TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 20, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~llllllii~uuiiiiii~lllllll~'~
FOREIGN
3ROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIII!IIIIIII~II~~~~
in Coynynu~ist P~o~ag~nda
Confidential
20 JANUARY 1971
(VOL . X}iI I , T?0 . 3 1
STATSPEC
5T00875R000300040003-8
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affectir. g
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation oP i+s contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
caouv f
E~duded from auiomoiic
downgrading and
drdouif cation
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 JANUARY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention i
INDOCHINA
Foreign Ministries Protest U.S. ''Escalation" in Ir~?ochina ,
Hanoi and Front Comment Scores U.S. Role in Cambodian Action.,? .
Moscow Says U.S. Action in Cambodia Repea~:s that in Vietnam
PRC Scores Lairfl Trip, Attack oa DRV, AFcviJ Action in Cambodia .
DRS' Foreign Minis-try Spokesman, Commentaries Protest Air Strikes.,.
Delegates at Paris Denounce U.S. Troop-Withdrawal Polic;~ ,
USSR Extols Aswan as Symbol of Cooperation, Friendship
.
. .
10
Podgornyy on UAR Economic Development, Political Sol~ition
,
,
10
Communique Calls Withdrawal Necessary foi? Peace
"
13
Moscow Discusses
Withdrawal Timetable," U.S. Policy
;RMANY AND BERLIN
14
GDR Leaders Adamant on No "Intra-Gez?man P.elations"
18
GDR Sees Planned FPD Meeting in West Berlin as "Provocation"
ECHOSI~OVAKIA
20
Party Goes on Record as Saying 1868 Invasion was "Requested"
C~~itical Comment from Yugoslavia., West European Communists
~j
~S
SINC;-SOVIET RELATIONS
Il.ichev Returns to Peking; PRC Ambassador Sees Kosygin
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Liaoning Sets Up Party Committee, First i:z No:?theast
27
31
Table: New Party Committees at County or Higher Level
32
Topics in Brief: Consumption of Coal; Team ~.-s. Brigade
34
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20 JANUARY 1971
TOPJCS AND EVENTS GIVEN idAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 JANUAt~Y 1971
Moscow (3809 items)
Peking (2667 items)
Podgcrr~yy in UAR for
(0.4%)
18%
Domestic Issues (28%)
38~
Aswan Dam
[Shanghai Party (--)
4~]
Commissioning
Mongolian Revolution,
(--)
6%
Congress
[L~.aoning Party (--)
1q]
50th Anniversary
Lures, 17, Lunakhod
(1q)
5%
Congress
Jordan (--)
16~
Indochina
(6~)
5q
Indochina (31q)
14~
China
(7%)
3q
[NFLSV Delegation (6%)
5q]
Czechoslovak CP
(--)
3%
in PRC
Documents on
Albanian bTational Day,(0.1q)
7q
1968-6y Events
25th Anniversary
U.S. ''Monist" anti-
(1%)
3%
FRC-Chile Diplomat?.c (8%)
3%
Soviet Activities
Angela Davis Case
(5%)
2q
Relations
Commonwealth Conference
(1q)
2f
in Singapore
These si :tlsticc? are based on the voir~?cast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorl~?l, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given maJor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the '!'rends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other eases the propaganda content may bP routine or of minor significance.
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CCivF:CDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 JANUARY 1971
I i'~DOCH I PdA
The llRV and PRG foreign ministri~~s on 19 and 2V January issued
statem~:nts which protest U.S. "intensification of aggression"
3n all four countries of Indochina. The DRV protest leads off
with the charge that "massive" operations in Cambodia hs~;e been
conducted "un~ler the direct r,~mmand of the United Stages" and
concludes with a denunciation of intensified ''acts of war"
against +lie DRV .
At this writing no communist source has ackn`wled~ed U.S.
press reports of an operation on the 17th in which South
Vietnamese paratroop?rs raided a camp in Cariibodia where
t:merican prisoners were believed to be held. But the new
charge that the United Stages has "dropped commando spies
in a dumber of areas in thf. foi.irth military gone" of the DRV
is made in a KHAN DAIJ editorial on the 20th which paraphrases
many of the charges in the foreign ministry statement.
Soviet media promptly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry state-
ment, and Moscow commentators follow Hanoi's lead in linking
Secretary Laird's recent trip to Soutl;east Asia to U.S.
"escalation" in Cambodia, in the DRV, and throughout Indochina.
Peking comments on Laird's trip along similar lines, in a
radio co~t?nentary on the 14th and in a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on the 19th which endorses a Sihanouk
appea~. for the Cambodian people to contiiue thEir struggle.
FOREIGN MINISTRIES PROTEST U.;: ~ "ESCAlATION~~ IN INi~OCHINA
It is not clear from the DRV and PRG foreign ministry state-
ments whether, as is usually the case, some particular U.S.
action prompted the protests at this level* or whether the;/
* DR'J statements at the foreign-min~.stry level protesting
U.S. "escalation" wire issued most recently on ~l December
(on intensificaticn of the war in Laos, including alleged
stepped-up air strikes, some of them by B-52's, and ~.ntro-
duction of Cambodian and Thai troops) and on 27 November
(on the concentrated air strikes against the DRV at she time
of the prisoner-rescue attempt a.t Son Tay.) The last, PRG
Foreign Ministry statement was issued on 22 November,
protesting the U.S. air strikeG against the DRV.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI; TRENDS
?0 JPIVUARY 1971
were responsive to a combination of actions. The DRV state-
ment leads off with Cambodia, going beyond earlier routinE
propaganda when it charges that "massive operations" have been
conducted "under dir~ct L'.S. command." It also singles out
support from the Li.S. air force and "warships of the ,Seventh
Fleet" positioned off Sihanoukville. After. routine attacks
on c~ir strikes and the dispatch of Thai "mercenary" troops
to Laos, the statF-.en~t says tha` the "U.S.-puppet" troops in
South Vietnam nave pushed ahead with "special pacification"
operations and launched "large-scale raiding operations,"
especially in Tay Ninh Province. Turning to the DRV, 'the
statement does not sl,ecify any of the air strikes which
prompted I,rotests from the foreign ministry spokesman in
the past week but condemns in general terms the "'recent"
intensification of "acts o?.' war" agai~.zst the DRV, including
alleged strikes by B-52's.
The PRG statemc::t ' ;:ads o: f L*=tai South j; i ~tnam, discussing
Cambodia second, and departs from tre substance of the DRV
statement. Thus t:a PRG says nothing spec~fical_ly aoout
operations in Tay Ninh, but it 3oes interject a reference to
the "scheme to herd handreds of thousands of peorlP i.n Qurng
Tri and Thua Thien provinces into the southernmos+~ provinces"--
an issue rot known to have been discussed in routine comment.
Th.-~ PRG follows the lead of the DRV statement, Y~owever, in_
its remarks on Laos and Nort.~ VietnaL~.
Both statements routi:rely scorn--and predict failure of--tre
Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine, and both charge
U.S. hypocrisy regarding a political settlement. In the
words of the DRV statement, "events have shown that
President Nixon has betrayed his promise to 'bring the war
to an early end' when assuming power two years s,go and that
his 'five-point pace initiative' is a cer.~plete hoax."
HANOI A~VD FRONT COMMENT SCORES l',S. ROLc IN CAMBODIAN ACTION
Prior to tiie release of the foreign ministry statements Hanoi.
and Front propaganda cited evidence of increased U.S. involve-
ment in Cambodia, particularly assailing stepped-up air raids
and support given the point South `Tietnamese-Cambodian government
operation begun on 13 January to clear Highway 4. Thus both
Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 17~h scored the use of B-52's
and other planes in connection with the Highway ~+ action and
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2C JANUARY 1971
quoted U.S. officials in Saigon as confirming that America~z
forces were giving logistics support to the o.llied clearing
operation. Articles in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 18th and 19th
and in NHAN DAN or_ the lyth also focused on the increased use
of U.S. planes in Cambodia. NHAN DAN additionally scored
"direct U.S. participation in looting raids" in Cambodia and
protested the dispatch of U.S. shi~;s "into Cambodian
territorial waters t?~ support ground raids" along the
Cambodian highway.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of the 19th was more specific
than NHAN DAN in its charges of U.S. involvement. It cited
Western news reports that Laird had authorized the use of
the U.So air force t~, support the clearing operation and
tha` a Defense Department spokesman had clai~-ed a U.S. right
to send South Vietnamese troops, war materiel, and other
supplies by aircraft and helicopter to Cambodia. The paper
added that "on 17 January 1971, the Americans farther stepped
up their direct intervention in the war in Cambodia by means
of U.S. warships, armed helicopters, and liaison personnel"
and that U.S. warships, including a helicopter carrier, have
been ~zsed for many supporting tasks. The first known Hanoi
reference to
t;ie
a:Lleged
involvement of U.S. military
personnel on
the
ground
came in a domestic radio broadcast
on the 18th
which
cited
an AP report that U.S. officers had
landed along
the
highway. The PRi~ Foreign Ministry state-
ment, unlike
the
DRV's, alleges that there are U.S. advisers
in Cambodia.
Fight'~ng along Highway ~E in early January was reviewed in a
19 January VN.'L report which claimed that since the beginning
of the year Cambodian insurgent forces had wiped out or
captured nearly 1,500 enemy troops, including 125 South
Vietnamese soldi_e~~s. VNA did not give spec:ifi.c figures on
allied losses ir. the current operation, although the Hanoi
dcmest.ic service broadcast on the 18th had cited AP's
reports of allied casualties. The allied joint operation
along ;iighway ~+, according to VNA, is meeting with "an
?ffective counteroffensive from the Cambodian patriotic
forces."
MOSCOW SAYS v~S~ ACTON IN CAMBODIN REPEF~TS TH;~? IN VIETNAM
Following Hanoi's propaganda lead, Moscow links U.S. "escalation"
in Inaochin~~, to Secretary Laird's recent trip. Soviet media
pick up DRV as well as Western accounts of the air strikes
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CON1~'1QPN'L'.LAL I~'i3iS 'L14[?,NDS
20 JANUARY 1971
against Not~th Vietnam and report the series oL DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's protests oJer the st~,rlke and the DRV
Foreign Ministry statement on "intensification" of the war
throughout Indochina.
Moscow plays up U.S. air strikes in the DRV and an increased
U.S. support role in Cambodia as evidence oi'.f'urther
escalation of the .Indochina conflict that runs co}znter to
earlier assurances by the Administ:?ation that it would not
resort to direct military intervention ~o support the Lon
Nol regime. TASS commentator Kharkov on 19 January said
it appears that President Nixon's "promise" to Congress that
the United States "would not increase its role in Cambodia
and would refrain from direct military intervention" was
intended to keep down protests from the American public,
"whictr,justly cor_siders that the United States is following
in Cambodia ?re same ominous path it follo~red in Vietnam."
The Kharkov commentary, entitled. "A Visit F'or Expansion of
Aggression," developed the theme that Laird's trip resulted
in further escalation of the war. Kharkov charged that the
United States has discarded its "camouflage" and is now
openly providing "direct support to combat operations of
Saigon a~~d Phnom Penh troops against the Cambodian patriots."
He noted that "U.S. combat planes and helicopters" are now
taking part in the fighting and stated that "the Pentagon
threatens to throw the entire U.S. air power in Sou?heast
Asia" into the conflict. A 16 January PRAVDA dispatch from
Washington had similarly reported that U.S. helicopters
were taking part in direct support of Saigon troops but was
more specific in noting that "b-52's" were also participating.
A brief TASS account of Secretary Rogers' remarks in a 16 January
TV interview also referred to the U.S. air role in the war.
While citing the Secretary's "claim that the United States
is not going to use combat forr.es in Cambodia," it added that
he "admitted that the U.S. air force was render.ng direct
combat support to Saigon troops which invalided Cambodia and
that U.S. B-52's were for the first time used in Cambodia."
Radio Moscow on the 20th, reporting on WP.ite House Press
Secretary Ziegler's press conference, said he "admitted that
t,~re scale of U.S. air force operations in Cambodia has
increased and gave it to be understood that the United States
is not bound by any limitations as regards the intensification
of the air war in Cambodia." On the 19th TASS picked up a UPI
report that the United States has "frozen the withdrawal of
air units ?rom Southeast Asia."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONI'IDENTIAL i'BIS 'TRENDS
c0 JANUARY 1971
Citing other "evidence of U.S. escalation," the Kharkov
commentary reported that American "advisers are helping
Saigon troops invade Cambodia." A TASS report on the 19th
quoted the WASHINGTON POSm as saying the United States was
using "liaison officer" to intensify its operations in
Cambodia.
At this writing thzre has been no Noscow *nention of a South
Vietnamese raid with U.S. air support on a Cambodian
r ~. soner camp .
CRITICISM OF Moscow comment on the military action
CAMBODIAN REGIME along Highway 4, including a 16 January
radio commentary in Cambodian, criticizes.
the government for taking part in a military operation against
its own people but does not mention Lon Nol explicitly. The
action, the commentary says, clearly demonstrates "that the
Phnom Penh leaders are trampling on the national interest and
that they h~.;re swerved from a neutral policy by ,joining
foreign forces--that is, the U.S. imperialists and their
Saigon puppets--in mili~:ary operations against the Khmer
peoplE." The commentary predicts that the new offensive will
be checked by the "patriotic forces" and that the Phnom Perch
leaders' policy will only "evoke the anger of the Khmer
people, who are rising up in defense of their fatherland.''
Despite the fact that it mP.intains relations with Lon Nol,
Moscow in the past has similaz~ly lauded the achievements of
"patriotic forces." And a 31 December PRAVDA commentary, among
others, accused the Phnom Penh "leadership" of having involved
the country in U.S. aggressive policy and of distorting the
country's economic life.
PRC SCORES LAIRD TRIP. ATTACK ON DRV. ARVN ACTION IN CAMBODIA
Peking's first reaction to Secretary Lard's Asian tour came
on 14 January in a widely broadcast commentary which says the
trip ;:ad the dual aim of "assuaging the U.S, running dogs"
and "making a new deployment for aggression." It derides U.S.
professions that the United States "still seeks a 'negotiated
nettlemer,t' in Southeast Asia," charging that "Laird raved
ti:9.t 'the United States will meet its treaty obliga~~ions and
commitments in this area of the world "' and."doggedly refused"
to withdraw U.S. troops "immediately, unconditionallyy and
completely." The commentary also deplores allied "war blackmail"
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI3 TRENDS
20 JA~'VUARY 1971
at the time of the tour, citing the air strikes against the
DRV, heavy air raids by B-52's and other aircraft over lower
Laos and Cambodia, and the intrusion of more South Vietnamese
troops into Cambodia to reopen Highway 4.
PEOPLE'S DAILY ON A 19 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
SIHANOUK APPEAL article endorses an appeal made by
Sihanouk the previous day, stating that
it is "bound to give an enormous impetus to the victorious
advance of the Cambodian people." Commentator maintains that
the I,on Nol regime is "eking out a precarious e;;istence" and
is "liable to fall at any moment." The appeal, carried by
NCNA on the 18th, claimed that the Lon ATol government is
isolated and has been forced to "hide" itself in Phnom Penh,
"completely encircled by our people's liberation armed
forces." Sihanouk called upon the Cambodian people to be
determined to carry out a prolonged struggle and to frustrate
"perfidious maneuvers aimed at enforcing solutions of
compromise and partition ." Among other things, he
also asked them to "multiply and strengthen the work inside
the enemy camp and launch more and more powerful political
moveme.zts in favor of our sacred cause in the cities not
yet liberated in order to hasten victory."
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN. COMMENTARIES PROTEST AIR STRIKES
The flurry of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements on
16, 17, 18, and 19 January protesting U.S. attacks above the
DMZ coincided with the announcements by the U.S..Comma.nd in
Saigon ci air strikes against DRV missile sites in connection
with the bombing of supply routes in Lays. However, the
protests were ambiguous as to the precise locations and
described broader action than that announced b;,r the U.S.
Command.* Thus, the spokesman's statement of the 16th
charged that on the previous day the "Americans fired a series
* According to the U.S. statements, on 17 January U.S.
fighter-bombers attacked two surface-to-air missile sites in
the DRV 16 and ~6 miles from the DMZ, respectively; on the i6th
a Shrike missile was fired at a missile site 10 miles north of
the DMZ; and on the 15th there were three similar strikes in
the areas of the Mugia and Bankari passes--80 and 30 miles
north of the DMZ, respectively.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 JANUARY 1971
of artillery salvoes from the southern bank of the DMZ at
Vinh Son village, in Vinh Linh." The protest of .the 17th
charged that U.S. aircraft on 6, 9, and 15 January sprayed
toxic chemicals on populated areas of Le Thuy, Bo Trach,
and Quang Ninh districts, Quang Binh Province, causing damage
to the vegetation and crops. It also alleged that on the
16th "U.S. planes fired rockets on several places in Vinh
Linh," and it added that all of the places cited are on
DRV territory.
The protest of the 18th contained the first description of an
action that seems to accord with the U.S. announcements.
It denounced the "firing of missiles on a locality of Quang
Binh Province on 15 January" and also said that B-52's
dropped demolition and steel pellet tombs on Huong Lap
village in the northern part of the DMZ on the 15th and
16th. The :,pokesman "severely condemned" these U.S. "war
acts" and "flatly rejected the so-called 'self-defense
response' of the U.S. ruling circles aimed .:,t covering up
their piratical acts."
The foreign ministry spokesman's fourth consecutive state-
ment ,' on the 19th, charged that on 17 January U.S. aircraft
"bombed and fired rockets at a number of places in the Vinh
L~nh zone and in Dien Bien Phu district, Lai Chau Province,
which belong to DRV territory."
COMMENT Routine protests over air strikes by the foreign
ministry spokesman normally prompt little
supporting radio or press co.RUnent, but there is comment on
the current ones--perhaps because of the coincidence of
* Ir_ the period between ttie concentrated U.S. air strikes
on 21 November 1970 and the current series, the DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman had issued four protests: the 30 November
charge that U.S. strikes on 28 and 29 November hit two
villages in the DMZ; a 14 December protest over use of
"noxious chemicals" on the 6th on a populated area in Bo
Trach district, Quang Binh Province; an 18 December protest
over U.S. strikes on the 15th at Lai Chau Province and on
the 16th at Huong Lap village in the northern paa?t of the
DMZ; and an 11 January protest over strikes on Ha Tinh
Province on the 8th.
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CONFIDENTIAL 1'B IS TRENDS
2.7 JANUARY 1971
propaganda charges of U.S. ''escalation" throughout Indochina.
Thus, the 20 January NHAN DAN editorial recapitulates the
specific charges of air strikes as well as the general
charges regarding actions throughout Indochina protested in
the foreign mi:~istry statement of the 19th. The editorial
is notable for the additional charge that the United States
"has dropped commando spies in a number of areas in the
fourth military zone to surreptitiously sabotage our rear.''
No date is mentioned, but the sentence comes directly after
a listing of the dates of U.S. actions as 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, and
17 January. TY_e editorial says the United States is planning
"military adventures" against the DRV, using the pretext of
"self-defense reaction, interdiction, and protecting the lives
of U.S. servicemen in the South." It declares that since the
10 December party-government appeal "a high tide of revolutionary
action" has developed throughout the DRV and that the people ere
determined to fulfill their tasks, including that of "rear base
duty to tiie vast frontline."
A 19 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary enumerates
a number of charges that appeared in the foreign ministry state-
ment, althoug'~ the statement was not released until late that
day. A NHAN DAi? commentary c^_ that day reviewed the incidents
protested in the series of foreign ministry spokesman's state-
ments and said that the Nixon Administration's "deceitful
allegations" about self-defense reaction and protection of
Americans in the So>t.~ can fool no one.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the 18th, unlike the other
co:rment, notes that the U.S. Command in Saigon "admitted" on
the preceding day that U.S. aircraft had fired rockets at
North Vietnam territory.
DELEGATES AT PARIS DENOUNCE U.S. TROOP-WITI-DRAWAL P~~LICY
The DRV and PRG delegates both denounced the U.S. troop withdrawal
policy at the 99th session of the Pe.ris talks on 1~ January. The
VNA and LPA accounts of the session note that PRG delegate head
?`one. Nguyen Thi Binh said the "key problem" fir anding the war
and restoring peace is the complete withdrawal of all U.S. and
allied troops from South Vietnam. LPA further reports her charge
that the "main obstacles" to ending the war are created by the
United States, which clings to "absurd conditions, namely 'mutual
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20 JANUARY 19'Tl
troop withdrawal,' and refuses to set an appr priw~: time limit
for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops." VNA notes that
Mme. Binh, in demonstrating and acclaiming the PRG's flexibility
on the question of U.S. troop withdrawal, recalled the PRG's
11 De; ember 1969 proposal that tYie United States declare it
will withdraw its troop:, in six .:,onths, its 17 September
eight-point initiative which included ~~he call for U.S.
agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971, and its 10 December
three-point statement on a cease-fi,:e.
Both LPA and VNA note that Mme. Binh "refuted the U.S.
Administration's contention about 'ending the U.S. combat role'
in South Vietnam" as a "maneuver to fool and divert public
opinion." In this regard, she charged though only LPA reports
it--that the President's 4 January TV intervieti* ~,nd Secretar;~
Laird's statement during h~.s rPCent trip "proved that the United
States is still reluctant" -.o withdraw its troops and that in
fact it is "undertaking adventurous military acts against the
DRV".and expanding the war i~z Laos and Cambodia.
Xuan Thuy--in a statement devoted largely to castigating
Secretary Laird's tour--a~so charged that the United States
intends neither to withdraw nor to end its combat role in
Indochina. Thuy brushed aside the President's declaration
that the United States is on its way out of the Vietnam war by
recalling that at the previous session, on 7 January, he had
pointed out that the President's remark was for "propaganda
purposes." VNA does not report this passage; however, nor
does it mention his statements similar to Mme. Binh's on action
in Cambodia and Laos.
STATEMENTS BY In ita usual manner, VNA brushes aside the
ALLIED DELEGATES statements of the allied delegates with one
sentence each. Thus it says that "at U.S.
bidding, the delegate of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration
tried to sling mud at North Vietnam in an attempt to hide its
own traitorous nature." And "the U.S. negotiator only rehashed
his insolent and obstinate allegations." It ignores Ambassador
Bruce's reiteration of U.S. complaints against the DRV on the
POW issue and his attempt to hand over to the communist side an
updated list of all American servicemen missing in Southeast
Asia, in addition to the request for any information the other
side may have on them.
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CONI'IDGNTIA.L I'DIS '1'I~ENDS
20 JANUN~Y 171
"ADDLE EAST
USSR EXTJLS ASWAN AS SYMBOL OF COOPERATION. FRIENDSHIP
Moscow gives voluminous attention to the ceremonies surroundi:~.g
the 15 January commissioning of the Aswan hydropower complex in
Egypt~~ Podgornyy's visit for. the occasion, the signing in Aswan
of a declaration" on the completion of the project, and the
message of congratulations from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kocygin
to President as-Sadat and Premier Fawzi, Material on the
occasion pays +ribute to Nasir while enumeratin6 she benefits
the UAR is deriving from the Aswan complex and holding it up
as a symbol of Egyptian-Soviet friendship and cooperation.
Aswan is repeatedly hailed as a firm foundation for the
country's industry and agriculture, as well as proof of the
effectiveness of cooperation of young developing stags with
the socialist countries.
Aswan is also seen as an illustration of the UAR's peaceful
objectives of c~onomi.c and social progress. For example, a
foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 16th says that
while the UAR has been forced. to devote immense efforts and
resources to defense, it i~ Successfully carrying through
%ts "peaceful plans for development" whi'.e Israel's economy,
in contrast, is being ruined because of its militarist
development.
The ,joint communique, as well as Podgornyy in his speeches. in
tlZe UAR, reiterates th_e.usual prescription for peace in the'
Middle East: Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab
territories, full implementation,of security Council
Resolution 242,. and fu1fi11mEnt of UN resa~,utions concerning
the lawful rights of the Palestinian people.
PODGORNYY ON UAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. POLITICAL SOLt~TION
In speeches during his 13-1q January visit, Podgornyy puts
considerable emphasis on Egyptian economic development,
praising the Aswan complex not only as a symbol of Soviet-
UAR friendship and cooperation but also as the. basis. for
further Egypt,~an economic progress. He routinely pledges
continued Soviet support and assistance to the Arabs in
their struggle against "Israeli aggression" and for a ";;ust
political solution," but offers no specifies other than a
brief announcement of Soviet assistance in rural electrifica-
tion and land reclamation.
CONFIDENT'Ah
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CONI~'IDLPf'.l.'T~L i~'131 ~ '.L'IiL;NllS
20 JANUA]2Y 1971
Paying tribute to 1Vasir for his "progressive social and economic
reforms" and his part in fostering UAR-Soviet friendship,
Podgornyy in his banquet speech on the 13th U,lso pr~~ises
President as-Sadat for his "great personal contribution to
the advancement" of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in uolitical,
economic, defense acid other fields. Characterizing the
calks held during his visit, Podgornyy says in his Cairo
television address on the 18th that they were "thorough a.rtd
fruitful," and that the "exchange of views" again confirmed
identity of opinions on major international issues.
SOVIET Podgornyy rep~a~cs past Soviet generalized pledges
SUPPORT of contin~zed support and assistari~~e to the Arabs,
both in t!~e context of the Middle East conflict
and with regard to economic development. Such avowals of aid
are typified by his Cairo television statement in which he
says the USSR will continue to render the Arab states the
necessary political, economic, and military assistance in
defense of their independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity. Not unexpectedly, he offers no details of such
assistance, and fails to enlarge on his brief announcement,
in his Aswan rally speech on the 15th, regarding the Soviet
decision to assist in rural electrification and land reclama-
tion--an announcement welcomed by Cairo media. Pointing out,
in his banquet speech on the 18th, that the USSR knows from
its own experience that a developed economy is a basis for
insuring enuine independence and "strengthening its defense
potential," Podgornyy again says the Soviet Union is "trying
to give all-round assistance" to the UAR in developing
industry and agriculture.
At the same time, Podgornyy seems to caution against any idea
of unlimited Soviet largesse: In his Alexandria dockyard
speech on the 17th, he says the USSR is prepared to assist
Egypt "as much as it can," but that it is not giving assistance
because of any surplus of capital since "we do not have it."
"Tae are ready," he says, "to make certain material expenditures"
to facilitate the development of young independent states,
without seeking any advantage for the USSR. Comparing the
"more difficult" conditions under which Soviet development
took place with those prevailing in the UAR, he notes that
"you have many friends" ready and capable of giving the
necessary aid. At the same time, he acknowledges "certain
difficulties" complicating develoi.ment in the UAR, such as
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CONt~'1llEN'I':[AL, I~'D:IS '1'ltIaNDS
20 JANUARY 1971
lack of capital Fnd specialists and "other greater or lesser
problems" in economic and cultural development. While he
assesses them as "doubtless" temporary, he says they are
"augmented by the Gcheming of internal reaction and external
imperialist forces,"
POLITICAL Podgornyy again presses the theme of apolitical
SOLUTION solution of the Middle East conflict, while
eschewing any detailed discussion of the subject,
He mentions the Jarring talks only once, remarking in his
banquet speech on the 13th that although Israel finally
announced agreement to begin negotiations through Jarring,
it appears from "international press reports" that it does
not approve full withdrawal, HA does not refer to the issue
of a cease-lire extension.
Podgornyy repeatedly outlines Moscow's "realistic program"
for peace which is reiterated in the communique. He portrays
the Egyptians as committed to a peaceful course but impelled
also to strengthen their defenses, and on the 13th promises
continued Soviet support for the "diversified" poli~:;y which
includes political and diplomatic activity. Speaking at the
banquet on the 18th, ha points to the difficulty of the
"man;-sided" struggle ahead and says it will call for "realistic
assessment" of the situation, statesmanlike wisdom., self-
control, and flexibility.
MILITARY Assessing bilateral rel.ati.ons in his banquet speech
RELATIONS on the 13th, Podgornyy remarks, with respect to
military relations, that they "have no secret goals
that represent a danger to peace." The meaning of these
relations, he says, is to "consolidate the defense; of the
UAR and its re:zdiness to give a worthy rebuff to the Israeli
aggressors."
Speaking ai; a luncheon in Alexandria on the 17th, Podgornyy
makes one of the infrequent Soviet references to USSR naval
visits to Egyi.t, mentioning that Soviet warships stationed in
the Mediterranean call at Alexandria, and that these visits
are of a "friendly nature and serve the interests of our two
count'"ies." He adds that the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean
is a "serious factor restraining imperialism from all sorts of
intrigues and ventures" directed against the national
liberation movements of peoples of the area, (Neitl'ier Cairo
nor Moscow media confirmed a report in AL-AHRAM, carried
by MENA on the 16th, that Podgornyy and as-Sadat ?~r~~>>d visit
the destroyer Leningrad, which dust arrived in Alexand~~ia,)
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONI'lll]iIN'1'IAL P'DIS 7.'Ii~NDS
20 JANUARY 1971
COMMUNIQUE CALLS WITI-mRAWAL P~ECESSARY FOR PEACE
The Middle East section of, the ,joint conuniuiique concluding
Podgornyy's visit to the UAti repeats the fornula for peace
along the lines of the iVasir communique last July: }3o~th
sides express the conviction that peace in the Middle East
can only be insured by Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
territories, full implementation of Security Council
Resolution 2!~2, and fu:~i?illment of UN resolutions concerning
the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. There
seems no particular reason for reversal of this order in the
December 1970 conununique on Ali Sabr. is Moscow visit, which
listed implementation of Resolution 242 before withdrawal.
The current communique does not include certain points in
the December document, such as its reference 'to the Jarring
talks and its reaffirmation ~f support foi efforts "in and
outside" the United Nations aimed at a peaceful settlement.
It does refer to the "dangerous situation'' in the Middle
East as a result cf "Israeli aggression," bv;; does not
repeat the December communique's statement on the danger
of continuation of the present situation created by Israeli
efforts to continue occupation of the Arab territories.
As usual, Israel's "aggressive expansionist policy" is said
to be possible only because of the support of "imperialist
forces, first of all the United StatPs."
Paralleling the December communique, the current one notes
Soviet assurances that the USSR will further support the
UAR people in their struggle against "Israeli aggression,"
for liberation of all occupied territories and a ,just
settlement in the Middle East.
The sides note the importance of developing and strengthening
niter-Arab cooperation in the struggle against Israel.
Podgornyy had also underlined this point in his 18 January
banquet speech, remarking, in connection with Aram unity,
that the overcoming of differences and lack of coordination
still manifesting themselves" acquire "ari increasingly
greater significance" in present-day conditions.
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CUN1~ 1llL;N`1'lAL :~'I3.IS `L'RL;NllS
20 JANUARY 19'71
BILATERAL `i'he usual"extensive exchange of opinions" is routinely
RELATIONS said to have taken place in an !mcsphere of ":cordiality
and full mutual understanding" and, a,s is customary, a
"unit;t of views" was noted in discussion of other topical inter-
national questions. (TABS, reporting the talks on the 18th, said
they were held in an atmosphere of "friendship and frankness," a not
unusual description: `1'he communique or. Nasir's July 1968 visit,
for instance, had spoken of a "fri.endly and cordial atmosphere
and spirit of complete mutual understanding" and immediately gone
on to say that "frank views were exchanged." on bilateral matters
and the Middle )/as~~ si.tuati~~n. )
The sides noted "with satisfaction" the friendly ties and fruitful
cooperation in political, economic, defense, and other fields and
discussed further "long-term" development of cooperation. The
communique notes without elaboration that the USSR will give the
UAR "all possible assistance" in rural electrification and land
reclamation "and in other fields as well." The UAR side requested
Soviet specialists to provide technical assistance in operation
of the Aswan complex until Arab specialists have been fully
trained. (According to M;;NA on the 15th, Podgornyy, meeting at
Aswan with Soviet experts, said that after completion o.? the
dam "a number of Soviet experts will return to the Soviet Union
while others will remain in Aswan"; the chairman of the High Dam
Authority had been reported by M);NA on the 7th as saying 40 experts
would remain during the warranty period,)
In the field of party ties, the communique advocated exchanges
of delegations; the Nasr communique last July had noted the
sides' agreement io continue "this fruitful and useful ,practice,"
NIDSCOW DISCUSSES '`l`JI THDRAWAL TIMETABLE, `~ U ~ S ? POLICY
The first Moscow comment on the >Jgyptan notion for a timetable
for Israeli withdrawal as a condition for an extension of the
cease-fire comes in the characterization of it as "reasonable"
by PRA~iA's Primakov, speaking in the radio's domestic service
commentators' roundtable on the 18th, The on~y previous known.
instance in Soviet propaganda when a cease-fire extension was
linked to a withdrawal timetable was in a TASS report that
President as-Sadat had stated on 3U November that the UAR
would agree to an extension of the cease-fire "only if an
accurate calendar plan is set" for Israeli withdrawal. Soviet
support for the idea of drawing up a.timetable--for the
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CONK':1ll]iIN'.l'I:AL, T'I3IS '.['ItI+~NDS
20 JANUARY :L971
withdrawal of troops and the implementation of "other }~roviaions"
of Security Council Resolut;ion 212--was voiced in the communique
on Ponomarev's December visit to t;he UAR, but; there was no mention
of a cease-fire in this connection.
Primaltov complains to his roundtable colleagues that Israel not
only will not raise the question of withdrawal, but is conducting
a policy aimed at assimilation of the occupied territories. Iie
concludes that it is "reasonable" for she UAR to say "that it
cannot officially continue the cease-fire after 5 February
unless Tsrael agrees to a timetable for the withdrawal of its
troops" From occupied territory. Egypt, he explains, does not
want to legally Justify, by prolonging the cease-fire period,
the occupation by Israel of Arab territory.
The Western press, Primakov says, presents this position as a
demand for unconditional withdrawal and nothing else. But,
he argues, if the Egyptians say that they are not prepared
to continue ~che cease-fi.re without a timetable, "tha+. they
do not limit themselves to the withdrawal of troops, then
they take upon themselves obligations on all the complex
of questions" envisaged in Resolution 242. Touching earlier
on this complex, he calls for a "package-deal solution"--
a concept outlined in the first public presentation of
Moscow's Mideast proposals, in the Vasilyev PRAVDA article
in January 1969--calling for witl-~drawal and simultaneous
resolution of the question of ending the Arab-Israeli state
of war, freedom of navigation of a11. sea routes, "and so on,
including the question of Palestinian refugees."
Primakov notes that the U.S. press is pointing out that the
United States has brought pressure to bear on Israel and
it has allegedly already made concessions--"utterly invisible,"
he says--and "now it is up to the USSR to say its piece."
Failing to take up the challenge, Primakov instead ass~rt~
that while "tranuferring some of the responsibility" from
itself to the USSR, the United States is instigating Israel
to thwart a "compromise settlement," remarking that the
delivery of new offensive weapons cannot be described as
pressure on Israel.
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CCiNI~'_fUI~;N'I'I/1[, I~'Isl; 'I'ItI~~NI)(~
~?0 J/1N11I11tY 19'( I
JARRING Moscow': scu.rrty coverage: o.f the: Jr.>,rri.ng ruisr;.ion tend:;
MISSION to convey an i-npressiorr oi' peso; im :>m .in i.huL no
change is seen .in Israel's attitude Lowc.ird wi.thdrr.rwa,.l..
Primakov, maintaining thzcL- the Soviet, [Jni.oi had "persistently
advocated" renewal oi' the Jarring mi:;~ion, rhetorically a:;hs
what Jarring brought back from his Lri.p Co Je:?ruculem, and
replies that according to the rJ.S. press, Israel is In no way
considering the question of withdrawal,. And 'i'ASS correspc-ndent
Piv warov reported from New York on the 15th that Prime Minister
Meir subm.it-ted to Jarring "new 'proposals' on the Middle East
peace settlement which do not move the solution even a single
step fnr?r,rard." Citing "reliable sources" at the United Na.t.ions,
he said the proposals were based on Tel Aviv's "old territorial
claims."
Moscow's domestic service on the 17th also attri.but~ed to "informed
UN circles" the view that the Israeli language had undergone some
changes, but the essence of its policy was unchanged, and it
forecast the danger of a "breakdown" in Jarring's mission. 'Phe
broadcast reported that Egyptian UN delegate az-Zayyat had handed
Jarring a written statement frog, the UAR Government on the 15th
caJ.ling for fulfillment of Resolution 242, "wY~ich demands with-
drawn,l~" and asserted that there was nothing about the resolution
in Mrs. Meir's letter to Jarring.
On the 18tH, TASS did report U Thant as expressing, at a press
conference that Say, "cautious optimism," as to prospects for
Jr3,rring's contacts.
PEACEKEEPING Typically evasive on the issue of. Big Two or Big
FORCE Four participation in a Middle East peacekeeping
force, TASS reported U Thant as saying at his
press conference that the question of the establishment and
ec:Y;,sition of an international peacekeeping force in the
Middle East falls under the competence of the Security Council.
According to U.S. press accounts, U Thant said '.re had doubts
as to the wisdom of active participation of the two superpowers
in a UN peacekeeping force, particularly in an area such as the
Middle East, although he saw no difficulty in British and French
participation.
TASS in reporting Secreta.i^y Rogers' 15 January CBS television
remarks noted without comment that he said the United States
"was 'prepared to play a responsible role in peacekeeping ir.
the area."'
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t't,Nl~'II,I~IN'I'1111~ a'I,il, 'I'IfI~;Nlrtl
Wtli Icy Mu,,rc,w';t ML,lcllu I~;rtul, Itr?c,lt?nn.l;;, rr.il uu,.,lc? lutl,l Ic~ I'r?~mt l,inu?
tct 1, I nun, c~trv i :;n.l.!r~ I,Itc~ It trtt i (nt i nll c, l' IIIV I'ur?c?c?;t I rl cc?r?tn,l n n.rc;n;l ,
Mc,ucuw lur;, bcrr;n rc;l,icc-tL with r?c;lrn,r?cl L, c, ('rti r?rt'~i l,r?c,ltc,nnl--
out.l.iHeil i.n I,IIC; 1 ; Jn.nun.r?y /l1~-11111tAM--I.'c,r IiLt~ I~'c,ttr lurr.?I, Lc5 i lu~l, i c,n
Ln rt 1.1N ix:rttccltccl,Ln(~ .Cc,rcc:. (Ictc'ur'cl.ftt(? I,c~ I.)tc; Itrti,c~r?, Llli;r wrr;t
thc~ "l,r i nc i ltrt L )w i ut" [ n I~'c,rc L(=,u M i -t 1:- tc;t? lt.i?yrl.cl'tl rr)r.lrttll, c~un l,rtr t;l
In I~cmclon, I'rtr?i t3, roof Ltomc; Ml!~NI1 ruttuct tltn,l, hc.; di nct.t;-nec; I,It i r;
l,rll, durl.nr; thc~ /',rreb-;:;cw~c;t talhu .Irt Crl,i r?o un the; lllth.
[3[G f=OUR ROLE Wh.Llc rte.-~I, 1,ubl.i.cl,y l,rc>tnotinN li/llt urNi.nEr:~ I'ur
I3 Lg l~'our uct.Lott i n prov.td i.ug recomntcrtdrtl; i ono
to Jarr:Ing, Moscow .IrtdLrecta,y sulrt,;c:,t.} un :i.ntcrent .In ttu~
posu:Lbi.:Lit,,y, 'L'huu the 'I'I1t~ account c7f U 'L'h,.;nt'tt lt.rcu;r conl'crenc:c
represerrtu him as saying--Ln the eonte~xt oi' the; Mldc.i.le I~~c~.it--
that the 13:ig b'our "play an irnportct.rrt role .i.n the Hues [.lone
concerning irrternationra,l. peace acrd security." U '.I'hr.~rrt i;;
quoted in t;he 11.5. press, however, as Lraving seen "some rrtc~ri t
in the .ttaternents of some governments that for the moment,
at least, the four permanent members of the Security Council
should not; be too active in arriving at a consensus or
agreed principles or guidelines." 11nd in its 'brief account
of Secretary Rogers' 15 January television remarks, `1'A.SS the
next day gratuit~?,:sly injected the observation that the
Secretary did not say whether the United States intended
to return to the Mi,ldle bast consultations of the deputies
of the ?3ig Four UN representatives, which had been "stalled
by it."
Ln an earlier reference to a Big I~bur role, a Ryzhikov domestic
service commentary on the 12th sn.id tlrat i.f the Jarring mission
resulted in an impasse due to Tel 11viv's present "extremist
position," only the negotiations between the Big Four
"will be rible to succeed, as is hoped i.n Ca.iro, in arriving
at a timetable" for implemento.tion of Resolution 21r2. Ryzhikov
recalled that in hi: It January television interview President
Nixon emphasized the role of the Big Four and "even urged them
to ,join efforts to promote the establishment of peace" in the
area. Referring to the anti--Soviet activities of the Jewish
Defense League, Ryzhikov asked why Israel's "paid agents" are
allowed "to drive a wedge between two members of the Big Four
who also, to use President Nixon's graphic terms, hold the
key to the maintenance of peace."
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I~~livl~~iili~,t,l'rtni, I~~ill? ~rtft~,Nlr,;
;'11 .I IIIVII/IIiY I ~)'( I
GI_IZMIIPJY MINI) 13 L:1~1_ I N
GUR LE/~Df :RS AT)M'VW T CNV NO "i NTfl/1-G~fZI'NW f~CL/1'I' l ONS"
~itr'~,~IItJ r?t?Ilt.lrtr'lill'lltlt i)l? tllc? til)I('t! llc)tlt?y I,~'~W'11r~1 1'~'Ilit,l~)ill; Wltll
Wt'r{ t L1c'1'llUlllY , ~'ll.l l i ntj 1?U r' "IIUI'lllrl l " !l l lr l ulll'i t l c' 1, 1 ~?,r ht'LWr'l?n
ecllu:lly !1lrv~?r~?It;u Itl,rrLc~u n.uci r~,J~?cl,iut~; I,II~~ W~~:,I, Gl,r?nvl.n runcelll
cal' ulre~? i al ".i ul,r?n-(ier?InlLU rc? l rtt i ~.~nn," hrrv~~ rrl,lx~r:rr~cl ,i.n.ll cl rr t'I ru?r`,y
cat' :;Lrl,tc+nu~ul;u cry I~'L(li Guv~~rnuu?IIL leaclc?t:; noel l,~~lil,irinul! iu Lhe
t'Lrlll. hal t' oC ~Irlnurrr?y c.>rr Wcut Cc?r?nlrul lu~l f ~~~ l,~~ward the (lUlt, the
1?l)Irr-llow.~r? ta].Icn curl W~_,ut. Iter?l i.u, tllr? rnL i t'i.c~cl,l.ton c,f tiro Mcx:;c~ow
caul Wur?:;c:w Lrctrt..Lc~u, anll tlu~ Ur;tilr~iltik i.u f;c?uc~rtll.
1.n rl. rel~.tL.Lvely .Low-lu?yecl ti;lx~ectl to t,hc dilllornat.Lc corl,~a rrt. c:
New Yeur?'~ rccc~ht.ion on ) ~7rrnuary, pub.l i.;.;hecl in NL:UI~,': DL;U'1'SCIIGIINI)
the next drry, ll.Lbr?lcht crgui.n leave his stock :r_nterprr~trrl,I~an of the
Moscow cocci Waruuw traat,lc?:a. Aucr:ib:inlr, tlrcir "f;rcrrt Lmportance" i;o
t;}rc 1'rrct that Bonn, by cigninl* thorn, has "r?ccolrnized l.he invi.olribi-
lity ruin. i.rnrnutliblli.ty under inl;c..ruut.ionca.l law" of t;h~ present
l~uropcrur borders, :Lncludinh the border between the P'RG and GDR, he
added ghat, t;he I~'1tG Government had pletl.l;ed i te:c:.11:' t;o conduct its
relation,; with the GDIt on the ba is of 1u 11. equality acrd nondi.s-
c.rimirration, Lie?nn, he sa.:i.d, has adopted t;he L.>>lcy ghat neither
state Carr ; epreserrt .he other abroad. or net; in its na-ne, thereby
creating "more favorr~;ble. conditions" for establishing "contruci,ual
relations" between the I'RG acrd the GDR on the basis of international
law, Ile reiterated the GDIt's readiness to begin negotiations with
all states, :including the L'1~G, on Lhe estub.r.ishrnent aP "norrrral
diplomatic relations."
On the 11~t;h, the day before State Secretaries Bahr of t:ie FRG and
Kohl of the GDR met in Bonn for the latest session in their current
series of talks, NEUES DEU`i'SCIiLAND published along report it said
had been delivered by Ulbricht ton 17 December session of the
,committee on preparations for the SED's 25th an-riversary, 21 April.
After a lengthy review of the evolution of the East German SED,
through a merger of the former Communist and Social Democratic
parties, and a glowing account of the SED's a~:complishments, Ulbricht
strongly denounced the FRG Tor trying to dray the GDR closer to the
FRG on the basis of a "fictitious 'national :oml~unity of interests'"
and for seeking to gain a foothold in the CDR by propagating "social
democratism." Repeating the GDR's insistence that there never can
be any "special intra-German relations" or "so-called unity of
nation," he stated that GDR policy is bases. on establishing rela-
tions with Bonn in accordance with internai;ional law, thereby
thwarting all notions of any kind of "intra-German relations."
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c;ONt~'1ItI~IN'I!1/11~ I~'lil;; '.l'[11~;NU1;
Un l.'( .lr(nucrr?,y, r~l, rut I~;rutl: lir.rl.i.n c~r~r(~nwuy nurr?1t.Lntr, the 5~!l,h auni-
v~~t?ttrtt?y uf.' l,hc clura,tha ol.' Itosr>, l,t,txemhur?1?; rLn(1 ICr,,rl. L:i(~hltru,chL, ;:;1~;1)
l'c~L:Ll;huro rn(~tnl,cr Nor(lcu took the occr~r;.l.on to dc:L.i.ver +.>, di.atribc
u(;r,,:Lnul; rtuttcommuntrtitn i_n gencx?rt.l and the L~'cilcru. licpuba.ic in
1x,.rt.Lcu r.t?r. l.n I;h~e up~ech r.rs broct.dcust live. 'by ]~;ast Berlin
rrt,cl.i.a, Norclun nrt.a.(L .(.'7.r,t,t.l.y that there w:Lla. be no "so-culled
dlr.(I.(i(rti" L,(.~tw(~en the GDIi rind l;hc I'RG. '.I!herru crLrr be no br:idgc
F,ci.wcc.rn t;hc two str>,tcs, he sr1:Ld, "Uut nn.Ly the sharpest delimita-
tion. 'l'hc~t?c w:L:L. never be so-culled special. internal Gt:rman
rclut.i.onc or so-ca:l.led d.i.aLot;s conducted between the I~'RG
r>.ncl this GDIt." 1'cace n.nd detente, he contimed, require "normal
rcl.c~i;ions under internat:onal law betwee?r bhe GDR grid the FRG."
BN-IR-K0I-IL '1'he comnn.tniquc issued after the 15 January Bahr-ICohl
TALKS rnect:ing, 'the third in the current series and the
first in Bonn, stated for the first time that the
t,wo sides had agreed not only 'to continue their tallts but to meet
again on a prearranged date--26 January, in Berlin. CDR media
treated the third meeting much as they did the first tiro: ADN
t~~rr:ely reported on the 13th that Kohl had suggested to Bahr that
they meet in Bonn on the. 15th, and on that date i.t announced with-
out elaboration that the two state secretaries had "another rneet;-
ing." 'T'ABS took note of the meeting on the 1.5th, also without
cotmnerri, .
'L'he dec_i.sion to hold the third meeting on 15 January came against
the bct,ckground of a SUCC:CSS10Ir of developments involving both
German ~tra,t;es and Moscow. On the 11th, FRG spokeswten Ahlers had
been quo Led by DPA as stating ut; a press conference that although
the second Bahr-Kohl tweeting on 23 December had been ''fruitless,"
Bann was waiting for East Germany to propose a date for the third
one b~.~t believed it could not. take place before the next--19 January--
round of the four-power ambassadorial talks on West Berlin, On
11 and 12 January, the two days precedi~rg the customary session
of the four ambassadors' deputies in preparation for the meeting
of their principals, the Soviet authorities held up ~?llied military
traffic between the FRG and West Berlin, ostensibly over improper
documentation--a hcldup typically unacknowledged in Soviet or GDR
media. During the same t?wo days, Kohl and GDR Foreign Minister
Winzer were meeting in Moscow with Grotr>,yko and Valentin Falin,
the liSSR ambassador-designate to the FRG, to discuss--according to
TASS and ADN--"topical international problems of ir.cerest to both
states that primarily concern the consolidation of European security."
The announcement on the scheduling of the third Bahr-Kohl meeting
was made the day after F:ohl and Winzer returned home.
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CONFIDliN'1'IAL FBIS `1'RLNDS
2C JANUARY 1971
GDR SEES PLANNED FPD MEETING IN WEST BERLIN AS ~~PROVOCATION~~
NLULS DliU'PSCIiLAND on 14 January published a brief' ADN dispatch
from West Berlin that charged the Springer press in West Germany
with calling for "further provocations" in West Berlin. Specifi-
cally, file dispatch noted that the West German MORGENPOST had
lauded the announced intention of the Free Democratic Party (FDP)
leadership to hold an "illegal session" of FDP parliamentary
leaders in late January "outside the borders of the FRG--in
West Berlin." The plan for such a meeti:,g, ADN conc~uded, is
"directed against detente in i;urope." `1'he dispatch contained
nn ;iirect warning of possi~le GDR retaliatory action, however,
and the GDR Foreign Ministry has yet to release a statement on
the order of those it issu~.u prior to the similar CDU/CSU and
SPD meetings ir. West Berlin in November and. December, respective-
ly. Those meetings also occasioned traffic slowdo.ms on the
autobahns linking th~? Federal Republic and West Berlin.
A direct reference to the traffic situation by CPSU Central Committee
candidate member V.A. Demchenlco, heading a CPSU delegation to the
FRG as a guest of the German Communist Party(DKP), was predictably
omitted in an ADN account of his remarks at a press conference on
the 14th. TASS did not report the press conference. The West
German DPA quoted Demchenko as remarking that "the incidents in
the Berlin traffic will cease only after a satisfactory Berlin
solution is reached." He also said, according to DPA, that there
is no direct "causality between the difficulties in the transit
traffic and the discussion of the link between x?atification of the
Moscow treaty and a satisfactory Berlin settlement," but that the
USSR nevertheless supports the GDR's ",justified" ~~lshes. A Soviet
commentator on 8 December had called the GDR authorities' actions--
not specified--at the time of the November traffic slowdown "justi-
fied countermeasures." During the December slowdown both Soviet
ar.d Fast German official statements and accompanying propaganda
disclaimed responsibility for the--again undefined--"consequences"
of the "illegal" SPD meeting in West Berlin.
M05COW COMMENT Recent Soviet comment has strongly criticized
Bonn for contradictions between its words and
deeds pertaining to West Berlin and the socialist countries.
Noting that "a number of provocative working sessions of the heads
of the ruling Bonr. coa.;.ition parties are planned to be held in
West Berlin in January and February," a Zakharov commentary
beamed to Germany on 16-17 January typically called this a
* For a discussion of this propaganda see the TRENDS of 23 December,
pages 28-29.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 JANUARY 1971
"relapse" into the "adventurous policy" of the past 20 years.
Against the background of Western reports about a widening gulf
between Bonn and its allies--primarily the United States--over
the rate of development of Brandt's Ostpolitik, Zakharov said,
Bonn is now trying to remove "a whole mountain of doubts and
distrust" in Washington through its "provocative acts and attacks
against tY~e socialist countries." And Bonn's "stilted phrases"
about efforts to contribute to the normalization of the situation
in West Berlin, he added, cannot be used "to camouflage the
unlawful claims and provocatitie acts which continue to be staged
in West Berlin."
A NOVOSTI commentary carried in the domestic service cn the
16th similarly argued that "illegal ,journeys to the city on the
Spree cannot in any way give juridical effect to the illegitimate
pretensions of the FRG to West Berlin"; they can only increase
tension in Central Europe, the commentary said, asking rhetorically
if that was "truly in the interests" of the West Berliners. Assert-
ing that Bonn "has no objections" to using the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties as a cover for its policy toward West Berlin and for its
"malicious campaign" against the GDR and other socialist countries,
Zakharov charged West Germany with contravening both the "letter
and spirit" of the t~~eaties <
FOUR-POWER Reporting the 13th meeting of the ambassadors' talks
TALKS on West Berlin on 19 January, ADN and TASS followed
the pattern of their coverage of the previous meeting.
TASS merely noted that the ambassadors met "for another meeting in
the framework of the exchange of views on questions pertaining to
the situation in and around We,,t Berlin." ADN again carried the
more detailed report, using the same formulation that appeared in
the TASS account but adding that there was a "businesslike discus-
sion" and noting that the next meeting would be held on 9 February,
preceded by consultations at the expert level.
Ulbricht, who in his New Year's address to the nation had accused
Bonn of using the four-power talks to delay a Berlin settlement;
by insisting that a settlement must await four-power agreement,
did not mention the talks at all in his 9 January speech to the
diplomatic corps in East Berlin. In brief remarks on West Berlin,
which seemed considerably more restrained than his New Year's
comments, he stated that the West Berlin problem should be settled
in the interests of peace in Europe and added: "Even though this
involves complicated questions, we believe that settlements will
be possible if the other side furnishes proof of its serious
desire to come to an understanding by displaying a corresponding
spirit of accommodation."
CONFIDENTIAL
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20 JANUARY 1971
Moscow comment has continued to ,tress that there can be no link-
age between ratification of the !dnscow and Warsaw treaties or the
.:onvening o_f a conference on European security with a "satisfactory
settlement" on West Berlin at the four-power talks. For example,
a Zakharov commentary in German on the 6th said that the four-power
negotiations are "not directly connected" with the Moscow and
Warsaw treaties. Zakharov reminded his listeners that in the
discussions on West Berlin "there is no talk about maintenance of
thA s`atus of West Berlin, but rather about an improvement in its
situation." To convert the "diplomatic goal" of the talks into
a "politica.l demand," he continued, would be "detrimental" to the
course of the four-power talks and to the entire process of esta-
blishing "new relations" between the FRG and the USSR, Poland,
and other socialist countries and would "torpedo" efforts to
normalize the situation in Europe.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/8c~nrr~~4A~I12P85T0087~0~1mi~040003-8
20 JANUARY 1971
CZEC~IOSLOVAKIA
PARTY GOES ON RECORD AS SAYING 1968 INVASION WAS "REQUESTED"
After a delay of more than a month, Czechoslovak media on 13 and
14 January released a lengthy document adopted by the 10-11
December CPCZ plenum entitled "Lessons Drawn Prom Lhe Crisis
Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress
ot~ the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia." In this document,
the CPCZ f'or the first time goes beyond its heretofore
official line that the August 1968 intervention was a grate-
fu11y x?eceived initiative taken by the Warsaw Five. It
declares now that "thousands" of Czechoslovak party leaders
and organizations actually "begged" for the invasion.
So;~et media had said nothing about the document's existence
in their coverage of the December CPCZ plenum, although
Prague reports at the time mentioned its adoption as one
~f the plenum's actions. The long delay in Prague media's
release of a text may be taken as circumstantial evidence
that the content was unde~~ review with Moscow and that the
Soviets wanted some changes made. They might have been
displeased with the indictment of Novotny's post-1966 leader-
ship--still strong in the text as now released--and the new
formula. on the invasion may haves been injected at Soviet
insistence.
in its first mention of the document, TASS carried a summary
on 14 January that was virtually identical to the CTK
surnma~y of the day before, and the TASS summary covered
about half a page of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA ~n the 15th,
including lengthy portions of the indictment of Novotny..
Radio Moscow has carried favorable commentaries on the
CPC'L document in Romanian, Czech, Polish, Mandarin, and the
Languages of other commu-rist and noncommunist countries.
One by j~?ltan, given fairly wide dissemination on the
15th and 16th, largely paraphrases the document itself in
highlighting the new formulation on the invasion as "the
only ^orrect decision."
THE CPCZ'S NEW ACCOUNT In its most striking passages, the
OF THE EVENTS OF 1968 CPCZ document, after reiterating
the usual thesis on the "counter-
revolu.t.ionary s;tuation" in August 1.968 and the Dubcek
leaderGhip's alleged ignoring of internal "appeals," adds
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spa .~nN~rnicr :x.971_
that "thousands of comrnunista" including "rnembe.t?s o1' the CI'C'l,
Central Committee began to turn 'to the ].caderships of
the fraternal parties" and governtnents, "begging them in th:Ls
hi.~orically grave moment 'to grant internationra,l assistance
to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of sociallsm." T~t
goes on to explain that these alleged requests were made "in
the proi'ound conviction that their class brethren would not
leave Czechoslovakia at the mercy of l.i1e counterrevolution,
which threatened bloodshed, and that they would prevent- our
country from being torn out of 'the socialist community."
The document does not identify any leaders who joined in calls
for the invasion, but the new formulation reflects the
continued prestige of such leading conservatives as Vasil
Bilak, CPCZ Presidium member and secretary in charge of
international party affairs. In the days just following the
1868 invasion, there were calls by Czechoslovak rank-and-file
liberals for the trial of Bilak, Indra, and other conservatives
on treason charges for having allegedly made the "request"
which the Soviets initially claimed as the justification for
the inter~e~ition.
The dccument goes into greater detail than heretofore on the
personnel involved in the working ot~t of the "Moscow agreement"
in the days following the invasion. It says that on
23 August 1968, "despite opposition from rightist representa-
tives," President Svoboda left for Moscow accompanied by a
delegation made up of "Comrades Gustav Husak, Vasil Bilak,
Alois Indra, Jan Piller, Martin Dzur, and Bohumil Kucera."
Still withholding a direct acknowledgment that Dubcek and
other liberals had been taken to 'the Soviet capital under
arrest, it adds that "in Moscow, they were joined by
Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky, Josef
Spacek, and Bohumil Simon." Two days later, it says, Oldrich
Svestka, Emil Rigo, Frantiseit Barbirek, Milos Jakes, Jozef
Lenart, and Zdenek Mlynar--all conservatives--arrived in the
Soviet capital.
On the score of the invasion, the document concludes that
"any solution which did not include immediate outside help
from the Soviet Union and other of our allies could have had
no hope of success" in "saving socialism in Czechoslovaki;~."
In this connection, it rejects anew, as Husak had done at
the June 1969 Moscow international party conference, the
`',dor on the a.f.3th. ?ovl~t
Ambaaeu.edor `i'olr,tLlcov, wtro a:l:;o hud Left Pclcir?g unannoun~nt?Lr Inn,t~~ Llu.~ (;hI rlr~rir? I rl n.rrl,l -;luv Ir~l, IIr?nl, Lmc~rrl.. Mr)nrtc,w hrcn
:Ica l,, hc)wc~vur, ctrn.wrr Inll,l Ictrtt Lc,rur I'c,r thr~ L'r?It.lrrh I,nl.hit I'r?c.~rn I I,n
rhrr.r?r.!r~rl I,hrr,t Lhu L'!rl ru~r,r? lurvc~ ru)t cl(~mc,ulrl,r?u.l;ucl r.r.Lucc~r f L,y Lu
~,r~r~lcirr~r, uor?nu.rLLrrr,Llorr c)L' r?r?lri.l,lr,rrrr. lrr t.r, r?n,rc rc.l.'r~renen to
the Lul.ltlr lu l,ol.c~mlcrr,l cOnunc?nl,, n, Itru.li.c, MollCOw br?or~clarrrrt Lrr
Mrtndu,r?1.rr on .LG Ju.ru-r>,r?,y c~xlrr?uulu~ci n hol,c~ Ll~tr~t, I,rr?o(rrcuu erttr be
uclrlevcc] rrt; tlrc tuLlcl; i.n l,hc Ic)nt;-tc~rrn Lntcr?catu of both rrlc cu.
A comnu:rrl.rrr?y i.n lirulio Moscow'u i)r?ogr?cun .L'or the, 1'LI1, on I;Lu; ].nth,
wcru unucua.Lay axirl.i.r..i.t irr r?c~l'err.ln~; to mi.l.:i.tcr,ry li:u,dc.r?u .rti.l1
in powcr? in the courrrr. of u discussion o1' 1.'uctionalLrrn and
d i:;corrtent within the Ch:i.nerre m].].it.ary. `.l'yplc.ally, the commentary
dep:l.ored the purges of Peng '.I'e-huai, IIo .Lung, and. l.,o Jui-clring;
bui; it a.1 so went on t;o mention several military conrrnanders--in
+).dciition to the fallen Sink].c~ng boss, Wang Ian-mao--wh_~ beerune
provincial revolutionary committee chfa.irmen during the cultural
revolution. One of those mentioned, IIsu Shih-yu, is a member
of the CCP Politburo as well as first secretary of the ICiangsu
provincial party committee.
,lccording to the cornrnentary, these and other local military
commanders dei'ied directives from Feking during the cultural
resolution and protected local. party o.rganizat;ions. Noting
that some of these were dismissed, the conunentary asks>d
pointedly: "But is it possiule to dismiss, persecute, and
intirrridate all those who are concerned with 'the destinies of
the state and its armed :forces?" Pointing out the high turn-
over rate of PLA ,chiefs of staff' in the political infighting,
the commentary o:~s~rved that "even the running dog of the
cultural revolution, Yang Chene-wu," had a short stay in the
post and was replaced by Huang Yung-sheng.
* On 17 October 19 9, three days before the opening of .the
Sino-Soviet talks, the Kiangs,:~ provincial ~?adio broadcast
t,wo commentaries which, drawing on the authority of Mao's
report "On the Chungking Negotiations," sought to explain
and defend the dual approach of negotiations and war prepared-
ness. These commentaries were unique in PRC media at the time
in their explicit treatment of the role of negotiations with
the enemy.
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~'-11V1~'II,I~;N'I'Inl, I~'11111 'I'ItI~;NI,;,
I'I?:M;IN(.; ON 'I'ku~ rkcnnlnrrrrl, tlu~me i-t I'r~lcin~!;'u al,lrr?c~rcc~lr wni~
SUk'1~:121'OWI:hS LLLurttr?atud. by r.~ 1'I~;OI'IJ~;';1 1)nL1,Y r~rl,:Lc.Le ou
LC, ,Jrcuurrr.?y c~ni,.Lt.Lc~d "li~iwr, W.LI;h IIc-~;en,or-.Lrun."
(J.Ll,lnlr the -~oru~.l.l.tlecl ccur(.'cr?cncu lu~a.rl 7,aul, ;;ul,rLumbcr? r.Ltua thc~
UN n.nnl.vc,~rr-r.r,r.?y cc.a.clir?al,Lci-~.rr r~u uxcun}i,.ur:, t'~c. ar?Liclc~ clu:L-ned
tku~t thu "meati.tm-nJ.~c r~n~l. cnn~.ra.a. ru.~ta.orrs" aru Uccomang mo:r.c
u--.Lted .i.rr oJipcs.Ltl.on to thc~ two uuY,c:r,~owar?s, "ll.>. .Lrnp:.~riaLiG,ur
and rsocia.L irnpr~riullum." Ar, i'ox? the I'RC, the arti.rle struck
the note lnti?oduced :Ln 1'c1c:Lng'ri New Year's Day editorial that
"at :ro t~.-ne will Cha.nrr, ever bcha?,?~ ].j.lce a superpower, neither
today nor in the future."
The scone ~:reme was used by Li Ilsien-nien on l8 Jra,nuary in
welcoming a delegation from Equatorial Guinea, one of the
countries with ~?rhich Peking has established diplomatic
relations in recent months. Attacking power politics as
practiced by the superpowers and rei~t-erating Peking's
disclaimer of any intent to become one, Li sought to play
on the Africans' desire for independence by deploring "big-
na+,ion chauvinism and power politics" and declaring that
African affairs srould be decided by the Africans themselves.
Apart from a reference to armed struggles in the Portuguese
colonies, the tYLrust of Li's remarks was directed against .
outside interference and subversion and in support of
established governments. He noted that relations between
the PRC and Equatorial Guinea were based on the five
principles of peaceful coexistence.
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;~u ,Inrlunl,v I ~r~ I
r~izc ((J~ri,(~r~ni_ 111=f~l1 I IZS
LI~ONIN(a SETS UP P/1f~lY CUMMITfLL, f;II~ST IN NOIZ'rliL/1S"I'
I:n Ll,rs :s l.xtlr itt.tclr nutuntrrrcrmc~rsl, w i Llti rr Lln~ Ixr,t1L (~ wcclt.rs, NC'IVn
ou :L.G ~fr.tn~rtrr',y rcLrorl.,uci ou I,}re c?:sl,r~Ls.l.Lslunc~nt cal.' rr, nc~w lsrtr?l;,y
corms .tl;crc L'or ,Laonl.ng rrr?ov:lrrce--l;h~r .L'.i.risl; l:.o he I'or?nu~~l i.n l;hc
Northecttsl; rc~;a.on c~~i' Cha.nrr.. A ].ocr.r,.l I?rr,rl;,y c:onLrr?coscs r.tttenc.la~l
by 97' de.l.c~irr,l;cs, :Lrtr~r!;cr thn.n l;lu' (i23-nur.tt lx~d;y' w1r.Lclr sclcr~Le~l.
t,hc .1'or?rncr provinc:i.aa. L;utrt,y carnm:i.tl,ce, met f.'ront 9 i,o
]-3 January and elcctecl f~l_ mcrnber~~' and 2~i a.Ltcrnates to the
Liaoning CCP Conunittee. P'i~rur'ca on the total aize af:' i:he
old. party committee arc not c>.vcLilable, btrt the five-rnan
group which heads the new corrunil;tee i._, :mallet than the
former l5-man secretariat.
Adhering to the pattern for the previously announced committees,
'top party positions on 'the new comnti~ttee were given to local
leaders within the provincial revolutionary committee-mi~.itary
establishment. Military men gained the top three positions
on the new secretariat. Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, chair-
man of the provincial revolutionary committee and comrnander
of the Shenyang Military Region (MR), was elected first
secretary, with Tseng Shao-sham, political commissar of the
Shenyang MR, named second secretary. Li Po-chiu, vice chair-
man of the provincial zevolutionary committee and deputy
political commissar of i;he Shenyang MR, was named secretazy.
Veteran cadres are r,~presented on the new committee by Yang
Chun-fu, vice chairman on the provincial revolutionary
committee and former secretary on the old proz~inc~ s.l party
committee, who was named one of the deputy sec: `sties.
Mao Yuan-hsin, nephew of Mao and a former Red Guard leader,
was named a deputy secretary. He was identified by NCNA
only in his concurrent position as vice chairman of the
provincial revolutionary committee, and once again there
was no specific claim that representatives of "the mass
organizations" are represented on the new committee. As in
the case of the other provincial party committees, the
Liaoning committee was said to have been formed on the
basis o?' the three-in-one alliance of old, middle-aged,
and young--with nc mention of the older triple formula of
PLA, cadres, and mass representatives still utilized in
lower-level party rebuilding.
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I't's ?v I uc1 I tr l -~
I ~ ~ v? I I In I L I'rov i nrut
111 tti, r? 1 c f,
(
l~
(;c~uu 1.
llttliw~~L~
1.~'ulc.tun
_r
;j?
(l
j
K tr~n~;;ti.i. +
:1.0
E;hr~nghctt +
3
~hr~ntung
Ronan
1l-
IlunanY~ +
31.4
Hupeh
1
6
Kwang~ i
1~
Kwangtung'~ +
1
15
I-Iopeh
Tnner Mongolia
Peking
Shansi
Tier_tsin
Heilungkiang
1
1
2
6
15
Kirin
5
Liaoning +
1
1?
4
Kan sup'
Ningsia
Shensi
Sinkiang
Tsinghai
Kweichow
Szechwan
Tibet
Yunnan ~
2
8
3
6
4
2
5
* Apart from announcing individual new party committees, the
provincial radio has claimed that "a majority" of or "many"
counties and/or municipalities have formed party committees.
? The provincial capital has formed its party committee.
CONFIDENm?AL
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I'llllh'llll~;il'I'1111, t~'I'~I;; 'I'Icl~,lllr,l
;'I I ?I/11111/llf'( I tl'( I
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nr~I~u,uru;I Ml fJl r t.llt? ;II,;/ I I';,t~tt I? I,~ Ill f l,y ~ ~r I.Iv? rt,l?nlrl 1, III
fIi,IV,I'r'llt. 'I'llr? t~llly III l)rlll, ttr'VIfLl.lrrll I~1'~,III I,IIt`
Ilflt,l,t'1'll fl.ltllt'flrtl 111 I,IIr' ;~Ilrl.llrfllrll 11.11111 ,11111'r'lllt'lll~, Wlllt'll IIIh11t' Iltl
rrl't'rt'nul, Lt, rl, I,n,l?I,y rn11? I t?I111 )-;I'nlll,. III ,rl I 1,I,IIr?r 111111,rllll't'I{
1 t, wn.ll rt+I,r,l'Lt~ll I,Iln.l, I,Iltr null II n.llllrt?;In Wn.tl rs I vt?II I,,y I,IIt? Ilt'nll
ll l' tllt' 1, 111.1'tY Ill lt'lt'llll Il l'ulll, r,ll llc`Ilr 1.1 (' 1,1' tll,' I,r,, l'I,y Illlt' I t'lltl
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Clrn.nll Chult-?c~ltln,c, nln,lln n. I,tt l i 1, i l'n.l I?t?I,t,rt ." A I ;t1,, 111 ~ ~lul,ulllln l ,
c'cmuull,tcc` nu'nllx~r'n wrrt' rr`In.>L'trtlll,y I'Ir~l?Lc~ll III n.ec?c,rtlrl,nl~t` wll,ll
thu l'rLr?Ly llc,nnL1 Lltt 11,n; t'I nc~wllc~rcr, i 1, lul,lt Illvnr fn.lrl,y I,tnrll
rtipucLl'Lccl I,lul.t tllc?,y w~rrr~ rr.lr`rl,trll 111 nc`crr,rllrl,llc't~ wll,ll I;htr I'Ivc~
r?uquLrcmc~rttrl of Mrl~:,, l,lu~ tllr?c~cr cr?Itcrrl.rc oI' Irf.n, r.rucl L,ht~ I'rrl?I.,y
Gou:ii;.Ltut Lc,rr .
;;Cc~ta.:~L1cr~:L].y t~J.ICr.I,Lirl(J, i t, i cr ICirtnr;all l,r?ov inct.~ I,Iu~L ul>1_>c:~rlr:~ to
br?cult from the act Lruttcrn. With +~ :Lr.Lr1?ct? Iu:>I,,u..''.I,C,.ion tLuut
rtny of the outer r.>.rca:; drat ltrlve 1'or?Ineca the:i r c~mm].ttecra,
Kiangsu invited i;he fawect number oJ' cae].et;ut,es to ].t;~ congr?~' ,
elected the smallest colrunitCee (courrt.i.ng al.i,c~rru.~tes, .il; :i~ I;lrr
sma1.1_est excelrt Shfin~rhai.'c,), and named the fewest uumbor r,~l'
members to its standing crnnmitl;ce (except far 1{unan, which
failed to specify). Yerhap" Politburo member [latz Uhih?-yu,
chief' of the prov ince and the Nanking Military Region, ser.'s
a greater need for emphasis on proiettit?ian centralism than on
proletarian democracy in his area.
PROGRESS Anhwei province is a ]. ikely crtndi date for the
El_SEWI-IERE next provincial par Ly conunittee, hr-wing
announced a rebuilt commit;t;ee for.? .llofei, its
capital city, on 4 January. The provincial radio on ].5 ~Jann;l.r,y
also claimed that after three "seri.~us" party consol.i.dat,ion
campaigns since 1958 "the overwhelming majority of the
municipalities and counties have held party congresses and
set up new party committees." The sc~rne sweeping claim was
made by Hunan and Kw~ngtung ,just before they announced
formation of their party committees last month.
Tsinan radio on 16 January evinced a rare sense of concern that
party consolidation may in some cases be proceeding too quickly.
Shantung, alone in t?he East region, has reported no committee
at county or higher level; yet the radio report states that in
general the movement is "in fine shape." It warns, however,
that some units are now "hastily carrying out party consolidation
work to progress faster," which makes it "impossible" for these
units to achieve any success. 'The speed-up is. said to have
directly affected "the quality of party consolidation artd party
building."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CI~c9~~~~6b875R000300040003-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2~?fl :.II~-T ~,1~85T00875F~~Q;Q~QtQQ~Q003-8
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