TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 16, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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T
Illlllu-m~~~~~~iiii~llllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~Illllllumuuiiii~~lllllll~~
ENDS
Confidential
U c / 'fit--e'
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
16 JUNE 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 24)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, seat1ons 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents bi
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP t
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[atuded heat euteme IC
degnpredlnp end
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 JUNE 1971
CONTENTS
Topics aril Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Publicizes First Session of Fourth National Assembly . . .
1
National Assembly Makes Few Changes in Roster of Officials . . .
6
Action in Quang Tri Said to Demonstrate Strength of PLAF . . . .
8
Attacks in Cambodia Viewed as Threat to Phnom Penh Defense . . .
9
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at DRV . . .
10
Soviet Comment Stresses Demand for U.S. Withdrawal Deadline . . .
11
Moscow Says Documents in N.Y. TIMES Show "Policy of Deceit" . . .
12
Laos: British Circulation of Souvanna Phouma Letter Scored . . .
15
Criticism of Souvanna Phouma Reply to NLHS Proposal Continues . .
16
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Leaders Review Major Issues in Election Speeches . . . . . . . .
18
GERMANY AND BERLIN
Honecker, Brezhnev Present Show of Unity on Berlin Talks . . . .
24
Honecker Advances Concept of Separate German "Nations" . . . . .
27
CYPRUS
President Makarios Pays Official Visit to Soviet Union . . . . .
29
CUBAN FISHING BOATS
Havana Denounces U.S. Trial of Cubans as "Judicial Farce" . . . .
34
Cuba Fines Five U.S. Citizens, Announces Eight More Held . . . .
36
TASS, NCNA Report Cuban Charges, Stress Cuban Indignation . . . .
37
PRC AND YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Visits PRC; Coexistence Hailed . . . .
38
YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR
Belgrade Charges Increased Meddling by "Foreign Enemies" . . . .
41
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Brezhnev Is Lavishly Praised in Election Campaign . . . . . . . .
46
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
16 JUNE 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 JUNE 1971
Moscow (2601 items)
Peking (1309 items)
Soyuz XI & Salyut
(5%)
27%
Domestic Issues
(22%)
30%
Soviet Elections
(8%)
23%
Ceausescu Tour
(29%)
28%
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
10%]
[in PRC
(29%)
21%]
[Kosygin Speech
(--)
4%]
[in DPRK
(--)
5%]
[Podgornyy Speech
(--)
3%]
Indochina
(31%)
21%
Mongolian Party
(1%)
6%
[PRG Anniversary
(8%)
8%]
Congress
[Sihanouk Tours
(3%)
4%]
Middle East
(3%)
3%
PRC
Indochina
(8%)
2%
[DRV National
(--)
3%]
China
(3%)
2%
Assembly Session
Kosygin Greetings to
(--)
2%
Yugoslav Foreign
(--)
4%
World Petroleum
Congress
Minister in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor signil cance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 JUNE 1971
INDOCHINA
The first session of the fourth DRV National Assembly, which under
normal conditions should have been elected in 1968, provides a
platform for high-level reiteration of standard lines on both
domestic and foriegn policy. The Assembly's election of officials
of government organs was largely a pro forma ree.ffirmation of the
current leadership. And the NHAN DAN editorial on 12 June remarked
that "our system does not need sudden changes of leaders but needs
stable leadership and a natural succession." Premier Pham Van Dong
in his speech at the closing session on the 10th reiterated in
routine terms that the peoples of Indochina are determined to
continue the struggle against U.S. "aggression." Consistent with
other propaganda, Dong exuded confidence in the ultimate failure of
Vietnamization and said the situation in the South is favorable for
"stepped up" struggle.
Communist reports on fighting in northern Quang Tri claim that the
ARVN's Operation 810 has been "smashed" and that the allies have
failed in their effort to prevent Viet Cong offensives. Propaganda
on the fighting in Cambodia lauds intensified attacks on government
forces around Phnom Penh, claiming that the communists are threaten-
ing defense lines to the south and east of the capital.
The Vietnamese communist spokesmen in Paris as well as propagandists
continue to insist that the United States set a date for total troop
withdrawal from South Vietnam, after which other questions could be
discussed, including the release of prisoners. Otherwise the prisoner
issue is ignored, and the accounts of the Paris session on the 10th
typically ignored the allied statements deploring DRV refusal to receive
the 13 sick and wounded prisoners who had agreed to repatriation by
the GVN.
Kosygin and Podgcrnyy in their election speeches routinely promised
continued assisiance to the peoples of Vietnam and "the other Indochinese
countries." The Soviet leaders did not broach the question of a settle-
ment, but other comment stresses that the United States must set a
withdrawal date. Moscow notes growing demands in the United States for
such a deadline, and the leak to the New York TIMES of secret documents
on U.S. policy decisions on the Vietnam war is seen as evidence of the
acuteness of the political struggle.
HANOI PUBLICIZES FIRST SESSION OF FOURTH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
DRV media on 11 June began to publicize the 7-10 June session of the
DRV Fourth National Assembly, elected on 11 April, with Hanoi radio
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16 JUNE 1971
broadcasting lengthy descriptive accounts of the proceedings.*
As is usual, Truong Chinh, National Assembly Standing Committee
chairman, gave the opening and closing remarks of the session.
Premier Pham Van Dong delivered the main address on the 10th.
Reports on the DRV's "diplomatic struggle" and the "military
task" were presented by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and
Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap respectively. But following
previous practice, these reports have not been publicized.
Truong Chinh in his opening remarks claimed that the National
Assembly is beginning its term at a time when "encouraging
strides" have been made. He said that the Indochinese people,
"developing the resounding and strategically significant
victories on the Route 9-Khe Sanh front," are continuing to
fight vigorously and to score great victories on all battle-
fields. He also made the usual call for the party, army and
people "to strengthen solidarity and strive to fulfill the
revolutionary duties of the entire nation in compliance wit,.
President Ho's sacred will . . . ."
In outlining the business of the session Chinh noted that among
other things the deputies "as the constitution stipulates"
will elect the state's leaders and high-ranking organs
including the president and vice president, the Standing
Committee and other committees of the National Assembly, and
the Council of Ministers.
Hanoi radio on the 3.1th reports that Ton Quang Phiet, secretary
general of the National Assembly Standing Committee, presented
to the National Assembly the report on the election results.
And on the 12th the radio reports that "after two days of
intensive work during which it broke into small groups to study
and discuss reports, the National Assembly resumed its plenary
sessions." It reporte ly "unanimously passed": 1) a resolution
approving the National Assembly membership of 120 deputies
elected on 11 April on the basis of the 22 May recapitulative
report from the Electoral Council, and 2) a resolution ratifying
all the resolutions that the National Assembly Standing Committee
passed between the 7th session of the Third National Assembly,
held in March, and the current session.
* For background on the delayed election of the Fourth Assembly,
see the FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 16 March 1971.
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16 JUNE 1971
A broadcast on the 13th reports that Ton Due Thang spoke
briefly at the closing meeting of the session on the 10th.
Hailing the elections of the state leaders as "a new success
of our people in exercising the right to be masters of their
c, wn country," he promised that he and the others elected
would strive to serve the people and "overcome all difficulties
and hardships in order to implement at all costs" President
Ho's testament. He said that it is the state's and peopie's
"unshakeable, steel-like determination" to completely defeat
the "U.S. aggressors," defend and build the North, liberate
the South and advance toward peacefully reunifying the
country.
PRAM VAN DONG In his Assembly speech on the 10th, Pham
ASSEMBLY SPEECH Van Dong reiterated in standard terms
Vietnam's determination to continue the
struggle against U.S. "aggression." While he routinely noted
that tLe struggle is carried out on the political and diplomatic
as well as the military front, he mentioned the Paris talks
only briefly--when he said that the communists' solution for a
settlement "remains undiscussed" there "because the other side
wants the war to drag on and keeps going after the mirage of
a 'military victory.'"
Although mentioning none of the substance of the communist
proposals at Paris, Dong observed that growing antiwar sentiment
in the United States is developing under such slogans as "end
the aggressive war now, set a deadline for total U.S. troop
withdrawal." (Hanoi media continues to carry reportage--citing
foreign press sources--of antiwar activities in the United
States, with current stress on lobbying for the passage of
Senate and House bills calling for a 31 December 1971 deadline
for troop withdrawal. A radio commentary on the 10th rounds up
antiwar activities since April; it observes that growing
disillusionment with the war was evidenced at the President's
1 June TV press conference when newsmen "raised a series of
questions which reflected the worries and doubts of U.S. opinion"
about the war.)
The Premier said thafl the results of recent military action,
particularly the Laos incursion, have substantiated DRV
assertions "made long ago that the policy of Vietnamizing the
war will inevitably end in failure."* Dong said that the
* Dong in his speech at the seventh session of the Third National
Assembly in early March this year similarly said "right at the
outset we predicted the inevitable failure of Vietnamization. Two
years of confrontation on the battlefield have eloquently shown
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Vietnamese and the Laotians along Highway 9 "knocked the daylights
out of [big and seasoned units], engaging them in an annihilation
battle which not only foiled their adventurous designs, but also
defeated all kinds of their much touted weapons and tactics."
He went on to say that with Vietnamizetion "shaken to its roots"
in the South it is a favorable time to step up the military and
political struggle "from the mountain areas to the plains and
even in the urban centers."
The Premier seemed to place unusual stress on the significance
of the Vietnamese struggle for the world revolution. In
addition to reiterating the stereotyped prediction of eventual
victory, which he called a victory of "tremendous international
significance," he also said: the Indochinece peoples' "just,
protracted, arduous but certainly victorious struggle is
gradually exerting its deep and far-reaching influence on the
international situation, on the revolutionary struggle of the
world's peoples, on the evolution of history. It is one of
the events of epoch-making significance since World War II."
He went on to say that "our strength and our certain victory"
are derived from the "world people's front" against U.S.
imperialism and in support of the Indochinese struggle.
Dong also cited socialist aid in the context of the global
impact of the Vietnamese war: "Our struggle, being part of
the world people's struggle against U.S. imperialism, has
received an extremely vigorous and precious support from the
Soviet Union, China and the other fraternal countries . . . ."*
Dong said that events have proved the "clearsightedness of our
party and state in their foreign policy and diplomacy," and he
noted that this included increasing militant solidarity and
fraternal friendship with the socialist countries and the
international communist and workers movement. But oddly, he
did not on this occasion--as DRV leaders normally do--speak of
the solidarity of the socialist camp.
In his remarks on domestic issues, the Premier focused on the
need to improve economic management, a continuing concern for
the DRV regime. Addressing himself to the newly elected
* At the Assembly session in March, he had said "with the
justice of our war against the U.S. aggressors, we have won
sympathy and firm and vigorous support and assistance of the
brother socialist countries and of the world's people."
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16 JUNE 1971
government officials, the Premier enjoined them to observe
Ho Chi Minh's request that they be "loyal servants" of the
people and explained that to do this they must first of all
improve their managerial abilities. He promised that the
Council of Ministers would "make the state machinery become
a managerial network that runs smoothly from the highest to
the lowest levels."
Dong touched upon practical questions of planning and
incentives in discussing management, noting that the improve-
ment of economic management required the imprcvement of
planning, the implementation of the economic audit system,
the proper use of economic levers, the development of the
effects of science and technology, and the "close linkage of
ideological education with socialist legislation and material
incentives." These problems were discussed in more detail
by Le Duan in his major article in February 1970, and Dong
recalled that article in another passage of his speech
expressing determination to step up economic restoration and
development to encourage the economy to develop more strongly
in the coming years "along the line set forth by Comrade
Le Duan" in his article.*
While Dong's discussion of domestic questions was generally
routine, he did interject a notable passage suggesting that
new regulations on conscription were going to be drafted.
Citing two articles from the DRV constitution--Article 21
and Article 42 on the duty of citizens to labor and to
perform military duty--he said: "In the days ahead, our state
will undertake studies in order to rationally and unequivocally
define the DRV citizen's duty to fulfill his task of protecting
the fatherland."
TRUONG CHIFsH Hanoi media also publicize a "grand meeting"
RALLY SPEECH held on the 13th in Hanoi to "welcome the
brilliant success" of the first session of the
Fourth National Assembly. Addressing the rally, Truong Chinh,
according to Hanoi radio on the 15th, urged the citizens of
Hanoi to be aware of their position and the special role of the
capital in setting an example for the rest of the nation. He
* For an analysis of the Le Duan article see FBIS SPECIAL
REPORT "North Vietnamese Problems and Policies As Outlined in
Le Duan's February 1970 Article," 7 August 1970.
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specifically called for an improvement in the quality of
industrial products, production of more goods for consumers
and export, and increased efforts in agriculture. Touching
on an issue not mentioned by Pham Van Dong in his survey
of the domestic scene, Truong Chinh added that it is also
"necessary to constantly pay attention to socialist reforms
in agriculture, light industry, and handicrafts."
Like Dong, Truong Chinh took note of the question of
conscription. He remarked, with regard to the "carrying
out of military obligations," that the first six-month
plan had been fulfilled, and he urged that "comrades learn
from the experiences of this recruitment phase so as to
better carry out the six-month plan for the second half of
the year."
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MAKES FEW CHANGES IN ROSTER OF OFFICIALS
The elections of officials of government organs by the new DRV
National Assembly was largely a pro forma reaffirmation of the
current leadership. The absence of changes in the leadership
was pointed up in the 12 June NHAN DAN editorial's assertion
that sudden changes of leadership were not needed. In a similar
vein, an editorial on the 14th, which mentioned the importance
of maintaining the stability of state organs while "gradually
strengthening them with new forces," went on to observe that
the assembly had elected leaders who had "assumed the state
tasks for many years."
VNA reported the results of the elections on the 11th and Hanoi
radio on the 12th described in detail exactly when and how the
various offices were filled. The broadcast reported that on
the afternoon of the 9th Ton Duc Thang and Nguyen Luong Bang
were reelected president and vice president, respectively, and
that Truoi:, Chinh was reelected chairman and Ton Quang Phiet
secretary t,eneral of the National Assembly Standing Committee.
All of the Standing Committee's vice chairmen were also retained.
Hanoi radio reports that Pham Van Dong's nomination by President
Thang for the position of premier was confirmed by the National
Assembly on the morning of the 10th.
It is in the National Defense Council that there were notable
changes: Ton Duc Thang assumed the chairmanship left vacant by
Ho's death. But of the two vice chairmen, Phsm Van Dong and
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Vo Nguyen Giap, only Dong was reelected, with Giap becoming a
regular member. Le Duan and Truong Chinh, were added to the
Council membership along with Nguyen Con and Tran Huu Duc.
Fozeign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Secretariat member Nguyen
Van Tran were dropped from the council.
The list of vice premiers remains the same, except for the omission
of Pham Hung and the addition of Hoang Anh, who was named vice
premier by the National Assembly Standing Committee at a meeting
on 1 April this year. The removal of Politburo member Phan Hung
formalized his relinquishment of his duties as vice premier since
his last reported public appearance in North Vietnam in September
1967. The 1 April Standing Committee meeting also named Hoang Anh
chairman of an Agriculture Commission established by merging
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of State Farms, and the
Managerial Board of Agricultural Cooperatives. At that time,
Minister of Agriculture Nguyen Van Loc and Minister of State
Farms Nguyen Xuan Yem were both named vice chairmen of the new
commission, positions in which they are again listed.
There was a shift in the leadership of the Ministry of Interior,
with Duong Quoc Chinh replacing Ung Van Khiem as minister.
Neither Chinh nor Khiem has been publicly active in recent years:
Duong Quoc Chinh has been reported to have appeared in North
Vietnam on only two occasions--in May 1968 and September 1969--
since he was replaced as Minister of Ag,.liculture in April 1965,
to assume other unnamed tasks. Ung Van Khiem last was noted in
public in July 1970 and prior to that only was mentiond at public
occasions about three times a year.
The list of ministers provides the first known confirmation in
DRV media that Dinh Duc Thien, formerly identified as chief of
the VPA's Rear Services Department, has been given the post of
Minister of Machinery and Metallurgy. No one was publicly named
to this post when the ministry was formed in December 1969;
however, Prague and Peking media referred to Thien as head of
that ministry in reporting a tour he made in late 1970--a tour
unreported in Hanoi media.* Thien's last reported public
appearance in North Vietnam was in September 1970.
* Dinh Duc Thien was first' identified in this position by Prague
media during his visit to Czechoslovakia in October and
November 1970. See the TRENDS of 9 December 1970, page S-2.
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For the first time, Nguyen Lam was named as the Chairman of
the State Price Commission; he is also a vice chairman of the
State Planning Commission. (Former Chairman of the State
Price Commission Do Muoi was named by the National Assembly
Standing Committee on 16 April to chair the Capital
Construction Commission.)
The three Boards of the Premier's office are not ment.Loned in
reports on the National Assembly meeting and presumably have
been abolished. The Chairman of the Internal Affairs Board
Nguyen Van Tao died in August 1970 and was not replaced.
The other two board chairmen, Do Muoi of the Economic Board
and Trs,n Quang Huy of the Board of Culture and Education,
were reported to no longer be in these positions in the 16 April
National Assembly Standing Committee communique. Tran Quang
Huy appears to be continuing his functions in the Premier's
office, however, since he is now identified as a minister at
the Premier's office in charge of cultural affairs and education.
ACTION IN QUANG TRI SAID TO DEMONSTRATE STRENGTH OF PLAF
Action in northern Quang Tri in the first week of June is
reviewed in a commentary in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
on 9 June and in an article in the party paper NHAN DAN on the
13th. The papers hail attacks in which the "armed forces and
people" of the area allegedly wiped out a total of some 1,000
allied troops, including 184 U.S. soldiers, downed 19 aircraft,
including a B-57, and destroyed or captured large quantities
of war material.
NHAN DAN claims that the ARVN's Operation Lam Son 810 in
northern Quang Tri has been "smashed" and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
cites widespread attacks in Quang Tri to refute allied "boasts"
that they could stop Viet Cong offensives. The army paper, as
summarized by VNA, claims that the PLAF's attacks prove their
preparedness and ability to "concentrate their strength into
mortal punches." Similarly, a Hanoi radio commentary on the 9th,
pegged to the Quang Tri fighting, echoes earlier propaganda in
ridiculing President Nixon for suggesting that events in coming
months would demonstrate that Operation Lam Son 719 had damaged
the communists' offensive ability. The radio adds that, "instead,
a wave of offensives and uprisings is rising throughout the South."
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Intensive allied air strikes in northern Quang Tri are acknowled3ed
in much of the propaganda. The NHAN DAN commentary, for example,
charges that the allies, following "bitter defeats" in southern
Laos and at Khe Sanh, "sent B-52's to wantonly hit many regions
in northern Quang Tri with a view to preventing the attacks of
the liberation forces." Reports on the fighting point to
successes in dealing with the allied air attacks, both through
antiaircraft fire and by keeping close contact with the ARVN
forces so as to restrict bombing attempts. QUAN DOI KHAN DAN,
for example, claims that "hand-to-hand fighting" by the PLAF had
greatly limited the allied artillery and air power.
ATTACKS IN CAMBODIA VIEWED AS THREAT TO PHNOM PENH DEFENSE
Recent attacks on Cambodian Government forces are praised in
Hanoi's press on 15 June. An editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
and an article in NHAN DAN laud the Cambodian liberation army
(CNPLAF) for achievements during the period from 7 to 10 June
when they allegedly destroyed five battalions of Phnom Penh
forces and a battle group command post and badly mauled three
other battalions. NHAN DAN describes the two areas where the
majo'? attacks were launched--the district capital of Srang
southwest of Phnom Penh and in the Tonle Toch area northeast
of the capital--as "important links in the Phnom Penh defense
system." The paper goes' on to claim that the CNPLAF are
"seriously threatening" lines to the south and east of the
capital city. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial routinely holds
that the "victories" are "heavy blows" at the Nixon Doctrine
and the policy of using "puppet" troops along with U.S.
firepower.
A 14 June report on the Tonle T_-ch fighting, transmitted by
jihanc'uk's news agency AKI, claimed that the CNPLAF in the
area had wiped out 423 government troops, between 3 and 10 June,
and 5.:^+ down seven planes. Among other details of the fighting,
the AKI L'eport noted that on 9 and 10 June the communist forces
captured 93 parachutes carrying supplies and drugs that were
dropped for "beleagured" troops at Kompong Chamlang and Kompong
Ampil. It said that the CNPLAF attacked the troops at Kompong
Ampil on the 9th and forced them to surrender. Also on the 14th,
the news agency claimed that the entire headquarters of a
government multi-battalion unit was captured by the CNPLAF in
fighting in the Srang area on the night of 9-10 June.
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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKE9,IAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT DRV
A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest of 15 June, publicized
in Hanoi media the same day, condemns U.S. "acts of war" against
the DRV in standard fashion and reiterates the demand for an
immediate halt to all acts of encroachment on the DRV's sovereignty
and security. The protest charges that from 8 to 12 June, U.S.
aircraft including B-52's bombed Huong Lap village, "north of
the 17th parallel, in the DMZ." tt also claims that on the 11th
U.S. planes "rocketed" Phu Quy state farm in Quang Binh Province.
On 6 June, Hanoi had claimed that an unmanned U.S. plane was
downed on the previous day in Nghe An Province. The alleged
downing brought Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,395.
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SOVIET COMMENT STRESSES DEMAND FOR U,S, WITHDRAWAL DEADLINL
While the top Soviet leaders in their election speeches did
not broach the question of an Indochina settlement, routine
Soviet comment continues to emphasize demands that the
United States fix a deadline for withdrawal of troops from
Vietnam.
Kosygin and Podgornyy routinely promised continued assistance
to the peoples of Vietnam and "the other Indochinese countries,"
and Kosygin assailed the U.S. Administration for "dragging out
and expanding the war" and pursuing a policy that does not
attest to serious intent to "find a way out of that shameless
war." Brezhnev mentioned Indochina only in passing in
decrying the presence of U.S. 'naval fleets off the shores of
China and Indochina as well as in the Mediterranean.
Propaganda at the routine level includes TASS reports of
statements by various U.S. public figures--including
Senators Humphrey and Mansfield, former Defense Secretary
Clifford, and Ambassador Harriman--criticizing Administration
policy and pressing for a troop-withdrawal deadline. TASS
says there is support in particular for the 31 December 1971
date proposed in the McGovern-Hatfield amendment and takes
note of the Senate debate on the amendment. TASS also
reports briefly that in a 13 June TV interview Secretary
Laird refused to fix a deadline on the grounds that the
United States could not be bound by such a commitment.
Comment pressing for a withdrawal deadline includes a talk
in English on 12 June by military observer Aleksey Leontyev,
who responded to a "listener's question" by disputing the
President's reasoning that setting a deadline would cause
the Vietnamese communists to lose interest in the Paris
talks and endanger American troops in Vietnam. Leontyev
called the troop-withdrawal issue the chief cause of the
deadlock in Paris and remarked that if a withdrawal date
is set, "the Vietnamese side would have an even greater
interest in the talks, not lesser." He added that
"thousands" of American lives would be saved because
the PRG has repeatedly declared that after a date is
announced, talks could be started immediately on the
release of captured American pilots and on security
guarantees for the troop withdrawal.
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A participant in the 13 June domestic service roundtable discussion,
commenting on the U.S. refusal to set a withdrawal deadline,
recalled that last week a White Mouse spokesman had said the
31 December date was too early and would not enable the South
Vietnamese to determine their own fate. The commentator
concluded that emphasis would continue to be placed on
Vietnamization. Another panelist added that the United States
not only does not intend to curtail its military operations
but continues to escalate the war while making "declarations
of intent" to withdraw troops by stages. In this context he
pointed to the "astounding facts" of growing U.S. interference
in Laos divulged in the Senate last week.
A Kozyakov commentary in English on 16 June said the fac.,; that
Congress is considering the Hatfield-McGovern amendment testifies
to the "profound crisis" confronting the Republican Administra-
tion's policies in the face of the American people's "Justified
dissatisfaction." Stating that the Administration is trying
to fight the amendment by playing on popular sympathy for the
captive U.S. pilots, Kozyakov disputed the argument that a
withdrawal deadline would prevent the return of the prisoners
and once again repeated the PRG's stand on this point. The
"crux" of the issue, he said, is Washington's intention to
preserve the existing government in Saigon. He foresaw a
"stormy" debate in the Senate but concluded that the opponents
of the Hatfield-McGovern amendment will not be able to stem
the growth of the antiwar movement in the United States.
MOSCOW SAYS DOCUIENTS IN N.Y. TIMES SHOW "POLICY OF DECEIT"
The publicity in the New York '.LIMES for a Pentagon study and
official documents on U.S. decisions regarding U.S. involvement
in Vietnam was promptly reported by TASS and in Moscow radio
broadcasts for foreign and domestic audiences un 15 June.
The reports said the airing of the documents has aroused
"panic" in Washington official circles and is growing into
"a huge political scandal."
The documents reveal, according to Moscow's reports, that
the U.S. "justifica-~ion" for escalating the war--the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution--was based on an attack on U.S. ships that
was actually "fabricated" by the Pentagon and that plans
for a major attack against the DRV were made even before
the Tonkin Gulf incident. The reports briefly cited statements
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by Senator McGovern and Congressman McCloskey criticizing the
"policy of deceit" and noted Senator Symingt?on's announcement
that he intends to propose a full. investigation of the history
of the emergence of the Vietnam war.
A 15 June 'PASS dispatch from New York said the documents
"confirm that the United States deliberately escalated end
broadened. the war in Indochina and misled the American
public in giving its reasons for doing so." The correspondent
~cmmented that the publication of this "record of official
duplicity" came at an "awkward moment" for the present
'administration, with the vote on the Mcvovern-Hatfield
amendment impending. He noted that some congressmen have
expressed the view that the publication of the documents
will strengthen the position of the antiwar elements in
Congress. The dispatch reported Secretary Laird as
stating that the Administration is "highly disturbed" by
the revelations a.id has asked the Justice Department to
determine whether the publication constitutes a violation
of security laws.
On the 16th TASS promptly reported that a federal judge
had placed a temporary injunction on further publication
of the documents. The day before, reporting Secretary
Rogers' press conference, TASS had mentioned briefly that
he "supported" the Defense Department's decision to institute
legal proceedings against the TIMES. (The Secretary in
fact merely "took notice" of toe Justice Department's
proceedings, although he did observe that the law clearly
provides that classified documents should not become public.)
TASS also reported that the Secretary said the publication
of the documents "would give a lot of trouble to the United
States," but it did not explain that Rogers was speaking of
relations with foreign governments.
Some Soviet comment has linked the "deceit" revealed by the
documents with the policies of the present Administration.
Zorin observed in a domestic service commentary on the 15th
that the leak reflects a political struggle in the United
States and was a "well-thought-out action" by "certain
circles." The Nixon Administration, he said, has been
trying to oppose demands for an end to the war, and the
latest events "can be interpreted as the result of the
bitter struggle in the Washington leadership."
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Zorin said the U.S. Government is now in a "very difficult
pooition," being deprived of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution which
had served as the only legal Justification for sending troops
to Vietnam. He commented that the Administration is feigning
innocence and trying to shift full blame to the preceding
Administration, but that the Republicans in fact had. access
to all the documents and chose to keep silent about them,
using the "provocation that served as a pretext" for the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution to continue aggression. A commentary
in English by Shakov on the same day similarly cited the
"American p-:ess" for reports that the present Administration
"has known from the very outset that the Gulf of Tonkin '
incident was a falsehood," but that it still denies it "in
order to justify its own share of escalation."
Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress announced in its English-
language program for Asia on 16 June that on the 18th it
would begin broadcasting the documents from the New York
TIMES for U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam.*
* The only available Hanoi acknowledgment of the New York
TIMES action appeared in a brief item broadcast in English to
U.S. servicemen. It said that "war critics seized upon top
secret documents stressing U.S. involvement in Vietnam as
proof that Congress and the public had been deceived about
the war all along." The broadcast cited UPI for the report
that the New York TIMES had publicized "the second installment
of its series on the documents, quoting from secret strategy
meetings, diplomatic cables, and military directives" in the
period before the large-scale U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.
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LAOS: BRITISH CIRCULATION OF SOUVANNA PHOWA LETTER SCORED
A VNA "authorized" statement on 15 June scor^s Britain for
unilaterally circulating on 9 June a message sent to the British
and Soviet Geneva conference cochairmen by r-,uavanna ?houma on
18 May.# It assails the British for releasing the getter and
"slandering" the DRV at a time when public opinion is condemning
U.S. aggression in Laos and "the Lao people and many Lao political
figures of good will" are voicing approval. of the 12 May NLHS
peace proposal for a U.S. bombing halt and sub'equent cease-fire
and talks on a coalition government. Charging that the British
move is aimed at justifying U.S. aggression in Laos, VNA asserts
that the British Government has "utterly contravened its
responsibility" as a Geneva conference cochairman. It "flatly
rejects" the slanders against the DRV, but dues not of course
acknowledge that in his letter Souvanna Phouma had charged that
DRV troops captured Pak Ting and other RLG positions on the
Bolovens Plateau.
A few hours before the VNA statea.ent was released a Pathet Lao
radio commentary had similarly attacked the British move. The
commentary assailed both Souvanna Phouma's letter and the
British cover message for trying to justify U.S. aggression--
the most "concrete proof" of which was Lam Son 719--by accusing
North Vietnam of "committing aggression in Laos." Counter-
charging that "many additional battalions" of Thai troops are
being mustered on the border ready to undertake action on the
Bolovens Plateau and in the Highway 9 area, the broadcast said
that U.S. "henchmen" in Vientiane--such as the Sananikone brothers
and Sisouk Na Champassak--are urging stronger preparation of
public opinion for new military ventures in the rainy season.
It commented that this military activity is the U.S. answer to
the new NLHS peace proposal and went on to score the British
for their role in supporting U.S. aggression.
The commentary concluded by praising the Soviet Union for its
"correct attitude" in consistently rejecting the unilateral
acts of the British Government; Moscow, a3 usual, ignores the
exchange.
* See the 28 April TRENDS, pages 15-16, for a discussion of
and background on communist reaction to the circulation by
Britain on 21 April of Souvanna Phouma's last letter to the
Geneva cochairmen.
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CRITICISM OF SOWANNA PHOUvIA REPLY TO NUNS PROPOSAL CONTINUES
Pathet Lao propaganda, since its first acknowledgment on 6 June,
has continued to criticize Souvanna Phouma's 26 May response to
the NLHS 12 May peace initiative, and to claim that there are
other circles in Vientiane who support the initiative. An
11 June statement by a spokesman of the Patriotic Neutralist
Forces (PNF) Alliance Committee, reported by the Pathet Lao
radio on the 15th, is similar to a "communique" of the NLHS
Central Commiteee "office," reported on the 8th, in its claim
that Souvanna Phouma's response "runs counter" to the NLHS
proposals and was made "under pressure" from the "U.S.
imperialists" and the "ultrarightist reactionaries." It goes
beyond the NLHS communique--but echoes earlier routine
propaganda--when it complains that Souvanna Phouma's reply
indicates that he in*ends to avoid talking about a bombing
halt and that his proposals "to hold negotiations in Vientiane
without conditions" and "to negotiate without limit" are aimed
at gaining time and serving U.S. aggressive intentions.*
A radio broadcast on the 8th provided the only known acknowledg-
ment in Pathet Lao propaganda that Souuvanna suggested that in
order to expedite prompt talks full authority be given
Souphanouvong's envoy in Vientiane, T`.ao Souk Vongsak, or that
he be replaced by someone with that authority. The broadcast did
not directly criticize this notion, saying only that his
proposal is only "one vague theme dealing with Prince
Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary representative" which does not
explain how discussions cvn be held while the United States
continues its aggression and bombing.
A hint of intensified communist military pressure if the NLHS
prorosals are not accepted appears in a 12 June broadcast
reporting a 20 May rally geld by PNF officials, soldiers, and
police of Phong Saly Province to praise the initiative. The
PNF command in the province is quoted as warning that if the
"U.S. imperialists" and their "flunkeys" continue to :eject the
NLHS proposals and intensify their aggression, the PNF will
"continue to cooperate with the NLHS, the LPLA, and people to
* See the 9 June TRENDS, pages 14-15, for a discussion of the
initial reaction to Souvanna Phouma's letter which called for
"immediate serious discussions" on "all problems which are
regarded as suitable for discussion."
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counterattack and inflUrt more humiliating defeats" on the
Americans and their "flunkeys." A broadcast on 7 June on
Souvanna Phouma's 26 May reply to Souphanouvong had noted
recent "victories" on the Bolovens Plateau and said that if
the Vientiane side persists in "dragging out the war," then
"heavier attacks should be made."
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
LEADERS REVIEW MAJOR ISSUES IN ELECTION SPEECHES
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy, in speeches to their constit-
uents on the eve of the 13 June election to the RSFSR Supreme
Soviet, took the occasion to sustain Moscow's challenge to the
West to respond to Brezhnev's 14 May call for negotiations on
force and armament cuts in central Europe. And Brezhnev sur-
faced yet another initiative--for talks on the problem of
restricting the cruising areas of the large powern' naribd.
The three speakers in pro forma fashion reaffirmed Soviet
adherence to a policy of peace, at the same time noting the
adequacy of Soviet defenses.
NAVAL Less than a month after his Tbilisi speech in which
TALKS he had called for talks on force levels in central
Europe, Brezhnev on 11 June raised the possibility
of East-West negotiations on the problems of restricting the
cruising areas of the navies of the large powers. He charged
that the "U.S. propaganda machine" has launched a campaign
against thi Soviet navy, warning of the "menace" created by
Soviet ships cruising in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean,
and "other seas." Brezhnev said U.S. officials nevertheless
consider it normal for the Sixth Fleet to ply the Mediterranean--
"next door, as it were, to the Soviet Union"*--and for the
Seventh Fleet to cruise off the shores of China and Indochina.
Commenting that it is not ideal for the navies of the great
powers to be "cruising about for long periods far from their
own shores," he said that "we are prepared to solve this pro-
blem . . . on an equal basis. On the basis of such principles,
the Soviet Union is ready to discuss any proposals."
* Moscow has long opposed the U.S. naval presence it the
Mediterranean, said to be "in direct proximity to the USSR's
southern borders." Brczhnev himself had declared in his
24 April 1967 Karlovy Vary speech that "the time has come to
demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from
the Mediterranean." Possibly foreshadowing the current initia-
tive, Brazhnev said in his 30-March CPSU Congress report that
after a Middle East settlement it. will be possible to "consider
further steps aimed at reducing war tension in that region,"
in particular at turning the Mediterranean into a sea of
peace.
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There has been limited followup propaganda to this demarche
so far. A domestic service roundup of foreign reaction on the
13th, citing "news agencies," said that the State Department's
refusal to express an immediate opinion was seen as an indica-
tion "that the Nixon government intends to study this proposal
carefully before issuing any statement."
Background: While the Brezhnev proposal is new to the USSR's
catalogue of partial disarmament measures, Moscow has in the
past offered initiatives which in effect would limit areas
of navigation for warships. Thus the Warsaw Pact Declaration
on European Security of 5 July 1966, signed by Brezhnev and
Kosygin, called for a ban on the entry of foreign submarines
and surface ships with nuclear arms into European ports. The
1 July 1968 Soviet Government memorandum outlining partial
disarmament measures called for a limitation on the zones of
navigation of missile-armed submarines. And restrictions on
zones of navigation are implicit in the USSR's calls over the
years for creation of nuclear-free zones encompassing the
world's oceans.
FORCE-CUT Challenges to the West to respond positively to
PROPOSAL the 14 May proposal for force-cut talks were made
by Brezhnev on the 11th and by Kosygin and Podgornyy
on 9 and 10 June. In keeping with Soviet comment over the past
month, however, none of the three elaborated in any way on a
possible forum for such talks. Brezhnev, who complained that
the 3-4 June NATO Council meeting in Lisbon did not give a
"clear answer" to his proposal, reaffirmed Soviet readiness to
discuss foreign armed forces in Europe as well as national
forces. Podgornyy, like Brezhnev, remarked that the NATO
meeting was compelled to consider the Soviet proposal and
claimed wide support for it. It is necessary, he said, to
enter into negotiations "in order to test the intentions
of the parties."
Kosygin, who did not mention the NATO meeting, said that the
USSR is ready for a reduction of forces and armaments in
central Europe "if the NATO countries do in :fact show a serious
attitude to the solution of this task." Progress in this area,
he said, might mark the beginning "of a completely new stage
of international relations in Europe and create a favorable
atmosphere of confidence and fruitful cooperation between all
European peoples." But he cautioned that the USSR cannot
ignore the fact that in Europe and elsewhere, there are still
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forces "hostile in their attitude to everything that serves the
cause of peace and international security."
EUROPEAN Podgornyy alone of the three broached the matter
SECURITY of a European security conference, a topic which
continues to be treated with regularity in routine
propaganda. He observed that the recent easing of tension and
strengthening of peace in Europe have advanced the chances of
holding such a conference. The socialist countries for their
part, he said, have concluded that the time !iiii come to move
from general words about the usefulness of a conference "to
the active phase of practical preparation." Earlier, in an
apparent reference to those in the West who would link the
calling of a European security conference or talks on force
cuts to progress on the Berlin problem, he said that the USSR
considers that "all European questions can and should be
solved simultaneously, in parallel, and without tying them up
into a single knot." More pointedly, a foreign-language
:ommentary on 14 June said that the participants in the NATO
meeting in Lisbon "decided to link the proposed talks on a
European conference, and on cutting arms in central Europe,
with the present negotiations on West Berlin." Citing
Washington POST columnist Chalmers Roberts, the commentary
observed that this is "the old diplomatic trick of using
procrastination in one matter to delay another."
While Kosygin failed to mention the proposal for a European
security conference, he did deal at length with the situation
in Europe, noting that the USSR has endorsed the principle
of strengthening European security and citing as evidence of
a trend toward relaxation on that continent the developing
of Soviet-French ties and the FRG's 1970 treaties with the
USSR and Poland. Possibly in response to the West's alleged
foot-dragging on'a European security conference, Kosygin said
that opponents of Soviet proposals stress that time is required
to study them and raise "various preliminary conditions." He
added that the USSR is not opposed to careful preparation, but
that "one must distinguish between what is a question of prepara-
tion and what, under the guise of preparation,..is .a question of
thwarting peace proposals."
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SALT, OTHER Brezhnev and Podgornyy touched on the
DISARMAMENT ISSUES strategic arms limitation talks (SALT),
with Podgornyy taking note of the
20 May accord at the Vienna session between the USSR and the
United States "to concentrate their efforts at present on pre-
paring an agreement on limiting the development of antimissile
defense systems, and to agree on some measures in the sphere
of limiting strategic offensive armaments also." In his
remarks on SALT--the first by an elite spokesman since the
20 May accord--Podgornyy pointed up the importance of strategic
arms agreements for the halting of the arms race which in turn
would allow allocation of resources to peaceful uses.
Brezhnev observed that the significance of the U.S.-Soviet
talks on strategic arms limitation ~s "certainly increasing,"
and said that a positive outcome would be in the interests
of both countries and universal peace. As he had done in h;s
30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress, he declared that
hopes for success in these talks lay in abandonment or all
efforts to gain unilateral advantages and adherence to the
principle of equal security.
In what is seemingly a swipe at Defense Department concern
over a growing So'riet threat, Brezhnev said that the United
States "systematically makes a noise about Soviet defense
programs, particularly on the eve of adopting the current war
budget."* The measures the USSR takes to strengthen. it
defenses are described, according to Brezhnev, as "something
verging on treachery, a direct threat to the success of the
talks. But what grounds does Washington have . . . to expect
us to give up a program which has already been adopted, if the
American Government itself has taken several very substantial
decisions on increasing its strategic forces during the talks?"
Brezhnev pledged the USSR to a continuing effort at achieving
both general and complete disarmament and partial disarmament
measures. He denied that the proposals set forth at the 24th
* Soviet accounts of Secretary Laird's 21 April speech before
the American Newspaper Publishers Association and his 27 April
Pentagon r---.ss conference pointed up his warnings abou- a
"Soviet threat," but did not indicate the nature of his charges--
that the USSR is involved in a new ICBM construction program
and has resumed activity at ABM sites around Moscow.
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CPSU Congress are mere "propaganda slogans," and he rejected
the contention of unnamed parties that disarmament and the
limitation of the.-arms race are "unrealistic" where "capitalism
is still in existence, where the imperialist powers continue
exerting quite a substantial influence on the international
situation." He ticked off several of the measures outlined
in the 30 March report to the congress--the banning of all
types of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of mili-
tary budgets of states, the complete cessation of nuclear
weapons tests, and the convening of a conference of the five
nuclear powers--and observed that "we are awaiting an answer
to these proposals." Earlier he had voiced support for the
"replacement of military blocs and groups by systems of
collective security."
Kosygin also touched briefly on the proposal for the convening
of a conference of the five nuclear powers, citing it as one of
the "clear and concrete proposals" put forward by the USSR.
U.S.-SOVIET Kosygin alone addressed himself directly to
R-IATIONS the question of U.S.-Soviet relations, declaring
that the state of relations is far from satis-
factory but echoing the 30 March report to the CPSU congress
that. improved relations are both possible and desirabid. He
warned that the USSR cannot draw a line between bilateral
relations and the "aggressive policy of the imperialist circles
of the United States, the barbarity committed in Indochina by
U.S. troops, the disregard for other peoples and the crude
trampling of their lawful rights and interests." Relations
cannot but be affected negatively, he added, by such acts of the
United States as "practical support of the expansion of Israel
in the Middle East and'opposition to the lessening of tension
in Europe." He urged that the United States choose a path in
quest of mutually acceptable solutions of pressing problems, and
pledged that the USSR is "prepared to hold talks with the United
States in a businessl41ke manner on a wide range of questions of
mutual interest." In effect answering Chinese charges, most
recently pressed during the just-concluded Ceausescu visit to
the PRC, he added that Soviet policy has nothing in common "with
the so-called 'policy of two superpowers." The USSR, he said,
"will never agree to the sanctioning of world hegemony of one
or several powers because this utterly contradicts both our
policy and our communist ideology."
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MIDDLE Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin all played up the
EAST Soviet-UAR treaty in their speeches; Brezhnev other-
wise made no reference to the Middle East. Podgornyy's
and Kosygin's remarks were directed mainly at the United States
for its activity as "alleged intermediary," and neither took the
occasion to press for Israeli withdrawal. Kosygin did declare
that the USSR?is undertaking "active efforts" for a peaceful
settlement in accordance with the 1967 Security Council resolu-
tion, the only "sane way" out of the crisie. Blaming the lack
of a political settlement on Israel, Kosygin decried "various
diplomatic maneuvers" by "the opponents of a just settlement."
And Podgornyy echoed previous charges that imperialists seek to
assume the role of peacemakers while trying to undermine the
Arabs' pursuit of social progress and cooperation with social-
ist countries. He also denounced imperialist attempts to
exploit "internal political complications" to split the Arab
patriotic forces.
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
HONECKER. BREZHNEV PRESENT SHOW OF UNITY ON BERLIN TALKS
In their speeches to the Eighth SED Congress in East Berlin,
SED First Secretary Honecker joined Brezhnev in calling for
"success" in the four-power ambassadorial negotiations on
Berlin, and the CPSU leader spoke of "concerted efforts" by
the USSR and GDR to solve the West Berlin problem. The
tenor of both leaders' remarks, and in particular an
assertion by Honecker of "complete unanimity" between the
Soviets and East Germans on "all questions," suggested a
resolution of differences over Berlin that had seemed
implied in the joint communique issued after the one-day
visit of Honecker and GDR Premier Stoph to Moscow on
18 May--their first talks with the Soviet leaders after
Ulbricht's step-down on the 3d. The communique had noted
that the two sides "expressed their views" on the four-
power negotiations and had reported unanimity only on a
desire for a settlement acceptable to all parties
concerned.
Delivering the Central Committee report to the SED congress
at its opening session on 15 June, Honecker prefaced the
statement of unanimity with a reference to the "high
value" placed by the SED on "the political consultations
between the party and state leaderships of the GDR and
USSR, which are being systematically developed." He went
on to declare that the SED "reconfirms that complete
unanimity on all questions exists between our parties
and states"--the kind of all-encompassing statement that
had been missing from the communique.
Brezhnev, according to a TASS summary of his congress
speech the next day, followed up his reference to concerted
Soviet-GDR efforts regarding West Berlin with a declaration
that the Soviet side in the four-power talks is "prepared
to make efforts to bring this matter to a successful
completion and to insure that the agreement reached will
be effective and carried into life." The implication appeared
to be that with tactics and objectives successfully coordinated,
the USSR could now give assurances that the GDR will not try
to block implementation of an agreement reached by the Big
Four.
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(;ONP'II)1~,N'I!IAli 1'111:11 T101:N1)f]
:I.6 JUN19 19'(:1.
HONECKER Ionecker broached the Berlin problem in the
ON BERLIN course of a diocusaion of five areas in which
the SED could contribute to the safeguarding
of peace in Europe: 1) the convening of a European security
conference, 2) admission of the GDR to the United Nations
and its specialized agencies, 3) GDR willingness to establish
normal diplomatic relations with "all" states, 4) the
establishment of "normal relations under international
law" with the FRG, devoid of any special "inter-German
relations," and 5) a GDR contribution to settlement of
the West Berlin question.
On the fifth point, stating that the GDR "is prepared to
contribute to the normalization of relations vis-a-vis West
Berlin," Honecker went on to declare that the GDR "wishes
success for the four-power talks on West Berlin"--a more
forthcoming statement than any made by Ulhricht. In his
report to the 14th SED Central Committee plenum on
9 December 1970, Ulbricht had expressed "hope" that
the negotiations would reach "a mutually acceptable
agreement" meeting the needs of the West Berliners and
the interests and sovereign rights of the GDR, the
formulation introduced by Brezhnev in his November Yerevan
speech and adopted by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative
Committee on 2 December in Berlin.
Honecker proceeded to quote from the 18 May Soviet-GDR
communique in his congress report: "An understanding
on this question would correspond to the interests of
everyone and do away with the grounds for disputes and
conflicts concerning West Berlin." The joint communique,
pronouncing the two sides in full accord'on this point
alone, had not gone on to spell out any of the bases for
such an understanding; it contained no reference to GDR
sovereignty or "interests" with respect to West Berlin,
no statement that West Berlin is "within" or "on" GDR
territory, no assertion that West Berlin is an "independent
political entity"--all standing elements of the Soviet
and GDR public positions. Honecker at the congress
introduced a revision of the "independent political entity"
formula, replacing it with a more open-ended description
of Berlin as having "special political status," but he
did so in the context of the GDR talks with the West Berlin
Senat, not the four-power negotiations. Declaring that
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONlilt 1U1N'.I!:tAb I'IIIU 'a'ItI N1it
16 JUN1i 1,971
the Ours had underlined itu desire ror an understanding on
Berlin "by deedu," r,'1 declared:
our proposals in the talks with the West Berlin Banat
are, as a matter of course, based on the condition
that both aides show good will. This requires
recognition of the reality that West Berlin is a city
with a special political statue, that it has never
belonged to the FRG, and that it never will. On
this basis it is possible to solve all problems in
the interest of strengthening European peace and,
last but not least, in the interests of the people
of West Berlin.
Without directly addrewsing himself to the issue of the
relationship between the Big Four negotiations and talks
between the GDR and the West Berlin Senat, Honecker in
effect served notice of an intention to continue pressing
the Senat to come to an agreement independently of the
four-power negotiations. Soviet media. have publicized
the GDR-Senat talks in brief news reports and limited,
low-level comment.
BREZHINEV Where Honecker--like the 18 May joint communique--
ON BERLIN did not bring up the matter of GDR interests
regarding West Berlin, Brezhnev reintroduced
this aspect in his congress speech. After declaring that
the "concerted efforts" of the USSR and the GDR "are directed
to securing a state of affairs where West Berlin will cease
to be a source of tension and critical situations and where
normal conditions will be provided for the life of the city
and its population," he added, "naturally, with due consideration
of the lawful interests and sovereign rights of the GDR." He
went on to make a strong plea for a successful conclusion of
the four-power talks, in the most optimistic characterization of
the recent progress in the talks yet made by a top Soviet
spokesman:
We believe that the talks on West Berlin now in progress
have made it possible first and foremost to make clear the
positions of the sides concerned. It is legitimate, there-
fore, that now the talks enter the stage of examining
concrete proposals on the content of a possible agreement.
I cannot speak for our partners in the talks, but we, on
our side, are prepared to make efforts to bring this matter
to a successful completion and to insure that the agreement
reached will be effective and carried into life.
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(iONl0;CD1!IN'i':LAI F'13:1(J '1.'111?.NI)U
1.6 JUNi :L9''(:l.
IKJNECKER ADVANCES CONCEPT OF SEPARATE GERMAN "NATIONS"
Dincussing GDR-FRG relations in his report to the BED congress,
Ionecker carried one step further the East German concept of
complete "demarcation" (Abgrenzung) between two separate,
sovereign, and independent German states, the worker-peasant,
socialist GDR and the bourgeois, monopolistic, imperialist
FRG--a delineation emphasized in East German propaganda since
the turn of the year, after Ulbricht elaborated it at the
December BED Central Committee plenum. Decrying Bonn's
"spurious claim" about a "homogeneous German nation"
divided into two German states, a claim he said was
designed to support the FRG's "revanchist" line of "intra-
German relations," Honecker argued that the development
of Marxism-Leninism and the advances made by the socialist
society in the GDR had produced "a new type of nation--the
socialist nation." The effect of this refinement of
terminology is to sharpen the "demarcation," countering
the notion of one German nation, two German states with a
concept of two German "nations."
Honecker also assailed the notion of "special intra-German
relations" in his discussion of GDR diplomatic relations
with other countries. His five-point program for European
peace called for "normal diplomatic relations with all
states, based on equality of all states and the principle
of recognition of the GDR's sovereignty by every state and
recognition of the other states by the GDR," then devoted
a carefully : rased separate point to the question of East-
West German relations. Asserting that "the GDR, as before,
advocates the establishment of normal relations under
international law with the FRG," he criticized the FRG
for refusing to abandon its concept of special intra-
German relations--a concept uncommon among "sovereign"
states, he said, and one that "torpedoes" bilateral
relations and European detente.
Brezhnev, notably, failed to call for FRG recognition of
the GDR in his congress speech, although he was glowing
in his praise of "the German socialist state" and of
Ulbricht and Honecker personally.
MOSCOW AND WARSAW Honecker repeated the GDR line on
TREATIES WITH BONN the "importance for European
security" of the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties with Bonn and called for their ratification. He
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also reiterated the standard line that "to artificially
construe an interrelationship" between ratification of the
treaties and the Berlin negotiations was "a disservice to
the cause cf detente." He appealed for the simultsnbous
solving of all problems facing Europe, "without preconditions
and artificial links between one problem and the other,"
Brezhnev denounced allegations "in the West" that the FRG
had made concessions to the USSR in signing the Moscow
treaty. He said: "We think that our commitments under
the treaty of 12 August are by no means less if not more
important for the FRG than its analogous commitments are
for the Soviet Union. What matters is not some 'unilateral
concessions'--there are none on either side--but the
political essence and the general trend of the treaty."
In an apparent allusion to the FRG's delay in ratifying
the treaty, Brezhnev belittled West German "figures"
who would engage in "political speculation" regarding
the treaty; he remarked pointedly that the "inviolability"
of the borders of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
"and other fraternal countries" are guaranteed by the might
of the Warsaw Pact states, "irrespective of the existence"
of the Moscow-Bonn treaty. But ratification would, he
said, "largely contribute to a renovation of the political
climate in Europe."
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CONFJ:1)1!1N'J!IAL I'13TrJ 1'11101)[1
:I,( JIM': J.9'(1
CYPRUS
PRESIDENT MAKARIOS PAYS OFFICIAL. VISIT TO SOVIET UNION
Moscow in the main adheres to established lines on the Cyprus
issue in propaganda surrounding the 2-9 June official visit to
the USSR by Cyprus President Makarios. Formal announcements of
the forthcoming official "three-day" visit were carried by TABS
and Nicosia radio in late April; the Soviet invitation, reported
in mid-February by the Greek Cypriot paper I MAKHI, apparently
originally had been extended for the enthronement of the new
Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Following one'sesiion of
talks on the day of his arrival, the Archbishop attended the
enthronement of Patriarch Pimen on 3 June, and the balance of the
visit was occupied by trips to vart.ous cities.
BILATERAL Bilateral relations are treated by Moscow in pro
RELATIONS forma fashion, with no indication of any specific
requests, proposals, or agreements under discus-
sion. TASS reported that in the talks held in a "friendly
atmosphere" on the 2d, the sides had an "exchange of opinions"
on further advances in bilateral relations as well as on major
international problems. The communique appraises, in general
terms, the "positive cooperation" in various fields, noting
that trade and economic ties are developing on a long-term
basis, and routinely records the sides' belief that there are
possibilities for further developing cooperation and broaden-
ing political contacts at various levels. In his banquet
speech on the 2d Podgornyy remarked "with satisfaction" that
relations were developing favorably, while Kosygin in his
luncheon speech on the 4th merely expressed confidence that
the visit would help strengthen relations "in all areas of
our cooperation."
Answering journalists' questions on his return, Makarios said,
according to Nicosia radio, that the Cyprus side had proposed
the signing of a new five-year trade agreement, but he gave
no indication of the Soviet reply. The Cyprus communist party
organ KHARAVYI reported on the 10th that Makarios declined to
answer a question on whether there was discussion of "Soviet
technical aid" to Cyprus, but he did say that no agreement of
any kind was signed.
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CONFIDENTIAL P113 EU 'J'HNNI)IJ
16 JUNE 19'(:I.
Nicosia radio on the 16th reported that during a visit to the
Soviet Union by Cyprus' commissioner for cooperative develop-
ment, which coincided with Makarios' visit, it was decided to
form a common trade committee, and various agreements were
reached on the sale of Cypriot products to the USSR.
CYPRUS The communique contains two departures from standard
ISSUE Soviet phraseology on the Cyprus issue. Where Moscow
customarily expresses opposition to outside interfer-
ence in Cypriot affairs, it now adds Soviet opposition to the
use of or threat to use force against Cyprus. And the communique
calls for respect of Cyprus' "unity" in addition to supporting,
as usual, the republic's sovereignty, independence, and terri-
torial integrity. These new elements would not seem to add up
to any shift in Moscow's posture on the Cyprus question. For
example, a followup commentary in IZVESTIYA on the 13th does
not employ the language of the communique, excluding the phrase
on "threat to use force" and the word "unity," and reverting.)to
the stereotyped phrases.
4 In the first instance, the Soviet side declares its "firm
and active opposition to any intervention, interference, use
of force, or threat to use force" against Cyprus. Moscow has
long been on record as opposing outside interference, advocating
solution of the problem by the Cypriots themselves.* The usual
formulation is generally employed in the context of alleged
intrigues by NATO and the Greek regime against Cyprus. In the
case of Turkey's air attacks on Cyprus in August 1964, Moscow
had weighed in with a government statement warning that the
USSR would help Cyprus defend its independence in the event of
a foreign armed invasion.
4. Cyprus' "unity" is referred to twice in the communique in
addition to its appearance in the call for respect of the
republic's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial
integrity. The Soviet side calls for creating conditions safe-
guarding a peaceful life for the Cypriots on the basis of
"absolute sovereignty and unity" of the state. And the
Cypriot side refers to their efforts to counter "machinations"
aimed at imposing inadmissible solutions or undermining the
state's sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.
* A communique issued on 1 October 196 marked the only other
visit of a Cypriot government delegation to Moscow, led by Foreign
Minister Kyprianou. The communique said that Khruahchev told the
delegation the people of Cyprus as a whole should settle their
internal problems without outside interference, and it recorded
agreement reached on "practical measures of assistance" to Cyprus
for safeguarding its freedom and territorial integrity.
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16 JUNE 197.L
The uoe of the word "unity," infrequent in Soviet elite stal-,e-
mpnte on Cyprus, might relate to the idea of a federation as a
oolution to the Cyprus question.* Gromyko had made what is an
apparently unique Soviet referenc'- to federation in a rare dis-
cussion of Cyprus' internal structure in a January 1,:55
IZVESTIYA interview. He did not rule it out as a solution,
but viewed such a system as presupposing the existence of a
single central government, single defense organization, and
a centralized administrative and judicial system. Remarking
that the republic's internal organization was a matter for the
Cypriots themselves to determine, Gromyko had said that they
must choose any form of state which would take into account the
specific position of the two national communities within a
single, sovereign, and "united" Cyprus.
+ The Soviet side again expresses a desire for a favorable out-
come of the intercommunal talks, regarded approvingly by Moscow
since their inception in the summer of 1968. Podgornyy and
Kosygin, in speeches on 2 and Ii June respectively, reiterate
hope for success of the talks, ICosygin carefully remarking that
"we have equal respect for Greek and Turkish Cypriots" and
wishing them success in settling their differences through
negotiations.
+ In the communique the Soviet side repeats the standard sup-
port for withdrawal of all forei n troops from Cyprus but does
not include the usual call for the elimination of foreign bases
on the island. Podgornyy in his banquet speech does warn, how-
ever, of the "serious danger" to the eastern Mediterranean and
Cyprus itself posed by foreign military bases on the island.
+ There is, of course, no reference in the communique to obser-
vance of the "lawful rights of both national communities," a
phrase which has appeared in several Soviet-Turkish communiques,
along with a call for recognition of the existence on the island
of two national communities. In the present document, the Soviet
side merely refers to the "Cypriot people as a whole."
* Turkish Cypri.'i leader Denktash was quoted by the Turkish
Cypriot c.landestL:e Bayrak Radio on 10 June as explaining that
the terms "unitary" and "unity" both include a form of a federa-
tive system. (U.N.. Secretary,Oeneral U.Thant in his 20 May
report on Cyprus expressed hope for an agreement based on the
independence and sovereignty of "a unitary state" of Cyprus.)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIU TIIENDU
16 JUNE 1971
ASSURANCES Turkish and Turkish Cypriot media report assur-
TO TURKEY ances by Soviet Ambassador to Turkey Grubyakov
that Soviet policy on Cyprus remains unchanged.
The Turkish Cypriot paper HALKIN SESI reported on 2 June that
Grubyakov had called on Turkish Foreign Minister Secretary
General Eralp and informed him that the Soviet Union continues
to support the territorial integrity of the island as,'vell
an the rights of the two communities. Any change in this
previously stated Soviet position is out of the question, the
ambassador reportedly said. And Ankara radio on the 11th,
reporting that Foreign NVinister 01cay had invited Grubyakov in
for clarification of Some points in the Makarios communique,
said that the ambassador stated he would convey the request to
his government and assured Olcay the question of change in the
general Soviet policy on Cyprus does not Arise.
The visit is given some publicity in Moscow broadcasts in Turkish
either to Turkey or to Cyprus or both, including reports on
Podgornyy's and Kosygin's speeches and the communique, reportage
on Cypriot public and press reaction to Makarios' reception in
Moscow, and a resume of Soviet press material.
COt LENT IN A LIFE ABROAD article by Kraminov, signed to press
LIFE ABROAD 26 May, recapitulates past occasional Soviet
criticism of the 1959 documents giving Cyprus
"restricted" independence. Reviewing the history of the issue,
Kraminov said the problem has exacerbated not only Athens-Ankara
relations but also relations between groups of countries and
"even between the greater powers." He accused the colonialists,
"aided by Athens and Ankara," of doing everything possible to
perpetuate the country's partition on national and religious
grounds and make both communities dependent on the "so-called
'guarantors'" of Cyprus' independence. The London and Zurich
agreements granted "extremely limited" independence, he said,
and the constitution provided for the creation of "two inter-
linked but opposing states or at least state formations." He
charged the Greek regime with attempting to seize Cyprus by
encouraging enosis--union with Greece, long opposed by Moscow.
Remarking that "only resolute action by Turkey, which 'has
threatened military operations," halted this, he then turned
on "noisy voices" in Ankara advocating annexation of the island
to Turkey, and proceeded to tick off alleged designs on the
island by Britain, NATO, and the United States.
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Kraminov accused these parties, and Athena and Ankara, of
supporting the idea of dual enosis--partition of the island
between Turkey and Greece--and said the concept was at
variance with the interests of the island's population.
He even expressed some muted criticism of the leaders of
the two Cypriot communities, remarking that they were
leaving a decision on the island's fate to Athens and
Ankara. And he later expressed dismay that the "bosses of
the two communities"--he parenthetically referred to the two
chief negotiators, Kl.iridhis and Denktash--are bitterly
opposed to attempts at rapprochement between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot working people. Kraminov seemed encouraged
by "new sentiments" developing in the Turkish Cypriot community
through the efforts of Turkish students from Ankara. He
observed that a "leftist movement" is emerging inspired by a
wish toward independent development shared by the Greeks, to
make Cyprus a community of two nationalities forming a united
Cypriot people.
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CUBAN FISHING BOATS
Cuba has reacted to the 9 June conviction, fining, and sentencir.g
of four Cuban fishing boat "captains" for violating U.S.
territorial wate3's off the U.S.-owned Dry Tortugas islands
with sustained denunciation of the entire trial procedure,
followed by publicity for its own trial, conviction, and
fining of five U.S. citizens who--according to Havana's
domestic service on 15 June--"admitted having entered Cuba's
jurisdictional waters without any authorization and having
landed illegally on national territory." As if to suggest
that Cuba retains a further bargaining lever, the use of
which will be determined by U.S. disposition of the fines
and prison sentences meted out to the fishermen, the 15 June
broadcast noted that "an appropriate investigation is still
under way" concerning a U.S. tugboat and barge with eight
U.S. crewmembers which entered Cuban territorial waters on
8 June.
Other reaction has included widespread protest meetings,
rallies of fishermen on the high seas, and the creation of
a "permanent" Cuban fishing fleet of 60 vessels, with an
average of 17 men on each, at the site in international
waters where Cuba claims the fishermen were seized by U.S.
authorities on 26 May.
Castro denounced the trial of the Cuban fishermen in a
conversation on 13 June with delegates to a Merchant
Marine and Ports Ministry production meeting, publicized
by PRENSA LATINA, but apparently chose not to press the
issue in his speech to the closing session of the conference
the next day. To judge from a domestic radio summary on
the 15th, he merely referred to Cuban fishermen who defy
"the perils of the sea as well as the political perils of
aggression" and mentioned a fishermen's meeting in the
Gulf of Mexico, which he called "the first outpost that
is beginning to hold the aggressors in check."
HAVANA DENOUNCES U.S, TRIAL OF CUBANS AS *"JUDICIAL FARCE"
A 10 June editorial in the party organ GRANMA, as reviewed
that day in the Cuban radio's Armed Forces Political
Information Program, called the U.S. trial a"judicial
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farce" characterized by "irregularities and partiality" and
resulting in a "prefabricated verdict" and "arbitrary and
illegal" sanctions. Contending that "flagrant contradictions"
in the statements of "the prosecutor's leading witnesses . .
left no doubt as to the nonexistence of the supposed crime,"
GRANMA labeled the entire affair "a hostile, deliberate, and
premeditated maneuver" designed to pressure Cuba into "foregoing
its right to fish in international waters" off the Dry
Tortugas and to carry forward the U.S. policy of "criminal
economic blockade . . . against the Cuban revolution."
To bolster the argument that the conviction was purely a
^rlitical act, and to justify the Cuban Government's
decision not to appeal the sentence because "it does not
consider the American courts worthy of consideration and
trust," GRANMA quoted the presiding judge as telling the
fishermen he was "well aware that you are innocent victims
of the political circumstances of your country." In "a
clear example of barefaced blackmail," according to GRANMA,
the judge also suggested that in entertaining a motion to
amend the judgment he would "take into consideration the
payment of the fines by the Cuban Government." GRANMA
concluded that "the four Cuban fishermen must be set free."
I- his informal remarks on-13 June, according to'PRENSA
LATINA., Castro took note of the "contradictions of the North
American authorities who arrested the fishermen," criticized
the "hasty arrival at a verdict," and described the sentence--
six months in Jail and a $10,000 fine for each--as "arbitrary."
Cuban media emphasize that the fines will not be paid--that
Cuba "will not falsely pay for freedom." The four fishermen
are described as determined "to remain in prison so that the
Cuban Government will not be forced to pay an amount of cash
which they believe is necessary to take care of more important
things in their country."
These themes have been struck in various commentaries on the
Jury's verdict and the court's sentence. Calling the trial
"phony Justice," a domestic service commentary on the 11th
claimed "violation of due process" and "lack of proper
defense." The "aim of this brutal outrage," it said, was
"to provoke our people," to "reinforce the blockade against
Cuba," and "to compel us to renounce fishing in international
waters, in an area traditionally worked by Cuban fishermen."
A communique released by the Cuban Gulf fishing fleet fishermen,
also on the 11th, stated that "by convicting the four fishermen
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- 36 -
American imperialism has tried to punish the attitude of a whole
nation." And a GRANMA editorial on the 12th called the
"arbitrary and criminal conviction" an "expression of a
policy systematically pursued against Cuba by the U.S.
Government," adding that this "aggression" by U.S. "imperialists"
will "turn against them in the end like a boomerang smashing
them square in the face."
CUBA FINES FIVE UPS, CITIZENS. ANNOUNCES EIGHT MORE HELD
The nature of the "boomerang" was made clear by a 10 June
announcement over Havana's domestic service--in the midst
of the initial reports of the conviction and sentencing of
the Cuban fishermen--that the Cuban Government "has decided
to refer to revolutionary courts the cases of the crews of
two boats which violated Cuban territorial waters and
illegally entered our territory." A one-man boat was said
to have entered Cuban waters on 22 May, and a large yacht--
"completely outfitted with telephone communications equipment"--
was said to have arrived on 6 June with four crewmembers
aboard. All five were "arrested by the authorities" for
entering Cuban territorial waters and landing on national
territory "without permission."
In addition, the announcement said, on 8 June a U.S. tugboat,
towing a 6,000-ton barge and manned by eight U.S. citizens,
entered Cuban waters and "was brought into port." The
report added that Cuban personnel were repairing the
mechanical damages "which were used as pretext to justify
violating our territorial waters," but cautioned that "this
peculiar event will be carefully investigated by Cuban
authorities."
The linkage to the U.S. treatment of the Cuban fishermen
was made clear in a radio talk by the freewheeling commentator
Guido Garcia Inclan on the 11th: "The Yankees are making a
great to-dc now that the shoe is on the other foot," since
Cuba is "holding a few Yankees" who "will have to be tried
by our revolutionary courts" for "arriving on our natural
shores." Contrasting the "hospitality" which the Cuban
Government accorded the passengers of the Pan American
U plane hijacked to Cuba on 29 May with the alleged U.S.
ill-treatment of the Cuban fishermen, Garcia suggested that the
U.S. citizens now being held might well be "spies" and that
"it is logical that they will be tried by revolutionary courts."
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An indication that the Cuban Government intends to recoup some
of the fines paid in the past for the release of its fishermen--
it paid $25,000 for each of four fishermen arrested and fined
earlier this year--was contained in the announcement on the
15th that the first five U.S. citizens had each been fined
$20,000.
TASS. NCNA REPORT CUBAN CHARGES. STRESS CUBAN INDIGNATION
Moscow's TASS and Peking's NCNA have both been carrying
sporadic brief accounts under Havana datelines of developments
relating to the arrest, trial, and conviction of the Cuban
fishermen. Neither Moscow nor Peking has commented. TASS
has echoed Cuban media in terming the seizure "illegal and
provocative" and denouncing the treatment of the detained
fishermen; its reports have highlighted the "legitimate
indignation" and mass protests and demonstrations of the
Cuban people. NCNA has concentrated almost exclusively
on the meetings and demonstrations in Cuba in protest of
the "kidnapping" of the fishermen and the "outrageous"
and "arbitrary" sentences.
Only the Soviet news agency has reported on the detention,
trial, conviction, and fining of the five U.S. citizens
for allegedly violating Cuban territorial waters. TASS
also mentioned on 11 June that the crew of the tugboat-
barge combination had been detained by Cuban authorities,
but it has said nothing further on this incident.
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PRC AND YUGOSLAVIA
YUGOSLAV FOREIGN SECRETARY VISITS PRC; COEXISTENCE HAILED
The 8-15 June visit to the PRC by a Yugoslav government delegation,
coming on the heels of Romania's Ceausescu, has further highlighted
the role of Peking's East Europe policy in its effort to gain
leverage against the two superpowers. Though not given anything
like the exceptionally lavish treatment accorded the Romanians,
the Yugoslav delegation--headed by Foreign Secretary Mirko Tepavac--
had "a friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai, held "extensive"
talks with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Acting Foreign Minister
Chi Peng-fei, and toured Nanking and Shanghai. In the joint
communique released on 15 June, the Chinese joined their visitors
in endorsing a formulation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence
that accords with Yugoslavia's long-standing opposition to a
bipolar international system and provides a rationale for the
more differentiated, less ideological approach to foreign
relations now being taken by Peking.
There was no attempt to conceal the political and ideological
differences between the two sides, though the very fact of
the visit demonstrated Peking's revised sense of priorities
and what Li described as "a turn for the better" in Sino-
Yugoslav relations in recent years. The communique says the
talks were conducted in an atmosphere of "frankness, under-
standing, and friendship"--a formulation indicating an agreement
to disagree while developing friendly relations. Accordingly,
the communique, while calling for a further enhancement of
their renewed friendship and an increase in economic,
scientific, and cultural cooperation, contains no reference
to international issues. But the communique registers the
two sides' satisfaction over the visit, and the Chinese
accepted an invitation to send a government delegation to
Yugoslavia at a time to be decided later. The Chinese
having earlier accepted Ceausescu's invitation to send a
party-government delegation to Romania, a visit to these
two countries would dramatize Peking's inroads in the
Balkans in the last few years.
Tepavac had been frank in acknowledging the likelihood of
differences when he spoke at a welcoming banquet on the 9th,
but he adroitly turned this fact of life to advantage by
scoring a point at the expense of the Soviet bloc. Observing
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that differences of view among equal partners are not unnatural.,
he pointed out that "what is unnatural is the absolute
concordance of views among those who are not equal." He
defined Yugoslavia's position as "independent, socialist,
and nonalined." The Chinese expressed respect for Yugoslavia's
independence and nonalinement, but they were not likely to
have savored the revisionist flavor of Tepavac's remark about
the Yugoslavs' belief in "the humane and democratic nature of
socialism."
That the turning point in Sino-Yugoslav relations to which
Li alluded can be traced to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
was reflected in Chinese expressions of admiration for
Yugoslavia's resolve to defend its independence. A slogan
greeting the visitors expressed support for the Yugoslavs
"in their struggle against foreign interference and threat of
aggression," and Li on the 9th assured them that they could
"expect firm support from the Chinese people" in defending
their independence. As in the case of the Romanians' visit,
the Chinese attacked the Soviets only indirectly as one of
the "superpowers" and avoided the more provocative charge
of "social imperialism."
As expected, there was no hint during the visit of a revival
of party relations. In the only reverence to either side's
communist party, Tepavac in his speech on the 9th paid
tribute to the Long March led by the CCP and "your leader,
Chairman Mao." On the same occasion Li saluted the
Yugoslavs' "glorious revolutionary tradition," but he
mentioned President Tito only during his toast.
PEACEFUL According to the joint communique, the two
COEXISTENCE sides "stressed that all countries, whether
their social systems are the same or different
and whether they are big or small," should base their
relations on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.
This formulation represents a revision of the orthodox
doctrine, as expounded by Moscow and formerly by Peking,
which applies the principles of coexistence only to
relations between states having different political systems.
The formulation used in the communique reflects Yugoslavia's
long-held position of opposition to bloc politics and to
pressures for communist states to fall in line with "the
socialist camp" in a bipolar global duel.
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Peking had introduced the revised formulation on the occasion
of Yugoslav national day on 27 November, when Deputy Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua declared that the principles of
peaceful coexistence underlie the improved PRC-Yugoslav
relations and should apply to relations between "all
countries, whether they have the same or different social
systems." It appeared for a time that the Chinese might
have made, use of this bit of revisionism merely to
accommodate the Yugoslavs, but subsequently Chou En-lai,
speaking at an 8 June rally for Ceausescu, reiterated the
formulation in the course of a disquisition on the superpowers.
The S.no-Yugoslav context was a fitting one for Peking's
introdtction of the revised formulation on peaceful coexistence.
During the period of destalinization strains following the
1956 CPU congress, when the Chinese were also seeking
influence in East Europe, Peking had urged (in a government
statement on 1 November 1956, during the Hungarian crisis)
that relations among socialist countries be based on the
principles of peaceful coexistence. But when the Chinese
made a sharp turn in 1957 toward a tough line on bloc unity
in the name of "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet
Union," they launched a vigorous ideological campaign
against the Yugoslavs for opposing blocs and for seeking
to stand outside what the Chinese portrayed as the
fundamental struggle between two camps representing
two different political systems.* In now seeking
support from among the "small and medium-sized countries"
in opposition to the superpowers, Peking finds Yugoslavia's
nonalined position attractive and is prepared to make
ideological revisions conducive to a more flexible
approach in the international community.
* The Yugoslavs' pleasure over the turn for the better in
relations with the Chinese may have been enhanced by the
continuing absence of Politburo Standing Committee member
Chen Po-ta, who, as one of the leaders of the anti-Yugoslav
campaign, authored a sharp attack on "the revisionism of
the Tito group" in the first issue of RED FLAG, in 1958.
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YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR
BELGRADE CHARGES INCREASED MEDDLING BY "FOREIGN ENEMIES"
Yugoslav media have escalated their expressions of concern over
alleged outside efforts to exploit the economic crisis in the
country and to capitalize on the political turmoil fanned by
the debate over Tito Is proposed constitutional changes. Such
concern extends to the possible impact on the army. Warnings
against stepped-up "hostile actions" of "foreign enemies"
directed against the country and army were elaborated in a
report to a 10 June Belgrade conference of communists in the
army, publicized by TANJUG, four days after Army Col. Vasilije
Cerovic had charged in the Belgrade daily POLITIKA that
"foreign" forces are waging "psychological warfare" against
Yugoslavia in an attempt to influence its internal course at
a critical juncture.
Although TANJUG's account of the 10 June report stopped short
of identify'ng the foreign enemies beyond linking them to
"Cominformists," the Yugoslavs have left no doubt as to the
principal target of their complaints. A POLITIKA dispatch
publicized by TANJUG the preceding day had charged that
"Cominform emigres" were giving lectures in the Soviet Union
slandering Yugoslavia and noted that the Secretariat of
Foreign AfP~.!irs had protested this activity to the USSR
Ambassador in I lgrade.
Yugoslavia's purpose at this stage is apparently to register
its concern without unduly exacerbating Soviet-Yugoslav
state relations. Followup comment on the POLITIKA correspondent's
charges has appeared in some other Yugoslav press organs but not
in BORBA, and the Foreign Secretariat spokesman at his 10 June
press conference declined to go beyond a confirmation that a
protest had been lodged.
In the most recent of a succession of warnings about "pressure"
from unnamed external sources, Tito told an audience of
Belgrade businessmen on .L5 June that Yugoslavia must not
"panic" in the face of "any kind of threats or--I don't
know--pressure on our country, and such pressure exists."
But he went on to say that the situation is "calmer" than
before.
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ARMY CONFERENCE As recounted by TANJUG, a considerable
portion of the report read at the Belgrade
conference of communists in the army was devoted to "the
efforts of certain forces abroad to wage a perfidious hostile
action under the cloak of concern for the fate of Yugoslavia
and of an offer of assistance." The "offer of assistance"
was not clarified, but the "cloak of concern" could allude to
the kind of profession of Soviet concern that was registered
at the highest level in Brezhnev's 30 March report to the
CPSU congress. Brezhnev's remark that "the Soviet people
want to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened," at a time
when planned constitutional changes look toward still further
decentralization, may well have been read in Belgrade as
interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.
The report to the 10 June conference, TANJUG said, charged
that the "assistance" the inimical forces have in mind
"amounts to an attempt to break up Yugoslavia and to deny its
independent and self-managing policy. This goal is served
by the dissemination of disinformation and intrigues which
are aimed at provoking demoralization and attempts at breaking
the unity of socialist Yugoslavia and its armed forces."
Charging that the "foreign enemies" are "directly allied" with
Cominformists, Chetniks, Ustashi, and Rankovic followers, the
report called for vigilance against people who, "under the
guise of the struggle against the breakup of Yugoslavia,"
are actually advocating a return to bureaucratic centralism.
In a May Day speech in Labin, Istria, Tito had similarly
raised the spectre of unnamed domestic and foreign enemies
trying to disrupt Yugoslavia. He expressed particular concern
over the activities of unnamed foreign "intelligence services"
which he said were exerting "incredible pressure" against
Yugoslavia. Adding that the Presidium had decided to "discover
the roots of these various intelligence attempts," he called
for national vigilance against the introduction of "misinfor-
mation from outside" designed to discredit Yugoslavia. Given
the spedial relationship that exists between Belgrade and
Bucharest, Ceausescu may have had the possibility of Soviet
interference in Yugoslavia in mind when he declared a week
later, in his 7 May address on the Romanian party's 50th
anniversary, that fraternal parties "have the duty to avoid
any interference in the domestic affairs of other parties,
not to encourage or add to party dissension under any
circumstance."
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TANJUG's account of the 10 June conference report dwelt or
concern over the vulnerability of elements in the army to
hardline appeals in a time of economic difficulties, quoting
it as saying the adverse economic situation has had "a
considerable effect on the political attitudes within the
army." The report pointed out, according to TANJUG, that
people with low incomes are particularly affected and that
"political indisposition" has afflicted, "among others,
members of the Yugoslav People's Army." In this context,
the report called for energetic action to meet the present
crisis and pledged support for the planned reforms and
constitutional changes.
Transparently addressing itself 1-o frictions over Serbian
dominance in the armed forces as well as over the army's
place in the planned reorganization, the document warned
that the party organization in the army "cannot allow
individuals, in the name of false radicalism, to sow
confusion" regarding the role of the army, its national
composition, and the competences of the republican leaderships
in relation to the army. The constitutional provision of
optimal propo'tional representation of republics and
provinces, the report said, "must be implemented." The
document was particularly critical of "the insufficient
numbers"of Slovene, Croatian, Albanian, and Hungarian
nationalities in the armed forces and called for new efforts
to determine the reasons why the representation of these
nationality groups in military schools is "insufficient."
The question of Serbian dominance in the armed forces and
security services had been in evidence at the 20th Central
Committee plenum of the League of Communists of Croatia
held in Zagreb in May. Rade Bulat, a Serb, attacked Croatian
chauvinism in a speech at the plenum and defended the
dominant position of the Serbs in the army and security
services. He was sharply rebutted by other speakers. In an
address to the 10 June army conference in Belgrade, Defense
Minister Ljubicic, according to TANJUG, emphasized in
particular the need to achieve unity of all army personnel
and said that "accounts should be resolutely settled with
those who would hinder this unity."
Tito had raised the issue of dissidence among the military in
an 8 May Sarajevo speech in which he attacked critics of
decentralization as well as "retired generals" who criticized
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the regime while drawing fat pensions from it. He added that
some of them are "megalomaniacs who would like to be presidents
of republics or at least ministers," and he promised that their
identity would be revealed "when they are called to account."
Although Tito limited his criticism to retired generals, his
warning may also have been meant for some who were still on
active duty.
SEEMEVO ARMY Another warning about inimical activity
CONFERENCE against Yugoslavia was made at a Sarajevo
army area meeting of communists on 11 June,
according to TANJUG. Maj. Gen. Ahmed Dzubo told the gathering
that "increased enemy activity against our country and the ariy
demands greater political vigilance and concrete security
measures." Urging support of the proposed constitutional
changes, Dzubo noted that "certain misunderstandings existed
here and there, misunderstandings which: are explained by the
fact that there were still members of the army, including
members of the LYC, who did not understand the full depth and
complexity of the processes of change taking place in our
society." TANJUG reported that the conference went on to
express "unanimous support for the 36th amendment to the
constitution, which expresses recognition of Comrade Tito's
contribution to building our country."
POLITIKA Col. Vasilije Cerovic's article in the 6 June
ARTICLE POLITIKA had developed the theme of the need for
vigilance against foreign enemies. Entitled
"Wishful Thinking," the article warned unnamed foreign forces
that their efforts to influence internal developments in
Yugoslavia by psychological pressure would fail. Cerovic came
closest to identifying the Soviets as the culprits when he
complained about people waging "psychological warfare" against
Yugoslavia with attacks on the nonbioc policy of some socialist
countries and with talk of "internationalist duty and the right
to defepd the achievements of socialism."
Cerovic's remarks may have been responsive to. a I June article
in RED STAR by Maj. Gen. Ye. Sulimov which warned of neutralist
tendencies and "the so-called nonalinement" among socialist
countries. The chief targets of these attacks appeared to be
Romania and Yugoslavia. On 13 June Radio Belgrade, taking note
of the appearance that day of a PRAVDA article attacking
nonalinement, also cited a "recent" RED STAR article that
similarly attacked the nonbioc approach.
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EMIGRES IN USSR There has been limited followup to the charges
that Yugoslav emigres in the USSR are publicly
"slandering LCY policy and President Tito," surfaced in the
POLITIKA correspondent's dispatch reported by TANJUG on 9 June.*
On the 11th TANJUG quoted the Slovene daily DELO as saying that
the purpose of the emigre attacks is "to sully Yugoslavia at all
costs" and as adding that the use of emigres is "impermissible
in honest polemics." The news agency also quoted the Belgrade
weekly NIN as observing that while it is fairly difficult to fix
motives for this "open return to the old manifestations of
Cominform campaigns," one motive may be "to inject polemical
arguments denying our self-management and nonalined concepts into
our internal dialog, with the addition of external inspiration."
The semiofficial BORBA has been totally silent on the issue.
See the TRENDS of 9 June, page 30.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BREZI?NEV IS LAVISHLY PRAISED IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
PRAVDA's handling of the campaign speeches for this month's
RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections tends to set Brezhnev further
ahead of his colleagues than was the case in June 1970, during
the comparable election campaign for the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Brezhnev is now favored with lavish and extensive praise,
while there is virtually no praise for Kosygin and Podgornyy.
In June 1970 the Bauman raykom first secretary, V.N. Makeyev,
in introducing Brezhnev at the district meeting with electors
in Moscow, praised him as an "outstanding figure of the
Communist Party, the Soviet state, and the international
communist and workers movement" and "a tireless and persistent
fighter for communism . . . ." (PRAVDA, 13 June 1970). In
his June 1971 introduction Makeyev reiterated these epithets
but expanded on them with praise for Brezhnev as the "talented
leader" of the party and an international figure who "enjoys
huge authority among all progressive forces of the world,"
a reference to Brezhnev's "merits" in strengthening peace and
unifying all anti-imperialist forces, a comment on the
"infinite faith and limitless love" of the people for Brezhnev,
and high praise for Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress report
(PRAVDA, 12 June 1971).
While PRAVDA published a verbatim version of Brezhnev's speech
with a quarter page of flattering introduction, it carried the
speeches of Podgornyy and Kosygin only in summary format with
very brief praise--as it did in June 1970. The only flattering
comments in regard to Kosygin and Podgornyy are: "the Soviet
people well know and deeply respect A.N. Kosygin" (PRAVDA,
10 June 1971), and "by his activity N.V. Podgornyy has won
the deep respect of the Soviet people" (PRAVDA, 11 June 1971).
In June 1970 it was said that Kosygin had "Justified with
honor" the faith of his electors (PRAVDA, 11 June 1970), and
that Podgornyy "by his tireless, active work . . . had fully
justified the faith of his electors" (PRAVDA, 12 June 1970).
The other Politburo members' speeches received only very
abbreviated summary treatment in PRAVDA and the other central
papers.
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