TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040029-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 14, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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'j~ IIIIIIIII-I~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIII~~I
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~IIIIIIIIItlIIIIIIIIII~~~~~lli
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
14 JULY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 28)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defensc of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmissloht or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
o.,Dup I
hcluded Item eulemelle
deaeprediep and
decle,il/ceciee
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JULY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . i
DRV, PRG Press Peace Plan, Rebuff Call for Restricted Talks . . 1
No Change in Comment on Ky, GVN Elections Since PRG Proposal . 3
New Supplementary Agreement Provides PRC Military Aid to DRV . 5
Mc'sc~jw Criticizes U.S. Failure to Respond to PRG Peace Plan . . 6
USSR Continues Comment on Pentagon Study, Attacks PRC Policy 7
Lao Princes Exchange Further Messages on Cease-Fire . . , . . . 8
Buc:iarest Reacts Defiantly To Hungarian Public Censure 10
Background on Hungary's Role as Soviet Surrogate . . . . . . . 14
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Soviet Press Assails U.S. Arms Buildup, Asks "Serious" Talks . 16
MALTA
Moscow Approves Mintoff Policies, Notes British, NATO Concern 18
COSMONAUT DEATHS
USSR Reports on Cause if Tragaly, Forecasts More Flights 21
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Yevtushenko Speech Enlivens Writers Union Congress . . . . . . 23
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: GRIEVANCES AGAINST-BOLIVIAN COMMUNIST
PARTY RESURFACE IN CUBAN REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 JiLY 1971
Moscow (3080 items)
Peking 1059 items)
Mongolian Revolution,
(--)
114%
Domestic Issues (35%)
26%
50th Anniversary
CCP 50th Anniversary (29%)
21%
[Kosygtn Speeches (--) 5%]
[Foreign Greetings (14%)
12%]
USSR-DPRK Friendship (0.1%) 9%
& Observances
Treaty, 10th
Anniversary
[Joint Editorial (13%)
Article
7%]
Indochina
(7%)
5%
PRC-DPRK Friendship (--)
18%
[PRG Seven-
Point Proposal
(2%)
3%]
Treaty, 10th
Anniversary
China
(7%)
1+%
Indochina (7%)
11%
Soyuz XI & Cosmonauts'
Death
(23%)
3%
[PRG Seven-Point (4%)
Proposal
4%]
Soviet-French CP Talks
(--)
3%
Albanian Army (--)
Anniversary
8%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items r rxtensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given ma!or attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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Vietnamese communist propaganda pressing for acceptance of the
1 July PRG peace proposal is highlighted by publicity for DRV
Premier Pham Van Dong's remarks at a 9 July Mongolian embassy
reception in Hanoi. Dong indicated the substance of the
proposal only by indirection when he asked: Why does not the
U.S. Administration take this opportunity to end the "aggression,"
withdraw all troops, and thereby bring the captured pilots
home? And given professed U.S. support of self-determination,
why does not the United States stop supporting the "bellicose,
ruling group" headed by Nguyen Van Thieu? Dong, the communist
delegates at Paris, and routine propaganda emphasize favorable
worldwide reaction to the proposal. Castigating the Administration
for failing to respond promptly, propagandists dismiss Ambassador
Bruce's suggestion that talks could progress more fruitfully in
a restricted session as a device to avoid a serious response.
PRC media have carried no further high-level comment on the
proposal since the 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. However, VNA
quoted Chou En-lai as expressing support for the proposal on the
4th when he met with the DRV delegation that negotiated an
agreement on supplementary military aid from the PRC.
Moscow's endorsement of the PRG proposal expressed in the 5 July
PRAVDA editorial is repeated in a statement by the USSR Central
Council of Trade Unions which, according to TASS on the 13th,
again asserts Soviet determination to give the Vietnamese people
"all necessary assistance and support" in their struggle. Routine
Soviet propaganda continues to contrast favorable reaction from
the U.S. public with the Administration's failure to respond
officially.
Alleged military achievements in various parts of South Vietnam
during the first half of the year are reviewed in Hanoi and
Liberation Front propaganda, including a series of NHAN DAN
editorials published from 9 to 14 July. The editorial of the
14th claims that 151,000 allied troops were put out of action
during the six-month period.
DRV. PRG PRESS PEACE PLAN, REBUFF CALL FOR RESTRICTED TALKS
The communist delegates' statements at the 8 July session of
the Paris talks amounted to a recapitulation of the substance
of the PRG seven-point proposal of 1 July along with pleas for
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a positive U.S. response. Ambass&?or Bruce's suggestion that
proposals of all sides could be ,.ore fruitfully explored in
a restricted session on the 15th was dismissed in the VNA
account and in subsequent propaganda as a "sinister trick"
to avoid responding to the seven-point peace initiative.
As it has done on occasion in the past, the VNA account
obscured the fact that the allied delegates spoke first.
Thus, it summarized Mme. Binh's and Xuan Thuy's formal state-
ments before dealing, in two paragraphs with those of
Ambassadors Bruce and Lam. Faced with a "warm" welcome from
public opinion, VNA said,the Saigon representative had to
pledge continued study of the PEG proposal, but in his speech
he "only rehashed the absurd demands raised in Nixon's so-called
five-point plan." The account thus obscured entirely such
specific probing of the PRG proposal as Lam's question whether
point one on U.S. withdrawal meant that the United States must
discontinue all the aid it is currently giving the GVN. (PRG
spokesman Duong Dinh Thao in his post-session briefing did
specify that the question of armaments of the Saigon forces
does not come under point one, but rather under point three
which deals with the question of Vietnam armed forces in
South Vietnam. As usual, the press briefings were not
publicized in Vietnamese communist media.)
VNA said of Ambassador Bruce's formal statement that he
"stubbornly refused" to set a deadline for the United States
to withdraw its troops and to stop backing the "bellicose group"
headed by Thieu, though he "had to recognize .he goodwill" of
the PRG proposal. VNA did not make clear that it was in his
formal statement that Bruce proposed that the 15 July session
be a restricted one in order to probe all proposals, rather
implying that this suggestion came up in the give-and-take
portion of the session: After reporting some of the rebuttal
remarks by Mme. Binh and Xuan Thuy, the account said that "at
this session the U.S. representative many times proposed
restricted sessions, which is a sinister trick to avoid
responding to the seven-point peace initiative. This also
proves that the Nixon Administration is very afraid of
public opinion." Thus, the VNA account only indirectly
indicated Mme. Binh's and Xuan Thuy's rejection of a restricted
session on the 15th. (The communist press spokesmen at the
post-session briefings reported that in the rebuttal portion
of the session, Mme. Binh and Thuy reiterated the standard line
that the main question is the "content," not the "form" of the'
talks.)
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Ambassador Bruce's specific arguments for restricted sessions and
his appeal for an end to use of the talks for propaganda purposes
were ignored in the accounts of the sessions and in subsequent
propaganda. A Commentator article in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN on the 12th, as broadcast by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese
to the South, says the U.S. delegate wanted to hold restricted
sessions to "clarify" issues that in fact are already clear.
Commentator prefaced this remark with the observation that "Bruce
on 1 July said he would reply at the next session, but on the 8th
he spoke evasively and did not directly discuss the issue."
Typical of propaganda since the PRG proposal was introduced on
the 1st, Commentator documents a claim of widespread fcvorable
response by listing numerous U.S. Senators, including McGovern
and Muskie, and such public figures as former Defense Secretary
Clark Clifford. Liberation Radio commentaries on the 9th and 10th
also assailed the call for restricted meetings. The broadcast on
the 9th said that public opinion can clearly see the Nixon
Administration's efforts to buy time through statements by Press
Secretary Ziegler, Vice President Agnew, and Kissinger as well as
Ambassador Bruce. Vietnamese communist media are not known to
have mentioned Kissinger's stopover in Paris en route back from
his Far East trip.
NO CHANGE IN COWENT ON KY. G\4 ELECTIONS SINCE PRG PROPOSAL
Hanoi propaganda on the South Vietnamese presiden-cial elections
has undergone no change in the wake of the 1 July PRG proposal,
which focused its attack excl,isively on Thieu by scoring "the
bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu" rather than the
"Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" which had been the standard target in
the past.*
Hanoi and Liberation Front accounts of developments in
South Vietnam related to the October elections continues
routinely to direct most of their fire at Thieu and to cite
Ky's attacks on him, but Ky also comes in for criticism.
Thus, while the language of the PRG proposal raised questions
* Mme. Binh at the 24 June session of the Paris talks--a
week before the introduction of the PRG proposal--referred
to the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" in a standard fashion, but
Xuan Thuy cited the regime headed by Thieu.
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about the communist attitude toward Ky as a presidential
contender, the propaganda has not portrayed him in a more
favorable light than before. And a 4 July QUAN DOI N1LN DAN
article, as reported by VNA, labeled Icy and Thieu "the two
topmost servants of the U.S. aggressors." Communist media
have not only failed to criticize the other presidential
candidate, Duong Van Minh, but have linked him with
anti-administration elements in the South which have been
treated favorably in their propaganda.
While the propaganda routinely calls on the United States
to stop supporting the Thieu regime and claims that
Washington controls the South Vietnamese political situation,
no comment in the media has gone as far as Le Due Tho in
his interview with New York TIMES correspondent Anthony
Lewis on 6 July, when he suggested that the October elections
would give President Nixon an opportunity to remove Thieu
from office and thus help settle the war.
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NEW SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT PROVIDES PRC MILITARY AID TO DRV
On 4 Jury, the same day PEOPLE'S DAILY editorially endorsed the
PRG's 1 July peace proposal, a protocol on a supplementary
military aid grant from the PRC to the DRV was signed in Peking.
This is the second instance this year in which a supplementary
agreement was arranged, the first being on 15 February =.n the
course of the allied incursion into southern Lao:.. Thf: only
previous supplementary agreement on record was signed on
25 May 1970 in the wake of the incursion into Cambodia. The
annual aid agreement covering 1971 was signed on 6 October
last year.
Unlike previous agreements, Erich embraced economic as well as
military aid, the new one refers only to a grant of "military
equipment and materials" and was signed by military officers--
PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Yen Chung-chuan and the head of a
DRV military delegation, Vice Defense Minister Tran Sam. In
another departure from previous agreements, NCNA's announce-
ment termed the accord a "gratuitous" supply of equipment.
Previously Peking had not indicated that its aid was given
free, while Hanoi's announcements have said it was
"nonrefundable."
VNA waited four days before reporting the signing of the
agreement, thus adding to the mystery surrounding the
activities of the DRV military delegation. The first report
on this delegation was a 9 June NCNA account of a banquet
in Peking honoring both a VWP delegation led by Le Duc The
and the military delegation headed by Tran Sam. NCNA noted
that "the Vietnamese comrades" had stopped over on their way
"for a visit abroad." An 11 June NCNA dispatch reported that
the two delegations had departed that day "to visit Europe."
Le Duc Tho's delegation attended the East German party congress,
after which he continued on to Paris to resume his post as
adviser to the DRV delegation at the Vietnam peace talks.
Hanoi did not report the two delegations' stopover in Peking.
The next report on the military delegation was a 24 June NCNA
dispatch noting that it had arrived in Peking that day "on
a friendly visit to China upon invitation." NCNA did not
indicate where the delegation had been in the interval, nor
have there been any reports from other monitored sources.
Subsequent NCNA reports told of the delegation's activities
in the PRC, including a meeting with Chou En-lai and Huang
Yung-sheng and a tour of the provinces, before its departure
for home on 5 July after signing the aid agreement.
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The sequence of events indicates that the military delegation
visited one or more European communist countries before
returning to Peking for the official portion of its stay in
the PRC, but its European tour received no publicity and no
known agreements resulted except the one with the PRC.
Hanoi's first report on the delegation's activities appeared
on 8 July.
PRG PROPOSAL VNA's 8 July report on the aid agreement
included an account of Chou's meeting with
the delegation. According to VNA, Chou expressed "warm and
firm support" for the PRG's 1 July proposal at the Paris
talks. NCNA's account merely reported that "a very cordial
and friendly conversation" took place.
Since the 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, Peking has carried
low-level propaganda supporting the PRG's proposal, but PRC
media have carried no elite commer.c on a Vietnam peace
settlement. None of the Chinese speakers at celebrations
marking the PRC-DPRK treaty anniversary has mentioned the
PRG proposal, though the head of the North Korean delegation
in Peking for the anniversary voiced support for the PRG's
peace plans.
MOSCOW CRITICIZES U.S, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO PRG PEACE PLAN
Routine-level Moscow comment censures the Nixon Administration
for failing to give a "direct response" to the PRG peace plan
and contrasts this with favorable reactions from world and
U.S. public opinion.
A panelist in the weekly domestic service roundtable discussion
on 11 July observed that while the proposal has received an
unpredecentedly wide response in the United States--"among the
most heterogeneous political circles, among Democrats and
Republicans, and in various organs of the American press"--U.S.
"official circles" merely demand clarifications without
explaining what they want clarified. The panelist called
Ambassador Bruce's suggestion of a closed session at Paris no
more than a continuation of U.S. "delaying tactics." Reviewing
the first point of the PRG t)lan, on troop withdrawal and the
release of war prisoners. t : roundtable participants commented
that "President aixon can no longer hide behind the prisoners"
and that in fact answers have now been provided for "virtually
all questions which the American side has raised for months
at the Faris 'elks,"
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Aleksey Leontyev, in a 10 July commentary broadcast in English
to North America, cited Presidential adviser Kissinger as
warning in Saigon that the PRG proposals are "unacceptable and
full of traps." But nobody, Leontyev added, explains why they
are unacceptable. He cited the Washington POST as saying the
Administration's objection is that the peace plan '')es not
promote America's "main goal" of maintaining the Saigon regime.
In a RED STAR commentary on the 11th, Leontyev said the
Administration does not dare to reject the PRG plan outright
because such a course would only confirm its critics' charges
that the Administration is incapable of showing flexibility.
Yet another commentary by Leontyev, broadcast to foreign
audiences on the 11th, said it is clear that Washington "does
not accept" the PRG proposals because they involve withdrawal
of its support for the Saigon regime, establishment of a
government of "national concord" in South Vietnam,* and the
holding of general elections. One of the roundtable panelists
on the 11th, remarking that Kissinger was sent to Saigon to
talk to politicians there, went on to make the unique statement
that he visited Saigon to talk to the three presidential
candidates and make a decision as to whether the United State..:
should maintain Thieu in power. On the other hand, a domestic
service commentary on the 11th said the real reason for
Kissinger's visit to Saigon was no doubt to express support
for Thieu. Although one of the "indispensable conditions" in
the PRG plan is the removal of the Thieu administration, the
commentary continued, Washington will rot part with him; since
he will fall if he is not propped up by American troops,
this argument ran, it is clear that Washington is not even
thinking about a complete troop withdrawal.
USSR CONTINUES COMENT ON PENTAGON STUDY. ATTACKS PRC POLICY
Authoritative Moscow commentators continue to speculate about
the publication of the Pentagon study on U.S. Vietnam policy.
Ratiani in PRAVDA on 10 July and a series of commentaries by
Zorin, broadcast in the Moscow domestic service between the
* Some Moscow commentators use the term "coalition government"
in this context, while others follow the Vietnamese communists'
liad and refer to a "government of national concord."
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8th and the 11th, repeated the conclusion that the episode
reflecto strife in top U.S. political and economic circles
over continuation of the war. A LIFE ABROAD article by
Yuriy Zhukov, summarized by TASS on 8 July, said the
publication of the study has contributed to a dgcline in
morale and growing antiwar sentiment among U.S. military
officers and men.
Attacks on Peking's Indochina policies recur in comment on
the Fen:agon papers. On the 8th TASS carried PRAVDA's
summary of an article in the Prague RUDE PRAVO by the
paper's deputy chief editor charging that China's stance has
encouraged the United States to escalate the war. As in
prior comment, the article recalled that in January 1965,
after the Tonkin Gulf incident and the first U.S. bombings
of the DRV, Mao told Edgar Snow that China would fight only
if it were attacked. RUDE PRAVO pointed again to President
Johnson's March 1964 telegram, included in the Pentagon
documents, which ;suggested that actions against the DRV
would be more successful if taken after an expected
deter.*,rction of Sino-Soviet relations. The article noted
that early in 1971, after the spread of aggression into Cambodia
and Laos, Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people "would
not spare a,iiy sacrifice" to help the Indochinese people; yet
it pointed out that shortly before, in December 1970, Mao had
emphasized to Edgar Snow his desire for mutual respect between
the American and Chinese peoples.
A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on 11 July
remarked on Peking's silence on the Pentagon documents,
asserting--incorrectly--that the PRC has "not mentioned a
single word" about them.* The commentary charged that Peking
was silent because the documents reveal the PRC's spl:Lttist
activities and refusal to adopt united action with the USSR
and other socialist countries--a course which fostered the
launching and escalation of "U.S. aggression."
LAO PRINCES EXCHANGE FURTHER MESSAGES ON CEASE-FIRE
Souvanna Phouma's 5 July reply to Souphanouvong's revised
peace proposal of 22 June was promptly attacked in Pathet Lao
propaganda, including another message from Souphanouvong
* In fact, Peking briefly mentioned t'.s documents in a 4 July
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the PRG peace proposals as well as
in a 3 July NCNA report of Xuan Thuy's statement at the Paris
session.
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dated 11 July. Souvanna Phouma mentioned neither U.S. bombing
nor the DRV presence in his response to the 22 June NLHS
proposal, which had called for a cease-fire "including" an
American bombing halt to be followed by talks between the
"concerned parties" held alternately in the Plain of Jars and
Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma countered by suggesting 1) a
cease-fire within a radius of 30 kilometers around the Plain of
Jars airfield, 2) discussions in the Plain of Jars and Vientiane
to reach a cease-fire throughout Lao territory, acid 3) discussions
of all outstanding Lao problems.
Souvanna Phouma's reply came under attack in a Pathet Lao radio
"conversation" on 11 July. Declaring that the reply contains
"nothing that can be agreed upon" and is no different from
previous letters in which Souvanna Phouma had avoided mentioning
a bombing halt, the broadcast declared that there cannot be talks
while fighting continues and specifically rejected the idea of
any negotiations prior to a cease-fire in all of Laos. In his
message dated the same day as the broadcast, Souphanouvong
expressed "regret" that Souvanna Phouma had proposed a cease-fire
in the Plain of Jars "in order to reject" the realization of a
cease-fire on the whole territory of Laos. "Given the situation
in Laos," the Pathet Lao leader'argued, "it is quite possible
for the parties concerned to order an immediate cease-fire on the
whole territory of Laos, as we did in 1961."
Noting that Souvanna Phouma's rejection of the NLHS proposal
came at a time when the Americans and the Lao "ultrareactionaries"
are conducting new attacks in the Plain of Jars and the Xieng
Khouang region, Souphanouvong said these acts confirm the
revelation in the Pentagon papers that the Americans have long
sought to undermine the settlement in Laos and to expand the
war there. A 14 July NLHS Central Committee statement on the
attacks in the Plain of Jars charges more directly that Souvanna
Phouma "rejected the reasonable proposal of the NLHS" under
pressure from the United States.
Earlier, the Pathet Lao radio on 8 July had broadcast an interview
in which Khamouane Boupha, commander of the Patriotic Neutralist
Forces in Phong Saly Province, had said that if Souvanna Phouma
rejected the new proposal "the struggle in towns, which is set
to go off at any time, will undoubtedly explode" and confront
Souvanna Phouma and the Vientiane administration with "new
dangers."
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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
BUCHAREST REACTS DEFIANTLY TO HUNGARIAN PUBLIC CENSURE
Romanian party chief Ceausescu used the occasion of a Bucharest
party aktiv meeting on 9 July, called to discttiss ways of
instilling greater discipline in the masses, to warn against
"nationalistic agitation, "no matter whence it might come,"
aimed at stirring up Romania's national minorities. Ceausescu
did not name his target, but he issued the warning on the
same day the party organ SCINTEIA came out with an authoritative
blast at tendentious Hungarian comment on the nationalities
question and an adrioaition that "nobody from outs3.de" can set
himself up as arbiter of another's affairs.
Signed by Paul Nicul scu-Mizil, Romanian Communist Party (RCP)
secretary in ch--.?ge of international party affairs and leading
RCP ideologist,* the SCINTEIA article also defiantly rejected
Hungarian attacks on Romania's China policy that reflected
Soviet disquiet in the wake of Ceausescu's Asian tour. The
Romanian counterattack was responsive principally to a speech
delivered before the Hungarian National Assembly on 24 June
by Zoltan Komocsin, Niculescu-Mizil's ccunterpart in the Hungarian
party (MSZMP) and a proxy spokesman for the Soviets in the past.
In that public forum, Komocsin implied that the Romanians
are letting themselves be used by the Chinese and charged
that Bucharest's independent stance is hindering Romanian-
Hungarian bilateral relations. He also expressed a "vital
interest" in the status of socialism among the Magyars in
Transylvania, in remarks conveying overtones of a threat to
disrupt the political situation in Romania by playing off
the Hungarian national minority against the Romanian majority
unless the Romanians take a more orthodox foreign policy line.
* A member of th(: RCP's Secretariat, Permanent Presidium, and
Executive Committee, Niculescu-.-ij zil is a political advisor to
Ceausescu in his capacity as RCP secretary responsible for
international party affairs. In February 1968, he led the
Romanian delegation's walkout at the Budapest consultative
conference of communist parties when the conference refused to
guarantee that no further attacks would be made on individual
parties. He delivered a direct attack on the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in a speech to the Italian Communist Party
Congress in February 1969.
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Two days after the appearance of the Niculescu-Mizil article,
an editorial article in the Hungarian government daily MAGYAR
HIRLAP, remarking that the Hungarian public hv,d taker: note of
the Romanian leaders' visit to Peking, repeated Komocsin's
complaint that Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations were
being complicated by foreign policy differences. The article
added that "as far as the Chinese attitude is concerned,
Hungary's public opinion denounces every form of anti-Soviet
disposition, whether overt or indirect." It was on 13 July,
two days after the MAGYAR HIRLAP article pursued Hungary's
attack, that Romanian media belatedly released Ceausescu's
9 July remarks.
KOMOCSIN'S SPEECH Reflecting Hungary's role as Soviet
surrogate in seeking to enforce
discipline in the Soviet bloc, Komocsin's review of
relations with the communist countries had given considerable
attention to Romania as well as to Yugoslavia and the PRC.
While noting that Hungarian-Romanian relations "have lately
become more active" and that the "basis" of their relations
is "identity of interests and aims," Komocsin added that the
development of such bilateral cooperation "is made difficult
by the differences which occur from time to time in the
Hungarian and Romanian views and in the assessment of
certain international issues." He called for "Joint
efforts" to overcome the difficulties.
Komocsin made clear the relevance of these remarks to
Ceausescu's Peking visit in statements later in his
speech on relations with the PRC. Repeating Budapest's
standard line on its desire for "normalization" of such
relations, he went on to remark pointedly that in this
process "we do not undertake unprincipled concessions
or flatter or praise that with which we do not agree,"
and "we cannot allow the international endeavors of the
Hungarian People's Republic to be used by anyone for anti-
Soviet pressures."
Komocsin's remart~s on the matter of the Hungarian minority
in Romania carried overtones of the Brezhnev doctrine: "We
have a vital interest in seeing that the inhabitants of both
Hungary and Romania--including the Hungarian nationalities
living there--realize that the fate and future of our peoples
are inseparable from socialism," and "it is only on the basis
of a socialist development that our mutual problems, cooperation
between our countries, and the strengthening of our relations
can be solved."
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The Yugoslavs fared better than the Romanians in Komocsin's
foreign policy review. The MSZMP secretary appeared to take
the ideological differences with that country for granted and
indicated that relations were developing successfully. He
expressed hope that relations with Hungary's "southern
neig'_-ror, socialist Yugoslavia," would "as in the past, in
the future also" not be hampered by the fact that certain
international questions "are Judged differently by the
Yugoslav comrades than by us." He saw possibilities for
successful development of relations with Belgrade, "since
we see a similar endeavor by our Yugoslav neighbor" to
overcome bilateral differences.
REBUTTAL FROM Niculescu-Mizil's SCINTEIA article opened
NICULESCU-MIZIL with a restatement of Romania's principles
on the proper basis of relations between
socialist countries--equal rights, national sovereignty, and
noninterference. Before turning to Komocsin, he complained
that the foreign affairs editor of the Hungarian party's
NEPSZABADSAG had "distorted" the purposes of Ceausescu's
recent trip to Peking in the course of a Budapest telecast
on 30 June.* Niculescu-Mizil went on to ask rhetorical],v:
"What can better serve the interests of unity--contacts,
principled, comradely discussions between party and state
leaders . . . , or the practices of blaming, labelling, and
invective which have always proved to be harmful?"
Proceeding to Komocsin's National Assembly speech, Niculescu-
Mizil expressed "amazement" that the Hungarian party secretary
should suggest that differences of principle between the two
countries are adversely affecting their bilateral relations.
He professed failure to understand how a Hungarian spokesman
could make such allegations at a time when bilateral relations
and cooperation have been expanding. "But irrespective of
the reasons which motivated the raising of the problems,!' he
added, the "overt assertion that differences of views should
hamper bilateral relations is completely unwarranted from the
theoretical point of view, profoundly harmful from the
practical point of view . . . , and cannot be accepted in
any form."
* The TV speech was not repeated in monitored Budapest radio
broadcasts and is not available to FBIS.
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N{culescu-Mizil evinced particular concern over Komocsin's
expression of Budapest's "vital interest" in the status of
socialism among the Magyars in Transylvania,* which the
Romanians cou.d read as an ominous linking of the class
and nationalities questions. He warned that "nobody from
outside can set himself up as judge or arbiter of the
progress of socialism in one country or another, nor
give marks and certificates." Taking an apparent swipe at
such now deposed orthodox Moscow favorites as Rakosi,
Novotny, and Gomulka, Niculescu-Mizil added: "As a matter
of fact, it is known that there were cases when people with
responsible positions excelled in teaching others lessons
in socialism . . . but were not able to cope with the tasks
of governing their own parties and people and, for this
reason, registered lamentable political failures."
CEAUSESCU SPEECH The 13 July AGERPRES summary of Ceausescu's
remarks to the party aktiv (a full text
in the same day's SCINTEIA is not yet available) cautiously
avoided specific mention of Hungary in passages that seemed
clearly responsive to Komocsin's linkage of the treatment of
the Magyars in Transylvania to the interests of "socialism."
Romania, AGERPRES quoted Ceausescu as saying, has been able
to solve the nationalities question "in the spirit of
Marxist-Leninist teaching, ensuring the full equality of
rights . . . irrespective of nationality." He warned that
"nothing and nobody in the world will be able to hamper
and prejudice this unity." He added pointedly that "anybody
trying to pursue a policy of national hatred pursues a policy
against socialism and communism--and must be treated
consequently as an enemy of our socialist nation."
* Transylvania, inhabited by both Hungarians and Romanians,
was seized .':rom Hungary by Romania in 1918, anr? in 1940 Germany
and Italy forced on Romania the so-called Vienna Award granting
most of the territory to Hungary. It was returned to Romania
after World War II. While the issue continued to rankle, it
has seldom been broached in Budapest or Bucharest propaganda.
It has not surfaced directly in radio or press media since
Ceausescu, in a 7 May 1966 speech on the RCP's 45th anniversary,
recalled "the dictate of Vienna imposed on Romania in August
1940" under which "the northeii part of Transylvania was stolen
and deliver d to fascist Hungary." A sanitized account of the
speech in PRAVDA omitted this passage.
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- 14 -
Another passage seemed calculated to counter the possible
impact on the Hungarians in Transylvania of Budapest's
expression of interest in their "socialist" welfare: "We
observe the rights of the nationalities and fight for
ensuring their rights and wish to advance together toward
socialism, and therefore we must admit no kind of attempted
nationalistic, chauvinistic agitation, no matter whence it
might come. It should be treated as an activity inimitable
to the cause of socialism and communism."
Ceausescu also used the occasion to defend his recent visit
to Peking and other Asian capitals as "an important contribu-
tion" to socialist unity and as part of Romania's policy of
developing good relations with all the socialist countries.
Maintaining his traditional balancing act in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, he vaguely urged the party aktiv to make sure that
"everybody understands our valuation of the Great October
Socialist Revolution, the role of the Soviet Union . . . and
our valuation of the revolution in China and the role of the
PRC."
Turning to Soviet bloc relations, Ceausescu repeated the Romanian
position that economic cooperation in CEMA should not affect
national independence and sovereignty and should insure full
equality among the socialist countries. Any problems that
arise, he said, should be settled "in the spirit of free
consent and in the interests of each socialist country."
BACKGROUND ON HUNGARY'S ROLE AS SOVIET SURROGATE
A growing emphasis in Hungarian propaganc?a in recent months
on orthodox solidarity with the Warsaw Pict and in CEMA was
exemplified by fulsome praise in Komocsin's National Assembly
speech for "socialist economic integration" and in his failure
to make any direct reference to Hungarian trade with capitalist
countries--propagandized vigorcasly in the past in Budapest
media as an important element of the Hungarian "economic
reform." Kadar had favorably cited commercial agreements
concluded with "Austria, Italy, France, the FRG, and other"
capitalist countries in his 23 November 1970 report to the
10th MSZMP Congress. But in his 1 April 1971 speech to the
24th CPSU Congress, Kadz.r stressed rather that while Hungary's
economic relations with the capitalist countries were "one
point, the other is the fact, which must be accepted, that
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for us politics are tantamount to neither commercial relations
nor a matter of give and take." He added: "We are committed
ideologically and politically" to the Soviet Union, the
Warsaw Pact, and CEMA.
The Hungarian party--with Komocsin the key protagonist--played
a key role in the preparation and fruition of the Moscow
international party conference of June 1969. The main
preparatory meeting for that conference, the 64-party
"consultative" meeting in Budapest in February-March 1968,
brought Komocsin into conflict; with Niculescu-Mizi1.
Following the Romanian delegation's walkout from the Budapest
gathering over the issue of open criticism of the Chinese,
Komocsin defended open criticism of Peking in telling the
gathering that-while collective analysis of another party's
policy was out of the question, "no party can prescribe for
another what it can or cannot say . . . at fraternal party
meetings."
Early this year, Moscow made special use of the Hungarians
as spokesmen in its behalf to counter Peking's more flexible
tactics in th Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus PRAVDA on 6 January
reprinted substantial excerpts of a Varnsi article in the
20 December NEPSZABADSAG, including Varnai's warning that
an assessment of Feking's current foreign policy was essential
because "some people" were inclined toward "far-reaching
conclusions" on the basis of initial favorable developments.
Also in January, Moscow broadcast to various communist countries,
including Romania, an article by Komocsin in which the MSZMP
secretary looked ahead to the forthcoming CPSU congress as an
occasion for acknowledging Moscow's preeminent authority in
the communist movement and invoked the 1969 conference in
stressing the importance of a party's correct relationship
with Moscow.
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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
SOVIET PRESS ASSAILS U.S. ARMS BUILDUP. ASKS "SERIOUS" TALKS
An article in the Soviet military paper RED STAR on 13 July,
described by -TASS as the first of "a series of items on the
present stage of the strategic arms race in the United States,"
echoes the language of Brezhnev's April 1970 Kharkov speech
in warning that any att^mpt to "ensure military superiority
over the USSR" will be met with a "proper increase" in Soviet
defense capabilities., On the heels of Moscow's then ongoing
propaganda attack on U.S. plans to move forward with the
second phase of the Safeguard ABM system and the announcement
of plans for the deployment of land-based MIRV's, Brezhnev
had said on 14 April 1970 that "we shall answer any attempts
by any party whatsoever to achieve military superiority over
the Soviet Union by maKiag the required increase in our own
military might to guarantee our defense." This warning,
repeated with some frequency in routine propaganda in the early
summer of 1970, has not since Lien voiced by any Soviet leader
and has been largely absent from routine comment ever the past
year.
The :RED STAR article, by Col. V. Kharich, is quoted by TASS
as calling Defense Secretary Laird thi chief spokesmantfor
those in the United States who "shout hysterically" about
an alleged Soviet menace and push a course of U.S. buildup of
strategic armaments that is "incompatible with a constructive
approach to a solution of the problems under discussion" at
SALT and "seriously prejudices" the talks. Kharich conclud'.s
with the stock avowal that the USSR, for its part, believes
strategic arms limitation will promote a relaxation of
international tension and is in the interests of all the
peoples of the world.
Low-volume comment on SALT over Radio Moscow and in the
nonmilitary press continues to balance pledges of serious
Soviet intent with warnings that the "military-industrial
complex" in the United States is stepping up activities
detrimental to the negotiations. An article by Y. Tomilin
in the 9 July IZVESTIYA warns that the "military-industrial
complex" is not giving up its efforts to "thwart the
successfully developing. dialogue." Tomilin assails the
"aggressive statements" of Secretary Laird and concludes that
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"public figures such as Laird" have apparently forgotten that
the existing world balance of strategic forces "condemns to
failure any attempts to pursue a policy from a position of
strength."
But Tomilin also points to the 20 May U.S.-Soviet agreement
in Vienna outlining the :ocus of negotiations for the year as
as important reason for "optimism" among observers at the start
of the Helsinki round. The USSR, he says, has 'ways favored
"serious and honest talks by equal partners" in search of an
agreement acceptable to both sides. Like the 7 July Viktorov
article in PRAVDA on the eve of the opening of the Helsinki
round, Tom.L.Lin notes that the 20 May agreement gives priority
to an ABM accord but that attention will also be given to
restricting strategic ol,ensive armament. The USSR has
declared, Tomilin observes, that it views the resolving of
strategic arms limitation "in its entirety" as desirable.
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MA LTA
MOSCUW APPROVES MINTOFF POLICIES. NOTES BRITISH. NATO CONCERN
A flurry of Moscow propaganda suppurts the "neutralist ccurse"
of the new Labor Party government in Malta, which took office
21 June, and depicts British, U.S., and other NATO circles as
viewing Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's policies with anxiety.
According to Soviet commentators, Malta is faced with increasing
British and NATO pressure, blackmail, and threats following
Mintoff's "perfectly legitimate and justified steps" to "defend
the country's sovereignty": his demand for review of the 10-
year defense and financial agreements with Britain, concludes.
in 1964 when the island obtained independence; his removal cf
the British Governor General; his declaring persona non grate,
Admiral Birindelli, commander of Allied Naval Forces, Southern
Europe; and his decision halting further U.S. Sixth Fleet visits
to Malta pending "revision of general arrangements,"
Soviet media play up the "feverish activity" in NATO capitals
caused by Mintoff's actions, including secret NATO meetings on
the "Malta crisis," discussion of the problem at a session of
the West European Union.Council, attacks on the Maltese Govern-
ment in the British Parliament, and a "London-and-Washington-
inspired" campaign against Malta ranging from blackmail to what
TASS commentator Kornilov on 6 July called "direct military
pressure."
Focusing on this NATO alarm at the developments endangering its
use of the island as a naval base and "center of espionage activity,"
Moscow offers conflicting assessments of Malta's relationship with
NATO. Thus some comment maintains that NATO use of the island is
without legal foundation since Malta is not a member of'and has no
treaties with NATO, while other propaganda acknowledges some form
of Maltese-NATO arrangements. Thus a panelist on the 4 July Moscow
domestic service commentators' roundtable cited the Mintoff Govern-
ment as announcing that Malta "has no firm treaties" concerning
the stationing of the NATO southern naval forces command on the
island and "that it had only a temporary, limited treaty which is
now losing effect." TASS on 1 July remarked that since 1953, with
British consent, the NATO southern naval forces command had been
headquartered on the island. NEW TIMES on 4 June, prior to the
recent Maltese elections, had noted that the Maltese Government
concluded an "agreement" with NATO in 1965 on the "establishment
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14 JULY 1971
of 'special relations' .Legalizing the presence of NATO head-
quarters" on the island; Res TIMES added that "the agreement
signed with NATO in 1968" increased the possibility of Malta
b.ing used in NATO interest:. With regard to the Sixth Fleet,
TASS in its 1 July dispatch reported the Maltese ^, -rnment
as declaring `:hat visits by Sixth Fleet units do n(-, accord
with the countr;r'a interests, and that there is no agreement
or understanding between Malta and the United States which
would ent3cle the Sixth Fleet to use Maltese waters.*
TASS on 12 July reported that, in an interview with IZVESTIYA
correspondent Kobysh, Maltese Information Minister Naudi
declared that Malta's goal is to get rid of the NATO head-
quarters and British war bases on the island, to establish
Malta's neutral status, and to develop equal relations with
all countries. The minister recalled, TASS said, that Malta
had addressed a statement to the Security Council informing
it that the defense agreement with Britain had "lost its
validity," and that if British threats continued Malta would
appeal to the United Nations for aid.
USSR-MALTA A Moscow domestic service commentary by Levin
RELATIONS on 7 July responded to "irritation" among a number
of Western countries regarding the visit to Malta
by-Boviet Ambassador to Britain Smi:rnovekiy, also accredited to
Malta. It is "perfectly natural," and "normal practice," for
ministers of a new government to meet with representatives of
other states, Levin declared, yet "bourgeois information agen-
cies" are trying to "cast a shadow" on Soviet foreign policy.
The reason for this, the commentator explained, is that the
Maltese Government's current actions, following years of British
superiority in the island, have "put the NATO leaders in a state
of mental unbalance."
While Moscow since the Maltese elections has not been heard to
mention the question of a Soviet base, NEW TIMES (No. 23, 4 June),
just prior to the elections, referred to a "fable concocted" by
Western powers about Soviet plans with regard to Malta, citing
the London TIMES as writing about fears the Russians would find a
permanent base for their Mediterranean fleet in Malta. Charging
* PRAVDA in November 1968 had recalled that in 1966 the United
States obtained permission to use the island as a repair base
for the Sixth Fleet.
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that these vicious lies" aimed at distorting Soviet foreign
policy and spoiling Soviet-Maltese relations, NEW TIMES declared
there was "not a grain of truth" in the claim that the USSR "plans
to build a military base in Malta," and it added that Mintoff had
written the TIMES refuting the paper's insinuations. Similarly,
NEW TIMES last fall (No. 45, 7 November) tcok note of a Swiss
report of Soviet plans fo: a naval and air base in Malta, and
again reported that Mintoff had written a "fitting rebuff." This
shows, NEW TIMES said, that there are "quite a few sober-minded
people in Malta" who know that claims that the Soviet Union "is
interested in acquiring a base on the island are absolutely ground-
less." NEW TIMES went on to recall the Soviet Government proposal
to turn the Mediterranean into a nuclear-free zone and to close
all foreign bases there, and asserted that the USSR has no inten-
tion of imperiling Malta's security.
Moscow had announced recognition of Malta on its independence in
September 1964 and Soviet willingness to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with it, and IZVESTIYA interviewed then Prime Minister Borg
Olivier in late December 1967 in connection with the establishment
of Maltese-Soviet diplomatic relations. Meager propaganda atten-
tion to Malta since its independence has dealt with NATO efforts
to keep Malta a stronghold of the alliance and to circumscribe its
independence.
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COSMONAUT DEATHS
USSR REPORTS ON CAUSE OF TRAGEDY, FORECASTS MORE FLIGHTS
The 11 July report of the Soviet commission investigating
the cause of the death. of the three-man crew of Sc,,-uz 11
has been widely publicized in Moscow media, with no
elaboration of the report's tPrss disclosure that the
t7:?agedy was caused by dep;-- Jurization resulting from a
"loss of the ship's sealing." According to the report, a
study is continuing to determine the probable causes of
the seal failure, which occurre:,. some 30 minutes before
the craft's soft-landing- eaxiy oi:. 30 June.
In characteristic fashion, Moscow had widely publicized the
launching of the Soyuz craft on 6 June, its linkup the
following day with the orbiting Salyut scientific station,
and the continuing activities of cosmonauts Dobrovolskiy,
Volkov, and Patsayev on board Salyut through the 29th.
Propaganda treating the three cosmonauts' record stay in
space stressed that everything was in order. And the TASS
announcement on the 30th that the men were found dead in
their seats stated that the unlinking operation from
Salyut had "passed without a hitch and all :.ystems were
functioning normally." That initial TASS announcement
said that the cause of the deaths was being investigated;
later on the 30th, the domestic service reported that the
party and government leadership had created a commission
for the purpose.
Soviet spokesmen have indicated that more flights are in
the offing despite the tragedy. Thus cosmonaut Maj. Gen.
Shatalov, in a eulogy of the deceased crew members at their
funeral on 2 July, declared that Soviet cosmonauts will
"continue the cause of space exploration" in a worthy
manner. And Academician B. Petrov stated in a 4 July
PRAVDA article that "new flights into space and the
creation of new inhabited orbital stations of the Salyut
type" lie ahead. Like other spokesmen, Petrov acknowledged
the dangers in the exploration of space: "It is never
possible to exclude chance when very complicated equipment
is being tested and mastered."
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Extensive Soviet followup propaganda on the deaths has featured
wide play for the message of condolences from the Soviet
leadership to the families of the cosmonauts as well as
messages from abroad, including those from President Nixon
and Premier Chou En-Lai.
THE PRC MESSAGE Chou's message is the latest instan^e of
OF CONDOLENCES Peking's willingness to observe the proprieties
in bilateral state relations with Moscow.
Chou had also sent a message to Kosygin on 13 June 1970
expressing condolences regarding recent floods and earthquakes
in the USSR. There had been no message on the death of Soviet
cosmonaut Komarov in April 1967; an NCNA dispatch at that
time had all but, gloated over the accident, remarking that
Moscow had played up the Komarov flight as a "great creative
achievement" dedicated to the forthcoming 50V: anniversary
of the October Revolution.
The terse Chinese message on the three cosmonauts' death did
not say anything about the Soyuz 11 flight, not even that
the craft had been launched. There was no other Peking
report on the event, apart from an NCNA report that Chinese
officials had called on the Soviet embass- on 2 July to
express condolences. The USSR's manned flijhts subsequent
to that of Komarov in Soyuz 1 had not been reported in
Peking me(ia; but the flight prior to Soyuz 1--that of
Leonov and Belyayev in -oskhod 2 in March 1965--had been
given cursory but currect Peking propaganda attention.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
YEVTUSHENKO SPEECH ENLIVENS WRITERS UNION CONGRESS
Except for a controversial speech by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, the
USSR Writers Union Congress held from 29 June to 2 July was
routinely uneventful. There was little criticism--even of an
indirect sort--of liberal writers, Solzhenitsyn was not
mentioned directly, and the stress on ideological correctness
was relatively mild. What there was in the way of bitter
attack was mostly directed at the conservative group of young
Russophiles, who were criticized especially by liberals
Konstantin Simonov and Yevtushenko. The new leadership
elected at the close of the congress remained substantially
as before.
The most noteworthy event at the congress was an impassioned
speech by Yevtushenko implicitly criticizing the union's
leaders, attacking the critics of the younger generation,
and urging the older generation to surrender some of its
monopoly on power (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July). Yevtushenko
scored he older, conservative writers (who dominate the
union) for citing the anti-Stalinist excesses of the
Yevtushenko generation as an excuse for denying it influence.
He argued that even though Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's
crimes had somewhat disoriented his generation, those who
attempt to smear the whole generation as "morally unstable"
and untrustworthy are "deeply wrong."
Casting aside "infantile blind faith" in the false values of
the Stalin era, my generation--Yevtushenko said--has developed an
"unshakeable" faith in the lasting, real values of the people and
society and is pledged to do everything to prevent any recurrence
of Stalinism. Nonetheless, he complained, this generation is
still not trusted by its elders, who control all literary journals
and "still think we are children and cannot be given adults' toys
for fear we will break them because of ine::perience."
Yevtushenko himself had been judged unreliable to sit on the
editorial board of a journal and was removed from YUNOST's board
in mid-1969 along with his fellow young writer Vasiliy Aksenov.
Despite his frequent nonconformity, Yevtushenko was indulged by
the union's leaders not only by being selected as one of only
35 speakers in the discussion but also by being elected to the
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14 JULY 1971
congress' governing secretariat. He had not been on any
governing body at the last congress. He was not, however,
elected to the 47-man secretariat of the board formed at the
end of the congress.
No one mentioned Yevtushenko's complaints, although Boris
Polevoy, speaking immediately after Yevtushenko, remarked that
he, the editor of YUNOST ("Youth") was, "alas, very unyoung"
(LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).
The generation issue was, however, also raised by conservative
Writers Union Secretary Sergey Sartakov, who noted that
"many" view "with alarm" the "aging" of the union. He.
ratic.nalized the phenomenon on grounds that people simply live
longer today and asserted that there are no "contradictions"
between young and old writers (LITERARY GAZETTE, 30 June).
FEW HARDLINE The only haidli,ie speech was delivered by
STATEM
ENTS
conservative R:FSR Writers Union Chairman
S.V. Mikhalkov. In an apparent reference to
Solzhenitsyn, he declared that any writer who separates
himself from society unavoidably attracts the "unhealthy
interest" of hostile elements abroad who "attempt to drag
him into their camp" and sometimes succeed. Mikhalkov also
attacked the "invention" and "savoring" of nonexistent
difficulties and stated that "advocates of 'pure art' and an
apolitical attitude in the final event themselves become the
tool of politics, indeed, of a reactionary, shameless
politics" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).
The main report delivered by conservative Writers Union
Secretary G.M. Markov was comparatively moderate. Although he
indirectly attacked young dissidents such aL. Ginzburg and
Galanskov, he virtually ignored the liberal-conservative
controversies so much in evidence since the last congress in
1967. Unlike Mikhalkov he appared to treat the liberal
deviations as a thing of the past, noting that the "subjectivist
attitude of some writers" toward controversial historical events
(industrialization, collectivization, World War II) has been
"mainly overcome" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 30 June).
Otherwise, conservative Nikolay Gribachev complained that in
the recent past literature often overstressed the suffering
during the war and collectivization,. and Armenian Writers Union
head Eduard Topchyan criticized the depiction of "isolated fact"
as unavoidably leading to "distortion of the truth of life"
(LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).
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Liberal positions were represented by Kirgiz writer Chingiz
Aytmatov, who criticized the "one-sided" attacks on liberal
writer Vasil Bykov, ate well as Yevtushenko, who argued that
there should be no "forbidden themes" in literature (LITERARY
GAZETTE, 7 July). Counterattacking, Yevtushenko criticized
a recent novel and poem by unnamed neo-Stalinist writers for
depicting youth as "spiritual currency speculators" and traitors.
RUSSOPHILES The main target of criticism at the congress was
ATTACKED the coterie of young Russophiles grouped around
the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. Markov, in his
main report, attacked some writers for "indiscriminately"
adopting ideas from "figures of the past who were far from
progressive" instead of studying the "heritage of revolutionary
democrats, Marxist critics, and primarily Lenin . . . ." As a
result, he continued, they could not "correctly explain the
national characteristics of the great Russian literature" and
its relations with other literatures, and the fruitless
literary debate initiated by the Russophiles had degenerated
into "name-calling," which is "completely intolerable in
Soviet literature."
Simonov criticized the differentiation of love of country into
"urban and rural love" and setting these against each other,
"as if one were better and one worse" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).
Devoting almost all his speech to the subject, he attacked
"historical insensitivity to other peoples and their history"
and stated that for him, a Russian, "loving our Soviet land . . .
means loving it all" and "not just my own, Russian, land . . ."
Conservative Nikolay Gribachev noted Simonov's discussion of
history and cautioned against overlooking a class approach to
history--a leading accusation against the Russophiles. Even
Russophile sympathizers Mikhail Alekseyev and Vladimir
Chivilikhin, who spoke at the congress, did not attempt to defend
the group.
It was Yevtushencko, however, who brashly and directly ridiculed
his conservative Russophile foes for their ideological deviation:
"When you read the articles of some zealous defenders of the
past, you are simply amazed at how these young people, born after
the October Revolution, have borrowed their ideas from reactionary
ideologists of the Slavophile school." After citing a young
director's film idolizing prerevolutionary rural Russia and
ignoring oppression by landowners, Yevtushenko declared that
"one wishes to remind these young people that in Russia they used
to sing not only 'God Save the Tsar' but also the 'Internationale'
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LEADERSHIP The now leadership elected by the congross
UNCHANGED reflected little change. The ailing first
secretary, Konstantin Fedin, was moved to
the new post of chairman of the board, while Georgiy Markov,
long the real leader of the union, became first secretary.
As before, moderates were represented in the new 47-man
secretariat by A.T. Tvardovskiy, K.M. Simonov, L.M. Leonov,
B.N. Polevoy, A.T. Honchar, and L.N. Novichenko, and
conservatives by such men as Markov, S.V. Mikhalkov,
N.M. Gribachev, A. Ye, Korneychuk, S.V. Sartakov,
M.A. Sholokhov, and A.B. Chakovskiy. New Ukrainian Writers
Union First Deputy Chairman Vasil Kozacherko was the only
notable conservative added to the secretariat and young
writer Robert Rozhdestvenskiy the only liberal. The
confused situation in the Ukrainian union was reflected in
the fact that deposed leaders Honchar and Novichenko were
reelected to the USSR union secretariat, while the new
Ukrainian leaders Yuriy Smolich and Kozachenko were added.
Moderates elected to the 225-member board but not its
secretariat included Ch. Aytmatov, V.P. Katayev, V.K. Ketlinskaya,
V.S. Rozov, and young poets A.A. Voznesenskiy and Yevtushenko,
while V.P. Aksenov and V.V. Bykov were elected to the Auditing
Commission. Such prominent conservatives as OKTY4BR editor
V.A. Kochetov and MOSKVA editor M.N. Alekseyev were also
elected only to the board. Russophile leaders V.A. Soloukhin,
S.V. Vikulov, P.L. Proskurin, V.D. Fedorov, and V.A. Chivilikhin,
as well as their allies and occasional defenders M.N. Alekseyev,
V.A. Zakrutkin, and A.A. Prokofyev, were also elected to the
board. Although still not represented in the secretariat, the
Russophiles gained some additional representation on the board,
with Vikulov, Proskurin, and Chivi:Likhin as new board members.
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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
GRIEVANCES AGAINST BOLIVIAN CP RESURFACE IN CLAN REPORTS
Cuban reports on the 11-13 June Third National Congress of the
Moscow-lining Bo'.ivian Communist Party (PCB) publicized
continuing discord within the PCB on the role of guerrilla
warfare in revolutionary tactics and, by implica.,ion, resurfaced
long-standing Cuban grievances against the PCB leadership.
PRENSA LATINA distributed two reports from its La Paz
correspondent which conveyed Cuban sympathy with a minority at
the congress that had unsuccessfully sought the expulsion of
two party leaders for bctrayal of Che Guevara's ill-fated
guerrillas in Bolivia in 1967.
At the same time, in keeping with Castro's evident desire not
to exacerbate relations with the orthodox Latin American CP's
in a period of good relations with Moscow, Cuban media refrained
from commenting on the congress and PRENSA LATINA did not
disseminate a third, tendentious account as the proceedings
by its correspondent. Taken as a whole, the limited Cuban
coverage reflected Castro's low-keyed current approach tb the
divisive issue of revolutionary strategy in Latin America
while registering, in muted fashion, the special opprobrium
that still attaches to the PCB in Havana as a consequence of
its lukewarm support or Guevara.
No Cuban delegation was present at the congress, which was
attended by delegations from Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru,
and Venezuela. No Cuban greetings message was publicized.
And in another apparent sign of Havana's unwillingness to
associate itself with the Bolivian party, PRENSA LATINA in
monitored transmissions did not distribute a report from its
La PEA, correspondent on a congress resolution "expressing
solidarity with the Cuban revolution and calling on patriotic
revolutionary Bolivians to demand the immedia:"-e reestablishment
of diplomatic relations with Cuba."
BACKGROUND: THE AFTERMATH OF THE GUEVARA DEBACLE
As the first PCB congress to meet since Che Guevara's death
in Bolivia in October 1967 (the Second National Congress took
place in 1964), the Third Congress was bound to take up the
question of the role of guerrilla tactics in light of the
Guevara debacle, which had divided the Bolivian left and
brought the PCB into acrimonious conflict with Castro.
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The Guevara venture had coafronted the PCB, committed primarily
to peaceful methods of struggle, with a dilemma compounded b5
the fact that the guerrilla band was led by a foreigner who
refused to subordinate his movement to PCB guidance. To remain
aloof from the movement would risk a breach with Castro, who
had earlier broken with the Venezuelan CP over its dissociation
from the guerilla forces in Venezuela and had posited support
for guerrilla warfare as the criterion for Cuban acceptance of
a party's revolutionary credentials. To participate in the
guerrilla campaign without controlling it, on the other hand,
would be tantamount to relinquishing the party's claim to
represent the revolutionary vanguard. Faced with this choice,
the party opted for an equivocal course of lip service to the
guerrillas short of a commitment to active support.
This stance enabled the PCB to disclaim responsibility or
the guerrilla venture after it failed. It also, however,
left the party open to charges by Castro that it must bear
responsibility for Guevara's death and for tae ensuing setbacks
suffered by the remaining guerrillas by virtue of its failure
to actively support them. Castro indicted the party in his
introduction to the text of Guevara's field diary, released
by Havana on 1 July 1968. Directing his fire particularly
at Mario Monje, first secretary of the PCB at the time
Guev:.ra's forces were in the field,* he L..:arged that the
PCB 'lad "sabotaged" the guerrilla movement after Guevara had
rejected Monje's "shameful, ridiculous, and unwarranted
demands" to take over command for the guerrillas. Guevara,
Castro said, was "not disposed . . . to hand over to an
inexpert empty-brain of narrow chauvinist outlook the
command of a guerrilla group designed to develop ultimately
into a struggle of broad dimensions in South America."
Subsequently Havana media periodically publicized statements
and communiques of the Bolivian Army of National Liberation
(ELN), the guerrilla organization which after Guevara's
death was taken over by ex-PCB members who had broken with
the party over its lack of support for the guerrillas. And
the PCB continued to be the target of Cuban invective.
* Monje resig;ieu the post early in 1968 in the midst of the
recriminations over the Guevara fiasco. He was replaced by
Jorge Kolle Cueto.
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14 JULY 1971
In September 1969, although Cuban-Soviet relations had markedly
improved and Cuban attacks on the traditional Latin American
communist parties had become a rarity, Cuban media used the
death of "Inti" Peredo, a Bolivian survivor of Guevara'6 band,
to recall the PCB leadership's "treason." An editorial eulogy
of Peredo in GRANMA on 13 September highlighted his break with
the "treacherous line imposed by the leadership of the PCB led
by Mario Monje." GRANMA in effect bestowed Cuban blessings on
schismatic activities in the party by declaring that Peredo's
act "firmly paves the way for the Bolivian party rank and file."
In August 1970, Cuban media cautiously withheld direct comment
in support of revived guerrilla activity by the ELN, but they
did publicize ELN documents which among other things derided
the PCB for consorting with the "national bourgeoisie." In
October, publicizing Bolivian statements skeptical or critical
of the new regime of General Juan Torres, Havana gave heavy
play to comment from the ELN.
Castro has sustained a cool but restrained wait-and-see attitude
toward the Torres regime in recent months, and Cuban media this
year have given negligible attention to Bolivian affairs.
Describing "a qualitative change in the Latin American
situation" in his 19 April speech on the Bay of Pigs
anniversary, Castro saw Chile under Allende as firmly launched
"on the path of revolution" and associated Peruvian Government
moves with a developing "revolutionary process" in Peru; in
Bolivia he portrayed a "profound radicalization" of the
people but commented that "with regard to the leadership of
that process, we have not expressed our views."
CUBAN COVERAGE OF THE CONGRESS
The two reports on the PCB congress which PRENSA LATINA
distributed, both on 15 June, together conveyed a picture
of the PCB as defaulting on its revolutionary obligations and
endorsing positions congenial to the bourgeois establishment.
They publicized the fact that the party was divided on the
still rankling guerrilla warfare issue, with a minority
dissenting from the prevailing position that assigned guerrilla
tactics a subordinate role, and they did so in such a way as
to reflect Cuban sympathy with the dissenters.
I
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The first, brief report led off by citing a PCB congress
resolution warning the working class "that a fascist coup
may be led by the right and some sectors of the armed forces"
and calling for a strengthening of the people's "fighting
unity." After reporting this more or less pro forma rhetoric,
in harmony with Havana's own line on dangers of a coup from
the right, the report went on in effect to impugn the PCB's
revolutionary credentials by quoting a favorable appraisal
of the congress by EL NACIONAL, "the official organ of the
Juan Jose Torres government." The paper commented, according
to PRENSA LATINA, that the congress had "arrived at conclusions
which are in agreement with the country's political reality"
and had "clearly and finally condemned the theory and practice
of sporadic individual guerrilla uprisings."
PRENSA LATINA also cited the views of a co]".mnist in EL DIARIO,
"the newspaper with the largest circulation," to the effect
that "finally the counterrevolutionaries of the Muscovite PCB
have come to dominate." It quoted EL DIARIO's columnist as
remarking that Jorge Kolle--a past target of Cuban attack,
reelected PCB first secretary at the congress--continues
"along with his retinue of professional lifetime leaders"
to put off meeting the Bolivian people's desire for
"liberation" on "the pretext of struggle against anti-
Marxist positions." An ensuing direct anti-Soviet remark
by the EL DIARIO columnist, cited in the original dispatch
filed to Hav%na by PRENSA LATINA's man in La Paz, was
edited out of the version PRENSA LATINA disseminated:
"They continue to make the PCB a travel agency and a public
relations agency for the Soviet Union. The communists of
the Moscow line deserved better luck . . . ."
The other report disseminated by PRENSA. LATINA publicized
direct criticisms of Monje and Kolle at the congress.
It highlighted a demand "made behind closed doors" by a
former Bolivian guerrilla, Orlando Jimenez Bazan, that
Kolle and Monje be expelled for "betraying" the Guevara
guerrillas at Nancahuazu. Jimenez claimed, according to
PRENSA LATINA, that he and other PCB members who had joined
the Nancahuazu guerrillas had accepted in good faith
assurances by Monje and Kolle that the PCB "was participating"
in the guerrilla campaign and would "collaborate as much ac
necessary."
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But the correspondent said it was also learned that Monje told
the congress the PCB had not been so committed "and that the
PCB members who joined the guerrillas did so on their own."
Although Jimenez' speech "was heavily applauded by part of
the congress," PRENSA LATINA said, "the other part" was
satisfied with Monje's report and rejected Jimenez' call
for his and Kolle's expulsion from the party.
PRENSA LATINA stated that the congress approved a Central
Committee report on guerrilla activity "which says, in
essence, that guerrilla activity without popular support is
not the most appropriate road to national liberation." It
added, however, that the congress resolution "merely says"
the congress approved the Central Committee report "on the
problem of the guerrilla nucleus which arose in Nancahuazu
in 1967 and entrusts to the new Central Comm!.ttee elected
by the Third Congress the final decision on its publication
and utilization." PRENSA LATINA said that neither the press
nor the delegates had received a copy of the Central Committee
report.
WHAT PRENSA LATINA DID NOT DISTRIBUTE
A longer and more tendentious account filed to Havana by PRENSA
LATINA's La Paz correspondent on 14 June, which the nears agency
decline's to distribute, included the remark that "observers"
regarded the congress outcome as "unexpected" because "delegates
from all over the country had said earlier that this event
would change the leadership of the PCB." In fact, the
correspondent wrote, the delegates "tacitly expressed their
support" of the former Central Committee by approving, among
other congress documents, one "reaffirming their antiguerrilla
line." He acknowledged "the distinction made by the PCB" in
regard to guerrilla action--the rationale that the party "is
not antiguerrilla because guerrilla activity is a method that
can be used" in the revolutionary process according to the
circumstances, but that such activity "must always be given
impetus and be led by the working class."
The dispatch contained a number of thinly veiled swipes at
the party leadership: Noting homage paid by PCB Central
? Committee member and mine workers' leader Simon Reyes to
party members who had fallen in struggle, the dispatch
observed that "he did not mention other PCB members who
fell at Nancahuazu and T.:oponte"--two sites of guerrilla
defeats. It noted that the "controversial" Mario Monje
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-s6-
was not named to the new Central Committee elected. by the
congress (he had resigned from the former Central Committee
in January 1968 In the aftermath of the Guevara debacle),
but it added that Monje, "who was involved in unimportant
action during the 1967 guerrilla activity, is now at the head
of the La Paz regional committee."
The correspondent cited Reyes' statement that the congress
reaffirmed its "political line, that of reaching power through
the struggle of the masses, rejecting the positions which
according to the congress are contrary to Marxism-Leninism;
he referred to the idea of guerrilla nuclei." The idea of
"guerrilla nuclei," or the "theory of the revolutionary center,"
was the heart of the Castro-Guevara thesis behind the
initiation of the guerril]- movemerit in Bolivia.
SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE CONGRESS
Moscow media covered the Bolivian congress in a brief 12 June
TASS report and a La Paz-datelined TASS dispatch in PRAVDA
the next day which highlighted First Secretary Kolle's
observation that the congress was taking place in. "a new
political atmosphere" resulting from Torres' assumption of
power in Octcber 1970. It noted Kolle's stress on the
importance of the "anti-imperialist process taking place"
in Bolivia and his advocacy of support for that process and
establishment of an alliance "with those circles in the
armed forces who uphold national sovereignty and serve the
cause of democracy and freedom." With the recent Chilean
experience undoubtedly an important influence, PRAVDA said,
the PCB's draft program outlined "the immediate central
to k" as being "the amalgamation of all Bolivia's revolu-
tionary forces into a single anti-imperialist popular front."
In Moscow media's only allusion to the contentious issue of
guerrilla warfare, the PRAVDA dispatch said discussions
at regional PCB conferences prior to the congress indicated
that "the question of the forms and methods of the revolu-
tionary struggle in Bolivia" would be "one of the most
important points on the congress agenda." Moscow has
consistently steered clear of polemical treatment of the
guerrilla issue. It pays tribute to Guevara on
appropriate occasions as a revolutionary hero, but it
generally avoids bringing up his theories or practice of
guerrilla warfare.
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