TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 26, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidentisl
~IIIIII!I~~iiuiii~~llllllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
1'12ENDS
in Car,~n~uni~t Pro~a~anda
C~nfirdenti~l
26 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, N0. 4)
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Thla propaganda analysis repurt is bused ex-
cluelvoly on mnterlal carried In communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIB without coordlnntlon wtth other U.B.
t3overnment components.
'JVARNINC3
Thla document contains intormntlon aRectlna
the national detenae of the United States,
within the menning of Title 18, sections 703
and 701, of the U8 Code, as amended. Its
trnnamlaalon or revelRti~n of 1ta contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person Upro-
hfblted by law
--C:Ou?-; ----
I.d.~w w.....ww
wA...~..,...
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CUNP'IDEN'i'T.AL 1rDf.4 'i'RI~NDN
26 JANUARY 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Evonts Given Ma;~ot Attention
INDOCHINA
i
DRV Dismissos Prosidont~s Eight-Point Poaco Plan as "Rehash"
1
Moscow Complains President's Plan Set No Withdrbwal Date
3
DRV, PRG Say State of Union Mea~~~tge Shows Presidents Obduracy
4
Paris Talks: GVN Legitimacy Questioned Vietnamization Scored
5
Moscow Echoes DRV in Criticizing Prc+sident's Meseage~ Policy
7
PRC Support of DRV llighlighted by "Supple.nentary" Aid Accord
8
DRV Spokesman Protests DMZo DRV Raids, Plane Downings Hailed
10
Communist Media Hail Military Gains in North, South Laos
11
Thai Actions in Indochina Assailed in Communist Statements
l3
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Rencte to Nixon-Sato Talks, State of Union Message
l5
CHINA
Peking Propaganda Makes a Gesture to Native Taiwanese
19
SOVIET BLOC AND PRC
Soviet Bloc Shnrpene Anti-China Line on Eve of Nixon Trip
21
Moscow Broadcasts to China Seek to Fan Opposition to Trip
23
GROMYKO IN JAPAN
Propaganda Stresses Possibilities for Economic Cooperation
25
Chou En-lei Supports Japanese Stand on Territorial Issue
SOUTH ASIA
26
Soviet Union Announces Recognition of Bangladesh
28
Peking Reports Evacuation of Consular Staf.E from Dacca .
30
GERMANY
CDR Evinces Concern Ovet Itamif ications of Mrn~es Toward Detente .
32
TOPIC IN BRIEF: The President's Remarlce on Weapons Systems .
36
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN THE UKRAINE LEADS
TO N~1 ARRESTS
S 1
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P'OTZ OD'>U',[CZAL U81~ nNZ,Y
I~'1114 'I'RI~~NUh
2(~ JANUARY 1.97'l
'1'UPLCS ANU IVI?N'I'S (I.CVI;N M/:,IUR A'I"L'I~;N'L'IUN 1.7 - c3 ,.fANUAItY Lc)7t
MaHCOw (24A0 .LtemW)
L'c~kank (1..353 :Ltumw)
Indochina
(IA,.) H'%
Uomestl.c 7.NSUey
(4LY)
39Y
[LI.S. Air Ralcls
(GY) 2%J
.Incloch:Lna
(1.H~)
227.
Chinn
(9%) 7%
[Mil.itur.y Actiun
(8X)
9x,J
Ind:Lu-1'alcistan
(3%) 4x
in Laos
I:uropectn Security
(3%) 3X
[PRC I?ore:l.gn Mln.Lstr.y
(--)
3Y]
Middle Lust
(7%) 37~
Statement on Iteloca-
World Zionist
(.l~) ~~
t:Lon o# South VietnameNe
Congress
Gromyko Visit to
(--)l~6
UN Security Council Spec:tal
Session in Africa
(--)
5%
Jupun
1'1sOPLL'S DAILY Rebuttu:L or
USSR's Malik
(--)
3%
Rhodesian 51*untion
(--)
3T
These statlatlca are based on the volcecaat commentary output of tl~e Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" la used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or edltorlai, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage arc
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentl~eaes Indicate volume of comment dering the preceding week.
Toplca and events given mayor attention 1n terms of volume are not always
dlacusaed !n the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may '.,a routine or of minor algnlflcance.
roR ot~c>r~ usE oxi, z
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CONI~',LpI~N'I'IAL 1rISZ5 'I'IZI.NI)5
26 JANUARY 1972
I NDOCW IN11
llanoi reacted to the President' d 25 ,January '.I'V speech with a
dommst:Lc serv~l.co radio commentnry some f ivo hours of tar it was
dmliverod. '.Phis 1.nltin.l eommentnry totully ignorod the President's
disclosuros that theta had bean private negoL?i~rti~ns and that
Presidential advisor Kissinger hnd met with North Vietnnmese
lenders a total of 13 times oinco August 1969. It dismie6ed the
President's oLgl~t-point peace plan as old proposals "put in a
new frame to fool the public." llanol and t:ront comment on tyre
20 January State of the Union message castigntod the President
for pursuing the wur through Vietnnmization instead of responding
to the PRG proposal.
In a departure from its normal practice of promptly covering all
mayor U.S. developments, TA55 has not reported the President's
TV speech. The first available Soviet reaction care at 1900 GMT
on the 26th itt a Moscow domestic service broadcast which, un1 ike
llanoi, repotted Ilia announcement that the U.S. peace plan would
be submitted at the Pa r.te talks on the 27th.
Peking's support for the Vietnamese communist, is currently
highlighted by the announcement of the signia~y on 22 January in
Peking of a protocol on "supplementary" aid to the D1,tV for 1972.
Peking continues its circumspect treatment of the President; the
KCNA report of the State of the Union message as well as other
propaganda remains devoid of personal attacks. Consistent with
it? normal reaction time, Peking has yet to mention the
President's speech of the 25th.
A PRG Government statement stressi,ag the need to destroy the
Vietnemization policy and r,alling for the Sor.rth Vietnamese to
unite, "millions as one," in an uprising to overthrow the Thfeu
administration has been given wide publicity beginning on
25 January. The statement directs its appeal to 10 different
groups--from youths about to be conscripted to main force army
unite--and stresses the "humane and lenient" policies of the PRG.
Publicized at a press conference icy Wanoi on the 25th by Nguyen
Phu Soai, the s~atement was hailed the next day in a NNAN DAN
editorial and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary.
DRV DISMISSES PRESIDENT'S EIGHT-POINT PEACE PLAN AS `REHASH`'
Hanoi reacted promptly to the President's TV speech in a radio
commentary first broadcast at 0500 GMT on 26 January and
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CUNT I:DIuN'C I'AL L~ Ii l8 'I'ltli;NDy
26 ,JANUARY .1972
aubsoquuntl.y rupeutod in other. caste. I~~ntt.tlad "Nixon Sot Forth
A Deca.itfu.l Eight-Point Viatnnn- 1'lnn Dee:ignod to Fool. the 1'ubl.t.c,"
the commentary sa, s a caroiul, analysis of the riroposn.ls 1ndl.rnto
that Washlnpton's baoic stand remu:in~ unchungacl. It argues thaC
the President is sti.1.1 suggaeti.ng n "cond:i.tionnl" w.ithcirnwal--
that is, withdrawing while maintaining "neocol.onia.l.ism through n
puppet regime." 'Phe commentary s?lmilarly ridicules thn not.ton
of elections to be held a month after Thieu's r.eslgnat:ion when
in fact, it days, a caretaker government would be lroaded by
'!'bleu's "henchmen." In standard fashion, it dl.smiseee the
President's proposal f?~r a ceasa-fire throughout I.ndochlna as
aimed at depriving Cho people of the right to self-defense, and
it caste doubt on the eincerlty of hie concern over the fate
of U.S. prisoners, And it repeats the stock line that the
PRG's seven-point proposal is the correct way to end the war
and restore pence.
This Initial reaction is more notable for its omissions than its
content. Thus, it fails to acknowledge any of the President'8
revelations that secret negotiations had been taking place
during the past three and a half years, that the communist
side presented a nice-point proposal privately, that the
eight-point U.S. proposal had been diepatched.pri~~ately but had
gone unanswered, and that Ambassador Porter has been instructed
to introduce the proposal at the Paris session on the 27th.
REACTIONS TO Hanoi had reacted differently to the
PAST DISCLOSI'QES President's disclosure of information about
private contacts with the Vietnamese
communists in hie 3 November 1969 speech on the U.S. vi~tnamization
and withdrawal policy--the speech in which he revealed tha'. there
had been correspondence with No Chi Minh during that summer and
char. there had been 11 private meetings between the two aide:
in Paris. Unlike the current commentary which tot~Iiy :,gnore~
the secret diplomacy aspect, immediate routine llanoi radio
reaction to the 1969 speech said "the Preaid~~nt advanced the idea
of secret contacts aimed at misleading public opinion." and Vi~lA
said that to divert public opinion the President "insinuated"
that private meetings were taking place. Xuan 'I'huy at the Paris
session questioned the President's motives in divulp~na pr~;ate
DRV-U.S. contacts.
A ORV Government statement on the President's 1969 speech begged
the question of his remarks on private contacts, saying only chat
he distorted the truth about the "situation of negotiations with
a view to leading people to believe he has good will." But at
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(.(JN1~:C1)I~1N'I' fAf, l~'IIrS T111;N1)S
2(~ JANUAIt1l 1,172
tho samu tJ,mu that ii~~noi ra~luusod tho Cc-vornmont dtutc+niont, It
broadcast t}?ia texts of th? Pr~naidunt'Fi and llo'w 1i~ttur?.*
MOSC01~1 COMPI~1 I NS PRESIDENT ` S PI~1N SET NO W I ThIDRl1N1AL DATE
Soviet media roacted to the l'rogiclent'c~ 'l5 Januar.y TV epnoc}~
belatedly in Moscow radio's domnatic service brc~adcnet at 1.'00 GMT
on tl~o 26th--the main eveninK nuwo a}u-w. I,ikr, Ilunoi, hl~r Moscow
hroadcast iytnored the President's disclosure of U,S.-1)RV secret
ca~~lks. rut unl.ikc llanoi, 1-, acknow]eciged hf.a announcemenx that
tract U.S. rapresentativn. La to oubmit the U,S, olght-point plan
at tbrri;Cia conference on the 27th.
Moscow complained that the plan Walther contains an exact data f~~r
total U.S, troop withdrawal from South Vietnam nor mentions U.S.
readiness to withdraw armad forma from oeher Indochinese countr.ieb
and to remove air and naval forces. Noting that the President said
Kha United States would never agree to the overt};.row of its "a11,y,"
the broadcast said the speech indicatep shat thr United 5tatas
intends to preserve "a pro-American regf.me" f.n Sielgon although is
maintains that it is peepared to hold new elections them . Moscow
concluded by noting that the President laic: "in essance" that
the United States intends to conduct the Parts ealke "from a
position of strength" and insists on "the unqualtf.ied acceptance"
of its plnn, citing him us ntating that tf the opponent rojeces
the proposal Washington will proceed wtth the Vietnam.tzation
policy.
The notable failure of TASS to carry its normal, prompt news
report of a major speech by the Pteai.dent suggests indecision on
how to react even on a reportorial level, at 'least until Nanoi's
reaction becomes known. It may also be related to tho absence
from Moscow of Bre~hnev and Koeyg!n, who were in Prague for the
Warsaw Pa^t Political Consultative Committee aESSion. The session
issued a Atatement on Indochina--coincidentally carried by TASS
at the same time as the doerestic radio broadcast reporting the
President's speech---which complained that "Washington continues to
bid not on a political but on a military solution of tl-~e problems"
of Indochina. The statement did not mention the President's speech.
+~ For a further discussion of this propaganda, see the TRi;NDS of
13 November 1969, pages 3-5.
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2h JANUARY 1972
DRV, F'RG SAY STATE OF UNION MESSAGE SI~IONIS PRES t DENT ~ S OBDURACY
Hanoi and the Front routinely assail President Ni.xon's remarks
on Indochina in hie State of the Union message ae furth~ar evidence
of hie intention to pursue the war. In addition to routine Hanoi
and Front radio and press agency reaction, there are articles in
the party daily NIIAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on
the 23d which include personally abusive comments on the President.
Ae briefly summarized by H~.noi radio, the arn-y paper says that
while the President wanted to present "a peace facade" in ox?der
to maintain the presidency another term, "no adornment can cover
up his too rotten, horrible face. Nixon continues unswF~rvingly
to show that he is an extremely stubborn and crafty ringleader
ag,gressor." In a similar vein, the N}tAN DAN article says that
tt~e message to C~ngrese mirrored the President's true image:
"After three years in off ice as President, Nixon's nature remains
unchanged. lie remains one of t'ne most anticommunist
reactionaries; he remains one of the most dangerous enemies of
peace, independence, and the freedom of the nation."
The NHAN DAN article as broadcast by }irnoi radio is attributed
to Nguyen Huu Chinh, a specialist on the United States who has
frequently commented on President Nixon--moat recently in a
7 January N}~ DAN article on the President's 2 January TV
interview.* Chinh's latest article contains some of the under-
tones pr.e4ent i.n that on the 7th and, more sharply, in Hanoi's
July-August anti-China polemics in the wake of the announcement
of the Presiatent's Peking visit. The polemical Hanoi comment
last sucranec }lad repeatedly claimed that the Nixon Doctrine was
aimed at splitting the socialist camp. In referring to the
nine foreign policy points as outlined by the President on the
20th, Chinh now claims that they mean, among other things, that
the United States will continue "to provoke and sow discord
among the socialist camp." And in a possible allusicn to the
President's summit diplomacy, Chinh says: "Nixon wants to make
believe that some diplomatic moves could keep him in the oval
office. But now as before in U.S. history, the fate of a
president can never be decided on by sheer diplomatic activities."
Chinh also cepeats the elaborated demands of the PRG proposal
regarding U.S. withdrawal and support of. Thieu--an cr.3 to all
U.S. action in both parts of Vietnam and relinquishment of
* See the TRENDS of 19 January, page 2 and 12 January, pages 3-5.
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26 JANUARY 1972
all commitments to Thieu--which have been spelled out frequently,
both at the Paris talks and by propagandists, since DRV Premier
Phaua Van Dorg presented the elaborated formulation in his
20 November speech in Peking. Chinh prefaced this by saying
that the United States must give up its "111usion" of winning
a military victory--an illusion he claimed to see evidenced
in the Administration's remarks on a U.S. residual force in
South Vietnam and on continued use of U.S. air and naval power
in Indochina.
The earlier, routine-level comment on the President's message,
like the Chinh article, had assailed the President's Vietnamization
policy. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 22d said the President
"boasted" that during his term 87 percent of U.S. forces had been
withdrawn but that he cannot conceal the fact Chat he has spread
and intensified the war throughout Indochina and has accelerated
air strikes against the DRV. A LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY commentary
on the dame day observed that more troops would be withdrawn,
however, "on condition that the U.S. agentr~ i.n Saigon are capable
of defending themselves."
PARIS TALKS; GVN LEGITIMACY (aUESTIONED. VIETNAMI71~+-TION SCORED
At the Paris session on 20 January PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien
focused on the perennial claim that the Saigon government is
merely a U.S. puppet and in no sense can speak for the South
Vietnamese people. In seeming response to Ambassador Porter's
questions on the 13th regarding the PRG, Tien insisted that the
NFLSV and PRG, not the Saigon regime, are the "genuine
representatives" of the South Vietnamese. The VNA account
glosses over Tien'a detailed remarks, including the claims Chat
the "people's revolutionary power has been established in South
Vietnam from top to village levels" and that the growing
international prestige of the NFLSV and PRG is reflected in their
having been recognized by 30 countries. Xuan Thuy in his prepared
statement routinely assailed the Vietnamization policy and echoed
comment on the President's 13 January troop withdrawal. announce-
ment in arguing that the war is still an American one in view
of continued U.S. air and naval as well as monetary support.
PRG PROPOSAL, In routinely pressing the PRG proposal, Tien
NY TIMES QUERIES said that to end the war and bring home U.S.
servicemen, including POW's, the Nixon
Administration should "negotiate: seriously with the genuine
representatives of the South Vietnamese people at the conference."
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26 JANUARY 1972
And he said again that in addition to a speedy troop withdrawal,
the Nixon Administration "must renounce the Thieu ruling group
so that the South Vietnamese may decide themselves on their own
affairs and future."
The line Chat the PRG proposal is the road Coward a Vietnam
settlement was also reiterated in the response to the New York
TIMES' A.M. Rosenthal from Ngo Dien, head of the preen deparr!nent
of the DRV Foreign Ministry. VNA's English-language transmission
on 25 January carried the text of Dien's response, in which he
said the answers to RosenthaJ.'s questions could be found in the
proposal.* VNA did not transmit the text of Rosenthal's
questions, instead stating: "After President Nixon's 2 January
TV interview at which he made ambiguous remarks on que Lions of
U.S. troop withdrawal anti of the South Vietnamese people's right
of self-determination," Rosenthal sent a number of questions to
Pharr Van Dong "asking him to clarify several points relating
to the aforesaid problems."
ALLIED SPEECHES, The VNA account of the 20 January session,
POW ISSUE like the account of the one on the 13th, says
that "the U.S. delegate again played the trick
of allowing the Saigon delegate to speak for the U.S. side" and
that it "resorted to the POW issue to elude the responsibility
of an aggressor in the settlement of the basic problems raised
in the PRG's seven-point plan."
Hanoi says nothing about Ambassador Porter's absence from the
session and the fait that his deputy, Heyward Isham, pressed tbr:
communists for inr:ormation on U.S. prisoners who are known
to have been downed alive inside North Vietnam but whose names
do not appear on Hanoi's prisoner list. (A brief TASS item on
the session, however, said: "The Unified States continues
sabotaging the Paris conference. The U.S. delegation head,
Porter, walked out of the conference and left for the United
States on 'private business. "')
A TASS item on the 21st reports that DRV Paris spokesman Nguyen
Thanh Le in remarks to reporters criticized the U.S. and Saigon
representatives' remarks at the post-session briefing on the 20th
* VNA's service channel from Hanoi to Paris carried the text of
both Rosei:thal's questions and Dien's response on 15 January.
See the TRENDS of 19 January, page 4.
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CONFZDTrNTIAL F13ZS 'TRENDS
26 JANUARY 1972
in which they "stressed the prisoner issue but sa.d nothing about
the PRG's peace plan." TASS quotes Le ae saying "we not only
inform the American government of all the captured American
pilots but, proceeding from the principles of humaneness permit
them to maintain ties with their families, to maintain
correspondence and to have visitors." Le made no such remarks
in his regular post-session briefing. No other reference to
these remarks has been monitored, and the circumstances under
which Le met the reporters are not known.
0
In another development concerning U.S. prisoners in North
Vietnam, VNA on 22 January publicized a communique .issued that
day by the Hanoi post office under the DRV General Department
of Post and i'elecommunications. Ln addition to reporting the
acceptance of 300 parcels for prisoners named in l~lsnoi's
December 1970 list, the communique notes that Hanoi has
rejected another 407 parcels, "sent to addressees who are not
on the above-mentioned list of U.S. pilots captured in North
Vietnam," and returned the parcels to the senders.
MOSCOW ECHOES DRV IN CRITICIZING PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. POLICY
Moscow radio and press comment on the State of the Union message
echoes Hanoi and the Front in assailing the President for his
Vietnamization policy and alleged prolongation of the war.
A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article or.~ the 23d observes that while
the President proclaims his wisLtfor a political settlement
he continues to bomb the DRV--thus "undermining both hie
personal prestige and the tattered prestige of the country he
represents."
ELABORATION OF A Moscow radio domestic service commentary
PRG PROPOSAL on the 24th contrasts the President's
expression of hope that the conflict could
be ended by talks with U.S. "obstruction" of the Paris talks
and alleged failure to seriously discuss the PRG's seven-point
? proposal. A PRAVDA article by Mayevsl~iy on the 19th--the day
before the President delivered his message--atypically spelled
out the elaboration of the PRG proposal, which includes the
? explicit demand that the United States must stop all military
action in both North and South Vietnam and end all support of
the Thieu regime.
Mayevskiy may have described the proposal in detail because
of the special circumstances: lIe was in Paris to attend a
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26 JANUARY 1972
preliminary session for the World Assembly for Peace to be held
in Versailles from 1L to l3 February, and in the article he
recounted a discussion he had with the DRV and PRG delegates to
the Faris talks, Xuan Thuy and Nguyen Van Thieu. Mayevskiy
presumabl;~ was also concerned to score points against Peking in
supporting the Vietnamese. He seemed to obliquely allude to
President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking when he accused the
President of seeking a solution to the Vietnam problem not in
Paris, but "elsewhere." The article was summarized in Moscow
broadcasts in a number of foreign languages, including Vietnamese.
PRC ?UPPORT OF DRV HIGHLIGHTED BY 'SUPPLEMENTARY" AID ACCORD
Peking's effort to reassure the Vietnamese communists of continuing
support has bean highlighted by a new military and economic aid
agreement. t?;CNA announced on 22 January that a protocol signed
in Peking that day calls for a "supplementary gratuitous supply
of military equipment and econamic materials by China to Vietnam
for 1972." Coming a month bef ore President Nixon's visit to the
PRC, the signing of the protocol follows in the wake of a
"supplemen~ary" aid agreement between Moscow and Hanoi signed on
29 December..
Apart from the usual annual aid accords between the PRC and the
DRV, the most recent of which was signed by Li Hsien-mien when
he visited Hanoi in September 1971, Peking has signed three
previous supplementary aid agreements with Hanoi. The last
previous one was signed on 4 July 1971, coinciding with the
publication of. strong Chinese editorial support for the PRG's
seven-point peace proposal. The first two supplementary
agreements were signed on 25 May 1970 and 15 February 1971 at the
time of the incursions into Cambodia and Laos, respectively.
The current protocol was signed by Chang Tsai-Chien, a PLA deputy
chief of staff, and by the DRV ambassador. The previous
agreements had been signed by visiting DRV officials, but the
lower level of representation is consistent with the signing of
last month's Soviet-DRV agreement by the DRV charge d'affaires
in Moscow. The Peking ceremony was a+aended by Yeh Chien-ying,
vice chairman of the party's Military Commission, who took the
place occupied last July by the purged PLA Chief of Staff Huang
Yung-sheng. VNA's report of the signing ceremony, but not
NCNA's, cites Yeh as hailing the "brilliant victories" achieved
at the beginning of the dry season by the Vietnamese, Laotian,
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CUN1P.1:1)IN`I'IAi, PIlZS '1'Ri~Ni)8
z~ JnNUnR~ 1972
and Carnbddlan paoplow and as expressing Chinoeo datorminntion
to support the Vi?tnnmose peopl? until "final. victory."
debar Peking support for the Vi,etnamase has taken the form of a
21 Januar~~ PRC Foreign Ministry etatomcnt--in support of 1?ho
PRG Foti~+.Lgn Ministry ?tatement of the 17th--condemning "U.S.
impa+cialism and the Nguyen Van Thieu clique" for the relocation
of inhabitants of northern provinces of South Vietnam to
"concentration camps" farther south. The PRC statement,
charging that the "ruthless" U.S. policy of pacification reveals
the "savage and cruel nature of the U.S. aggressors," demands
that the "U.3. Govornmerrt" Atop its persecution of the South
Vi?tnamese people, end VietnamizaCion, withdraw from S~~uth
Vietnam, and stop suppor,~ting the "puppet" rebimes ir. Indochina.
But it does not censure the "Nixon Administratio