people and the socialist development of these
countries, but also evolve into anti-Sovietism and undermine the
unity and cohesion rt the world socialist system." Zn language
even more pointedly aimed at Romania, Zhivkov added that "attempts
are being made within the world communist movement, under the
cover of the correct thesis regarding the autonomy and equal
rights of communist parties, to deprive proletarian internationalism
of its content and meaning."
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i~;~SR
COLLUSION CHARGED BETWEEN UKRAINE NATIONALISTS AND PEKING
Ukrainian newspaper. articles released at the time of President
Nixon's visit to China have accused Ukrainian nationalists
residing in Western countries of forming a "dirty alliance"
with the PRC. ArCicle~ '~ RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 26 February and
RABOCWAYA GAZETA on 27 February have alleged that the Ukrainian
emigres desire a war betwea:n the USSR and China, in the hope
that Soviet military efforts would be "disrupted" by non-Russians
in the USSR, whose disintegration would thereby be assisted.
The Ukrainian nationalists and Peking as well were charged with
quite specific activities to this end. RADYANSKA UKRAINA claimed
that the Ukrainian emigre groups initiated the contacts by
sending their anti-Soviet papers, books, and pamphlets to "all
known addresses of state and public establishments" in China,
"in hopes that the Chinese leaders would use these materials in
fanning anti-Soviet hysteria." The C:iinese, it was alleged,
responded by buying up "a large quantity of anti-Soviet bourgeois
nar_ionalist literature" in Munich during 1970 and by conducting
"special" negotiations with representatives of a Ukrainian
nationalist group "on point anti-Soviet action." In October
1971 a Ukrainian emigre leader allegedly traveled to Peking
for the purpose of "establishing direct ties with those circles
in the PRC Which specialize in anti-Soviet subversive acts."
Citing the Western press, the article also asserted that, in
addition to broadcasts by Radio Peking, China is publishing a
special bulletin in Ukrainian containing "provocative appeals
to the Ukrainian people."
The parallel RABOCHAYA GAZETA article added other accusations.
It said that Ukrainian nationalists are seeking to establish
contacts with Chinese officials at the United Nations, trying
to set up "direct personal contacts with Maoists in order to
organize 'Ukrainian' radio broadcasts from China and other
anti-Soviet actions," and scheming to persuade China to make
Ukrainian independence "one of the key slogans" in the Chinese-
Soviet conflict.
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Ukrainian emigres did take an interest i.n China following Peking's
attacks on the USSR's nationality po11c~ and reports of China's
support for national communist circles i.n the Ukraine. A
December 1971 article in the Ukrainian emigre journal SUCHASNIST
indicates, however., that Ukrainian emigres remain divided on the
propriety of cooperating with China.
M~IAVANADZE PROTEGE A,,"iTACKED BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
A recent CPSU Central Committee decree criticizing the Tbilisi
city party committee for a wide range of shortcomings comes close
to being a public rebuke for Georgian First Secretary and
Politburo candidate member Vaeiliy Mzhavanadze. Although the
direct target of the decree is the Tbilisi city first secretary,
Otar Lolashvili, Mzhavanadze is clearly involved: the Tbilisi
organization is by far the largest in Georgia and certainly
comes under Mzhavanadze's close supervision, and Lolashvili
himself has worked directly with Mzhavanadze for the last 10
years. Mzhavanadze selected the 38-year old Lolashvili to
head the Georgian Central Committee's administrative organs
section in 1962. He quickly moved up to the post of Tbilisi
aecorad secretary in October 1963 ~+.nd to first secretary in
April 1965, also becoming a candidate member of the Georgian
Central Committee bureau in 1966 and a full member in 1971.
In February or early March of this year Lolashvili was called
to the CPSU Central Committee to report on his city committee's
work. Now a Central Committee decree published on 6 March
condemns his organization for shortcomings in organizational
and ideological work, in industry, construction, and trade,
and in the struggle against embezzlement. The decree lectures
the Georgians on the need to improve ideological education, the
quality of party members, and the observance of party norms,
as well as on the necessity of eliminating "liberalism" in
cadre work.
Such criticism must be a bitter pill for Mzhavanadze, who has
long stressed the themes of discipline, ideological purity,
and careful screening of prospective new party members.
Mzhavanadze's coolness toward Brezhnev has often been evident
in his speeches in recent years, and he appeared to suffer a
setback at the party congress in 1971 when despite his seniority
he was listed last among candidate members by Brezhnev.
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CWINA If~TERNAL AFFAIRS
CIVIL POLICE FORr,ES ATTRACT SOMIE FAVORABLE PIBLICITY
PRC media have recently carried a few unusual items of a public-
relations nature on tine police forces--few in number, but the
first of their kind for sometime. NCNA transmitted domestically
on 24 February reports on good deeds of the Peking police in
searching for missing family members, returning lost property,
and rescuing children from drowning. On 3 Mach, the Chekiang
provincial radio broadcast similar reports on police rescues
and services to ill persons.
The popularization campaign, if it proves to be such, follows
the disengagement of the PLA from public security functions
and presumably is intended to raise the prestige of the civilian
security organs. During the cultural revolution there were few
mentions of the police forces which were often closely associated
with the old order. PLA troops assumed supervision over public
security and for a time were. Assisted by ad hoc groups such as
the various "provost corps" which maintained order under PLA
leadership. The more recent rebuilding of a professional
security force has been accorded little media attentio.~ up to
this time.
A 24 February Tsinghai radio report on a study session held :~y
the provincial security, procuratorial, and judicial departme~:t
delved into more aubstan.ti.?:e issues. The party committee of
the department attacked Such "swindler" theories as "the refection
of party leadership." Now more than ever. 4he committee declared,
it asks for instructions from F.n.d reports to higher levels,
"placing public security wort: under the absolute leadership of
the party." The emphasis on party control seems to be a lightly
veiled attack on the orevi.ous PLA administration.
The Tsinghai report. indicates that. currenC efforts are being aimed
at centralizing control over security policies. Some notice was
paid to basic units and to the principle of democratic centralism,
the report clearly showed that decisions must come from high-
' level party organs. And wh11e the party itself may still call
for open sessions with mass participation, there was no mention
in the Tsinghai report of a mass voice in public security. The
report noted that during the "one blow and three oppositions"
campaign some units tried t.o initiate policies and asked the
provincial organ to do away with certain conventions called for
by the party, but these units were educated to see that party
policies must be followed in all areas.
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