TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 ,Doc /
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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
'SERVICE
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
5 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 1)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusliely on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . : . . . . . .
1
DRV, PRG Score President's TV Interview as "Brazen, Insolent" .
1
TASS Report Notes President Intends To Raise POW Issue in PRC .
5
DRV Claims 24 Planes, 7 POWs During Late December Bombing. . .
6
Hanoi Hails "Proper Execution" of VPA Order on Vigilance.
8
PRG, NFLSV Denounce Strikes Against DRV, Warn of "Punishment" .
11
USSR Government Statement Scores Bombing; Aid Accord. Signed . .
13
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator Echoes Foreign Ministry on Bombing..
16
Year-End Reviews Optimistic on Struggle in. South Vietnam . . .
18
SINO-SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS
Sino-Soviet Troubles Mark Onset of Year of Nixon Visits . . . .
21
Peking Sees Regrouping of Forces in International Community . .
22
Moscow Warns of "Major Political Deals" Between PRC, U.S. . . .
14
AFRICA
Soviet Propaganda on Rhodesia Includes Anti-Peking Barbs . . .
27
PRC-JAPAN
Peking Reiterates Its Claim to Sovereignty. Over Senkakus . . .
29
CHINA
Joint Editorial at New Year Skirts Leadership Issue . . . . . .
30
PRC Claims Record Harvest, Ten Percent Industrial Gain . . . .
31
Hunan Holds Second Party Plenum, First Province to Do So . . .
33
Moscow Sees U.S. Phantom Decision as Threatening Peace
34
35
YUGOSLAVIA
Foreign Currency Issue Resolved, Tito Crackcuwn Continues . . .
39
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Belated Publication of Stalin-Era History Announced . . . . . .
42
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 DECEMBER 1971-2 JANUARY 1972
Moscow (2976 items)
Peking (1472 items)
Indochina
(9%)
14%
Domestic Issues
(36%)
35%
[U.S. Air Raids
(--)
13%]
Indian-Pakistani
(21%)
19%
Podgornyy New Year's
(--)
9%
Conflict
Greetings to
[Chinese Protests
(1%)
5%]
Soviet People
Indochina
(21%)
14%
China
(5%)
6%*
[U.S. Air Raids
(3%)
7%]
Cuban Revolution
(0.1%)
5%
New Year's Joint
(--)
5%
Anniversary
Cuban President
(5%)
5%
Editorial
Japanese Claim to
(--)
4%
Dorticos in USSR
Chilean CP Anni-
Senkakus
Iraqi Government
(1%)
47
versary
Delegation in PRC
Indian-Pakistani
(5%)
3%*
PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial (--) 4%
Conflict
on UNGA Session
Mars 2 & 3 Probes
(3%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
z.:ent or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figm,.,s in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other eases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* The China figure excludes commotaries on China's role in the
Indian-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the
figure on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly one-half of the total
on the conflict last week and two-thirds this week.
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INDOCHINA
The heavy, continuous U.S. air strikes against the DRV from
26 through 30 December prompted daily protests from the DRV Foreign
Ministry, with ministry statements on the 26th and 29th and lower-
level routine protests by the ministry spokesman on the other three
days. Hanoi claims the Administration had to announce the end of
the five-day bombing because it was "being defeated militarily and
politically." But at the same time propagandists point to U.S.
threats of more bombing and call for continued implementation of
the 28 December VPA High Command order on vigilance. President
Nixon's 2 January TV interview is assailed as the latest evidence
of U.S. intent to continue the strikes. Hanoi's reaction is
typified by a 4 January editorial in the party daily NHAN DAN
which asked how Nixon could be so naive as to hope to win by
following in the footsteps of his predecessor, whose air war
against the DRV was defeated.
Moscow's official protest on the air strikes was not issued until
30 December, but it came in the form of a government statement
rather than at the foreign ministry level at which Peking as
well as Hanoi had protested. On the same day Moscow also reported
the signing of an agreement on "additional" Soviet assistance to
the DRV. The government statement was couched in relatively mild
terms, and it may have been issued at the high level to suggest
greater support than had come from Peking. Moscow continues to
link the U.S. air strikes with Peking's "rapprochement" with the
United States. And a TASS report of the President's TV interview
pointedly notes his remark that the POW issue would be raised
during his PRC visit.
Peking's only substantial comment on the air strikes following
the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement is a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article on the 31st which, like the statement,
avoids personal criticism of the President. Peking media have
not yet mentioned his TV interview. A Chinese speaker at a
4 January ceremony opening a Vietnamese art exhibition made a
passing reference to the strikes. But Li Hsien-nien did not
mention them in a speech at a banquet on the 29th for a visiting
Iraqi delegation.
DRV, PRG SCORE PRESIDENT'S TV INTERVIEW AS "BRAZEN. INSOLENT"
The Vietnamese communists reacted promptly to the President's
2 January radio-TV interview with CBS correspondent Dan Rather,
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with statements by both the PRG and DRV spokesmen in Paris and
routine Hanoi radio and Front media comment. There has as yet
been no such authoritative propaganda as a NHAN DAN Commentator
article, the standard Hanoi vehicle for reacting to major
Presidential announcements.
The first monitored reaction came in a Hanoi radio commentary
early on the 4th--some 24 hours after the interview. Although
the statements in Paris were transmitted to Hanoi on VNA's
service channel on the 3d, they were not carried in DRV and
Front media until after the Hanoi radio commentary had been
repeated several times on the 4th. The statements did not
deal with the details of the President's interview in
declaring--in the words of the DRV spokesman--that
his remarks again demonstrated that the Nixon policy is one of
prolonging the war in South Vietnam, expanding it to all of
Indochina, threatening the sovereignty and security of the
DRV, refusing to negotiate seriously at Paris, and continuing
to oppose the PRG's seven-point proposal.
The initial Hanoi radio commentary said that "Nixon brazenly
said he had personally ordered the bombing raids against North
Vietnam," and it took issue with his justification of the
"acts of war" by repeating the "old, groundless allegation"
that North Vietnam has violated the understanding which led
to the bombing halt in 1968. The commentary countered this
"sheer falsehood" by saying it was the United States which
had "brazenly violated" its commitment to halt the bombing
totally and unconditionally. As documentation of its claim,
it observed that former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford had
said that he did not understand the reasons given by the Nixon
Administration to justify the recent bombing raids. Without
explicitly mentioning the bombing halt, the DRV Paris spokesman
had cryptically said that the President in his interview "once
again made unreasonable and deceitful allegations and repeated
the absurd history of the so-called 'secret understandings,'
which have been resolutely rejected by us and condemned by world
public opinion . . . ." This ambiguity accords with other
comment on the recent air strikes.
A 4 January NHAN DAN editorial rounding up the Moscow and Peking
and other communist and worldwide condemnations of the air
strikes included a passage on the President's interview. As
broadcast by Hanoi radio--some five hours after the initial
commentary on the President--the editorial said that "everyone"
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has pointed out that the air strikes again proved, among other
things, that the Nixon Doctrine has gone bankrupt, and that
"public opinion has also exposed Nixon's boasts that the war
is going to end and that the United States is gradually
withdrawing from Vietnam." Claiming that the President had
been "seriously upset" by his "serious" military defeats in
the air strikes and worldwide protests, the editorial said
that in his interview "Nixon sought by every means to defend
his crimes while continuing to make insolent threats . . . .
How can people believe in his arguments about 'self-protective
reaction?"' The editorial went on to attribute to the "U.S.
Government," rather than the President, a series of arguments
to justify the strikes--"self-protective reaction, measures
aimed at protecting the lives of U.S. troops and cutting off
supplies and preventing losses in Laos, and action taken
because U.S. POWs have not been released." Insisting that the
real motive behind the President's move was to salvage something
from his "heavy, basic defeats" throughout Indochina, the
editorial labeled U.S. arguments as "inconsistent and illogical"
and "smelling of banditry."
POW ISSUE Initial comment on the 4th and 5th assails the
President's justification of the air strikes so
long as American prisoners are held by the communists. But
propagandists skirt the exchange in which the President asserted
that in Paris "the communists had totally rejected" the notion
of a prisoner release if the United States set a deadline for
withdrawal. The only known reference in available Vietnamese
communist propaganda is in two VNA English-language news items
on the 5th which quote Senator McGovern's contradiction of the
President's remarks. These VNA items have not been repeated
for domestic Vietnamese audiences to date. VNA says without
comment:
Senator George McGovern said in a television
interview Monday that President Nixon had
deceived the American people with his statement
that his idea of releasing captured U.S.
armymen in return for a declared deadline for
American withdrawal from Southeast Asia was
rejected by North Vietnam negotiators. It is
simply not true--and the President knows it is
not true--that our negotiators in Paris have
ever discussed with the North Vietnamese the
question of total U.S. withdrawal from Indochina
in conjunction with the release of our prisoners,
the Senator said.
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Both the PRG and DRV spokesmen in Paris had merely said
cryptically that the President made "deceitful" or "perfidious"
statements in an attempt to shift the blame for the deadlock
of the Paris talks which has prevented the repatriation of
prisoners. But both also refer to points one and two of the
PgG proposal--on withdrawal and a settlement in the South--in
the more intransigent terms which have been fairly standard
since last fall. Thus the PRG statement, after calling for
withdrawal, says "at the same time" the United States must
"immediately give up all support" of Thieu. And the DRV
spokesman spells out some of the hardened elaboration that
Pham Van Dong had voiced during his November visit to Peking.
For example, the spokesman specified that the United States
must end all action in both zones of Vietnam. And a Hanoi radio
commentary on the 5th repeats this and goes on to say under point
two that the United States must "renounce its support for and
commitments to the fascist Thieu clique."
Hanoi, of course ignores the President's remark that the
prisoner issue might be brought up during both his February trip
to Peking and his Moscow visit* next May and his revelation that
the issue has already been discussed with both the Chinese and
the Soviets--between Kissinger and Chou En-lai in Peking in July
and October and with Gromyko in Washington in late September.
* Hanoi studiously avoided any explicit mention of the President's
trip to Peking despite its vitriolic anti-Chinese polemic during
July and August. The only known explicit mention of either trip
in Hanoi media appeared in the November issue of a Journal of
the Central Committee's Propaganda and Training Department THOI
SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS). The article charged the
President with "using vague hints to create the illusion that
those trips will help the United States to resolve the Vietnam
problem." The only known reference to the Peking visit in Front
media also appeared in November in a broadcast in English to
U.S. servicemen on the 25th which quoted a U.S. general as
dismissing the trip as having no significance for the Vietnamese
problem.
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TASS REPORT NOTES PRESIDENT INTENDS TO RAISE POW ISSUE IN PRC
Moscow's fullest account of President Nixon's 2 January radio-TV
interview is provided by TASS in a 3 January dispatch which selectively
reports his comments on Vietnam. TASS says that the President
"refused" to give assurances that by election day there would be no
Americans anywhere in Indochina, and that he pointed out that if no
progress were made in negotiations "we will have to continue to retain
a residual force in Vietnam" and "continue the possibility of air
strikes on the North Vietnamese." TASS says that the President "side-
stepped" a question asking how, then, he could campaign saying he had
ended the American involvement. The report notes that the President
again tried to "justify" the bombing by saying that it is necessary
to protect American troops and "get back" the POWs. TASS interjects
the observation that the United States has never answered the PRG's
"constructive proposal" that would create conditions for solving the
Vietnam issue and "all questions connected with this problem."
The TASS report mentions that the President declared his intention to
raise the question of American POWs during his visit to Peking, but
fails to note that he also said he had talked to Gromyko about the
question and intended to discuss it during his visit to Moscow as
well. A Moscow radio domestic service report on 2 January similarly
picks up the President's expression of intention to discuss POWs in
Peking and cites speculation by "journalists" that General Haig,
now leading the advance delegation in Peking, has been "authorized
to give an explanation of the recent American bombing raids on
North Vietnam."
There has been no comment on the interview in the Soviet press and
the only available Moscow radio comment comes in a Mandarin-language
broadcast on 5 January which, in the course of criticism of Peking's
"collusion" with the United States in Indochina, refers to the
President's remarks. It says the President indicated that the
United States hoped to achieve a dual objective with the bombings--
to "intimidate" the people of the DRV and inflict heavy losses on
them, and to demonstrate that the United States has no desire to
withdraw from Southeast Asia and that-it is prepared to solve
problems by force. A 4 January commentary on the "unofficial"
Radio Peace and Progress, broadcast in English to Asia, takes issue
with the President's reasoning that the bombing is necessary to
free the POWs and protect the lives of U.S. troops. It acknowledges
that if the present withdrawal rate continues by the end of the year
there will be only some 25-35,000 U.S. troops left in Vietnam, but
says that this means that the war will go on "for at least another
year," and points out that everything the President said is
essentially the same as was being said three years ago.
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DRV CLAIMS 24 PLANES, 7 POWS DURING LATE DECEMBER B(t1BING
Hanoi's claim that eight U.S. planes were downed and two pilots
captured on 30 December, the fifth and last day of the
continuous U.S. bombing of North Vietnam which had begun on
26 December, came first in a Hanoi radio report on the 30th.
A few minutes later Hanoi broadcast the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement charging that the Nixon Administration
"again mobilized hundreds of aircraft to continue to carry
out air raids against many densely populated areas including
the Trang pagoda and a suburban area of the Vinh provincial
capital" in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces. Although the
spokesman says that "hundreds" of planes "again" bombed on
the 30th, the four earlier protests had not mentioned numbers,
instead referring to "many" or "many waves." A QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN editorial on the 30th, however, says that since
17 December the "U.S. imperialists" have sent '-hundreds" of
jet fighters to repeatedly bomb or strafe many populated
areas.
Like the earlier protests, the 30 December one says that the
bombings "cynically violate", the U.S. commitment to end the
bombing of the DRV and are "an insolent challenge to the
broad public opinion in the world and the progressive people
in the United States." It says that at a time when the
President "is clamoring that he is 'finding every possible
means to bring home all American POWs', the U.S. war
escalation against the DRV will but lengthen the list of
captured American militarymen." It predicts heavier defeats
for the Nixon Administration "the more obstinate and truculent"
it is.
The spokesman's statement notes the downing of the eight
aircraft but does not mention the two captured pilots, saying
only that "many" other planes were damaged and a number of
pilots killed or captured. The initial radio announcement had
specified that seven of the claimed planes were downed in
Nghe An and one in Quang Binh. The pilots, however, were
reportedly captured in Nghi Xuan district of Ha Tinh Province--
which borders both Nghe An and Quang Binh. The 31 December
NHAN DAN editorial said that "the Ha Tinh armed forces and
people, in coordination with the Nghe An armed forces and
people, captured aggressor pilots who had been shot down."
The radio report additionally said that the armed forces and
people of the coastal district of Nghe An and Ha Tinh
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''courageously fought the enemy coming to rescue aggressor
pilots who had fallen into the sea." And it reported that
a total of 19 planes were downed during the five days of
bombing: ten in Nghe An, seven in Quang Binh and two in
Thanh Hoa. Hanoi on 1 January reported the downing of an
unmanned reconnaissance plane over Nghe An that day, bringing
Hanoi's total of downed planes to 3,428.*
The downing of the eight planes and the capture of the two
pilots was immediately acclaimed that day, the 30th, by a VPA
High Command communique which "warmly commends the fresh
exploits of the armed forces in Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh
provinces and reaffirms the determination of the Vietnamese
people to foil any new adventurous acts taken by the U.S.
aggressors against the DRV."
Just as it had presented four pilots at a press conference on
20 December, Hanoi on the 31st presents the two captured
the day before. The conference was again held by the Information
and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry and foreign and
local newsmen were again present. Ngo Dien, head of the press
department, said the purpose of the conference was to give further
evidence of the U.S. war escalation and its "ignominious failure."
Newsmen were invited to go to a hospital to photograph a third
U.S. pilot--captured on the 26th--who was injured. Citing the
29 December foreign ministry statement, Dien said that the
bombing was "an extremely serious step of war escalation, a big
crime and an impudent challenge to world public opinion."
Referring to the VPA High Command communique of the 30th, which
had also reported the downing of 19 planes in the five days
of bombing, Dien recalled that downings during the 17-18
December action brought the total to 24 planes and seven U.S.
pilots captured in the 17-30 December period. (The three
prisoners were identified as David Wesley Hoffman and Norris
Alphonso Charles, and Lynn Ellis Guenther, the injured pilot;
brief statements attributed to them, giving their identity and
thanking the Vietnamese for the treatment they had received,
were carried by Hanoi radio in English to Southeast Asia on the
31st.)
* A 31 December Hanoi radio roundtable discussion on the Indo-
Chinese peoples' victories in 1971 claimed that during the year
56 U.S. planes--"mostly jet fighters and one B-52"--were downed,
a number it said was "markedly greater than in the previous year."
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Also on the 31st, the DRV War Crimes Commission held a press
conference to denounce the U.S. "crimes" recently committed
"against the civilian population in North Vietnam." The VNA
account of the conference noted that "a film and an exhibition
of photographs on these crimes" were shown. Newsmen were given
a special communique by the commission detailing the alleged
results of the U.S. bombings from 26 to 30 December. The communique
spelled out the number of sorties and bombs used per day in a
given province and detailed damages. No total of Vietnamese
casualties was released; in some cases the numbers of people killed
and injured were combined, but the various reports add up to at
least 44 deaths.
The reported attacks against two hospitals during the raids
prompted a statement by the DRV Ministry of Public Health on the
31st which denounced to the world public "the savage crimes" of
the United States. It said that on the 26th, 27th and 29th "many
flights" of aircraft attacked the provincial hospital of Thanh
Hoa and the hospital in Dong Hoi, capital of Quang Binh, which
had been destroyed prior to 1968 and had been rebuilt.
HANOI HAILS "PROPER EXECUTION" OF VPA ORDER ON VIGILANCE
The role of vigilance and combat readiness continues to be stressed
in the propaganda as it has since the U.S. strikes on 17-18
December. There is frequent reference to the VPA High Command
order, dated 28 December and released on the 29th, which called
for continued vigilance and combat readiness.* The downing of
eight planes on the 30th is hailed as an example of properly
executing the order and comment frequently warns, in urging
continued awareness, that additional U.S. attacks may be
forthcoming. Thus the 30 December NHAN DAN editorial, claiming
that the downings of U.S. planes have increased the North's
"enthusiasm and confidence," cautions that the "U.S. aggressors
are still very stubborn and warlike. They still cultivate the
illusion of using their air force as a trump card to extricate
themselves from total defeat on the Indochinese battlefield.
They will commit other crimes." NHAN DAN says that from now
until "total victory" the North "will have to continuously cope
with the cunning plots and frenzied actions" of the United States
"because the more it sustains heavy defeats in South Vietnam,
* See the 29 December TRENDS, pages 4-5.
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Laos, and Cambodia, the more intense its reckless actions
against the DRV." It goes on to urge heightened vigilance on
the part of the armed forces; earlier it had praised various
specific units of the armed forces--for example, antiaircraft,
air force, missile, radar, engineer, and signal units--for
their role in defending North Vietnam in the past few days.
A radio broadcast on the 30th cites various defense preparations
in response to the High Command order, noting, for example,
that in Nghe An militia units in coastal areas "have built
new watch towers and combat positions" from which they can
attack commandos and "fight the enemy who may land by boats
or by aircraft." In Thanh Hoa, the broadcast reports, the
people and self-defense militia forces "in all localities, at
all agencies and along all communications lines are
expeditiously building or repairing many communications tunnels
and trenches, shelters, and combat positions."
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 30th, hails the downing of the
eight planes on 30 December as an example of executing the High
Command order and notes that 19 planes have been dowtied in five
consecutive days. It warns "Nixon and his subordinates": "The
firepower of the Vietnamese armed forces and people throughout
this heroic and indomitable country is a hatred-boiled firepower
of an entire nation that is determined to fight and win.
Definitely this firepower will reduce to ash the frenzied and
perfidious intimidating allegations of the U.S. President and
defense secretary, will burn all insidious and cruel war designs
and tricks of the U.S. Imperialists and will reduce to ash their
Vietnamization policy."
A NHAN DAN editorial on the 31st also praises Nghe An and
Quang Binh provinces for downing the eight planes in compliance
with the VPA order, and hails the antiaircraft and missile units,
and the artillery and self-defense militia forces "which
resolutely fought off the enemy coming to rescue the aggressor
pilots who had parachuted into the sea," as well as engineer
and signal combatants. The editorial, observing that the
United States "has not renounced its evil aggressive designs,"
warns that the U.S. "imperialists will resort to cunning tricks
and criminal acts against the people in the northern part of
our country." NHAN DAN urges cadres and combatants everywhere
"to devote all their efforts to executing the High Command
order." The editorial says that "our armed forces have achieved
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close coordination of combat, raised an intense fire-net and
directed stunning blows at the U.S. aggressor pilots.'
The NHAN DAN editorial notes that some of the attacking planes
came from bases in South Vietnam when it quotes "some panicky
enemy pilots, who safely returned" to Da Nang after the air
raids on the 29th, as saying that "North Vietnam's air
defense forces are much stronger than they were in 1968"
and the JRV's firepower better than ever before. While the
editorial also mentions that U.S. planes used for the raids
came from U.S. ships off the Vietnamese coast and bases in
Thailand, as well as South Vietnam, only one of the official
protests--the 29 December DRV Foreign Ministry statement-,-
points out that the planes came from the three locations.
The DRV War Crimes special communique released on the 31st
refers only to the carriers and the bases in Thailand.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 31st also praises the
antiaircraft and air force troops and militia and self-defense
forces in the provinces which downed the eight planes on the
30th. Similarly suggesting there will be further raids, the
editorial says that the U.S. "imperialists remain stubborn
until their death. They still recklessly threaten to continue
to strike the North if the DRV resists U.S. aircraft."* It
warns that U.S. planes which violate DRV airspace "will
certainly be downed." And the paper says that "everywhere
in the North, there is a determination to fight and win, to
strictly carry out the High Command's orders, to sharpen one's
vigilance, to deal violent blows at the enemy and to
wholeheartedly" assist the South.
* VNA on 30 December atypically carried an account of the
downing of one of the U.S. planes on the 18th by a MIG.
Earlier statements by the U.S. Command in Saigon on the involve-
ment of MIGs during the 17-18 December weekend had typically
been ignored by Hanoi.
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CONFIDENTIAL HIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1.972
PRG, NFLSV DENOUNCE STRIKES AGAINST DRV, WARN OF "PUNISHMENT"
Official PRG and NFLSV protests denouncing the 26-30 December U.S.
bombing raids against North Vietnam were not issued until the
day the air strikes ended. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement*
and a NFLSV Central Committee statement on the 30th condemned the
raids, and the air strikes were scored a day later in a statement
from the Vietnam Alliance of National Democratic Peace Forces.
Both the PRG Foreign Ministry and the Vietnam Alliance statements
voice support for the DRV Foreign Ministry statement issued on
the 29th and echo its claim that the DRV is a sovereign and
independent country, with a right to self-defense. Neither
statement, however, characterizes it as a "socialist" country
as the DRV statement had. Both statements score the U.S.
justifications for the raids--that they were "protective
reaction" raids and that North Vietnam had violated the "under-
standings" between it and the United States--as an attempt to
deceive public opinion. The PRG statement calls the strikes
'extremely serious criminal acts" and a "premeditated step of
war escalation." It charges that the raids--along with the
intensification' of the war throughout Indochina, "the .evast6n
of the PRG's seven-point peace initiative," and U.S. "sabotage"
of the Paris talks--"have further laid bare the Nixon
Administration's aggressive, stubborn, and bellicose nature."
South Vietnamese communist comment uniformly warns the United
States that its action against the North will bring a
response from the South. Thus the PRG statement says that
the South Vietnamese people are "determined to turn their hatred
into stormy attacks on the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys and
duly punish them for any one of their criminal acts against our
people in the North." The NFLSV statement, expressing
indignation "at the new heinous crimes" against the North, says
that the United States "is mistaken if it thinks that its
frantic war acts can shake the combat will of the Vietnamese
people. All its aggressive designs, however brutal, will only
incense the people and army in both zones. . . ."
* The earlier DRV charges of U..S, intrusions and strikes
on the 17th and 18th were similarly echoed in a 21 December
PRG Foreign Ministry statement.
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Comment from the South does not reiterate many of Hanoi's
claims concerning the raids, although a Liberation Radio
commentary on the 30th does cite some of the details,
including the allegations that 24 U.S. planes have been
downed since the 17th and that four pilots w'are captured
on the 18th and two more on the 30th. An NFLSV/PRG message
to the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the DRV Government,
broadcast by Liberation Radio on 30 December, hails the
"victories" of the North but fails to mention any specific
figures, instead citing the downing of "scores" of aircraft
and capture of "many" pilots. An LPA commentary on the lot
echoes Hanoi comment when it says that President Nixon
"had to o-4er a halt" to the bombings on the 30th and calls
this action an admission of the Administration's "glaring
failure."
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CONE' I I)I N'I TAL FRIS' '[RENDS
5 JANUARY 1972
USSR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT SCORES BOM{3iNG; AID ACCORD SIGNED
Moscow waited until the end of the five-day series of heavy U.S.
air raids on the DRV, which began on 26 December, to condemn
them in a USSR Government statement on the 30th. While Moscow's
statement is at a higher level than the !.RV Foreign Ministry
statements it suppoxts and the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry
statement, it is nevertheless cast in relatively mild terms.
It routinely promises to continue giving the DRV the "necessary
assistance",; simultaneously, Soviet media report a new agreement
providing additional Soviet aid to "further strengthen the DRV's
defense capacity." The brief announcement of the agreement is
publi9hed on the front pages of PRAVDA and IZVFSTIYA directly
below the government statement,
Other propaganda on the bombing includes further protest
statements by Soviet public organizations and the usual protest
meetings in factories and enterprises throughout the country
which have customarily followed Soviet Government statements
on Indochina. Routine-level attention includes reportage of
Vietnamese communist comment and reports of protests being
voiced throughout the world, including the United States. TASS
on 3] December briefly cited critical remarks by Senators
Fulbright, Church, McGovern, Muskie, Humphrey, and Mansfield.
Many Moscow commentators continue to link the U.S. decision
~o initiate the bombings with Peking's policies of
''rapprochement" with the United States, particularly President
Nixon's forthcoming visit.
GOVERNMENT Although the USSR Government statement scores
STATEMENT the "barbarous" bombings and notes, like routine
propaganda, that Secretary Laird said that they
are being made on instructions of the White House," it does
not mention President Nixon by name. (A 25 February 1971
government statement on the Laos incursion warned that actions
of the United States "undermine the very foundations on which
interstate relations are built . . . and cannot but affect
Soviet-American relations too.'7)
The statement once again, like routine propaganda, says that
the aggression shows the "hypocrisy" of American statements
about the "curtailment" of U.S. involvement in Indochina and
about striving for a peaceful settlement, and shows that
Washington really seeks a "military solution." It says nothing
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about the Furls talks. And it ciao fails to specifically mention
the PRG's seven-point proposal although it does demand an end to
U.S. aggression, full and uncord:Ltiinal troop withdrawal from
Indochina, and respect for the Indochinese peoples' right to
solve their own affairs.
BACKGROUND: The most recent Soviet Government statement on
Indochina was on 25 February 1971, belatedly scoring the Laos
incursion which had been announced on the 8th. Since the
official cessation of the sustained U.S. bombing in November
1968, Moe:;aw has normally supported DRV Foreign M:.nistry
statements ot- U.S. bombing raids only with lower-level
propaganda.* The 2]. September 1971 strikes were denounced in
a belated 1 October TASS statement,** apparently to place Moscow
officially on record in support of the DRV before Podgornyy's
arrival in Hanoi on 3 October. The air strikes of March 1971
prompted no such formal statement. On 16 December 1970 a Soviet
Government statement had belatedly supported the 10 December
DRV party-government appeal for vigilance in the wake of the
21 November raids and had denounced President Nixon's 1.0 December
press conference containing "threats" to resume bombing. The
21 November raids had earlier been condemned in a TASS statement
on the 23d. A Soviet Government statement, read by Kosygin at
a 4 May 1970 press conference, had included a denunciation of the
1-2 May bombings of the DRV but was mainly concerned with the
incursion into Cambodia.
AID AGREEMENT Moscow media cryptically reported on the 30th
that as a result of talks in Moscow "of major
significance" an agreement was signed on the USSR's "additional
assistance gratis" to "further strengthen the DRV's defense
capacity." There has been no elaboration so far from Moscow and
virtually no followup comment. VNA's 1 January report, however,
says that the agreement, signed on 29 December, was for
"supplementary non-refund military aid" to the DRV for 1972.
VNA adds that the accord was signed by Soviet Col. Gen. G.S.
Sidorovich, vice chairman of the State Committee for Economic
Relations with Foreign Countries, and the DRV charge d'affaires.
* Before the cessation of the sustained bombing Moscow had
customarily supported the DRV on various developments in
connection with the bombings with USSR Government statements.
** The TRENDS of 29 December 1971 on page 10 erroneously stated
that the September strikes had prompted only routine comment.
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Other officials of the Soviet committee and a defense ministry
representative attended the ceremony, as did the PRG Ambassador
and the DRV military attache.
The aid agreement:, although signed at a low level and receiving
little publicity, takes on added interest in the wake of the
air attacks. VNA quotes Sidorovich as expressing "indignation"
at the latest bombing raids in a speech at the signing ceremony.
The limited publicity given the current accord, however, is not
without precedent. On 18 August 1971 TASS had similarly
tersely reported the signing of agreements in Moscow on
additional aid "to strengthen the ARV defense potentialities,'
giving neither the date of the accord nor the names of the
signatories. VNA's report shed no further light on the
circumstances of the signing, and the general secretiveness
seemed to have been designed to cover up prolonged and difficult
negotiations.* But Moscow does normally give considerable
publicity to its aid agreements--both the usual annual ones,
the most recent of which was signed or 7 October during
Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi, and "supplementary" ones signed in
June 1970 and November 1968.
ATTACKS Many Moscow commentators continue to link Peking's
ON PEKING policy of "rapprochement" with the United States
and its invitation to President Nixon with the
U.S. decision to make the bombing raids. A RED STAR article by
Lt. Col. Ponomarev on 31 December on Secretary Laird's year-end
press conference even says that he "was ultimately contelled to
make it understood" that the true purpose of the bombings was
to "intimidate the peoples of Indochina before Nixon's trip to
Peking."
Ignoring the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement, some
commentators continue to point to Peking's "silence" on or
low-key response to the bombings. A PRAVDA article by
Mayevckiy, as summarized by TASS on 4 Jr-iuary, says that
"foreign commentators" feel that the new U.S. aggression "has
a direct bearing" on the President's forthcoming visit to
Peking and cites Sulzberger of the New York TIMES as saying
that "the Chinese did not come out with energetic, to Peking's
standards, objections." A roundup of foreign comment on
* The August 1971 agreement is discussed in the 18 August TRENDS,
page 12, and the 25 August TRENDS, page 9.
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Peking's attitude in LITERARY GAZETTE on 1 January is preceded
by the editorial comment that "the Peking press is writing
about anything and everything except" the U.S. raids on the
DRV. TASS on 30 December and a radio broadcast in Mandarin
the next day cite an AFP report that in a 29 December speech
for a visiting Iraqi delegation, Li }isien-nien "did not say
a word about the massive bombing of North Vietnam," and
comment that this confirms Peking's intention not to draw
attention to the American raids while the American advance
delegation is in the PRC.
The only available Moscow acknowledgments of the PRC Foreign
Ministry statement are in Mandarin-language commentaries by
Vasiliyev broadcast on 31 December and 2 January* which say
that the U.S. "ruling clique" has "completely ignored" the
statement because it knows that Peking's "serious warnings"
and ''verbal threats" are not worthy of attention. Vasiliyev
adds that some of the most intensive bombing came after Peking
issued the statement.
PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ECHOES FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BCr1I3ING
The 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement condemning the
U.S. bombings is followed by a 31 December PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article which denounces the air strikes without
recalling the foreign ministry statement. The raids are given
little attention in other comment, and as yet Peking has not
mentioned President Nixon's 2 January radio-TV interview.
The Commentator article does not directly criticize the President
in claiming that the bombing of North Vietnam shows that the
Nixon Administration's Vietnamization plan is suffering defeats.
Similarly, the PRC Foreign Ministry statement referred to the
"Nixon Administration" but not to the President himself. While
Peking does not attack the President on its own authority, a
rcutine-level NCNA commentary on 30 December employs the
the device of quoting statements by American spokesmen to show
* TASS has not reported the PRC statement. The 13 December 1970
PRC party-government statement supporting the DRV appeal was not
reported by TASS until the 17th--a report which was published
in PRAVDA on the 18th--after the release of the belated
16 December Soviet Government statement supporting the DRV
appeal.
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President Nixon's personal responsibility for the bombings.
Thus NCNA notes that SecreLdiy Laird, in his 27 December press
conference, disclosed that the raids were approved by the
President, and it cites White House spokesman 7.legler for the
statement that the bombings are "totally consistent'! with
President Nixon's stated policies. Adding that the raids
have aroused widespread domestic and foreign condemnation,
NCNA says 30 Democratic Representatives sent the President a
telegram on the 28th urging that he stop the current bombing,
and it cites an unnamed Democratic Senator as saying that the
bombings show the bankruptcy of the "Nixon policy of
Vietnsmization."
The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, in language reminiscent
of the 24 December Commentator article scoring the 18 December
air intrusions, charges that the new "air crime" has"exposed
the aggressive features of U.S. imperialism' and "torn off its
peace mask with regard to the Vietnam question.' It scores
the U.S. imperialists for trying to justify their action by
saying that the raids "are for withdrawing their forces from
South Vietnam," and repeats that if the United States really
wants to withL~_aw it can do so unconditionally and completely
without anyone standing in the way. Commentator recalls that
the United States has all along refused to reply to the PRG
seven-point proposal. The article 1Rbels as "shameless
sophistry" U.S. statements that the bombing is of "limited
duration" and not in violation of U.S. commitments to cease
the bombing. After again praising the Indochinese peoples'
"splendid new exploits," PEOPLE'S DAILY reiterates that the
Chinese people will, as always, "resolutely support" the
Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples, and it expresses
confidence that the "iron bastion" of the three Indochines^
people fighting in unity will defeat any new U.S. military
adventures.
A passing reference to the bombings was made by Shih Shao-hua,
"a leading member of the cultural group under the State
Council," in a speech at a 4 January ceremony opening a
? Vietnamese art exhibition. According to NCNA, he briefly
condemned U.S. imperialism for recently bombing the DRV
"savagely and repeatedly," and expressed the indignation of
the Chinese people and their "firm support` for the DRV
Foreign Ministry statements. He reiterated that the Chinese
people "firmly support and assist" the people of Vietnam and
the other Indochinese countries in their war against U.S.
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aggression "until final victory." Li Hsien-nien attended the
ceremony but did not speak. Speaking at. a 29 December banquet
for a visiting Iraqi delegation, Li failed to mention the
bombing, judging from the NCNA summary of his speech.
YEAR-END REVIEWS OPTIMISTIC ON STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Vietnamese communist propaganda on the fighting in 1971 claims
that the United States has failed in its efforts to prepare
the ARVN to replace U.S. troops, has not met its pacification
goals, and has not been able to strengthen and stabilize the
Saigon government. The propaganda repeatedly stresses that
the strongest allied efforts were "strategically" defeated and
that the way is now open for the "complete" defeat of allied
forces. While this may merely be rhetoric to bolster the
morale of the communist forces, some of the language used
suggests genuine optimism on the course of the war.
PLAF CO+1UNIQi': Military developments in South Vietnam
during the past year were authoritatively
assessed in a 24 December communique of the PLAF Command,
publicized by Hanoi and PRG media on 3 January. While
reflecting the reduced level of military action in South
Vietnam during 1971, the communique axudes confidence about
the future. It argues that the PLAF and "people" have
frustrated the most severe allied efforts to win a "decisive
victory" for Vietnamization and that, with U.S. and other
foreign troops withdrawing and the ARVN "seriously clibintegrating,':
the PLZF is "fully capable of defeating the Saigon puppet army
even if it received more U.S. dollars, weapons, and air support."
It routinely claims that the balance of forces is tipping more
and more in favor of the ^ommunist forces and then adds
cryptically: "All the three kinds of our armed forces are
being deployed for attack on the enemy in all the three strategic
zones"--the'mountains, plains, and urban areas.
Discussing the alleged decline of the ARVN, the communique
claims Saigon's troops have never faced "so serious a collapse"
since the Tet offensive in 1968 and that they have never
surrendered or been captured in such numbers as in 1971. It
claims that a total of nearly 300,000 Saigon troops were put
out of action throughout all of Indochina during the past year.
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For the second year in a row, the year-end communique's tally of
alleged allied losses in South Vietnam contains lower claims
than the previous year's.* The communique asserts that its
forces in South Vietnam during 1971 wiped out a total of nearly
250,000 allied troops, a figura sharply reduced from the
420,000 allied troops which the PLAF supposedly "annihilated"'
in 1970. (The peak year for the communists, according to
their statistics, was 1969 when 645,000 allied troops were
allegedly put out of action in South Vietnam.)
Claimed casualties among U.S. and other foreign troops are even
more dramatically red'.ced from the previous year, the current
communique claiming 20,000 non-Vietnamese troops wiped out in
1971 while the communique a year ago said that 110,000 foreign
troops were among the 1970 casualties. Alleged allied material
losses are also down from the previous year. Thus the communique
claims 1,800 airy '-ft downed or destroyed in 1971 in comparison
with the 5,900 aircraft claimed in 1970. Similarly, 8,000
military vehicles were allegedly wrecked or captured in 1971,
while 14,000 were claimed in 1970.
OTHER COMMENT The PLAF Command's optimistic evaluation of the
communists' military position in South Vietnam
and elsewhere in Indochina has been echoed in other propaganda,
including editorials in the 4 January issues of NHAN DAN and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged to the PLAF communique. Thus, the
4 January NHAN DAN editorial reiterated that the "great
strategic" victories of 1971 created "a new and very favorable
offensive position" for the "southern revolution," and that "the
PLAF is strong enough to completely defeat the Saigon puppet army."
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial praised "noticeable" PLAF
progress in "coordinated combat involving various armed branches
and in fighting big battles of annihilation" and it claimed that
the allies, following "their defeat in early 1971," were "no
longer capable of launching large-scale operations." The paper
also underlined the importance of building up local political
and military forces and other tasks--"of the greatest strategic
importance"--aimed at defeating rural pacification.
Prior to the release of the PLAF communique, its tone was
anticipated in the 1 January NHAN DAN editorial which maintained
* The PLAF Command communique on fighting in 1970 was analyzed
in the 6 January 1971 TRENDS, pages 9-10.
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that "the puppet troops cannot fight alone without the U.S.
forces as their prop, and U.S. aircraft are not strong enough
to protect them." It held that the U.S. "war of aggression
is going downhill" and that the situation is favorable for the
Indochinese "people" to completely defeat the "U.S. aggressors
and their lackeys."
A Liberation Radio editorial marking the New Year, broadcast
on 31 December, also expressed communist confidence in strong
terms. It maintained that the PLAF's regular troops are in
good shape, have experience in big battles, and "are capable
of launching big, annihilating attacks on various battlefields."
The editorial held that the allies are, among other things,
trying to "avoid big annihilating battles," to save
Vietnamization and lessen losses. It predicted "more difficulties
and hardships" for its side in "a very arduous but glorious phase
of struggle," and stated that the armed forces and 'people"
will develop their "winning position" and "stage relentless
offensives" with determination to "intensify their activities on
all fronts and in all three strategic zones."
Other PRG comment included an article in the army paper QUAN GIAI
PRONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4 January. The commentary
repeated standard claims and went on, after pointing to the
alleged failure of the pacification effort, to assert that "new
concerted uprisings will break out throughout the South, fierce
ones that will completely smash the pacification scheme"' and
which will be "a painful blow to the Vietnamization strategy
and the Nixon Doctrine." Discussing the urban areas, the
commentary maintained that the "people's struggles" in the
cities are "preparations for revolutionary storms" and "are
capable of turning into a revolutionary high tide which will
make the cities the enemy's basic weakness and our important
political strength."
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- 21 -
S I NO- SOVIET- U, S, RELATIONS
SINO-SOVIET TROUBLES MARK ONSET OF YEAR OF NIXON VISITS
The collision of Soviet and Chinese interests in South Asia and
in the United Nations, intensifying the strains arising. from
developments in the two communist powers' triangular relations
with the United States, has brought Sino-Soviet relations to an
acrimonious state at the onset of the new year. The policy
review in Peking's authoritative New Year's Day joint editorial,
a paean to the successes of Chouist moves in the world arena,
offers a rationale for Chinese efforts to gain leverage in the
international community in order to compete with the two super-
powers and to take advantage of their clashes of interest. The
editorial confers Mao's sanction on these policies by quoting the
chairman as stating that international affairs must be settled
through consultation by all concerned and not be left to the
two big powers.
The Chinese editorial, which sharply denounces "the Brezhnev
renegade clique" while sparing President Nixon any direct attack,
repeats the charge of unspecified conspiracies by Liu Shao-chi
"and other swindlers who had illicit relations with foreign
countries."* In the context of Peking's invitation to the
President and the purge of Lin Piao and other military leaders,
such a charge raises the question of possible opposition by the
purge victims to developments in Sino-U.S. relations in the past
year--developments which Peking interpreted as part of an effort
to isolate the Soviet Union as its main enemy. While Moscow has
not cited this charge and has treaded carefully in discussing the
purge, Soviet comment has given some play to suggestions that
the recent Chinese internal upheaval is connected with the
President's impending visit. Moscow has also complained that
strongly anti-Soviet figures in Puking are- involved in these
developments, and an article in the Soviet military organ RED
STAR on 29 December chose to raise the border issue in
? discussing the Chinese leadership struggle in connection with
Peking's moves within the triangular setting.
* A similar charge was also made in major editorials on 1 July
and 1 December. The 1 December editorial, a veil;:d explanation
of the recent purge, included the charge in a passage recalling
conspiracies by Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, Peng Te-huai, and Huang
Ko-cheng--an intriguing list in that these former purge victims
were tainted with suspicion of connivance with the Soviets.
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In a significant departure from its heretofore notably restrained
treatment of Chou En-tai, Moscow has rebuked the Chinese premier
for his anti-Soviet stand and has suggested. that he is receptive
to deals with the United States which others in Peking would
oppose. Also in anticipation of the President's visit to Peking,
the Soviets have seized on the U.S. air strikes against the DRV
as an occasion for warning Hanoi that its interests are menaced
by Sino-U.S. developments. In fact, Moscow's extensive polemical
campaign keyed to the Indian-Pakistani conflict, featuring-
charges of Sino-U.S. collusion and of Chinese betrayal of the
national liberation movement, can be interpreted in large
measure as intended for the benefit of Hanoi and other such
targets of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
PEKING SEES REGROUPING OF FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial provides 3 review of
the world situation designed to justify moves toward enhancing
the PRC's influence in the international community and its
maneuverability vis-a-vis the superpowers. Stressing the clashes
of interests between the two superpowers as well as those
dividing the latter from the "small and medium countries" and
the third world countries being championed by Peking, the
editorial sums up the world situation as being one of "global
upheaval." Similarly, a lengthy NCNA review on 30 December
portraying growing opposition to dominance by the superpowers
explained that political forces in the world arena are
regrouping in a process of "great upheaval, great division,
and great reorganization."
The formulation regarding a great upheaval and regrouping of
international forces was revived last August in the wake of
Peking's announcement of its invitation to President N-xon.*
This significant cue, which figured to a major policy statement
in November 1965 signaling Peking's rejection of any accommodation
with Moscow despite pressures within the communist movement to
close ranks behind the Vietnamese comrades, serves to give notice
of important policy developments such as the shifts .that produced
the invitation to the President and Peking's flexible moves in
the international community. Likewise, the quotation from Mao
* The use of the formulation at that time is discussed in the
TRENDS of 1 September 1971, pages 18-19.
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calling for consultation by all concerned in determining
international affairs justifies Peking's recourse to the
diplomatic and negotiating tracks in place of its former
emphasis on obstructionist and insurrectionist approaches.
"Gone are the days," the editorial observes, when the super-
powers could decide the destinies of other countries by "making
deals behind their backs."
At a time of hostility toward Moscow and relative restraint
toward Washington, the joint editorial directs its animosity
mainly at the Soviets. Most notably, where the 1971 New Year's
editorial denounced "Nixon's reactionary rule" while soft-
pedaling attacks on the Soviet leadership, the 1972 editorial
does not mention the President but assails "the Brezhnev renegade
clique" for oppressing its people and attempting-to extend its
influence throughout the world. The editorial charges that
Moscow has colluded with the United States in "nuclear deals,"
sold out the GDR on the Berlin question, threatened the Balkans,
undermined the armed struggla of the Palestinians and Arabs,
"and, above all, shamelessly end flagrantly supported the Indian
reactionaries' armed aggression against Pakistan."
Implicitly offering a rationale for negotiating with. the United
States in order to cope with an expansive Soviet Union, the
editorial points out that the "powers of aggression" of the
United States have been "enormously weakened" in the Indochina
war and that there has been a "profound change" in the balance
of forces between the United States and its capitalist competitors.
These judgments reflect Peking's optimistic reactions in the past
year to developments in Indochina and in the political and
economic relations among the capitalist countries. Most
recently, in reacting to the U.S. air strikes against the DRV,
Peking went no further than necessary in condemning Washington
while implying that the North Vietnamese and their.. allies in
Indochina could handle the situation and that ongoing S.ino-U.S.
developments were not in jeopardy. Shortly after the series of
concentrated U.S. air raids, Peking announced on 3 January that
an American advance party arrived that day to prepare for
President Nixon's visit the next month. On the 4th Peking
announced that Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had held
talks with the U.S. delegation.
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In contrast to the 1971 New Year's editorial, which contained
but a brief ritualistic call for liberation of Taiwan, the
editorial this year includes a passage reaffirming Peking's
position on the Taiwan question. The discussion is consistent
with the major attention devoted to this issue in the past year
and with Peking's diplomatic moves, reflecting concern over a
possible tendency within the international community to accept
the permanent alienation of Taiwan from the PRC. Thus, the
editorial refers to "our compatriots" on the island who are
"our brothers by flesh and blood." It reiterates opposition to
formulas that would dilute Peking's claim to sovereignty over
Taiwan--such as "one China, two governments"--and again demands
the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces. But there is no
attempt to convey a sense of urgency or threat, the editorial
closing its discussion of Taiwan by expressing confidence that
"the day is bound to come" when the island will be liberated.
MOSCOW WARNS OF "MAJOR POLITICAL DEALS" BETWEEN PRC. U.S.
Moscow's bitter polemical campaign against the Chinese arising
out of the Indian-Pakistani confli,:t and Sino-Soviet clashes
in the United Nations has been seeded with charges of collusion
and bargaining between Peking and Washington. The U.S. air
strikes against the DRV in late December afforded Moscow further
opportunity to develop this theme, accompanied by increasing
references to President Nixon's Peking visit. Moscow has also
sought to exploit the Chinese leadership crisis in its effort
to discredit Peking's policies in general and the President's
visit next month in particular.
A lengthy article by V. Vasilyev in RED STAR on 29 December, based
mainly on foreign as well as Chinese press reports for an account
of the Chinese leadership crisis, explains that this development
reflects more than a mere power struggle but is rooted in
fundamental disagreements over domestic and foreign policy.
According to Vasilyev, the "Maoists" have had recourse to
"shameless anti-Sovietism" in order to divert attention from
the crisis and to gain time for consolidating their rule.
Documenting Peking's anti-Soviet actions, Vasilyev mentions
not only the polemics over the Indian-Pakistani conflict but
also raises the sensitive border question by noting that a
provocative Chinese film on the 1969 border clashes is now
showing in Peking. The film openly expresses territorial
claims, Vasilyev points out.
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Significantly, it is against this background that Vasilyev
? introduces the charge of Sino-U.S. collusion, citing the
"world progressive forces" as having concluded that the Chinese
position in the United Nations "confirms the possibility of
major political deals between Peking and Washington at the
expense of the interests of the peoples of diffe_ent parts of
the world during Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking." Vasilyev
himself concludes that the present course of "the great-power
chauvinist Mao Tse-tung group," which is "hostile to Marxism-
Leninism and hostile to socialism," is fraught with "serious
consequences for the Chinese people themselves" and "conceals
a threat to the interests of the peoples of other countries."
As in other recent Soviet comment, Vasilyev takes note of the rise
in the Chinese hierarchy of individuals distinguished by "particularly
unbridled anti-Sovietism"--namely, Chiang Ching, Chang (hun-chiao,
and "Mao's son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan." Vasilyev cites the Western
press as explaining that "the Chiang-Chang-Yao group" had reason
to oppose the recently purged military leaders in view of the
army's role in suppressing the Red Guards during the turmoil of
tis cultural revolution. Vasilyev remains vague, however, about
what connection Lin Piao and the other purge victims might have
with opposition to what he describes as Maoist policies
contradicting "the objective requirements of China's development
along the path of socialism and along the path of restucing friend-
ship and international. ties with the USSR."
Though Vasilyev does not repeat the personal attacks on Chou that
have recently appeared in Soviet media, he alludes to Chou in
an unfavorable context centering on the President's visit to
Peking. Vasilyev quotes the Washington POST as saying that it
is possible for the United States to have dealings with the
Chinese leaders "who have been educated in the traditions of
the mandarins," and that support should be given to those
leaders who are removing the party and military figures whose
interests are undermined by the President's visit. Again,
Vasilyev fails to spell out Lin Piao's role in this scenario.
In a notable attempt to fish in troubled waters, a 31 December
article by V. Filippov in SOVIET RUSSIA cites a pamphlet
entitled "Problems of Sino-American Relations" which allegedly
appeared for only ?i few hours in Peking last September. Basing
himself on a summary of the pamphlet carried in a Japanese
weekly, Filippov notes the pamphlet's claim that the announcement
of the President's forthcoming visit to Peking provoked bitter
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5 JANUARY 1.972
disputes in Chl.nu. Ilo quotuH the pamphlet am saying the Poking
Leadership is dl.v[dad into two tIJnom on domestic and foru:Lgn
issues, with Mao and Chou Htressi.ng that the Soviet Union poses
a greater threat to China than the United States while
unspecified "comrades who follow Marxist-Leninist theory"
oppose this line as "a far-reaching rightwing deviation."
In a remark that makes the pamphlet seem too good for Soviet
purposes not to be false, Filippov quotes it no charging that
Peking is "facilitating the implementation of American provocations
against the DRV and of the policy of splitting Vietnam."
Earlier, on 22 December, the pamphlet had been the subject of
a broadcast to the Chinese by the purportedly unofficial Radio
Peace and Progress, a channel especially suited for the more
provocative Soviet meddling in other countries' affairs. The
broadcast version was notably more derisive toward Chou,
attributing the invitation to the President to what it described
as Chou's two-faced foreign policy. According to the broadcast,
the pamphlet Fays many people in China disapprove of Chou's
pro-U.S. policy and regard the invitation to the President as
a surrender to U.S. imperialism.
In another difference between the two Soviet accounts of the
pamphlet, Radio Peace and Progress quoted foreign observers as
saying that Chou persuaded Mao to purge Lin, with whom Chou had
a bitter dispute. The broadcast also went on to cite unnamed
foreign specialists on China as suggesting that Chou himself
may become a future purge victim should Mao need a scapegoat
for difficultieL resulting from the policy of Sino-U.S.
rapprochement.
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5 JANUARY 1972
AFRICA
SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON RHODESIA INCLUDES ANTI-PEKING BARBS
Moscow sustains its largely one-sided polemic against Peking's
policy regarding Rhodesia, while spokesmen for both communist
powers condemn in similar fashion he 24 November 1.971 Anglo-
Rhodesian agreement. In Lhe face of a steady diet of Soviet
propaganda denunciations of the Anglo-Rhodesian accord and
other "colonialist" phenomena in Africa, Peking has had little
ammunition with which to counter the Soviet attacks on PRC
policy in Africa. A lengthy NCNA commentary on 31 December,
for example, on the medium and small nations' united front
against "the two superpowers," explicitly scored Soviet policy
vis-a-via India and Pakistan and the 1968 intervention of
Czechoslovakia, but attacked oily the alleged policies of
Portugal and "the United States and its allies" on the African
continent.
Moscow has leveled its heaviest attacks against Peking's stance
on Rhodesia via the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and
Progress in English to Africa. Thus a typical commentary
broadcast on 27 December, on the PRC's behavior as a newly
elected member of the United Nations, observed that while
"in its propaganda Peking is sparing no efforts" in its
condemnation of "the racist and colonialist regimes in Africa,"
it is actually "maintaining with them a most favorable trade,
being thereby one of those who are thwarting the trade and
economic blockade against the racists and colonialists as
proclaimed by the Organization for African JTnity." The
broadcast went on to charge that "the Peking leaders are
sabotaging the economic sanctions imposed against the
Rhodesian racists" by purchasing large quantities of
Rhodesian chrome ore. It added that the Peking leaders are
"hindering the alliance of the national liberation movement
forces" by supporting the ZANU movement against ZAPU in
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).
An 11 December broadcast by Radio Moscow in English to Africa,
in which Observer Vasiliy Stepanov answered questions purportedly
from listeners in Africa, similarly charged that the Peking
leaders were trying to "split the national liberation movement"
in Rhodesia, as well as in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa.
It added that, "in Rhodesia, China buys chrome." These
policies, it declared, were aimed at "turning Africa into a
seat of Maoism."
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Both Moscow and Poking had issued authoritative condemnations of
the late-November settlement between Britain and Rhodesia, in a
TASS statement on 3 December and in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article carried by NCNA on 5 December. Avoiding any Sino-Soviet
nuances, the two pronouncements reserved their venom for Britain
and Rhodesia, alth'" h the PEOPLE'S DAILY article added the
charge that the United States, in defiance of the will of the
African countries in the United Nations, had "obdurately stuck
to its position of importing chrome from Rhodesia." Soviet
media, both before and after the TASS statement, carried a
succession of commentaries denouncing the Ang1o-Rhodesian
iccord. NCNA did no more than selectively repor.c such
denunciations in a Lusaka, Zambia-datelined item on 1 December,
an Afro-Asian Journalists Association statement on the 4th,
and a speech by PRC deputy delegation head Chen Chu in the
U.N. Security Council. on the 8th.
In the recent period, a British veto of a Somali-sponsored
Security Council resolution condemning the Anglo-Rhodesian
accord was scored in a Skobelev commentary carried by TASS
on the 31st and in N^NA's 3 January account of a speech by
the PRC's permanent representative Huang Hua to the Security
Council on the 30th.
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PRC-JAPAN
PEKING REITERATES ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER SENKAKUS
Reacting to recent legislative action in the United States and
Japan on the Okinawan reversion agreement, Peking has issued its
most authoritative and detailed pronouncement to date on the
Tiaoyu (Senkaku) island question. A 30 December Foreign
Ministry statement firmly declared that the Okinawan reversion
agreement does not alter "the sovereignty of the PRC over her
territory of the Tiaoyu and other islands." No specific course
of action was outlined, however, as the statement argued that
since the disputed islands are "appertaining to Taiwan" their
recovery is linked to the eventual recovery of Taiwan. The
statement did not demand settlement of the Ti'.aoyu island issue
as a specific prerequisite for ameliorating relations between
China and Japan.
"Like Taiwan,' the statement declared, the Tiaoyu island group
has 'been an inalienable part of Chinese territory since
ancient times," and "it is utterly illegal for the U.S. and
Japanese governments to include China's Tiaoyu and other
islands in the so-called 'area of reversion' in the Okinawan
'reversion' agreement." Drawing a sharp distinction between
the Japanese people and the Japanese Government, the statement
specifically castigated the Sato Government for working in
"collusion with U.S. imperialism" to reach an agreement on the
"'reversion"' of Okinawa which includes '"the Tiaoyu and other
islands in the 'area of reversion."' Reiterating Peking's
standard line on the Okinawan reversion agreement, the statement
portrayed it as a "fraud . . . jointly contrived by the U.S.
and Japanese governments . . . to strengthen U.S.-Japanese
military collusion and to accelLrate the revival. of Japanese
militarism." It then asserted that the Chinese Government and
people support "the Japanese people's valiant struggle to smash
the fraud of the 'reversion' of Okinawa' and to oppose the
attempt by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries" to -tse the
agreement "to sow seeds of discord in the friendly re.Latione
between the peoples of China and Japan."
Following release of the Foreign Ministry statement, NCNA carried
an article which went beyond the issues contained in the statement
and aimed an additional volley at "Japanese reactionaiies" for
working in "collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek clique" in an
attempt--proposed in November 1970--to jointly develop the oil
resources of the seabed and subsoil of the seas around these
islands" by "temporarily 'shelving' the dispute over the title to
these islands."
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C H I N A
JOINT EDITORIAL AT NEW YEAR SKIRTS LEADERSHIP ISSUE
The New Year's Day editorial of PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, while plainly reflecting the. recent
leadership changes in China, sheds no new light on the reasons
for the changes or their ultimate effect. Recent media
references to intrigue and conspiracy are given Mao's personal
imprimatur via the instruction to "Practice Marxism and not
revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and aboveboard,
and don't intrigue and conspire."
There is no indication-in the editorial that. the coming year
will see any expansion of the recent purge. Stressing. Mao's
injunctions for unity around the center's line, the editorial
states that the old principle of "curing the sickness to save
the patient" must be applied to those who have fallen into
error and unity can be reached with those "who have wrongly
opposed us but are sincerely correcting their mistakes." But
the editorial does also reiterate Mao's October 1968 instruc-
tion that in party building it is necessary to "get rid of
the stale and take in the fresh."
ROLE OF PLA In line with recent practice,.the political.
role of the PLA receives less attention. The
editorial emphasizes that the PLA must reform itself and
"raise ics political and military qualities higher." Lin
Piao's "four good" standards for improving. army. units,. men-
tioned in last year's editorial in this regard, have dropped
out of PRC media.
The most obvious sign of the PLA's changed status comes in a
well-known Mao quote which has been revised since its inclusion
in last year's editorial. Last year Mao was said. to have
enjoined: "In industry learn from Taching; in agriculture
learn from Tachai; the whole nation should learn from the PLA."
The editorial this year adds a final phrase: "the Liberation.
Army should learn from the people of the whole country."
Broadly intimating that army opposition to the new diplomatic
line is a cause of the purge of PLA leaders, the editorial
singles out "armymen and people" in enjoining study of "the
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international situation and the party's line and policies in
foreign affairs" and defense against both "aggr'asion and
subversion."*
To greet the traditional "support the army and cherish the
people" campaign, the State Council and the-CCP Military
Commission issued a circular on 3 January, and this too
reaffirms the army's less"npd status. Like the joint editorial,
the circular quotes Mao to the effect.that.the army must learn
from the people; it also affirms that the PLA must.improve
discipline and follow the party's guidance.
Last year separate circulars for the PLA and- for civilians
were issued by the State Council and. the PLA General Political
Department. The change this year to a single. circular. issued
by the Government and a party organ seems designed to. stress.
the PLA's subordination to state and party. .The circulars
last year stressed the achievements of the.PLA and. its role
as "mainstay of the dictatorship of the. proletariat.'.' The
phrase is repeated this year, but in thecontext.of several
paragraphs on the importance of the masses and of the local
cadres.
PARTY Perhaps in part because the issue. was thoroughly
covered by the special joint editorial of_30 November,
the current editorial devotes little attention. to. party. leader-
ship, simply noting that the principle should be followed..
More attention is devoted to informing.party members-that they
must still learn from the masses and be concerned. for. their..
well-being. Unlike last year, there is no closing-slogan .
wishing long life to "the great, glorious and correct Communist
Party of China."
PRC CLAIMS RECORD HARVEST. TEN PERCENT INDUSTRIAL GAIN
Both the joint editorial and a NCNA roundup on 31 December
broke with the pattern established- of ter. the-.fiasco of . the.
"leap forward" by providing concretefigures for grain, yields. and for outputs of some major industrial products.. Total.
_.
value of industrial and agricultural. output. was said to be
* For a discussion of foreign.policy aspects-of the edi-c.orial,
see the "Sino-Soviet-U.S. Relations" section of this Trends.
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up about 10 percent over last year. While the actual figures
may be somewhat exaggerated, they are consistent with those
for 1970 given Edgar Snow in his interview with Chou En-lai
la't year. Also, again without reference to magnitude, the
Chinese have been selective in their economic claims-in recent
years, choosing not to make claims in relation to preceding
years unless in a direction actually reflected by yields.
AGRICULTURE China's grain output was said.to be 246 million
tons this year; this compares with.the."over
240 million" figure cited by Chou En-lai for the 1970 harvest.
This year's record was said to have been. achieved.despi.te the
obstacle of natural disasters three times. as..great-as.last
year. Much credit is given to irrigation projects and advances
in mechanization and in supplies of fertilizers.
From figures given in the NCNA account and by Chou.En-lai-it
appears that the gains in fertilizer production were almost
exclusively in output from small local plants, whose.product is
of relatively lower quality. These plants. are. now. said. to
account for 60 percent of China's supply,.indicating.a.rise -
in local production for the year of about.two-thirds over 1970.
Besides claiming that China is now "self-sufficient in. grain
and has a surplus," the NCNA report notes that output of some..
industrial crops, whose cultivation has increasingly. been urged-
by propagandists, was stepped up this year. Some crops.for. .
which increases were not claimed are apparently being.-encouraged
by new pricing policies. The report'states that state purchase.
prices for sugar cane and beets, oil-bearing crops, and bast-
fiber crops have been raised.
INDUSTRY Industrial production seems generally to have risen
more in fields given special-emphasis-in the
media over the past year. Thus mining.machinery,.which has
been the focus of numerous articles stressing that steel. .
cannot be made without ore, showed a gain of. nearly 70 percent,
the largest percentage gain given. Iron ore output increased
by 26 percent.
Although excessive concentration on metallurgical equipment has
been a charge aimed at the Liuist "swindlers," production. of -
metallurgical equipment is said to be up nearly-one-quarter.
Total steel output is said to have reached 21-million-tons;
Chou had indicated that the 1970 figure was around 18.million,
but he told Snow that "a rapid increase is expected this year."
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HUNAN HOLDS SECOND PARTY PLENUM. FIRST PROVINCE TO DO SO
On 26 December, the Changsha radio reported on Hunan's second
provincial party plenum, held from 13 to 20 December--about one
year plus two weeks following the first plenum. This could be
an indication of a pattern of anniversary plenums to be followed
by other provinces, but it is also possible that Hunan, as Mao's
native province, will stand alone in holding a plenum amidst
the unsolved leadership problems at the center.
A total of 79 members and alternates attended the plenum, against
the 90 named to the new committee a.year ago; but some may have
absented themselves because of illness. or other duties. The.
December 1970 announcement of the committee's formation did not
state that all members were l.:esent; and, to cite one known
example, Hsieh Fu-chih failed to attend the congress and plenum
that confirmed his election as Peking first secretary.
Hunan has probably fared better than most provinces in the
upheavals this fall. Its first secretary Hua Kuo-feng.has
been promoted to a post in Peking, the only provincial chief
who has so far risen in the aftermath of Lin's.downfall. The
secretary and deputy secretary, respectively commissar-and
commander of the military district, both attended the plenum.
The plenum apparently discussed political and economic tasks,
stressing party leadership over all areas. Although-Lin-was
not mentioned by the plenum report, a speech by deputy secretary
Yang Ta-i on party leadership and Mao.'s line and a.discussion.
of 10 measures on "repudiation of revisionism and rectification
of work style" were probably concerned with Lin's fate. The
conference also discussed P. 10-year plan..for industrialization
and agricultural mechanization. Other provinces-have also
recently referred to 10-year plans, and it maybe that.provincial
planning generally is to proceed on a 10-year basis.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW SEES U.S. PHANTOM DECISION AS THREATENING PEACE
Moscow responds in predictable fashion to President Nixon's
statement, in his 2 January CBS interview, that the United States
has made a "commitment in principle" to sell additional jet
aircraft to Israel. TASS in reporting the interview on the 3d
typifies Soviet reaction in declaring that the decision shows
that the United States continues to aid the "aggressor" and
thus creates obstacles to a political settlement. Moscow radio's
Cairo correspondent Kudryavtsev, in an Arabic-language broadcast
on the 4th, says Cairo observers point out that President Nixon
announced the decision at the time Jatring's mission was to be
resumed. Kudryavtsev asserts that U.S. media have been trying to
portray the decision as a quid pro quo for Mrs. Meir's undertaking,
in her meeting with the President, to make concessions, bv* that
this has been denied by an Israeli spokesman.
A Potemkin article in PRAVDA on the 3d and one by Nikanorov in
IZVESTIYA on the 4th claim the U.S. decision disproves Washington's
assertions of lack of bias in the Middle East and ends U.S.
attempts to play the role of an impartial mediator. Potemkin
sees the discarding of the "farcical unofficial embargo" on the
sale of Phantoms to Israel as evidence of the tremendous influence
of Zionist circles on the U.S. Government, and Nikanorov
similarly calls the decision the result of Zionist pressure
"capable of influencing the outcome of the presidential election."
Moscow had promptly noted, in a 31 December Arabic-language
broadcast, reports by U.S. media that day that the United States
had decided to resume the sale of Phantoms to Israel, but at
first gave the development little further publicity other than
to report Cairo press "indignation." TASS on 1 January cited
a statement by an unidentified Egyptian "informed source"--also
quoted by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY--that such reports are
considered as encouraging Israel's expansionist policy and
aggravating the Middle East crisis. The Egyptian official
spokesman's statement, reported by MENA on the 4th, is
briefly cited by TASS the following day as declaring that
the U.S. decision to supply more Phantoms to Israel is a
challenge to world public opinion, creating a still more
dangerous situation in the area.
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An Arabic-language commentary on the 3d pegged to the U.S.
decision approvingly cited Arab press comment advocating
"decisive measures" against imperialist interests in the Arab
world. A Primakov article in the 5 January PRAVDA, as reported
by TAS-: routinely assails U.S. assistance to Israel without
mentioning the Phantom issue. Primakov remarks that "objective
observers" draw the conclusion that the United States, while
supporting Israel's "aggressive policy," fears for its positions
in the Arab countries "where its principal economic interests
in the Middle East are concentrated,"
PRIMAKOV URGES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN YEAR-END REVIEW
Former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Yevgeniy Primakov, rc-:
deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of
World Economy and International Relations, again underscored
Soviet support for a political settlement in a year-end radio
series touching on various aspects of the Middle East situation.
And in a 5 January PRAVDA article, Primakov again presses Moscow's
proposals for a political settlement, as he had done in a Moscow
domest'c service commentators' roundtable on 19 December, and
expresses the belief that many conditions are available for
normalizing the Middle East situation.
Primakov's series of four talks, broadcast in the Arabic service
27-30 December, employs some of the same arguments and touches
on some of the same themes as the series of talks by Maksimov
broadcast in Arabic in November.* In his first installment,
Primakov dealt with the military balance in the Middle East,
stressing that there is a "tendency" toward an equilibrium
but that the process of achieving a balance of military power
between the Arabs and Israel "is long and complex." As an
example of Egypt's improved military position, Primakov--like
Maksimov in November--cited the September downing of an
Egyptian aircraft by Israel, the downing of an Israeli plane
in return, and Israeli retaliatory action in firing Shrike air-
to-ground missiles at Arab positions "for the first time" with
"mediocre results." (Maksimov said the Shrike salvo "caused
no harm or losses to the Egyptian forces.") Primakov assured
his listeners that the trend toward military equilibrium "is
developing," and declared that the Soviet Union furnishes "the
* The Maksimov commentaries are discussed in the 24 November
TRENDS, pages 20-21, and the 1 December TRENDS, pages 18-19.
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appropriate conditions" for strengthening Arab military power.
He recalled the Soviet declaration, in the joint communique on
Egyptian President as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow, that the
USSR would continue to render "whatever is necessary to strengthen
the military power" of Egypt.
While Primakov asserted that these Soviet measures "are continuing,"
he left the impression that the military negotiations might not
have been entirely smooth. He juxtaposed to his remark on the
"continuing" measures the observation that Soviet-Arab relations
"as a whole" developed successfully, but immediately conceded
that 1971 "was very complicated from this aspect as well." He
explained that events in certain Arab countries, such as the
"anticommunist hysteria" in Sudan, were exploited by imperialist
propaganda in an effort to foster Soviet-Arab differences.
Recalling that Ponomarev was visiting Egypt during the anti-
communist campaign in Sudan, Primakov said "the wisdom of the
Egyptian statesmen prevailed" in that the communique on Ponomarev's
visit condemned hostility toward communism, as did the later
communique on as-Sadat's Moscow visit.
In the context of further attempts to exploit "differences of.
opinion" between certain Arab countries and the USSR, Primakov
in his second talk implicitly responded to Arab criticism--most
vociferously from Libya--of the Soviet position on the Indian-
Pakietani conflict. He rejected the "inadmissible" contention
that the Arabs should support Pakistan in all its actions because
it is a Moslem country, and argued that the Islamic label in
itself does not make a movement or a country good or bad. In
his third talk Primakov gave the standard propaganda assessment
of Washington's "so-called good offices" in efforts for an
interim settlement along with a routine picture of Israel's
"growing international isolation."
Primakov's concluding talk emphasized a Middle East political
settlement, mentioned 10 times in four paragraphs. Like Makismov,
who had declared that support for a political settlement did not
mean peace at any price, Primakov explained that such a solution
does not mean searching for "peace in any way possible."
Rather, the Soviet Union, he said, equates a political
settlement with the struggle to eliminate the consequences
of "Israeli aggression." Also like Maksimov, Primakov
insisted that there is no contradiction between seeking a
political solution and assisting the Arabs in consolidating
their "defense capability" since the stronger the Arabs become
militarily, the more rapidly a political settlement will be
achieved.
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Primakov also touched on the importance of recognition of the
ralestinians' legitimate rights in any settlement. He observed
that the Palestinian movement has been weakened militarily as
a result of attacks by extreme rightist elements which exploited
"leftist actions by some Palestinian groups." But he noted that
every liberation movement has its ups and downs, and asserted
that the Palestinian movement must still be taken into account,
particularly in light of the support it receives from the Arab
people "and the Soviet Union."
But while pledging unspecified Soviet support to the Arab
Palestinians, Primakov typically offered no suggestions for
solving the Palestinian problem and indeed immediately went on
to reiterate, in effect, Israel's right to exist: The Soviet
Union, he said, "wants all countries in this area to be assured
of survival and secure boundaries for these countries maintained."
Otherwise, he concluded, a situation might arise which could again
activate "imperialist forces" and jeopardize Arab revolutionary
achievements and progressive changes.
SOVIET Primakov in the broadcast series did not take the
PROPOSALS occasion to mention the Soviet proposals for a
Middle East settlement, but in a 5 January PRAVDA
article he does bring up the subject. The proposals are not
known to have been detailed in Soviet propaganda since Primakov
outlined them in a 15 October 1970 PRAVDA article.
Affirming that the USSR stands for a political settlement,
Primakov analyzes "specific features" of the Soviet measures
in his PRAVDA article, listing first the need for Israeli with-
drawal from all occupied Arab territories along with simultaneous
termination of the state of war and establishment of peace
between Israel and the Arab states. Primakov observes that it
is "evidently necessary" to call attention to the fact that
only the borders established for Israel by the United Nations
in 1947 have a basis in international law. In the roundtable
discussion on 19 December, Primakov had noted that the Soviet
proposals aim at insuring the existence of "generally recognized
frontiers" in the area, and Israel could find security in this
recognition of "existing frontiers." In PRAVDA, he declares that
? the Soviet plan is a "well-considered system of measures to
provide guarantees for the security of the borders of all
countries" in the region, including guarantees by "a number of
great powers" or the UN Security Council or both.
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Primakov advises the Arabs that a "major prerequisite" for a
successful struggle is the solidarity and unity of the Arab
countries themselves on an anti-imperialist basis, and
cautions them that imperialism is "trying to capitalize on
differences between Arab countries in their approach to the
solution of individual problems."
Expressing the opinion that many conditions are available for
normalizing the situation, Primakov points to Resolution 242
as a basis for a political settlement and says the resolution
could be implemented now. He recalls Israel's failure to give
"an official reply" to Ambassador Jarring's 8 February 1971
memorandum, but does not, according to the TASS review, call
for a positive Israeli reply now--a condition set by Egyptian
President as-Sadat in his 11 November speech to the People's
Assembly.
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YUGOSLAVIA
FOREIGN CURRENCY ISSUE RESOLVED, TITO CRACKDOWN CONTINUES
Federal and republic authorities, at Tito's insistence, have
agreed to a compromise solution of the controversial foreign
currency problem--the issue that triggered the 10-day November-
December strike by Croatian students and was seized upon by
Tito as an opportunity for a showdown with the Croatian leaders.
At the same time, the Yugoslav Pres'dent has sustained his
pressure on nationalist and other dissident elements throughout
the country. A League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
Presidium document on the tasks of the party, published in the
30 December BORBA in preparation for the second League confer-
ence, calls for a continuing struggle against the class enemy
and warns that there will be no democracy for those who try
to undermine the system. According to TANJUG, the Zagreb city
committee of the League of Communists met on the 30th and
decided on a thorough housecleaning of all "champions of
nationalist ideology" in all conference organizations and
"particularly of some university professors."
Meanwhile, the media continue to carry isolated reports of
Croatian unrest and arrests of Croatian citizens for "nationalist
excesses." Demonstrating that the Yugoslav authorities' crackdown
on nationalist elements extends to other republics as well,
TANJUG reported on the 30th that the Serbian security police
had arrested Slobodan Subotic, the chairman of both the Serbian
and Yugoslov bar associations, for "hostile activity against the
state." Subotic, and an unemployed engineer and five other
unidentified persons arrested with him, were charged specifically
with writing, printing, and distributing nationalist, anti-
communist propaganda.
REFORM OF Following Tito's 18 December demand for a
FOREIGN EXCHANGE rapid solution to the foreign exchange
problem--long a cause of discontent in
Croatia--the Federal and republican authorities reached an
agreement on the controversial question, TANJUG reported on the
29th. According to the agreement, Croatia and the other
republics will be allowed to keep more of their foreign currency
earnings. Where in the past exporters were allowed to keep only
7 percent of these funds, the reform allows them to keep 20 per-
cent. It also provides for an increase from 40 to 45 percent
for foreign exchange earnings from tourism.
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In an apparent effort to sell the reform to the Croatians,
the Zagreb daily VJESNIK on 1 January carried a lengthy
interview with Ratko Karlovic, a member of the Council of
the Croatian Assembly, in which he hailed the agreement
as a victory for commonsense rather than a triumph of any
individual, republic. Acknowledging that no republic got all
it wanted, he cautioned that "results would not follow automatically"
from the reform agreement and urged Croatians to use their
"business acumen to take advantage of the opportunities"
provided by the new measures.
LCY PRESIDIUM The 29 December meeting of the LCY Presidium--
DOCUMENT the third within a month--resulted in a
Presidium document entitled "The Development
and Current Tasks of the LCY" published in BORBA the next day.
According to TANJUG, the document is designed to serve as a
basis for public debate in preparation for the second LCY
conference scheduled for 25-26 January, ,hich will take up
the problem of the League's reorganization. Judging by the
content of the document, TANJUG commented on the 29th, "a
further sharpening can be expected in the open clash between
the LCY and those trends which put obstacl?ai in the way of
reinforcing the decisive role of the working class."
Describing the present situation as one of "deepening ferment"
in many sectors of Yugoslav life, the document warns against
efforts of "nationalist and other opponents" to challenge the
class basis of the Yugoslav revoluticaary movement and calls
for a strengthened party to deal with them. It pointedly
adds that there will be no democracy foY those who seek to
undermine the Yugoslav social system. Attempting to maintain
a middle position between nationalists and unitarists, who
prefer strong central rule, the document goes on to voice
opposition to any concept that would lead to a loose coalition
of republican organizations or to any restoration of "centralistic,
supra-republican organization." Although the document professes
to envisage more autonomy for republic parties in the planned
reorganization, it emphasizes that the principle of democratic
centralism must be observed "from tot- to bottom" and underlines
that the prime goal of the League reorganization must be to
strengthen the party's role in political and social life
throughout the country.
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NEW INCIDENTS Although the compromise solution on the foreign
IN CROATIA currency issue may assuage Croatian grievances
and bolster the new Croatian party leadership,
the problem of republic nationalism and the new animosities
generated between the Croats and the Belgrade center by Tito's
intervention in Croatian affairs will continue to pose difficulties.
The Yugoslav authorities' concern over this problem seemed
inflected in press reports on 28 and 29 December that the ousted
leaders--Dabcevic-Kucar, Tripalo, and Pirker--had requested that
tite Zagreb daily VJESNIK publish their statemints dissociating
themselves from "some individuals and small groups" who are using
their names and who support "hostile positions." According to
TANJUG reports on 13 and 14 December on student protests in
the wake of the ouster of the Croatian leaders, the demonstrators had
shouted slogans expressing support for Dabcevic-Kucar and Tripalo.
Although there have been no new reports of such manifestations,
Zagreb's VJESNIK reported on 3 January that seven youths were
sent to prison for 60 days for singing nationalist songs. The
same paper also reported that four person,3 in Bosanka Krupa were
given similar sentences for "nationalist and chauvinist excesses
and insults to the highest organs of authority of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia."
According to a TANJUG report on 5 January, a mail room employee
in BORBA's Zagreb printing plant was killed by an exploding parcel
which the police assumed contained a time bomb. TANJUG on
the 1st had reported that Yugoslav customs officers on the
Yugoslav-Greek border apprehended two persons attempting to
smuggle mines into the country.
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- 42 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BELATED PUBLICATION OF STALIN-ERA HISTORY ANNOUNCED
PRAVDA on 29 December announces the publication of the long-awaited
Book 2, Volume 4 in the official multivolume "History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union." This work deals with the
most sordid period of Stalin's regime, the 1929-37 era of the
collectivization of agriculture, the assassination of Kirov, and
the launching of the great terror. Publication was suspended in
late 1970, presumably because of unresolved differences in the
leadership over the Stalin issue or concern over the book's
potentially disruptive impact on public opinion, and another,
later book in the series was released in January 1971, covering
the 1938-45 period.*
The new work will provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive
assessment of Stalin by Khrushchev's successors. However, in
view of Brezhnev's statement at the 24th CPSU Congress that
the "problems" connected with the Stalin cult have "irrevocably
receded into the past," it seems likely that the new work will
not depart markedly from those historical assessments of recent
years which have uniformly extolled the virtues of the `heroic"
past while muting criticism of Stalin's "mistakes."
For background, see the TRENDS for 3 February 1971, pages 38-39.
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