TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 30, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Illlllui~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~IIIIII
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
30 JUNE 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 26)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda nnalyaia report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document conta_is information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 704, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL
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30 JUNE 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
PRV, PRG See Pentagon Study as Showing Continuity of Policy . .
1
Moscow Comment on Documents Scores Continuing U.S. "Deceit" . .
5
Le Due Tho, DRV Adviser to Paris Talks, Returns to Paris . . .
7
Pathet Lao Modifies Its Proposal for Laotian Settlement . . . .
8
Hanoi Hails Attacks on Defense Line in Northern South Vietnam .
10
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Scores U.S. Strikes in North . .
11
Hanoi, Front Publicize Oslo War Crimes Proceedings . . . . . .
11
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Demands Withdrawal of "U.S. Imperialism" from Taiwan . .
13
CEAUSESCU TOUR
Romanians, North Vietnamese Stress Need for Solidarity . . . .
19
Romanians Conclude Asian Tour with Lackluster Visit to NPR . .
20
Moscow Claims Wide Support for Five-Power Conference Proposal .
21
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
30 JUNE 1971.
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 JUNE 1971
Mbscow (2978 items)
Peking (1364 items)
Indochina
(7%)
11%
Domestic Issues
(37%)
42%
[U.S. Press Revela-
tion of U.S. Secret
(5%)
8%]
OAU Summit Conference
in Addis Ababa
(--)
11%
Report
Korean War Anniversary
(--)
9%
[Oslo War Crimes
Meeting
(--)
2%]
Okinawa Reversion
Agreement
(3%)
9%
Soyuz XI & Salyut
(11%)
10%
Indochina
(17%)
7%
30th Anniversary of
(3%)
9%
Iraqi Economic
(2%)
4%
Nazi Invasion of USSR
Delegation in PRC
Soviet Government State-
ment on 5-Power Nuclea
Conference
(--)
r
8%
OAU Summit Conference
in Addis Ababa
(0.4%)
6%
China
(2%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi caps its reports on the furor over publication of the Pentagon.
study on Vietnam with a full-page NHAN DAN commentary on 27 June
entitled "The Most Obscene Dupery in History." The commentary says
actions exposed in the documents should be condemned but asserts
that it is more important that "odious acts" of the current
Administration be denounced and stopped. NHAN DAN reiterates the
view, conveyed in Hanoi's earlier reports, that the documents
confirm long-standing Vietnamese charges about U.S. "aggression."
The same point was made by the DP.V and PRG delegates at Paris, and
DRV delegate Xuan Thuy also scored the Nixon Administration for
"pretending" to apply a new policy and trying to dissociate itself
from the actions of its predecessors.
Moscow continues to charge that the present Administration is
following the same "deceitful" policies revealed in the Pentagon
documents. Comment speculating on the source of the "leak"
includes a 26 June PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov which elaborates
the notion that the publication of the documents was master-minded
by powerful U.S. financial circles.
The media of Moscow's East European allies have generally seconded
the Soviet line that the Pentagon study confirms U.S. duplicity,
although Romania's relatively restrained comment has avoided
censure of present U.S. policy. Peking media still have not
mentioned the Pentagon documents.
Hanoi reports the return to Paris on 24 June of Politburo member
and "special adviser" to the talks Le Duc Tho after an absence of
more than a year. The reports quote Tho's remarks on arrival but
do not include his responses to reporters' questions.
A new NLHS proposal publicized in Pathet Lao and Hanoi media on
25 June calls for a U.S. bombing halt to be "included" in a cease-
fire, modifying the 12 May NLHS peace plan's stipulation that the
bombing halt must come first. The new proposal is contained in a
letter from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, dated 22 June.
Vietnamese communist battle reports highlight fighting in Quang Tri
just south of the demilitarized zone. The capture of Fire Base Fuller
is hailed as an "outstanding armed exploit" which, along with other
successes, has "shattered" the allied defense line along Highway 9.
DRV. PR13 SEE PENTAGON STUDY AS SHOWING CONTINUITY OF POLICY
Hanoi's first press comment on the Pentagon study on Vietnam, the
NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA*on 27 June, develops the
companion themes that present U.S. policies are no more than an
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extension of past ones and that President Nixon's present
personal attitudes represent no more than a continuation of
those he held in the past. A commentary and an article carried
by Liberation Radio on the 27th press essentially the same
themes, and a commentary broadcast by the Front radio the next
day claims that the documents demonstrate the nefarious nature
of the Saigon regime, past and present.
As reported by VNA, the NHAN DAN commentary observes that "it is
wrong to say, as some people do, that Nixon has nothing to do
with the U.S. aggressive policy" divulged in the documentm.
Mr. Nixon "showed himself to be a diehard warmonger" when he was
vice president, it says, and "kept on supporting the war policy"
of the Johnson Administration while he was out of office; since
he became President, he "has never given up his aggressive
policy but always sought to prolong the war with the 'Vietnamization'
plan and 'Nixon Doctrine.'" While declaring that the "vile acts"
of previous administrations which the study brings to light
must be condemned, NHAN DAN says it is "far more necessary and
urgent to denounce, condemn, and resolutely stop the odious acts
of the current Nixon Administration aimed at fooling public
opinion and thwarting the American people's interests."
Liberation Radio is similarly at pains to trace the President's
position back to his tenure as vice president. Thus the Front
article on the 27th says that in 1954 he "advocated sending
U.S. troops to Dien Bien Phu and using tactical nuclear weapons
against the Vietnamese people"; the Front commentary of the
same date contains a similar reference to his 1954 views on
tactical nuclear weapons. The article charges that the President
has "visited South Vietnam on eight occasions to directly step
up the war" and that he is continuing now to prolong and expand
it and to deceive the American public.
Like earlier Hanoi propaganda, the NHAN DAN commentary observes
that the conclusions the American press has drawn from the
documents are "no novelty" to the Vietnamese people, whose own
government has long been denouncing the U.S. Government's
Vietnam policy and "its deceitful measures to cover its
barbarous war crimes." NHAN DAN adds that the "two and a half
million words" in the documents only reflect "part of the
innumerable barbarous crimes" committed by the United States.
The Pentagon study, according to NHAN DAN, shows that one cause
of U.S. "failure" in Vietnam was "the miscalculation about the
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Vietnamese people's strength and resolve." The paper concluded
by reiterating this resolve--shared by the Cambodian and Lao
peoples--"to forge ahead on our triumphal path, to persist in
and step up the fight until final victory is won."
Continuing daily reportage in Hanoi and Front media sustains
its stress on U.S. reaction, chiefly from senators, to the
airing of the study and to the court injunctions against further
publication. Hanoi's reports portray a struggle on the issue
between the Administration on the one hand and the press and
some congressmen on the other hand, and they say the President
"was forced to hand over" the study to Congress on 28 June.
The reports also say that the President has asked the Supreme
Court to bar publication of the study. British Government
concern over the publication of the documents is mentioned in
a 25 June Hanoi radic report which charges that the U.S. war
escalation "as a whole has received strong backing" from the
British Government, a cochairman of the 1954 Geneva conference.
Hanoi radio continued on 23 and 25-27 June to broadcast
installments of Neil Sheehan's article which accompanied the
New York TIMES' initial release of the documents, and the
radio noted on the 25th that the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
began that day to carry "large excerpts" of the article.
PARIS TALKS Both PEG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh
and DRV Minister Xuan Thuy, in their statements
at the 24 June Paris session, argued that the Pentagon study
confirmed that the origin and "direct cause" of the Vietnam war
was U.S. "intervention and aggression" and scored the President
for continuing and expanding the "aggression." But Mme. Binh
devoted the bulk of her statement to denouncing the
Vietnamization program, and the VNA and LPA accounts of the
session ignore her remarks on the Pentagon study. They report
only that she "severely condemned" the Administration for
pursuing the war while "seeking by every means to deceive the
American Congress and people." In her statement she said the
documents only revealed "a part of the truth" of U.S. intervention
in Vietnam and were "indisputable confirmation" of what "we have
revealed for a long time, at the very first session ^f this
conference."
The DRV's Xuan Thuy echoed and elaborated these sentiments in
passages VNA did report. He scored the present Administration for
"trying to avoid its responsibilities, pretending that it is
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- I+ -
applying a 'new policy'" and contending that the policies of
previous administrations "'belonged to history,' that the
deception of the American people is a thing 'of the past.'"
According to VNA, he said it is well known, "that Mr. Nixon
himself was directly concerned in the process of aggression
and the war . . . during the past years." And he added that
the current Nixon Administration "is more warlike and more
deceptive toward the American people than any other previous
administration."
As evidence of Administration deceit, Thuy went on to condemn
"fraudulent allegations" that included talking about reduced
involvement while escalating the war, talking about victory
"while suffering defeat," and claiming that the other side
is unwilling to negotiate while the United States itself is
"hindering" the Paris balks.
VNA says the allied delegates' statements showed how the U.S.
disclosure of the documents "has pushed the U.S. and puppets'
delegation into a queldary." It adds that they "still
perfidiously sought to distort history and obstinately clung
to Nixon's five-point program, which has been refuted by the
Vietnamese people." VNA's typical brush-off of Ambassador
Bruce's remarks thus fails to acknowledge his comment, both
in his statement and during the give-and-take portion of the
session, that the United States seeks discussion on current
issues, not the past. Also ignored are his remarks on the POW
issue in which he noted recent broadcast messages purporting
to be from U.S. military personnel captured in South Vietnam
and sought identification and proper treatment of these men,
as well as correspondence between them and their families.*
* The fact that correspondents at the post-session briefing
questioned the communist spokesmen about the Ambassador's
remarks on prisoners was of course also ignored in communist
media, which as usual failed to publicize the briefing. The
DRV and PRG press spokesmen sidestepped the questions with
the standard formula that if a troop-withdrawal date is set,
the question of prisoners of war will be rapidly settled.
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MOSCOW COMMENT ON DOCUMENTS SCORES CONTINUING U.S. "DECEIT"
Moscow continues to comment along established lines on the
publication of the Pentagon study, charging that the Administration's
"embarrassment" stems from its pursuit of the same "deceitful"
policies revealed in the documents, speculating on the source
of the "leak," and examining the effect the episode may have on
U.S. international relations.
A 26 June PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov elaborates the charge
that the publication of the Pentagon study was directed by
powerful financial circles in the United States who were
becoming concerned with the burdens the protracted war was
placing on the U.S. economy. This line had appeared in some
previous comment, including the 20 June Moscow domestic service
roundtable. According to Zhukov's scenario, the "powerful
clans of big business" did not object to the war when
President Johnson sent in 500,000 troops because they could
profit from the requirements of the Army; but after the
spring of 1968, when it became clear that the United States
could not win, they began to speak out against the war. Now
that the war has brought the United States to the "brink of
national disaster" and "the foundations of capitalism have
been shaken," Zhukov concludes, the financiers have resorted
to release of the documents in a clash with those who rule
in Washington.
A PRAVDA New York correspondent on 24 June, on the other hand, took
the tack that those who engineered the publication of the
documents were "people within the 'establishment' utterly loyal
to the American system" whose objective was to bring about a
more "realistic" review of foreign policy. In this context,
the correspondent observed that more and more "influential
political and public figures, including Democrats and
Republicans," are declaring support for these who divulged
the documents. In a similar vein, Matveyev had commented in
the 19 June IZVESTIYA that in recent years a number of "eminent
U.S. figures who at first supported" the war now oppose it and
that the "sobering process" has now "even" affected the New
York TIMES.
Comment speculating on the possible impact on U.S. relations
with other countries included a domestic service commentary
on the 26th pegged to the new Soviet proposal for five-power
nuclear talks. Such talks, the commentary said, are especially
timely in light of the Pentagon documents' revelation that the
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question of use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam was discussed by
U.S. officials meeting in Honolulu in June 1964. Pursuing the
question of foreign impact from another angle, Shakov cautioned
in a foreign-language radio talk on the 28th that the Tonkin
"provocation" could be repeated elsewhere and cited the
Mediterranean as an example.
TASS reported on the 25th that the British Foreign Office,
after a meeting between Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home and
Presidential adviser Kissinger, announced that it had
instructed its ambassador in Washington to express British
concern that the publication of the documents threatens
confidential contacts between the two countries. TASS commented
that in this way Britain is helping President Nixon to achieve
a ban on the publication of the documents; it quoted the British
communist MORNING STAR as saying London's move reflects
apprehension that publication will reveal Britain's "direct
implication" in misleading public opinion and concealing the
facts about the war.
EAST EUROPE Moscow's East European allies have for the
most part treated the Pentagon material as
confirmation that the United States has been the aggressor in
Vietnam and has systematically practiced deception to conceal
its actions. A recurrent theme has been that the Nixon
Administration is continuing policies revealed in the documents
and will persist in these policies despite the present public
controversy. The available comment from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
the GDR, and Hungary has been marked by unrelieved hostility,
while critical Polish comment has included some comparatively
detached passages detailing the developments and viewpoints
in the controversy over publication of the documents. Romania's
reaction has been relatively restrained and has avoided direct
criticism of present U.S. policy.
The Budapest domestic service on the 28th carried the first part
of a three-part radio play entitled "The McNamara Files," to be
broadcast on consecutive days. Allegedly based on facts
contained in the documents published by the New-York TIMES,
the series takes the form of a trial, opening with a "prosecutor"
reading a formal indictment of "four consecutive p sidents"
for committing themselves to continuation of the war.
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LE DUC TNO. DRV ADVISER TO PARIS TALKS. RETURNS TO PARIS
Hanoi media reported on 24 June that Politburo member Le Duc
Tho, "special adviser" to the DRV delegation at the Paris
talks, had left East Germany for Paris that day after attending
the SED cony--ess. Tho's arrival in Paris--following a 14-month
absence*--and his press conference at the airport were not
reported by Hanoi until the 26th, when both VNA and Hanoi radio
carried accounts of his arrival and noted that he is in Paris
to "exchange with Minister Xuan Thuy a number of opinions
concerning the work" there.
ha,noi's account of Tho's prepared statement to the press says
he recalled the "great victories" of the three Indochinese
peoples in the past two years and expressed confidence in
their eventual victory. He is reported to have "vehemently
denounced" President Nixon for failing to end the war as he
promised during his election campaign in 1968, for expanding
the war "with the aim of implementing the Nixon Doctrine
through extremely insidious and crafty tricks," and for
"pretending" to seek an end to the war.
Tho claimed that four major attacks in Indochina "initiated"
by President Nixon had been defeated, citing action in Laos
in September 1969, actions in Cambodia in March 1970 and
February 1971, and the incursion into Laos this year in which
the allies suffered "a defeat of important strategic
significance." These "defeats," according to Tho, have
prompted the U.S. antiwar movement to develop "to unprecedented
proportions."
Tho went on to assert that "time is not in favor of Mr. Nixon"
and to state: "If Mr. Nixon is somewhat clearheaded, let him
put an end to the Vietnamization policy and enter into
serious negotiations aimed at attaining a political solution . . .
He stresses' that the Vietnamese people want the United States
to withdraw so that no more American men need be killed and
all U.S. troops captured in Vietnam can be "allowed to return
* This was Le Due Tho's longest absence from Paris: He
traveled between Paris and Hanoi several times in 1968 and
was away from Paris from July 1969 until the end of January
1970. For an account of Tho's remarks when he left Paris in
April 1970, see the 15 April 1970 TREOS, pages 1-2.
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quickly to their families." And he stated that if the
Administration pursues its present policy, the Paris talks
will remain stalemated, the war will continue, and "the
Americans will finally be defeated."
The Hanoi radio account of Tho's arrival reports that he
answered newsmen's questions but does not indicate any of
the substance of the exchange, thus ignoring Tho's denial that
he had any intention of meeting Ambassador Bruce outside the
conference hall, his statement that he brought no new initiative
"for the time being," and his answer to questions about the
Senate passage of the Mansfield amendment calling for withdrawal
of U.S. troops in nine months if American prisoners of war are
released. (The Vietnamese communist spokesmen at the post-
session press briefings in Paris echoed Tho in remarking vaguely
that the Senate vote on the Mansfield amendment showed that
many people in Congress were opposed to the President's policies.
Both Hanoi and Front media reported the 22 June Senate vote
without comment.)
PATHET LAO MODIFIES ITS PROPOSAL FOR LAOTIAN SETTLEMENT
Another NLHS peace proposal, modifying the initiative publicized
on 12 May, is advanced in a 22 June message from Souphanouvong
to Souvanna Phouma, reported by Pathet Lao and Hanoi media on
the 25th. The latest proposal contains two points:
4 The first point calls for a. cease-fire "including having
the United States stop bombing" and a "cease-fire in place"
to be carried out by "the armed forces in Laos" throughout
Lao territory. The plan released on 12 May had proposed
that a cease-fire and talks come about only after a bombing
halt. The Souphanouvong message and much of the followup
comment, however, also continue to repeat the standard NLHS
demand that the United States end its aggression in Laos,
ending the bombing "as an immediate step" so that the Lao
parties concerned can meet.
+ The second point proposed, as in the earlier plan, that
immediately after the cease-fire the "concerned parties" in
Laos meet to discuss "all questions of common concern,"
adding that the meetings should take place alternatively
in the Plain of Jars and Vientiane. Unlike the 12 May proposal,
the current one does not specify subjects to be discussed, such
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as a coalition government and meas;ires guaranteeing the
neutrality cf Laos. The omission may be responsive to
Souvanna Phouma's 26 May message to Souphanouvong--in reply
to the 12 May NLHS proposal--which placed no limitations
on the subject nutter of the talks. And the suggestion on
a venue for the talks may be responsive to Souvanna's
implication that they should take place in Vientiane.*
There is no mention of Khang Kay as a possible location for
the talks--the subject of lengthy negotiations last year.
Souphanouvong's letter goes on to assert that a halt to the
war and restoration of peace in Laos is desired by "many
Lao people of good 41l," by the King, and by all peace-loving
people in the world including "progressive personalities in
the United States."
Commentaries on the new proposal carried by Radio Pathet Lao
on the 26th and the Pathet Lao news agency on the 27th
bring up the U.S. press publication of the Pentagon study in
claiming that the American people support Pathet Lao peace
initiatives. The news agency says that "the American people,
part of the GI's in active service, and part of the U.S.
political circles" oppose the Indochina war; that the publication
of the Pentagon study has created a "big stir" among the U.S.
public; and that "with the backing of the people across the
country" the 22 June NLHS proposals, "which meet the legitimate
aspirations of the American people and the world public,"
will win growing support in "friendly countries."
The NLHS proposal gets official support from the DRV and PRG
in foreigr ministry statements, released on 30 June, which
characterize it as a "new" and "very important" initiative.
Similar statements had supported the May initiative some 10 days
after it was publicized. The Patriotic Neutralist Forces
similarly laud the initiative in a statement by their Alliance
* Souvannal. Phouma's message had avoided getting into the
substance of the NLHS proposals and mentioned neither the U.S.
bombing nor the DRV presence, calling instead for "immediate
serious discussions" on "all problems which are regarded as
suitable for consideration." His suggestion that Souphanouvong's
"special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak be given full negotiating
powers had been interpreted in subsequent Pathet Lao propaganda
as a proposal that the talks be held in Vientiane.
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Committee. The DPV statement asserts that the initiative responds
to the aspirations of the Lao people and all peace-loving people
in the world, including "many prominent Americans who firmly
demand that the Nixon Administration -put an end to the war of
aggression against Laos." The PRG statement comments in a
similar vein, and both warn that the more the United States
and its "henchmen" prolong and expand the war the "heavier"
its defeat' and punishment will be. The DRV and PRG delegations
at the Paris talks also issued statements praising the
initiative as once again showing the good will and patience
of the NLHS in its quest for peace in Laos. The proposal is
given further support in a NHAN DAY Commentator's article.
TASS and PRAVDA promptly reported the current proposal and the
NHAN DAN article, and Soviet media reported the DRV Paris
delegation's statement some 15 hours before VNA did. There is
no Soviet comment to date, although Moscow media had devoted
some low-level comment to the May initiative. Peking's NCNA
reported the NLHS proposal promptly without comment, as it
did the earlier one.
HANOI HAILS ATTACKS ON DLFENSE LINE IN NORTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM
Rounding up reports on the fighting at Fire Base Fuller in
northern Quang Tri, Hanoi and Liberation Front battle reports
on the 28th claim that attacks on and around the base from
21 to 25 June killed or wounded 767 allied troops, including
145 GI's, and "wiped out or heavily decimated" the let and
2d Battalions and two companies of the 4th Battalion of the
ARVN 2d Regiment. At the fire base itself--designated Hill 544
by the communists--Hanoi claims that the PLAF "annihilated"
350 men including 20 Americans, took many prisoners, destroyed
80 percent of the fortifications, and seized a large quantity
of military equipment.
The communist capture of Fire Base Fuller on the night of 23-21L June
is hailed in a 26 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which claims
that this and other feats in Quang Tri have shattered the allied
defense line along Highway 9 and "exerted serious pressure" west
of the Quang Tri provincial capital. The army paper says the
battle demonstrates the ability of the Quang Tri liberation
forces to destroy strong positions manned by allied battalions,
and it concludes that they will "certainly surge forward to
achieve more resounding exploits."
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An earlier QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, on 25 June, praised
"victories" in both Quang Tri and Quang Ngai which it said "show
that the Saigon puppet main-force units' strength has extensively
declined, that both the seasoned puppet mobile units and the
puppet troops manning defene,iv..., blocking positions have been
seriously annihilated, and that the Saigon troops cannot avert
doom no matter how intensive the U.S. air, artillery, and
logistical support may be." The commentary cited attacks in
several areas of Quang Tri and praised a surprise attack on
ARVN forces at Bai Mau, Son Ha district, in Quang Ngai on 7 June.
In that attack, it alleged, the PLAF "annihilated" the 2d
Battalion of the ARVN 6th Regiment.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN NORTH
The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 24 June issued a routine
statement protesting alleged U.S. strikes against the northern
part of the DMZ and Quang Binh and Thanh Hoa provinces. The
spokesman charged that from 19 to 22 June, U.S. aircraft
including B-52's bombed Huong Lap village and U.S. "heavy
artillery" from south of the demilitarized zone fired on Vinh
Son and Vinh Giang villages. The villages lie north of the
17th parallel in the DMZ, according to the statement.
The spokesman also charged that on the 19th U.S. aircraft bombed
a number of areas in Tuyen Hoa district, Quang Binh Province,
and that on 21 June U.S. ships "fired on the southern area of
Hon Me Island belonging to Thanh Hoa Province."
In standard terms, the spokesman condemned "these brazen acts
of war" and demanded a permanent end to all U.S. encroachments
on the DRV's sovereignty and security.
HANOI, FRONT PUBLICIZE OSLO WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS
A spate of Hanoi and Front propaganda focuses attention on the
second session of the International Commission for the
Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Indochina, held in Oslo
20-24 June. VNA and Liberation Radio on the 26th and Hanoi
radio on the 27th publicized the session's conclusions,
including the charge that the "crimes" were the result of
long-term U.S. policy and the judgment that the "main burden of
responsibility" rests with the policy-makers. The session called
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upon all "men, women, organizations, and governments" to work
for an immediate end to the fighting and a U.S. troop
withdrawal.
VNA on 29 June carried a lengthy account of the report by Pham
Van Bach, head of the DRV delegation to the session and
chairman of the DRV War Crimes Commission, noting that Bach
dezi:)unced U.S. "crimes" in North and South Vietnam as well as
in Laos and. Cambodia. LPA on 23 June carried "large excerpts"
from a report by Nguyen Van Tien's, head of the PRG delegation,
which directed its fire chiefly at Vietnamization. On the
30th VNA publicized a document presented at the session which
it said "particularly drew attention" to crimes committed
against the South Vietnamese "city dwellers" during the Nixon
period. On 24, 26, and 29 June LPA publicized reports delivered
at the session by various Vietnamese witnesses of U.S. "crimes,"
containing graphic detail on sufferings attributed to U.S.
policy.
CONS' IDENTIAL
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SING - U, S, RELATIONS
PEKING DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL OF "U1S, IMPERIALISM" FROM TAIWAN
Peking has again used the anniversary of the outbreak of the
Korean War (25 June) and of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan
(27 June) to air its catalog of grievances against U.S. China
policy and to promote Asian unity against the United States
and Japan. A new recurrent formulation in this year's
anniversary propaganda demands that "U.S. imperialism must
withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits." This formulation
is more vague than the demand advanced in authoritative PRC
statements--including PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng's
speech on this occasion last year--that the United States must
withdraw its "armed forces" from Taiwan. While now using
the more generalized formulation, Peking has all but ignored
the question of improving PRC-U.S. relations, an issue that
figured prominently in comment on the 1970 anniversary.
Considering Peking's sharply negative comment on this
subject last year, its virtual silence this year at a time
when the issue is even more topical suggests an effort to
assume a position with the broadest possible latitude. The
rephrasing of the withdrawal demand seems consistent with
such an effort.
Peking marked the Korean War anniversary on 25 June with a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a rally addressed by Kuo Mo-jo.
NCNA articles and broadcasts to Taiwan were devoted to the
27 June anniversary of President Truman's order for the
interdiction of the Taiwan Straits by the U.S. Seventh
Fleet. Last year, on the major occasion of the 20th
anniversary of these events, the CLinese sent a high-level
delegation under Huang to take part in ceremonies in
Pyongyang. This year the Chinese were represented at
the latter by a low-level delegation already present in
the DPRK for a youth congress.
In his speech at the Peking rally Kuo focused particularly
on the threat the Chinese perceive in a growing Japanese
role in Asia under U.S. aegis. Incorporating recent
Chinese attacks on the Okinawa reversion agreement, Kuo
updated Peking's line on the menacing role envisaged for
Japan in the Nixon Doctrine by charging that the Okinawa
agreement enables the United States to press the Japanese
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to "undertake bigger military obligations" and to serve on
"the first line of (U.S.) aggression in Asia." Declaring that
Japanese militarism "has increasingly become a dangerous
force of aggression in Asia," Kuo soinded the theme of an
Asian "united front" directed against the United States and
Japan. As on other occasions on which this theme has figured
in the past year, representatives from Korea, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos were present at the rally. Unliko last
year, however, the Chinese did not take the occasion to get
in digs at the Soviets for consorting with the enemy.
TAIWAN Kuo voiced the newly formulated call for withdrawal
of "U.S. imperialism" in the course of a denunciation
of arrangements designed to separate Taiwan from mainland China.
In this connection hQ expressed standard objections to policies
leading to "two Chinas" or to an independent Taiwan. These
and other grievances--such as alleged U.S. violations of the
PRC's waters and airspace, military support for the ROC, and
the U.S. military presence in the Taiwan area--were spelled
out in two NCNA articles on the 27 June anniversary. One of
the articles, disseminated in NCNA's international service,
took special note of the Taiwan independence movement, a
subject on which Peking has expressed concern in the past.
NCNA called Peng Ming-min, a Taiwan independence leader now
in the United States, "a pawn of U.S. imperialism"; it also
picked up recent press reports of charges that U.S. military
personnel and CIA agents had lent support to the Taiwan
independence movement.
The new formulation of the withdrawal demand* seems designed
to take account of a situation in which such matters as
Japan's influence on Taiwan and the question of sovereignty
over Taiwan are of as much concern to Peking's irredentist
objectives as the issue of a U.S. military presence. These
concerns were reflected in Kuo's discourse on the Japanese
danger, as well as in NCNA's refereaces to inclusion of the
disputed Senkakus in the Okinawa reversion agreement and to
* There have been some near-precedents for the new formula,
as in a 3 December 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the establish-
ment of PRC-Ethiopian diplomatic relations which demanded that
"the U.S. aggressors must withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan
Straits." And last year on the occasion of the 27 June anniversary,
an NCNA account of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan closed with the
demand that "U.S. imperialism must get out of Taiwan." None of
these variants, however, has appeared in the recurrent, stereotyped
pattern used in this year's anniversary propaganda.
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recent U.S. statements that sovereignty over Taiwan remains an
unsettled question subject to future international resolution.
In Peking's terms, these issues are very much a part of coping
with "U.S. imperialism."
BILATERAL Last year, speaking at a 27 June rally in Pycagyang
RELATIONS Huang Yung-sheng defined "the crucial issue" in
Sino-U.S. relations as "U.S. occupation of Taiwan
by armed force" and called for the United States to withdraw its
"armed forces" from Taiwan and the Straits as the condition for a
relaxation of Sinc-U.S. relations. Huang cited the troop
withdrawal demand, +ogether with the accompanying cal.L for the
two countries to base their relations on the principles of
peaceful coexistence, in explaining the fundamentals of Peking's
position at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. Peking had
canceled the last scheduled session of the talks the previous
May in protest against the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. In
his speech, which reflected Peking's efforts at that time to
give the cause of Asian communist unity high priority, Huang
took a hard line on Sino-U.S. relations, declaring that a
relaxation of relations was "out of the question."
While Huang was delivering this authoritative assessment of
Sino-U.S. relations in mid-1970, other propaganda on the
anniversary was notably explicit in attacking the Nixon
Administration's China policy, including the President's
appeal for improved relations. An NCNA correspondent's
report claimed that the Nixon Administration had pushed "even
more frenziedly" the policy of "forcible occupation of Taiwan
and opposition to China," and it dismissed the President's
call for better Sino-U.S. relations as "nothing but a trick."
An NCNA account of alleged U.S. provocations against the PRC
called the President and his predecessors since Truman
"jackals of the same lair." The Nixon Administration, in
faL:t, had proven to be "even more crafty, sinister, and
ferocious" than its predecessors.
On the anniversary this year, in contrast, none of the comment
in the central media has offered an assessment of the state
of Sino-U.S. relations, nor has there been any discussion of
the Nixon Administration's China policy as such. As to be
expected on this occasion, the two NCNA articles on Taiwan
took note of visits to the island by Vice President Agnew
and other U.S. officials, cited U.S. pledges to honor treaty
commitments to the ROC, and made much of U.S. military
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activities in the Taiwan area.. Also not s?trprisingly, the
passage on Japan in ICuo Mo-,do's speech made the point, that
the Nixon Administration envisages an important place for
Japan in regional affairs. The only direct comment on PRC-
U.S. relations appeared in a 27 June broadcast to Taiwan
over the PLA's Ft,kien Front Radio--a transmitter beaming
propaganda to the people of Taiwan, outside the mainstream
of Peking comment designed for an international audience.
TI' broadcast accused the President of playing a "counter-
revolutionary doubledealing game" by professing to improve
relations with the PRC while seeking to effect a permanent
severance of Taiwan from mainland authority.
Thus, although the formulation regarding withdrawal of "U.S.
imperialism" might be read as a stronger demand than the one
calling only for military withdrawal, it seems significant--
against the background of recent signs of movement in Sino-U.S.
relations--that Peking did not use the anniversary this year
to signal a hard line by commenting adversely on the prospects
for improved relations. In this context, the broader, more
propagandistic formulation may have been adopted to offset
Western press speculation, including some based on talks with
high PRC officials, over the precise terms on which Peking
would accept an accommodation on the Taiwan issue.
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CEAUSESCU TOUR
The Romanian party-government d.alegation under Ceausescu returned
home on 211 June after an Asian tour on which the Romanians
flaunted their banner of independence while practicing their
ecumenical 1:Lne in the cor gist movement. The strains in
Soviet-Romanian ref' ions, a;~gravated by the demonstration of
common interests between Pekinig and Bucharest during the
Romanians' stay in the PRC, were reflected in the cool
reception given the delegation on its stopover ir. Moscow en
route home. The delegation was met by Kosygin r,.ld Suslov
but not by Brezhnev and Podgornyy, who hold Ceausescu's
counterpart titles of party chief and head of state. T.ASS
reported that heads of "some" diplomatic missions were
present, while the Romanirri agency AGERPRES noted the
presence of the PRC ambassador and the envoys of other
countries visited.
ROMANIANS. NORTH VIETNAMESE STRESS NEED FOR SOLIDARITY
During its 15-19 June visit to North Vietnam, the Romanian
delegation was accorded high-level treatment comparable to
its reception in the PRC and DPRK.* The Romanians were met
at the airport by most of the members of the Politburo,
including Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap,
and Le T1,anh Nghi.** Le Duan and Pham Van Dong hosted the
visitors in Hanoi and Dong accompanied them on a trip to
Haiphong.
The joint communique said that the talks were held in an
atmosphere "full of sincerity, solidarity, and fraternal
friendship," a formulation similar to that used in the
communigaes in the PRC and the-DPRK and reflecting a stress
on solidarity despite divergent views on several issues. As
in the case of other countries visited, a Romanian invitation
* The Romanians' visit to the PRC is discussed in the 9 June
TRENDS, pages 16-21; their stay in the DPRK is covered in the
23 June TRENDS, pages 23-25.
* Le Duc Tho was absent, attending the East German party
congress, and Hoang Van Hoan inexplicably did not appear.
Hoan's last known public appearance was at Tho's departure,
reported by VNA on 10 June.
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11
for a party-government delegation to reciprocatie the visit
was accepted. The joint communique did not specify individuals,
but at an 18 June banquet Ceausescu expressed the hope of
again meetin' Le Duari and Pham Van Dong to Romania.
In the joint communique, Romania affirmed its determination to
continue to extend "political, moral, and material support,"
while the Vietnamese ti!.anked the Romanians for their
"political support, ecoi.,cmic and military aid, and assistance
in the training of technicians." (For the past several years
both Romania and the DRV have acknowledged that military aid
is included in the annual aid agreements, the most recent of
which was signed in November 1970.) The sides expressed
determination to further develop friendship and "many-aided
cooperation," pledging that "mutual support and assistance
will be increased." In speeches the leaders specifically
noted that economic cooperation wild. be stepped up.
The visit afforded Le Duan an opportunity to repeat demands
for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and to express Hanoi's
determination to continue the struggle. The communique
routinely denounced Vietnamization as a plan to prolong
the war and scored U.S. air attacks on the DRV and
intensified actions in Laos and Cambodia. Charging that
the United States is plotting "new military adventures,"
it said that the Vietnamese people, acting to accordance
with Ho Chi Minh's testament, are determined to struggle
until final victory. Both sides once again supported the
programs for a political settlement of the NFLSV and the NLHS
and Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 appeal and the FUNK program.
During the visit 'both sides stressed their mutual interest
in strengthening communist unity. Ceausescu observed, as he
had done in Pyongyang, that his visit contributed not only
to the solidarity of the two countries but also to unity
among the socialist countries. Consistent with the neutrality
of both countries in the Sino-Soviet dispute, no criticism
was directed at Moscow or Peking. As he had done during his
visits to the PRC and the DPRKj Ceausescu alluded to the
dispute in an 18 June Hanoi rally speech in which he cited
a need to overcome fraternal strife. The communique declared
that the two sides will seek to strengthen friendship with
"all" fraternal socialist countries and to contribute to the
"restoration and consolidation of solidarity among the
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socialist countries." The North Vietnamese joined with the
Ro.,,ianians in a line particularly dear to the latter,
affirming that "all the Marxist-Leninist parties are
independent and have equal rights."
The North Vietnamese balked, however, at following the
Romanians further down the line of independence in the
communist camp--a caution evidently dictated by an awareness
of the DRV's dependence on backing from its big brothers. In
Peking and Pyongyang Ceausescu had declared that there was no
longer a center {?" the communist movement, a point included in
the Romanian-DPRK communique, but this subject was not
broached during the DRV visit. As Hanoi frequently does,
Le Duan in several speeches named both the Soviet Union and
China when thanking the communist countries for their
assistance. Even more pointedly, a 21 June NHAN DAN editorial
on the visit stressed that strengthening of the solidarity
of "the socialist camp"--a term avoided by the Romanians,
Chinese, and North Koreans--is "an imperative demand which is
intimately connected with the revolutionary cause of Vietnam."
The e- t3rlal added that the Vietnamese will do their utmost
to sec, re solidarity within the socialist camp, specifically
mentioning unity with the Soviet Union and China in this
connection.
Hanoi's awareness of a need for big-power communist support
was also reflected when Le Duan, in his speech on 18 June,
pointed out that the Romanian communists led a successful
uprising in 1944 in.the wake of the Soviet army offensive.
Ceausescu on the sane occasion referred to the uprising
without mentioning a Soviet role.
North Vietnamese aversion to detente politics was reflected
in the absence of expressions of support for Romanian
policies on European security that had been recorded in
the communiques signed in the PRC and the DPRK. As he had
done on the earlier legs of the trip, Ceausescu had called
in a speech for a European security conference and for the
removal of foreign troops and bases. The joint communique
went no further than a generalized expression of support
for Romanian contributions to "the de'ense of peace and
security in Europe and the world" plus a demand for de jure
recognition of the GDR. The Middle East question was simply
ignored in the communique.
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ROMANIANS CONCLUDE ASIAN TOUR WITH LACKLUSTER VISIT TO NPR
A lackluster visit to the MPR from 21 to 24 June did little
more than touch base with Moscow's Asian satellite. According
to the joint communique, the talks were held in "a comradely
atmosphere and in a spirit of friendship and sincerity," and
an invitation for a reciprocal visit by a delegation headed
by '.:sedenbal was accepted.
On this leg of their tour the Romanians were able tc find .
agreement on certain issues that had been divisive in their
earlier stops. Thus the communique registered the two sides'
agreement that the Middle East conflict should be settled in
consonance with the November 1967 Security Council resolution,
and both sides called for a European security conference. But
unlike the three previous communiques, which demanded a UN
seat for the PRC, this one ignored China altogether.
The two sides agreed that strengthening of unity of the
communist countries "is of fundamental importance," but on
the question of independence they had recourse to a formulation
unobjectionable even to Moscow and lacking the forceful
affirmation of autonomy that marked the earlier phases of the
delegation's Asian tour.
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NUCLEAR TALKS
MOSCOW CLAIMS OIDE SUPPORT FOR FIVE-POWEP CONFERENCE PROPOSAL
Claims of worldwide favorable reaction to the Soviet call for
a five-power nuclear disarmament conference pervade Moscow's
followup comment on the Soviet Government statement addressed
to Washington, Peking, Paris, and London. Rebroadcasts of
the statement, released in Soviet media on 22 June, account
for more than half of Moscow's substantial radio publicity
for the proposal. Radio and press comment describes it as
ye" ar.,,ther initiative consistent with the USSR's "peace-
loving Leninist foreign policy," and commentators say that
the "new, specific step to rid mankind of the danger of
nuclear war" demands a response :"om the other nuclear
powers.
The first reactions worldwide are said to have cut across
political lines. In circles of widely varying views,
according '..) a foreign-language radio talk on the 214th,
the proposal was generally appraised as "a very topical and
very positive step." This c'.aim recurs in a .RAVDA article
by Yuriy Yasnev on the 29th, summarized by TASS. But the
article goes on to profess surprise at efforts of "certain"
U.S. and British papers to link the convening of a conference
"with the solution of certain international issues" at a
time -hen Washington and London are considering the
proposal. Such an approach, according to the article, is
"none other than premeditated obstruction, a deliberate
striving for postponing for a long time the freeing of
mankind from the heavy burden of the nuclear arms race."
Reporting the opening session on the 29th of the reconvened
25-nation Geneva disarmatau_it talks, TASS noted that the head
of the U.S. delegation, James Leonard, indicated that the
United States agreed that there are certain questions which
could be discussed gust by the nuclear powers. He added,
TASS continued, that there are other 'uestions which should
be discussed by both the nuclear and :.on-nuclear powers, and
for that reason the United. States is "favorab?_y disposed to
the participation of all nuclear powers in Vie efforts toward
.he control of armaments." TASS concluded that "members of
the American delegation answered in the affirmative" when
asked if Leonard's remarks could be regarded as agreement
to the conference proposal.
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BROADCASTS Sustained comment in Mandarin over Radio Moscow
IN MANDARIN and the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and
Progress ple7ys up the idea that a nuclear
disarmament accord would serve the Chinese people's interests
and avoids the polemics that have characterized earlier Soviet
comment on the PRC's attitude toward. disarmament. Moscow now
pointedly reminds Chinese audiences of the PRC's own past
calls for nucieax disarmament. Typically, a Radio Moscow
talk in Mandarin on the 24th said "the Soviet people still
remember that the Chinese Government also proposed at one
time to completely ban nuclear tests and weapons and to
destroy these weapons." A Peace and Progress broadcast in
Mandarin on the 26th recalled that PEOPLE'S DAILY in October
1957 called on governments which possess strong armed forces
to reach agreement "at the earliest date on disarmament,
mainly the banning and testing of nuclear weapons."
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