TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 5, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~IIIIIIIII~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIII~I
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~I
TRENDS
in. Communist Propaganda
Confidential
5 MAY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 18)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report Is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
AO I
Included from euleeaelle
de.epred (o p and
daleuifeertee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given I4aj:.r Attention
INDOCHINA
Hanoi, Front Assail President's "Repression" of Demonstrators. . .
1
Allied Proposals on POW's Ignored; DRV "Initiative" Hailed . . . .
k
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Again Protests U.S. Bombing of DRV. . .
6
Moscow Reports Protests, Pictures President as Unresponsive. . . .
7
Peking Depicts Administration Running "Scared" Before Protests . .
9
Le Duan Remains in USSR as Other DRV Delegates Depart. . . . . .
SINO-U,S, RELATIONS
9
Peking Denounces U,S,, Statements on Status of Taiwan . . , . .
11
PRC Reaffirms Claim to Sovereignty over Senkakus . . . . . . . . ?
MIDDLE EAST
15
Moscow Sees Rogers Trip as Effort to Refurbish U.S. Image. . . . .
YUGOSLAVIA
17
Party Presidium Outlines Steps to Meet "Serious" Situation . . .
EAST GERMANY
19
Honecker Takes Over in Orderly Transfer with Soviet Blessings.
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
22
Kosygin Is Slighted in Supreme Soviet Nominations. . . . . . . . .
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
26
May Day Leadership Turnout Produ,:es No Surprises . . . . . .
28
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 APRIL - 2 MAY 1971
Moscow (2852 items)
Peking (1775 items)
Soyuz 10
(13%)
23%
Indochina
(19%)
39%
May Dar
(4%)
18%
[Summit Conference
(7%)
16%]
CPSU Congress
(12%)
7%
Anniversary
Indochina
(3%)
7%
[U.S. Demonstrations
(1%)
3.5%]
China
(2%)
3%
Domestic Issues
(43%)
220
Middle East
(2%)
3%
May Day
(--)
17%
[Secretary
Trip
Rogers'
(0.1%)
1%]
Sierra Leone Independence
Anniversary
(--)
3%
Bulgarian Party
Congress
(7%)
2%
Tanzanian National Day
(--)
3%
SEATO Meeting
(--)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971
INDOCHINA
Vietnamese communist propaganda on the U.S. antiwar protests seizes
on the mass arrests in Washington on 3 and 4 May as evidence of
President Nixon's "obduracy" in pursuing the war and "repression"
of peaceable citizens who demand a deadline for withdrawal of U.S.
troops from South Vietnam. A notably abusive article in the DRV
army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN calls the police ac;.ions, taken in "panic,"
an exposure of the President's "fascist, cruel. face." The
President's televised press conference of 29 April was pictured as
an attempt to thwart the antiwar protests, and Hanoi radio said the
President "brazenly declared" that neither the demonstrations in
the streets nor the opposition in Congress %rill make him change his
Vietnam policy.
Hanoi propagandists continue to take issue with President Nixon's
insistence that there cannot be a total U.S. troop wi.thdrewal until
prisoners are released. There is no acknowledgment of the allie4
proposals--cited by the President on the 29th--for the immediate
release of sick and wounded and the transfer of some prisoners to
a neutral country. Instead, the media highlight what is called
the DRV's "new initiative" at the Paris session of the 29th for
immediate discussion of a withdrawal deadline so that the question
of releasing prisoners can be taken up.
Routine Moscow comment on the antiwar demonstrations says the
President is becoming more isolated as opposition to the war
increases. Particular note is taken of calls in Congress for a
troop-withdrawal deadline, and Moscow gives prompt pro forma
support to the DRV "initiative" of the 29th.
Peking's propaganda on the U.S. protests is confined to reportage
which focuses on the authorities' "brutal suppression" of the
demonstrators but refrains from extensive personal abuse of the
President.
Peking marks the first anniversary of the founding'of Sihanouk's
Royal Government of National Union--announced 5 May 1970--with a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a greetings message from Chou En-lai
to Premier Penn Nouth. Moscow thus far has ignored the anniversary,
in keeping with its failure to recognize the Sihanouk government.
it has been giving low-level publicity to a "solidarity week" mark-
ing the first anniversary of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia.
HANOI, FRONT ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S "REPRESSION" OF DEMONSTRATORS
Vietnamese communist media at first carried largely routine reports
of the daily ev'-nts in the antiwar demonstrations in Washington.
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But following the mass arrests on 3 and 4 May, there is a
barrage of propaganda holding the President responsible for
the "repression" of the demonstrators: VNA on the 5th
carried a message of "sympathy" from the Vietnam Committee
for Solidarity with the American People, and Hanoi radio
has broadcast articles from both the party paper KHAN DAN
and the army or,-,,an QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.
Earlier VNA reports had taken :cote of the demonstrators'
aim, on the 3d and 4th, of obstructing traffic in Washington
in order to bring government operations to a standstill, but
this objective is obscured in the propaganda attacking the
President. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN is the most abusive when it
declares: "Nixon's fascist, cruel face was again exposed
completely. Panic-stricken by the protest movement which is
mounting and spreading throughout the United States, Nixon
used policemen and military forces to ruthlessly repress and
terrorize the defenseless peace-loving Americans." Both
papers report that 7,000 people were arrested, and NHAN DAN
observes that "hundreds" were wounded. The party paper says
that from California the President called the Washington
police chief and ordered that he "take rescute measures" to
cope with the protesters. It notes that "brothers Davis and
Hoffman, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and many other demonstration
leaders" were arrested, but it adds that the demonstrators
were not deterred and that they held aloft the PRG flag and
chanted "Hail to Ho Chi Minh! The NFLSV will certainly win."
The propaganda pictures the President as increasingly
isolated and on the defensive but inflexible in his pursuit
of "aggression." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of 5 May
says that at his 29 April news conference "Nixon brazenly
stated that he was not intimidated at all, that his govern-
ment would continue to advance on the bellicose, dictatorial
path, and that demonstrators who infringed the law would be
appropriately dealt with." The army paper adds that on
1 May "on Nixon's orders" tens of thousands of U.S. tt?oops,
along with the police, began preparing for a counteroffensive
against the "honest, peace-loving Americans." Earlier
reaction to the President's press conference had pictured it
as an attempt to thwart the antiwar movement, and two Hanoi
radio broadcasts on the 30th reported the President as having
"brazenly declared that neither the demonstrations in the
streets nor the opposition in Congress will make him change
his Vietnam policy." ;?.uch of the propaganda, including the
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QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of the 5th, notes the President's
frequent public appearances in which he has tried to "Justify"
his Vietnam policy.
The propaganda has repeatedly stresses: the diverse nature of
the demonstrators, and a NHAN DAN commentary of 3 May says the
massive demonstration in Washington on 24 April "will go down
in the history of the United States as the greatest of its
kind in composition, strength, and mettle." The earlier
demonstrations of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War are
also cited, as evidence of disaffection among servicemen.
Both Hanoi and Front media report that U.S. troops in Saigon
demonstrated on 28 April and that they handed out leaflets
which, among other things, expressed support for the current
demonstrations in the United States. A 3 May Hanoi radio
commentary says the demonstrations in Saigon "have further
motivated antiwar actions among the U.S. military ranks in
South Vietnam" and have also "influenced the thoughts and
feelings of the puppet soldiers and officers."
On 2 May, Liberation Radio carried a message from a group of
captured U.S. servicemen, described as "against the war,"
welcoming the reported GI antiwar demonstrations in Saigon.
The message recalls that the 26 April PLAF Command order*
specified that the Liberation forces will not attack GI's
who oppose the war. The PLAF order was also recalled in a
speech at a meeting held by the South Vietnam Committee for
Solidarity with the American People. Liberation Radio
reported on the 29th that the meeting took place "in a
liberated area in South Vietnam," but it gave no date. DRV
media on the 26th had reported a meeting in Hanoi that
evening of its Committee for Solidarity with the American
People. In remarks broadcast by Liberation Radio on the
30th, the vice chairman of the Solidarity Committee recalled
the PLAF's 26 April instructions on attitudes to be taken
toward U.S. servicemen who oppose the war. The speaker also
reportedly called antiwar activities of U.S. veterans "the
first important step of the antiwar movement of U.S. troops."
See the 28 April TRENDS, pages 2-3.
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ALLIED PROPOSALS ON POW'S IGNORED; DRV "INITIATIVE" HAILED
While comment on the President's press conference stresses his
linking of a U.S. troop presence in South V.etnam with the
POW's, it ignores most of his specific remarks on the prisoner
issue, including his reference to allied priposals made in
Paris that day. Similarly, Vietnamese communist accounts of
the 29 April Paris session obscure the allied proposals;
instead, communist media highlight what is called the DRV
delegate's "new specific proposal." According to the VNA
account, Xuar. Thuy's "concrete proposal" was that the U.S.
representative set "a reasonable time limit" for a total
U.S. troop withdrawal to be considered by the parties
"immediately today," so that they could then discuss the
problem of releasing captured military men.'
VNA charges that the U.S. delegate "dodged this concrete
proposal." Regarding the allied delegates' speeches, VNA
says only that they "still resorted to perfidious contentions
about the so-called prisoner-of-war problem" and that the.
Vietnamese communist delegates "exposed the U.S.-puppet dark
scheme." (Ambassador Bruce proposed that POW canes in both
North and South Vietnam be open to inspection by international
humanitarian organizations or third party governments to be
agreed upon by both sides. GVN delegate Lam.recalled his
government's 26 January proposal concerning the repatriation
of sick and wounded prisoners and its 8 April offer to transfer
prisoners held captive for a long period of time to a neutral
country. Lam also asked the North Vietnamese to propose
adequate measures for the release of the sick and injured and
to suggest their choice of a neutral government.)
* The communist delegates at the Paris sessions have routinely
reiterated the PRG proposal that the United States announce
its agreement to withdraw all troops by 30 June 1971 so that
the parties can discuss "at once" the question of guaranteeing
the safety of the withdrawing forces and the release of all
captured military men. Sporadically, as at the last three
sessions, they have indicated that if the United States does
not find that date agreeable, it.should "set another reasonable
date to be considered by the other parties."
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Hanoi media have been at some pains to call attention to Xuan
Thuy's 29 April "initiative" and to obscure the President's
press conference remarks that day as well as his subsequent
proposal that some of the POW's be transferred to Sweden.
Thus, Xuan Thuy's "new specific proposal that the parties
immediately discuss a time limit" for total U.S. withdrawal
has been repeated in the DRV Paris spokesman's 30 April
statement--carried by VNA on 1 May--on the President's press
conference; in another VNA item on 1 May accusing the Nixon
Administration of using the POW question for "propaganda"
purposes; and in a 4 May statement by the DRV spokesman in
Paris, carried by VNA on the 5th. This latter statement
postdates the President's suggestion of a transfer of
prisoners to Sweden; however, it is described merely as
having been made "in connection with the Nixon Administration's
references to the so-called question of prisoners." Completely
obscuring the allied stand, the DRV spokesman complained that
the President and the U.S. delegation at Paris "have refused
to respond positively to the DRV's specific proposal." The
spokesman also repeated the charge that "Nixon's raising the
so-called prisoner-of-war question is nothing but a maneuver
to cover up the Administration's crime of aggression and count-
less war crimes and to justify its stubborn refusal to fix a
reasonable time limit for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops."
Hanoi and Front comment on the President's press conference .
noted that even people in the United States do not support the
Administration's position on prisoners. Thus, Hanoi's initial
reaction to the press conference in a radio broadcast on the
30th said the President's "arrogant argument" that troops would
remain in South Vietnam as long as U.S. prisoners were not
released has been rejected by such men as Senators Muskie,
vavits, and Stevenson, who have pointed out that the way to
get U.S. prisoners released is to withdraw all troops. On the
same day Hanoi radio also cited Senator Mansfield as saying
that the only correct way to settle the question is to set a
troop-withdrawal deadline.
A Hanoi radio broadcast to U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam
on the 4th cited Senator Muskie as stating that the continued
presence of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia will prolong the war,
not speed the release of U.S. prisoners. The broadcast also
quoted Muskie as saying on the day after the President's press
conference, "I can't recall a war in which prisoners have been
exchanged before the war was settled."
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The initial 30 April Hanoi broadcast alone acknowledged that
the President reiterated his five-point peace proposal of
7 October, but it does not mention that an exchange of prisoners
is one of the points. Instead, it focuses on his call for a
mutual troop withdrawal.
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN AGAIN PROTESTS U1S, BOMBING OF DRV
The latest in the continuing series of protests over U.S. air
strikes by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman is a 29 April
statement which scores action in Vinh Linh area and Ha Tinh
Province. It charges that from 21t to 27 April U.S. aircraft,
including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village, "north of the 17th
parallel in the DMZ," and that U.S. planes bombed "a number of
localities in Huong Khe district, Ha Tinh Province" on the
28th.* The protest says that the army and people of Ha Tinh,
"fighting bravely," downed a U.S. plane. The alleged downing
had been reported promptly on the 28th by DRV media in reports
which claimed that the total of downed U.S. planes now stood
at 3,392.
Routinely, the protest "energetically denounces and sternly
condemns" the U.S. "acts of war" and demands an end to all
encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security. Xuan Thuy Ft
the Paris session that day, as reported by VNA, "energetically
protested" the recent "continuous dispatch" of U.S. planes to
violate the DRV's airspace and bomb "a number of places on its
territory." He demanded that the Nixon Administration respect
the U.S. commitment to "totally and unconditionally" stop all
encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.
* The U.S. Command in Saigon reported on the 29th that U.S.
planes attacked missile and antiaircraft sites 85 and 115 miles
northwest of the DMZ on the previous day, after they had been
fired upon.
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MOSCOW REPORTS PROTESTS. PICTURES PRESIDENT AS UNRESPONSIVE
Moscow deplores what it portrays as a failure on President Nixon's
part to be swayed by the big U.S. antiwar demonstrations, but its
treatment of the protests has been limited and almost entirely at
the routine propaganda level. The 30 April May Day editorial in
PRAVDA did bring up the subject, but only briefly in the statement
that "mass antiwar demonstrations, in which 750,000 people took
part in Washington and San Francisco alone, have recently spread
through the United States." A commentary by Kozyakov in English
on the 3d says the continuing demonstrations show that the
"silent majority" on which the Administration relies for support
has now spoken and is not supporting official policies; instead,
the antiwar protesters demand a deadline for the withdrawal of
U.S. troops.
Limited, low-level Soviet reaction to the President's 29 April
press conference stressed that he tried to "justify" and "explain"
continued aggression in Indochina in the face of the growing
antiwar demonstrations. A domestic service broadcast on the 30th
observed that the American public was "disappointed" at the
President's stand--advocacy of a "tough line" in Indochina at a
time when the antiwar campaign is going on all over the country.
The initial TASS report of the press conference said the President
was "compelled to admit" that the demonstrations were of a massive
nature, but it added that his remarks that "lawbreakers would be
prosecuted" contained an "unconcealed threat" to the demonstrators.
TASS on 29 April also saw an effort at intimidation in the
decision by the House Internal Security Committee to investigate
organizations sponsoring the Washington demonstrations--the
National Peace Action Coalition and the People's Coalition for
Peace and Justice.
Soviet media noted plans by the demonstrators to block traffic in
Washington on 3 May and thereby close down the government.
Subsequent reports acknowledged that the traffic arteries remained
open but stressed police use of truncheons and tear gas. TASS also
noted the "record number" of more than 7,000 arrests, including
the arrest of organizer Rennie Davis. The domestic service on the
3d cited press reports that the President--who remained in
California--sent Police Chief Wilson a message instructing him
to treat the demonstrators "fairly but firmly." Moscow observed
that the "firmness" was evident in the arrests and use of tear
gas but that "fairness" was not to be found.
CONFIDENTIAL
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OPPOSITION A dispatch from IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent
IN CONGRESS Sturua, published in the paper on 29 April, took
note of increasing Congressional opposition to the
President's Indochina policies and concluded that the present
"troubles" in the Capitol are symptomatic of the "storm" shaking
the entire United States. It is no coincidence, he said, that
the "mutiny" in Congress coincides with the antiwar "spring
offensive." Documenting a shift of opinion in Congress against
Administration policies, Sturua pointed out that Senators
Church and Cooper have introduced a bill proclaiming as a
"national objective" the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Vietnam; that the Hatfield-McGovern bill calling for withdrawal
before 31 December 1971 is getting increasing support in the
Senate; and that Senator Hartke is sponsoring a resolution
calling for immediate withdrawal. Sturua also noted that in the
House the Democrats passed a resolution to withdraw all troops
by the end of 1972--the first time the Democratic majority has
refused to support the President on the war. Commenting that
the approach of elections is whipping up the "infighting" all the
more, Sturua said that the Democrats are making political.capital
out of "Nixon's war" while the Republicans are preparing an
"escape route."
Moscow also continues to publicize statements by memLcrs of
Congress critical of the President's Indochina policies. On
1 and 2 May TASS briefly reported remarks by Senators Fulbright
and Muskie criticizing the President's refusal to set a with-
drawal date. TASS singled out Fulbright's comments on ABC's
Issues and Answers, but it ignored his critical remarks on violent
demonstrations. TASS has also reported that more than 20 senators
and representatives will take part in a nationvide "antiwar tour" to
explain legislative proposals for fixing a deadline.
POW ISSUE The 30 April Moscow domestic service account of
President Nixon's press conference notes that in
reply to a question the President said a contingent of troops
would remain in South Vietnam for "an unlimited length of time,"
but it does not acknowledge his statement that the residual
force would remain as long as the DRV holds U.S. POW's and until
South Vietnam can defend itself.
Moscow's reports fail to acknowledge the exchange at the press
conference in which the President criticized the DRV's stand on
POW's and pointed to the allied offer at the Paris conference
that day to repatriate sick and wounded DRV prisoners and send
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others to a neutral country. However, Moscow has commented
favorably on the "new initiative" of the communists at the
29 April Paris session in which they again offered to discuss
the release of prisoners if the United States agreed to a
troop-withdrawal deadline. A TASS commentary by Kharkov on
30 April and a Glazunov foreign-language radio commentary on
3 May praise the "constructive" initiative and criticize the
United States for dismissing it as "nothing new." The U.S.
"who-cares attitude" toward the Paris talks and "negative
reaction" to all DRV and PRG proposals, Glazunov says, amount
to the position of a "persistent aggressor" who aspires to
victory on the battlefield.
PEKING DEPICTS ADMINISTRATION RUNNING "SCARED" BEFORE PROTESTS
While continuing to spare President Nixon extensive personal
abuse, Peking's reportage on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations--
at the Capitol, the Pentagon, Selective Service headquarters,
and the Justice Department--portrays a wave of brutal police
and military repression undertaken by a frightened U.S.
Administration. The Chinese reports picture a massive influx
of demonstrators undaunted by repression and determined to
continue to make themselves heard.
The "scared Nixon Administration hurriedly called out large
numbers of police and troops for brutal suppression," NCNA
said on 4 May, and a "scared" President Nixon "came out himself
on 29 April threatening to 'punish' the demonstrators if they
refused to 'obey the law.'" The NCNA item did not specifically
mention the President's press conference, however. It added
that the demonstrators camping in West Potomac Park were
forcibly dispersed by "helmeted police armed with truncheons"
and that "nearly 1,500 persons had been arbitrarily arrested
earlier in the week." Underscoring the demonstrators' resolve
to "carry on the struggle," NCNA quoted one protest leader to
the effect that "the police atrocity 'in no way stops our
plans.'"
LE DUAN REMAINS IN USSR AS OTHER DRV DELEGATES DEPART
Vietnam Workers Party First Secretary Le Duan, who arrived
in Moscow as head of the VWP delegation to the CPSU congress
on 27 March, is apparently still in the USSR. VNA on 2 May
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reported his "recent" visit to Sebastopol, where Moscow had
said he had arrived on 25 April. There are no available
mentions of his whereabouts since then. His stay of more
than a month in the USSR is unusual; his past visits to the
USSR, for the 23d CPSU Congress in March-April 1966 and for
the Lenin centenary in April-May 1970, each lasted about
three weeks.
Nguyen Duy Trinh, a member of Le Duan's delegation to the
24th CPSU Congress, went on to Sofia to attend the Bulgarian
party congress and left Bulgaria for home on 27 April via
Moscow and Peking. According to TASS and VNA, Kosygin
received Trinh on the 29th for talks on the Indochina
situation and on "further development of the all-round fraternal
cooperation between the USSR and the DRV." VNA reports that
he stopped in Peking on 1 May, and NCNA reported his departure
"for home" on the 3d. There is no available indication that
Trinh conferred with top Chinese leaders.
The leader of the NLHS delegation to the CPSU congress, Kaysone
Phomvihan, went home from Moscow via Peking without attending
the Bulgarian congress. While in Peking he was received by
Chou En-lai and attended Sihanouk's 25 April banquet marking
the first anniversary of the Indochinese people's summit
conference, after which he visited cities in southzrn China.
NCNA reported on 30 April that he left "for home" from
Nanning.
Nguyen Van Hieu, who led the FRG delegation to both the CPSU
and Bulgarian congresses, was reported by the Sofia radio to
have left Bulgaria on 3 May. There has been no further report
of his whereabouts.
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S I N 0-U, S, RELATIONS
PEKING DENOUNCES U1S, STATEMENTS ON STATUS OF TAIWAN
Peking has reacted sharply and authoritatively to State
Department spokesman Bray's 28 April statements that
sovereignty over Taiwan represents an unsettled question
subject to future international resolution and that it
should be resolved by the two rival Chinese regimes. In
the customary pattern of authoritative comment on a
current development, Peking's reaction took the form of
a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article accompanied by a
heavily editorialized NCNA report on 4 May characterizing
Bray's press briefing as new evidence of U.S. hostility
and interference in China's internal affairs. The NCNA
report contains Peking media's first direct response--
a negative one--to recent U.S. gestures toward improving
relations with the PRC.
Peking's rejoinder to Bray's statements provides the
sharpest expression to date of its concern lest the
international community seek an accommodation on the
China question thc.t would fall short of the PRC's major
objectives. In comment on its diplomatic moves in recent
months and on the question of UN representation, Peking
has displayed apprehension over efforts to arrive at a
formula that would in some measure preserve the inter-
national standing of Chiang Kai-shek's regime and leave
the formal resolution of the China question indeterminate.
This issue became especially topical after the PRC-Canadian
recognition agreement, in which Canada was permitted
merely to "take note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan without
endorsing'it. At that time, Peking voiced concern over a
tendency within the international community to have
recourse to what a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 15 October
called "the new gimmick" of a "one China, one Taiwan"
formula as a variation of the "two Chinas" policy.
STATUS OF TAIWAN Taking issue with Bray's statement that
Taiwan's status remains an unsettled
question, the Commentator article and the NCNA report
advance unusually specific historical and juridical
arguments for the PRC's claim that, Taiwan and the
Pescadores are a part of its territory. Thus, after
recalling Japan's occupation of Taiwan at the end of the
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19th century, Commentator cites the Cairo and Potsdam declarations
as proclaiming the restoration of Taiwan to China and recalls a
January 1950 statement by President Truman acknowledging Chinese
authority over the island. Taking exception to Bray's clarifying
statement that the Cairo and Potsdam declarations represented a
statement of purpose that has never been formally implemented,
Commentator rejected this "barefaced lying" on the grounds
that "the then Chinese Government" as3umed control of Taiwan
in 1945 and that thus "China has resumed the sovereignty over
Taiwan" from that time on. The PRC's position, then, is that
the international question has long since been resolved and
that its recovery of Taiwan remains purely a Chinese internal
affair.
The thrust of Peking's argument is directed at Bray's statement
that sovereignty over Taiwan is unsettled. His suggestion that
the two Chinese governments might resolve the question between
themselves is not examined separately and on its merits; rather
it is cited only in conjunction with the statement that the
sovereignty question is subject to international resolution,
as indicating the "self-contradictory and nonsensical"
character of Bray's remarks and as representing "a flagrant
interference" in China's internal affairs.
Apart from quoting Bray's references to the two Chinese
governments, Commentator makes no mention of the Chiang
regime. The NCNA report, citing Bray's references to U.S.
diplomatic and treaty relations with "the Chiang Kai-shek
gang," follows a standard line in reading into these
references a "sinister design" of the Nixon Administration
to "continue to be hostile towards the Chinese people and
to perpetuate its forcible occupation of China's territory
Taiwan."
TAIWAN "LIBERATION" Characteristically, Peking has been
vague about how it intends to gain
control of Taiwan. The Commentator article, after denying
that Taiwan is a question for international resolution and
reaffirming Peking's opposition to any two-Chinas arrangement,
reiterates the line that "when and how the Chinese people
liberate Taiwan is entirely China's internal affair" in
which no foreign country has any right to interfere. Quoting
Mao as declaring that the Chinese "are determined to liberate
Taiwan," Commentator deals with the U.S. presence in the
area in the following imprecise terms: "The U.S. armed
forces must pull out of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. The
U.S. aggressors have to pull out in any case and are not
allowed to behave otherwise."
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Peking has not reported Chou En-tai's statement to Edgar Snow
last year distinguishing between liberation of Taiwan as as
internal matter and the U.S. military presence as an
international one. According to Snow, Chou expressed Chinese
readiness to negotiate on the latter question. This formula-
tion of the Taiwan issue had been advanced by Chou in the
past. In official pronouncements in recent years, notably
the foreign ministry statement of November 1968 proposing
resumption of the Warsaw talks, Peking has coupled a demand
for withdrawal of U.S. armed forces with a call for Sino-
U.S. relations to be based on the five principles of peaceful
coexistence. As in its current reaction to Bray's press
briefing, Peking has insisted that the status of Taiwan
and the island's future control are not subject to inter-
national negotiations.
Peking has not demanded abrogation of the U.S.-ROC treaty,
presumably preferring to regard this as a dead letter
if the United States undertakes to withdraw from Taiwan.
TWO CHINAS Peking's forceful reaction to Bray's
statements attests to its overriding
concern over anything smacking of a two-Chinas solution--
a concern overshadowing any satisfaction it may have
drawn from Bray's remarks as implying erosion of U.S.
support for the ROC's claims. The NCNA article notes
that Bray's briefing followed the submission on 26 April
of a presidential commission's report on U.S. policy on
the United Nations. According to NCNA, the report
advocates a "one China, one Taiwan" formula for resolving
the China representation issue in the United Nations.
NCNA also quotes President Nixon's remark at his 29 April
press conference that the report is being given.
consideration in high councils of the government. This
sequence of events, according to NCNA, shows that the
United States is intensifying efforts in behalf of a
"two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" formula and
that Bray's statement about Taiwan's unsettled status
was "precisely aimed at preparing public opinion for
this plot."
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NCNA's account does not mention the President's dismissal of
the suggestion for negotiations between the Chinese regimes
as "completely unrealistic." Beyond his reference to the
commisbion's report, the President's discussion of Sino-U.S.
relations and the Taiwan question is ignored in the report.
PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY While the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article is confined to a rebuttal of
Bray's statement on the juridical status of Taiwan, the NCNA
report discusses this issue within a broader context of
Sino-U.S. relations. According to NCNA, there has been
"a new development in the friendship between the American
and Chinese people" since the visit of the U.S. table
tennis team. In Peking's first comment on Washington's
recent initiatives toward the PRC, NCNA scornfully
observes that the Administration "hastily made various
geptures . . . as if it wanted to improve relations" in
an effort to gain political capital at a time of
"unprecedented isolation at home and abroad." Bray's
statements and the other evidence of an attempt to separate
Taiwan from the mainland, NCNA concludes, show that the
Administration's professed intention to esteilish normal
relations with the PRC "is all humbug."
Before the NCIA report on Bray's statement, Peking had
not commented on the political implications of recent
Sino-U.S. developments. Apart from an anomalous
Shanghai broadcast, the uniformly friendly PRC
propaganda on the American table tennis players' visit
even avoided making a distinction between the American
people and their government. An authoritative
endorsement of people's diplomacy was given in
Peking's May Day joint editorial, which commended
friendly exchanges between the people of various
countries and the Chinese people.
While Peking had taken care to keep the atmosphere
surrounding Sino-U.S. relations clear in the wake of
the table tennis team's visit, the recent U.S.
statements on the sensitive Taiwan issue have moved
it to make a more direct pitch for political pressure
on the Administration to change its China policy.
This application of people's diplomacy is reflected
in the closing passage of the 4 May NCNA report,
which says the American people "always wish to be
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friendly with the Chinese people" and portrays the American
people as supporting Peking's aims regarding Taiwan. NCNA
ends with a warning that the Nixon Administration "will only
make itself more isolated at home and abroad and end in
utter failure" if it should "cling to its hostility toward
the Chinese people"--that is, if it seeks a compromise on
the China question falling short of Peking's fundamental
objectives.
Peking's sharp reaction to U.S. statements on the Taiwan
issue accords with the position set forth in a major
policy address by Huang Yung-sheng on 27 June 1970, the
20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan.
After reiterating opposition to any formuia for
separating Taiwan from the mainland, Huang stressed that
"U.S. occupation of Taiwan by armed force" is "the
crucial issue" in Sino-U.S. relations and that a
relaxation of relations is "out of the question" until
the United States undertakes to withdraw its armed
forces from Taiwan. As in its current reaction,
Peking's comment at that time derided the Nixon
Administration's call for improved relations with
the PRC as a maneuver to circumvent public pressure
for a change in policy.
PRC REAFFIRMS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER SENKAKUS
While taking exception to U.S. statements raising the
question of Taiwan's status, Peking has also reacted
to recent disclosures that administrative contr%.~l over
the disputed Senkakus will be acquired by Japan as part
of the Okinawa reversion plan. A PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on 1 May and an NCNA report the
follo'ing day forcefialy reassert the PRC's claim to
sovereignty over the Senkakus and excoriate "the
Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang" for allegedly selling
out Chinese territory and resources by taking part
in joint development projects with the Japanese and
the South Koreans. While denouncing the United States
for being hostile to the Chinese by acceding administrative
rights to Japan, Peking has ignored the U.S. distinction
in this case between administrative rights and sovereignty.
As in its comment on the Taiwan question, Peking is
concerned to deny that the question of sovereignty is
unsettled and subject to negotiations.
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The 1 May article is the most authoritative Peking comment on
the Senkakus since a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article of
29 Dacembe2. Unlike the December article, which focused
mainly on the offshore oil and other resources of the
Senkakus, it is essentially concerned with juridicia?_
questions of sovereignty. Peking's current propaganda
is also notable for an effort to rally patriotic support.
Thus, Commentator scorns the Nationalist Chinese for
acting "servilely and humiliatingly" toward the Japanese
and says "burning wrath among all the patriotic Chinese"
has been aroused over the Senkakus issue.
Commentator commends the Overseas Chinese for launching
"a patriotic campaign" over the issue. Peking's first
endorsement of agitation by Overseas Chinese on this
matter appeared in a 23 April NCNA account of a demonstra-
tion held in Washington on 10 April. The account reflected
Peking's effort to turn the Overseas Chinese against the
Nationalist regime, quoting the demonstrators as angrily
denouncing "the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang for its
treacherous act in selling out China's territory and
sovereignty." Peking has not mentioned the recent
demonstrations in Taiwan on the Senkakus question.
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MIDDLE EAST
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MOSCOW SEES ROGERS TRIP AS EFFORT TO REFURBISH U.S. IMAGE
Soviet propaganda on Secretary Rogers' Middle East tour, which
began on 1 May in Saudi Arabia, sustains Moscow's ongoing
criticism of U.S. motives i., the area. In line with comment
since the 23 A',ril anno,incement of the trip, Soviet
propagandists reject the notion that it represents a
serious effort at mediation of the Middle East situation,
citing Washington's "pro-Israel bias." Commentators
continue to criticize U.S. aid to Israel--including the
shipment of "oifensive" Phantom aircraft--and alleged
U.S. opposition to the reopening of the Suez Canal as
proposed by the UAR. Reports on Rogers' stops in Jordan
and Lebanon, on the 2d and 3d respectively, have high-
lighted local protests over U.S. support for Israel.
Primakov on 2 May, in the first of three installments of
an interview with a Radio Moscow correspondent broadcast
to Arab listeners, said the Secretary's trip can in no
way be called a mediation mission; the only such mission,
he added, is the one undertaken by Dr. Jarring.
Primakov remarked that no one had entrusted Rogers with
his mission--"neither those at the United Nations nor
anyone . . . from the Big Four, whose delegates are
conducting consultations" on the Middle East. Pointing
up continuing U.S. support for Israel, he concluded that
the trip is not taking place because of a change in
Washington's policies, "but because the United States
is forced to camouflage still further the objectives
of its policy." In his interview on the 3d, Primakov
said the Rogers mission "contradicts" that of Jarring.
Primakov and others press the line that oil is a major
factor in a U.S. effort to refurbish the American image
in the Middle East. In Primak.ov's words, the United
States had dispatched Rogers to the Middle East at
least in part to safeguard American oil monopolies--
which "cover about 60 percent of the American balance
of payments deficit"--against "the blows of the Arab
national liberation movement." Taking a different
tack, commentaries in Persian and Arabic on 29 April
mentioned profits accruing to American oil companies
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from the closing of the Suez Canal. The broadcast in Arabic
concluded: "We can see how American oil companies stand
behind the Israeli policy of destruction which aims at
disrupting the operation of the Suez Canal."
A 3 May broadcast in Arabic, quoting the Arab press,
said Rogers' visit is viewed as an attempt by the United
States to portray itself as a neutral in the Arab-Israeli
dispute; Rogers is in fact, however, "submitting suspect
proposals which amount to Arab surrender." The commentary
also quoted a joint statement by "progressive" Lebanese
organizations to the effect that the United States is
"seeking not only to impose surrender on the Arabs and
deal a blow to the Palestinian people, but also to
consolidate the regimes which are pursuing a pro-American
course in the Arab countries," allegedly hoping to set
up "a bloc directed against the Federation of Arab
Republics."
TASS on the 4th, reporting Rogers' arrival that day in
Cairo, cited the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGiNCY for the
statement that along with the UAR initiative on opening
the Suez Canal to international shipping, "the stand
of the United States in the question of a settlement
of the Middle East crisis" would be discussed. A
28 April Moscow commentary in Arabic, more forthcoming
than the bulk of Soviet comment, had stated that the
USSR "is ready to support any positive initiative
aimed at the establishment of a just peace in the
Middle East, including an initiative from the Jnited
States."
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YUGOSLAVIA
PARTY PRESIDIUM OUTLINES STEPS TO MEET "SERIOUS" SITUATION
A lengthy communique issued on the League of Communists (LCY)
Presidium meeting held on Brioni from 28 to 30 April, broadcast
by Radio Belgrade, acknowledges that the economic and political
situation in Yugoslavia is "serious." But it seeks to assure
foreign and domestic audiences that the country is not on the
brink of disintegration by portraying the LCY as in "complete
unity" in its efforts to find solutions to pressing problems.
Although Tito appears to have induced the participants in the
session to curb public polemics and to agree on general approaches
in speeding up reforms, the vagueness of some of the proposals
enumerated in the communique suggests that many of the specifics
remain to be worked out.
The document announces that an LCY conference--the highest party
body between congresses--will be held soon to discuss the party's
"role and organization.'. TANJUG reported on 4 May that the Croatian
Central Committee will meet on the 11th to consider Presidium deci-
sions, and other republican parties may be expected to take similar
action.
Analyzing Yugosla.via's current situation, the communique broadly
attributes present difficul'ies to insufficient development of
self-management relations. structural disruptions in the economy,
discord among the republics, and increased nationalism. Although
prior to the Presidium session Tito had promised to name names and
threatened to purge the LCY of those who violate unity--a course
he may yet pursue during the planned party reorganization if party
officials try to frustrate LCY decisions--the communique limits
itself to e. general call for a .3truggle against bureaucratic cen-
tralism and nationalism. It comes down particularly hard on the
latter: "The LCY is unanimous in its assessment that nationalism
is the basis for rallying all anticommunist forces, that it under-
mines the trust and unity of the peoples and nationalities of
Yugoslavia and leads to the undermining of the unity of the League."
The communique goes on to cite the need for the LCY to strengthen
its political and ideological role and to take a more active part
in trying to solve the nation's problems. In particular, it calls
on the party to vigorously implement economic stabilization mea-
sures and to work to create conditions for a general agreement on
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the economic system. Noting that opposition to the LCY's course
has appeared in the public media, the communique calls on party
officials to "take measures to insure that communists will more
resolutely" crack down on opposition to LCY policy.
In an apparent effort to paper over the Serb-Croat dispute over
alleged Croatian ties with Ustashi emigres abroad, the communique
accepts the Federal Executive Council's conclusions, released in
a statement on 28 April, that "hostile elements" abroad had tried
to discredit the Croatian party leadership but that federal
organs had no part in the "conspiracy." In an'ostensible non
sequitur, the communique adds vaguely that "the session also noted
shortcomings in the work of certain security services which must
be eliminated in the shortest time through the work of superior
organs." The Executive Council's statement, as reported by TANJUG,
had made no mention of "shortcomings" in the state security
apparatus, but it did call on both federal and republican organs
to "strengthen the personnel of the security services" in order
to combat "hostile activities."
The Croatian Central Committee had specifically charged in a
communique on 8 April that hostile elements abroad and some
federal organs were disseminating allegations that the Croat
leadership was linked with Ustashi emigres abroad. Although
the Croatian Central Committee communique did not name the State
Security Service (SDB) as the responsible, federal organ, subse-
quent Croatian calls in the FederaliAssembly for reorganization
of the SDB clearly reflected a view of the SDB as the culprit.
TITO SPEECH In a May day speech in Labin, Istria, Tito gave
a rambling report on the Brioni meeting in which
he underlined the need to proceed from words to deeds and promised
"energetic" action against opponents of the LCY's course. Although
he acknowledged that the debate at the Presidium meeting was "sharp"
at the beginning, he said that unity was achieved on all questions.
Noting that similar League discussions had taken place in the past
(and by implication without significant results), Tito firmly added
that "the question of execution of decisions is not a matter which
should be left on paper. No, this matter must move into practice
and be carried out." Although he urged communists to start
immediately to resolve the present crisis, he noted tha' it will
"probably take a few months" and added that during that period
"there will be cadre changes" and a "regrouping" in the Federal
Government. Stating that the planned reorganization of the LCY
will make it "a more efficient protagonist of the further buildir,
of our country," he added: "We shall do this in the shortest time,
too."
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As if to underscore the urgency of the need to implement party
and government reforms, Tito raised the spectre of unnamed
domestic and foreign enemies trying to disrupt Yugoslavia.
Warning against "all deformations among ourselves," he assailed
universities which "retain and tolerate lecturers who work against
our system, slander our leadership, and serve foreign interests,"
thereby misleading the youth. He was also critical of the Yugo-
slav press for disseminating "misinformation" and "slanders" and
promised to take "energetic action" against unnamed papers that are
"introducing trouble among the people." He went on to express con-
cern over the activities of unnamed foreign "intelligence services"
which he said were exerting "incredible pressure" against Yugoslavia.
Adding that the Presidium had decided to "discover the roots of these
various intelligence attempts," he called for national vigilance
against the introduction of "misinformation from outside" designed
to discredit Yugoslavia.
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EAST GERMANY
HONECKER TAKES OVER IN ORDERLY TRANSFER WITH SOVIET BLESSINGS
Warm personal tributes from Soviet and East Buropean leaders as
well as from his own party have accompanied Walter Ulbricht's
resignation as party First Secretary in favor of his long-time
heir apparent, Erich Honecker, in the kind of well-oiled
transfer of power that is a rarity in East European communist
history. The only other publicly untarnished stepdown of a
top East European leader in recent years was Janos Kadar's
relinquishing of the post of Hungarian premier shortly after
the reemphasis on collective leadership in the USSR with
Khrushchev's removal in October 1964.
Ulbricht tendered his resignation in a speech to the SED
Central Committee on 3 May. After informing the plenum of
his decision--"which has not been easy for me"--to step down
as party leader because of "old age," he received encomiums
from Honecker and in a letter from the SID Central Committee
read by Premier Stoph. TASS promptly recounted the plenum
proceedings and publicized cordial messages from Brezhnev
both to Honecker on his election as First Secretary and to
Ulbricht on his election to the honorary post of "Chairman"
of the SED.* The Soviet leader's message to Honecker under-
scores continuity, noting that the new SED leader's career
has been guided by "the outstanding leaders of the German
working class movement, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht."
It notes Honecker's ''big contribution" to strengthening
friendship between the SID and CPSU and the East German and
Soviet people.
The new division of powers in the GDR is described by Brezhnev
as "an embodiment of the important Leninist principle of the
successiveness and collectivity of party leadership." His
message to Ulbricht says "we all know very well and highly
appreciate the immense contribution" the veteran GDR leader
has made to the building of socialism and to friendship between
ADN announced on the 5th that the eighth SED congress in
June will be opened by new SED Chairman Ulbricht, presumably
the ceremonial function of welcoming visiting delegations by
name, after which Honecker will deliver the Central Committee
report.
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the East German and Soviet parties and people. The message
also echoes the passage in the SED Central Committee's letter
of appreciation to Ulbricht which recognizes his new status as
that of another member "working in the collective of the
Politburo." Ulbricht had said, in concluding his resignation
speech, that he would "continue working in the collective body
of the Central Committee and the Politburo according to my
strength" while "conscientiously" carrying out the function
of State Council Chairman, which he retains.
From East European sources, prompt reports of the SED leader-
ship change have come from Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian,
Romanian, and Yugoslav media. In the only available comment
from any of these sources so far, TANJUG said the change "did
not come as a surprise" and went on to highlight the factor of
Ulbricht's age--a factor of obvious import also for the
Yugoslav leadership picture. The commentary added that "it
is clear now why, a number of days before, Ulbricht did not
leave for a visit to Romania as scheduled," to sign the new
GDR-Romanian friendship treaty.
The first monitored telegram of congratulations from East
Europe came from Husak to Honecker on the 3d--released by
CTK before TASS released Brezhnev's. Summing up the East
European response, TASS quoted ADN late the next day as
reporting that "cordial felicitations" to Honecker and
messages to Ulbricht "paying tribute to his outstanding
work" had been sent by Gierek, Husak, Kadar, and Zhivkov.
AGERPRES had carried messages from Ceausescu to the two GDR
leaders Several hours earlier.
HONECKER Firm solidarity with the CPSU pervaded both
SPEECHES Honecker's acceptance speech and his speech
presenting to the plenum the report of the SED
delegation, officially headed by Ulbricht, to the March--April
CPSU congress. In accepting his "heavy responsibility,"
Honecker declared that "the guarantee of our further secure
and successful progress lies primarily in our unbreakable
fraternal alliance with the party of Lenin, with the CPSU."
In introducing the SED delegation's report to the CPSU
congress, Honecker said the Soviet congress results were
"of inestimable value for the shaping of the developed
socialist social system in the GDR," adding that the SED
delegation report "stresses explicitly in this context
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that the way to socialism and its main characteristics are
determined by general laws." He also heavily stressed economic
"integration" in CEMA, as he had done in a 20 April article in
PRAVDA on the 25th SED anniversary, and praised Brezhnev
personally for his remarks at the congress on the virtues of
"businesslike" economic planning.
Commenting on GDR policy toward the FRG and West Berlin,
Honecker used language very similar to that used by Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko in his 3 April speech to the CPSU
congress. First pointing out that ratification of the
r LLscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn would have "favorable"
repercussions throughout Europe, Honecker said that the
ratification of these treaties, the convening of an all-
European security conference, and "the settlement of West
Berlin's problems" are "necessary and important steps" toward
a lasting peace in Europe. But he immediately added?--as
Gromyko had done--that these steps "must be carried out in
parallel, without waiting for the solution of one question
before moving on to the second," and noted that the policy of
solving issues in parallel "is the point of view of the CPSU
as well as of the SED." He described West German efforts to
link ratification of the treaties with a West Berlin settlement
as "hopeless attempts" and remarked that Bonn's "babbling
about so-called intra-German relations" had been rebuffed at
the CPSU congress.
Again asserting complete unity between the CPSU and the SED,
Honecker said that "both parties, and with them the other
fraternal parties, are also agreed that nothing has changed
with regard to the reactionary and aggressive character of
imperialism and the FRG." The East Berlin radio account of
the speech does not, however, make it clear whether Honecker
directly mentioned the Bonn government or the SPD/FDP coalition.
BACKGROUND Although Ulbricht has periodically been out of
the limelight because of illness in recent
years, his own remarks and the plenum announcement cited only
"age" and not health as the reason for his stepdown as First
Secretary. On 21 April he delivered a lengthy speech on the
SED's 25th anniversary, carried live by the East Berlin
domestic service, in which he may have implied his impending
stepdown in a passing remark on the subject of plan fulfill-
ment: "I do not want to prejudge the Central Committee report
to the eighth party congress," scheduled to open on 111 June.
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5 MAY 3.977.
As at the CPSU congress, he did not include any direct attack
on Peking in that speech. Honecker, however, assailed "the
Mao Tse-tung group" in a speech outside the congress, in
Magnitogorsk on 4 April, and the Chinese leadership came under
similar attack in a NEUES DEUTSCIILAND editorial on the CPSU
congress summarized by PRAVDA on 29 March.
The East German press in the last few years has amply hinted
at Honecker's status as heir apparent in almost invariably
including him in group pictures involving Ulbricht and Stoph,
usually with Honecker and Stoph at a similar distance just
behind or beside Ulbricht. In GDR party-government delegations
to international communist gatherings, Honecker has regularly
been included as an extra man, with no counterpart in
delegations from the other. Soviet bloc countries. He has been
Ulbricht's stand-in at domestic functions and as the SED
representative on such occasions as a GDR party-government
delegation's visit to Moscow in July 1969; during another
such visit to Warsaw that same month on the Polish 25th
anniversary, a celebration also attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin,
Husak, and Svoboda; and at the Bulgarian party congress of
20-25 April this year. After the close of the CPSU congress,
TASS on 12 April reported Brezhnev's "cordial" meeting with
both Ulbricht and Honecker; Stoph, who was also a member of
the SED delegation, was not mentioned in the report.
ADN's biography of Honecker, carried on 3 May, says among
other things that the new leader "last year attended all
important meetings of the party and state leaderships of the
socialist countries" and "took an active part in the preparation
and execution of the international conference of communist and
workers parties in Moscow in 1969."
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5 MAY 1971
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
KOSYGIN IS SLIGHTED IN SUPREME SOVIET NOMINATIONS
Downgraded to third place in Brezhnev's listing of the
Politburo at the close of the 24th CPSU Congress, Kosygin
is the victim of new protocol setbacks in the course of
nominations to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The first
nominating sessions took place on 27 April, and they
were reported in the papers of the next day.
In the nominations from Moscow city--the only ones in
which epithets are applied and hierarchical order is
directly comparable to that of 1970--that of Brezhnev
was listed first, Podgornyy second, and Kosygin third,
reversing the order of the latter two in the April 1970
Supreme Soviet nominations. Additionally, in PRAVDA,
MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, and most other papers, Kosygin was
granted exactly the same epithets as Podgornyy
("promin.ent political and state figure"); in 1970
Kosygi.n had been a "true Leninist and important
political and state figure" while Podgornyy was only
a "prominent figure of the Leninist Communist Party
and Soviet state." IZVESTIYA differs from the other
papers in snubbing Kosygin further, by deleting his
epithet while including Podgornyy's.
On the other hand, Podgornyy and Kosygin received the
identical number of nominations--as had happened also
on the first day in April 1970. At the May Day parade
too, Kosygin and Podgornyy followed their familiar
pattern of flanking Brezhnev at the tribune, giving no
further hint of any change.
Interestingly, Brezhnev stood out less from the leading
troika this year than in 1970. Whereas Brezhnev received
far more first-day nominations than Kosygin and Podgornyy
in 1970--from 16 areas as against six--this year his
16 regions were almost matched by the 15 which nominated
Kosygin and Podgornyy. Whereas PRAVDA's report on the
first day in 1970 (25 April 1970) reported the epithets
for Brezhn,:!v but deleted those for Kosygin and Podgornyy
(IZVESTIYA lid report the praise for Kosygin and Podgornyy,
and PRAVDA belatedly added epithets for them on 30 April),
this year all papers except IZVESTIYA carried epithets
for all three top leaders.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971
The first day's nominations in PRAVDA generally confirmed
Brezhnev's 9 April ranking of Politburo members:
Brezhnev's ranking 971 nominations 1970 nominations
1.
Brezhnev
16
16
2.
Podgornyy
15
6
3.
Kosygin
15
6
4.
Suslov
3
4
5.
Kirilenko
2
4
6.
Pelshe
2
2
7.
Mazurov
2
1
8.
Polyanskiy
2
2
9.
Shelest
1
1
10.
Voronov
1
2
11.
Shelepin
2
2
12.
Grishin
13.
Kuriayev
1
14.
Shcherbitskiy
1
15.
Kulakov
1
Some papers differed from PRAVDA's count. Among them, RURAL
LIFE and TRUD carried more complete listings, reporting
nominations from 18 areas for Bre.hnev, three for Kirilenko,
two for Voronov, two for Kulakov, and two nominations in the
Ukraine for both Shelest and Shcherbitskiy instead of
PRAVDA's one.
The lineup at the 1 May parade also followed the order in
Brezhnev's listing, except for Voronov, who stood in sixth
place, instead of ranking 10th as he did in May 1970 and
in Brezhnev's April 1971 congress listing.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971
- 28 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY DAY LEADERSHIP TURNOUT PRODUCES NO SURPRISES
The May Day festivities in China this year reflected Peking's
increased attention to foreign affairs, with little attention
paid. to domestic affairs in the joint editorial or in rally
comment. Mao and Lin Piao made their customary appearance at
the massive Peking rally; NCNA portrayed Mao as "in excellent
health and high spirits."
Three Politburo members continued their lengthy absence from
the public scene by failing to appear at the Peking rally.
Hsieh Fu-chih, although he was named head of the Peking CCP
Municipal Committee in March, maintained his year-long absence.
Politburo Standing Committee members Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta
also remain undo; the cloud which enveloped them last fall.
As on National Day last October, when Chen Po-ta's appearances
had already ceased, NCI'A listed Standing Committee members
along with other members of the Politburo. This time Peking
offered some explanation for the absences by using a formula
dating from October 1969 to the effect that the name list
excludes those not present in Peking and "absentees on
account of work or sickness."
Two former Politburo members made their first public appearance
since 1969, listed as vice-chairmen of the Central Committee's
Military Commission: Chen I, former foreign minister, and
Hsu Hsiang-chien, one of the old marshals.
No comprehensive list of provincial appearances on 1 May is
yet available, but provincial leaders listed as present in
Peking on 1 May may provide some indication of which provinces
are now undergoing central review before forming party
committees. The two top leaders of Sinkiang, which has
reported much lower-level party activity, were both listed
among Central Committee members in Peking. A vice chairman
from Yunnan, whose chief died last year, and from Szechwan,
where leadership factionalism has been severe, also appeared
in the listing. Several leaders from provinces that have
established their CCP committees also appeared.
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CONFIDENTIAL, FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 197.1
Editorial comment for this year's holiday came in the form of
an unexciting joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY
DAILY editorial released by NCNA on 30 April.* Domestic
issues were underplayed in the editorial, which stressed
the PRC's international solidarity with the world's working
class. The editorial merely outlined the need for greater
work efforts to fulfill the 1971 national e;;onomic plan
and to achieve the objectives set at the Ninth Party
Congress. "Victories on all fronts" must also be won to
greet the 50th anniversary of the CCP (1 July) and the
promised Fourth National People's Congress.
The editorial made the usual plea that "senior cadres
in particular" increase their study of Mao's vorks, a
major PRC propaganda theme since the second party pienum
last September, in order to meet "the arduous domestic
and international tasks of our party." Some progress in
the 9-month campaign for senior cadres to undertake
intensive study of Mao's works was indicated in a 2 May
NCNA review of May Day celebrations. NCNA offered
unusual praise for "leading cadres at various levels
in particular" for their "progress in criticizing
revisionism." The report then applauded "many leading
cadres" for their serious study of Mao's works. On
3 May, NCNA again portrayed upper-level cadres as
playing an exemplary role in nationwide meetings held
to celebrate May Day by studying Mao's Thought.
* Last year, May Day served as the peg for a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial which drew a connection between the utilization of
Mao's Thought and the successful launching of the PRC's first
artificial satellite. No editorial comment appeared for the
holiday in 1969. A joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION
ARMY DAILY editorial was released in 1968.
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