TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 28, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
ii FIIIIoIIIIRIIIIEII'IIIIGIIII~I N
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
28 APRIL 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 17)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively oii material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaiiing of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Eraluded Irem eulereetlc
devong'adino arid
duleoificeliee
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
U.S. Antiwar Demonstrations Hailed by Indochinese Communists . 1
Peking Sees Groundswell of Support for U.S. Demonstrations . . 6
Moscow Gives Demonstrations Limited, Routine Attention . . . . 7
May Day, TU Anniversary Prompt Comment on Southern "Struggle" . 7
DRV, NFLSV Deride "Imaginary" Lam Son 720 Operation in A S;iau . 9
Communists Review Three Months of "Victories" in Cambodia . . . 9
Foreign Ministry Spokesmaa Denounces U.S. Bombing of DRV . . . ii
Anniversary of Indochinese People's Summi-.. Conference Marked . 12
Hanoi Scores U.K. Cochairman's Charge of DRV Invasion of Laos . 15
Fifth Congress of Hanoi Vietnam Workers Party Held . . . . . . 16
Moscow Assails Maoist Policies; Ilichev Returns to Peking . . . 17
NEW TIMES Article Says Chinese "Easily Betray Friends" . . . 19
CEYLON
Moscow Reports "Ultraleftist" Rebellion; Peking Remains Silent. 22
PAKISTAN
Moscow Publicizes Official Pakistan Government Line . . . . . . 26
Peking Continues to Decry Indian, "Superpower" Interference . . 27
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Notes Rogers' Mideast Tour, Rejects Israel's Suez Ideas . 29
HAITI
Moscow, Havana Broadcasts in Creole Urge "Patriots" to Revolt 32
SPACE FLIGHTS
Soviet Space Docking Hailed as Step Toward Orbiting Stations . 35
Cosmonautics Day Brings Statements of Interest in Cooperation . 37
(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
CONTENT S (Continued)
GDR Reports, Moscow Silent on Abrasimov Remarks on Berlin . . .
38
Warsaw Press Continues Discussio:i of Soviet Draft Proposals . .
;;9
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prague Radio Reacts to West German Comment on Bilateral Talks . 41
BULGARIA
Party Congress Reasserts Orthodox, Pro-Soviet Line . . . . . .
43
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Son of Politburo Member Shelest Defends Self in Press . . . . .
46
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Slogans Signal Beginning of May Day Propaganda Buildup . . . .
49
Table: New Party Committees at County or Higher Level . . . .
50
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
ATTENTION 19 - 25 APRIL 1971
Moscow 306 items)
Peking (1521 items)
Soyuz 10
(--)
13%
Indochina
(23%) 19%
CPSU Congress
(40%)
12%
[Summit Conference
(4%) io%1
Lenin's Birth Anniversar
(--)
9%
A
i
y
nn
versary
Bulgarian Party Congress
(0.3%)
7%
[U.S. Demonstrations
(--) 7%]
Finnish Premier in USSR
(--)
6%
DPRK Supreme Peoples
(8%) 5%
May Day Slogans
(2%)
4%
Assembly
GDR Party Anniversary
(0.2%)
3%
Afro-Asian Journalist
(--) 4%
Indochina
(11%)
3%
Day
Middle East
(5%)
2%
Soviet-PRC Marine
(0.05%) 3%
China
(1S)
2%
Accident
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment cr party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi and Front media continue to exploit the U.S. antiwar
demonstrations in standard fashion. Propaganda includes official
messages to the U.S. sponsoring organizations and a NHAN DAN
editorial on 26 April, entitled "The Days that Shake the United
States," which observes that the participants this year include
more peopi.e "from the upper strata and political circles" than
previously. On the same day Front and Hanoi media publicized a
PLAF Command Order instructing the communist forces in South
Vietnam cn the proper attitudes and actions to be taken toward
U.S. servicemen who oppose the war.
Vietnamese communist comment on action in South Vietnam claims
that the fighting shows the strength of the PLAF and the losing
position of the allies in central Vietnam; and a PLAF Command
message to combztants in the central highlands calls for more
vigorous attacks and "uprisings" leading to total victory. Calls
for intensified struggle also appear in propaganda pegged to May
Day and the 27 April anniversary of the founding of the South
Vietnam Liberation Trade Union Federation.
The first anniversary of the Indochinese people's summit conference
(24-25 April) provides the occasion for reiterations of communist
claims of "strategic victories" in the recent operations in Laos
and Cambodia. Propaganda on the anniversary includes publicity
for a Peking banquet hosted by Sihanouk and addressed by Chou
En-lai, who again described the Indochinese struggle in glowing
terms.
Peking comment on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations includes a
27 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which says that "a new
revolutionary storm is rising vigorously among the people of the
United States."
Moscow has carried no editorial comment on the U.S. antiwar
activities, but there is some routine comment in addition to TASS
reports. Soviet broadcasts in Mandarin continue to castigate
Peking for rejecting united action in aiding the Indochinese and
to note that Peking's friendly gestures toward the United States
come at a time when the United States is escalating the war; a
26 April commentary goes so far as to say that the "real meaning"
of the Sino-U.S. contacts is "to obstruct the Indochinese people's
war" against U.S. aggression.
U.S, ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS HAILED BY INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS
The NHAN DAN editorial of 26 April, carried b Hanoi radio and
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people" and says the Vietnamese people "regarded it as a
valuable support cn4 encouragement to them." Also on the
26th, VNA reported a meeting held in Hanoi that evening by
the Committee for Solidarity with the American people to
welcome the 1971 U.S. spring offensive "demanding immediate
and total withdrawal of U.S. trcops from Vietnam and an end
to the war." Hoang Minh Giam, chairman of the committee,
opened the meeting*; the main address was given by dice
Chairman Dang Thai Mai, who according to VNA "warmly welcomed
the spring offensive" and cited the "mammoth" demonstrations
of the 24th. VNA reported that Mai "warmly hailed the antiwar
movement" which is "valiantly confronting the most bellicose
and barbarous administration ever seen in the history of
America." The movement, he said, constituted "great encourage-
ment to the fight of the Vietnamese people."
The VNA report notes that the meeting passed a resolution
"warmly welcoming" the spring offensive, "vehemently denouncing"
Vietnamization, "resolutely demanding" that the United States
end the war, and "pledging determination to stand shoulder to
shoulder witt? the Lao and Cambodian peoples to fight until
total victory."
PLAF CONti1AND ORDER Coincident with the focus of propaganda
attention on the U.S. demonstrations,
both Hanoi radio in its English-language program for U.S.
servicemen and Liberation Radio publicized a PLAF Command
order--dated the sane day--instructing PLAY forces on the
proper attitude and actions to be taken toward U.S. servicemen
who oppose the war. The order pictures a growing U.S.
opposition to the war, including servicemen who have returned
to the United States. And it says many American servicemen
still in South Vietnam have urged an end to the war, op:osed
orders of their commanders, and demanded an immediate withdrawal
of U.S. troops. It states that on a number of occasions the
NFLSV and PRG have made clear that their policy is to welcome
U.S. servicemen who oppose the war and to give humane treatment
to U.S. soldiers captured or wounded on the battlefield.
The order instructs troops to refrain from attacking certain
U.S. troops, to give them "proper treatment," to assist deserters,
* VNA on the 17th had reported a message from Giam to the
American people. See the TRENDS of 21 April 1971, pages 4-5.
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and to "hail and appropriately reward the U.S. servicemen who
support the NFLSV and PRG." The order calls on U.S. officers
and men to "seek by all means to contact and inform the South
Vietnamese people and the southern PLAF of their planned
antiwar act'.on so that the southern people and PLAF can help
them."
BACKGROUND: Appeals to allied soldiers to desert or defect i:
a low-level staple of Vietnamese communist propaganda. But
there have also been appeals in the past on an official level.
The PRG issued an appeal on 23 December 1969 which urged U.S.
servicemen to oppose the war by "refraining from conducting
sweeps, from staging shellings, and from taking hostile action
against the PLAF." Liberation Radio on 10 July 1970, in
announcing that permission had been granted John M. Sweeney
to leave Vietnam for Sweden, said the action was in line with
the "humanitarian" policy spelled out in the December. 1969
appeal. On 15 November 1967 the South Vietnam People's
Committee for Solidarity with the American People--established
the preceding month--addressed a letter to American soldiers
in South Vietnam urging them to refuse to fight and offering
them help.
NATURE AND SCOPE Hanoi and the Front are inconsistent in
OF DEMONSTRATIONS identifying the organizations sponsoring
the U.S. demonstrations. But messages
have been addressed to both the National Peace Action Coalition
nra the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice from NFLSV
Central Committee Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho (on the 25th) and
from the South Vietnam Liberation Youth Union (on the 22d).
The South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the
American People addressed its letter (on the 23d) to the
American people, Tho's message, as broadcast by Liberation
Radio on the :.7th, says the spring offensive "will certainly
score great success and advance toward a new high tide that
will force Nixon to immediately end the war" and withdraw all
U.S. troops unconditionally.
The propaganda notes that there were "massive" demonstrations
in San Francisco as well as in Washington on the 24th, and the
figure of 500,000 demonstrators is claimed for both cities.
Earlier, Hanoi had duly hailed the activities of the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War. VNA noted on the 25th that a
"coalition of militant antiwar activists announced that they
would try to shut down Congress and other government activity"
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-4--
in the coming weeks. And on the 27th VNA cited foreign sources
as reporting that the "second phase" %)f the spring offensive
had begun ;n the 26th. Liberation Radio on the came day pointed
out that the second phase has been organized by the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice, and it mentioiied such specific
actions as the sit-ins at the Selective Service and Internal
Revenue Service offices.
AT';ACKS ON THE PRESIDENT The NHAN DAN editorial of the 26th
IN NHAN DAN AND AT PARIS is notably abusive toward the
President, claiming that while
speaking of U.S. honor, "it is Nixon himself who has cast slurs on
the honor of the United States" through the "crimes" committed
in Indochina. It charges that since the President took office,
his Indochina poliey has consisted of two parts: "to prolong
and extend the war and fool the American people." It claims
that to "defuse" the antiwar movement the Administration has
resorted "to all means--slanders, threats, terror, and division
coupled with empty promises, dilatory moves, and the fanning
of great-nation chauvinism." The version of the editorial
broadcast by Hanoi radio elaborates: It says that the
Administration has tried to silence U.S. congressmen "through
their unsigned threatening letters from the FBI" and that it
has "terrorized the press and refused to disclose news on the
Indochinese battlefields in an attempt to make the American
people know and believe what they want them to know and believe."
At the 110th session of the Paris talks on 22 April, both DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy and FRG delegate Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh used
the current demonstrations to highlight their negotiating
demands. Scoring the President's 7 April TV address in which
he announced an additional 100,000-man troop withdrawal and
his 16 April remarks to newspaper editors, in particular his
refusal to set a deadline for all U.S. troops to be withdrawn
from South Vietnam, the communist delegates cited the
demonstrations as evidence that U.S. public opinion is
"indignant" at the President's refusal to set such a deadline.
In remarks summarized broadly by VNA, Thuy asserted that at
present, "all over the United States, the American people are
waging an energetic spring offensive to compel the Nixon
Administration to respond to the imperative demand that a
deadline be fixed . . . ." LPA says Mme. Binh "laid particular
stress on the vigorous development of the movement of the South
Vietnam townsfolk and the unprecedently strong growth" of the
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American people's movement for an end to the war, a deadline for
total U.S. withdrawal, and renunciation by the Administration
of the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique of traitors."
SOUPHANOUVONG LETTER The Pathet Lao news agency on 25 April
TO AMERICAN PEOPLE reported what it called Prince
Souphanouvong's "second" letter to the
American people, dated the 21st. He says that in his "first"
letter, dated 19 February and carried by the Pathet Lao news
agency the next day, he had called attention to the "grave
situation" in Laos as a result of the invasion of southern
Laos by "U.S. and Saigon puppet troops." In his latest letter
he tells the American people of the "important victories" of
the Lao "patriotic forces and people," saying that the
victories cannot be separated from the solidarity and support
of the peoples of the world, including the American people
"who, by their waves of antiwar protests spreading across the
country, have struck vigorously at the war policy pursued by
the White House leaders." He praises the American spring
antiwar campaign, noting that it includes diversified sectors
of the population ranging from veterans to "Democratic and
even Republican senators."
Although Souphanouvong calls his 19 February message his first
letter to the American people, he had in fact sent a similiar
letter dated 8 November 1969 praising the antiwar demonstrations
at that time. Other Pathet Lao leaders, Phoumi Vongvichit and
Tiao Souk Vongsak, as well as the leader of the Patriotic
Neutralist Forces, Khamsouk Keola, also lent messages in 1969.
There were apparently no such letters in connection with the
May 1970 U.S. demonstrations against the Cambodian incursion,
however.
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Appr
PEKING SEES GROUNDSWELL OF SUPPORT FOR U.S. DEMONSTRATIONS
Highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY worker-commentators' article
on 26 April and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 27t1,
Peking's continuing publicity for the "unprecedented massive
demonstrations and rallies" against President Nixon's
Indochina policies stresses the involvement of Americans
of all classes, races, and occupations, "standing on the
same front with the three Indochinese peoples and the
peoples of all the other countries struggling against
U.S. imperialism."
Observing that "a new revolutionary storm is rising
vigorously among the people of the United States" and
that the 24 April demonstrations "pushed the struggle
to a new high tide," the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pointed
out that "workers, black people, students, and women,
people of all classes and strata and of different occupa-
tions, beliefs, races, and ages have joined the demonstra-
tions" despite intimidations and "threats from the U.S.
Government." Taking particular note of the involvement
of U.S. servicemen, including Vietnam veterans, the
editorial asserted that "all this reflects the new
awakening of the American people." It observed that
"a situation like this is rarely seen in history--the
people of a country so courageously opposing their own
country's imperialist war of aggression."
In similar vein, the PEOPLE'S DAILY article by worker-
commentators hailed "the American people's rising
revolutionary storm against aggression" and stated
that "the broad masses of the American people are an
important battalion in the anti-U.S. united front of
the people throughout the world."
Other Peking comment has highlighted the participation
of the veterans, noting that they "staged dramatic scenes
on the Capitol steps to expose the outrageous crimes
committed by U.S. aggressor troops." They are said to
have "won wide support from the American people,
especially the Washington residents, many of whom took
part in the protest activities organized by the veterans."
NCNA on the 26th said that "U.S. imperialist chieftain
Nixon was so frightened that he sneaked away from Washington"
prior to the demonstrations on the 24th. Apart from this
reference, however, Peking's propaganda on the demonstrations
has avoided personal abuse of the President.
18-2
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MOSCOW GIVES DEMONSTRATIONS LIMITED. ROUTINE ATTENTION
Soviet media's news coverage of the U.S. antiwar demonstrations
has featured the activities of the Vietnam Veterans Against the
War, the weekend "mass demonstrations," and plans for the 10-day
"peace offensive" sponsored by the People's Coalition for Peace
and Justice. Brief TASS reports and correspondents' dispatches
in the press have been accompanied by some routine-level comment.
In a dispatch carried by TASS on the 26th, PRAVDA's correspondent
pointed out that the Saturday demonstration in Washington had
"new features," including the participation of middle-aged
people, workers; and members of minority groups. He saw in
this demonstration and in others a "new upsurge" of the antiwar
movement in the United States, contrary to the expectations of
"certain political observers" who had recently expressed the
view that Vietnamization had taken the steam out of the movement.
A radio commentary in English, also on the 26th, said the
demonstrations show that "the so-called silent majority is not
so silent any more." Although the Administration has the
mass media at its disposal and the widest publicity has been
given to the President's speeches defending his policies, the
commentator said, no arguments or propaganda can repair the
split in the country or overcome the crisis of confidence.
MAY DAY, TU ANNIVERSARY PROMPT CONINENT ON SOUTHERN "STRUGGLE"
The 10th anniversary of the South Vietnamese Liberation Trade
Union on 27 April and the approaching May Day holiday prompt
comment by the Front radio hailing the workers' struggle in
the South and calling for further efforts to overthrow the
Saigon regime and. force a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. A
Liberation Radio commentary on 25 April scored a GVN ban on
May Day demonstrations and declared that the workers and
urban people are "determined not to retreat in the face of
difficulties." It added that the ban will not prevent May
Day activities in South Vietnamese cities such as the holding
of meetings and the gathering of "struggle forces" during
parades and demonstrations in the streets, at headquarters,
in factories, and elsewhere.
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An appeal from the Liberation Trade Union Federation Executive
Committee, broadcast by the Front radio on the 26th, marked
May Day and the Federation anniversary with a more general call
for stepped-up struggle against the Saigon regime. While
warning of "hard, difficult, and complicated circumstances" to
be faced in GVN-controlled areas before "total victory" is
achieved, the appeal confidently claimed that "the final phase
of our struggle" is underway and expressed determination to
"advance the revolution to total victory."
Hanoi marked the Liberation Trade Union Federation's anniversary
with a meeting organized by the DRV trade union federation on
24 April. A Hanoi broadcast to the South on the 26th reported
that VWP.Secretariat member Nguyen Van Tran and DRV Vice Premier
Do Muoi attended the meeting and that the northern trade union's
vice-president and secretary general, Nguyen Due Thuan,
delivered a speech hailing the workers' struggle in the South.
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DRV, NFLSV DERIDE "IMAGINARY" LAM SON 720 OPERATION IN A SHAU
The first Vietnamese communist acknowledgment of the details of
Operation Lam Son 720 in the A Shau valley came in a 21 April
Liberation Radio commentary attribut!d co the station's
commentator "Nguoi Ban Tia" (The Sniier).* The commentator
claimed that the Western press had "laid bare the deceitful
nature" of this operation and he quoted, among other things,
a Western news report speculating that the allies are
"'spreading misleading news'" to "'confuse the communists"'
and observing that only reconnaissance troops are operating
in the A Shau valley. Dismissing Lam Son 720 as a
"psychological plot aimed at making stupid people believe
that the U.S.-puppets still remain strong" after Lam Son 719,
the Front commentator concluded: "The U.S.-puppets tried at
all costs to send a few small detachments to the jungle area
in Western Thua Thien and then boastfully clamored that a
big operation haO. been conducted there."
Hanoi first discussed Lam Son 720 in an article in the 22 April
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which cited contradictory Western news
reports about the operation and derided it as "fake." It
charged that Gen. Abrams and President Thieu "boasted" about
"this imaginary Lam Son 720" in order to conceal allied
s,,tbacks" both in southern Laos and in the South Vietnamese
hi,nlands. Unlike the Liberation Radio commentary, the Hanoi
paper took note of a Western news agency report that Abrams
had raised the possibility of Saigon troops engaged in the
operation crossing the border into Laos.
COMMUNISTS REVIEW THREE MONTHS OF "VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA
Alleged victories of the Cambodian "liberation" forces in the
first three months of the year are recounted in a 22 April
report from the Cambodian Information Agen-y (AKI), an organ
of Sihanouk's front. The report highlights action along
Highway 4 and in the Phnom Penh area as wel_ as communist
attacks on South Vietnamese forces engaged in Operation
* An 18 April Liberatior. Radio commentary on President Thieu's
speech in Hue on the 17th merely noted his reference to the
launching of Lam Son 720.
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Toan Thang (Total Victory) 1/71 in northeast Cambodia. It
also claims that "encroachment and pacification operations" by
Phnom Penh's main forces have been rebuffed by the liberation
forces.
The AKI report credits the "people" and the "Cambodian liberation
army" (CNPLAF) in the first three months of 1971 with having
"eliminated or captured" 25,000 troops, including 14,000 South
Vietnamese. In addition, 350 aircraft were allegedly downed or
destroyed and 1,400 military vehicles destroyed, including 600
tanks and armored cars. The allies, according to AKI, also
lost 120 guns and over 60 vessels, and thousands of arms were
allegedly captured by the CNPLAF.
The AKI report repeats communist claims that the GVN Toan
Thang 1/71 has been "defeated"; but it acknowledges the
continuation of the operation in noting that the allies are
currently "throwing other units" into it, adding that they
have "been unable to reverse their unfavorable situation."
Beginning in mid-March Vietnamese and Cambodian propaganda
claimed that Toan Thang 1/71 was defeated, with some comment
stating that the allies had to abandon the operation only a
month after its initiation on 4 February.
AKI echoes battle reports in recent weeks which have claimed
that South Vietnamese units involved in Toan Thang 1/71 have
been forced to abandon numerous positions. Thus it maintains
that GVN troops have been "forced to retreat" from Chup, Suong,
and Damber and find themselves "in a critical situation" in
Khnar, Pratheat, and Kandol Chrum--on Highway 7--and Snoul--on
Highway 13. It claims that the CNPLAF, in action since the
start of the GVN operation, has killed, wounded, or captured
nearly 13,000 troops, putting out of action 21 infantry
battalions and 12 armored squadrons. In addition, 200 planes
have allegedly been shot down or destroyed during this period
and 1,100 military vehicles put out of action, including more
than 550 tanks and armored cars.
These alleged achievements of the CNPLAF?are hailed in
25 April editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged
to the anniversary of the Indochinese people's summit
conference. NHAN DAN amplifies on the victory claims,
commenting that the number of Saigon troops "annihilated" in
Toan Thang 1/71 is more than three-fourths of the number
lost on the southern Laos front and that the number of tanks
and armored cars destroyed equals those destroyed in southern
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Laos. The editorials, like AKI, hold that military victories
in Cambodia are a blow to the Administration's Vietnamization
plan and Nixon Doctrine and to the Phnom Penh regime, which is
said to be seriously isolated and plagued by internal contra-
dictions. Hailing both the Laotian and Cambodian "victories"
this year, NHAN DAN concludes that a "new situation" has
arisen on the Indochinese battlefields and that the Indochinese
people and armed forces "are ready to engage ourselves in new,
resolute battles, to change the balance of forces increasingly
in our favor, and to advance toward completely defeating the
U.S. aggressors."
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENOUNCES U,S, BOMBING OF DRV
The nature of recent U.S. air strikes, reportedly aimed at
North Vietnamese missile sites and air bases, is not acknow-
ledged by Hanoi, which issued only routine DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statements on 22 and 24 April protesting strikes in
Quang Binh and in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces, respectively,
as well as in the northern parts of the DMZ. Typically the
reported U.S. contact with North Vietnamese MIGs on the 23d
is ignored.
The protest on the 22d says that on the 18th and 20th, U.S.
aircraft "bombed and strafed a number of populated areas in
Quang Binh Province, causing losses in lives and property."*
Hanoi media on the 23d reported the downing of two U.S.
planes in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces on the previous day.
And VNA specified that the downing in Nghe An "by the
people's armed forcer" occurred during a "counterattack
against an air raid on a populated area in the western part
of the province." These U.S. actions are scored in the
foreign ministry spokesman's protest on the 24th which notes the
downings and in standard language voices determination "to
duly punish all U.S. reckless acts of encroachment on DRV
territory." Hanoi on the 28th claims that another plane was
downed that day in Ha Tinh, bringing its total to 3,392.
* The spokesman's statement of the 22d describes action which
seems to correspond to the strike which the U.S. command in
Saigon said occurred on the 19th against a surface-to-air
missile site. Later in the week the U.S. command said that U.S.
fighter-bombers on the 22d bombed DRV missile and antiaircraft
sites and that one raid penetrated 185 miles into North Vietnam
for strikes against a MIG air base.
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The protest of the 22d also charges that on 16-18 April U.S.
aircraft, including B-52's, "on several occasions" bombed
Huong Lap village and "used its artillery from positions on
the sea and south of the DMZ to shell Vinh Son village."
It stresses that these two villages are "located north of
the 17th parallel in the DMZ." The foreign ministry spokesman
in the pretest of the 24th similarly charges that U.S. air-
craft, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village--this time
on the 21st and 22d. And it charges that U.S. artillery "off
the coast and from south of the DMZ shelled villages north
of the 17th parallel in the DMZ," but makes no specific
mention of any village. It echoes the protest of the 22d that
"all these villages belong to the DRV."
The alleged downing of U.S. planes on the 22d is lauded in a
Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d which says that to make up
for allied losses on all Indochinese battlefields the United
States is "pez,petrating military adventures against our North
with many perfidious tricks." And a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
commentary on the 24th says that the U.S. "systematic acts of
war against the DRV" were shown by the repeated air strikes on
16-18 and on 20 April and by the "admittance" of the U.S.
command in Saigon on the 23d "that the order had been given
to the U.S. Air Force and Navy to attack various parts of
North Vietnam."
ANNIVERSARY OF INDOCHINESE PEOPLE IS SLMIIT CONFERENCE MARKED
The first anniversary of the Indochinese summit conference
(24-25 April) provides the occasion for reaffirmations of the
pledge to persist in the struggle against the U.S. "aggressors."
Propaganda on the anniversary includes editorials in the Hanoi
and Peking press and publicity for a Peking banquet, hosted by
Sihanouk and attended by Chou En-lai, a Hanoi meeting, sponsored
by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and attended by Pham Van Dong,
as well as meetings in South Vietnamese and Laotian "liberated
areas."
At the Peking banquet, the Indochinese speakers voiced explicit
gratitude for Chinese assistance as well as general appreciation
for support and assistance from "other socialist countries."
The PRG charge d'affaires and the DPRK ambassador at the banquet
recalled that Chou En-lai, during his March visit to Hanoi,
had warned that if the United States expanded the war the Chinese
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people would "take all necessary measures, not flinching even
from the greatest national sacrifices, to give all-out
sui_Drt and assistance" to the Vietnamese and Indochinese
peoples. Peking's comment has not on its own authority
repeated this pledge since the 11 March PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial on Chou's visit.*
In his banquet address, Chou routinely said that the Chinese
"firmly support and assist" the people of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. And consistent with propaganda on the Laos
incursion, he professed optimism regarding the Indochinese
situation. Referring to growing opposition to the Nixon
Administration's war policies at home and abroad, as well as
the "struggle" of the Indochinese people, Chou said that "the
U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have never before been so
isolated and in such a difficult position as they are today."
Similarly optimistic, the 25 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
recalled the assertion in Mao's 20 May 1970 statement that
"the situation is getting better and better" in the Indochinese
struggle, and it praised the victories of the Indochinese
people in the past year since the summit conference. The
editorial said that President Nixon "is having a much tougher
time," particularly since the Highway 9 battle, as the American
people's struggle demanding an end to the war has grown and
"internal disputes" within the "ruling clique" and "contradictions"
between the United States and its "puppets" have become more acute.
The editorial concludes with a routine pledge to give "all-out
support" to the Indochinese people.
Sihanouk routinely referred to China as the "reliable and
invincible great rear area" cf the Indochinese people, and
the DRV ambassador similarly said that the victories of the
three countries are linked to "the devoted, precious, timely,
adequate" support of the Chinese people who are acting as
"a firm rear."
The Pathet Lao speaker at the Peking banquet was NLHS vice
chairman Kaysone Phomvihan, in Peking after participating in
* On 17 April, however, NCNA reported the recollection of
this formulation by DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam at the North
Korean Supreme People's Assembly session. The DPRK ambassador
at the Peking banquet had also echoed Ho Tam at the Assembly
session in stressing Asian unity. See the 21 April TRENDS,
pages 38-41.
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the CPSU congrebv in Moscow.* He routinely thanked the Chinese
for their "tremendous and valuable support and assistance,"
calling them the "staunch rear area of the Indochinese people."
He departed from the usual theme of mutual support and
assistance among the Indochinese people to single ri't for
praise North Vietnam's aid to the other Indochinese. He said
that "North Vietnam has not only become the staunch rear
area of South Vietnam, but also has given all-out support
and assistance to the struggle in Laos and Cambodia." This
statement is consistent with NLHS expressions of gratitude
to the DRV for its "support and assistance" to the Lao battle-
fronts in the wake of the Highway 9 battles. The usual Hanoi
practice, however, is to limit itself to assertions that
it fights "shoulder to shoulder" with the Laotian and
Cambodian people, renders them "support," or fulfills its
"international obligations" to them.
MOSCOW Moscow gave the anniversary minimal attention, in
keeping with its cautious stance regarding Sihanouk
and the fact that the summit conference was sponsored by
Peking. (The PRC, DPRK, and Albania had greeted the conference
last year with government statements, but Moscow had given it
only routine-level attention.) TASS briefly reported the
meeting in Hanoi and an address on the anniversary by Nguyen
Huu Tho to the people of South Vietnam, but apparently did
not mention the Peking banquet.
PRAVDA commentator Mayevsk'.y, in an article scoring the U.S.
refusal to withdraw its troops, summarized by TASS on the 27th,
briefly mentioned the anniversary in passing. He said that
the conference marked a "new stage" in the struggle of the
peoples of Indochina, adding that the "anti-imperialist front
of the peoples of Indochina" plays a "paramount part" in rallying
the patriotic forces and has achieved "remarkable success" in
repelling the enemy.
* Le Duan, who led the DRV delegation to the CPSU congress, is
still in the USSR, now visiting the Black Sea, while Nguyen Duy
Trinh, who was a member of the delegation, is now in Sofia for
the Bulgarian party congress. Nguyen Van Hieu, who represented
the PRG at the CPSU congress, is also at the Bulgarian congress.
All three Indochinese delegations had stopped in Peking on their
way to the CPSU congress and attended a banquet celebrating the
Indochinese victories along Highway 9. See the 31 March TRENDS,
pages 6-9.
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HANOI SCORES U1K, COCHAIRMANIS CHARGE OF DRV INVASION OF LAOS
On 23 April the Hanoi domestic service carries a commentary
castigating the British Government for circulating on 21 April
a note to the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreement "slander-
ously accusing the ARV of reputedly encroaching upon Laos'
neutrality and violating the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos."
It scores the British Government for having approved of the
U.S.-supported Saigon operation in Laos and having "slandered"
the DRV for "invading" Laos. The commentary does not acknowledge
that the British note id's ,covering memo to a Souv nna
Phouma 1 April letter to the Soviet and British Geneva
Conference cochairmen, the British having decided to circulate
the letter unilaterally after having failed to enlist Soviet
cooperation.* Soviet media have not mentioned the Souvanna
Phouma letter and the British response, in accordance with
their usual silence on such exchanges. On at least one occasion
in the past, however, in August 1969, Moscow did belatedly note
a June Souvanna Phouma letter in a routine-level Lao-language
broadcast.
Although the Hanoi commentary does not mention Souvanna Phouma's
current letter, it does recall that on it March the British
circulated a 5 February letter from Souvanna Phouma to the
Geneva cochairmen which contained "slanderous accusations"
against the DRV, and notes that the NLHS had protested that
Br=tish move with a central committee spokesman's statement.**
Since mid-1969 Hanoi media have apparently ignored the various
letters from Souvanna Phouma to the Geneva cochairmen and
Britain's unilateral circulation of them. Prior to that,
however, in 1968 and early 1969, Hanoi had responded with
NHAX DAN article6 and on one occasion, 22 March 1969, issued
* Souvanna Phouma's letter focused on charges that DRV
troops attac;.ad the outskirts of Luang Prabang on 21 March.
Although it acknowledges that U.S.-supported Saigon troops
entered Laos on 8 February and that on the same day the RLG
condemned all foreign forces using Lao territory, the letter
states that the incident would not have occurred had North
Vietnamese forces not been present in Lao territory.
** See the 10 March 1971 TRENDS, page 25.
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a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denouncing a letter
from the "Vientiane authorities" to the Geneva cochairmen.
The Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces and the Pathet Lao
news agency carry commentaries on 25 and 28 April castigating
the current British message and noting that Souvanna Phouma
had sent a letter to the British, but not acknowledging that
the letter was sent to the Soviet Geneva cochairman as well.
Normally the NLHS responds to the British circulation of
Souvanna Phouma's letters with a central committee spokesman's
statement, but none has been monitored so far in this instance.
FIFTH CONGRESS OF HANOI VIETNAM WORKERS PARTY HELD
DRV media have reported the convening of the fifth congress of
party organizations in the Hanoi area. The Hanoi newspaper
HANOI MOI in early April had reported that a municipal
party conference, held 10-13 March, hac' taken the decision to
hold the fifth congress in the latter half of April.
VNA on the 23d, r'_porting the congress, noted that a report
by Nguyen Van Tran, secretary of the Hanoi committee and member
of the VWP Secretariat, reviewed "achievements recorded over
the past three years." It noted also that the congress dealt
with Hanoi's future tasks from 1971-73. The only othei available
propaganda on the congress is a 26 April Hanoi domestic broadcast
which said that the congress "was extremely elated" in welcoming
Premier Pham Van Dong, who spoke. According to the radio, Dong
hailed the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance and spelled
out the tasks of the North--to provide support for the frontline,
stand ready to fight, and strengthen the North in all fields.
The radio added that he hailed Hanoi's determination to carry
out its share of the tasks., HANOI MOI had indicated that the
municipal party executive committee would be reelected at the
congress, but there is no mention of this in either the VNA or
Hanoi radio reports.
The fourth Hanoi congress was held in April 1968 and was
addressed by Party First Secretary Le Duan. The fourth congress
of party chapter delegates reportedly reviewed "the leadership
over tasks during the past four years and set forth new trends
and tasks for coming years." Nguyen Van Tran read a political
report. A 17 April 1968 radio report of that congress noted that
the previous third Hanoi congress was held in July 1963.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW ASSAILS MAOIST POLICIESi ILICHEV RETURNS TO PEKING
In Moscow's first substantial reaction to recent Sino-U.S. devel-
opments, the weekly NEW TIMES has accused Peking of easily
betraying its friends and of persisting in efforts to obstruct
the relaxation of tansions across a wide range of international
issues. The thrust of the NEW TIMES comment is that Peking's
recent moves do not indicate a change in its basic line of seek-
ing world power in order io pursue nationalistic aims at other
countries' expense.
Soviet concern over the impact of "ping-pong diplomacy" has sur-
faced in the Moscow domestic radio's weekly roundtable discussion
program, a forum for airing cuxrent international topics for the
home audience. On 25 April panelists discoursed at length on
suggestions that Sino-U.S. developments may have adverse implica-
tions for Soviet interests and for the Indochinese communists.
In a sign of Soviet irritation, both NEW TIMES and the roundtable
panelists referred to the Chinese leaders as "the Maoists" rather
than by a neutral term. This usage also accords with Moscow's
line that Chinese policy has not really moderated or departed from
radical goals commonly associated with Maoism.
While showing its displeasure, Moscow has demonstrated restraint
in responding to Peking's recent moves. There has still been no
direct comment in the Soviet central press on the recent events
in Sino-U.S. relations, nor has there been an authoritative response
to Peking's major ideological pronouncement on the centenary of the
Paris Commune on 18 March. (Moscow took just less than four weeks
to reply in kind to Peking's authoritative statement on Lenin's
centenary last spring.) In the major Soviet address on Lenin Day
this year, CPSU Secretary Katushev on 22 April limited his anti-
Peking remarks to a slap at "petit-bourgeois and pseudorevolutionary
ideas" without naming the Chinese.
BORDER TALKS At the same time, Moscow has called attention to
the Sino-Soviet border talks, as if to signal its
intent to attain progress in the negotiations amid speculation
that the Soviet position is adversely affected by improved relations
between the other two sides in the triangular relationship. TASS
reported on 19 April that L.F. Ilichev, the chief Soviet negotiator
at the talks, and Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov had returned to Peking
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that day after having attended the CPSU congress. Reversing the
order in which Moscow had given the two Soviet officials' names
when reporting their meeting with Chou En-lai on 21 March, before
they had gone to Moscow, TABS listed Ilichev ahead of Tolstikov.*
TASS identified the talks as concerning a "settlement of border
questions," a formulation Brezhnev had used in his report to the
congress on 30 March. Moscow has referred to the talks in various
ways, sometimes specifying that they concern a border settlement
(earlier examples were speeches by Kosygin and Podgornyy last
June) and at other times noting more broadly that they deal with
unspecified topics concerning bilateral relations. Moscow's
original announcement on the agreement to open talks said they
would deal with questions "in which both sides are interested,"
and Brezhnev on 27 October 1969--a week after the opening of the
talks--declared Soviet readiness to settle "border and other
questions."
The TASS report on Ilichev's return could indicate that he has been
given fre3h instructions for making progress in the border negotia-
tions, though it may simply reflect a judgment that with results
obtained on other issues--notably the resumption of ambassadorial
relations and improved trade relations--the focus should now be on
the border question. At any rate, the identification of the talks
as concerning a border settlement accords with the way the Chinese
have consistently defined the subject of the negotiations from the
very beginning.
The TASS report noted that the Soviet officials were met at the
airport by the chief and deputy chief of the PRC delegation to
the talks, Chiao'Kuan-hua and Chai Cheng-wen. The two Chinese
were also reported by Moscow on 23 April to have attended a film
show at the Soviet embassy commemorating Lenin's birthday. Revert-
ing to its practice during the late 1960's, Peking this year ignored
Lenin Day, apart from opening radio broadcasts on that day with a
quotation from Lenin rather than from Mao.
Peking reported neither the return of Ilichev and Tolstikov nor
the Soviet embassy film show, just as it had failed to report the
21 March meeting of the two Soviet officials with Chou. Peking's
failure to match Moscow's efforts to portray Sino-Soviet state
relations as proceeding normally was thrown in sharp relief by
0
* As a party Central Committee member, Tolstikov outranks Ilichev,
but the latter as a deputy foreign minister is superior to the
ambassador.
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NCNA's report on an 18 April PRC Foreign Ministry note "expressing
indignation" over a collision between a Soviet ship and a Chinese
fishing boat in the Tonkin Gulf. Moscow had sought to head off
trouble over the accident by a prompt TASS announcement on 31 March--
less than 24 hours after the collision--that the Soviet Government
had expressed "deep regrets" over the accident. The TASS effort
was denounced by NCNA as "a sheer distortion."
NEW TIMES ARTICLE SAYS CHINESE "EASILY BETRAY FRIENDS"
The NEW TIMES article on "Peking's Diplomatic Game," published in
issue No. 17 over the signature of L. Kirichenko, follows familiar
polemical lines in seeking to isolate Peking as an outlaw among
responsible members of the family of nations despite recent Chinese
diplomatic moves. Available thus far only in summary, the article
also seems to play on North Vietnamese and North Korean concern
over Chinese gestures toward the United States. This aspect was
highlighted by a 21 April TASS summary which began by quoting the
article's charge that "the political practices of the Maoists show
that they easily betray friends and quickly come to terms with
those whom they just called enemies" if "they consider it necessary
to meet the great-power nationalistic interests" of Peking. Apart
from the TASS summary, versions of the article have been hears only
in broadcasts to Asia in French and English over Radio Peace and
Progress.
Judging from the NEW TIMES article, Moscow has come up with no new
approach to the challenge posed by Peking's more flexible p;li~'ies
and has fallen back on old rind tried themes depicting the PRC as
a disruptive force in the international community. The article
grudgingly acknowledges "some new aspects in Peking's recent moves,"
but it stresses that Peking's unchanged basic strategy continues to
be directed toward achieving world power in order to impose its
will on other states in "the traditional spirit of sinocentrism."
This wa- the line Moscow took in its effort to isolate Peking during
the period of heightened Sino-Soviet border tensions.
SINO-U.S. Though the article takes the Chinese to task on a wide
RELATIONS variety of issues, its timing was clearly occasioned
by recent Sino-U.S. developments--a subject that had
been discussed in an earlier NEW TIMES article (in issue No. 13,
dated 26 March) anticipating further developments in "the diplomacy
of eaiiles" between Washington and Peking. NEW TIMES, a foreign-
affairs weekly published in several languages, frequently conveys
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Soviet views on international issues on which the principal Moscow
press is avoiding direct comment.
The Kirichenko article seeks to disparage the recent Sino-U.S.
developments, noting; that Washington has rewarded Peking's "con-
ciliatory gestures" with only "minor steps" and that the United
States "does not i.itend to liquidate its bases on Taiwan and to
return the island to China." As for China's representation in
the United Nations, the article scornfully observes: "Well,
Washington is prepared, as a present to Peking, to offer the
latter . . . the two-Chinas combination" (TASS' ellipses).
As in other Soviet reaction to the visit of American table tennis
players and corre pondents to China, the article brings up the
question of strategic implications of "this fact of minor impor-
tance" for the future of Southeast Asia and the Far East. It cites
Western commentators as analyzing this event against the general
background of developments in those areas and as making "far-
reaching conclusiors." However, the TASS summary does not discuss
Indochina.
SOVIET-U.S. A significant dimension of Soviet concern over the
RELATIONS impact of Chinese diplomatic moves shows through in
the NEW TIMES article's attempt to depict Peking as
an obstructionist element in efforts to settle international con-
flicts. Statisig that the Chinese oppose any measures which could
contribute to "a real relaxation" of tension, the article in effect
reminds the United States that it has a greater stake in cooperating
with the Soviet Union in the interests of international stability
than in seeking to gain leverage by improving relations with the
PRC. Thus, the article points out that Peking opposes the Soviet-FRG
trer_y and objects to any move toward a Middle East settlement. It
also takes note of Peking's campaign against the two superpowers in
the name of smail and medium-size nations, which "reveals clearly a
desire to make China the principal superpower of the world." In
short, the article reflects Soviet concern that Peking's more flexi-
ble maneuverings will complicate Moscow's owi, diplomatic objectivc;3
while enhancing Chinese influence.
In seeking to depict the PRC as a menace to international security,
the article takes a familiar polemica: tack in imputing to Peking
a wish to trigger an armed class betwee. the Soviet Union and the
United States. This charge has long figured in Moscow's effort to
discredit Chinese motives in the international arena, particularly
in connection with arms control issues. The TASS summary does not,
however, mention arms control as one of the subjects on which the
Chinese have takes: a negative stand.
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THIRD WORLD Following still another familiar line, the article
seeks to play on fears of Chinese influence among
the independent states of the third world. It charges that "the
Maoists continue to meddle with the affairs of India and Burma,
Pakistan and Ceylon, the Arab states and several countries of Africa."
Moscow's special interast in India is reflected in the article's
claim that one Chinese aim is "to encircle India by states which
would follow in the wake of Peking's policy."
SOCIALIST Soviet concern over Peking's East European policy
COMMUNITY is registered in a passage accusing the Chinese of
intensifying their attempts to "undermine the social-
ist community'! in pursuit of their "great-power, hegemonic line."
With the growing Sino-Romanian ties evidently in mind, the article
argues that the Chinese seek to isolate other communist countries in
order to impose Peking's political line on them one by one--an implied
warning to Romania that it could become another Albania.
Moscow's allies--except for Bucharest--have weighed in with comment
supporting the Soviets and probing anti-Soviet implications of recent
Sino-U.S. developments. In one commentary, the Polish ZYCIE WARSZAWY
on 28 April spelled out some of the sensitive issues underlying
Moscow's concern over the impact these developments could have on
its bargaining position. Stating that there would be no cause for
concern over an improvement in Sino-U.S. relations were it not for
a desire by both Peking and Washington to strengthen their hands
against the Soviets, the article observes that the Sino-Soviet talks
are at "a complete deadlock" and that Washington has not shown any
readiness to meet Moscow halfway at the strategic arms limitation
talks or in the talks on Berlin.
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CEYLON
MOSCOW REPORTS "ULTRALEFTIST" REBELLION; PEKING REMAINS SILENT
While Peking media maintain total silence on the armed insurgency
which broke out in Ceylon on 5 April, Moscow has reported the
government moves against the rebels and has identified them--in
a broadcast for Chinese listeners in Southeast Asia--as "ultra-
leftist terrorists" who profess socialist objectives but are in
fact supported by "reactionaries." They are directly identified
as "Maoist" in the Hungarian party daily, quoting the chairman
of the pro-Soviet Ceylon Communist Party. But there has been no
comment in the Soviet central press, and in most of its radio
comment Moscow has obscured the causes and nature of the
insurgency. It has nowhere alluded to the USSR's supply of
military aid to the Ceylon Government in response to the latter's
request.
Pyongyang acknowledged the insurgency obliquely on 20 April in
officially protesting the Ceylon Government's expulsion of the
DPRK embassy staff, complaining that the action was based on
"fabricated" charges linking the DPRK to the "domestic unrest"
in Ceylon. Pyongyang's protest coincided with Peking publicity
for a Ceylon Government statement refuting "malicious rumors"
(vaguely defined) about Chinese activities in Ceylon.
Havana media, publicizing'the visit of Ceylon Prime Minister
Sirimavo Bandaranaike's son to Cuba, have taken only the
briefest notice of the insurgency.
MOSCOW During the first two weeks of the insurgency Soviet
media confined their coverage to scattered brief
reports on the "resolute measures" taken by the Ceylon Government
to restore order and to put down what were described as "rebels"
organized by "reactionary forces" seeking to overthrow
Mrs. Bandaranaike's United Front Government. There was no
allusion to the insurgency in a Moscow commentary in English
to Southeast Asia on the 17th expressing the Soviet people's
"full understanding and support" for the "progressive course"
of the Ceylon Government during its first 10 months in office;
the commentary was pegged to Brezhnev's CPSU congress remarks
grouping Ceylon with Afro-Asian countries following a
noncapitalist path.
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It was in a broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast ksia on the
18th that Moscow media elaborated on the nature of the
insurgency and explained who the rebels are. The broadcast
said the Ceylon Government had uncovered many "secret arms
caches" and a "plot" by "ultraleftist terrorists and
reactionary forces to 1aunrl. large-scale attacks on govern-
ment organs, to create confusion by staging a revolution,
and to overthrow the legitimate government by means of
armed violence." Identifying the insurgents as belonging
to "the People's Liberation Organization," which is "mainly
composed of young students and unemployed secondary school
and university students," the commentary asserted that
although the organization "terms itself socialist," it is
"pursuing objectives that have nothing in common with
genuine socialism"; and although it "proclaims itself a
leftist progressive organization," it has "resorted to
terrorism." The commentary charged that in addition to
receiving support from "Ceylon's reactionaries," the
insurgents had been funded by "Western espionage organizations,
including the CIA."
Subsequent Moscow radio commentaries in other languages have
refrained from elaborating on the causes or nature of the
insurgency, and the characterization of the rebels as
"ultraleftists" has not recurred. Brief news reports on
continuing Ceylon Government efforts to "liquidate pockets
of resistance" portray the insurgents as "ter.-?orists backed
by the reaction."
BUDAPEST, The Soviet line that reactionary forces are
WARSAW behind the rebellion has been echoed in East
European media. In an interview reported by
Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on 20 April, Ceylon Communist Party
Chairman Dr. S.A. Wickremasinghe contended that "rightist
groups opposing the implementation of a progressive-program
and nationalizatica" are behind the "antigovernment uprising"
in Ceylon. He stated that the rightist groups had been
assisted by the unemployed, well-educated young people, and
"Maoist groups of the workers movement, which were also
supported from abroad." By implication, he also sought to
include the U.S. embassy and the opposition United National
Party, ousted by Mrs. Bandaranaike's United Front in May 1970,
among the conspirators.
? CONFIDENTIAL
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Playing a similar theme, an article in the Warsaw daily
SZTANDAR MLODYCH, reported by PAP on 16 April, charged
"the Ceylonese reaction" with "creating appearances of
attacks launched by the pseudo-leftwing circles" in order
to "provoke tension and create political and economic
confusion, setting Premier Bandaranaike at variance with
the leftwing forces which support her."
PEKING Silent on the insurgency, NCNA reported on
19 April that the PRC ambassador to Ceylon had
been received by Prime Minister Bandaranaike and, with no
linking of the two events, noted on the 20th that the Ceylon
Government had issued a communique "refuting malicious
rumors aimed at disrupting Ceylon-China relations." The
communique sought to discredit rumors circulating in Ceylon
about Chinese technicians working on the PRC-supported
construction of the Bandaranaike memorial international
conference hall in Colombo and about "materials" being
brought in from China for the project. NCNA did not
elaborate on the substance of the rumors, which apparently
included speculation that materiel for the insurgents was
being brought in along with the construction materials.
PYONGYANG The DPRK Foreign Ministry on 20 April issued
a statement contending that "unfriendly action"
by the Ceylon Government had made it impossible for the
DPRK embassy staff "to perform their functionu as a diplomatic
mission in Ceylon" and that the staff "had no altern:utive but
to leave the country on 16 April." Alleging that the
expulsion of the embassy staff "stemmed fron the sinister and
sly scheme of imperialists" and reactionaries to wreck
Ceylon-Korean relations, the statement asserted that the
expulsion was taken "without any reason or foundation
whatsoever," that it was based on "fabricated facts" which
scught to link "the domestic state of unrest" in Ceylon with
the DPRK, and that it was part of "a wicked plot to mislead
public opinion and slander the DPRK." The statement predicted
that the "sinister scheme" will be "shattered" and that
Korean-Ceylon relations "will be normalized again in the
interests of the peoples of the two countries."
HAVANA The single, brief report of the insurgency
monitored from Cuban media was a domestic service
news item on 9 April noting that a factory and a school had
been bombed by the Royal Ceylon Air Force and that armored
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units had repulsed "insurgent groups" at two other locations.
The nature of the insurgent groups was not defined: neither
Cuban nor any other monitored communist media have taken
notice of thy: ;designation of the insurgents as "Che Guevarists,"
reported in the Western press.
On 1.1 April Cuban media reported the arrival in Havana of
Mrs. Bandaranaike's son Anura, and on the 16th he was
reported to be taking part in cane-cutting activities.
PRENSA LATINR said on the 11th that he had come to Cuba
"to learn of problems related to youth, its incorporation
into productive labor, and the historical process of the
Cuban revolution."
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PAKISTAN
Apparently judging that the rebellion in East Pakistan is winding
down and that Soviet interests lie in good relations with Pakistan
President Yahya Khan's government, Moscow confines its now infre-
quent coverage of the situation to reports attributed to Pakistani
sources portraying a return to normalcy in the rebellious region
and a complete rout of the secessionist forces. Previously,
Moscow had balanced reports on events from the Pakistan Government's
standpoint with Western news accounts depicting widespread afted
opposition to the Pakistan military forces attrMpting to restore
control in the Eastern region.
Peking has sustained its silence on what it Pakistan's
internal affairs while focusing on alleged i, arence by India
abetted by the two "superpowers."*
MOSCOW PUBLICIZES OFFICIAL PAKISTAN GOVERIW`4ENT LINE
After having stated its concern over events in East Pakistan in
President Podgornyy's 3 April message to Yahya and then retreating
to an essentially neutral stance, Moscow now associates itself with
the Pakistan Government's line that the rebellion has been brought
to heel. Thus, TASS on 19 April noted a Pakistan press agency
report that "the last major town controlled by the supporters of
Mujibur Rahman" had fallen to the Pakistan Army, and it cited a
Dacca radio report on the restoration of public transportation
and the improving availability of foodstuffs in East Pakistan. On
22 April TASS quoted "official reports from Dacca" as saying that
"life is gradually returning to normal in the cities and towns of
East Pakistan." On the 27th TASS cited a Pakistan Radio announce-
ment that "mopping-up operations" were being conducted against
secessionist units in various areas of the Eastern wing, and it
took note of other claims that normalcy had been restored.
The considerations underlying Moscow's approach were reflected in
a 15 April commentary in English to South Asia which was particularly
defensive regarding Pakistani press reaction to the Soviet position
on the Pakistan crisis and to Podgornyy's message to Yahya. This
commentary, the only elaboration of Podgornyy's message in Soviet
media, reiterated what it said was "the essence of the Soviet
* Earlier Soviet and Chinese treatment of Pakistan developments is
discussed in the TRENDS of 7 April, pages 24-27, and 114 April, pages
30-33.
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message" and. stressed that the Soviet interest was simply in
ending the bloodshed and encouraging a peaceful :iolutic.n. It
emphasized that "the public in many other Asian countrie.j
friendly to Pakistan share the [Soviet] alarm and concern about
the events in that country." Soviet media never acknowledged
Yahya's reply to Podgornyy's message.
Soviet media have also ignored Pakistani appeals--repeated by
Peking--for Moscow to urge India to cease its alleged inter-
ference in Pakistan's affairs. Moscow's first public
acknowledgment of Indian-Pakistani tension appeared in a
TASS transmission on 28 April which, in a studied show of
neutrality, juxtaposed Pakistani and Indian accounts of
border trouble. A Karachi-datelined report quoted a Dacca
radio announcement that two soldiers from an Indian frontier
battalion had been taken prisoner during Pakistani operations
against infiltrators, while a Delhi-datelined report cited an
Indian news agency as saying Pakistani Government troops have
repeatedly crossed the border and fired on Indian border posts.
Moscow's suspicions regarding Chinese interests in the area
were conveyed in a NEW TIMES article, reviewed by TASS on
21 April, which stated that "the Maoists continue to meddle
with the affairs of India and Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon" and
seek "to encircle India by states which would follow in the
wake of Peking's policy."*
PEKING CONTINUES TO DECRY INDIAN, "SUPERPOWER" INTERFERENCE
Peking has continued to focus its propaganda on alleged inter-
ference in Pakistan's internal affairs by the "Indian
reactionaries, Soviet revisionism, and U.S. imperialism"
while avoiding comment on the secessionist movement and the
fighting in East Pakistan. PRC media have not acknowledged
messages of support to Yahya from Chou En-lai (reported by
both Pakistani and Indian news sources) and from Mao Tse-tung
(reported by Indian sources). Peking has publicized material
from Australian communist, Albanian, and Congolese organs to
condemn the Indian Government, the United Nations, the Soviet
Union, and the United States for interference in Pakistan
events. In addition, Peking has continued to publicize
See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.
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Pakistan protests to the Indian Government alleging armed
activities against Pakistan forces.
NCNA on 18 April, in what seems a glaring oversight by its
editors, carried a Rawalpindi-datelined report on East
Pakistan protests against Indian interference which included
a quotation from a Karachi paper that should have brought a
blush to the editors' cheeks:
On more than one occasion Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi had publicly stated that India could
could not sit idle--a notorious euphemism for
military action interminably used by would-be
aggressors.
Also on 18 April, NCNA reported a banquet in Peking in honor
of Pakistan Air Force Commodore Kamal Ahmad, commandant of
the staff college of the Pakistan Air Force, and an accompany-
ing group of instructors and cadets. It took note of toasts
"to the constant consolidation and growth of the friendship
between the peoples, the armies and the air forces of China
and Pakistan."
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i28 APRIL, .1.971
MIDDLE EAST
USSR NOTES ROGERS' MIDEAST TOUR1 REJECTS ISRAEL'S SUEZ IDEAS
Moscow dismisses the 23 April announcement of Secretary Rogers'
forthcoming Middle East tour as a maneuver aimed at white-
washing U.S. policy and asserts that no diplomatic strategems
can force the Arabs to abandon their just demands. Propagandists
focus on portraying the United States as too aligned with
Israel to be objective, and depict Israel as trying to
substitute U.S. mediation for that of Jarring. But TASS made
no mention of the Secretary's trip in reporting the continued
suspension of Jarring's mission, announced on the 23d,
linking It only with Israeli efforts to "wreck" a Middle
East peace settlement.
At the same time, Moscow continues to press a Big Four role,
calling attention to world expectations that the four-power
consultations will produce some realistic effort for peace,
and charging the United States with cynicism and obstructionism
in its attitude to the talks.
The propaganda claims that Israel desires some purely American
rather than international and UN guarantees to accompany the
reopening of the Suez Canal. Moscow terms as unacceptable
the reported Israeli ideas on reopening the canal, describing
them as aimed only at retention of the occupied territories.
ROGERS' Reporting Secretary Rogers' 23 April press conference
TOUR at which he announced his forthcoming visits to the
UAR, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, TASS
singled out his statement of continued U.S. support for Security
Council Resolution 242 and for the Jarring mission. In this
connection, TASS said, the Secretary stated that his tour
aimed at supplementing, rather than substituting for, the
Jarring mission. Washington's deeds, TASS asserted, contradict
Rogers' statement, and it pointed to U.S. military and
political aid to Israel and charged the United States with
obstructing Big Four consultations by proposing that the
four powers "not 'impose peace on the Middle East.'" The
role of the Big Four is also underlined by other propagandists,
Kolesnichenko in PRAVDA on the 23d quoting Ambassador Bush
as stating, in an interview for an Israeli radio audience,
that the United States views the four-power consultations
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CON I' I, I)1 N'I'IAI:, 101JIU 'I1tli1N1)13
I'll A111011, 19(1
"merely as 'conversations and nothing more,' au It 'commun:l.catiunu
line," and that the United. States hau nothing "nerioun and
specific" in its portfolio for the 'talks, I~artiruiar:l.y regarding
peace guaranteed.
TABS and Moscow broadcasts in Arab:I.c have quoted comment from
the Cairo papers AL-AKFIBA.R and AL-JUMHURIYA.II criticizing U.S.
policy', the former saying Secretary Rogers' visit could be
useful only if it aimed at honest observance of Resolution
242, and the latter claiming that the purpose of the tour is
to strengthen American interests. An Arabic-language broadcast
on the 27th described Arab press reaction to the Rogers trip as
further affirmation of the UAR's "constructive stand" in
desiring to solve the crisis peacefully. While describing
the trip as a new maneuver of U.S. diplomacy, it added, the
Arabs "are not rejecting the possibility of expressing their
views once again" on the question of establishing a durable
and just peace.
ISRAEL'S SUEZ Israel's ideas on a partial settlement relating
PROPOSALS to reopening the Suez Canal, discussed by
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Alon and
Secretary Rogers on the 20th, were promptly branded by TABS
on the 21st as testimony to "further sabotage" by Israel of
UAR efforts to settle the crisis and reopen the canal.
Israel's proposals are regarded in Cairo, according to a
foreign-language commentary on the 26th, as u,imedat
perpetuating the occupation by attempting to isolate the
problem of the canal reopening from a general settlement.
Primakov, in the domestic service commentators' roundtable
on the 25th, summed up the essence of the "so-called
proposals": Israel is "supposedly ready" to partially
withdraw its troops 10 miles, "beyond the range of medium-
caliber Egyptian artillery," on condition that Egypt end
the state of war with Israel and no Egyptian soldiers cross
the canal. In other words, Primakov said, Israel demands
legalization of the occupation, and he viewed the proposals
as completely unacceptable. In recalling President as-Sadat's
initial proposal, on 4 February, for reopening the canal,
Primakov noted that the question of distance of withdrawal
was not "definitely stated" and that it "therefore remains
a subject of further discussion." (In his NEWSWEEK article
released on 15 February, however, as-Sadat had defined
partial withdrawal to mean withdrawal to a line behind
al-Arish--a point noted by Moscow at the time.)
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28 APRIL 1971
AMERICAN Soviet commentators claim that Washington,
"MEDIATION" responding to Tel Aviv's appei.1, agreed to
serve as an intermediary in the Suez Canal
question, with Israel thus addressing its 1..dias to the United
States and ignoring the Jarring mission. Priraakov in his
27 April commentary speculated as to whether the United
States assumed the "so-called mediation mission" to substitute
for the Jarring mission, or to ease world criticism of
Israel by saying that mediation was still. going on, or to
try to reestablish U.S. positions in the Arab countries. A
'1'soppi commentary broadcast in English to Africa on the
22d asserted that Tel Aviv, relying for mediation not on
Jarring but on the United States, seemed to think that
Washington has some right to shape the course of Middle East
developments. Tsoppi cited the Egyptian weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF
as commenting that the UAR would have nothing against a
positive contribution to the Jarring mission, but was
absolutely against Washington's attempt to act the part
of sole benefactor of the two sides in the dispute.
EGYPTIAN On the 25th, TASS reported a UAR Foreign
STATEMENTS Ministry statement, pegged to the Rogers
tour, as declaring that any questions
relating to a partial Israeli withdrawal can be discussed
only within the framework of an all-round settlement of
the crisis envisaging, first of all, Israeli withdrawal
from all occupied territories. The statement stressed
Cairo's hope, TASS said, that the mission Secretary Rogers
intends to carry out "will correspond to the general stand
of the UAR," TASS at the same time ci':ed AL-A1RAM as
noting that the UAR Foreign Ministry was studying news
agency reports that Washington supports a partial settlement
based on limited Israeli withdrawal, and said the paper
pointed out that the ministry was also studying calls
from different world capitals to convene the Security
Council or the UN General Assembly to discuss Israel's
"negative stand."
TASS the same day reported UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as
declaring that any partial troop withdrawal is out of the
question, and there can inly be full withdrawal, which
"could be carried out in two stages but must be accompanied
by international guarantees and Israel's written commitment
to Jarring."
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HAITI
MOSCOW. HAVANA BROADCASTS IN CREOLE URGE "PATRIOTS" TO REVOLT
Following the death of Haitian President Dr. Francois Duvalier,
announced on 22 April, Moscow and Havana have evoked a threat of
U.S. intervention in behalf of the regime against "patriotic"
opposition forces and have used their special radio services in
Creole to call for a popular uprising against Duvalier's heirs.
Havana has long used its broadcasts in Creole and Moscow the
Creole service of its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and
Progress to excoriate Duvalier and openly promote revolution.
INITIAL Both Cuban and Soviet media briefly reported
REACTION Duvalier's death soon after it was officially
announced in Haiti, and both promptly speculated
on the possibility of U.S. military intervention. TASS reports
and a 23 April Radio Moscow broadcast in Portuguese to Brazil
charged that Washington, "alarmed" by the possible consequences
of Duvalier's death, was "undertaking threatening steps" aimed
at giving "psychological comfort to the supporters of the late
dictator and butcher of the Haitian people." Such steps were
said to include "a virtual sea b:..jckade of Haiti." Moscow said
the United States was preparing to intervene against "the
Haitian people's progressive forces" on the pattern of the
intervention in the Dominican Republic. In a similar vein, a
Havana domestic :Arvice commentary on the 22d noted speculation
about "a new intervention by U.S. troops, as in 1915 when they
invaded Haitian territory on the pretext of protecting foreign
interests."
0
Such comment, however, has not been extensive from Radio Moscow
or in the Havana radio's regular services, which have paid
little attention to events in Haiti since the period immediately
following Duvalier's death.
BROADCASTS Inflammatory Soviet and Cuban broadcasts in
IN CREOLE Creole, on the other hand, have fired a barrage
of personal abuse at the late president's daughter
Marie Denise--described by Havana as "the real power" in the new
government--and at Jean Claude Duvalier, who has succeeded his
father as president for life. Broadcasts in both Creole services
have called upon the Haitian people to institute revolutionary
action, picturing the regime as unchanged by Duvalier's death and
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seeking to lend urgency to the call to arms by dramatizing
the threat of foreign intervention.
A Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Creole on the 24th
cited the contention of the Central Committee of the Unified
Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH) that the Haitian people
must be "very vigilant not to allow foreign intervention"
and must unite "so that the action against Duvalierists can
be successfully initiated and be crowned with complete
success." In its greetings to the CPSU Central Committee
on the occasion of the 24th CPSU Congress, carried by PRAVDA
on 12 April, the Haitian party Central Committee had asserted
that the struggle against the Duvalier regime "must be of
the nature of a popular armed struggle for national liberation,
opening the way for the building of socialism."
Jean Claude and Marie Denise came in for particularly vituperative
personal attack in a Radio Peace and Progress commentary in
Creole on the 25th, which warned the "imperialists" and "the
Duvalierist band of sons of bitches" to "prepare themselves for
the rebellion of the people." The broadcast said "things are
getting tougher in Haiti now" and declared that "the battle
is ready to begin in which the people will definitively cleanse
the country of all the filth and grease from the Duvalier
family." It called on the people to be alert and appealed to
"all the patriotic forces to unite, so that they can rise up
together against Duvalierism and the Yankee imperialism that
is supporting it."
Havana broadcasts in Creole on the 23d and 24th said the
Haitian people have many demands "that only a people's govern-
ment can meet" and emphasized that the people "do not want a
tyrant to replace a tyrant." The commentary on the 23d called
on Haitians to "mobilize on a patriotic, revolutionary base,"
to "take the initiative, stand up for their rights," and
"prepare our forces." The commentary said: "Our souls are
united and ready to attack the neocolonial, pro-Yankee
society and finally begin the revolution in Haiti."
11
Citing the U.S. Navy's "vigilance over Haiti" since "the old
tyrant died" and blaming the United States for all of
"Duvalier's crimes, infamies, and murders," a Havana commentary
in Creole on the 24th urged Haitians to "Join forces to destroy
the social roots of Duvalierism--that is, to change the
semicolonial regime into a national liberation regime, a
revolutionary regime." It added that only when that occurs will
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the U.S. Government "take its troops off alert status,
because it will know--as. it knew with Cuba--that the Marines
would not come to Haiti to have a nice time; that they would
be stopped on Haiti's plains and in the mountains of a new
Vietnam."
BACKGROUND Both the Soviet and Cuban radio services in
Creole had for years been forecasting the
imminent downfall of Duvalier in the face of an armed revolt.*
Peace and Progress commentaries since the beginning of this
year had been picturing increasing unrest under a "wave of
terrorism," denouncing Duvalier's constitutional machinations
to establish Jean Claude as his successor, and publicizing
calls by the PUCH for the people to "overthrow the dictatorial,
antipopular, greedy regime." On 9 April a commentary in Creole
carried a PUCH appeal to Haitians to "be alert" and prevent
"Duvalier's heirs from coming to power." A 13 Apr'.l commentary
depicted "a major crisis" in Haiti and declared that "the
struggle against Duvalier should be a people's armed struggle
for national liberation and should open the path to the building
of socialism." It added that the.Haitian people "have the
support of all the progressive forces in the world, and
especially that of the Soviets." .
Havana's Creole broadcasts have been in similar vein. A
typical commentary on 17 March called on "all patriots and
revolutionaries in Haiti" to unite in the creation of "a move-
ment for a second independence of our homeland, to change the
social system and this rot, and to build with the courage and
heroism of the people . . . another Haiti, another society
`hat is anti-imperialist, democratic, independent, sovereign,
and socalist." On 13 April a Creole commentary characterized
the Haitian revolutionary movement as "more enthusiastic, more
vigorous, more dynamic, and more communist than ever" and
concluded that "only a socialist revolution will enable Haiti
to emerge from underdevelopment and from the conditions which
now prevail."
* For a discussion of earlier Moscow and Havana broadcasts
to Haiti in Creole, see the FBIS SURVEY of 23 May 1968,
pages 4-7.
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SPACE FLIGHTS
SOVIET SPACE DOCKING HAILED AS STEP TOWARD ORBITING STATIONS
Moscow propaganda hailing the two-day flight of Soyuz 10 and
its br:Lef docking, on 24 April, with the unmanned Salyut craft
lays stress on creation of orbital stations as a chief aim
of the Soviet space program. Writing for TASS on the 26th,
a Soviet scientist observed, for example, that "we are or. the
way to space stations and laboratories, which is to be done
by combining automatic devices with man's operation aboard
a spaceship." In a similar vein, S'iyuz 10 commander Shatalov,
at a 25 April press conference heLi by the crew of the ship
in Karaganda, asserted that "we a-. *e contini'.ing to advance
along the road of creating orbital research stations."
An ?ZVESTIYA article on the 24th stcced that "one of the
chief aims" of the Soyuz program is the assembling of
orbiting stations to perform scientific tasks as well as
to resolve problems in the national economy. On the
latter score, the IZVESTIYI'. article and other commentaries
point up such benefits of space research as the discovery
of mineral deposits and the accurate forecasting of
weather. Such stres:i on practical results--perhaps aimed
at justifying the expenditures on space research--has been
prominent in Moscow's comment on Soviet space activities
since 1967.
Available propaganda offers no explanation for the short
duration of the linkup of the two craft and of the flight
of Soyuz 10. As in the past, Moscow's reporting conveys
the impression that all went well. Summing up the results
of the flight at the 25 April press conference, Shatalov
said that while it was short, it was complex in its work,
aims, and tasks. One of the most important tasks, according
to the TASS account of Shatalov's remarks, was to try out
the system of searching for and approaching an unmanned
object in space and to test a new system of docking. This
line was echoed by cosmonaut Feoktstov, among others,
in an interview with TASS on the 25th. That some problems
were met is implicit, however, in Feoktistov's observation
that "it will become necessary in the future to learn to
dock a relatively small transport spaceship with a huge
multipurpose laboratory." A docking of this type, he
added, is a more difficult task than the docking of two
Soyuz~or Cosmos spaceships--"craft of roughly the same
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Moscow has given no indication that the Salyut craft will
serve as a docking target for other Soyuz flights. But in
line with statements in the media that experiments with
the craft will be continued, the 26 April message of
congratulations from the leading Soviet organs to those
responsible for the flight of Soyuz 10 observed that
research "which constitutes the beginning of work with
Salyut" was carried out during the flight of the manned
craft.
DELAYED REPORT Soviet coverage of the flight of the two
OF DOCKING crt'.ft stopped short of stating directly
that a docking maneuver was scheduled--
in keeping with past practice of withholding advance
publicity for planned experiments on space flights. But
Moscow's reports had hinted strongly at the possibility.
The TASS announcement of the 23 April launch of Soyuz 10
stated that the orbital inclination was 51.6 degrees--
the same figure given for the orbital inclination of
Salyut in the TASS announcement of that launch on 19 April.
The biographies of the three crew members of the Soyuz
craft--released by TASS on the 23d--noted that two of them
had flown in the craft involved in a docking maneuver in
January 1969 and in the "group flight" of three ships in
October 1969; the third member of the crew, according to
TASS, had been trained as a test engineer of an orbital
station.
The announcement that a docking had taken place did not
come until late on the 24th. TASS on the 25th, reporting
the safe landing of Soyuz 10 that day, stated that the
docking had been accomplished at 0147 GMT on 24 April
and lasted five and a half hours. A TASS Russian dispatch
at 1054 GMT on the 24th--after the docking had occurred
but before it was announced--had said that during the
joint flight scientific-technical experiments and
operations "involved in docking and undocking of the
manned spacecraft with the Salyut orbiting station were
carried out."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
- 37 -
COSMONAUTICS DAY BRINGS STATEMENTS OF INTEREST IN COOPERATION
Soviet spokesmen took the occasion of Cosmonautics Day, 12 April,
to reaffirm Moscow's interest in cooperation with the United
States in space. But available Soviet propaganda on the
flights of Soy:iz 10 and Salyut does not touch on this issue,*
and Moscow media have not publicized. Soviet cosmonaut Maj.
Gen. Beregovoy's remarks in Italy on a joint space venture.
As reported by AFP on 26 April, Beregovoy said that space
flights "with mixed Soviet-American crews would be possible
in the future." AFP quoted him as remarking that both
countries have accumulated knowledge in a certain secto%- and
that each would benefit if they pooled their experience.
The avowals of a desire for cooperation on Cosmonautics
Day had been couched in the usual broad generalities. A
letter from Soviet cosmonauts published in PRAVDA on
12 April said that.in the interests of peace and friendship,
"cooperation between space explorers of different countries,
including the USSR and the USA, should develop and grow
stronger." In the same issue of PRAVDA, Academician Boris
Petrov took note of the fact that agreement has been
reached on the development of Soviet-U.S. cooperation
"in certain directions of space research." And Soviet
Academy of Sciences President Keldysh, at a Kremlin
meeting reported in the domestic service on the 12th,
said that the "first steps" have been made toward coopera-
tion with the United States. Petrov and Keldysh presumably
alluded to the 21 January 1971 agreement between the
Academy of Sciences and NASA to study a wide range of
areas of cooperation, as well as to the 28 October 1970
accord looking toward the development of compatible
docking systems.
The Central Committee report read by Erezhnev at the
24th CPSU Congress on 30 March mentioned in passing the
desirability of cooperating "with other interested states"
in the conquest of space.
* While Moscow has long affirmed a Soviet interest in space
cooperation with the United States, it has not often broached
the subject in connection with the USSR's recent manned space
flights. For a report on the treatment of the flight of
Soyuz 9 in June 1970, see the TRENDS of 15 July 1970, pages
39-40.
CONFIDENTIAL
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(JONI'l.l.!EN'CIA1, 11,11113 '.L'Jfl NDU
28 APHI.C. 1.9'(1.
- 38 -
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR REPORTS, MOSCOW SILENT ON ABRASIMOV REMARKS ON BERLIN
East German but not Soviet media have publicized remarks by
Abrasimov, the USSR ambassador to the GDR, on the Soviet
draft proposals on West Berlin presented 26 March at the
18th session of the four-power talks. Abrasimov's comments--
the most authoritative Soviet public discussion since the
Polish press divulged details of the draft proposals on
15 April--were made on the 23d in the course of a report
on the CPSU congress at a meeting of the German-Soviet
Friendship Society's Central Executive in East Berlin.
The Moscow central preys, which has yet to acknowledge the
existence of the Soviet draft proposals, did not even
report that the meeting took place. Moscow radio's domestic
service took note of the meeting in a brief news item which
did not mention that Abrasimov spoke. But East Berlin media
have given the meeting extensive coverage: ADN reported
the meeting and the content of Abrasimov's speech the same
day, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published the speech on the 24th,
and East Berlin's Deutschlandsender broadcast a commentary
on the speech and on the Soviet draft proposals on the
26th.
As quoted in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Abrasimov prefaced his
references to the Soviet proposals with a recollection
that the "peace" program outlined at the CPSU congress
called for a European security conference, quick
ratification of the Warsaw and Moscow treaties with Bonn,
and "settlement of the problems involving West Berlin."
Brezhnev, he said, "-_-learly stressed" to the congress
"the Soviet Union's readiness to conclude the negotiations
on the problems connected with West Berlin for the mutual
benefit of all interested sides," provided the Big Three
respect the allied agreements stipulating the "special
status of West Berlin" and the "sovereign rights of the
GDR as an independent socialist state."
Declaring that the Soviet Union has made a "maximum" effort
to demonstrate its desire for "mutually acceptable solutions"
in the year-long four-power negotiations, the USSR ambassador
went on to note -:;hat the Soviet side had "recently submitted
an extensive and comprehensive draft of an agreement" on
West Berlin which "offers every possibility of arriving at
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(10 N101, 1)11IN1,H:A1, I'H:C[! '1.'HE Nllfl
~ L3 API :LL 1.971.
mutually advantageous uolut:1.onn" in the :Lntorontn of all.
concerned. "According to our deopent conviction and from
the viewpoint of its practical significance," he naid, "this
Soviet draft offers everything required to achieve an
agreement in the near future." But he added that because
the negotiations are multilateral, "the good will of all
sides and a striving to find an agreement not in words but
in deeds" are essential.
WARSAW PRESS CONTINUES DISCUSSION OF SOVIET DRAFT PROPOSALS
Along with the GDR's publicity for Abrasimov's remarks,
further Polish press comment on the Soviet draft proposals
seems part of a well-orchestrated effort to convey via the
media of Moscow's allies--while the Soviet central press
stays silent--the impression that the USSR has made
appreciable concessions at the four-power talks in the
inte;-eats of a West Berlin settlement.
In another in the succession of Polish press articles
following up the disclosure of the Soviet proposals in
a ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial of the 15th,* a 23 April
article in DZIENNIK LUDOWY reported--for the first time
in monitored bloc media--Abrasimov's remark to the p_ess
just after the 18th session of the four-power talks to
the effect that "progress is possible."
On 27 April, in his second major article in ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in 10 days, Ryszard Wojna commented at length on the West
Cerman reaction to the Soviet draft proposals. Labeling
the presentation of the Soviet proposals "a new fact of
immense importance" and calling the proposals "the most
far-reaching in the history of West Berlin," Wojna said
that the Soviet Union submitted its draft at a time when
the Brandt-Scheel government was pursuing a "realistic
policy" despite strong internal political opposition.
Deploring the CDU/CSU opposition to Brandt's Ostpolitik,
and particularly to the Soviet proposals on West Berlin,
Wojna added that some circles in Bonn believe that "in
the face of definite Soviet concessions" the Federal
Republic should "raise the price" of a settlement rather
See the TRENDS of 21 April 1971, pages 29-31.
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CONFIDENTIAL P'BTB TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971.
- 4o -
than matching Soviet "good will." Wojna said the Soviet
proposals had been offered in the same spirit of good will
that had produced the signing of the Moscow treaty with
Bonn, and he added pointedly that it was not the USSR that
created the "linkage" between the ratification of the treaty
and a West Berlin settlement.
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108111 'I'J NNI)I1
PA APRIL :I.9'(1
- 4;I. -
FRG-CZECEIOSLOVAKIA
PRAGUE RADIO REACTS TO WEST GERMAN C(*N NT ON BILATERAL TALKS
A commentary in the West German weekly DE1i SPIEGEL of 12 April
suggesting that the Czechoslovak side had been inade'uately
prepared for the initial round of exploratory talks on normalizing
FRG-Czechoslovak relations, held in Prague on 31 March and 1 April.,
has prompted the first and only discussion of the talks in Prague
media since they were held. In the vein of Czechoslovak propaganda
preceding the bilateral talks, a Prague radio commentary on 24 April
rejoined that it had been at Czechoslovak initiative that the talks
were finally begun after "long hesitation" on the part of Bonn. The
Czechoslovak Government had long been welling to hold the talks and
had long been prepared for them, the broadcast said, while recogniz-
ing that it would not be "easy to remove the obstacles that had
accumulated" in relations between the two countries over the "past
decades."
After pointing out that the Bonn representative at the talks, State
Secretary Frank, had praised the initial round for their "businesslike
and frank atmosphere" and that West German media had for the most
part treated them in a "serious" manner, the radio commentary went
on to express concern over DER SPIEGEL's portrayal of a far less
favorable West German reaction. It cited passages in DER SPIEGEL
quoting "alleged" statements by Frank "or other officials of the
Bonn foreign ministry" to the effect that the Bonn negotiators
"did not know at the end of the talks what they were actually in
Prague for" and that the Czechoslovak side "had obviously not been
properly prepared for the negotiations." The officials indicated
that Bonn welcomed this situation because it wants to "drag out
the talks" in line with its general tactical approach to
Czechoslovakia, the broadcast quoted DER SPIEGEL as reporting.
If the weekly's allegations are true, the broadcast said, they
would be in "crass contradiction" to Bonn's initial appraisal of
the Prague talks as "encouraging." And this, the radio added,
could only "considerably shake the positive impression of the
Bonn negotiators' seriousness" and their "professed interest in
a positive outcome of the talks."
Declaring that the West German Government should dissociate
itself from the DER SPIEGEL commentary, the broadcast reported
the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs as stating, in
response to a question from Radio Prague, that Bonn has
CONFIDENTIAL
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28 A1''D E L 1971
- 42
"otfieially dissociated itself through diplomatic channels
from the alleged statementu" and considers such peculation
"harmful" to the next stage of the talks. As If to leave
the situatior still in some doubt, however, the broadcast
added that if there has indeed been such a diplomatic
demarche from Bonn it "should be considered a satisfactory
explanation by the appropriate quarters in Prague."
Scheduling of the second round of the exploratory talks for
May in Born, reported by Federal Government spokesman Ahlers
on 22 April, has yet to be mentioned in Prague media.
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CONI IDL1N'TIA1, INB:C(3 '.I'It1 NI)J
P8 APIU
-143-
BULGARIA
PARTY CONGRESS REASSERTS ORTHODOX, PRO-SOVIET LINE
The 10th Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Congress, which
met from 20 to 25 April, reaffirmed a predictably orthodox
pro-Soviet line and was about as unspectacular as the
March CPSU congress from which it drew its guidelines.
According to Bulgarian media, the congress "unanimously"
elected Todor Zhivkov as party first secretary and
reelected the entire 11-man Politburo. It also expanded
the Central Committee from 137 to 1147 members. The only
mild surprise was the ouster of Luchezar Avramov, who was
not reelected as a candidate member of the Politburo.
Avramov, the foreign trade minister, had been rumored for
months to be in some difficulty because of an embezzlement
scandal over a year ago in the Bulgarian Merchant Fleet
enterprises which were doing business with the West.
Venelin Kotsev, leading party ideologist, was elected
to candidate membership in the Politburo in his place.
The congress also dutifully ratified the new five-year
plan directives and the new party program--a highly
orthodo?, theoretical document that had already been
published in the Bulgarian press on 14 March.
In deference to Bulgaria as Moscow's most loyal ally,
Brezhnev led the Soviet delegation to the congress.
Hungary's Janos Kadar and Poland's Edward Gierek were
the only East European party chiefs present. The other
bloc delegations were headed by East Germany's Erich
Honecker, Politburo member and secretary of the
Central Committee; Czechoslovakia's Alois Indra,
Presidium member and secretary of the Central Committee;
and Romania's Gheorghe Pana, Presidium and Executive
Committee member and Central Committee secretary. The
Yugoslavs, whose relations with the Bulgarians continue
to be strained over the perennial Macedonian issue, did
not send a. delegation, but Radio Sofia reported that
the Yugoslav ambassador attended the congress as an
"observer."
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VONIPiDi N'I':rAL I1'1316 ''I!10:NI)IJ
;.?8 APR I:T, 1971,
Peking has not been Beard to mention the congress, and 'T'irana
has limited its coverage to a brief radio report on the 26th
that the Bulgarian "revisionist party" had reelected Zh:Lvkov
fir.ot st-cretary.
ZHIVKOV In his report to the opening session of the congress
REPORT on 20 April, as reported by B'2A and published in
RABOTNICHESKO DELO, Zhivkov was typically effusive
in his praise of the Soviet Union and relatively restrained
in his criticism of China and the United States. Following
Brezhnev's lead at the Soviet congress, Zhivkov assailed the
Chinese for attempts "to bring dissidence within our
movement" but expressed Bulgarian willingness to "normalize"
relations with Peking "regardless of serious ideological
differences." The BCP chief also followed Brezhnev's cue
in asserting that Bulgaria had "fulfilled its international
duty as an ally by rendering international assistance to
the fraternal Czechoslovak people" in August 1968.
Despite the Yugoslavs' failure to send an official delegation
to the congress, Zhivkov was conciliatory toward Belgrade:
He remarked that Sofia is "guided by the view that cooperation
between the two socialist countries corresponds to the
interests of our peoples" and promised that the Bulgarian
Government would make "further efforts for the further
consolidation of Bulgarian-Yugoslav good-neighborly
relations." Turning to another Balkan neighbor, he
described the Albanian leaders as "sunk in the bog of
opportunism and anti-Sovietism" but added that "in spite
of this, Bulgaria is making and will further make sincere
efforts to normalize relations among the Balkan states."
In this vein Zhivkov asserted Bulgaria's readiness "to
participate actively in all many-sided Balkan events that
would lead to expanding economic, political, and cultural
ties among the Balkan countries." He went on to declare,
in the broader context of European security, that Bulgaria
was prepared to conclude "bilateral or regional treaties"
on renunciation of the use or threat of force in inter-
national relations--a point reiterated in Foreign Minister
Bashev's speech to the congress on the 21st.*
* According to Western news sources, a proposal fora six-
nation Balkan security conference was deleted from Zhivkov's
congress report at the last minute; a Bulgarian. official was
quoted as telling newsmen it had been decided that the .proposal
would be inappropriate in a party forum and should come as a
government initiative.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CON P'ID NT,IA1, I'DIEJ '1111N)B
26 AP1(Ii J.97.L
-115-
Turning to relations with the West, Zhivkov limited himself
to routine criticism of U.S. policies in Indochina and the
Middle Eaot--later formalized in routine congress resolutions
on both subjects--and played the coexistence theme while
expressing an interest in further cooperation with the West
"on the basis of mutual benefit." On the domestic scene, with
the lessons of the December riots and Gomulka'e ouster in
the background, Zhivkov put c,,::siderable stress on the need
to increase the Bulgarian people's standard of living. In
all spheres, he promised, "our efforts will aim at solving
the main task: to further raise the material and spiritual
level of the life of the people." In this connection, he
promised an increase in the minimum wage and pensions as
well as further efforts to improve housing and. maintain
price stability.
BREZi-WEV There was little of note in Brezhnev's speech
SPEECH to the congress on 21 April--the first by a
foreign delegate, relayed live from Sofia by
Radio Moscow. The Soviet leader did not repeat in Sofia
his CPSU congress attack on the Chinese or defense of the
intervention in Czechoslovakia, Zhivkov having echoed the
Soviet position on both counts. The main thrust of
Brezhnev's speech was aimed at portraying Bulgaria as
the epitome of a flourishing, contented ally in tune with
its Soviet mentor. After noting the similarity of focus
and subject xr.atter at the CPSU and BCP congresses, Brezhnev
added; "In working to develop socialist economic
integration, in defending socialist gains in the inter-
national arena (read: Czechoslovakia), in working out
measures for further strengthening the Warsaw Treaty,
the BCP has always acted and continues to act from
the position of consistent socialist internationalism.
For this we, friends and allies, pay the tribute of our
deepest respect."
In his closing address to the congress on the 25th,
broadcast by Radio Sofia, Zhivkov once again assured
his Soviet patrons that Bulgaria would be "unwavering"
in its "awareness that it is necessary to subordinate
without hesitation the private and temporary interests
to the common and lasting interests of the world
communist movement."
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CONFIDENTIAL 1V13IS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
- 46 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SON OF POLITBURO MEMBER SHELEST DEFENDS SELF IN PRESS
In a move probably designed to fend off domestic criticism,
the on of Petr Shelest, Politburo member and Ukraine first
secretary, has charged the New York TIMES with distorting
his earlier proposals in regard to increased contacts with
foreign scientists and altered priorities for Soviet science.
In the 16 April 1971 LITERATURNA UKRAINA, Vitally P. Shelest,
deputy director of the Kiev Institute of Theoretical Physics,
and the editors of LITERATURNA UKRAINA assail the TIMES for
allegedly falsifying and sensationalizing their pleas for
more basic research and for freer contacts with foreign
scientists. But while renouncing the TIMES' interpretation,
particularly the suggestion that their views are in dispute
in the Soviet Union, Shelest and the editors reaffirm their
positions and defend the public discussion of shortcomings
in Soviet science.
A year ago, in May 1970, Vitally Shelest initiated a 5-month
debate on the problems of Soviet science in.LITERATURNA
UKRAINA. In the 5 May issue of this newspaper, he argued
in behalf of a step-up in basic research as against applied
research, and proposed establishment of an advanced studies
center along the lines of that at Princeton. In a PID
PRAPOROM LENINIZMU article at about the same time, Shelest
urged more contacts between Soviet and foreign scientists.
Soviet scientists participating in the subsequent. public
debate mostly approved of Shelest's proposals. The author
of an article in the 28 July issue of LITERATURNA UKRAINA
went so far as to criticize the bureaucratic nature of
security regulations that make it difficult for scientists
to travel abroad or subscribe to foreign scientific
publications. On the other hand, a spokesman in the
7 July issue of the Ukraine paper--economist G. M. Dobrov--
accused Shelest of improperly setting basic science
against applied science and of creating the impression
that different branches of science are disputing among
themselves.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
- 147 -
On 13 October, a LITERATURNA UKRAINA article by Yu. M. Dadenkov,
Ukrainian Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education,
abruptly terminated the discussion. Dadenkov concurred
in the need for basic research and foreign contacts
and in the proposal to set up new centers for advanced studies,
but he stressed the importance of the faster returns from
applied research and the primary need to.resolve global
political issues that hinder collaboration among the world's
scientists and technicians.
A month later, on 8 November, writing in the New York TIMES,
Prof. Harry Schwartz reported on Shelest's pleas for increased
basic research and more opportunity for foreign contacts.
Noting Shelest's dissatisfaction with Soviet scientific
shortcomings, Schwartz recalled his suggestion that the
USSR imitate Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies.
He suggested also that there is high-level Soviet
opposition to Shele..`'s proposals.
Now, 5 months later, Shelest and the editors of LITERATURNA
UKRAINA are accusing Schwartz of exaggerating and twisting
their ideas and of "seeking out crises and conflicts in our
country." Shelest claims Schwartz is making "attempts to
create an atmosphere of unhealthy sensation" around his
and the other LITERATURNA UKRAINA articles, trying to "present
as a sensational innovation the fact of scientific collabora-
tion between the USSR and foreign countries, which is steadily
developing and which . . . is equally advantageous to both
sides." Shelest goes on to quote several letters from
prominent foreign scientists urging expanded exchanges
with his institute, and he concludes that "it is well known"
that the "development of international scientific contacts
is the unchanging line of the Soviet government, which will
develop more and more widely."
Shelest declares that Schwartz, "demonstrating his ignorance"
of the history of Soviet science, falsely maintains that the
USSR traditionally has favored applied science. In fact,
declares Shelest, Soviet science "traditionally" has given
deep attention to basic problems--"in contrast to American
sciences, which is mainly pragmatic." In his original
article, Shelest had complained that Soviet applied
science "drowns out" basic science and had expressed high
admiration for U.S. science.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
-48-
In an accompanying article, LITERATURNA UKRAINA'.aeditors accuse
the TIMES of trying to "set scientists of the Soviet Ukraine
against the people and the Communist Party and perceiving in
our science some sort of crisis or difficulties." They defend
the discussion initiated in their paper by Shelest, noting
that the organ of the Siberian Academy of Sciences had
reprinted Shelest's article and citing his proposal for
a Princeton-style institute as receiving an especially good
response. The editors defend public exposure of shortcomings
in science and state that all articles in the discussion
were constructive. Cautiously, however, they disclaim
responsibility for specific proposals made in.the articles,
saying they are not qualified to judge them and must leave
such analysis to "the responsible establishments which the
party and state have entrusted with caring for the
development of science" in the Ukraine.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 APRIL 1971
- 49 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SLOGANS SIGNAL BEGINNING OF MAY DAY PROPAGANDA BUILDUP
Calling unusual propaganda attention to this year's celebrations,
NCNA on 26 April released a list of 32 May Day slogans summarizing
familiar PRC propaganda themes. Although formal May Day slogans
were released during the early 1950's, none hau appeared since
1955. Formal slogans were last released for the 20th anniversary
of the founding of the PRC in October 1969.*
An interesting aspect of the current slogans is the fact that
Mao's name, directly referred to only four times in the 1969
National Day slogans, now draws somewhat more attention, with
eight direct references. Mao's name has also climbed from its
pro forma placement at the end of the 1969 list to earlier
mention in the current set of slogans where it is tied to the
need to deepen one's study of Mao's works--a dominant theme in
PRC propaganda since the party plenum last September.
The slogans concerned with domestic subjects introduce no new
propaganda themes. Routine victory is proclaimed for the
cultural rev^lution, and workers, peasants, Red Guards, and
armymen receive the customary salute. The usual prescription
for success in the future is given in terms of fulfilling the
tasks set at the Ninth Party Congress and undertaking additional
doses of struggle-criticism-transformation. "New victories"
are demanded to greet the 50th anniversary of the CCP and the
convocation of the Fourth National People's Congress.
* Paralleling the sporadic use of May Day slogans over the
years, slogans for National Day were issued during the early
years of the regime up to 1953, followed by a long hiatus
ending in 1967.
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040018-2
NEW PARTY COMMITTEES AT COUNTY OR HIGHER LEVEL
Provincial-
level Unit Province
District
City
County
Anhwei* +
5
it
17
Chekiang* +
2
1
28
Fukien +
2
17
Kiangsi +
3
2
24
Kiangsu +
it
2
20
Shanghai +
5
Shantung* +
2
1
5
Honan* +
2
14
Hunan* +
1
all
all
Hupeh +
5
3
11
Kwangsi* +
1
20
Kwangtung* +
6
6
19
Hopeh 1
13
Inner Mongolia (no local news on radio)
1
Peking +
3
Shansi +
8
Tientsin
Heilungkiang
1
19
Kirin +
2
it
13
Liaoning 4.
1
4
23
Kansu* +
1
21
Ningsia
it
Shensi* +
2
8
Sinkiang
1
1
8
Tsinghai +
3
6
Kweichow (no local news on radio)
Szechwan (no local news on radio)
Tibet
Yunnan
14
* Apart from announcing individual new party committees,
the provincial radio has claimed that party committees
have been formed in "a majority of" or "many" counties and/or
municipalities ("all" in the case of Hunan).
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