TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 19, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
TREK
S
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
19 MAY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO.20)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analyde report is based ex-
elusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by PM818 without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contain information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title IA, sections 793
and 76#, of the US Code, u amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 MAY 1971
CONTENTS
? Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
VNA Statement Details Method of GVN Release of DRV Prisoners . . 1
DRV, PRG at Paris Stress Need for Total U.S. Troop Withdrawal . . k
Hanoi, Front Exploit Alleged Opposition to War by POW's, GI's . . 5
Le Duan Returns Home After Prolonged Stay in USSR, PRC Visit . . 7
NLHS Peace Plan Endorsed by Hanoi, Moscow; Reported by Peking . . 8
Media Note Thieu-Ky Election Rivalry, "Big" Minh Appearance . . . 11
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Seeks to Discredit Current Chinese Policies . . . . . . . 13
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Gives Terse Accounts of UAR Leadership Changes . . . . . . 17
FORCES IN EUROPE
Brezhnev, Kosygin Voice Interest in Talks on Force Levels . . . . 20
Mansfield Amendment: Stress on Administration Opposition . . . . 22
"Frank" Exchange Marks Second Round of Bilateral Talks
Lenart, Husak Set Line on 1968 "Extraordinary" Congress . .
Husak Eulogizes Conservative Bilak While Sniping at Novotny
26
28
New Party Committees Announced for Kweichow and Sinkiang . . . . 29
Propaganda Reflects Leadership Problems at the Top . . . . . . . 31
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: CHINESE AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE
PHILIPPINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
Peking Courts Normalization While Supporting Communists
Peking, Moscow Compete for Loyalty of Philippine Cornnunists
Soviets Press in Low Key for Diplomatic, Trade Ties
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
19 MAY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 MAY 1971
Moscow (3205 items)
Peking (1558 items)
Georgian Jubilee
(--)
11%
Domestic Issues
(32%)
43%
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
6%]
(27%)
27%
Indochina
(10%)
8%
[Le Duan in PRC
[U.S. Demonstrations
(7%)
5%]
[lst Anniversary
(9%)
1}%]
WPC Meeting in Budapest
(--)
5%
Sihanouk's Government
Soviet Elections
(--)
5%
[U.S. Demonstrations
(7%)
2%]
VE Day
(10%)
5%
Romanian CP Anniversary
(3%)
3%
Zionism & Soviet Jews
(1%)
5%
PRC Workers' Delegation
(0.3%)
2%
Middle East
(3%)
1+%
in Albania
Czechoslivak CP
(--)
3%
PRG-Peru Trade Talks
(--)
2%
Anniversary
PRC-Cuban Trade Protocol
(--)
2%
China
(2%)
2%
Somali Government Delega-
(--)
2%
tion in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 MAY 1971
INDOCHINA
The Vietnamese communists continue to press the line that progress
toward a peace settlement can come about only if the United States
agrees to a date for total withdrawal of U.S. troops from South
Vietnam. The communist delegates at the Paris talks on 13 May
again assailed President Nixon for making total withdrawal
conditional upon release of U.S. prisoners and the ability of the
Saigon forces to defend themselves.
The VNA account of the Paris session again obscured specific allied
proposals on the prisoner issue. Thus, there was no anticipation
in the propaganda of the 13 May VNA "statement" which responds to
the GVN offer to release 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese.
The VNA statement proposes that on 4 June both sides send unarmed
ships flying Red Cross flags to an area south of the 17th parallel
for the transfer of any "illegally detained patriots" who choose
to come to North Vietnam. Previous GVN releases of sick and
wounded North Vietnamese prisoners--in July 1970 and January
1971--had also been preceded by statements from Hanoi that
similarly said those "detained patriots" who chose to come to the
North would be welcome. The current statement differs only in its
outlining of the DRV's formal participation in the transfer by the
dispatch of ships, a procedure probably dictated by the much
larger number of prisoners--570 as against the 62 released last
July and the 37 released in January.
Hanoi and Front media praise as an "important peace initiative"
the NLHS' "new proposal" for an immediate end to U.S. bombing over
Laos, followed by a cease-fire and. a discussion of the formation
of a provisional coalition government by the "Lao parties concerned."
Moscow also promptly endorses the proposal in low-level propaganda.
Peking has merely reported the plan without comment.
Moscow's continued expressions of support for the Indochinese
people include Kosygin's remarks at an 18 May luncheon for visiting
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau in which he expressed "alarm" at
continued aggression in Indochina and reiterated support of the
programs for political settlement put forward by the "patriots" of
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The DRV press publicizes Brezhnev's
expression of "militant solidarity" with the Indochinese people in
his 14 May Tbilisi speech.
VNA STATEMENT DETAILS METHOD OF GVN RELEASE OF DRV PRISONERS
The VNA statement responding to the GVN offer to release 570 sick
and wounded North Vietnamese p,.Lisoners obscures the fact that the
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 MAY 1971
proposal had been made at the Paris talks, a pattern that accords
with Hanoi treatment of previous GVN releases of North Vietnamese
prisoners. The VNA statement says merely that "on 29 April, on
U.S. orders, the Saigon administration again announced the release
of a number of Vietnamese illegally arrested in South Vietnam
whom they called 'North Vietnamese prisoners of war.'"
Hanoi may feel that to explicitly acknowledge the GVN proposal
advanced at the 29 April Paris session would be at variance
with its insistence that discussion of the release of prisoners
can take place only after U.S. agreement to a date for total
troop withdrawal. Hanoi has also studiously ignored other
allied proposals advanced at Paris for international inspection
of prisoner of war camps and for the repatriation or transfer
to neutral countries of captives who have been imprisoned for
a long time.*
The VNA statement calls the GVN "announcement" an "old trick" of
the Nixon Administration, aimed at misleading public opinion.
Typical of Hanoi's practice of avoiding explicit acknowledgment
of the VPA presence in the South, the statement refers only to
"patriots" illegally arrested and detained. VIA recalls that a
24 December 1970 DRV statement said that any "patriot" released
by the allied side "who wishes to core and settle in North
Vietnam will be received and assisted by the DRV Government."
Not surprisingly, VNA fails to indicate that the DRV statement--
as well as one from the PRG that it cites--was issued in response
* The suggestion that sick and wounded prisoners be released was
tendered by GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam in Saigon on
26 January, two days after the GVN's release of 37 DRV sick and
wounded North Vietnamese on the occasion of Tet. The proposal
was introduced at the Paris talks on 4 February by GVN delegate
Pharr Dang Lam. Lam recalled this proposal at the 22 April
session, along with suggestions for repatriation or transfer to
neutral countries of long-held prisoners, and on 29 April he
specified that the GVN was ready to unilaterally release 570
sick and wounded. President Nixon, in his press conference that
day, called attention to this proposal as well as to the one for
the transfer of prisoners to a neutral country. Lam repeated
the proposals at the Paris sessions on the 6th and 13th, but in
the later instance he did not specify the'numbers involved.
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19 MAY 1971
to GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam's 22 December announcement
that his government would release a number of sick and wounded
DRV prisoners on the occasion of Tet.
The VNA statement stipulates that the prisoners be transported
on 4 June by unarmed U.S.-Saigon civil ships flying a Red Cross
flag to an area south of the 17th parallel, where they would
be transferred to unarmed DRV civil ships flying a Red Cross
flag. It demands a 24-hour cease-fire in the area of the
release and says that the allies must announce in advance "the
number and characteristics of the ships transporting the
patriots to be released this time." It provides that if the
weather is bad, the release will be postponed until further
notice, and it says the U.S. and Saigon administrations "must
bear full responsibility for all consequences if they act
counter to the abovementioned stipulations."
BACKGROUND There are precedents for VNA's outlining of the
manner in which the GVN should release the
prisoners. In response to delegate Lam's announcement at the
3.1 June 1970 Paris session that his government intended to
release a group of 62 sick and wounded North Vietnamese
prisoners as well as 24 North Vietnamese fishermen, the DRV
on 23 June issued a VNA "authorized statement." That state-
ment--in language identical to the current one--.aid that "on
orders from the United States, the Saigon administration on
11 June again raised the issue of releasing a group of 24
North Vietnamese fishermen and 62 other people . . . whom they
call 'North Vietnamese prisoners of war.'" VNA said that past
practice must be followed and that the prisoners must be
released at the 17th parallel or at a place adjacent to the
FRV coast.
Last January Hanoi at first ignored the details of the GVN plan
to release sick and wounded prisoners across the DMZ, spelled
out by Paris delegate Lam at the 14 January session. An
authorized VNA statement on 23 January countered by declaring
that the same procedures must be followed as on 11 July 1970,
then proceeded to spell out the details of how they would be
released at sea. A 25 January foreign ministry spokesman's
statement scored the GVN for its release the day before of the
prisoners across the DMZ.
The matter of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners held
by the GVN also figured in Hanoi propaganda in 1968, during
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the U.S.-DRV bilateral talks in Paris. Thus, a VNA authorized
statement on 11 August 1968--on the heels of Ambassador
Harriman's announcement at Paris of the U.S. decision to
release 14 North Vietnamese naval personnel captured during an
engagement in July 1966--assailed what it called a "recent"
Saigon government communique on the "so-called question" of
releasing sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners. VNA
reiterated the line--standard at that time--that any detainees
in the South are either "southern compatriots" or DRV'civilian
or military personnel who have been arrested and detained
illegally. It demanded "immediate" release of all DRV citizens.*
DRV. PRG AT PARIS STRESS NEED FOR TOTAL U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL
The VNA account of the 13 May session of the Paris talks says
both communist delegates stressed that in order for the Paris
conference to make headway the President should set a "clear"
deadline for the withdrawal of all,U.S. and other allied
foreign troops from South Vietnam. VNA says that DRV delegate
Xuan Thuy "made clear the good will" of the DRV and the PRG
for peace as "expounded in the fair and reasonable proposals
for a correct settlement of the Vietnam problem" and that he
"exposed the obduracy and bellicosity of the U.S. and Saigon
administrations, which are seeking by all means to stall the
Paris" talks.
VNA notes that Xuan Thuy repeated what Hanoi cells the "concrete
proposal" presented at the 29 April session of the talks calling
for immediate discussion of the question of a time limit for a
total U.S. troop withdrawal so that the questions of ensuring the
safety of the withdrawing troops and the release of captured
military men may then be taken up without delay. Emphasizing
that the PRG and DRV proposals are "still on the conference
table," Thuy said the key point at present is that President
Nixon must announce "on which day, in which month, in which
year he will complete" the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.
He added: "Of course, the date chosen should be a reasonable
one and not one implying a prolonged withdrawal." Xuan Thu!,,
also said, although VNA does not report it, that "only after
this question is solved can other questions, including the
question of releasing captured military men, be rapidly solved."
See the TRENDS of 1 August 1968, page 4.
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PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien--substituting for Mme. Nguyen
Thi Binh, who was in Hungary--dwelt on U.S. "crimes" against
the Vietnamese people. He also reiterated the offer that if
the United States is unwilling to accept the PRG's 30 June
time limit for U.S. withdrawal, "it may set another reasonable
time limit for consideration by the parties concerned." He
declared that the "appropriate arrangement of a deadline" for
the withdrawal of allied troops "will create many favorable
possibilities for the settlement of all other questions," and
he added that "this is also a key point for a breakthrough"
at Paris.
The VNA account does not acknowledge that Xuan Thuy made a
point of the fact that the 13 May session coincided with the
third anniversary of the start of the U.S.-DRV bilateral
talks. He observed that after the United States "accepted the
unconditional bombing halt" the bilateral talks should have
been "at once" on 6 November turned into a four-part conference.
He added that this did not happen until 25 January 1969 because
of obstruction of "the U.S. warlike forces and the Saigon
administration." VNA does note that in the course of his
review of the Paris talks Xuan Thuy said that the Nixon
Administration once "downgraded" the conference for over eight
months. It also notes that he scored the President's May 1969
and October 1970 peace proposals as "plans for the materializa-
tion" for U.S. objectives: He "flatly refuted" the U.S. demand
for a mutual withdrawal and "the argument about the question of
U.S. POW's" and "the condition that it will withdraw only when
the South Vietnamese develop the capability to defend themselves
against a communist takeover."
Of the allied delegates, VNA says they "persisted in their
fallacious and insolent arguments," which "were flatly refuted"
by Xuan Thuy. VNA thus ignores the allied delegates' reiteration
of proposals on prisoner-release, including Ambassador Bruce's
offer of U.S. transport for North Vietnamese prisoners to any
agreed neutral country.
HANOI, FRONT EXPLOIT ALLEGED OPPOSITION TO WAR BY POW'S. GI'S
A spate of Vietnamese communist propaganda sets out to document
what is claimed to be growing otpo:ition to the war among the
U.S. military. The actions of the Vietnam Veterans Against the
War and other servicemen during the recent antiwar demonstrations
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in the United States continue to be cited. And Hanoi as well
as Liberation Radio have broadcast a series of purported letters
from U.S. prisoners, most of them anonymous, in programs in
English for American servicemen.
Hanoi radio's program for U.S. servicemen on 9 May carried a
letter from "a group of captured GI's against the war" which
the broadcast said had been released "some days ago by
Liberation Radio." The letter detailed the 26 April PLAF command
order on the proper treatment of U.S. troops who opposed the
war and encouraged the troops to resist their military orders
and express their antiwar sentiments. On the 15th, Liberation
Radio's broadcast for U.S. servicemen featured a special
program marking Armed Forces Day which it said. was presented
by a group of "captured U.S. servicemen against the war."
After discussing the meaning of the recent antiwar demonstrations
in the United States, the broadcast said that if the President
refuses to end the war, it is up to the men who are fighting
to end it. The broadcast also mentioned the PLAF command
order and encouraged U.S. troops to act against the war. On
the 114th, Liberation Radio's broadcast to U.S. servicemen
carried a message from "deserter Michael Branch" who encouraged
GI's to "help bring an end to the war." LPA on the 13th and
Liberation Radio the next day carried a letter dated 1 May
from an alleged group of Americans on "unauthorized leave"
in Paris to Mme. Nguyen Thi Dints, deputy commander of the
PLAF, thanking the PLAF for "its open declaration of your
support for our struggle, inrade and outside the army."
On the 17th, Liberation Radio broadcast a message from a
"group of captured GI's in South Vietnam" addressed to
Senator Fulbright. It noted his support of the Hatfield-
McGovern bill, thanked him for his efforts to end the war,
and offered support of those efforts. On 11 and 12 May,
Liberation Radio had carried messages from unnamed prisoners
to California congressmen and to Senator Hatfield approving
congressional opposition to the war.
Hanoi radio's domestic service on the 19th cited UPI as
reporting that one Betty Alvarez, daughter of an American
"pilot who was captured in 19614," had made a statement accusing
President Nixon of using the problem of captured U.S. airmen
as a pretext to prolong the war. It stated that she and her
mother are initiating a movement to unite POW families opposed
to the President's policies.
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LE DUAN RETURNS HOME AFTER PROLONGED STAY IN USSR, PRC VISIT
Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan returned to
Hanoi on 16 May after a six-week stay in the USSR, where he
attended the 24th CPSU Congress, and a five-day visit to the
PRC. He arrived in Peking on 10 May and departed from Canton on
the 15th after a tour of southern China.
Some elements in the propaganda surrounding Le Duan's tour seem
particularly noteworthy against the background of his prolonged
stay in the Soviet Union and recent developments in Sino-U.S.
relations. While Moscow has aired its misgivings over these
developments, particularly in an Indochina context,* Hanoi has
maintained its silence in keeping with its care not to offend
either of its two big allies.
In describing Brezhnev's meeting with Le Duan on 9 May, the day
before he left for Peking, TASS used a unique formulation when
it said the talks had been held in an atmosphere of "complete
unanimity and cordiality." It might be conjectured that there
is indeed "unanimity" between Hanoi and Moscow regarding Peking's
overtures to Washington but that, given its neutral stance,
Hanoi would not be likely to say so publicly. Significantly,
VNA's account of the talks used the stereotyped characterization
militant solidarity and fraternal friendship."
Some passages in Le Duan's speeches in China seemed calculated
to please his hosts--perhaps as a way of balancing off his
prolonged sojourn in the USSR. Speaking at a Peking banquet
on the 11th, as reported by NCNA, he raised the issue of
"Asian unity," a line used by both Peking and Pyongyang in the
past. After speaking of China's role as the "great rear," he
said: "Our front extends from Vietnam to Laos, to Cambodia,
to China and to Korea; and it is constantly exprnding." He
had made no such remark in addressing a 26 March banquet in
Peking en route to Moscow, although the Chinese had staged
the event as a show of Asian unity and Chou En-lai had
sounded the unity theme on that occasion. Most recently,
Peking has given the Asian unity line authoritative expression
in its joint editorial commemorating Mao's 20 May 1970 state-
ment. The editorial declares that in the face of "frenzied
U.S. imperialist aggression in Asia, the people of China,
Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have further strengthened
their revolutionary unity."
See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.
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Speaking in Canton on the 15th, Le Duan declared, after noting
that Kwangtung Province borders on Vietnam: "There exists a
profound revolutionary friendship between us. Both in the
present struggle against U.S. aggression and for national
salvation and in the greater struggles in the future, we will
fight shoulder to shoulder until final victory."
NLHS PEACE PLAN ENDORSED BY HANOI. MOSCOW: REPORTED BY PEKING
Hanoi and Front media promptly praise the NLHS' "new proposal,"*
which provides for an immediate end to all U.S. bombing over
Laos after which there would be a cease-fire and the "Lao
parties concerned" would discuss the formation of a provisional
coalition government and "other problems of mutual concern."
The proposal is called a "new important peace initiative" in
a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 13th and an LPA commentary
on the loth. Both echo the NLHS in saying that in the face of
the "current strained situation in Laos" caused by U.S.
aggression, the initiative shows the Pathet Lao's good will
in effcrts to obtain a peaceful settlement on the "basis" of
the NLHS' 6 March 1970 five-point program.
The VNA account of the 13 May Paris session says the allied.
delegates' "fallacious and insolent arguments" were "flatly
refuted by Xuan Thuy, who condemned the Nixon Administration
for expanding its war of aggression in Cambodia and Laos.
He praised the peace initiatives of the Lao Patriotic Front."
The communist press spokesmen at the post-session briefing
were unusually forthcoming in elaborating on the NLHS points
in reply to newsmen's questions. The DRV spokesman, asked
whether the cease-fire proposal applies only to the NLHS and
RLG armed forces or to all troops in Laos, said it applies to
"all",-the armed forces in Laos. He stressed that the emphasis
in the proposal on the demand for a total cessation of U.S.
bombing over the whole territory of Laos is a point "wortky
of note." However, in response to another question he recalled
that a similar demand appeared in the five points and emphasized
* The proposal was reported by VNA and the Pathet Lao news
agency on 12 May in publicity for a communique on a 26-27 April
NLHS-Patriotic Neutralist Forces conference. See the TRENDS
of 12 May 1971, pages 13-14.
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that the proposals on a cease-fire and talks on a coalition
government are "new." He added that they "further clarify"
the demand in the five points that there must be a bombing
cessation "in order to create conditions making it possible
for the interested Lao parties to meet." A Hanoi radio
broadcast in English on the 17th summarized the DRV
spokesman's remarks on the "new" aspects of the NLHS proposal
but did not mention his comment that the cease-fire would
apply to "all" troops in Laos. Hanoi media normally do not
report the post-session Paris briefings at all.
Vietnamese communist media have not reported the PRG spokesman's
comments at the press briefing when he was asked if it was not
true that "to settle the Lao problem, the South Vietnam problem
must be settled first." He replied: "If peace is restored to
Laos earlier than in Vietnam, we will also welcome this." The
Vietnamese communists are not known previously to have commented
on the notion of a Laotian settlement preceding a Vietnamese
one. The subject did not arise in comment at Paris on the
NLHS five points in March 1970. In rejecting President Nixon's
7 October 1970 proposal on a broad Indochina conference,
Vietnamese spokesmen had stressed that the problems of the
three countries should be settled individually, in accordance
with the peace programs put forward by each, but did not
indicate the order in which they might be settled.*
SOUPHANOUVONG LETTER It was not until the day after the
TO SOUVANNA PHOUMA NLHS proposal was released that
Pathet Lao media reported that it
had been dispatched to Souvanna Phouma in a letter from
Soinphanouvong--delivered by special envoy Tiao Souk Vongsak,
who returned to Vientiane on 8 May. The text of the letter,
as released by Vientiane on the 13th, says nothing about
continued discussion of a meeting between plenipotentiaries
of the two princes.
* At a Paris press conference on 10 April 1970, asked about
the French cabinet's 1 April suggestion of a broadened
Indochina conference, Le Duc Tho had said, as reported by
TASS, that a Vietnam settlement should be the basis of a
settlement for all of Indochina.
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VIENTIANE-HANOI The Vietnamese and Laotian communists have
RELATIONS predictably ignored Souvanna Phouma's appeal,
in his 11 May Constitution Day speech, to
the NLHS to break away from Hanoi's control and negotiate.with
the RLG. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a
statement by a spokesman of the NLHS Central Committee, protesting
the stoning of the DRV charge d'affaires' car after he walked
out on Souvanna Phouma's speech, once again merely vaguely
accuse Souvanna Phouma of making "slanderous accusations
against the DRV."
MOSCOW TASS promptly reported the new NLHS proposal
on the 12th, and the next day TASS commentator
Kharkov praised it as "a new important initiative paving the way
for a political settlement in Laos." Asserting that.-.the present
Laos "tragedy" is caused "exclusively by American intervention,"
Kharkov said "it is clear that while American air piracy over
Laos and other forms of armed interference in the affairs of
this Indochinese state continue, there can be no hope that an
atmosphere will prevail in which the Laotian sides concerned
could discuss a peaceful settlement in the country." Moscow
broadcasts to Indochinese and domestic audiences have praised
the proposal in similar terihs.
This prompt endorsement contrasts with Moscow's initially cautious
reaction to the NLHS five-point program in March 1970, when
Soviet media acknowledged the substance of the five points only-
after several days' delay. However, the plan was officially
endorsed by Kosygin in a message to President Nixon--
summarized by Radio Moscow op 15 March--declining to join
the President in supporting Souvannas`'houma's proposal for
consultations among the signers of the Geneva agreement on Laos.
PEKING On 15 May NCNA reported that the NLHS-PNF
joint-communique setting forth the new
peace proposal was publicized at a 12 May Hanoi press conference
by a spokesman of the NLHS information office. NCNA carried
the text of the proposal but offered no comment. On the 18th
NCNA also reported without comment an NLHS Central Committee
statement on the seventh anniversary of the inception of.U.S.
bombing of Laos; the statement includes an appeal to world
peoples and governments to support the new NLHS peace
proposals.
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The acknowledgment of the existence of a peace plan contrasts
with Peking-'s reaction to the NLHS five points in March 1970.
At that time NCNA reported that the NLHS had isouoki a central
committee statement but omitted all mention of a five-point
peace program. Peking has subsequently officially endorsed
the five points, however; an 8 March 1971 communique on Chou
En--tai's visit to Hanoi said that the Laotian question should
be settled in accordance with the five-point program of
6 March 1970.
MEDIA NOTE THIEU-KY ELECTION RIVALRY. "BIG" MINH APPEARANCE
Hanoi and Front media have publicized several items noting
evidence of a "dispute" between GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu
and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky as opposing candidates in
the October presidential election. Statements by Ky attacking
Thieu have been cited, and LPA on 13 May noted Saigon press
reports on the 11th which quoted Thieu as ruling out the
possibility of the two men running on the same ticket.
While publicizing Ky's criticism of Thieu, the media make it
clear that the Vietnamese communists regard the vice president
as no different than Thieu, describing both men as "running
dogs of the U.S. imperialists." A Hanoi radio commentary,
broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 13 May, cited
statements by Ky critical of the Saigon regime and then
went on to explain that Ky wanted to place the blame for
the "rottenness" of the administration on Thieu and to
represent himself as a patriot. In fact, the commentary
claimed, "everyone knows that both Thieu and Ky are ugly
traitors" who have incurred "a blood debt" to the South
Vietnamese peop:.e and that they are now denouncing each
other "because each wants to be the number one lackey of
the Americans."
The rivalry between Thieu and Ky was also discussed in a
Liberation Radio commentary on 14 May which quoted AFP as
reporting on the 13th that Thieu had prevented Ky from
delivering a planned address at a meeting in a Saigon
cinema.
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The other potential presidential candidate, Duong Van ("Big")
Minh, has not been criticized by Vietnamese communist media,
and references to him by Hanoi and the Front seem calculated
to cast him in a favorable light. Thus LPA items on the
10th and 17th, in reporting 9 May ceremonies at the An Quang
Pagoda marking Buddha's birthday, noted a speaker's calls for
peace and criticism of GVN?policies and added gratuitously
that "retired general" Duong Van Minh was present at the
ceremony. Monitored Hanoi and Front broadcasts in Vietnamese
made no mention of Minh's presence at the ceremony, and the
LPA reports did not note that Minh has been mentioned as a
possible presidential candidate. An article broadcast by
Liberation Radio last February did directly discuss the
effect of Minh's potential candidacy on President Thieu.*
* For a report on this article and other attention to Minh
in Vietnamese communist propaganda, see the TRENDS of
3 March 1971, page 23, and 12 November 1970, pages 5 and 6.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW SEEKS TO DISCREDIT CURRENT CHINESE POLICIES
While Moscow continues to show restraint in commenting on recent
Sino-U.S. developments, Soviet apprehensions over prospects of
enhanced Chinese influence are reflected in efforts to arouse
suspicion regarding Peking's motives and U.S. intentions,
especially in the Indochinese context. A recurrent refrain is
that Washington is linking its hopes for realizing its aims in
Vietnam with Peking's policies. Though the Soviets have been
careful to attribute this view to American observers, the
manner in which it has been aired in Soviet media suggests a
calculated campaign to play on fears among the Indochinese
over a Sino-U.S. accommodation at their expense.*
Moscow has refrained from commenting on Sino-U.S. relations in the
central daily press, relying mainly on the foreign-affairs
weekly NEW TIMES and LITERARY GAZETTE to convey its views.
Undoubtedly discomfited by Peking's success in projecting a
more reasonable and accommodating image after the excesses
of the cultural revolution, the Soviets have countered by
calling attention to less pleasing features of Chinese life
today as well as to vulnerable aspects of Peking's foreign
relations. Thus, LITERARY GAZETTE on 5 May carried the first
of a series of eyewitness articles by "Soviet diplomat
D. Karpil" on "China After the Cultural Revolution" depicting
a bleak way of life marked by pervasive militarism and Maoist
idolatry. Commenting that "a fact is a fact--China is
preparing for war," the article warns that for the Chinese
to launch a war would be "a fatal adventure" for them. The
article was given wide dissemination in the Soviet provincial
press.
* Hanoi has remained silent on the visit of American sportsmen
and journalists to the PRC. Against this background, an attempt
by the Soviets to strengthen their hand with the Vietnamese may
have been reflected in Moscow's unprecedented characterization
of Brezhnev's talks with Le Duan as having taken place in an
atmosphere of "unanimity." See the Indochina section of this
TRENDS..
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The second in the Karpi.l series, carried in LITERARY GAZETTE
on 12 May, portrays discontent, uncertainty, and disarray in
the Chinese educational system today. The militarist theme
again appears, Karpil observing that the reduction in the
length of education was designed to free resources for the
development of the war industry, The third article, on the
19th, deals with Chinese agriculture, "the most acute problem
in China today."
That the Soviets are smarting over the favorable publicity
being given to the Chinese in the world press is reflected
in an article in NEW TIMES No. 20 (14 May) taking scornful
exception to recent British and West German articles. NEW
TIMES takes a particularly sharp slap at the Chinese lcadership,
terming the cultural revolution a case of "unbridled gleat-
power chauvinism" directed by "the Mao Tse-tung group against
the CCP''--a strong polemical formulation that has appeared
only rarely in Soviet comment in the past year. Seeking to
discredit the stream of noncommunist visitors to China
recently, the article takes special note of the visit by
Klaus Mehnert, whose presence the Chinese did not see fit to
acknowledge publicly. NEW TIMES describes Mehnert as a
former Nazi intelligence agent who is "an inveterate anti-
Soviet" author, Ac^ording t.c NEW TIMES, his purpose in
going to China was to gather material for a book in which
he intends to praise the cultural revolution. "Of course,
no comment is necessary," the article concludes.
In a striking sign of Soviet discomfort over Sino-U.S.
developments, an article in NEW TIMES No. 19 went so far
as to raise the specter of an "encirclement" of the USSR.
Signed "D.V."--presumably Associate Editor D. Volskiy, who
contributed an ar;:icle to the previous issue disparaging
Peking's stand on Cambodia--the article quotes a Canadian
journalist as discerning "breathtaking possibilities inherent
in the new turn in U.S.-Chinese relations." As outlined by
NEW TIMES, these possibilities relate to a rapprochement
between the PRC and the United States which would permit each
side to concentrate its strength against the Soviets; thus,
American power could be redeployed from Asia to areas like
Europe and the Mediterranean to confront the Soviet Union,
while Chinese forces now tied down by American power could
be arrayed along the Sino-Soviet border. "What is this,"
NEW TIMES asks rhetorically, "if not a revival of the old plan
to encircle the Soviet Union and the socialist community?"
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Moscow has generally avoided the sensitive border question in
discussing the implications of Sino-U.S. relations, but this
issue also figured in a Mandarin broadcast on 5 May which
explained how Washington counts on Chinese passivity toward
the war in Indochina. According to the broadcast, the U.S.
calculation is supported by information from U.S. reconnaissance
satellites showing Chinese missiles deployed in the north
against the Soviet Union rather than in China's south, "the
direction of actual threat."
INDOCHINA The tone having been set by the wide-ranging
Kirichenko article in NEW TIMES No. 17 on "Peking's
Diplomatic Game,"* Moscow has made a point of linking recent
Sino-U.S. developments with Peking's stand on Indochina.
Rejecting the suggestion that Peking is engaged in a complex
diplomatic game, Kirichenko saw the situation in stark terms.
He made use of "the Vietnamese proverb" that "you can't hide
an elephant in a basket" to lead into a harsh attack on the
Chinese for easily betraying friends and alining-themselves with
"those whom they have just been calling enemies."
Moscow's tactic was illustrated by a 28 April LITERARY GAZETTE
article rounding up foreign press reports following the exercise
in "ping-pong diplomacy." The article juxtaposed a section
headed "Great Expectations"--the Nixon Administration's hopes
for using Chinese influence in behalf of its Vietnam policies--
with a section headed "But Meanwhile . . ." containing reports
on wilitary operations in Indochina. It concluded by quoting
an Indian paper's observation that the friendliness shown toward
"the American government, which is destroying thousands of people
in Vietnam, shows that the verbal facade of the Chinese leader-'
ship is simply a disguise for its real intentions."
A similar point was made in D. Volskiy's article on Cambodia in
NEW TIMES No. 18. According to Volskiy, new calculations based
on Chinese reactions emerged in U.S. strategy in Indochina
after the incursion into Cambodia. Volskiy claimed that
declarations like Mao's 20 May statement last year "proved to
be merely propaganda maneuvers dictated by Peking's hegemonist
aspirations." Significantly, in addition to Mao's statement
Volskiy singled out the Chinese pledge to take all necessary
* The Kirichenko article is discussed in the TRENDS of
28 April 1971, pages 19-21.
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steps even to the point of "the greatest national sacrifices"
as among these empty declarations. This pledge, made during
Chou En-lei's visit to the DRV in early March and repeated in
an editorial on the visit, has disappeared from Chinese
statements or support for the Indochinese. Vietnamese and
Korean spokesmen, on the other hand, have seen fit to remind
the Chinese of their pledge in speeches made in Peking subsequent
to the visit of the American table tennis team to the PRC.
Apprehensiveness about Peking's place in Vietnam's future was
reflected in a Lugovskiy article in NEW TIMES No. 19 discussing
Secretary Rogers' appeal at the recent SEATO session for the
PRC to play a constructive role in Southeast Asia. Contrasting
the Secretary's remarks with previous U.S. declarations calling
for containment of China, Lugovskiy viewed with suspicion the
way in which the question of Sino-U.S. relations was raised in
connection with Vietnam. Lugovskiy concluded this discussion
by striking a familiar note in current Soviet comment, citing
American observers as believing that "Washington is linking
with the Peking leadership's policy its hopes of-.-achieving
the aims in whose name the United States has been fighting
unsuccessfully in Vietnam for many years."
TAIWAN PRAVDA on the 7th carried a TASS account of the 4 May
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator artt61e:-rebutting a U.S.
State Department spokesman's.statement.that sovereignty over
Taiwan remains an open question. In carrying the account Moscow
managed both to call attention to a tough issue complicating
Sino-U.S. relations and to show Soviet solidarity with another
communist country on an international question. In recent
months both Moscow and Peking have selectively-reported one
another's statements on such questions.
A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 7th pointed out, in
connection with the PRAVDA report, that the Soviets have
consistently opposed the two-Chinas formula and have voted
for seating the PRC in the United Nations and expelling the
Nationalist delegation. By implication,, Moscow is putting
the onus on Peking for any compromise on this question.
Moscow's account of the PEOPLE'S DAILY article cites its
reference to the Cairo and Potsdam declarations as awarding
Taiwan to China. In citing these declarations Moscow may have
been seeking to buttress its own position in the dispute with
Japan over the "northern territories" awarded to the Soviet
Union as part of the World War. II settlement based on these
declarations.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW GIVES TERSE ACCOUNTS OF UAR LEADERSHIP CHANGES
Soviet media have carried only brief news reports on the govern-
mental and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) shakeup in Cairo, citing
the MIDDLE EAST. NEWS AGENCY (MENA). Similarly, TASS and Moscow
radio had carried only a one-line acknowledgment, attributed to
MENA, of the 2 May dismissal of 'Ali Sabri from his post as vice
president.
TASS on 13 May promptly reported as-Sadat's acceptance of
Interior Minister Jum'ah'r resignation and the appointment
of his successor; the further ministerial and ASU resignations
subsequently announced by Cairo that day--including War
Minister Fawzi, Presidential Affairs Minister Sami Sharaf,
Information Minister Fa'iq, and ASU officials an-Nur, Dawud,
and Shuqayr--were reported by TASS and Moscow radio on the
14th. In reporting the announcement of the new cabinet on
the 14th, TASS listed the prime minister and the four deputy
prime ministers without mentioning that all but one deputy
prime minister, concurrently appointed to the information
post, are holdovers from the previous cabinet.* But the TASS
account did pointedly note that ash-Shafi'i "is again"
appointed vice president, as if to underline the absence in
this cabinet of 'Ali Sabri.
In a two-s? ztence report on as-Sadat's 14.May radio and
television address to the nation detailing what he called
a planned coup d'etat, TASS that day merely quoted him as
stating that the resignation of leading ASU officials and
some ministers was caused "in the first place" by their
opposition to the establishment of the Federation of Arab
Republics (FAR).** TASS additionally noted that as-Sadat
proposed to hold new ASU elections. Echoing the TASS account,
* #iCNA on 18 May, giving a factual account of the major
resignations and appointments, did note that the prime
minister and three of the four deputy prime ministers
retained their posts.
** Moscow has apparently failed to mention as-Sadat's
joint meeting on the loth with leaders of the other two
FAR states, Syria and Libya, as well as an-Numayri of
Sudan, linked with the other three countries in the Tripoli
Charter.
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a Koryavin dispatch in IZVESTIYA on the 16th also mentioned
that as-Sadat, touching on the Middle East crisis, affirmed
that the UAR would seek a political settlement.
An 18 May TASS report on the situation for the first time
suggests the extent of the changes in reporting that the
resigned officials have been put u_.der arrest and that a
number of dismissals and new appointments have been effected
in some ministries and departments, including the information
ministry and the security service. Citing an AL-AHRAM report
that as-Sadat has agreed to become supreme commissioner of
the UAR police, TASS adds that the same paper said 110 people
have been arrested on charges of "actions 'aimed against the
interests of the people.'"
BREZHNEV Brezhnev declared in his 14 May Tbilisi speech
SPEECH that the UAR, Syria, and other Arab states,
"rallying together all patriotic progressive
forces within their national and the general Arab framework,"
strengthening fraternal cooperation with the socialist coun-
tries, and giving a "resolute rebuff to the blackmail and
outbursts of imperialism," will triumph in their just cause.
His remarks seem to be a departure from the conventional
Soviet propaganda appeal for Arab unity, typified in Podgornyy
and Kosygin's call for the "strengthening of unity of the
Arab countries and peoples" in their December 1969 message
to the fifth Are_b summit conference in Rabat. It is unclear
what Brezhnev had in mind in referring to "patriotic
progressive forces" and in specifying "national" as well
as general Arab solidarity. He may have been intimating
concern over the fall from power of Egyptian leaders commonly
thought to be favored by Moscow. Or, in a broader context,
he may have been alluding to the FAR, which has been supported
by the Syrian CP, while the Sudanese CP has opposed Sudan's
membership in the federation. The Sudanese regime, in turn,
has been the target of protests by the Jordanian, Iraqi,
Syrian, and Lebanese CPs for attacking the Sudanese communists.
Brezhnev's speech was cited by a "responsible official source,"
quoted in a dispatch from Moscow published in AL-AHRAM, as
reported by DPA from Cairo on the 16th. The source is said
to have declared that the USSR considers the governmental
changes in Cairo as an internal matter concerning the UAR
alone. The source further is quoted as saying, according to
DPA, that the USSR is anxious to strengthen friendship and
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cooperation with the UAR--a view that Brezhnev, the source
claimed, expressed in his Tbilisi speech when he said the
USSR would continue to support the Arabs' struggle.
LEBANESE CP The Lebanese CP daily AN-NIDA's concern over
CRITICISM the events in Egypt is reported on the 17th
in an East Berlin radio commentary which says
the paper points out that following Secretary Rogers' visit,
"certain circles on the Nile" are concentrating on appeals to
end the confrontation with the United States, going so far
"in their subservience" as to glorify the United States as
the only force capable of resolving the Middle East crisis.
According to an IRAQI NEWS AGENCY account on the 15th,
AN-NIDA does not find the Egyptian Ettuation reassuring
in that it might weaken the UAR position in confronting
the "imperialist-Zionist occupation and aggression." The
purpose behind the Egyptian developments, AN-NIDA claims,
is to appease the United States and to establish moderate
forces capable of reaching an understanding with-it, as well
as to make further concessions to liquidate all the gains of
the Arab liberation movement.
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FORCES IN EUROPE
BREZF,NEV, KOSYGIN VOICE INTEREST IN TALKS ON FORCE LEVELS
Brezhnev used'his speech in Tbilisi on 14 May to put new focus
on the proposal for reduction of armed forces and armaments in
Central Europe that he had brought up briefly, as one ingredient
in a potpourri of long-standing disarmament measures, in his
30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress. The formulation in
the 30 March report diverged from the usual pattern by failing
to specify "foreign" armed forces. Now singling out the force-
reduction proposal in the Tbilisi speech., Brezhnev noted that
NATO spokesmen were asking whether the 30 March proposal
concerns foreign or national forces, nuclear or conventional
arms, and challenged them to clarify the issue by "starting
negotiations" on this question.
Kosygin also broached the subject of troop and arms reduction
on 18 May, at a luncheon in Moscow honoring Canadian Prime
Minister Trudeau, but in terms of the old formulation
stipulating foreign forces. In his remarks as summarized by
TASS, he did not allude +o Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech, nor
did he specify Central Europe. He took note of "animated"
discussions in the West on troop and arms reductions in Europe,
particularly on the possibility of reducing the strength of
"foreign" troops, and observed that "if the West displays
readiness to take practical steps in this direction, we will
do everything possible to reach agreement."*
Available follow-up propaganda on Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech--
confined largely to reportage--repeats his formula leaving open
the possibility that a reduction of national as well as foreign
troops be negotiable. PRAVDA on the 15th and IZVESTIYA
the following day carried roundups of favorable reaction to
Brezhnev's remarks on troop reduction, including U.S. reaction.
* Kosygin had repeated the language of Brezhnev's 30 March
report almost verbatim at a 21 April luncheon for the visiting
Finnish Prime Minister Karjalainen: On that occasion, he.
indicated readiness "to cut back armed forces and armaments
in the regions where military opposition is particularly
dangerous, above all in Central Europe."
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The PRAVDA roundup quoted Senator Mansfield to the effect that
Brezhnev had advanced "a very good proposal"; and a domestic
service report on the 17th, on the Senate debate on the
Mansfield proposal for halving U.S. troop strength in Europe,
said the Senator was the first American political figure to
welcome Brezhnev's remarks. A foreign-language talk by
Glazunov on the 18th described Washington's reaction to the
Soviet proposal as "more or less positive" but declared that
Secretary Rogers was less than forthcoming in his 16 May remarks
on'4eet the Press'when he indicated "that Washington wants to
know what the results will be even before starting the talks."
Glazunov noted that Rogers indicated he would take up the Soviet
proposal with Washtngtca's allies at the NATO Council session
in Lisbon in early June.
Moscow has not yet been heard to mention Ambassador Beams
17 May meeting with Foreign Minister Gronyko at which they
rep.rtedly discussed the Brezhnev proposal. A RED STAR article
reviewed by TASS on the 19th complains that the United States
"has not responded so far" to the proposal.
BACKGROUND In line with the Central Committee report to the
CPSU congress, neither Brezhnev in Tbilisi nor
Kosygin in Moscow treated the force-reduction issue in the
context of a European security conference. Long on record in
favor of "foreign" troop cuts in Central Europe, Moscow has
customarily placed the matter in a European security framework
in recent years. In apparent response to the recurring NATO
proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions, the memorandum
of the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers
in Budapest had suggested a means of discussing the matter in
that framework.` It proposed that a European security conference
discuss "the establishment of a body concerned with questions of
European security and cooperation," adding that in the Pact
* The NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions in
Europe has long been under fire from the Soviet Union. Among
other arguments, Moscow has contended that the question is an
interbloc matter better suited for discussion at the Geneva
disarmament talks than as an agenda item at a European security
conference. Propaganda has also argued against the NATO proposal
that Soviet forces be cut by 30 percent while NATO forces be cut
by only 10 percent. For a fuller discussion, see the TRENDS of
1 July 1970, pages 26-27, and 3 June 1970, pages 18-19.
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members' view "it would help to lessen tension and promote
security in Europe if the reduction of foreign armed forces
on the territory of European states were discussed," either
in the newly proposed permament body "or in other ways
acceptable to the states concerned."
While more recent propaganda has not referred directly to the
Pact proposal for a permament body and the possible discussion
of force cuts in that forum, Moscow continues to point to
alleged wide support for the agenda outlined by the Soviet
bloc states. For example, a Dmitriyev article in PRAVDA on
11 May said that an understanding regarding the participants in
a European security conference as well as its venue has been
achieved by joint efforts, and "in essence there are no
objections to the agenda proposed by the socialist states."
MANSFIELD AMENDMENT; STRESS ON ADMINISTRATION OPPOSITION
A flurry of Soviet press and radio propaganda in the past week
has hailed Senator Mansfield's 11 May proposal--in the form of
an amendment to a bill to extend the draft--to halve the number
of U.S. troops in Europe by the end of 1971. According to TASS
on the 18th, the Mansfield proposal enlists the support of "all
progressive forces" who advocate abandonment of "the obsolete
'cold war' principles," liquidation of NATO, and the reduction
of U.S. military expenditures, expenditures which have led to
"serious socio-economic and financial difficulties."
At the same time, the propaganda predictably assails Administra-
tion efforts to "torpedo" the initiative. TASS on the 16th said
President Nixon has decided to intervene personally in the
"acute struggle" over the proposal, and a domestic service
broadcast the following day reported that the President has
called together "cold war experts" to drum up support for
the Administration position. In the words of the broadcast.,
former Secretary of State Acheson "and other has-beens" have
hen asked to defend an outdated policy. The same broadcast
cited newsmen for the observation that the President will go
so far as to veto the bill if his Senate supporters cannot
block the Mansfield amendment.
! 16 May dispatch in PRAVDA on the Senate debate reported that
a State Department spokesman claimed that a reduction of U.S.
troops in Europe would "harm negotiations concerned essentially
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with a genuine, balanced, and reciprocal reduction in the
numbers of armed forces." The spokesman went on to say,
according to PRAVDA, that "it would be tragic if our country
were to be deprived of its trump card at a time when the
Soviet leadership is expressing renewed interest in a balanced
and reciprocal reduction" in the armed forces in Europe.
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FRG-CZECP0SL0VAKIA
"FRANK" EXCHANGE MARKS SECOND ROUND OF BILATERAL TALKS
Prague media's report of the communique on the second round 'of
Czechoslovak-FRG exploratory talks, held 13-14 May in Bonn,
reflects evident lack of progress toward a compromise formula
on the invalidity of the Munich Agreement--the chief obstacle
to the inception of formal negotiations on the normalization
of relations. CTK reports the communique as saying that the
talks were "frank and to the point and contributed to a mutual
clarification of views." The CTK report registers, in lower
key, essentially the same appraisal conveyed by the Bonn
representative, FRG State Secretary Frank, on West German TV
on the 14th. In remarks unacknowledged by Prague media,
Frank said the two sides presented their positions "with all
objective harshness and all necessary precision" and made
no progress. They did agree to continue the talks, the
communique noting that the third round will be held in
Prague. .
Prague media have refrained since the inception of the
exploratory talks from spelling out the Czechoslovak
position, repeatedly and insistently aired in comment prior
to the first round, that Bonn must recognize the Munich
Agreement as invalid ab initio and must accept "all the
consequences ensuing therefrom" before formal negotiations
on normalizing relations can begin. But a brief Prague
domestic service commentary on the eve of the second
round seemed designed as assurance that the Czechoslovak
side would stand firm on this position. Complaining
that certain "rightwing" West German weeklies had
failed to go along with the "reserved" treatment of
Czechoslovak-FRG relations in the rest of the FRG press,
the 12 May commentary rejected the suggestion of the
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE's Prague correspondent that
Czechoslovakia is prepared to show "a certain magnanimity"
on the Munich agreement issue.
In Prague media's only other commentary on the talks in the
interval between the first round at the end of March and
the second, a domestic radio commentary on 24 April had
denied charges by another "rightwing" West German weekly,
DER SPIEGEL, that the Czechoslovak side had been inadequately
CONFIDENTIAL
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19 MAY 1971
prepared for the initial round of the talks.* There has been
no discussion of the talks in the Czechoslovak central press
since before the first round.
The Czechoslovaks did, however, use the 9 May 26th anniversary
of the Red Army's liberation of Czechoslovakia and the 6 May
first anniversary of the signing of the new Czechoslovak-Soviet
friendship treaty to underscore their stock position on the
Munich Agreement. First Secretary Husak, in a RUDE PRAVO
article on the 6th, expressed appreciation to the USSR and
"othor allies" for their support of Czechoslovakia's "Just
demand that the Munich Agreement be recognized as invalid ab
initio." And in IZVESTIYA on 9 May, CPCZ Presidium Ccididate
riember and Federal Assembly Chairman Hanes repeated the formula
in welcoming the support expressed by Brezhnev at the 24th
CPSU Congress for Czechoslovakia's "Just demand that the
Munich Agreement be recognized as invalid ab initio"--again,
as in Husak's RUDE PRAVO article, stopping short of tying
the issue to the Prague-Bonn talks.
SOVIET, GDR The Soviet Union and East Germany jo..ntly
ENDORSEMENT endorsed the FRG-Czechoslovak talks in a
communique on the one-day visit of a GDR
party-government delegation led by Honecker and Stoph to
Moscow on 18 May. Supporting the Czechoslovak line on the
Munich Agreement, the communique stated that the USSR and
GDR "assessed as a positive event in European life the
meetings between Czechoslovak and FRG representatives at
which the question of the invalidity ab initio of the Munich
Agreement was raised."
* See the 28 April TRENDS, page 28.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS
Bolstered by a strong Soviet endorsement of the success of his
leadership, Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary Husak
delivered a confident, relaxed speech at the 14 May session of
the Slovak CP congress, naming names as he drew closer to the
conservative wing of the party and heaped scorn on the libe.alsd
The 13 May message from the CPSU Central Committee on the CPCZ's
50th anniversary had credited the Czechoslovak party with having
"achieved normalization of the situation" in the country--in
agreement with the identical claim made the same day in a PRAVDA
article on the anniversary by Husak.
Husak recallod blandly at the Slovak congress that "in 1968 anel
later there was a lot of commotion in connection with our
fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and the other allied
socialist states." He added that "we cleared things up and
put them in the right place, and with frank words we expressed
our views on this subject." He went on to declare anew that
Czechoslovakia's "existence" and sovereignty are "guaranteed"
by the USSR and its allies and that he would continue repeating
this standpoint "until the last citizen of our state understands
this fundamental truth." He derided the "bourgeois propaganda"
view--"and they say this with tears in their eyes"--that the
CSSR is "some sort of cecupied country" run by "collaborators or
agents."
LFNART, HUSAK SET LINE ON 1968 "EXTRAORDINARY" CONGRESS
The manner in which the forthcoming CPCZ congress will deal
with the discredited Vysocany congress of 22 August 1968, the
"extraordinary 14th congress of the CPCZ" held in secret the
day after the invasion, was anticipated at the Slovak congress.*
Advance propaganda billed the Slovak congress as the first to
* Despite the federative setup in the country, in effect since
the start of 1969, the propaganda surrounding the Slovak congress
presented it--as in the past--strictly in the context of prepara-
tions for the 14th CPCZ Congress, scheduled to open on 25 May.
As an event of purely domestic import, it was not attended by
any notable foreign guests.
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19 MAY 1971
be held since 1966 and avoided any allusion to the "extraordinary"
Slovak congress which met in Bratislava 26-29 August 1968 and
endorsed the Vysocany congress.
The history of the 1968 Slovak gathering contains clear elements
of potential embarrassment to Husak. Arriving in Bratislava
from Moscow for the "extraordinary" Slovak party session on
27 August 1968, Husak strongly urged the Slovak party to accept
the "honorable" Moscow settlement but identified his own stand
with that of Dubcek, among others, in the "frank" talks which
had preceded that settlement. The 1968 congress named Husak
Slovak CP first secretary in place of the ultraconservative
Vasil Bilak, then and now a favorite of the Sovi3ts.
At the current Slovak congress the problem of how to treat the
1968 congress, and specifically how to exculpate Husak, was
worked out in the report delivered by Slovak CP First Secretary
Jozef Lenart at the 13 May opening session. Lenart divided the
1968 Slovak congress into an "anti-Marxist-Leninist first part"
and a "principled second part" which started with Husak's
arrival at the congress from Moscow. This formula, subsequently
incorporated in the congress' final resolution on the 15th,
was followed in Lenart's report by a ringing endorsement of
Husak: "In April 1969 a comrade was elected as Central
Committee First Secretary who did most for the defeat of the
right wing and for leading us out of the crisis--that was and is
Comrade Husak." Lenart hailed the August 1968 invasion at two
separate points in his report, delivered before a demonstratively
pro-Soviet audience, and recalled Husak's remarks at the 24th
CPSU Congress expressing "sincere thanks" for the intervention.
Addressing the Slovak conclave, Husak wondered aloud whether
"one should laugh" at the recent manifesto issued by liberal
emigres Goldstuecker, Pelikan, and Sik which contended that the
true loth Congress of the CPCZ is the 1968 Vysocany congress,
not the 14th CPCZ Congress scheduled to open on 25 May. He
recalled that the 1968 Slovak CP congress--after his arrival
there from Moscow--had "rejected the petit bourgeois, counter-
revolutionary coup against our party," the Vysocany congress.
Deploying a crudeness he had not previously used against the
liberals, he quoted from a book a line to the effect that "if the
devil cannot harm you, he at least leaves a smell" and belabored
the point by adding that "those Goldstueckers, those Pelikans,
they cannot harm ius, so at least they make a smell."
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HUSAK EULOGIZES CONSERVATIVE BILAK WHILE SNIPING AT NOVOTNY
Registering his growing affinity for the conservative elements
among the Czechoslovak communists, Husak paid warm personal
tribute to Bilak, his predecessor as Slovak CP first secretary,
a CPCZ Presidium member from April 1968 to the present, and a
CPCZ secretary as well since November 1968. He recalled that
Bilak, as Slovak party head, resisted "the growing rightwing
and revisionist attack" in the pry.-August 1968 period. As a
result, Husak said, "a fair number of people blackened his name
and spat upon his human and communist '^onor," despite Husak's
own "mar.v interventions" in getting Bilak elected to the new
Slov' Central Committee at the 1968 congress. Declaring
that arty can he proud of such a proletarian fellow,"
Husaa that "if some people are speculating on any
diffe. a" between him and Bilak, they should be advised
that " 'rade Bilak . . . is one of the closest and most
princi, iinded coworkers I know in the party leadership."
The pr, us day, Lenart had put in a similar plug for Bilak's
op;~,-)sition to "antisocialist trends and revisionism" in the
Slovak party in the pre-invasion period.
At the same time, promoting his image in the Slovak part of the
country, Husak took several swipes at Antonin Novotny, the arch
villain in Slovak eyes who allegedly held back Slovakia's
development Into a modern industrialized region. In the course
of a lengthy attack on young writers opposed to his leadership,
Husak remarked sarcastically that "Novotny played cards with
them, so these writers were great," adding: "Recently I have
heard that some people from this sphere. say that things are
worse than under Novotny." He also indicted Novotny in
connection with the problem of Slovak nationalism, recalling
that "several people--Novotny, Bacilek, and various other
political corpses, as we may call them today"--showed lack of
understanding and insensitivity to the problem cf Slovak national
pride, now "solved" through the federative system.
Having thus dissociated himself from some of the derelictions of
the Novotny era, Husak went on to warn of the new responsibilities
incumbent upon the Slovaks under the federation, remarking that
"you can no longer blame Novotny" if something goes wrong in
Slovakia today. In this connection he in effect further downgraded
the federative setup, as Lenart had done the day before, stressing
the primacy of "a united Czechoslovak awareness, based on our
socialist system" and patterned on the Soviet concept of the
multinational state.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
NEW PARTY COMMITTEES ANNOUNCED FOR KWEICWOW AND SINKIANG
Ending a one-month hiatus when no new provincial-level party
organ was reported, NCNA on 17 May announced the formation of
new committees for Kweichow and Sinkiang. The namelists for
the new committees contained no surprises, with present local
leaders taking over the top party posts. Of the PRC's 29
provincial-level adminictrative divisions, 21 have now set up
new committees.
KWEIYANG RADIO The formation of a party committee for
GREETS COMMITTEE Kweichow has apparently eased the factional
problems which have long troubled the
province. On 18 May Kweiyang radio ended its 20-month solid
relay of Peking Radio and announced a summer broadcast schedule
that includes local newscasts. Among the political originations.
broadcast the same day was a KWEICHOW DAILY editorial welcoming
formation of the new provincial committee. Kweiyang radio had
ceased broadcasting locally originated material on 30 September
1969. Now only Szechwan and Inner Mongolia, both without
provincial party committees, remain awkwardly silent, with no
local broadcasts.
Highlighting Mao's leadership of the CCP, the Kweichow party
congress was held in Tsunyi--site of the 1935 conference which
placed Mao in control of the party--rather than the provincial
capital located at Kweiyang. With one other exception, all
previous provincial party committees were established by local
congresses convened in their respective capital cities. The
Shensi party congrczs met in Yenan, Mao's former revolutionary
base, rather than the provincial capital of Sian.
The Tsunyi congress, meeting from 7 to 14 May, was attended by
812 delegates, who selected the 72 full and 15 alternate members
on the new committee. A five-man leadership group made up of
two civilians and three military men heads the new committee.
Lan Yi-nung, Kweichow's leading figure for the past year, was
named first secretary. Although Lan has never been formally
identified as chairman of the revolutionary committee, actual
control. of the province devolved on him shortly after chairman
Li Tsai-han dropped from public view in 1969. Early in 1970,
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Lan was transferrel to Kweiohow from Szechwan where he had
served as a utanding member of the revolutionary committee.
During local National Day rallies in October 1970, Lan was
listed first among Kweichow leaders.
Chang Jung-sen, a military man with responsibilities Within the
Kweichow Military District (MD), was named secretary. Chia
Ting-san, Li Li, and Ho Kuang-yu were named deputy secretaries.
Chia, a newcomer to the province, is a senior cadre with
several years of previous experience on the old Peking party
committee. Li Li, vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee
and pre-Cultural Revolution governor of Kweichow, is the sole
named survivor of the group that headed the early "model"
Kweichow Revolutionary Committee, formed in February 1967.
Ho Kuang-yu, longtime commander of the Kweichow MD, has been
identified as a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee
since 1969; he was involved in the January 1967 rebel effort
to "seize power" in Kweichow.
Lan's keynote address to the congress appla'ided the greater
unity which he claimed has been achieved within the province
between the army, government, and people over the past year.
He called for intensifying the serious study os' Mao's works
so that "senior and middle cadres" can protect themselves from
"sham-Marxist political swindlers."
SINKIANG The Sinkiang committee.was formed by 725 party
COWITTEE delegates meeting in Urumchi from 7.to 11.May.
A five-man leadership group heads the new
committee consisting of 67 full and 23 alternate members.
The top spot on the committee went to Lung Shu-chin, chairman
of the revolutionary committee and commander of the Sinkiang
Military Region (MR). Saifudin, vice-chairman of the
revolutionary committee and deputy commander of the Sinkiang.MR,
was named second secretary. Tsao Ssu-ming, believed to hold
local military responsibilities, was named a secretary. Sung
Chin-ho and Liu Hsing, vice-chairmen of the revolutionary
committee, were also named secretaries.
Both Lung and Saifudin addressed the Urumchi congress. Lung
called for strengthening border defenses within Sinkiang--"an.
outpost in the anti-imperialist and antirevisionist struggle."
Stressing themes also contained in the keynote addresses of the
other border provinces with new committees, Lung linked the
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need to improve militia work with criticism of "social-imperialism"
for carrying "out subversive activities and armed provocations in
Sinkiang on many occasions."
Saifudin, governor of Sinkiang from 1955 to 1967 and long the
most important Uighur in the CCP, actually delivered two
speeches to the Congress, according to the NCNA account. At the
opening ceremony, he conveyed Mao's "kind attention and er. )urage-
ment" to the people of Sinkiang, and subsequently "on behalf of
the regional party committee" he urged a struggle for "new victories
in both revolution and production." Perhaps he is to maintain de
facto control over the new party committee, from his position as
second secretary.
HOPEI CONNIITTEE Hopei appears a likely candidate for a party
IN OFFING committee in the not too distant future. On
13 May the provincial radio broadcast a HOPEI
DAILY editorial on democratic centralism which claimed new party
committees for the "overwhelming majority of basic units and
counties" within the province. Similar claims were issued
previously by several provinces just before their new committees
were announced.
PROPAGANDA REFLECTS LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AT THE TOP
Current articles in Chinese media attacking "reactionary
fallacies" may well be an offshoot of dissensions surrounding
the long-absent Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. A HOPEI DAILY
editorial on 13 May provided one of the clearest indications of
top-level disharmony in the wake of the cultural revolution with
an attack on "Liu Shao-chi and other swindlers," a formula now
used with increasing frequency. It is alleged that these
swindlers have "constantly undermined" proletarian centralism,
enlisted turncoats, "formed cliques to pursue their own interests,
and created an independent kingdom in an attempt to resist the
CCP Central Committee" under Mao and Lin. The current campaign
does not seem to be merely a revival of anti-Liu attacks, and it
is presumably related to criticism of the "May 16 group,"
reported in non-media sources.
The central media's failure, to. observe, the fifth anniversary of-the
16 May'diredtive of theCCP Central,7Committee;'cfbll6wing extensive
praise for the fifth anniversary of Mao's 7 May directive, lends
support to the supposition that Kang Sheng continues to be in
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serious trouble. Kang was mentioned in the 16 May directive as
the only good member of the original cultural revolution "group
of five."
Articles on philosophy written during the past winter and spring
as part of the cadre reeducation campaign have generally.been
vague, with no clearly discernible target; however, their
appearance beginning on the heels of the disappearance of Chen,
considered for many years to be Mao's chief theoretical. prop:,
suggested some relationship. An article in the fifth issue of
RED FLAG by the writing group of the Liaoning Provincial CCP
Committee, presumably controlled by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien,.
seems to be an attack on theoreticians who have "tried to overawe
people with words and phrases torn out of context from Marxist
works." The article criticizes those who do not acknowledge "the.
dependence of knowledge on social practice." Although it is
impossible to pin down current targets with any certainty, the
focus of the attack seems to be leftists who maintain their own
theoretical ideas even if they run counter to practice.
The decline of the "left" ha's been amply demonstrated in.the ...
formation of party committees. Of the first five "model"-provinces
to form revolutionary committees, four have now formed.party
committees; three of these were formed without the participation.
of their original chairmen, selected.when the cultural revolution
group under Chen and Kang was at the height of its influence.
Only in Shanghai, where the leadership was perhaps selected on
the basis of its ties to Mao rather than by the cultural revolution.
group,.has.the original leadership retained power. The only .one..
of the original five models not to form a party committee is
Heilungkiang, where there had appeared to be no trouble in-recent
years and which until after the disappearance of Kang Sheng.led
all provinces in announced county party committees. Provincial.
chief Pan Fu-sheng, who made frequent appearances in the past,.
has now been out of sight since mid-December, perhaps reflecting
the political decline of his mentors.
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19 MAY 1971
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
CHINESE AND SOVIET PROPACANQA ON THE PHILIPPINES
The crosscurrents of Sino-Soviet competition for influence on
the developing nations of Asia and Peking's dual-level
approach to these noncommunist Asian countries are illustrated
in recent propaganda treatment of the Philippines, reflecting
both communist powers' efforts to improve their relations with
the Philippine Government. While Chou En-lai met with the
members of two unofficial Philippine economic missions visiting
in China, Peking media sustained their propaganda attacks on
the "reactionary Philippine authorities" and continued to
express support for the armed insurgency of the Philippine
New People's Army led by the pro-Peking Philippine communist
party.
Moscow pressed its wooing of the Philippine Government with
a visit by a Soviet friendship and cultural delegation;
concurrently it registered its bid for local Philippine
communist allegiance by publicizing a meEsage of greetings
to the 24th CPSU Congress from the Central Committee of the
Soviet-lining Communist Party of the Philippines.*
PEKING COURTS NORMALIZATION WHILE SUPPWTING COMMUNISTS
There have been signs that Peking hopes to extend its current
diplomatic drive to noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia,
an area that has been a major target for Peking-backed
armed insurgencies. An effort to test the ground for more
normal relations between the PRC and its noncommunist neighbors
has been indicated by the arrival of trade groups in China
and gestures by Peking pointing to more amicable relations
with governments that have been objects of severe propaganda
" Moscow and Peking each refers to the group it supports as
"the" Philippine Communist Party. For purposes of clarity
this article refers to the Peking-lining CPP as the CPP/M-L,
consistent with the nomenclature applied to the pro-Peking
CP's of such other Asian countries as India and Australia,
and to the pro-Moscow party as the CPP.
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attack. NCNA reported on 15 May that trade delegations from
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma had attended the Canton
spring export fair which closed that day. Earlier in the
month Peking had announced the arrival of two unofficial
trade missions from the Philippines and one from Malaysia.*
Peking reported that the two Philippine groups were received
by Chou En-lai for "a friendly conversation," met with
Chinese trade c.~fficials, and visited historical sites.
NCNA's coverage of the visits has not indicated any
agreements or discussions looking toward agreements, but
its report on the Canton trade fair pointed out that
"trade personages from countries that have no diplomatic
relations with China as yet showed their friendly sentiments
for the Chinese people and expressed their strong desire
for developing friendly trade contacts with China."
On two other occasions Peking has taken pains to demonstrate
Chinese good will. On 8 November 1970 NCNA announced that
the Chinese Red Cross had decided to donate food to
Philippine typhoon victims. Similarly, Peking acted
quickly to avert undue trouble in late March of this
year when a Philippine airliner was hijacked to Canton
by Maoist Filipino youths. NCNA reported on 31 March
that after investigations the PRC "decided to give
lenient treatment" and ordered the plane to "leave China
quickly." There was no mention of the hijackers'
political motivation or affiliation, NCNA noting simply
that six passengers who "firmly refused" to return to
the Philippines remained in China.
These Chinese moves suggest an effort to stimulate domestic
pressure on the Philippine Government to take a more
accommodating approach toward the PRC. The Philippines
has diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime on
Taiwan, and it has voted against seating of the PRC
in the United Nations. Moreover, the Philippines is
a member of SEATO and has contributed personnel to the
allied war effort in Vietnam. Chinese propaganda on
the Philippines has focused on what it has portrayed as
dominant American influence on that country's political
* NCNA's reportage of the activities of the latter group
used the term "Malaysia" for the first time, in contrast to
Peking's past practice of referring to "Malaya" or
occasionally quoting other sources' use of the federation's
official title.
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and economic life, a line calculated to appeal to nationalistic
and anti-U.S. sentiment.
Peking has also sought to put pressure on the Philippine
Government from another direction, in the form of propaganda
support for the pro-Maoist New People's Army led by the
C,'P/M-L. Since a k August 1970 NCNA report, the first
Chinese propaganda support for the Philippine communists
since October 1967," Peking has periodically disseminated
accounts of armed guerrilla actions against "reactionary
troops and police." Peking has also played up the
insurgents' propaganda activities among the people,
reporting that the New People's Army propagates Mao's
thought among the peasants and organizes them for armed
struggle.
Peking has not, in its own name, directed polemical
attacks at President Marcos personally, a restraint
which the Chinese have also practiced toward the Burmese
and Malaysian leaders. But the recently inaugurated
"Voice of the People of Burma"--a clandestine radio
following a Maoist propaganda line in support of the
Burmese communist insurgency--in an 18 April commentary
denouncing Burmese leader Ne Win's trip to the
Philippines called Marcos "the reactionary President
of the Philippines" and cited domestic pressures on
him from "the people and the Communist Party of the
Philippines." The commentary declared that no matter
how wseh they may try to destroy their countries'
communist parties, Ne Win and Marcos "can never avoid
the doom of being overthrown by their own i^oples."
Another pro-Maoist clandestine radio, the "Voice of
the Malayan Revolution," has also hailed the Philippine
communists' armed struggle and the ;rowth of the New
People's Army "during the past two years."
No clandestine radio has yet been heard broadcasting
in the name of the Philippine communists. The
inauguration of the "Voice of the People of Burma" on
28 March has enabled Peking to follow a dua.i approach
toward Burma, in effect permitting a division of labor
according to which the clandestine radio propagates the
revolutionary line while the PRC media observe the
diplomatic constraints.
"Peking's revival of propaganda support for the Philippine
communists is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 August 1970,
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PEKING, MOSCOW COMPETE FOR LOYALTY OF PHILIPPINE COt!JNISTS
The Sino-Soviet competition for leadership of the international
communist movement is reflected ii the existence of two groups
of Philippine communists, each laying claim to be the'.legitimate
communist party of the country. Characteristically, both Peking
and Moscow have manipulated propaganda attributed to their
respective followers to air their competing ideological lines
for the world communist gallery.
PEKING NCNA on 29 January transmitted a 26 December 1970
statement of the Central Committee of the CPP/M-L
commemorating the second anniversary of the reestablishment
of "the Communist Party of the Philippines." The statement
asserted that the party "as presently constituted by the
advocates and practitioners of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetii
Thought" had "proven itself as the true inheritor of the
revolutionary achievements of the proletariat" in the
Philippines. "In preserving its revolutionary integrity,"
the statement continued, the CPP/M-L' "pursues the rectification
movement to the end against the Lava revisionist renegade
clique and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique."
The "Lava revisionist renegade clique" refers to the followers
of Jesus Lava, the pro-Soviet CPP secretary general captured in
1964. Taruc and Sumulong, who have been accused by ANG
BAYAN--the CPP/M-L journal--of trying "to amass wealth
privately" in collusion with "bourgeois politicians," were
the recent leaders of the pro-Soviet CPP. Sumulong was
captured in September 1970 by the Philippine armed forces
and Taruc was killed in October 1970, initiating a period
of chaos and factionalism within the CPP.
An NCNA commentary on 28 March 1971, commemorating the
second anniversary of the founding of the New People's
Army on 29 March 1969, noted that the CPP/M-L rectification
campaign against the Lava-Taruc-Sumulong "cliques" was
being pursued "to the end." Implying victory over the
pro-Soviet groups, a New People's Army statement on the
29 March anniversary, carried by NCNA on 10 April,
contended that "the com*lete collapse" of the Taruc-
Sumulong "gangster cliqu:" in "less than two years after
its mass criticism and repudiation" had "totally
vindicated the correctness of the establishment of
the New People's Aray under a communist party inspired
by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought." None of the
propaganda has named the leaders of the party.
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MOSCOW After years of near silence on the CPP, Moscow on
12 April broadcast the text of a message of greetings
to the 24th CPSU Congress from "the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Philippines." Observing that one of
the main reasons "for our defeat in the '50's" was "self-
isolation from the international communist movement," the
message asserted that "the current leadership" of the CPP
"is fully determined to adhere to the principles of proletarian
internationalism." Taking note of the conflict with the CPP
M-L, the message stated that the CCP's position was opposed
"by a group in the Philippines that poses as a revolutionary
force, but in fact is guided by the counterrevolutionary
concept serving the Maoist leadership's aspiration to dominate
in Southeast Asia."
Moscow had virtually ignored the CPP since January 1965 when
it publicized the party's contention that liberation could
be achieved in the Philippines by peaceful means. In late
1969 and early 1970 Soviet media carried a few brief items
on the possibility of legalization of the CPP by the :?tarcos
government. The CPP was identified by Western news sources
as one of the two unnamed "clandestine" parties present at
the June 1969 Moscow conference, but Moscow said nothing
about its presence. The CPP was not among the parties
reported by Moscow to have sent representatives to the
Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow in April 1970, and
Soviet media did not mention the presence of a CPP delega-
tion to the 24th CPSU Congress.
SOVIETS PRESS IN LOW KEY FOR DIPLOMATIC, TRADE TIES
Infrequent Soviet comment on the Philippines generally
focuses on anti-U.S. events in the Philippines and on
alleged U.S. exploitation of the Philippine economy and
domination of Philippine foreign policy. In a continuing
effort to improve state relations, however, Moscow publicized
the August 1970 visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation
of Philippine congressmen; extended relief through the Red
Cross to Philippine flood victims in September 1970; and
has reported allegedly growing sentiment in the Philippines
for normalization of diplomatic and trade ties with the
Soviet Union. On 6 May IZVESTIYA reported "great interest"
aroused in the Philippines by the visit of a delegation
from the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and noted that
the delegation had been received by President Marcos.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040021-8