TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 3, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~IIIIIIU~~~iiii~~lllllllll~~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~I
d y4sce---e
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
3 MARCH 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 9)'
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the nat!onal defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
IIII E,cIud.d from aulon,o?,
dorvngrading and
d~doulfimlion
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 MARCH 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
NOTE: Foreign rrdio and press reactions to President Nixon's 1971 Report
on U.S. Foreign Po.'.icy for the 1970's will be summarized in an FPIS
Special Memorandum on It March. See also the Indochina and Middle East
sections of this TRENDS.
DRV Foreign Ministry Scores President's Foreign Policy Report
1
DRV Foreign Ministry Protests New "Adventures" Against North . .
4
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Issues Series of Protests . .
6
Communists Claim Massive Allied Losses in Laos Operation . .
8
DRV, PRG Say Allied Objective Thwarted, Appeal to ARVN . . . . .
11
Announcement on Use of U.S. "Rescue Teams" in Laos Assailed .
13
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Scores Vientiane on DRV Prisoners
15
USSR Government Protests "Invasion"of Laos, "Threats" to DRV . . . .
16
Peking Comment Avoids Question of Chino's Security . . . . . . .
21
Front Says Thieu Wants to Eliminate "Big Minh" as Candidate
23
Sihanouk Government's Press Agency Begins Transmissions . . . . .
24
Soviet Government Statement Presses Political Settlement . . . .
25
Romanian Statement Deplores Israeli Lack of Receptivity . . . . .
28
USSR Has Little Comment on Ilideast Section of Nixon Report . . .
29
GDR Foreign Ministry Protests CDU/CSU Meeting in West Berlin
Stoph Proposes Negotiations with West Berlin on Visits to GDR . .
32
Ukraine First Secretary Assails Kiev Oblast Leadership . . . . .
35
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
3 MARCH 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 FEBRUARY 1971
Moscow (3740 items)
Peking (3019 items)
CPSU 24th Congress
(33%)
19%
Indochina
(70%)
47%
[Draft
Directives
(28%)
12%]
[Battle Reports
(6%)
15%]
Indochina
(11%)
11%
[Sihanouk Tour
(5%)
14%j
[Soviet
Government
(--)
4%]
of PRC
tatement, 25 Feb.
Domestic Issues
(18%)
34%
Soviet Armed Forces
(1%)
8%
British Arms to
(--)
2%
Anniversary
China
(5%)
5%
South Africa
Zionism & Soviet Jews
(4%)
5%
Middle East
(3%)
3%
[Soviet Government
(--)
2%]
Statement, 27 Feb.
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary c?atput of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
went or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
couxxted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and. events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior isoues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or ot minor significance.
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CONFli)ENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 MARCH 1971
INDOCHINA
Vietnameoe communist reaction to the Pre.sident's 25 February foreign
policy report includes a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 2 March
which claims that he merely repeated old arguments about Vietnamiza-
ti.on "which have been completely refuted by reality." Like routine
propaganda reaction, the statement claims that the President uttered
threats against the DRV and that "new military adventures" against
the North are being planned. The charge of new "military adventures"
also appears in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 3d--which
protests "increasingly serious acts of war" against North Vietnam
since the massive air strikes last November--and in foreign ministry
spokesman's statements on 26 February and 3 March. The nature of
the "military adventures" is left ambiguous, although the foreign
ministry statement of the 3d does refer to the massing of troops
near the DMZ as well as to increased air strikes and shellings.
Exultant Vietnamese corraaunist propaganda continues to claim that
"liberation" troops are devastating the allied forces engaged in
the Laos operation. Some comment says that insurgent attacks in
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam have foiled allied plans to
launch another major operation in the tricountry border area. In
addi+;on to claiming that several South Vietnamese battalions have
been wiped out, propagandists cite the alleged capture of scores of
allied personnel, including U.S. pilots and officers of the ARVN's
ji Airborne Brigade.
Nt:.scow's first official protest in the wake of the Laos operation
came in a .)viet Government statement on 25 February which warns
that the USSR "cannot remain indifferent to the ntew escalation,"
promises c::ontinued assistance, and warns pointedly that the DRV is
"a member of the socialist family." It is unclear whether the
timing of the belated statement on. the day the President's foreign
policy report was released is more than coincidence. The statement
has been given heavy followup publicity, and there has been litti?
comment of substance on the President's remarks on Indochina.
Pek;ing comment on Indochina has. not raised. the question of Cnina's
security :since the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
which reacted to President Nixon's press conference on the 17th.
But repetitions of the routine pledge of rear-area support include
that by Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu at a 1 March Nanking rally
for Sihanouk.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SCORES PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT
Hanoi media first carried reaction to the President's foreign
policy report on the 26th, in a radio commentary broadcast at
0330 GMT. Two hours later VNA carried the statement by the DRV
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
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spokesman in Paris, which had been issued there the day before.
The spokesman, claiming that the President tried "to make black
whitey" singled out three "lies" by the President--"pretending"
he wants a peaceful settlement, claiming that the DRV had
expanded the war to all of Indochina, and insisting he wants
negotiations while failing to respond to the PRG initiatives
at the Paris conference and in fact "nurturing illusions of
military victory."
The reaction for the most part glosses over the substance of
the President's remarks on Indochina, instead taking the occasion
to repeat the usual attack on the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization
as tools to pursue neocolonial4sm. A VNA commentary on the 26th
said that "Nixon's lengthy report did not offer any novelty; he
tried by inflated rhetoric to cover up his extremely reactionary
bellicose colonialist policy." And the initial Hanoi radio
commentary said that "Nixon brazenly emphasized that the
Indochina problem is a manifestation, a concrete example of his
doctrine," adding that "while Nixon boastf>lly reiterated his
theme that Vietnamization is a path which may lead to peace,"
it is in fact a plan of "having puppets die in place of Americans."
The DRV Foreign Ministry statement says that in the part of his
report dealing with Indochina the President tried to prove that
Vietnamization was "correct and successful"; that he tried co
"Justify" U.S. expansion of the war to Cambodia and Laos; and
that he "also uttered threats of war against the DRV"--a claim
also n.ade in the routine comment.* The statement refers four
separate times to "new military adventures against the DRV."
The DRV statement says the resident "actually just repeated the
oj_d arguments that have been frequently reiterated since he came
to power--arguments that have been completely refuted by reality."
It then argues routinely that the purpose of Vietnamization is
not to end the war or withdraw all U.S. troops and that the
Nixon Doctrine "is merely an extremely insidious and cruel policy
* This is apparently an allusion to the President's statement
that in the process of withdrawing U.S. troops under the Vietnami-
zation policy if North Vietnam took or tried to take advantage of
redeployments by building up its strength in the South and launching
new attacks, "I have made clear on a dozen occasions that I would
take strong and effective measures to prevent the enemy from
jeopardizing our remaining forces."
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designed to use Indochinese to fight Indochinese in order to
promote the Americans' neocolonialist interests." It claims
that Vietnamization has "gradually failed and is faced with
the danger of bankruptcy" and that it was in this "defeated
situation" that troops were sent to invade Cambodia and Laos.
It asserts that "obviously the Americans do not want to end
the war through negotiations" as the President has stated but
are prolonging and expanding the war.
The statement gives some prominence to domestic and world
opposition to the Nixon policy. Declaring that partial troop
withdrawal and "deceitful peace tricks" have not covered up
the "warlike, aggressive nature" of the Nixon Administration,
it says "this is why the Americans and world peoples, including
some American politicians, have vehemently protested against"
the Vietnamization policy. It adds that "the world's peoples.,
including the American people, demand" that an end be put to
the aggression. The statement also says the President again
"tried. to plead" for his policy, "faced with the American
people's crisis of confidence in the U.S. Administration and the
profound indignation of world public opinion."
THE FRONT The President's report has not as yet prompted
a high-level statement from the Front, whose
statements frequently follow DRV statements by a day or two.
The FRG spokesman in Paris did issue a, statement on the 26th,
carried by LPA the next day. Initial reaction came in a
Liberation Radio commentary broadcast at 2300 GMT on the 25th--
a few hours before the first reaction in Hanoi media. The PRG
Paris spokesman, like some Hanoi comment, takes issue with the
President's declaration that the United States would not "let
down its friends," the Saigon administration. The statement
also scores the President for "flagrantly and cynically mis-
construing" the present situation in Indochina and at the Paris
conference, saying he "shamelessly alleged that Hanoi does not
want to seriously negotiate, that Hanoi 'has made this war an
Indochina conflict."
The Liberation Radio commentary says the President "repeated
? his threats toward the peoples in the Indochinese countries,"
but adds that "he can intimidate no one." An LPA commentary
on the 27th says that the "gist" of the President's report is
? his emphasis on an intention to "broaden the conflict and
increase American aid and air support to the Saigon and other
aggressor forces in Indochina."
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DRV FOREIGN MINIS RY PROTESTS NEW "ADVENTURES" AGAINST NORTH
The 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting "increasingly
serious acts of war" against the North and charging U.S. plans
for "new military adventures" against tha DRV climaxes a steady
barrage of such warnings in both routine and elite propaganda
which began with the first rumors of the allied operation in Laos.
The charge of "adventures" appeared in both Hanoi's 5 February
foreign ministry statement and in the 10 February government
statement. Like these earlier statements, the current one singles
out the "massing" of troops near the DMZ as well as increased
numbers of ships in the Tonkin Gulf, but it does not explicitly
refer to the possibility of ground incursions. Routine
propaganda both before and after the President's 17 February
press conference had referred to remarks by President Thieu
and Vice President Ky on a possible ARVN incursion.
It is not clear whether the issuance of the statement at the
foreign ministry level may be related to U.S. announcements of
recent concentrated air strikes against the North. Like the
foreign ministry statement on the President's report, .t is
replete with direct references and appeals to public opinion.
It begins by declaring that over the cast few months "the Nixon
Administration has not ceased to intensify its increasingly
serious acts of war against the DRV," and it says "public
opinion ,as vehemently protested against the extremely barbarous
U.S. air strikes on several populated areas of the DRV on 21
and 22 November." It concludes by expressing the conviction
that "the world and American people will struggle more vigorously"
and demand that the United States end its encroachments on DRV
sovereignty and any "new military adventures." :choing propaganda
after the November air strikes, it observes that the United States
has "violated its pledge" to stop the bombing of the DRV completely
and unconditionally.
The current statement goes beyond the foreign ministry and govern-
ment statements since the November air strikes in pointedly noting
that U.S. actions constitute "an impudent challenge to socialist
countries." This assertion has appeared in some other recent
propaganda, however, including remarks by Defense Minister Giap
at a reception marking Soviet Armed Forces Day on 23 February.
The statement says the Nixon Administration "is wrong" in
"entertaining the illusion of being able to intimidate the
Vietnamese people." It gces on in a later passage to declare
that "every cynical scheme of the U.S. imperialists against the
DRV" will certainly be defeated by the strength and sol de.rity
CONFIDENTIAL
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of the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples "given the strong
support and assistance of the socialist countries and the peace-
and justice-loving peoples and governments of the world."
DRV, PRG COMMENT The flurry of comment during the past week
on U.S. action against the DRV has included
editorials in NHAN DAN on the 26th and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the
27th which point to recent U.S. bombings from Vinh Linh to Nghe
An, the entry of U.S. ships into DRV territorial waters, and the
use of U.S. artillery below the 17th parallel to fire on villages
in Vinh Linh. Both editorials--stres sing preparedness against
any U.S. "war adventures or escalation acts"--also note the
President's 17 February remark confirming the unrestricted use
of U.S. air power in Indochina.
The NHAN DAN editorial alleges that the Nixon Administration also
"impudently threatened that if it were defeated in Laos it would
not rule out the possibility of attacking the northern part of
our country." It goes on to stress that "we must always be
vigilant" and particularly draws attention to the need to strengthen
air defense activities, mentioning such things as alarms, shelters
and trenches, firefighting and first aid teams, and first aid
stations.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, like the 3 March foreign ministry
statement, goes on to charge that the allies are deploying more
troops in the area of the DMZ and that U,S. ships have regularly
operated in the Tonkin Gulf. Calling upon the people to sharpen
their vigilance, the paper notes that "intensive efforts" have
been made to strengthen the people's air defense and the protection
of public order and security.
President Thieu's remark at Pleiku that a march to the North was
just a matter of time is ridiculed in a 26 February Hanoi radio
broadcast, which echoes previous propaganda on "threats" by Thieu
and Icy in claiming that he "once more served as loudspeaker number
one for his U.S. masters." It asserts that "the brazen, threaten-
ing words" will "certainly be unable to shake the iron-like
determination" of the 31 million compatriots in North and South
Vietnam.
Comment from the South includes an LPA commentary on the 27th
which says; uniquely, that "there were days on which some 50 enemy
aircraft bombed and strafed for hours places in North Vietnam,
causing odious crimes against our countrymen there." (To date
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-6-
this is the closest Vietnamese communist propaganda comes to
referring to stepped-up U.S. strikes in the DRV on the weekend
of the 20th and 21st, announced by the U.S. command on the 23d.)*
Like Hanoi propaganda, the commentary mentions the "resident's
remarks on unlimited U.S. air power in Indochina and claims
that he also said he would not rule out an attack against North
Vietnam if the United States were defeated in Laos.
A 2 March Liberation Radio commentary notes Ky's and Thieu's
threats to invade the North and, arguing that the Saigon "clique"
only represents the Nixon Administration, charges that despite
all the "serious defeats" and public condemnations the
Administration has "not yet renounced its evil, aggressive
designs against Vietnam and has unceasingly intensified and
expanded the war," along with intensified attacks and threats
against the DRV.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ISSUES SERIES OF PROTESTS
U.S. actions against North Vietnam are scored in a series of
three foreign ministry spokesman's protests issued on
26 February and 1 and 3 March. The protests of the 26th and
3d additionally refer to U.S. "plots" to carry out new military
adventures against the DRV.
PROTEST AGAINST Scoring U.S. naval actions, the protest on
NAVAL ACTIVITIES the 26th charges that since the beginning
of 1971, "along with stepping up air raids
over several populated areas in North Vietnam," the United
States "has intensified the use of its navy to carry out
activities against the DRV." It claims that many U.S. ships
"of various types have continuously operated in the Gulf of
Tonkin, many of them intruding into the DRV's territorial waters
conducting reconnaissance and encircling, threatening, and
firing at the Vietnamese people's boats navigating along the
coast, thus causing losses in manpower and property tL the
people."
Calling these actions "brazen acts of war . . . grossly encroach-
ing on the DRV's sovereignty and security and violating all
elementary norms of international law," the protest says they
* See the TRENDS of 24 February, page 10.
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_7-
are "part of the U.S. scheme of gradually intensifying air
and naval activities and preparing for new military adventures
against the DRV."
PROTESTS ON The spokesman's statement on 1 March makes the
AIR STRIKES more familiar charge of U.S. bombing strikes
against the DRV. It says that from 22 to
28 February, the United States "sent many a~.rcraft to drop
demolition and. steel pellet bombs and fired rockets on a number
of populated areas in Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh area,
causing big losses in lives and property to the local
inhabitants. "
The spokesman's protest on the 3d charges that on the
preceding two days the United States "bombed and strafed a
number of populated areas in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces
and the V..nh Linh area." It claims that "upholding their
vigilance and combat-readiness, the people and army of these
localities shot down two U.S. jet planes on the spot." The
statement also says "it is clear that along with the war
escalation in Laos, the United States is intensively stepping
up its war activities and plotting to carry out new military
adventures against the DRV. "
Earlier cn the 3d, Hanoi announced that two planes had been downed
in Quang :+3iah Province, bringing Hanoi's total of U.S. planes
downed over the DRV to 3,375. The broadcat;t alleged that U.S.
planes had bombed and strafed a number of populated areas in
Quang Binh Province.
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COMMUNIS'TS CLAIM MASSIVE ALLIED LOSSES IN LAOS OPERATION
The Hanoi press currently highlights alleged insurgent achievements
throughout Indochina in the month of February. Thus, a commentary
in the army paper QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN on 2 March claimo that
10 battalions have been wiped out and 10 others "heavily decimated"
and that more than 300 U.S. aircraft have been downed or destroyed
and nearly 750 vehicles destroyed or seriously damaged, about half
of them tanks and armored cars. Successes in Laos continue to be
given. the most attention, and an editorial in NHAN DAN on 1 March
claims that allied forces in the Laos operation have lost half of
their helicopters and more than half' of their armored.force.
Another editorial in the party paper on the 2d also alleges that
the insurgents have "annihilated" one-fifth of the troops of the
allies' "most important and elite forces."
A VNA commentary on 2 March, listing alleged gains throughout
Indochina in February, specifies that insurgent forces in southern
Laos annihilated or captured nearly h,000 enemy troops, -including
six entire. battalions, one multibattallon unit, and one . brigade.
headquarters. Previous communist reports had claimed a total.of.
2,500 allied casualties through 20 February; thus the new figure
of 4 , 000 through the 28th would imply a claim that some 1,500
were put out of action during the last.week of February. The VNA
report also alleges that in February the Laotians shot.down
207 aircraft and destroyed 107 military vehicles, more than half
of them tanks and armored cars.
VNA also tallies alleged allied losses in Quang Tri, crediting the
PLAF "on the Khe Sanh front" with putting out of combat nearly
1,700 soldiers, including nearly 1,000 Americans. Earlier
communist reports indicated that a total of 1,500 troops, nearly
900 of them American, were put out of action in the first three
weeks of February. VNA says that the PLAF also wrecked more than
200 military vehicles, including 72 tanks and armored cars, and
downed 69 aircraft.
ATTACKS ON AIRBORNE UNITS A 25 February VNA report claims that
TO THE NORTH OF HIGHWAY 9 the Lao "liberation army" that day
"completely wiped out" the GVN's 3d
Airborne battalion in its position on Hill 456--designated by the
allies as Hill 31. Recalling Hanoi ?s claim that the 6th Airborne
battalion was put out of action on the 13th, VNA observes that
the 3d Airborne. Brigade has thus lost two of its battalions. VNA
says the. attackers. captured 120 allied troops, including. many
officers, and seized all the weapons. Commentaries in the Hanoi
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press on 26 February appraise the fighting on Hill 31, QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN alleging that the engagement resulted in the largest
number of prisoners and largest quantity of weapons captured in
the past two weeks of fighting on Highway 9. NHAN DAN recalls
previous alleged allied losses north of Highway 9 an'. says that
four out of the six allied battalions deployed on the northern
flank of the operation have been "annihilated."
On 27 February VNA belatedly claims that on the 25th, after
"wiping out" the 3d Airborne battalion, the Laotian forces
attacked the headquarters of the 3d Airborne Brigade and captured
"the colonel commander of the brigade and all the officers of the
headquarters, including.many lieutenant colonels, majors, and
company-grade. officers." Press comment on the 28th includes a
NHAN DAN article which claims the capture of "sever.al.hundred
POW's" in the attack on Hill 31 as well as documents, weapons,
and communications equipment of the brigade headquarters. A
QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN editorial on the same day maintains.that the
3d Airborne Brigade "has basically lost its fighting strength"
and says the brigade's "only remaining battalion is being
besieged."
In hailing other alleged feats in Laos, the QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN
editorial of the 28th also cites a 26 February.attack on
another--unnamed--GVN airborne unit in which 17 tanks were
allegedly destroyed and 13 others.captured.* On the 27th VNA
had claimed that in this engagement, north of Ban Dong, a
"prong" of 200 paratroopers had been put out of action. NHAN
DAN's 1 March editorial also lauds this engagement and claims
that the allied tactic of using armored vehicles has been defeated.
It concludes that the fighters on Highway 9 have created conditions
for "advancing toward crushing the enemy's aggressive operation."
ACTION SOUTH OF HIGHWAY 9 Communist media on 1 March hail the
"annihilation" of the 2d battalion,
3d Regiment of the GVN's lst Division in a battle south of
Highway 9 on 27 February. According to the communist account,
more than 300 South Vietnamese troops were killed or wounded, more
than 40 others--including many officers--were captured, and all
enemy weapons and other military equipment were seized. Propaganda,
* Neither this editorial nor other propaganda mentions the
ce:imunist use of tanks in Laos.
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including an article in the 1 March QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN, claims that
this is the seventh South Vietnamese battalion put out of action
by the Laotian fighters.
Battle reports on 2 March claim that on the preceding day another--
unnamed--battalion of the 1st Division was "wiped out" at "peak
619," some five kilometers southwest of Phoi Ko Boc. Twenty South
Vietnamese troops, including a number of officers, are alleged to
have been captured, along with "all" weapons, three ammunition
dumps, and food supply caches.
YANG PAO TROOPS Alleged allied efforts to coordinate the Laotian
operation with Vientiane forces are brought up*
in a 26 February Pathet Lao news agency report: It hails achieve-
ments of "regional forces and guerrillas"in Savannakhet Province on
the 18th against a "key position of the U.S.-fostered. 'special
forces"' in the Huoi Mun area and on the 17th against an airstrip
of the "Nang Pao bandits and commandos" in the same area. Linking
the presence of these forces in the area to the GVN move into
Laos, the report notes that "the said bandits and commandos, belong-
ing to the 30th commando regiment of the Vang Pao 'special forces,'
had been air-transported to the Muong Nong area, in southeast
Savannakhet Province, to prepare the ground for the current
aggressive operation of U.S. and Saigon troops in southern Laos,
but meeting with fierce and repeated attacks of the Lao patriots,
they were later transferred from Muong Nora to Huoi Mun."
A charge of collusion between Saigon and Vientiane is made in
3 March Hanoi broadcast which cites "Western sources" for the
report that a South Vietnamese military delegation arrived in
Vientiane on 1 March to talk with Prince Souvanna Phouma. Hanoi
quotes UPI as reporting that the meeting with the Prince has
given rise to rumors that the South Vietnamese are seeking
Vientiane support for the allied operation in southern Laos or
"are soliciting authorization to unleash military attacks every-
where in Laos." It warns that "the Vientiane authorities. must . . .
be held responsible for helping the Americans and their lackeys
to intensify their aggression against Laos.
* Earlier communist claims to have engaged Laotian Government
forces moving east on Highway 9 are reported in the 18 February
TRENDS, page 2.
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DRV, PRG SAY ALLIED OBJECTIVES THWARTED, APPEAL TO ARVN
Vietnamese communist comment on the Laos operation insists that
U.S. aims in the operation have been thwarted, particularly
ridiculing Administration claims to have disrupted the communist
supply lines. The propaganda says that while the allied
intention was to strengthen GVN forces through the Laos operation,
in fact ARVN units in Laos have disintegrated. Some comment also
notes, and ridicules, the allied objective of forestalling any
communist dry-season offensive. After detailing alleged
insurgent achievements in Indochina during the past month, a
Liberation Radio commentary on the 3d remarks: "It is crystal-
clear that the Nixon clique has been unable to ward off our
offensive."
Some propaganda claims that communist attacks have forced the
allies to postpone a planned operation in the tricountry
border area which was supposed to be launched in the wake of
the major allied operations in Cambodia and Laos. Allegations
about the aborted operation--in NHAN DAN editorials of
25 February and 2 March and in other comment--are made in the
context of praise for South Vietnamese insurgent attacks,
especially in the highlands area.
SUPPLY LINES, Administration statements about allied forces'
FUEL PIPES disruption of communist supply lines in Laos
are caustically derided in a 25 February QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN article and a Liberation Radio commentary on the
26th, both pegged to remarks reportedly made by Presidential
adviser Kissinger at a briefing for members of Congress on
23 February. Ridiculing his view that the operation was achieving
its objective of "cutting the enemy's lifeline," the article in
the army paper--reviewed by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio--
compares the reported allied objectives at the start of the
Laos campaign with the allies' present beleaguered position on
the battlefield. It says the allies initially wished to destroy
the enemy's trcops and supplies, to disrupt his lifeline, to
increase the independence and strength of the Saigon army, and to
"completely strangle adversary forces operating in South Vietnam
and Cambodia." The radio version of the article also includes
the comment that "by openly belittling the objectives of this
large-scale operation on behalf of the White House, Kissinger
openly admitted both the U.S. failure and the Nixon clique's
erroneous strategic considervtions."
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The article also ridicules Kissinger for citing the cutting of enemy
fuel lines to demonstrate that supply routes have been cut. It
cites a South Victnamese statement that enemy fuel lines are main-
tained in Tchepone and remarks that "thus Kissinger is 'skillful'
because the U.S.-puppet have destroyed the fuel pipes without even
reaching the locality."
Both the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and the Liberation Radio
commentary note Western news reports that the volume of war
materiel transported by the adversary in the past two weeks has
doubled. An alluaiou to communist efforts to keep supplies
moving appears in a 25 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial which,
in surveying the contributions of various types of Laotian and
Quang Tri troops, says that "combatants of the engineering corps"
have "cleared many roads" and "combatants of the transportation
branch . . . have fought the enemy to advance and have cleared
roads to drive ahead and bring goods to their destination, thus
contributing to common victories." Other Hanoi propaganda on
transportation in recent weeks has not directly mentioned Laos,
but the allied air and ground strikes at the IIo Chi Minh trail
seem to be the obvious reason for a spate of comment urging
transportation workers to overcome extreme hardships and
difficulties to move supplies through to the "frontline."
POW'S, PROSELYTING There are numerous apF'als for troops to
surrender. A Liberation Radio broadcast
on 27 February, for example, appealing to ARVN troops to "return
to the people's side," warns that "you are now standing on the
brink of death." Liberation Radio claims that the Laos operation
has failed and that "the U.S. aggressors are urging the Saigon
troops to retreat from Ban Dong and the other positions to avoid
being exterminated." It adds that the liberation forces on the
southern Laos front "are tightening their stranglehold and
pursuing the remnants of the enemy troops; all Saigon army units
are nos within the range of the 1LAF artillery." This and ether
calls for surrender recall the "annihilation" of :;anger and
Airborne battalions.
A Liberation Radio broadcast on the: 27th, similarly claiming that
the allies "have begun to retreat from a cumber of places along
Highway 9,"outlines procedures for proselyting and, among other
things, instructs that POW's be sent "to the rear for interrogation
in order to serve combat and enemy proselyting." There is some
evidence of the use of South Vietnamese ralliers and POW's. A
Pathet Lao news agency report on 28 February, in detailing the
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communist assault on Hill 31, notes that "mingled with the shots
of the Lao liberation fighters was the broken voice of a rallied
Saigon soldier calling on his fellows to stop resistance." And
on 1 March Liberation Radio broadcast remarks by two prisoners
allegedly captured on 19 February during the attack on Hill 500.
A 25 February QUAN DOI NIiAN DAN "essay," broadcast in Vietnamese
to the South on the 26th, stresses the psychological impact on
allied forces of the capture of the 39th Ranger battalion position
on Hill 500.* The essay links the "victory" on Hill 500 with the
past Vietnamese victories at Phu Tram, Dong Khe,** and Dien Bien
Phu, noting that these battles "contributed to creating a call for
surrender that compelled the seasoned Legionnaires of the French
colonialists and the then puppet troops to kneel and shout:
'Let us surrender immediately; otherwise all of us will be
exterminated. "' While professing reluctance to draw a current
:tna.logy with the "great meaning" of these victories, the essay
suggests that the victory on Hill 500 was similar in that it
"canoed the clearest and most efficient command: 'Surrender
s,nd live; resist and die. "
ANNOUNCEMENT ON USE OF U.S, "RESCUE TEAMS" IN LAOS ASSAILED
PRG, DRV The Administration's position that U.S. infantry
teams can be sent into Laos to rescue downed
pil:.,:;s is scored in a 27 February statement by the PRG's Paris
delegation spokesman. The statement, carried by VNA on the
28th, merely refers to remarks by "many" Administration spokes-
men on 26 February. But a NHAN DAN commentary on the 28th
quotes Defense Department spokesman F-iedheim as saying on the
26th that "'small teams of infantrymei' would be sent into Laos
and probably even North Vietnam to protect the lives of downed
American pilots or their rescuers." NHAN DAN again claims
Consistent with other comment, the essay credits the South
Vietnamese PLAF witai the capture of Hill 500, a position of
the 39th Ranger battalion in fact located in Laos. Communist
comment on the attack on Hill 500 is discussed in the 24 February
TRENDS, page 4.
** This may be an allusion to the communist capture of the
French outpost of Dong Khe during the September 1950 border
campaign--the first major offensive against the French. It
is not clear what the al'?usion to Phu Traia represents.
CONFIDENTIAL
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that U.S. ground troops are already in Laos and charges that
President Nixon is attempting to lift restrictions on such
operations. It speculates that, "according to Friedheim's
logic," rescue teams will be used first, then "other U.S.
units of bigger size will cross into Laos to 'protect' the
'rescue teams,"' and finally, "if the trend holds, there will
be before long a sizable force of U.S. combat troops in Laos
described as 'rescue teams' by Washington but which in fact
is an aggressor army."
Saying that the Pentagon spokesman did not rule out the
possibility of using rescue teams in North Vietnam, NHAN DAN
comments that this position is in line with Thieu's "shout for
a northward march and with Nixon's 17 February statement that
the United States might support an offensive" by Saigon against
the North. The paper maintains that the United States is
obviously "bent on preparing for extremely serious adventures
in Indochina" and that "Nixon is contemplating the dispatch
of U.S. combat troops to Laos and a ground attack on North
Vietncm." A 2 March LFA commentary similarly scores statements
on the use of rescue teams and says that "in the last fe',T
days the accelerated intensification of bombardments by U.S.
aircraft, warships, and artillery against the DRV has exposed
Nixon's wicked design of widening the war to the whole of
Indochina."
Typical of other references to the possible use of U.S. ground
forces in Laos, the 2 March NHAN DAN editorial charges that
because of heavy allied losses, "the aggressors are scraping
infantrymen and aircraft from other areas and se::ding them to
the Highway 9 area" and "are making preparations to send U.S.
troops into Laos."
NLHS A 2 March statement by an NLHS Central Committee
spokesman also scores Friedheim's remarks on the
use of U.S. rescue teams in Laos. The statement comments that
the United States is thus revealing the presence of U.S. troops
in the Laos operation "gradually" and preparing a pretext for
bringing in "massive numbers of U.S. Infantrymen." It claims
that in the current operat.an in :Los the United States has,
among other things, "deployed 10 battalions of U.S. armored
troops and infantrymen" which, along with "some U,S. Green Beret
elements disguised in Saigon puppet uniforms," coordinate with
the Saigon troops and "directly commanded the operation." It
also charges that "a large number" of U.S. infantrymen disguised
in Vientiane "puppet" uniforms are present in various areas in
southern Laos.
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FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES VIENTIANE ON DRV PRISONERS
In line with its consistent failure to acknowledge the DRV
rresence in Laos, Hanoi takes issue with the 27 February press
conference in Vientiane at which North Vietnamese prisoners
were presented by a Defense Ministry spokesman. A DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement, carried in Hanoi media on 1 March,
denounces the "concocted" story about North Vietnamese prisoners
and "flatly rejects all these vile allegations and slanders" by
Vientiane. This is the first time such a statement about
prisoners has been made at this level;. in the past Hanoi had
occasionally used the vehicle of a VNA "authorized" statement to
score the Vientiane press conferences at which North Vietnamese
prisoners were exhibited. The most recent VNA statement was on
17 February 1970, and the last one before that was on 3 December
1968. An 8 April 1969 press conference was apparently ignored
by Hanoi, which left it to the NLHS to issue the denial via the
Pathet Lao news agency.
The ct'rrent statement, while denouncing "concoctions" about North
Vietnamese prisoners, does not address itself to the broader
question of the presence of DRV troops in Laos. This is consistent
with Hanoi's usual practice of denying "North Vietnamese aggression"
in Laos and of charging Souvanna Phouma with "slandering the '%V"
without explicitly addressing the question of a VPA troop presence
in Laos. A NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA on 3 March, which
scores a statement by Souvanna Phouma seeking UN Secretary General
U Thant's inter ention in the war in Laos, similarly avoids the
question of DRV troops in Laos but complains that Souvanna Phouma
"frequently speaks ill of the DRV, charging her with 'aggression.
Explicit denials of the troop presence do appear occasionally,
however. A 10 October 1970 NHAN DAN article scored President
Nixon for stating that "North Vietnam has invaded South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia." A 14 October 1969 DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement denounced a white paper published by the
Vientiane government which documented the "so-called presence of
North Vietnamese troops in Laos." The 17 February 1970 VNA
authorized statement did not specifically deny the presence of
DRV troops in Laos, although the one on 3 December 1968 denounced
the "cooked-up story of the presence of the North Vietnamese army"
as well as of North Vietnamese prisoners.
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16 -
DRAFTING Another DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement,
VIETNAMESE also carried in Hanoi media on 1 March, denounces
Vientiane for "forcibly drafting" Vietnamese
residents of Laos and sending them for training. Scoring these
"persecutions and illegal arrests," the star' ment says they
prove that the "Vientiane authorities," in collunion with the
Ligon "puppet administration," are trying to serve the U.S.
"scheme" of intensifying the war by "pitting Indochinese against
Indochinese." It calls the drafting a "serious challenge" to
the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government which "undermines
the long-standing friendship between the Lao and Vietnamese
peoples."
USSR GOVERNMENT PROTESTS "INVASION" OF LAOS, "THREATS" TO DRV
Moscow's first official protest of the U.S.-supported ARVN move
into Laos came in a sharp Soviet Government statement on
25 February--two-and-a-half weeks after President Thieu's
announcement of the operation on the 8th. The statement
"resolutely denounces" the incursion as "another criminal
act of the United States" that violates international law
and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos--elements that were
also present in the 3 February TASS statement. Charging
that by its actions the United States is "taking upon itself
grave responsibility for new complications in the inter-
national situation," the statement goes on to say that they
"cannot but affect Soviet-American relations."
Singling out President Nixon's press conference comment on
the 17th that he did not rule out the renewed use of air
power against the DRV, the statement comments: "Judging
by everything, the U.S. leadership seeks to condition
public opinion to the idea that the United States
acts in Indochina with impunity . . . . This is a
dangerous delusion, fraught with the most serious
consequences for the United States itself in the first
p).ace." The statement emphatically asserts the resolve
of the Soviet Union "and other socialist states" to give
the DRV help in repelling U.S. "aggression," warning
pointedly in this context that the DRV is "a member of
the socialist family." (A TASS English-language summary
of the statement uses the term "socialist camp," but both
the domestic service and PFIAVDA use the word "family"
[semya).) Saying that he Soviet Union "cannot remain
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indifferent to new escalation of the American aggression," the
statement concludes with a promise "to continue giving all
necessary aid to the fraternal DRV, to the patriots of
Indochina."
The statement's formulation that the Soviet Union "cannot
remain indifferent to new escalation" sharpens the warning
in the two previous government statements reacting to U.S.
actions in Indochina--the one on 16 December supporting the
10 December DRV joint party-government appeal and the one on
4 May on Cambodia, read by Kosygin--that the Soviet Government
"will draw appropriate conclusions" from the new U.S. actions.
The current formulation appeared in only one previous
government statement on Indochina, on 30 June 1966,
protesting the U.S. bombings near Nanol and Haiphong. It
said that no state, "no matter how far away from Vietnam
it may lie" and "showing real and not pretented concern
for the fate of the world," can be indifferent to the U.S.
action.
The assertion that the Soviets will continue to gi%re all
necessary aid to the DRV and the "patriots of Indochina"
seems to be responsive to the spread of the fighting and
is consistent with other expressions of broadened Soviet
support. Over the years, Soviet propaganda has promised
aid to the DRV and the "South Vietnamese patriots," and
on at least one recent occasion Brezhnev implied assistance
to patriots in all of Indochina. In his 12 June 1970
elect-ion speech Brezhnev followed an expression of support
for the ",just principles and demands advanced by the
patriotic forces of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos" with the assertion that "we shall render all
the necessary assistance to those who are righting for
their freedom and independence."
EAST-WEST The statement that U.S. actions in L,.aochina
RELATIONS "cannot but affect Soviet-American relations
tco" goes farther than the 4 May government
statement. That statement did say, hc.rever, that the
actions in Cambodia "may further complicate the overall
international situation" and questioned whether it was
possible to talk seriously about the President's desire for
fruitful talks to solve urgent international problems at
a time when Washington was "crudely trampling on" the 1954
and 1962 Geneva ag.eements and is "undertaking more and new
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actions that undermine the mainstays of international security."
In response to a question on the effect of the incursion into
Cambodia on the Vienna SALT negotiations during the press
conference that followed the reading of the statement,
Kosygin said that the cavalier U.S. attitude toward inter-
national agreements and law "arouses watchfulness on our
part, and one must say that these actions by the United
States do not strengthen mutual trust."
In their election speeches in June 1970, all three top Soviet
leaders expressed concern over the effect of U.S. "aggression"
in general on U.S.-Soviet relations. Podgornyy made the most
negative assessment, saying that relations are "not developing"
snd "are practically in a kind of frozen state" because of the
"aggressive course" of the United States.
Before May 1970, the Soviet leaders had refrained from
explicitly assessing the effect of the Nixon Administration's
Indoch'na policy on U.S.-Soviet relations, although they had
made negative assessments during the Johnson Administration.
The last such discussion publicized by Moscow was in Kosygin's
25 June 1967 UN press conference, when he said in response to
a question on Soviet-U.S. relations: "I believe that the
problem of the improvement of Soviet-American relations must
be solved, first of all, by a cessation of I".S. aggression in
Vietnam." The edited official Soviet "text" of the press
conference, carried by TASS, Tendered this passage in a more
negative vein: "It is impossible to count on an improvement"
of relations so long as aggression in Vietnam goes on.
FOLLOWUP The possibility that the release of the Soviet
TREATMENT statement on the 25th may have been timed in
part to offset President Nixon's foreign policy
report is reinforced by Soviet media's followup treatment.
In addition to giving predictably wide publicity to the
statement, Soviet media have featured numerous reports and
roundups to portray a worldwide favorable reaction to it.
A Radio Moscow commentator on the 26th said the "progressive
world public warmly received the Soviet statement, appraising
it as an exceptionally timely document of immense international
significance." An article by Ilinskiy in IZVESTIYA on the 27th
similarly hailed the Soviet declaration as "the center of
attention of world public opinion." And a dispatch from
Hanoi published in PRAVDA on the 27th pointed out that "all
Hanoi papers frontpaged the declaration."
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On 2 and 3 March TASS reported meetings held throughout the USSR
to support the government statement, presumably beginning a
campaign like the one that followed the 3 February TASS state-
ment.
Other. Soviet comment on Indochina has hewed closely to the
language of the government statement. An international
review in PRAVDA on the 28th, according to TASS, denounces
U.S. Indochina, policy and repeats the Soviet statement's
warning that "to think that the U.S. aggression will go
unpunished is a dangerous illusion for the United States
itself." It adds that the Soviet Union ready 1?,o
"continue giving all necessary aid to the DRV and Indo-
chinese patriots."
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN In contrast to the portrayal of an,
POLICY REPORT enthusiastic world reaction to the
Soviet statement, Soviet media depict
President Nixon's foreign policy report as arousing widespread
criticism but provide 1..`tle original comment. A brief Radio
Moscow account of the President's report on the 25th said it
indicates that "the Republican Administration apparently does
not intend to make any amendments to its foreign-political
course, which, as before, is based on the Nixon doctrine."
The radio added that "the American President continues to
insist on his 'right' to organize armed intrusions into
such neutral countries as Cambodia and Laos."
A panelist in Radio Moscow's weekly domestic service roundtable
program on the 28th made the point that it is necessary to
distinguish between the President's report "and what the
United States is doing in Indochina." He added that "despite
all the dodges, the President does not promise total with-
drawal of American troops from South Vietnam and Indochina;
he once again puts forward his old theories, his old positions . .
on mutual withdrawal of troops." The discussion was notable
for its emphasis on the intensified use of U.S. air power in
Indochina. One of the panelists, observing that "rocket-
carrying aircraft are really being used as artillery and
are sweeping over the patriots' battle positions," added
that "such large-scale use of air forces is really a new
form of operations."
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A Washington-datelined dispatch in PRAVDA on the 27th focused
on adverse U.S. congressional reaction to the comments on
Indochina in the President's foreign policy report. The
dispatch also said the report has given new impetus to the
antiwar movemen?; in the United States.
A Radio Mosco~* broadcast to China on the 26th, noting that
in the foreign poliy report "Nixon emphasized that we are
prepared to hold bi:_ateral talks with Peking," added: "The
United States is trying to make use of the nationalistic
trends in the Chi~2se leadership's policy, play on the anti-
Soviet nature of their foreign policy, and reap big profits
from their policy of splitting the world revolutionary and
national liberation movement."
Moscow's effort to play down the President's report is made
the more apparent by a Zhukov article in PRAVDA on "Nixon's
doctrine of Vietnamization" which--as summarized by TASS on
2 March--fails even to mention the report, commenting instead
on a recent interview given by Herman Kahn to U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT on plans to strengthen U.S. positions in Asia.
Zhukov says it appears from Kahn's arguments that the United
States plans only to reduce U.S. casualties through
Vietnamizatioa and does not plan on a withdrawal.
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PEKING COMMENT AVOIDS QUESTION OF CHINAS SECURITY
Peking's comment on Indochina, still voluminous but on a declining
level in the past week, avoids any mention of China's. security--
last raised in the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.
Sihanouk's.tour of China has occasioned another major leader's
speech, this time at a Nanking rally on 1 March.. Politburo member
Hsu Shih-yu, Kiangsu chief and commander of the Nanking military
region, lauded the "strong determination" of the three Indochinese
peoples in "their war" against the. United States and expressed.
Chinese determination to- "fulfill the proletarian internationalist
duty of the great rear area." Hsu also. said current. operations. in
Indochina. show. that the United States "is. baring its teeth and
blustering,.but it is,.in fact, a paper tiger which is outwardly
strong but inwardly weak."
Like Chang Chun-chiao at a 22 February Shanghai rally for Sihanouk,
Hsu did not refer to China's security interests in discussing ..
current. military developments in Indochina. And Hsu, in fact, did
not go as.far.as Chang in.associating Peking's interests with
those of its Indochinese allies.. Chang had termed recent actions
in Indochina "a grave provocation" against the people of China .
a;;1 of the world as well as against the Indochinese--the. formulation
i,sed in the PRC's 4 May 1970 statement on the incursion into Cambodia
and in subsequent statements on Vietnam and Laos.
While Peking's current reticence on the subject of China's security
may reflect high-level consultations.or an-optimistic assessment of
recent military developments in Laos, it may simply be that having
registered authoritative concern--in the 12 February government
statement--over a threat. to its -security from operations in Laos,
Peking is. now waiting to. see how the situation develops. The
Commentator article on.the 20th, like the 14 February PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial responding to earlier White House denials that
the Laos operations pose_a_threat to China, was apparently designed
to buttress the government statement's warning by challenging
Washington's dismissal of the question of Chinese security.
Peking has not yet addressed itself to the. President's discussion
of Indochina in his State of the World Report.* In an apparent
* Peking has directly, mentioned the.report twice so far: An NCNA
report on.25 February, denouncing the British decision to -sell arms
to South Africa,. quoted the President's. statement opposing any
effort to isolate South. Africa;. and a 2 March PEOPLE'S DAILY .
Commentator article on Korea derided the President's report for
citing U.S. policy on Korea as exemplifying the Nixon doctrine.
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allusion to the report, a 28 February NCNA account of the military
situation in southern Laos said the President "recently moaned
that the United States and its Saigon running dogs would have
'more hard choices ahead' in Indochina." (The President's report
says at one point that enemy intentions and capabilities in
Indochina will pose "some hard choices" about the deployment of
allied troops as the Wilted States withdraws.)
PUBLICITY FOR In a striking albeit modest sign of Peking's
USSR STATEMENT willingness to accommodate .Hanoi's .sen31tivities
. regarding the Sino-Soviet rivalry, NCNA on
27 February, reports the Soviet Government statement on Laos
issued two days.earlier. The report--broadcast in Peking!s Russian
service. and. some other foreign. languages, but not in. the.. domestic
service--quotes the statement .as. saying, that . the.Soviet Union. "can-
not remain. indifferent to. the new escalation. of the American.
aggression," but its promise of.continuingaid is not mentioned.
NCNA's account also omits the statement's reference to..the.DRV. as
a member of "the socialist family." Not surprisingly, NCNA quoted
the statement's warning that.U.S. actions "cannot but affect
Soviet-American relations."
Peking's publicity for the Soviet statement. reciprocates .Moscow's
reporting. of recent Chinese pronouncements. on Laos. There . was
similar reciprocity last November, .when each side reported the
other's statement on the invasion of Guinea. The effect is to
submerge the Sino-Soviet rivclry in the interests of a show of
unity in behalf of those--like the North Vietnamese--directly
involved. Such a move accords with Peking's tendency in the past
year or so to assume.a markedly. less intransigent stance in
international. affairs, including. bilateral relations with Moscow,
while accenting interests in common with the "medium-sized and
small nations" defending their independence and sovereignty.
On 2 March NCNA rounded up bloc comment on the Laotian incursion,
noting that government organs in the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia had issued statements and .Poland a
memorandum condemning. U.S. actions in Laos. Peking had. .reported
the Albanian -government statement on 12 February, and on 6 and
17 February. carried press comment from Romania, which has not
yet issued a government statement.
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FRONT SAYS THIEU WANTS TO ELIMINATE "BIG MINH" AS CANDIDATE
Front media again portray South Vietnamese political figure Gen.
Duong Van Minh as an important opponent to the Thieu regime,*
and suggest additionally that he 113 committed to peace and to
independence from U.S. domination. Two LPA news items on 1 and
2 March, listing examples of opposition to the Laos operation
among noncommunist elements in South Vietnam, quote General
Minh as being critical of the operation; both items identify Minh
as a member of "an opposition group." The report on the 1st says
that Minh, speaking at a 27 February reception in Saigon, "con-
demned the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique who on orders from their U.S.
masters had sent Saigon puppet troops to Laos is cannon fodder
for the U.S. aggressors." According to LPA, Minh opposed "serv-
ing as a tool" for anybody and urged that "the army must serve
peace."
Minh'a potential role as a presidential candidate is raised in
an article on the October GVN presidential elections broadcast
by the Front radio in a series of five daily installments begin-
ning on 16 February. The article is attributed to To Lien** and
is said to have been published in the January issue of the
magazine TIEN PHONG, organ of the PeDple's Revolutionary Party.
In an effort to discredit President Thieu, To Lien reviews his
actions at the time of the September 1967 presidential elections.
He changes, among other things, that Thieu used "crafty tricks"
to eliminate the Au Truong Thanh and Duong Van Minh slates which
"enjoyed greater prestige among the people."
Following a lengthy attack on Thieu's actions as president, To
Lien directly deals with Duong Van Minh's potential role as a
presidential candidate. He claims that Thieu is "very anxious to
eliminate" Minh and that "Minh is Thieu's greatest fear." The
article explains that, although Minh "has not declared that he is
running, Thieu is afraid that Minh will be able to exert influence
on various circles because Thieu plans to continue the war for
another two or three years to 'eliminate' all communists." Review-
ing alleged Thieu efforts to.hamper Minh, the article adds: "The
most brazen act was that.Thieu repeatedly threatened: 'an immediate
peace is a false peace. . . . Those who advocate an.immediate peace
are communist lackeys."' Iii this same context, it deplores a report-
ed Thieu statement, quoted from a 17 January AFP dispatch, that "'I
will use violence to overthrow any i.:ader who is ready to negotiate
with the communists.'"
* Attention to Duong Van Minh in Vietnamese communist media was
discussed. in the 12 November 1970 TRENDS, pages 5 and 6.
** An article attributed to the same author, published in TIEN PHONG
and broadcast by Liberation Radio on 15 November 1970, discussed the
South Vietnamese economy.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENDS
3 MARCH 1971
- 24 -
SIHANOUK GOVERNMENTS PRESS AGENCY BEGINS TRANSMISSIONS
Development, of the propaganda apparatus of the Cambodian FWC
and RGNU moved forward with the inauguration on 2 March of a
daily radioteletype transmission in French by the INFORMATION
AGENCY OF KAMPUCHEA (AKI). The new transmission was announced
in a communique of the "AKI Secretariat," broadcast by the
FUNK radio on 25 February and picked up by Hanoi's VNA the
next day.
The first propaganda medium of Sihanouk's government was the
"Voice of the FUNK,'' :"1+ich began broadcasting on 1 August 1970
following an announcement carried in Hanoi media on 28 July.
On 9 August the new FUNK radio announced that AKI would be
established the following day. AKI-attributed items were
subsequently publicized by VNA and in Liberation media.
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CON F1 DENT], At, FB1111 11,1111.1111 D.,),
3 MAI(CII 1971
MIDDLE EAST
SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT PRESSES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
The c,uv{.eL Government ntnLemcnt iuuued on 27 Februrtry placers heavy
crnp;rru: is on polittcal settlement (nome 15 references) raid focuuen
(n Lhe devclopmentu stemming from the Jttrri ng ta.l kr. , pr.lmrt.ri ly
' (on;Lr?uctive" UAlt i.nILiativcu, reuultinf; in it "more favorable
:'r Lunt, ion" in the print few weeks. The document highlights the
:'1 F".:bruary 1r;racll cabinet utatcrncnt rejecting full. Inrush
withdr?rtwal, (:harru:Lcriz.ing it, an it negative "reply to .Tarring,"
and It hold the United utrttes rcuponuible, with luracl, for
thin "olnitructtoniut" step. The statement comes one dr(y after
i;rucl grtve Jarring its reply--frreuhadowcrl In Lhe .11 February
cttb i n:_ t. ; tutoincn t which Mot,cow in at tack ing--curd a week before
the (INrtrch expiration of the seams-fire, not mentionr.d In the
:~tatcmcnt..
In i:;:;uing ;t rtatement. at, this; level, r' ;:ow per?hap ? uccku to
demonstrate concern over the fate of the Jarring mis:;lon rind
to provide Impetus for its diplomatic ac t, P. it 1e'.--unacknowledged
by ;oviof. rncrlla--to move up it uchedsa.lcd Big Four Meeting tend
secure four-power intervention. 'I'1rc ltiot formal Soviet statement
on the Middle East, by the Soviet Foreign Ministry Treat October,
had concluded by pl,.dging that the USSP would pr=ote it political
"in every way in the frrtrework of hilateral meetings"
and four-power con;;u1tit;ions. The current statement, however,
pledge;; only to "do everything" for peace.
ilot since March 1968 has Moscow issvsd it statement on the Middle
Ertst at government level; thr.t one was responsive to Israeli
"military provocations" against the Arabs. Since then, formal
.LrttetncnLs have been is;ucd by 'PASS, the Supreme Soviet, and
the Foreign r.1ini:;try.
U.S. ROLE The current statement, criticizing Israel for its
negative reply to Jarring, routinely charges that
Israel counts on U.S. support, and accuses the United States of
encouraging Israel's "aggressive policy." Making the stereotyped
charge that Israel is the "shock tool of American imperialism,"
the statement claims that the United States pays lip service to
a political settlement and recognizes in words the Arab states'
"lawful interests," but supports Israel in deed. The document
asserts that the United States shares responsibility
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COill'IUI',11'I'iAI I'LiL?. '1'!tl;llbll
MAitt,'I1 19'(1.
with 1ir't' i for the ni turttlcrn now developing in t,hr Mtddlc Er;nt,
for ti z'tr l'rl "intent obritruc~ionint atop" in rrfunitig to
withdraw, tuicl "for fill poor; l.b lc connequ'ttCeti of th 1.n ."
The statement prencriben no couroc of fiction--there in no
mention o1' poriribis Bit-; four or security Counri.i mcruturcn--but
merely cnlln for "vl.gorour; actic,tui" by "nil ntttteti lntererited
in pears" to prevent, lorncl and Itn ptitronn from fru_itrtiting a
political nettletncnt. Claiming that, lurncl's plnnr, tire "doomed
to failure," it declarer; that the Soviet Union will continue
providing the Arab peopier; the necet-inry pol.iticril find mrttcrittl
t.n;iitru;cc in the itruggic for liberation of the occupied ltindn.*
AR/1i3 Strenning Arab 11nitintiven since the resumption of the
MOVES Jarring talks, the government statement observes that
from the very out:;et the cont.rictu "acquired the nature
of a discussion of concrete undertakings." it praisen the 11AH's
"clear and positive stand" and "cont;tructivc position," noting
that the "Arab countricu" agreed to continue the cctwe-fire and
the UAR propooed opening the Sue: Canal to international shipping
If Israel would begin withdrawing troops from Sinai. It adds
that in response to Jctrring's 8 February approaches to both
sides regarding "concrete commitments on two hey questions"--
withdrawal and term:; of pence--the UAIt declared its readiness
to conclude a peace agreement with Israel if Israel undertook
to withdraw from all occupied territories and fulfill UN
decisions on the Palestinian refugees.
The statement notes commitments the UAfl is prepared to envisage
in the peace treaty, Including to end to the state of war and
respect for each uthcr's sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence,** is well tt; recognition of the
* The Soviet Government statement in March 1968 had referred to
U.S. support of Israeli actions, branded Israel as following the
footsteps of "iiitlcrite criminals," cautioned that Israel's policies
"cannot go unpunished," and pledged that as long as Israel's
leaders, with "support from outside," espoused annexation of Arab
territories, the USSR would help the "victims o. aggression."
*"These points were included, according to a Petrov NEW TIMES
article, in a clause on "mutually binding documents," in the
Soviet proposals advanced at the end of 1968. NEW TIMES (Russian
edition, 19 February) said the UAR had "fully endorsed" the
proposals, which were "agreed upon between the Soviet and UAR
governments."
CONFIDENTIAL
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C7011 VI 1*11TI At,
1 hlt; 'I'Ill.ilU;~
:i I4AliCf 1971
right or each aide to .Il.ve in pence within necure rind reeogni'Led
boundnriet; . Mentioning t.hc I1AIt'n por;itlon on navigation through
Lhe ,;ur7',?, (;ruin[ ntnd the 'i'iran i;trtilt, the ntrttemettt nddt; that
(;r-iro nir,o exprenned r-grcement with the Idea of cretti.ng
dcmilitariz