TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 23, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

N~ w L j ? _ ? 1 ? j ?Nl;l1 N ". ?M ~ ? 1 Nf? .~N? 1 ? N? ('
.`?{'~,'~+yl" {w? ~ : ~ .. M {~r? j M?QQ~l/ljpp_~~_JMJMOOj{{ ?? ' ??~ ? +jj^+jLL}} ` L/ (}{?~~??`(}(N?? ~ t {jf C ~ ?jr~ p t ? ~ _.
?? t?M? ???~ fNN .1 ?t? ' . YJM~ '.I~?` ~t~~~ ttt VI~ ?W'. '~i" ?_I ~~ ~iN~! ~?~ w(~~N~ MIMjt ~fM0 _ pp or Retea~f /75 CIA- 85t 875 0 3UU4 3 8 _
? Q}1
?IIM ~1M~ `NN?N~ Y T ~? _ . --C ~w?~~w?~ ~?l 4 .l ~. /
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST ~
INFORMATION
S ERVICE
~~Illllll~~muiiii~~llllllll~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
SUPPLEMENT
TENTH ANNIVERSARIES OF NORTH KOREAN TREATIES WITH USSR. PRC
STATSPEC
Confidential
23 July 1971
(COL. XXII, NO. 29)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by PSIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
olour I
bdubl l..w eWwNk
dw.IndW G .d
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Fie ease 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
TENTH ANNIVERSARIES OF NORTH KOREAN TREATIES WITH USSR, PRC
The observance of the 10th anniversaries of the signing of the
DPRK's treaties of friendsuip, cooperation, and mutual assistance
with the USSR (6 July) and the PRC (11 July) reflected the current
state of Pyongyang's relations with its two big communist allies.
As dec-nnial anniversaries, both received more publicity than
the routine annual observances, but the Sino-Korean anniversary
was celebrated far more lavishly than the Soviet-Korean one.*
Peking's warm treatment of the occasion came against a background
of the return to cordial relations with Pyongyang over the past
year and a half. Peking had given the 1970 anniversary considera-
ble publicity after three years of token attention during the
period of frigid Sino-Korean relations. The current observance
followed other continuing Chinese moves to restore former bonds
with the North Koreans. The Chinese senior representative at
the Korean Military Armistice Commission was reported by NCNA
on .16 June to have returned to his post after an absence of
five years. On 3 July NCNA reported the conclusion of a
bilateral Sino-Korean agreement on rescue at sea. In June 1.967
Peking had refused to continue a joint sea-rescue agreement
to which the USSR, the PRC, and the DPRK were signators. The
following October Pyongyang had signed a bilateral agreement
with the Soviets,
Leaders' messages were exchanged on both anniversaries, and
Peking marked the occasion with a joint editorial and dispatched
a high-powered delegation to Pyongyang, The North Koreans
reciprocated by sending a major delegation to Peking., A
Soviet delegation headed by a Politburo member went to
Pyongyang, but the North Koreans were represented only by
their ambassador in Moscow. Though both the Chinese and
Soviets showed some restraint in failing to echo Pyongyang's
more belligerent anti-American charges, the Chinese were
clearly able to stake out a larger ground of mutual interests
with the Koreans than the more circumspect Soviets. Both
the big countries sought to score points with Pyongyang by
portraying a Japanese threat in East Asia, but the Chinese
went well beyond the Soviets in affirming mutual security
interests with the North Koreans.
* Peking devoted, more than 4O percent of its propaganda to
the Sino-Korean anniversary in the week ending 18 July,
while Moscow's comment on the Soviet-Korean anniversary
accounted for only nine percent of its propaganda during
the week of 5-11 July.
Approved For Release I 9990 ~N1 1- RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R0 .03Q0040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUr,DLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
- 2 -
Sino-Soviet polemics were muted on the occasion, though Moscow
delivered some polemical Jabs in broadcasts to the Chinese and
Peking's comment included attacks on the "superpowers."
Leaders from both sides were able to put on a show of
fraternity in Pyongyang in connection with wreath-laying
ceremonies in which each side honored the others' fallen
soldiers.
A Soviet delegation headed by Politburo member and First
Deputy Premier Mazurov* visited North Korea from 5 to 9 July
for the anniversary, attending a rally and banquets and
visiting Songnim. Kim I1-so.ig entertained the guests at a
luncheon on the 7th, after receiving them for a "friendly
conversation." The anniversary was observed in Moscow in
a routine way comparable to nondecennial occasions; no
North Korean delegation visited the USSR, the DPRK Ambassador
representirg his country at the various events. He addressed
a Moscow me.;t:.ng which was attended by Politburo member
Voronov and also addressed by Vice Premier Novikov. He
also attended a luncheon hosted by Gronyko and gave a
banquet at which Voronov spoke.
Moscow's comment reflected its general reluctance to
associate itself with Pyongyang's anti-American bellicosity.
Soviet propaganda characteristically emphasized the economic
aid that the Soviets have given the North Koreans over the
years. Speaking at the Pyongyang rally, Mazurov reviewed
in some detail the economic and technical aid the USSR had
given the DPRK, pointing out that "a substantial role in the
fulfillment" of the DPRK's economic plans was played by
Soviet assistance. Pyongyang's summaries of his speech
omitted these passages, possibly reflecting sensitivity over
its claim to self-reliance. North Korean spokesmen
expressed gratitude in general terms for the aid given
by the USSR during the Korean War and during postwar
reconstruction, as well as for Soviet "support" today for
the struggle for Korean unification.
* Mazurov had visited Pyongyang last August for the 25th
anniversary of the Korean liberation. He also hosted First
Vice Premier Kim I1 when the latter visited Moscow in March
1967.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
Soviet speakers in Moscow particularly stressed the peaceful
aspects of the treaty, but a 6 July IZVESTIYA article described
it as "a serious warning to those who have not abandoned
attempts to operate from a position of strength and to test
the strength of the socialist system by force of arms."
Soviet comment did not, however, name the United States in
the context of reading a warning into the treaty. In his
speeches in North Korea Mazurov used more militant formulations
than the speakers at home, inveighing against "the reactionary
and aggressive nature of the U.S. imperialists." He called
the treaty "a resolute warning to people who like playing
with fire that encroachments by an aggressor upon the
socialist gains and sovereign rights of our peoples will
encounter a worthy rebuff," and at a banquet on the 8th he
acknowledged that the treaty contributes to "military
cooperation" between the two countries.
Moscow's characterizations of the treaty's role were bland
in comparison with those of North Korean speakers, who
typically described it as an instrument for curbing the
"criminal maneuvers of the imperialists, headed by U.S.
imperialism," at a time when their "aggressive and war-
provocative maneuvers are being further intensified." The
DPRK ambassador was particularly outspoken in delivering
this message at the Moscow meeting. Portraying a situation
in which the "U.S. imperialists" are intensifying aggressive
moves and the "Japanese militarists" are stepping up plans
for overseas aggression, he declared that it "is of great
significance for the two countries to further consolidate
the relations of alliance and faithfully discharge the
obligations they assumed under the treaty."
Both sides concentrated on depicting a threat in Asia arising
from U.S.-instigated "Japanese militarism" rather than
elaborating a picture of a U.S. threat. The Soviets
generally avoided even their routine accusations that U.S.
"provocations" against the DPRK and the military buildup in
the ROK increase tensions on the peninsula.* At the
Pyongyang rally Mazurov took note of the visits to South
Korea of "those who are maintaining the Seoul puppets with
bayonets and money," but he avoided naming Vice President
Agnew and did not depict a U.S. threat to the DPRK.
* An atypically strong Soviet charge had appeared in a
25 June PRAVDA article on the Korean War anniversary which
explicitly linked U.S. modernization of ROK forces and the
moving of "fresh U.S. troops into the South" with a planned
Appro Ftb9- '119tA%6/2"3'YCTAt bPq5 75R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
The 6 July IZVESTIYA article described an atmosphere of
unceasing provocations by the American military and the
South Korean regime," South Korean regime,"'but did not
invoke the danger of renewed hostilities in'Korea and went
on to praise the DPRK's eight-point program for "peaceful"
unification and demand the withdrawal of American-troops from
South Korea.
North Korean speakers referred briefly to U.S. preparations
for a "new war" in Korea, but they did not specify charges
such as infiltration of spies and incursions by spy boats
and aircraft as they did subsequently on the anniversary
of the treaty with the Chinese. A speaker at the Pyongyang
rally made one pointed effort to link Soviet security
interests with those of the DPRK. In a passage describing
Japanese designs on South Korea and Taiwan he added that
the Japanese claim the "northern territories" occupied
by the Soviet Union. Driving the point home, he stressed
that it "stands out today as a very urgent task to fight
against Japanese militarism . . . while struggling
resolutely against U.S. imperialism." The closest
Mazurov came to linking Soviet, Korean, and Chinese security
interests was his remark at the rally that the Americans
and Japanese are becoming "increasingly active in the
direct proximity of the borders of the socialist states."
COLLECTIVE Describing the Soviet "peace program,"
SECURITY Mazurov mentioned "collective security"
along with b ar..ning nuclear, chemical, and
bacteriological weapons, liquidating foreign bases, and
halting the arms race. He did not, however, resurrect
the notion of an "Asian collective security system," a
proposal with anti-Chinese overtones which he had
mentioned in Pyongyang in August 1970 but which Pyongyang
had censored in its account of his statement. This time
the Pyongyang domestic service summary of his speech
omitted his remarks on the Soviet proposals, while the
KCNA account dismissed the passage containing the proposals
by noting simply that Mazurov "referred to the question
of nuclear disarmament."
COMMUNIST Speakers on both sides voiced standard and
UNITY mutually acceptable appeals for communist
unity against imperialism. Moscow's willingness
to mute its polemics with Peking on this occasion was
reflected in ceremonies in which Mazurov laid wreaths at
monuments to fallen Korean, Soviet, and Chinese soldiers.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
Both KCNA and a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin reported that
Mazurov met the Chinese ambassador at the memorial to the
Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), the Moscow broadcast
adding that after the ceremony Mazurov "held talks" with
the PRC ambassador in which he stressed the need for Soviet,
Chinese, and North Korean unity. Soviet central media did
not report the meeting.
In some low-level. comment broadcast in Mandarin, Moscow used
the anniversary as an opportunity once again to attack
Peking's "splittist" policies. A broadcast on 6 July was
particularly outspoken, saying that Chinese policy harms
the interests of the Korean people at a time when the United
States "directly threatens" DPRK security. Saying that the
Soviet-Korean treaty guarantees that "the DPRK is truly capable
of defending itself against any aggression," the commentary
made a rare Soviet reference to the Pueblo incident, claiming
that "the firm stand and resolute action taken by the Soviet
Union" in the spirit of the treaty in that episode "stopped
Washington from resorting to armed force on a large scale
on the Korean penninsula."
EFFUSIVE COMMENT ON PRC-DPRK TREATY HIGHLIGHTS SOLIDARITY
Peking and Pyongyang exchanged high-ranking delegations from
10 to 16 July. The Chinese group, led by Politburo member
and Vice Premier I*, Hsien-nien, included the head of the
General Political Department of the PLA, the head of the
CCP's International Liaison Department, and the minister of
foreign trade as well as vice ministers, The North Korean
delegation was led by Kim Chung-nin, a Political Committee
member, and included such luminaries as a vice premier and
the first deputy chief of the KPA General Staff.
Activities in both capitals included rallies and banquets,
and the delegations took side trips to Hamhung and Shanghai,
respectively. On 11 July Kim I1, Pak Song-chol, Political
Committee member 0 Chin-u, and alternate member Yang Hyong-sop
had "very cordial and friendly talks" with the Chinese visitors,
and on the 13th Kim Il-song received them for "a fraternal and
friendly talk" before hosting them at a luncheon. The Korean
representatives were received in Peking on 10 July by Chou
En-lai, Huang Yung-sheng, and other leaders for talks in what
NCNA termed "a warm atmosphere of great friendship and revolu-
tionary unity of the parties and peoples of China and Korea."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLED1ENT
23 JULY 1971
On the 12th NCNA reported that Chou and Huang received the
Koreans for talks in "an extremely cordial and friendly
atmosphere." Mao took no part in the activities, mart from
the greetings message.
In contrast to the routine-level press comment from Moscow,
Peking marked the treaty anniversary with a joint editorial
in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY.
Another feature of the Sino-Korean anniversary that was not
part of the Soviet-Korean observance was the inauguration of
a "friendship week" marked in the PRC and the DPRK. There
was also an exchange of provincial delegations tc attend
provincial rallies. (There had been only one brief Soviet
report that a Korean provincial delegation visited the Soviet
Maritime Province for the USSR-DPRK anniversary.)
Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese joined with the North Koreans
in describing their treaty as being directed against "U.S.
imperialist aggression." The Chinese also explicitly
quoted the passage of the treaty committing them to provide
military assistance to their ally in case of attack.
Chinese willingness to link their security interests with
those of North Korea was stated most forcefully by PLA
Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 10 July Peking banquet
at which he said that the security of the two countries is
"closely interrelated." Historical experience has proven,
he declared, "that when the enemy invades China, it invariably
invades Korea first, and that when it invades Korea, it
invariably further invades China."
In portraying a common threat Peking focused on a menacing
"Japanese militarism" which, in "collusion" with the United
States, plots aggression against Korea, China, and other
Asian countries. Although Chinese speakers accused the
United States of "carrying out provocations" against the
DPRK as well as occupying Taiwan and resorting to a
"two Chinas conspiracy," the Chinese left it to the North
Koreans to make specific charges that the United States
sends "armed agents, armed Spy ships, and high-altitude
reconnaissance planes" to intrude into the DPRK and
carries out "armed attacks" along the demilitarized zone.
In none of the propaganda was there an explicit reference
to the Pueblo or to the downing of the U.S. EC-121
reconnaissance plane, although as recently as the 25 June
Korean War anniversary Peking recalled the Pueblo incident
in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Peking also treated Vice
N Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
President Agnew with a measure of restraint in denouncing his
visit to South Korea. While the Korean speakers typically
? called him an "imperialist warmonger," the Chinese avoided
epithets except for the relatively mild characterization--by
Chang Chun-chiao at a Shanghai rally--cf the Vice President
as a "chieftain of the U.S. aggressors."
Peking recalled that the CPV had helped the Koreans during the
Korean War but did not otherwise refer to Chinese aid. The
Koreans thanked the Chinese for having dispatched the CPV and
also expressed gratitude for the "tremendous" assistance
given by the Chinese during postwar reconstruction and for
currently "supporting" the Korean struggle for unification.
Peking continued to express support for the North Koreans'
eight-point program for "peaceful" unification, as it did
on the Korean War anniversary. Peking had resurrected this
modifier in its discussion of Korean unification last fall
for the first time since 1966.
ASIAN UNIT'. As expected, propaganda on both sides was
pervaded by the theme of Asian unity, with
repeatea invocations of a "united front" of the people of
Korea, China, the Indochinese countries, and other "revolu-
tionary" countries of Asia. Speaking at the Peking rally,
Yao Wen-yuan put a new gloss on the theme, observing that a
strong front opposing U.S. aggression is developing and
growing "in the eastern part of Asia." Once again, as has
become habitual on such occasions, the theme was further
served by the presence at the festivities in Peking of
representatives of Sihanouk's government, the DRV, the
PRG, and the NLHS.
Unlike the Korean War snniversary, when Peking avoided
anti-Soviet remarks, the Chinese used the treaty anniversary
for attacks on the "superpowers" and "modern revisionism."
Yao Wen-yuan praised "medium-sized and small nations" for
uniting to oppose the "politics of hegemony of the super-
powers," a remark duly reported by KCNA. Peking's joint
editorial, after a passage depicting the development of
Asian unity against U.S. aggression and Japanese militarism,
said it would be daydreaming for "any superpower or any
'economic power'"---an allusion to Japan--to try to "ride
roughshod" over the Asian people and "turn back the wheel
of history." The North Koreans may have been reluctant
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT
23 JULY 1971
to permit anti-Soviet politicking on the occasion, which could
have accounted for the fact that Li Hsien-nien at the Pyongyang
rally had recourse to the April 1970 joint communique on Chou's
visit to North Korea to get in a dig at "modern revisionism."
The Chinese visitors in North Korea, like the Soviet delegation
before them, laid wreaths at monuments to fallen soldiers from
all three countries. Both Pyongyang and Peking reported that
the memorial to the Soviet soldiers was included, but only the
North Korean account noted the Soviet ambassador's meeting with
the Chinese at that ceremony.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
torn the agreements of the two Geneva conferences to scraps with
its own hands dripping with blood." A 13 October 1970 PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article, reacting to President Nixon's 7 October
Indochina proposals, said that the Geneva agreements "have long
been torn into pieces by U.S. imperialism," adding that the
United. States had cast the agreements "into oblivion." At that
tine, two months before Peking's first endorsement of the PRG's
proposals at Paris, Peking's comment on the President's proposal
made no mention of the Paris talks or the communist negotiating
position, and these topics were also omitted from Peking's
accounts of Vietnamese cement.
In now marking the Geneva anniversary with an editorial, including
another endorsement of the PRG's peace proposal, Peking has taken
another step toward restoring its political and diplomatic options
following a period of single-minded opposition to a negotiated
settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Peking's last previous editorial
on the anniversary was in 1965, when PEOPLE'S DAILY lauded the signing
of the accords as "a major victory" for the Indochinese. While
ignoring the anniversary in 1966, Peking comment at that time--pegged
to a fighting appeal to the Vietnamese by Ho Chi Minh--declared that
the Geneva agreements were "already nonexistent." During that period
the Chinese showed great sensitivity to invocations of the Geneva
agreements in connection with appeals for Vietnam peace talks.
In addition to publishing its own 20 July editorial, Peking marked
the anniversary this year by publicizing the texts of NHAN DAN's
20 July editorial and of a Royal Government of. National Union of
Cambodia (RGNUC) statement and summarizing 20 July editorials
of the Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN and the Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT.
Both the RGNUC statement and the NODONG SINMUN editorial praised
the intent of the 1954 Geneva agreements--the RGNUC statement
characterized the accords as "a shining victory won by the
Vietnamese people"--and accused the United States of "systematically
violating" them. Also on the 20th, Peking reported a meeting in
Hanoi between a delegation of the DRV National Assembly's committee
on national reunificatiun and the PRG's "special representation"
to the DRV. The next day NCNA carried a correspondent'n account
of the "heroic" achievements of the three Indochinese peoples in
"smashing the enemy's new military adventures in the first half of
this year." Contending that battlefield developments this year
have been "of great strategic importance" and have "brought about
an increasingly excellent situation," the account observed that
the principal characteristic of this reriod was "the three
peoples fighting in unity to foil the enemy's new military
adventures and the three battlefields merging more completely into
one."
Approved For Release I 999/09/2?p 1 pE85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/58'dRY-*P85T00875ftLM70030-8
-8-
USSR CALLS FOR RESPONSE TO PRG, QUESTIONS SINO-U,S. MOTIVES
Routine Moscow comment continues to criticize the United States
for procrastinating on a response to the PRG peace plan.* An
IZVESTIYA article on 17 July says that the United States tried
to "distract" world and U.S. opinion from the PRG proposals by
announc'ng the replacement of Ambassador Bruce by Ambassador
Porter. Some propaganda, including a 15 July TASS item, notes
White House spokesman Ziegler's denial that Brace's retirement
had any political meaning, but also reports his statement that
the White House does not plan a specific reply to the PRG
proposal. TASS cites American press conjectures that Bruce's
resignation will lead to a "new delay" in the Paris talks.
A 16 July IZVESTIYA article speculates that Vietnam was the
main topic of President Nixon's consultations with Kissinger
in Son Clemente upon the latter's return from his Asian tour.
IZVESTIYA says the Administration does not dare openly reject
the PRG proposals and claims that the talks in California
were aimed at finding a more ccnvincing justification for
'procrastination." The commentator also points to American
press speculation that there will be no U.S. reply before the
October elections in South Vietnam. A panelist in the 18 July
domestic service roundtable discussion refers to Kissinger's
meetings with Saigon politicians in observing that the United
States is planning to do all it can to preserve the Thieu
regime. The panelist says that the U.S. answer to the PRG
proposals may be seen in Thieu's speech--given after
Kissinger left--expressing his intention "to continue the
blood-letting on South Vietnamese territory."
* Judging from the TASS summary, Gromyko does not specify
the latest PRG plan in his 13 July letter in reply to UN
Secretary General U Thant's inquiry on the implementation
of a UN declaration on international security. TASS on
the 20th reports Gromyko as saying that "a constructive
foundation for a solution of the problers of Indochina" has
been furnished by the proposals put forward by the DRV, the
PRG, Sihanouk's FUNK, end the Laotian NLHS.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
PRESIDENT'S TRIP Some of Moscow's propaganda reacting to
TO PEKING President Nixon's announcement of his
planned trip to Peking speculates on its
effect on a Vietnam peace settlement.* An 18 July international
review in SOVIET RUSSIA, stating that the latest PRG peace
proposals provide the United States with an opportunity for
withdrawing from Indochina honorably, adds that "perhaps
Washington, which is now attracted to a flirtation with Peking,
is risking letting this chance slip." KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
cites the London DAILY MIRROR as sayirg that the invitation to
Nixon means that "China is using all its influence to help
America extricate itself from Vietnam on terms more acceptable
to it." On the 19th TASS quotes the CPUSA organ DAILY WORLD
as asking whether Nixon is really making his trip in the name
of peace since the United States continues the bombing in
Indochina and uses the troop-withdrawal question for "political
aims."
TASS briefly summarizes the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial on the
Nixon Doctrine, including its assertion that an aspect of the
doctrine is the effort to "split the socialist countries by
winning one part of them to its side and setting it against
the other," a passage which is compatible with Moscow's
"socialist unity" line. A summary printed in PRAVDA on the
20th also includes this passage along with NHAN DAN's assertion
that Nixon is engaged in a "search for the way out," but that
he "has set off in the wrong direction." Both summaries omit
the warning that Nixon's policy also tries to achieve a
"compromise between the big powers" to make "smaller countries
bow to their arrangements."
GENEVA AGREEMENTS Moscow marks the 17th anniversary of the
ANNIVERSARY Geneva agreements with a "solidarity day"
and inauguration of a "solidarity month."
Last year no solidarity month was publicized although it was
observed every previous year back to 1966. The customary
Moscow public meeting is held and messages from public
organizations are reported. TRUD carries an editorial and
* Such comment, some of it more pointed than Moscow's, has
also come from Eastern Europe. See the Sino-U.S. relations
section of this TRENDS.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999M?Fi~ -RDP85T0021 WMFM 9760040030-8
JULY
other comment includes a 20 July PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy.*
The comment routinely expresses Soviet determination to continue
assisting the VietnamesE people in their struggle and demands
the implementation of the Geneva agreements and the withdrawal
of U.S. troops. Commentators support the new PRG initiative
in standard terms, Mayevskiy, for example, reiterating that the
proposal "opens a prospect of peace in Indochina," and that it
now "depends on Washington whether it will avail itself of the
new opportunity or will stubbornly continue the line for
expansion of the criminal war."
INDOCHINA An IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev on 17 July
SETTLEMENT links U.S. failure to respond to the PRG
proposal with its actions in Laos and Cambodia.
Kudryavtsev scores the United States for "pressuring" Souvanna
Phouma to reject the NLHS' latest peace proposal in Laos** at
the same time that it exhibits a "negative attitude" toward
the PRG proposal. The U.S. attitude shows its reluctance to
end aggression, says Kudryavtsev, and since the aggression
has spread to Cambodia and Laos, "it is impossible to speak
of peace in Indochina while aggression continues in even one
of these countries." Kudryavtsev recalls that President Nixon
himself said in his 7 October 1970 speech that the Indochina
war is a "single whole" and cannot be ended by concern with
just one of the regions where it started, although he does
not recall'that President Nixon proposed a broad international
conference on Indochina. Kudryavtsev concludes that the
"propaganda fuss" about gradual withdrawal from Vietnam is
meaningless unless concrete steps are taken "simultaneously"
to end the aggression in Cambodia and Laos.
Moscow in the past has followed Hanoi's lead when, in rejecting
proposals for a broad conference on Indochina, it has implied
that a Vietnam settlement should be separate from settlements
in the other countries. In denouncing President Nixon's
* There had been no editorials last year and only a RED STAR
one in 1969. The three previous anniversaries had been marked
with PRAVDA editorials. The 10th anniversary in 1964 had
received minimal attention and there were no editorials.
** See the TRENDS of 14 July, pages 8-9, and of 30 June,
pages 8-10, for a discussion of the latest NLHS proposal, put
forward by Souphanouvong in a letter to Souvanna Phouma on
22 June.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
7 October proposal for an international conference, Moscow had
said that Vietnam could be settled at Paris and settlements
in Laos and Cambodia were "the business of the peoples in
these countries."
Kudryavtsev in his IZVESTIYA article also refers to Chinese
security interests in Laos but does not go on to criticize
Chinese policies. It notes that Laos borders on the PRC as
well as on Burma and the DRV, and cites the FAR EASTERN
ECONOMIC REVIEW for a report that the CIA scission in Laos
sends intelligence and diversionary groups into China's
Yunnan Province.
MEDIA OBSCURE CALLS AT PARIS FOR CLARIFICATION OF PRG PLAN
The Vietnamese communist delegates' statements at the 15 July
session of the Paris talks again denounced the Nixon Administration's
lack of response to the PRG's 1 July peace package and accused
the United States of distorting their good will and continuing to
wage war. Other propaganda continues to stress worldwide acclaim
and support for the seven-point proposal. This support is
contrasted with the President's failure to respond to communist
demands that he set a troop withdrawal deadline and stop backing
the Thieu administration. DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris
session said that the President reaffirmed his "old erroneous
policy" when he said on 6 July that the United States was
actively pursuing negotiations and Vietnamization simultaneously.
Thuy asked: "How can one seriously negotiate" while carrying
out Vietnamization, which means prolonging and expanding the
war, and "deliberately" maintaining the Thieu administration
"which Is the greatest obstacle to the progress of the Paris
conference?" (Earlier comment had scored the President's
6 July remarks to news media executives in Kansas City for
ignoring the 1 July PRG peace initiative.)
At the session, the communists studiously avoided further
clarification or explanation of any of the seven points; DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy only briefly eapsulized point one on a U.S.
troop withdrawal and prisoner release, while Mme. Nguyen Thi
Binh merely repeated the gist of point one on U.S. withdrawal
and point two on the question of power in South Vietnam. The
efforts of Ambassador Bruce and GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam to
obtain further clarifications are ignored in the VNA account
of the session, which merely says the allied delegates "again
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/(gl25D.RDP85T0087MO.QM040030-8
21. JULY 1971
avoided responding seriously to the PRG's seven-point peace plan
by setting forth perfidious contentions." It adds that the U.S.
delegate "rehashed the absurd claim about 'mutual troop withdrawal'
and still schemed to maintain the Nguyen Van Thieu bellicose group."
VNA thus ignores Ambassador Bruce's and Lam's reiteration of the
U.S. suggestion last week that the talks be moved into restricted
sessions away from the glare of publicity. And it does not
reflect the fact that Bruce answered the four questions posed by
Mme. Binh last week* and asked five of his own. Similarly, the
account of the session ignores the fact that GVN delegate Lam
again sought clarification of a number of issues.
Following standard practice, Vietnamese communist propaganda did
not carry accounts of the post-session press briefings at which
the additional remarks of the communist delegates were revealed.
According to VNA's Service transmission from Paris to Hanoi,
PRG spokesman Duong Dinh Thao reported that Mme. Binh charged
that Bruce's questions were aimed "not at clarifying the problems"
but at "distorting" the proposals and "avoiding the questions
which have been clearly posed." She then repeated the last three
of the four questions she had raised last week--suggesting that
she may have been satisfied with Bruce's remarks, in response to
her first question, to the effect that the United States is
willing to consider for negotiation any proposal by the other
side "as well as our own."
Thao further reported that Mme. Binh said she had the "impression"
that all seven points were "considered negative"--an apparent
allusion to Bruce's request for further clarification of
individual points before he could state which ones the United
States considered positive and which negative.
PRG SUGGESTS VOTING FOR "PEACEFUL CANDIDATE" AGAINST THIEU
In a departure from the standard propaganda fare which dismisses
the forthcoming South Vietnamese presidential election as a
"fraud," a 17 July Liberation Radio broadcast seemed to suggest
that the elections could be used to change the Saigon regime in
* The questions were wh-''h--her the United States agreed to
consider the seven points as a basis for negotiation, which of
the seven points it found positive and which unacceptable,
whether it was ready to set a date to end the war, and whether
it was ready to end its support of the GVN.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
order to proceed to a peaceful settlement. The commentary
quoted the view of "officers and civil servants" that a vote
for Thieu is a vote for war and that "if you want peace, you
should vote for a peaceful candidate." It added that "our
people do not lack talented and virtuous men of good will;
although their views may differ on a few points, their
aspiration for peace is unanimous."*
A similar positive note was struck in another Liberation Radio
broadcast on the 18th which reported that an "expose" by the
Citizens' Political Office (yawn phongf chans trij coong daan)
in Saigon had appealed for the National Asoembly and presidential
elections to be free and honest and proclaimed that: "the
forthcoming elections must provide an opportunity for the people
to arise to demonstrate their indomitability, to sweep away the
filthy and unskilled elements who have decayed this nation, and
to create a new, clean, democratic, progressive, and peaceful
situation for this country."
Further evidence that the communists may seek to use the GVN's
political machinery for their own ends was contained in a
19 July Liberation Radio report on activities of "compatriots"
in areas adjacent to the Each Gia provincial capital. According
to the broadcast, the "compatriots" have formed committees to
determine the espirations of the local people and then inform
"candidates for political office." The broadcast said the
candidates would be asked to pledge to meet these aspirations
once they win the elections. I c noted that similar committees
have been set up in a number of precincts in Saigon.
* The thrust of the Front commentary seems consistent with
Le Duc Tho's reported remark in his 6 July New York TIMES
interview that the October presidential election could
provide an opportunity to remove Thieu and thus help settle
the war. Communist media have not publicized the interview.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/@
LjRDP85TOOVAF0AgR0O4OO3O-8
21 JULY 1971
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ
Two DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, on 12 and 17 July,
charged the United States with using B-52's and artillery against
villages in the DMZ. In addition, the protest of the 12th charged
that U.S. planes fired rockets against localities in Quang Binh
Province, on 10 July.*
Recounting the alleged U.S. action in the DMZ, the protest of
the 12th said that U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, on 9 and 10 July
bombed Huong Lap village "north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ."
The protest of the 17th claimed that on 15 July U.S.?B-52's
bombed Huong Lap village and that from the 14th to the 16th
U.S. artillery on ships off the coast and based south of the DMZ
repeatedly shelled Vinh Giang, Vinh Quang, and Vinh Son villages,
which the spokesman. said are in the DMZ and on DRV territory.
Both statements "energetically condemned" these "war acts"
and demanded that the United States permanently stop all "acts
of encroachment" upon DRV sovereignty and security.
* The U.S. Command in Saigon reported on the 11th that U.S.
fighter-bombers had hit a cluster of antiaircraft sites in North
Vietnam that day in the area of the Mugia Pass about eight miles
northwest of the DMZ.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
- 15 -
SING - U, S, RELATIONS
PEKING CARRIES NO CCI+'ENT ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF NIXON VISIT
Apart from rciroadcasts of the announcement in PRC domestic and
foreign services, Peking has made no further mention of
President Nixon's acceptance of an invitation to visit the PRC
before next May, announced simultaneously by the President and
NCNA at 0230 GMT 16 July. The original announcement was
carried in NCNA's English service sandwiched between reports
on a PRC delegation in North Korea for the anniversary of the
PRC-DPRK treaty. The announcement was broadcast in the Peking
domestic service's national hookup program at 1200 GMT
16 July as the fifth of 10 news items. As usual, Peking
has not reported the substance of Chou En-tai's remarks to a
group of Americans on 19 July.
Chinese comment on a wide range of issues involving U.S.
interests has followed standard lines, converging particularly
in a portrayal of a joint U.S. and Japanese threat in extensive
comment marking the 10th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK treaty.
Peking's special concern over territorial questions was again
reflected in a speech by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng
at the DPRK embassy on the 16th, shortly after the announcement
of plans for President Nixon's visit. Taking note of
Philippine and South Vietnamese claims to disputed islands
in the South China Sea, Huang declared that the PRC has
"indisputable legitimate sovereignty" over the Spratly and
Paracel Islands and "absolute-I? allows no country to
encroach upon this sovereign right." Huang did not mention
Taiwan, but calls for the "liberation" of Taiwan recurred
in other Chinese comment on the anniversary; such a call
was voiced in the most urgent tones by Li Hsien-nien at a
Pyongyang mass rally on the 11th, when he said the Chinese
people have not forgotten that the United States is "still
occupying" Taiwan and affirmed that the goal of liberation
"must be attained" and "can certainly be attained."
Nome of Peking': comment during this period has been
addressed directly to the state of Sino-U.S. relations,
nor has there been any personal vilification of the
President in the course of attacks on U.S. policies.
Territorial questions--specifically, those raised by State
Department spokesman Bray's 26 'pril statement that
sovereignty over Taiwan represents an unsettled question--
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
- 16 -
FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
had occasioned adverse comment on Sino-U.S. relations in early
May. Though an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
on 4 May was confined to a rebuttal of Bray's remarks on the
status of Taiwan, an accompanying NCNA report offered Peking's
first comment on Washington's recent initiatives in the wake
of the visit to the PRC by the American table ',e!inis team the
previous month. Noting that the Administraticu had "hastily
made various gestures . . . as if it wanted to improve relations"
with Peking, NCNA concluded that U.S. statements on the Taiwan
question showed the Administration's professed desire for
normalized relations to be "all humbug."
Peking all but ignored the question of improving Sino-U.S.
relations in comment marking the anniversary of the outbreak
of the Korean War and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan--an
occasion last year for a Chinese policy statement ruling
out any relaxation of tension. The only direct comment on
Sino-U.S. relations appeared in a 27 June broadcast to
Taiwan over the PLA's Fukien Front Radio which accused
the President of "doubledealing" by professing to improve
relations with the PRC while seeking a permanent severance
of Taiwan from mainland authority. The same transmitter has
been a unique source of comment on relations with the United
States in the wake of the announcement regarding the
President's forthcoming visit. A commentary broadcast on
17 July, taking note of the stream of American visitors to
the PRC since the table tennis team, claimed that the U.S.
policy of isolating the PRC for over 20 yaars has gone
bankrupt. Depicting the American people as being in "the
same frontline with us" in struggle against "U.S.
imperialism," the broadcast cited Mao for a. distinction
between the people and the government of the United
States. This distinction had been cited by the Shanghai
radio, but not by the PRC central media, at the time of
the table tennis team's visit.
Peking's continuing practice of "people's diplomacy" was
reflected in an NCNA report that Chou En-lai had "a cordial
one friendly conversation" on 19 July 4th "the friendship
delegation" of the American Committee of Concerned Asian
Scholars. The importance Peking attaches to these contacts
is indicated by the presence at the meeting of Politburo
members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan '.long with the
Premier. Following its usual practice, Peking has not
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
reported Chou's remarks to the group. According to Western
news reports from Peking, the visitors said Chou indicated
to them that U.S. withdrawal from Indochina has top priority
and that normalization of Sino-U.S. relations would not
deflect Peking's support for that demand.*
0
HANOI, PYONGYANG IGNORE ANNOUNCEMENT; DRV BETRAYS DISQUIET
Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned the announcement
on President Nixon's visit to Peking, but Hanoi has registered
misgivings over the development in a flurry of authoritative
comment stressing its resolve to pursue an independent foreign
policy and not to succumb to pressure from the big powers.
Hanoi's comment emphasizes that the Vietnamese communists
too': the initiative in giving the President a way out of
Vietnam when the 1 July PRG peace proposal was presented.
(Hanoi's comment is discussed in the Indochina section of
the TRENDS.)
Pyongyang, in keeping with its militant anti-U.S. line and
opposition to detente politics, has ignored the announcement.
Like Hanoi, Pyongyang had also remained silent on the visit
of the American table tennis teem to the PRC in April. With
motives similar to those of tae truculently anti-U.S. North
Koreans, Peking's militantly anti-imperialist Albanian ally
has also kept silent so far.
* PRC propaganda on Vietnam is discussed in the Indochina
section of the TRENDS.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
SPARSE SOVIET REACTION NOTES SINO-U,S, "FLIRTATION"
Soviet reaction to the announcement on the President's
forthcoming visit to the PRC has been sparse and chilly,
reflecting the disquiet over Peking's "flirtation" with
Washington that has been expressed in Moscow's reaction to
earlier developments in Sino-U.S. relations. As in the
reaction to developments in the wake of "ping pong diplomacy,"
the daily press has carried only brief references to Sino-U.S.
relations and has relied mainly on selective reporting from
foreign sources to convey comment. Extensive comment on
earlier developments was confined to the Soviet weekly press
and foreign broadcasts by Radio Moscow.
Moscow's initial reaction to the announcement appeared in a
TASS transmission more than seven hours later which juxtaposed
a Peking-datelined report and one datelined Washington telling
of the Kissinger-Chou meeting-and disclosing the President's
acceptance of the invitation. TASS said the President
"motivated his decision by the desire to establish new
relations" with the PRC. The account did not cite his remark
that the visit is not directed against any other nation. The
Soviet press carried the account the next day.
The announcement was mentioned briefly in two international
reviews in the press on the 18th. A PRAVDA article by Ovchinnikov,
taking note of the recent travels of Vice President Agnew,
Secretary Laird, and Henry Kissinger, cited a report from San
Clemente that the latter received an "exceptionally cordial
and courteous" reception in Peking. Characteristically, a
review of the week by A. Yefremov in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
cited a foreign paper for 'u-be view that the invitation to the
President means Peking is using its influence to help the
United States extricate itself from Vietnam on terms acceptable
to Washington. Vietnam also figures in an oblique reference
to the invitation appearing in a SOVIET RUSSIA article by
Gerasimov on the .8th. After stating that the latest PRG
peace proposals offer the United States an opportunity of
withdrawing from Indochina with honor, Gerasimov added:
"Perhaps Washington, which is now attracted to a flirtation
with Peking, is risking letting this chance slip."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
- 19 -
An effort to score points in the Vietnam context--which has
figured prominently in Moscow's reaction to earlier Sino-U.S.
developments--comes through clearly in a 19 July TASS account
of an editorial in the U.S. communist paper DAILY WORLD.
According to the account, the editorial asks whether the President
is really undertaking his voyage in the name of peace, noting that
B-52's were sowing death in Vietnam at the very t.Lme the President
announced his forthcoming visit to Peking. TASS quoted the paper
as saying broad circles of the American public are demanding that
Washington accept the PRG's latest proposals.
There has been ?.o comment in Soviet media on the implications of
the latest Sino-U.S. development for the triangular relationship.
BUDAF_ST. SOFIA MOST VOCAL PROXIES FOR MOSCOW IN EAST EUROPE
Soviet bloc concern over the possible repercussions of President
Nixon's projected Peking visit have been expressed most
extensively by Hungary, which has served in the past as Soviet
proxy spokesman in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and by Moscow's
faithful Bulgarian satellite. Most notably, the Hungarian
party organ NEPSZABADSAG on 18 July implied that a Sino-U.S.
detente may be detrimental to Hpnoi's interests and warned of
the "dangers" inherent in a visit motivated by "anti-Sovietism."
The same article contained a new Hungarian blast at Romania's
China policy, lecturing on the impermissibility ofa reu jalist
posture. And Poland's first--belated--authoritatfve reaction in
TRYBUNA LUDU on the 20th took pointed note of the presence of
Romanian visitors at a recent rally at which the Chinese expressed
their "anti-Soviet line."
Like WarsP.w, Prague waited until .the 20th to come out with comment
on the projected visit iii its lending party daily, RUDE PRAVO.
East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND he- yet to comment.
HUNGARY Hungarian media have paid lip service to the notion
that the President's trip to Peking could serve the
cause of peaceful coexistence but have expressed apprehension over
its possible adverse effects on Hanoi and its "anti-Soviet"
overtones.
Articles in both the party and government newspapers have contained
passages evidently contrived to suggest the possibility that the
Chinese might sell out-the DRV for their own national interests.
An article in the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 18th said
the projected trip "creates a pretext for further American
delays in Paris and for postponement of answers to constructive
proposals." TIAGYAR HIRLAP added that the move,
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
which "according to the facts available was not coordinated by
Perking with the DRV and the PRG," could thus "inflict grave
dzunage and suffering on the struggling people of Vietnam."
On the same dey, NEPSZABADSAG's "weekly editorial foreign
policy review," after granting that exchanges of views between
two major powers and the lessening of world tensions are
regarded "as useful and desirable by everybody favoring
peaceful coexistence," went on to e cation that the President's
trip should not be appraised from th,i viewpoint of "diplomatic
niceties." The only applicable criterion, the paper said,
is: "How will it affect the life-and--death struggle of the
Indochinese peoples? . . . Will it weaken or strengthen them?"
On the score of Soviet interests, taking note of the President's
assurance that his decision to go to Peking was not aimed
against any state, NEPSZABADSAG commented that the Chinese-
American rapprochement had taken place so far on an "anti-
Soviet platform" and that "this junction is an extremely
dangerous one" E-en if Washington and Peking "are led by
different motives." Nobody who is dedicated to the cause of
progress in international relations, it warned, "must forget
these dangers and their possible serious repercussions."
Pursuing its role as Soviet surrogate with respect to the
Romanians, NEPSZABADSAG stopped short of bringing up Western
press speculation about a Romanian role in the Sino-U.S.
developments but took the occasion to repeat recent
Hungarian criticisms of Ceausesc- s Peking visit and to
lecture again on the impermissibility of neutrality in the
struggle between ideologies. Remarking on the ways in
which the Peking press has exploited Ceausescu's visit' to
press its "anti-Soviet" line, particularly by coupling the
USSR with the United States as "superpowers" opposed to
small and medium-sized nations, the paper clearly implied
that Romania's attraction for Peking lay in its resistance
to Soviet tutelage and that the Romanians were letting
themselves be used Rs Chinese pawns in the Sino-Soviet
conflict. A similar implication had been drawn by Hungarian
party secretary Zoltan -Komocsin in a Hungarian National
Assembly speech on 24 June which prompted a defiant rebuttal
from his Romanian counterpart in the Bucharest SCINTEIA on
9 July.*
* See the TRENDS of 1 July, pages 10-15, for a review of
the Hungarian-Romanian polemic.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
- 21 -
Pointing to "erroneous views" in the international communist
movement, NEPSZABADSAG argued that "it is the responsibility
of every communist party to adopt a clear and principled stand
in connection with the vital questions of mankind." The paper
added pointedly: "We reject neutrality in the struggle among
ideologies, in politics, and in the stri?rings for unprincipled
compromises becaus:. we maintain that Marxism-Leninism is a
commitment. It is impossible to condone a defined stand and at
the same time approve of those who represent the opposite."
BULGARIA Moscow's Bulgarian acolyce has discerned sinister
Sino-U.S. "collusion" in the announcement of the
planned visit. An authoritative Bulgarian news agency commentary
entitled "'Normalization' of Relations Only?", publi-'i.ed in all
the Bulgarian national newspapers on 17 July, placed the
projected visit in the context of U.S. "anticommunist policy"
worldwide and of "the Chinese leaders' effort to split the
anti-imperialist powers." The announcement from Washington
and Peking, the BTA commentary said, "vividly demonstrates who
it is that joinE.in secret collusion at present with imperialism
in the name of unworthy political aims." The question could be
raised, BTA added, whether the desire for "normalization" on
both sides "has not been dictated above all by the longings to
un'',e their forces in a definite direction which has nothing in
common with a genuine concern for peace and international under-
standing."
On the 17th Sofia's military daily, NARODNA ARMIYA, interpreted
the President's decision to visit China as part of a U.S. effort
"to take advantage of Peking's isolation from the socialist camp
and of Peking's overt anti-Sovietism." The article added that
normalizations of relation with Peking would be of "great strategic
significance for the United States in the Far East, since the
Pentagon would be assured of a more tranquil military presence
in Pacific countries." An article in Sofia'.-. VECHERNI NOVINI
on the 16th brought up the U.S. elections: "It is obvious that
relations with Peking will be Nixon's ace r,f trumps in the
election campaign; he will t.-;? to balance the Vietnam policy
with the PRC policy, at least until election day."
? POLAND Following limited, ca-_,;ious comment in lesser Polish
papers and what seemed essentially time-marking first
reactions in the party's TRYBUNA LUDU and the government's ZYCIE
WARSZAWY, the Poles came out with their first authoritative
appraisal in TRYBUNA LUDU on 20 July. On the 18th, a roundup
of foreign reactions in the party daily had tied the President's
announcement to the U.S. election campaign, seeing the visit as
"a high point" of moves to improve his chances ~ocf~ree~lectipon; and
Approve l h~ government e4r~? ,, te~~4~3 o~ PT fig -5 Ye"Ya Yc~o`fn
if the trip "would really indicate a turnabout in the American
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 9G i %P85T008
940030-8
way of thinking about the contemporary world" but that only
the future will tell what the "real motives" are.
TRYBUNA LUDU's assessment in a signed article on the 20th, as
reported by PAP, set out to make points in the international
communist movement at Peking's expense. The trip must be
judged, the paper said, in a broad context of "the global
confrontation between aggressive U.S.-led imperialism and the
forces of socialism and national liberation movements." Against
this background, it charged, "the rapprochement between the
Nixon Administration and the Chinese leadership was made easier
by Peking's anti-Sovietism and schismatic policy in the socialist
community." The article insinuated that the Romanians were
abetting these machinations. It is "significant," TRYBUNA LUDU
said, that before the news about the invitation to the President
was announced, the Chinese reiterated their "anti-Soviet line"
at a rally marking the visit of "a Romanian delegation," as well
as in a press article on the Chinese party's 50th anniversary.
TRYBUNA LUDU went on tc s--agest that the Washington-Peking
"rapprochement in the pr' '_.wo years" has been detrimental to
Hanoi's interests, "for .s was a period of escalation of the
U.S. aggression in Vietnw,, which was extended to Cambodia and
Laos." Alleging that "reactionary" forces in the United States
and elsevhere have welcomed the President's plan to go to Peking,
the article remarked that they did so because they "expect that
the visit will be followed by pressures on the Soviet Union and
the other socialist cc,antries, and they see Peking's invitation
as a help in the pursuit of their policy aimed against the
forces of socialism and national liberation."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prague and Bratislava media at first played
down the announcement of the trip in meager
news coverage and limited comment. Almost identical, very
brief reports of the President's announcement appeared in all
the dailies on 17 July. Through 19 July, comment appeared only
in the Bratislava trade union daily PRACA and the Bratislava
PRAVDA. The regular "weekly review" in the Bratislava paper
on the 17th traced the warming trend in U.S.-PRC relations and
observed that now "Peking has offered a helping hand in view of
next year's presidential elections." It recalled Husak's
statement at the 114th CPCZ Congress to the affect that the
Chinese leadership's views constitute "a danger for the
interests of socialism." And it remarked on the relevance*
cf the President's Peking visit to he war in Vietnam: "If,
with hidden Chinese help, President Nixon tries to evade
direct roads such as those suggested by the Vietnamese
patriots, this will most decidedly not benefit world peace
one little bit."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/Q, jEWA&DP85TOO?JAR@ ; 0040030-8
21 JULY 1971
RUDE PRAVO did not comment until the 20th, when it published
a review of world reaction interlaced with attacks on U.S.
Indochina policy and President Nixon personally. After noting
that world reaction has been essentially favorable and that
commentators believed the trip could be "useful for understanding
among nations" and for bringing peace to Asia, the paper added
caustically that it is the United States which is responsible.
for the present conflict in Asia and observed that "the Pentagon
papers revealed that the signatures of five American presidents,
including President Nixon, are stained with the blood of the
Indochinese peoples." Quoting Bulgarian and other communist
sources, RUDE PRAVO went on to question the sincerity of the
President's motives: "The U.S. President does not regard
relations be:reen the PRC and the United States as an instrument
of peace and -nderstanding among nations, but rather as a means
of disturbing the unity of anti-imperialist forces."
THE GDR East German media have so far been marking time on
the news of the projected trip. The party organ
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 17 July carried a short ADN report on the
President's announcement. On the 19th the 15aper carried a
brief report citing the NEW YORK TIMES on the President's
consultations in San Clemente, as well as short accounts of
articles in the 18 July Moscow PRAVDA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
concerning U.S. diplomatic activity and Western press reaction
to the announcement. At this writing, the paper has carried
no original comment on the subject.
In reporting the President's. announcement, East Berlin Radio on
the 16th remarked that Mr. Nixon, while emphasizing that his
journey would be made for peace, avoided the most important
point: "When will American troops be withdrawn from Vietnam?"
ROMANIA HAILS PLANNED VISIT* AS CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD DETENTE
Romania abstained from comment on the announcement of the visit
for five days, then released an authoritative aeeeeament.in,?tbe
party organ SCINTEIA which welcomed Sino-U.S. detente as a con-
tribution to world peace and in effect disputed the line pressed
by Moscow's orthodox allies that it endangers "socialist"
interests. Unlike the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries,
Bucharest media reported not only the announcement released
by the President and in Peking but went into some detail on
the President's 16 July televised statement, quoting among
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TO0875R000WO040030-8
-24-
other things his expression of a deep conviction that all.
countries will benefit from better U.S.-PRC relations.
Bucharest also noted that UN Secretary General U Thant had
released "a statement stressing that this event is auspicious
not only for relations between the two countries but also for
the future of the United Nations."
The 21 July SCINTEIA article, under the authoritative signa-
tures of the paper's leading political commentators Caplescu
and Fintinaru, developed similar themes in hailing the
projected visit as "an important contribution" not only to
Chinese-American relations but to international detente. "It
is a gladdening fact," the article added, that the United
States has taken what amounts to "the first step toward giving
up the unree.listic policy promoted for more than 20 years in
relation to China." Arguing that S3no-U.S. detente is "an
imperative of peaceful coexistence," the article made the
point that it is therefore also in the best interests of
socialism: "Unquestionably, the increasingly active world
role of China, a socialist country, favors the growth of the
anti-imperialist forces.'. . . Therefore, it is only natural
that everybody desirous of seeing international detente should
view Peking's increasing international activity with satisfaction."
In an evident attempt to counter the charges issuing from Soviet
bloc media that a Peking-Washington rapprochement might be
injurious to Hanoi's interests, the paper declared: "Our
country has also stressed, and now stresses it equally clearly
and consistently, that there is an imperative need to end the
war in Vietnam and throughout Indochina and to find a political
solution for the Vietnam issue, based on the recent seven-point
proposals of the PRG." In the wake of Western press speculation--
and innuendo in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU--about a possible Romanian
role in the latest move in the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, SCINTEIA
reiterated a stock rationale for its independent line: Romania
favors contacts among all states, regardless of systems, and
"makes her own contribution."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/QMD 4A tDP85T00 ,~Pf9p 80040030-8
21 JULY 1971
PROLIFIC YUGOSLAV C04IENT GREETS ANNOUNCEMENT WITH ENTHUSIASM
Against the background of Belgrade's own recent normalization
of relations with Peking and its vested interest in detente,
Yugoslav media have reacted enthusiastically to the President's
announcement, with the press hailing it as "sensational," r
"bomb blast," "passing the Rubicon," and "a major historic
change." The most authoritative comment came on the 17th in
the daily BORBA, which called the President's decision to
visit Peking "a great event of enormous importance" that
represents a triumph of "realism" over "self-delusion."
While cautioning that no one should hope for spectacular
results overnight, the paper was optimistic about the chances
that the visit might open the way "for a general improvement
of the situation in Asia, the United Nations, and the entire
world."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 CI)P.G1iiuuik-. Ak riqApproved For Release 1999/09/25 DP85T00875, 6 030-8
CHINA UN SEAT
PEKING PROMPTLY PUBLICIZES ALBANIAN RESOLUTION ON MEMBERSHIP
Peking media beginning on 17 Jul, publicized the draft resolu-
tion--sponsored by Albania and 17 other nations--on the question
of PRC membership in the United Nations. The resolution, dated
the 15th, calls on U Thant to include the membership issue in the
agenda of the 26th s9asion of the UN General Assembly, scheduled
to open on 21 September. Calling the PRC the "sole legitimate
representative of China" in the world organization and "one of
the five permanent members of the Security Council," it demands
restoration of the PRC's "rights" and expulsion of "the represen-
tatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the seat which they illegally
occupy" in the United Nations and in all the organizations attached
to it.
NCNA, in transmitting the text of the resolution, recalls that for
the first time in 20 years the General Assembly last November
approved a similar resolution. But because "the United States,
Japan, and other countries" had succeeded in passing a resolution
declaring PRC membership an "important question" requiring a two-
thirds vote, NCNA notes, the restoration to the PRC of its legiti-
mate rights was blocked.
The prompt publicity for the draft resolution, while not unprece-
dented,* is notable when cast against the recent announcement of
President Nixon's scheduled visit to the PRC and the spate of
statements by Chinese spokesmen since last November welcoming the
support of others for restorations of the PRC's "legitimate rights"
in the world organization. The NCNA dispatch wrapping up last
November's vote on the PRC membership issue had held its fire
against the United Nations as an organization, instead attacking the
"superpowers" who were allegedly colluding via the UN machinery.**
* In 1963, for example, an NCNA dispatch on the opening of the
Genera]. Assembly noted in passing that the Albanian foreign minister
had sent a letter to U Thant on 16 September demanding inclusion of
the PRC membership issue on the session's agenda.
** Last year's vote on the membership issue is discussed in the
TRENDS for 25 November 1970, pages 24-26.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
-27-
Moot recently, acting PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, in
remarks at an Iraqi embassy reception reported by NCNA on
17 July, hailed Iraq's support for the restoration of the PRC's
rights in the United Nations and ite opposition to "the
imperialist plot of creating 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one
Taiwan." Two days earliir, an NCNA dispatch said that the
acting foreign minister thanked France--at an embassy reception
on Bastille Davy on the 14th--for "upholding justice in the
United Nations' and supporting the restoration o1 he PRC's
rights there. Peking has not reported Chou En-lai'a remarks
to visiting American scholars on the 20th: According to Western
news reports, he said that the P1C would never join the United
Nations if the world organization sought a compromise which
would give China's seat to Peking while retaining Taiwan as a
member.
MOSCOW A rare high-level Moscow reference to PRC membership
in the inited Nations appears in a letter from Foreign
Minister Gromyko to U Thant outlining the Soviet posture on various
international issues in connection with the UN Declaration on the
Strengthening of International Security. TASS summarized the
letter on the 20th but did not indicate the date it was sent;
according to the New York TIMES, it was dated 13 July.
In the passage treating the United Nations, Gromyko's letter says
that the organization's universality would increase its effective-
ness, and he calls for the admission of both German states and the
PRC as well as the expulsion of the Taiwan representatives. After
failing in his 1969 speech before the General Assembly to call for
the admission of the PRC and the two Germanies, Gromyko reverted
in his 21 October 1970 address to his earlier practice of urging
admission for all three states. In his 1970 speech he did not
restate the specific demand of previous years for expulsion of
the Nationalist Chinese, but he characterized the PRC as "a power
which alone can represent the Chinese people in the Security
Council, at the General Assembly, and in other UN organs."
Since the Gromyko speech in October 1970, the matter of PRC
membership in the United Nations has been broached only once by the
Soviet leadership: A statement on Indochina at a Warsaw Pact Poli-
tical Consultative Committee meeting in Berlin in December 1970--
signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin--took note of the fact that the
United States has "prevented the restoration of the lawful rights
of the Chinese People's Republic" in the United Nations.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
MIDDLE EAST
PONLMAREV ARRIVES IN UAR FOR JULY ANNIVERSARY, ASU CONGRESS
The arrival in Cairo on the 20th of a CPSU delegation led by
Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev* to attend the 19th
anniversary of the 23 July revolution and the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU) national congress seems to underscore Moscow's
interest in the newly reconstituted ASU following the UAR
leadership purges in May. Attendance of such a high-level
Soviet delegation at these functions appears to be unusual,
although Nasir in his 23 July address to rr congress last
year did welcome unidentified delegation ?re was no
advance public announcement of the Ponom "'"legation's
visit. T1), 'FIDDLE E4ST NEWS AGENCY (MEN, )rted on
the 21st that CPSU and ASU delegations hE.L .,reliminary
meetings" that day, discussing "fraternal it linking
the two countries and political organizati, The sides
also reviewed aspects of cooperation in vai. i- fields to
be discussed, MENA said, in "official talks" scheduled
to begin in Alexandria after tt.,; ASU congress meetings.
The communique on Podgornyy's May visit had seemed to
reflect strains in CPSU-ASU relations. Notably brief an-i
more restrained with regard to party ties than Soviet-
Egyptian communiques in January and last December, it
merely said that there were discussions of "questions of
the development of relations" between the ASU and the
CPSU and that "agreement was reached on concrete under-
takings in fulfillment of the plans of the parties in 1971."
A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on 2 July, however, "noted
with pleasure" the "constantly developing close relations"
of the ASU and the CPSU. Pegged to the ASU primary-level
elections, the commentary justified the "rebuilding" of the
ASU, calling this necessary to consolidate the organization's
role in the country's life. It commented approvingly on
the ASU's social structure and its close relationship with
the masses. Like Podgornyy in his speeches in Cairo in
May, and the communique on his visit, the broadcast stressed
that the UAR Government's program is based on the National
Action Charter and Nasir's 30 March 1968 program,
committing the UAR to a socialist path.
* Ponomarev led a CPSU delegation to the UAR 10-20 December
1970; a member of his current delegation, Y. Tyazhelnikov,
headed a Komsomol delegation which visited the UAR 21-28 July
last year.
Approved For Release I 999/c / i .RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
But an article by PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov,
reviewed by TASS on 20 July, warned that "social contrasts
in Egyptian society are rather marked still," and that it
would be a mistake to think that the struggle is over. The
Egyptian press, he added, constantly points out that the
"sector in which capitalist relations e,~:ist is still rather
large" in the UAR. The country's development, he concluded,
is taking place in complex conditions of continued Israeli
aggression, and he called for a high degree of organization,
vigilance, and activity of the working class in view of
the "constant threat of intrigues of internal and external
reaction."
UAR-USSR A statement issued after a UAR cabinet session
MEETING on the 20th said, according to Cairo radio, that
there was a "further debate" on the outcome of
Foreign Minister Riyad's recent visit to Moscow and some East
European capitals, and that "it has been decided to hold a
meeting between representatives of the UAR and the USSR
soon." TASS, in a short account of this statement by the
UAR information minister, noted that the cabinet heard a
report by Riyad but failed to mention the decision on a
UAR-Soviet meeting.
MOSCOW REPORTS ARAB ANXIETY OVER FIGHTING IN JORDAN
Moscow's coverage of the recent Jordanian operations against
Palestinian fedayeen in northern Jordan again refrains--as it
did during the fighting last September--from initiating any
criticism of Husayn. And limited comment broadcast in Arabic
again says the clashes will benefit only the Arabs' enemies,
and expresses Soviet sympathy for both the Jordanian and
Palestinian people. But reportage increasingly focuses on
Arab criticism of the Jordanian actions rather than contriving,
as last fall, to present relatively neutral, balanced accounts.
0
BROADCASTS A commentary on the 16th routinely charged
IN ARABIC "anti-Arab forces" with circulating false rumors
and allegations aimed at sowing dissension
among the Arabs, and declared the Soviet people to be
sympathetic to both "the friendly people of Jordan" and
to the Palestinians. A broadcast on the 20th accused "certain
elements" in Jordan of activity in harmony with imperialist
and Zionist interests aimed at liquidating the Palestinian
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 Jinx 1971
resistance movement. It claimed that current events can only
please the Israelis and their patrons, particularly when some
of the Palestinians were "forced to retreat" to occupied
territory. The commentary recalled that during the September
fighting the Soviet Union "issued a direct warning" to the
imperialists and Israel, and it quoted Brezl.nev as having
said the USSR sought to contribute to halting the fighting.
It expressed hope, in conclusion, that the Arab forces "are
not dispersed to no avail," and called for a quick end to
the fighting.
REPORTAGE ON Citing Palestinian sources in its first
DEVELOPMENTS report on the new fighting on 13 July, TASS
noted that according to "news services"
there had been no official Jordanian communique or other
confirmation of the Palestinian reports. An Arabic-language
broadcast the following day said a Jordanian representative
had stated that the events in northern Jordan "did not go
beyond normal friction" betwec the fedayeen and government
forces. Subsequent TASS dispatches have reported appeals by
various Arab organizations for a halt to the fighting and
protests against the Jordanian action, Syrian efforts to
mediate, Iraq's decision to close the Iraqi-Jordanian border
and to demand the recall of the Jordanian ambassador, and
a UAR spokesman's statement regretting the Jordanian
Government's stand.
In a review of developments in the 17 July PRAVDA, the
paper's Cairo correspondent, Glukhov, placed Egypt's
postponement of Husayn's scheduled visit to Cairo in the
context of the Jordanian fighting, although he explained
that the postponement "is motivated" by UAR preoccupation
with the 23 July anniversary celebrations and the ASU
congress. In a 19 July PRAVDA dispatch Glukhov reported
that the 17 July communique on the Mersa Matruh meeting
of Tripoli Charter states--the UAR, Syria, Libya, and
Sudan--expressed profound concern over the Jordanian
clashes and that the Cairo press attributed the fighting
to a Jordanian desire to liquidate the Palestine
resistance movement. He cited Cairo's AL-AHRAM as
charging the United States with giving the "Jordan
authorities" open support against the Palestinians. A
TASS roundup on the 19th noted reports that the Jordanian
Government hay' declared it considered the Cairo and Amman
agreements of last fall on Jordanian-fedayeen relations
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
as ''3Pnseless" in the change' conditions, although the spirit
and principles of ,he agreements remained valid. PRAVDA on
the 20th, reporting Jordan's "denunciation" of the agreements,
recalled that they were signed by both Husayn and Palestinian
leader Arafat. TASS the same day briefly noted that a UAR
spokesman had expressed Egyptian support for a Libyan call
for an Arab summit conference to discuss the Jordanian
situation; the UAR cabinet, TASS also said, had assessed the
operations against the Palestinians as harming Arab unity
and interfering with the resistanc,; movement.
ABORTIVE MOROCCAN COUP GETS LIMITED ATT-NTION FROM MOSCOW
The abortive coup in Rabat on 10 July received minimal
attention from Moscow, which has failed to comment on the
incident and only belatedly expressed sympathy to King
Hassan. lASS on the 17th briefly reported that the Soviet
ambassador had conveyed Podgornyy'R "deep sympathy" in
connection with the "recent tragic events"; Rabat radio on
the 16th said the ambassador, after meeting with the king,
stated that Podgornyy had expressed his "deep satisfaction"
with the failure of the attempt on Hassan's life. The head
of a Soviet economic delegation which had arrived in Morocco
on 7 July was reported on the 15th by Rabat radio--but not
Moscow sources--as having expressed sorrow and condemnation
of the "painful events and abhorred attack" at Skirate Palace.
TASS dispatches from Rabat in the first few days after the
coup attempt briefly summed up developments, reporting that
military school cadets with the director of the royal military
cabinet, General Medbuh, at their head, had attacked the
palace at Skirate during a diplomatic reception marking the
king's birthday. Royal troops, the report said, quelled the
mutiny. A TASS report on the 12th mentioned in passing that
the king's address to the nation, early on the 11th, contained
a warning to opposition political and trade union leaders.
TASS on the 15th picked up the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report--
not received from Libyan media--that Libya had broken diplomatic
relations with Morocco. TASS added that Libyan-Moroccan
relations were "aggravated" following the coup attempt, but
failed to explain that this stemmed from Libyan radio support
for the Moroccan "revolutionaries" and attacks on the king.
Also on the 15th, noting that the situation in Morocco was
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
gradually returning to normal, TASS reported that General
Oufkir in a LE MONDE interview announced the termination of
the emergency powers with which he had been invested by the
king after the coup attempt, and his return to his duties
as interior minister. TASS also noted that according to
the Oufkir interview, the investigation had established that
the chief of the military school, Colonel Ababou, was the
main leader of the plotters, rather than General Medbuh.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 19';1
- 33 -
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
RED STAR ARTICLE REVIVES ISSUE OF U1S1 FORWARD BASES
The second article in the RED STAR series on "the present stage
of the strategic arms race in the United States," appearing on
16 July, is most notable for its revival of the argument that
the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) should take up the
question of U.S. bases near the USSR--an issue largely
quiescent in Soviet media since it was broached in V. Shestov's
3 February article in PRAVDA.* The RED STAR article i3 signed
by Col. V. Kharich, who also wrote the first in the series on
the 13th, this time with Engineer-Captain 2d Rank G. Koloskov
as co-author. In keeping with the theme of the first article,
it draws heavily on foreign press reports to document the
conclusion that Washington "has set a course aimed at the
qualitative development and reinforcement" of its strategic
:'crces, accompanied by "a quantitative increase in nuclear
might." The article says "it is hardly necessary to state
what a threat this represents for peace and the peoples'
security."
Denouncing "groundless attempts of the U.S. press" to prove
that SALT should not deal with the question of U.S. forward
bases, Kharich and Koloskov argue that the line between
strategic forces and tactical forces located in Europe and
elsewhere on the periphery of the socialist bloc is becoming
"blurred." This, the authors say, is because use of tactical
nuclear arms carries the threat of a chain reaction leading
to a nuclear missile conflict, and it is also a function of
"the asymmetry of the positions of the sides: vitally
important targets on the territory of the European socialist
countries can be threatened with nuclear strikes from U.S.
air force bases in Europe, while U.S. targets overseas are
inaccessible to tactical aircraft."
The article charges that the attempt to exclude these foreign
bases is aimed at obtaining unilateral military advantage and
"in no way corresponds in practice to the principle of equal
security" sought by the USSR. It adds that "the Pentagon
strategists" also hope to complement Washington's overseas
bases, which would serve as "'nuclear magnetL' in the event of
* The Shestov article is reviewed in the TRENDS of 10 February
1971, pages 22-23.
Approved For Release 1999/0942&Ii RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIA?, FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
- 34 -
war," with new weapons systems designed to pose a threat to
the USSR from underwater. It cites the re-equipping of
submarines with multiple-warhead Poseidon missiles and the
development of an underwater long-range missile system ?(ULMS).
Other available propaganda on SALT--including foreign-language
broadcasts on the 15th and 16th which treat the negotiations
in the course of a review of the 31 March 1971 "Soviet peace
program"--continues routinely to stress the need for adherence
to the principle of "equal security." As in the past,'Moscow
picks up expressions of U.S. iomestic opposition to various
defense programs. Thus PRAVDA on the 16th reported that
Senator Humphrey, supported by Senator Muskie, proposed before
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control on
the 14th that appropriations for further deployment of the
.Safeguard ABM system and for the development,of MIRV's be out
off. According to PRAVDA, Humphrey stressed that "the
creation of new-nuclear missile systems may exert a negative
influence" on the progress at SALT. The report did not go
on to note that Humphrey planned to introduce a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution calling on the President to propose that
the United States and the USSR agree to -freeze the deployment
of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons while the arms
talks are-under way.
CONFIDEN`rIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
POLAND
POLITYKA GIVES CONFIDENT ESTIMATE OF GIEREK REGIME'S STATUS
Reflecting the increasing consolidation of Gierek's leadership,
a comment r?. entitled "Accomplishments and Announcements" in the
Warsaw weekly POLITYKA on 17 July uses the occasion of the
upcoming 27th anniversary of People'z Poland (22 July) to
confidently contrast the present situation in the country with
that of a year ago under the Gomulka regime.
POLITYKA's optimistic appraisal comes against the background of
further moves by Gierek to shore up his position at home. At
the party's 24-25 June 10th plenum he 11 removed his last-
remaining high-level opponent, Mieczyslaw Moczar, as PZPR
secretary though leaving him on the Politburo for the time being.
On 18 July, according to TASS and PAP the next day, Gierek
conferred with the Soviet leaders in Moscow for the third time
this year; he had visited the Soviet Union in January and again
in March-April for the 24th CPSU Congress. This time, while
"having a holiday in the Soviet Union," he and State Council
Chairman Cyrankiewicz had talks with Brezhnev and Podgornyy in
which the two sides "informed each other" on socialist construction
in the respect_ve countries and "exchanged views on a number of
topical international questions." The atmosphere, as in January,
was described as one of "cordial friendship and mutual under-
standing." Warsaw media reported both Polish leaders back home
on the 20th, two days before the National Day observance.
The POLITYKA commentary registers the increasing regime
self-confidence that has manifested itself in open denigration
of the Gomulka leadership. As summarized at length by PAP on
the 16th, it refrains from new direct attacks on Gomulka*
* There was an extensive recent airing of direct attacks on
Gomulka in a 367-page supplement to the party monthly NOWE DROGI,
signed to the press 15 May 1971, entitled "Materials From the
Eighth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee" of 6-7 February.
? In addition to reproducing Gierek's plenum speech and the
plenum resolution, which had been released in Warsaw media on
7 February, the supplement made public for the first time an
anti-Gomulka "evaluation" of the December events by the plenum
along with plenum speeches by rank-and-file Central Committee
members attacking the former leader.
Approved For Release 1999/09v :IEfP85T00875R000300040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
- 36 -
but makes extensive use of innuendo to signal the final
discrediting of the fallen leader and his high-level supporters.
Stressing that the "climate" surrounding this year's National
Day is "different than a year ago," the commentary remarks
that "there are fewer cliches saturated with stereotyped
optimism." A year ago, it recalls, "we felt with growing
acuity the disproportion between the material and staff
potential that had been accumulated and the anachronistic
forms which blocked progress and forced the choice urgent
and sometimes doubtful solutions in situations where
far-reaching, bold thinking was needed."
The commentary goes on to underscore both the solidity:-of
the socialist system in Poland and the depth of popular
support for Gierek: Polish "society has staked everything on
socialism, on its vitality and ability to reject everything that
is alien to it," and "the time of hardest trial [December 1970]
confirmed the lasting nature of the transformations in the
collective consciousness of the nation." On the score of ties
with the USSR and the socialist bloc, POLITYKA declares that
"even the most unfriendly observers" have had to admit that
their calculations about a loosening of such ties "proved illusory
when confronted with the real attitudes" of Polish society.
At the same time, the commentary makes an urgent pitch for
popular support of Gierek's efforts against the entrenched
Gomulka-oriented middle- and lower-level bureaucracy. People
are confident, it declares, that "the 'top' will not get
fatiguedq" and' the effectiveness of "the 'top' is the only
guarantee that the process of change also embraces lower levels
of management." The fact that "we have crossed a point of no
return," it says, will sooner or later be realized also by
"those who would like to hide for awhile and wait for life to
return to its old tracks" and who "found life easier" before
the leadership change. The commentary winds up with an
enumeration of "basic trends" of the new regime, including a
more consumer-oriented economy, "dismissals of persons not able
to cope with the modern requirements" facing managerial cadres,
and "improving in format;on."
The regime appears to be continuing its efforts to demonstrate
the sincerity of its promise of freer information, made by
Gierek in his initial speech as First Secretary on 20 December.
In addition to keeping up the innovative practice of ir;suing
reports on meetings of the party Politburo and Secretariat, the
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R00030,0040030-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JULY 1971
- 37 -
regime has been more forthcoming than its predecessor in airing
economic problems. In the recent period TRYBUNA LUDU on
13 July carried an article on the growing unemployment problem
in Lower Silesia. The Warsaw domestic service on the 15th
reported the firing of several Lublin building enterprise
directors for "poor labor management" and "delays," and the
radio on the 19th carried a report underscoring weaknesses in
the machine industry. Minister of the Machine Industry
Wrzaszczyk was quoted to the effect that directors of enter-
prises not implementing monthly production plans "must not
go on holidays at this time."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040030-8