TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 13, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIIIII~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIII~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
13 JANUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 2)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States, o
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
oROup I
Galuded Iron, oulmnelk
dernpredinp end
duleulfielien
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 JANUARY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . .
INDOCHINA
. i
Evidence of "Aggression" Seen in Remarks by President, Laird
1
Media Ignore DRV Spokesman on POW List, Kosygin Interview . . .
. 3
DRV Protests Air Strike, Releases War Crimes Communique . . . .
Moscow Says Remarks by President, Laird Mean More Escalation .
. 4
Peking Scores 4 January Nixon Statements on "Understandings" .
. 6
LPA Communique Condemns Allied "Violations" of Cease-Fires .
7
East Berlin Reports DRV Politburo Member Truong Chinh in GDR .
MIDDLE EAST
. 7
Moscow Cautious on Prospects for Jarring Contacts . . . .
9
Podgornyy Attends Aswan Dam Celebrations in UAR . . . . . . . .
. 12
Moscow Blames Jordan Clashes on "Imperialist Agents" . . . .
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
. 13
Moscow Propaganda Seeks to Counter Chinese Challenge . . . . .
JEWISH QUESTION
. 15
Soviets Evince Concern over Censure of Treatment of Jews . . .
. 19
Italian Party, Yugoslav Paper Criticize Leningrad Trials . . .
. 21
Romanian Press Reports Leningrad Verdict Without Comment . . .
SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS
. 22
Moscow Charges U.S. "Connivance" in Harassment by Zionists .
SOVIET ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE
. 23
First Direct Propaganda Mention of Soviet ABM's Since February
BERLIN
. 25
GDR Protests Federal Republic's Actions in West Berlin . . . .
POLAND
. 26
Party Leaders Travel Abroad as Domestic Tension Persists . . .
. 27
Polish Media Report Expressions of Popular Dissatisfaction . .
. 28
(Continued)
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13 JPNUARY 1971
C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
rink System of Farming Advancing Rapidly in R3FSR . . . . . . . . 31
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shanghai Sets Up Party Committee, Fifth in Nation . . . . . . . . 33
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 JANUARY 1971
Moscow (3550 items)
Peking (2782 items)
China
(7%)
7%
Indochina
(16%)
31%
Indochina
(4%)
6%
[Laos, 15th
(--)
13%]
Tashkent
(--)
5%
Anniversary
Declaration,
(NFLSV Delega-
(10%)
6%)
5th Anniversary
Angela Davis Case
(1%)
5%
tion in PRC
PR(,'-Chile Diplomatic
(--)
8%
Polish First
(--)
2%
Relations
Secretary Gierek
India-Nepal Relations
(--)
3%
in USSR
i4iddle East
(1%)
3%
Middle East
(2%)
2%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
Sec,A.etary Laird's trip to Saigon provides a current peg for
Vietnamese communist charges that the United States is intent
on continuing aggression in Indochina through Vietnamization
and the Nixon Doctrine. President Nixon's remarks in his
4 January TV interview as well as Laird's statements continue
to be cited as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy regarding a
political settlement of the Vietnam issue. And there is
routine stress--at the Paris talks and in comment--on the
basic demand that the United States agree to a timetable for
a total troop withdrawal.
Propagandists continue to deplore U.S. "threats" of air strikes
against the DRV, and on 11 January the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman protested U.S. action on the 8th in which planes
"fired rockets on an area three kilometers off the coast
of Ha Tinh Province."
Routine Moscow comment also scores both the President and
Secretary Laird for only paying lip service to peace while
continuing to expand aggression. Soviet commentators say
that a prime motive of Laird's trip was to implement the
Nixon Doctrine of "using Asians to fight Asians."
Peking's reaction to the President's 4 January rem:.rks on
Vietnam is limited to a single NCNA commentary, carried only
in the news agency's Chinese-language transmission on the
9th. NCNA rejects the President's statements about U.S.-DRV
understandings in connection with the Lalt to U.S. bombing
of the North and denounces the President as a "war criminal."
EVIDENCE OF "AGGRESSION" SEEN IN REMARKS BY PRESIDENT, LAIRD
President Nixon's remarks on Vietnam in his 4 January TV
interview were scored at the 98th Paris session on 7 January
along the lines of initial Hanoi and Front comment, with
both DRV delegate Xuan Thuy and PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh
casting doubt on his sincerity regarding a political settle-
ment. The VNA account notes that Mme. Binh questioned how
the President could state that the United States was "on the
way out of the Vietnam war in a way that would bring a just
peace" when, she claimed, he in fact "has turned Johnson's
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war into his own and has even extended it to the whole of
Indochina." According to the account, Xuan Thuy said that
the President in his TV interview and Secretary Laird at
his Paris news conference on the 6th "made a wholly
erroneous analysis of the Vietnam problem, or to be more
precise, gave a tendentious assessment of it."
VNA also reports Thuy's complaint that the President spoke
only of the withdrawal of combat troops, not of all. troops,
and of ending the U.S. combat role, not the U.S. '!military
occupation," and that Laird "said explicitly" that a number
of infantry as well as air force and logistic units will
remain. The President's remarks on the troop-withdrawal
issue are also scored by NHAN DAN on the 7th and 8th, with
a Commentator article on the 7th complaining that the
President "still refuses to announce a definite deadline
for the withdrawal of all troops" and observing that after
May 1971 there will still be 280,000 U.S. troops in South
Vietnam. Unlike other reaction to the interview, Commentator
acknowledges that the President was asked whether the United
States would intervene after the bulk of U.S. troops were
withdrawn if--as Commentator puts it--the Saigon Administration
were in danger of being overthrown." Commentator says the
President's "evasive" answer demonstrated his policy of
prolonging the war, his refusal to witndrww U.S. troops, and
his "persistent effort" to support the GVN.
Commentators and the delegates at Paris also took issue with
the President's account of U.S. achievements in South
Vietnam. VNA. reports that Mme. Binh countered by noting
that 11420,000 enemy troops, including. 110,000 GI's, were
put out of action in.1D70." These statistics from the PLAF
Command's year-end communique--although Mme. Binh did not
identify them as such--are cited in much of the comment in
rebuttal of the President. Xuan Thuy in his statement not
only cited the 1970 statisticG but recalled the allegation
that in 1969 the communists "put out of action" 640,000
troops, including 230,000 U.S. and other foreign forces.
The VNA account, however, does not report this.
Like earlier Hanoi comment on the President's interview,
Xuan Thuy referred to the "myth about an understanding,"
saying that although the DRV has rejected it, the President
"persevered in reiterating it to have a pretext for resuming
air attacks on north Vietnam." VNA does not note his
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citation of the President's remark that if the DRV says there
is no understanding then "there is no restraint on us," which
Thuy labelled even more "cynical" than the "understanding myth."
The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 7th also notes that
the President "brazenly" repeated the allegation about an
"understanding" which the DRV has rejected. It adds that
the President said that the United States will continue
reconnaissance flights and that if these aircraft are fired
upon, U.S. planes will strike at DRV anti-aircraft positions.
But like earlier comment, the article glosses over the
details of the President's explanation of his understanding.
Both Hanoi and the Front continue to comment on Laird's
trip to Southeast Asia, with a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on
the 13th saying he acted as an advertiser for the President's
professed "peaceful desire." But commentators uniformly
see the true purposes of the tour as connected with the
effort to step up Vietnamization and with a quest for ways
to improve Cambodia's "deteriorating" situation and to
increase U.S. military aid to Thailand.
MEDIA IGNORE DRV SPOKESMAN ON POW LIST. KOSYGIN INTERVIEW
POW ISSUE The VNA account of the 7 January Paris session
does not mention that Ambassador Bruce again
raised the question of U.S. POW's held in the DRV. In
keeping with standard practice, Hanoi media have not
publicized the post-session briefing by DRV press spokesman
Nguyen Thanh Le in which he brought up the question of the
POW list given by the DRV last month to Senators F'.ilbright
and Kennedy. Thk3 VNA account of the session merely notes
that the U.S. and GVN delegates "again resorted to perfidious
allegations to plead for their aggressive stand." It thus
ignores Ambassador Bruce's criticism of the DRV's "cynical
exposure of prisoners of war to public curiosity for
propaganda purposes" as demonstrated by the recent film
made by a Canadian television correspondent.
Nguyen Thanh Le in the post-session Paris briefing on the 7th,
transmitted in VNA's Paris-to-Hanoi service channel the next
day, betrayed sensitivity t,) U.S. charges that the list of
prisoners of war held in the DRV is incomplete. Le said
that in response to requests "we provided a full and complete
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list of U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam," and he went
on to rebut U.S. references to inconsistency with a previous
list.
The last known mentions of the POW list in DRV media were in
the statement by the DRV spokesman in Paris released 26 Deuftmber
and in a NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 27th which scored
remarks by Secretary Rogers at his 23 December press conference.
KOSYGIN Both Hanoi and Front media carried brief reports
INTERVIEW of some of Kosygin's remarks on Vietnam in his
written response to the Tokyo ASAHI, but they do
not acknowledge his assertion--reported by TASS on 2 January--
that "the Soviet Union is ready, on its part, to further
facilitate the attainment of a political settlement in
Indochina."
DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le was not directly responsive
to a question about Kosygin's.remark at his press briefing on
the 7th, saying only that "in many statements the USSR has
shown the United States the way to extricate itself from the
Vietnam quagmire, namely to withdraw all its troops."
DRV PROTESTS AIR STRIKE, RELEASES WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUE
On 11 January a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
charged that on the 8th U.S. planes "fired rockets on Rn area
three kilometers off the coast of Ha Tinh Province to the east
of the Cua Sot rivermouth, North Vietnam." The statement
"sternly condemned that act of war" of the United States and
routinely warned that DRV territorial waters, land, and
airspace are inviolable. It expressed the determination of
the Vietnamese people "to punish any U.S. encroachment on
DRV sovereignty and security and any acts of war against it."
This incident appears to be one belateily acknowledged by
the U.S. Command in Saigon on the l2th.* Hanoi has apparently
* A U.S. spokesman said that u Shrike missile was fired at
an antiaircraft missile site--whose radar was tracking an
unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane and its fighter escort--
100 miles north of the DMZ but that the missile missed the
site and landed in the sea.
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not acknowledged another incident on the 8th in which,
according to the U.S. Command on the 9th, a U.S. strike was
made in the DRV east of the Mugia Pass and some 55 miles
north of the DMZ.
WAR CRIMES VNA on 8 January released a communique of
COMMUNIQUE the DRV War Crimes Commission listing alleged
U.S. war crimes during December in North and
South Vietnam. The charges are for the most part routine,
and there is the familiar complaint that U.S. "crimes" were
intensified during the month. In South Vietnam, the
communique enumerates such "crimes" as those committed
during pacification operations and bombings, the supplying
of U.S. naval equipment to the GVN navy, and "intensified
activities of U.S. warships."
VNA says the communique "denounced with particular
vehemence the intensified U.S. air reconnaissance flights
in Ncrth Vietnam and the encroachments on DRV sovereignty
and security." In addition, it lists alleged U.S. tactical
air raids against Lai Chau, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
provinces and tactical and strategic B-52 raids against Vinh
Linh area.
MOSCOW SAYS REMARKS BY PRESIDENT, LAIRD MEAN MORE ESCALATION
Moscow continues to score U.S. "aggression" in Indochina in
routine-level comment on President Nixon's 4 January TV
interview and Secretary Laird's trip to Paris, Bangkok, and
Saigon. An 8 January SOVIET RUSSIA article assails the
"hypocrisy" of the President's comment that "we can now
see the end of America's combat role in V.Ietnam" and observes
that on the eve of the interview U.S. planes, including B-52's,
carried out heavy strikes on South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
and that there are continued U.S. "threats" to renew bombing
of the DRV. A 10 January PRAVDA article includes Laird's
trip among "international developments in the first 10 days
of 1971," saying that it has no connection with "genuinely
peaceful efforts" and may even be "linked with reports of
preparations for a resumption of widescale U.S. air operations
against the DRV."
TASS on the 6th, reporting Laird's press conference in Paris,
noted that he praised Vietnamization and expressed "pessimism"
regarding the prospects of a peace settlement at the Paris
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talks. Reporting his press conference in Saigon, a domestic
service broadcast on the 11th said that he indicated that the
United States will step up its Vietnamization program but
that he avoided specific numbers when he spoke of the
"gradual withdrawal" of American troops.
Other comment also stresses that Laird's trip was aimed at
assessing the progress of Vietnamization and at implementing
the Nixon Doctrine. A domestic service broadcast on the 7th
quoted Laird as saying "frankly" upon his arrival in Bangkok
that the aim of his trip was to strengthen military aid to
Washington's allies in Southeast AbIS and that this was what
the President meant when he spoke of Vietnamization in his
IV interview. In thi: connection, a Moscow broadcast in Thai
on the 8th said that American officials visiting Saigon
inevitably stop off in Bangkok, not merely because it is en
route but because they believe the success of the Vietnamization
program depends on how much support Thailand gives the Saigon
government. Commentaries have also cited U.S. aid to Cambodia
as further evidence of plans for continued aggression in the
area, and Moscow on the 10th said that the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, was being sent
"urgently" to Cambodia to study the military situation there.
PEKING SCORES 4 JANUARY NIXON STATEMENTS ON "UNDERSTANDINGS"
Peking's only comment on the President's statements about
Vietnam in his 4 January television conversation comes in a
9 January commentary by NCNA correspondent Ou Ping, transmitted
only in the news agency's Chinese-language service. The NCNA
correspondent routinely rejects the President's assertion
that there is an "understanding" allowing unhindered aerial
reconnaissance over the DRV. He notes derisively that the
President, in addition, "nonsensically dished out a kind of
new 'understanding"' that "only the U.S. aggressor troops
are allowed to remain in South Vietnam, but the Vietnamese
people are not allowed to oppose aggression," and that the
DRV will be bombed if the security of U.S. troops is not
insured.
Ou Ping maintains that "the Vietnamese people, the Indochinese
people, and the world's revolutionary people will not now and
can never reach an 'understanding' with the U.S. aggressors--
an understanding of the theory that it is right to commit
aggression and the theory of aggression for security."
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Deriding President Nixon for citing the word of members of the
former administration to document the existence of a U.S.-DRV
understanding, Ou Ping says he used as witnesses "a group of
stinking war criminals." The commentary lists President
Johnson and Secretar es Rusk and Clifford but does not mention
that the President also cited Amba'sador Harriman in this
context.
LPA COI41UN I QUE CONDENIVS ALLIED `VIOLATIONS' OF CEASE-FIRES
Liberation Radio on 7 January broadcast an LPA communique of
that date accusing the allies of committing 303 violations of
the communists' three-day cease-fir's over the Christmas and
New Year holidays.* LPA charges that the allies "brazenly
violated" the PRG cease-fire order on a "widespread basis"
and even conducted sweeps on Christmas day when the allied
truce was in effect. The communist forces strictly observed
the cease-fire order, according to the communique, and did
not take the initiative in attacking. Numerous specific
allied actions during the two cease-fires are charged in the
communique, which declares that "the PRG severely warns the
U.S. Government and its puppets about these crimes and that
they will Continue to be punished appropriately." The
communique reiterates the PRG order for a four-day cease-fire
over the Tet holiday--fror^ 26 to 30 January.
EAST BERLIN REPORTS DRV POLITBURO MEMBER TRUONG CHINH IN GDR
The first indication of DRV Politburo member Truong Chinh's
whereabouts since late October** comes in an 11 January East
* Alleged allied violations of the communists' cease-fires
have been charged. in low-level propaganda since 27 December.
This is the first time since 1968 that the LPA is known to have
issued an official communique on cease-fire violations.
** The last public function that.Truong Chinh was reported as
attending was the 19-22 October session of the DRV National
Assembly Standing Committee. He has appeared in public
regularly in the period since Ho's death in September 1969,
with no absence from the public eye for longer than three and
a half weeks. His last prolonged absence was from 20 March
to 19 July 1969; at that time there were no public reports
on his whereabouts.
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Berlin ADN report that he is in East Germany "taking a cure"
and that he w^s received on the 11th by SED Politburo member
Friedrich Ebe,_t.
Truong Chinh's absence from Hanoi had again been indicated
in Hanoi radio's 9 January report that the DRV National
Assembly Standing Committee, of which he is chairman, had
held a regular meeting that day presided over by Nguyen
Xien. Xien is a vice chairman third in line for the role,
after Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan. Budapest's MTI on
30 December reported that Hoan had left Hungary that day,
having remained "for a rest" after heading the DRV delega-
tion to the 10th Hungarian party congress. His whereabouts
is not known to have been reported since then.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON PROSPECTS FOR JARRING CONTACTS
Commenting on the resumption of the Jarring talks, Moscow con-
tinues to profess the opinion that "full objective conditions"
exist for the success of the mission, but cautions that serious
difficulties lie ahead. Propaganda asserts that Israel is making
prior conditions, unacceptable to the Arabs, and is continuing to
evade implementing the "main condition" for a settlement, that of
full Israeli withdrawal. A panelist on the 10 January Moscow
domestic service commentators' roundtable maintains that success
of the Jarring mission depends wholly on the approach of the two
sides to the "key clause" of Security Council Resolution 242 on
withdraw t, and routinely contrasts UAR and Jordanian positions
.ith Israeli insistence on the impossibility of returning to old
i :-ontiers .
Treating the two sides' attitudes in more detail, a Lunev domestic
service commentary on 6 January noted that the UAR and Jordan are
ready to end the state of war with Israel and sign a "corresponding
multilateral document" with the "necessary condition" of full
Israeli withdrawal. Isra:,I, however, demands a revision of borders
and insists on the conclusion of bilateral treaties with each Arab
country separately, the commentator said, "although discussion of
this question is not even within Jarring's competence."
JARRING Dealing with Dr. Jarring's 8-9 January talks in Israel,
IN ISRAEL Moscow cites unspecified press comment and journalists'
views to the effect that Israel is trying to replace
substantive discussions with procedural issues. TASS' New York
correspondent Pivovarov on the llth says journalists at the United
Nations believe the Israeli leaders have taken a stand which cannot
facilitate a peaceful settlement, and he refers to press reports that
Jarring was presented with "ultimatums" and a map of the Arab
territories Israel intends to keep. A foreign-language commentary
by Tsoppi on the 11th asserts that U.S. and Israeli propaganda is
trying to create the impression that Jarring was given a "brand new
and very constructive plan" for settling the Middle East question,
but that the Western press has reportedtthere is nc real change in
Israel's stand.
TASS on the 9th asserted that Israel was pressuring Jarring in
order to channel the talks in the direction it wanted, that of
indefinite prolongation of the cease-fire agreement and transferral
of the contacts from New York to the Mediterranean, Noting that "a
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certain mechanism" for carrying out the talks had been formed
at the United Nations, it characterized the demand for a change
of venue as an effort to disrupt the talks.
The issue of the level of the talks as well as the venue is
raised in a Moscow domestic service broadcast of a dispatch by
Cairo correspondent RE.ssadin on the 8th: It says that Israel's
desire "to take the talks away from UN control" is shown by its
proposal to transfer them to Cyprus and hold them at foreign-
minister level. On the other hand, TASS on the 9th reported with-
out comment that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad in his Paris press
conference said that he was empowered to hold talks with Jarring
and "at the latter's suggestion their meeting is to be held in New
York." (A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast, as well as Cairo radio,
had reported Riyad's 23 December meeting with Jarring while in
Moscow as a member of 'Ali Sabri's delegation.)
CEASE-FIRE While Moscow has seemed reluctant to publicly express
EXTENSION its views on the desirability of a cease-fire exten-
sion, panelist Beglov, on the commentators' roundtable
on the 10th, notes that the cease-fire period will end in less than
a month, on 5 February, and comments that "it is clear that the
Jarring mission can work only when the guns are silent." He goes on
to cite UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as saying that if Israel is prepared
to implement the Security Council resolution, the cease-fire agreement
"could be extended for an unlimited period." TASS on the 6th had
reported Riyad as making this remark at a London press conference;
on the 9th it cited him as telling newsmen in Paris that it would
be vain for Israel to hope for an "endless prolongation" of the
cease-fire, which would mean permanent occupation of Arab lands.
TASS in reporting recent speeches by UAR President as-Sadat has
pointed up remarks to the effect that Egypt does not seek to
initiate military action after the expiration of the cease-fire
agreement on 5 February. Thus it quoted him as refuting, in a
speech to Asyut University professors on the 10th, "bellicose
statements attributed to me in the Western press" to the effect
that Egypt's intention not to prolong the cease-fire agreement means
the UAR will declare war on 5 February. TASS cited him as stating
that he never said he would declare war on this date, but only
that "after this date we shall not consider ourselves bound by
the cease-fire agreement." And in briefly reporting his speech
at the Supreme Court in Cairo on the 12th, TASS highlighted his
remark that "he and the government of the republic 'will make
every effort to avoid bloodshed' after the expiration of the
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term of the cease-fire agreement." The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(MENA)--to which TABS attributed its account--merely reports
as-Sadat as saying that "it was announced in the United States
that I am prepared to go to the end of the world if this pre-
vents one of our soldiers from being wounded." This remark is
not linked to the cease-fire expiration.
Since the Ponomarev communique of 20 December endorsed the idea
of a withdrawal timetable, Moscow has given little further publi-
city to Cairo's variously stated call for a timetable, either
for Israeli withdrawal or for implementation of Resolution 242, as
a condition for further extension of the cease-fire agreement.
.PASS on the 11th did note as-Sadat as saying in his recent CBS
interview that "if no settlement is reached" during the Jarring
contacts, the UAR will not agree to prolongation of the cease-fire
agreement. And in a speech at an Asyut rally on the 11th, accord-
ing to TAGS, he called for a "clear-cut plan" for withdrawal as
the condition for an extension.
UAR ON BIG FOUR, Moscow has also failed to give propaganda
SECURITY COUNCIL support to the Egyptian call--explained by
AL-AHRAM on 13 January--for Big Four direc-
tives to Jarring* calling for a timetable for implementation of
Resolution 242 or, failing this, for a Security Council meeting
before the end of January to discuss implementation of the resolu-
tion. TASS' short reports on recent as-Sadat speeches do not
touch on his proposals for the Big Four or the Security Council
to guarantee a withdrawal timetable (Cairo University on the 8th),
to intervene to implement Resolution 242 (to Asyut University
professors on the 10th), to agree with Jarring on a timetable to
implement the resolution (Asyut rally on the 11th), or to
guarantee "specific steps" and a timetable (at the Supreme Court
in Cairo on the 12th). Reporting the last speech, TASS merely
cited the initial part of his remark, that the cease-fire agreement
would not be prolonged if the Jarring mission "fails to produce
serious results."
* As recently as 4 December, a PRAVDA article by Glukhov noted
that Cairo supports continuation of the four-power consultations
with the aim of formulating plans for implementing Resolution 242.
TASS last summer had cited Nasir as stressing, in his;23 July
anniversary speech, that Jarring should receive instru tions from
the Big Four. And Belyayev, in an article in the 7 4ugust.NEW
TIMES, had declared it would be "perfectly logical" to activate
the four-power consultations "to formulate coordinated?recommenda-
tions" to Jarring.
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Similarly, TAGS in reporting UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's recent
statements in London and Paris did not mention his remarks along
the same lines or his comment in Paris, reported by AFP on the
9th, that the UAR wants Big Four participation in a peacekeeping
force and "the Soviets, British, and French have shown under-
standing on the matter," (A broadcast in Arabic on 7 August
last year--apparently Moscow's sole propaganda reference to the
idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet peacekeeping force--had rejected a
Washington POST suggestion on a Big Two peace force, calling
this an attempt to "drag the Soviet Union into U.S. diplomatic
ways and methods alien to the Soviet Union.")
NIXON INTERVIEW, NOVOSTI commentator Katin, in an 8 January
BIG FOUR ROLE domestic service commentary, noted President
Nixon's remark in his 1 January television
interview that the key to peace in the Middle East i.. in the
hands not only of the two sides directly involved, but also the
Big Four. Observing that this is not a new idea, Katie added
that it is however a "just one," and said that it applied first
of all to the United States itself. He made no reference to
the President's additional remark that "if the Soviet Union does
not play a conciliatory peace.-making role, there's no chance for
peace in the Middle East." But he indirectly responded in going
on to assert that the Soviet Union from the outset of the con-
flict had been "tirelessly" making every effort to achieve a
just solution, and had contributed a "carefully and thoroughly
drawn up plan for a political settlement."
Nor did Katin mention--in keeping with Moscow's long silence on
the question of an embargo on arms to the Middle East--President
Nixon's further comment on the importance of the Big Four joining
together in a process of "not having additional arms and additional
activities go into that area." Katie did note that the President
said the United States would continue to support Israel and that
he recalled that tYa Administration had just provided Israel with
a $500 million aid program. This "vast sum" will be used to buy
arms, Katin said., "inflaming the atmosphere" in the Middle East.
PODGORNVY ATTENDS ASWAN DAM CELEBRATIONS IN UAR
Moscow announced on 7 January that Podgornyy would pay an official
visit to the UAR and would "also attend" celebrations in Aswan on
15 January marking completion of the construction of the Aswan
hydropower complex. TASS material in connection with his depar-
ture for Cairo on the 13th focuses on the "great construction
project" as the symbol of Soviet-UAR "friendly cooperation" a.ud
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a demonstration of the Egyptian people's "loyalty to the road of
revolutionary reforms chosen by the people." Throughout December
Moscow in its Arabic-language service had broadcast features,
radio quizzes and other material lauding the high dam.
Podgornyy's delegation, according to TASS, includes the minister
and first deputy minister of electric power development and
electrification and the chief engineer of the Aswan project,
as well as chairman of the USSR state foreign economic relations
committee Skachkov, first deputy defense minister Sokolov, and
deputy foreign minister Rodionov.
On arrival in Cairo, Podgornyy is reported by Cairo radio as
saying that during the coming meetings with UAR leaders the sides
will "exchange views" on f>rther strengthening the "friendship
and comprehensive cooperation" between the Soviet and Egyptian
peoples and will discuss "vital questions" in general and pro-
blems connected with the Middle East situation in particular.
MOSCOW BLAMES JORDAN CLASHES ON "IMPERIALIST AGENTS"
As during the fighting in Jordan last September, Moscow reportage
treats the Jordanian-Palestinian clashes which began on 8 January
in essentially even-handed fashion, with TASS generally ignoring
Arab criticism of the Jordanian Government. Limited comment from
PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent, and in a foreign-language commentary
by Tsoppi, professes to see "imperialist agents" behind the incidents.
And both Moscow's domestic service and TASS report Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) official Ibrahim Bakr as blaming
the CIA for the latest events.
TASS, following developments in Jordan and Cairo, noted as-Sadat's
call to Arab heads of state to send representatives to Amman for
an emergency conference. Sudanese and Libyan leaders were reported
in one dispatch as viewing the clashes as a violation of the Cairo
agreement on normalization of the situation in Jordan; while this
item failed to mention their criticism of the Jordanian Government,
a subsequent report from Khartoum noted "strong criticism" by
Sudanese officials of the actions of the government and the Jordanian
army commaad. TASS on the 12th reported the joint statement by
Bnkr and Jordanian Premier at-Tall calling for a cease-fire and
subsequently reported from Beirut on the 13th that Amman was calm,
and from Cairo that firing had continued overnight in the Jordanian
capital.
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MOSCOW PRAVDA's Glukhov on the 10th cited UAP sources to the
COMMENT effect that the fault lay with the Jordanian authori-
ties," quoting AL-AIIRAM as reporting that the Jordanian
army had been instructed to "conduct wide-scale operations" against
Palestinian camps, and noting that an official UAR announcement
said the "surprise operations" of Jordanian troops were conducted
"without any justification." On the 11th, reporting further
developments, Glukhov found it "impossible not to agree" with the
Cairo press conclusion that the skirmishes serve only the purpose
of the Arabs' enemies. Asserting that there are "serious grounds"
for supposing that the situation was provoked by imperialist agents,
Glukhov pointed out that the flareup coincided with the resumption
of Jarring's mission, which aims at realization of Security Council
Resolution 242 envisaging Israeli withdrawal and "the just settle-
ment of the problem of the Palestinian refugees."
Similarly linking the renewal of clashes with the Jarring mission,
the Taoppi foreign-language commentary on the 11th recalled that
Jordan is a party to the talks and more pointedly observed that
the incidents "are distracting Jordan's attention from the problem
of providing an overall political settlement within whose framework
the Palestinian question could also be solved."* Tsoppi likewise
attempted to lay the blame on "imperialist agents" with the aim of
creating inter-Arab friction. Noting that the UAR took the lead in
proposing collective Arab efforts to eliminate the dispute, he ex-
pressed the hope that the Arabs "will become friends again" in the
shortest time.
* Moscow had used the same argument last summer in bolstering
Nasir's acceptance of the U.S. initiative in the face of Arab
charges of a sellout on the Palestinian issue: A broadcast in
Arabic on 4 August had explained that implementation of Resolution
242 was bound to "make Tel Aviv take into consideration the
legitimate rights and interests" of the Palestinian people,
and the next day the same service insisted that realization of
Resolution 242 "would be an important step along the path of
completely solving the Palestinian question."
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW PROPAGANDA SEEKS TO COUNTER CHINESE CHALLENGE
In the wake of the authoritative polemical exchange triggered by
the Polish troubles, Moscow has moved to defend its claim to
authority in the communist movement and to take the measure of
Peking's more flexible tactics in the ongoing Sino-Soviet rivalry.
Moscow has recently made special use of the Hungarians as
spokesmen in its behalf, presumably calculating that the
Hungarians have the most independent reputation among those
of its allies willing--as the Romanians would not be--to play
such a role. The Romanians, in fact, appear to be a prime
object of Soviet concern over the impact of Peking's political
and diplomatic advances.
Following up its 31 December editorial article responding to
Peking's anti-Soviet comment on the Polish situation, PRAVDA
on 6 January belatedly carried a Hungarian assessment of
Chinese foreign policy that had been published before Peking's
outburst. The Hungarian view--that Peking has changed its
tactics in order to better pursue its "basic course" of
rivalry with the-Soviet bloc--accords with the line taken in
Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese. In departing from its
previous practice of restricting comment on China (apart
from rejoinders to specific attacks) to these broadcasts
and to weekly publications, Moscow has underscored its
concern and impatience over Peking's challenge. Similarly,
the 31 December editorial article represented a more
authoritative response than the Mikhaylov PRAVDA article
on 20 September which answered Chinese attacks on the
Soviet-FRG treaty.
In another use of the Hungarians as proxy spokesmen, Moscow
has broadcast an article by the Hungarian official in charge
of interparty relations, Z. Komocsin, who played a central
role in the preparations for the 1969 Moscow international
conference and who commented on current relations with China
at the Hungarian party congress last November. In an other-
wise unidentified article broadcast by Moscow to various
communist countries, including Romania, Komocsin looked
ahead to the forthcoming CPSU congress as an occasion for
acknowledging Moscow's pre-eminent authority in the communist
movement. He invoked the 1969 conference in stressing the
importance of a party's correct--duly dependent--relationship
with Moscow.
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Recent Soviet comment has similarly sought to reinforce Moscow's
claim to primacy and to demand cohesion against the Chinese.
An 8 January PRAVDA article by I. Pomelov, a discourse on
Soviet patriotism at a time of Jewish protest, referred to
Maoism as exemplifying the danger of nationalism in the
communist movement. The article aimed an indirect rebuke
at the Romanians for selectively determining the extent of
their cooperation with their Soviet bloc allies.* In the past
year Bucharest has enhanced its leverage by means of added
political and economic support from Peking.
On another front of the Sino-Soviet contest, an article in the
Soviet weekly NEW TIMES (No. 1, 1971) took sharp issue with
the Australian CP for assuming an independent stance in the
communist movement and for demonstratively--as a show of
independence--deviating from Soviet-style orthodoxy on such
crucial issues as the Czechoslovak reform iovement. The
article expressed resentment over the Australians' failure
to criticize Peking's "splitting and adventurist" course.
Peking's continued development of a more flexible and less
sectarian line will make it increasingly difficult for
Moscow to sustain this portrayal of Chinese policy. That
the Soviets are intent on maintaining their ideological
pressure is reflected in the article's e^,.,rtion that the
struggle for Marxist-Leninist purity "has special meaning"
at the present time.
HUNGARIAN PRAVDA on 6 January reprinted substantial excerpts
ARTICLE of an article by F. Varnai published in the
Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG on 20 December.
An indication of the concern underlying the article--and of
Moscow's motivation in reprinting it in PRAVDA--is contained
in Varnai's observation that an assessment of Peking's
current foreign policy is essential because "some people"
are inclined toward "far-reaching conclusions" on the basis
of initial favorable developments. In noting changes in
Sino-Soviet relations, the PRAVDA account refers to the
exchange of ambassadors, trade expansion, and the border
talks being held in Peking--"as yet unsuccessfully." The
account also mentions Peking's call for peaceful coexistence
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and its establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada and
Italy. The account suggests, in line with an earlier article
in NEW TIMES (No. 47, 1970), that the Nixon Administration,
inhibited by domestic political constraints from acting on
its desire to improve ties with Peking, is "for the time beirg"
leaving the initiative to the NATO allies.
According to the article, Peking's "basic course" ::?emains
unchanged, since it bases relations with the Soviet bloc on
the same principles as govern normalization of its relations
with the capitalist states. The article welcomeF measures to
improve relations with the PRC, although limited by Peking to
state and trade ties; but it stresses that readiness to
develop relations on the basis of anti-imperialist unity in no
way signifies baste ideological concessions.
The PRAVDA account is notable for what it omits from the article
as well as for the above points inclLdec; in the excerpts. Thus,
PRAVDA deletes the article's statement that although Peking
refuses to consider interparty relations "as yet" (it was
announced at the Hungarian congress that the CCP had rejected
an invitation to attend), "we nevertheless regard it as a
promising sign and a good beginning that after the past
decade we can look forward to the prospects of drawing closer,
rather than farther, from each other." This was also the line
taken by Komocsin at the congress, but at that time PRAVDA
duly reported the Hungarian assessment. The change in PRAVDA's
treatment may reflect a darker atmosphere following the recent
troubles in Sino-Soviet relations.
PRAVDA's editing exhibits Soviet sensitivity over comment
regarding factions within the Chinese leadership. The
account omits a paragraph in the Hungarian article that
refers to the emergence into prominence in P'king of
"some people" who, while also guided by "nationalist
and great-power interests," are beginning to assess matters
"more realistically" and to "redress the mistakes" previously
made. PRAVDA also omits a passage which contains a
provocative reference to "the Mao Tse-tung group." Still
another deleted passage mentions "armed provocations" by
the Chinese on the border in 1969--a sensitive subject
which Soviet media carefully avoid.
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TASS ON NPC In another sign of heightened Soviet attention
to China, TASS on 11 January reported on
preparations for an overdue session of the Chinese National
People's Congress (NPC). The report was printed in PRAVDA
on the 12th. Although couched in nonpolemical terms, the
report noted that the four-year term of the NPC delegates
had expired in 1968 and that the NPC chairman, "Marshal
Chu Te," and the PRC chief of state, Liu Shao-chi, had fallen
victim to the cultural revolution.
The reference to Chu Te's military title has provocative
overtones in that military ranks were abolished by the
Chinese in 1965--a move with anti-Soviet implications
that struck a blow at elements in Peking, notably then Chief
of Staff Lo Jui-ching, who favored an accommodation with
Moscow for security reasons--and in light of the sympathy
shown for Chu in Soviet comment on the cultural revolution
purges. Whether or not Moscow's reference to the old marshal
represents a signal of interest in the Chinese :military as a
group favoring a reduction in Sino-Soviet tension, it has
been the military--particularly the current chief of staff,
Huang Yung-sheng--who would seem to fit the NEPSZABADSAG
article's description of newly prominent elements in Peking
who view matters more realistically.
Comment broadcast in Radio Moscow's Mandarin-language program
for the PLA has persistently lectured on the perversion of
the PLA's role in Maoist campaigns, the threat posed to a
vulnerable China by the United States, and the benefits in
modern weaponry available to socialist countries on good
terms with the Soviet Union. A recent broadcast in this
grogram, on the 12th, deplored Mao's recurrent purges of
the PLA--Lo Jui-ching, Peng Te-huai, and Ho Lung were
named as victimized heroes--and said discontent is-rife
over the PLA's role as a gendarmerie, its poor equipment,
and its separation from the armed forces of the Soviet
Union and other communist states.
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JEWISH QUESTION
SOVIETS EVINCE CONCERN OVER CENSURE OF TREATMENT OF JEWS
Concern over the possible impact at home and in the inter-
national communist movement of foreign censure of the
treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union is reflected in a
lengthy theoretical article by I. Pomelov in the 8 January
PRAVDA which invokes Marxism-Leninism to rationalize the
present "class" approach to the Jewish question.* The
article is in large part devoted to indoctrinating Soviet
citizens in the proper attitude toward Soviet "patriotism,"
a concept that encompasses love of country and communism
and eschews "local nationalistic tendencies." But Pomelov's
emphasis on the organic relationship of patriotism to inter-
nationalism and his condemnation of "revisionist" as well as
imperialist propaganda on the question suggests that the
article is also aimed at communist critics who have aired
independent views on the Jewish question and whose "nationalist"
approach to the subject could impair international communist
unity. Radio Moscow broadcast the article widely in its
foreign-language services, including its services in Romanian,
Slovene, and Italian. The article comes against the background
of criticism of the Leningrad trials by the Italian Communist
Party and a blast against Soviet anti-Semitism in the Yugoslav
press, as well as a 5 January CBS telecast on the freedom
Romania accords its Jews to practice their faith or emigrate to
Israel.
The Pomelov article, entitled "Soviet Socialist Patriotism,"
perceives an intensifying campaign by "imperialist" propagandists
and their "revisionist accomplices" to provoke discord among
0
* I. Pomelov has been a previous contributor to PRAVDA's
"Questions of Theory" column. In a 20 February 1967 article,
a disquisition on the leading role of the party in socialist
countries, Pomelov followed a polemical approach similar to
his current one: The 1967 article combined an indirect rebuke
aimed at one country--in that case Yugoslavia--with a direct
attack on Mao's China as the prime example of deviation from
the orthodox policy line.
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"certain" Soviet nationalities and to "undermine Soviet
patriotism" in general. In particular, Pomelov rejects
"imperialist arguments" that the Jews' motherland is Israel
and that there are "indissoluble ties" among Jews everywhere.
Pomelov argues from a class position that "the interests of
working Jews, no matter what country they may be citizens of,
are opposed to the interests of the Jewish capital magnates,
bankers, and entrepreneurs, no matter where they may live."
Soviet patriotism, Pomelov continues, eschews "narrow-minded"
concepts "divorced from social systems and ideology"; trum
patriotism means "not only loyalty to one's native land a'id
definite historical values but also loyalty to the most
progressive socialist social system and to Marxist-Leninist
ideology."
In effect holding up the Soviet view of patriotism and inter-
nationalism as the only acceptable one for the international
movement, Pomelov further argues: "In the Marxist-Leninist
concept, which expresses precisely the coincidence of vital
national interests and the common interests of the working
people of all countries, patriotism and internationalism are
inalienable aspects of the single ideopolitical position of
the working class; and any belittling and, all the more so,
any discarding of one of the aforementioned aspects signifies
an undermining of this position, a slipping back to the
platform of nationalism, national egoism or national nihilism,
and wounding of national interests and feelings."
Pomelov censures only China by name, referring to "Maoism" in
passing as an embodiment of the evils of nationalism, but his
discourse has evident implications for the Italia" communists,
the Yugoslavs, and particularly the Romanians. Recalling that
the parties which attended the 1969 international communist
conference in Moscow had concluded that "the defense of socialism
is an internationalist duty of communists," Pomelov goes on to
assail those 'who emphasize national pecularities and "disregard
the regularities of socialist development." In a passage that
seems directed especially at the Romanians, he lectures: "The
Leninist principle-of the unity of patriotism and internationalism
is incompatible with the slightest weakening of links between any
fraternal country and its natural and reliable allies--the
socialist states and Marxist-Leninist partieP." It is also
incompatible, he says, "with a limitation of the sphere of
cooperation merely to questions which are allegedly 'beneficial'
at the given moment or to any attempt to use the contradictions
between socialism and capitalism for national egoistic aims . . . .
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In a passage that could apply to the Italian communists, who
have disclaimed any anti-Soviet sentiments but have been
critical of the Leningrad trials, Pomelov warns the Soviet
"patriot" to distinguish "true from false and friendly foreign
propaganda from hostile, no matter how well the latter is
concealed by illusory 'objectivity' or assurances of 'good'
feelings toward our people."
ITALIAN PARTY, YUGOSLAV PAPER CRITICIZE LENINGRAD TRIALS
Apparently anxious to get its critical view of the Leningrad
trials on the public record for domestic political purposes,
the Italian Communist Party (PCI) issued a communique on
6 January, published in L'UNITA, recalling that following
the Leningrad verdict the PCI had called on "interested
parties" to commute the death sentences and had also raised
issues of "a more general nature." The party said it was
issuing the communique in response to a letter from 93 Soviet
Jews, published in the Western press, which among other things
accused the PCI of indifference to the fate of Soviet Jews.
While disclaiming knowledge about the authors of the letter,
and hence by implication begging the question of its
authenticity, the communique said the party had taken these
allegations into account and had used the appearance of the
letter as an occasion to define its attitude on the question
of Jews in the USSR and in "certain other socialist countries."
It did not elaborate.
The PCI's public stand on the Leningrad trials was set forth
in a 27 December article in L'UNITA. While defensively
disclaiming any intention of taking part in an "anti-Soviet
campaign," the PCI organ objected to violations of the legal
rights of the accused, termed the death sentences imposed on
the two hijackers "incomprehensible," and "demanded" that
they be commuted.
Although the Yugoslav party has remained silent on the
Leningrad trials, an article in the Ljubljana (Slovenia)
DELO on 30 December took the Soviet Union to task for
practicing anti-Semitism from the time of the "Tsarist
pogroms" to the prosecution of the Leningrad hijackers. It
observed that in his day Stalin "took care to insure that
Yiddish culture and schools would languish" and that "one
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year before his death he had two prominent Yiddish writers
executed by firing squads." It went on to charge that
although the present Soviet leadership does not officially
encourage anti-Semitism, "a furious a~tti-Israeli campaign
serves as a cover for it" and "unofficial outbursts of
anti-Semitism are not curbed in any way." The Leningrad
trials, it said, are designed as "exemplary punishment"
and as "a warning" to Jews who wish to emigrate.
ROMANIAN PRESS REPORTS LENINGRAD VERDICT WITHOUT COMMENT
The Romanian regime, which has long insisted on a strict--
essentially self-serving--policy of noninterference in other
countries' internal affairs, has abstained from comment on
the question of Soviet Jews. The Romanian press confined
itself to brief factual reports of the death sentences passed
on two of the hijackers in Leningrad and on the subsequent
commutation of the sentences. But Bucharest may have aroused
Moscow's ire by allowing a CBS news team to film a special
report on Jews in Romania, telecast in the United States on
5 January. In sharp contrast to the situation of Soviet
Jews, the Romanian Jews were depicted as practicing their
religion, learning Yiddish, and freely emigrating to Israel.
The CBS commentator made the point that the news team was
permitted to travel anywhere it wished in Romania, unescorted,
and emphasized Romanian pursuit of an independent line with
respect to the Jews both domestically and internationally.
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U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW CHARGES U.S. "CONNIVANCE" IN HARASSMENT BY ZIONISTS
The 8 January bombing at the Soviet embassy annex in Washington
prompts a "resolute" statement of protest from the embassy
which is summarized by TASS that day. Three days before the
bombing a Soviet embassy statement to the State Department
had warned that the USSR Government could no longer assure
the preservation of normal conditions for U.S. institutions
in the Soviet Union in view of the continuing hostile anti-
Soviet campaign being carried on in the United States by the
Zionists with the "virtual connivance" of U.S. authorities.
A TASS commentary on the 8th cited U.S. press charges of
alleged threats to U.S. diplomats in Moscow. But Soviet media
have not acknowledged the harassment in Moscow of U.S.
diplomats and newsmen or the U.S. embassy protest on the
11th over the harassment.
Soviet propaganda has given no undue attention to the latest
incidents in the United States. But TASS on the 12th
reported receiving letters and telegrams expressing "indigna-
tion at the hooligan actions of Zionists," a step which may
be a prelude to protest meetings in the Soviet Union."
The Soviet embassy protest on the 8th and supporting comment
blames the "notorious 'Jewish Defense League" (JDL)--"a mob
of fascist thugs, little different from Hitlerite storm
troopers"--for the bombing as well as the other threats and
intimidations of Soviet personnel in both Washington and New
York. JDL leader Kahane's trip to Israel provided the peg
for the charge by commentator Ryzhikov on the 12th in the
domestic service that "the whole activity of American
Zionists is directed from Tel Aviv" through the Israeli
embassy in Washington. Citing Kahane's statement that
the JDL's purpose is "to provoke a crisis in Soviet-
American relations," Ryzhikov asserted that Israel sought
to sabotage the possibility of U.S.-Soviet cooperation
regarding a Middle East settlement.
* Soviet reports of meetings in the USSR demanding the return
by Turkey of two hijackers of a Soviet plane on 15 October had
been preceded by central press reports of receiving a flood of
letters and telegrams.
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Ryzhikov attributed the "obvious indulgent attitude" of U.S.
authorities to the fact that the incidents distract the
American public's attention from Indochina, inflation, and
the threat of economic crisis. The commentator pointed out
that the Zionist campaign had "already been instrumental in
he recent curtailment of the planned U.S.-Soviet cultural
exchange program"* and warned that the Zionists, encouraged
by their ability to "act with impunity," had decided "to
assail the vhole spectrum of relations between the two
states." A 10 January "mailbag" program, bruadcast in
English to North America, noted that although the Soviet
Union favored a wide exchange in both cultural and scientific
fields "a lot depends on the international climate" anu,
citing the recent harassment and bomb!.ng, observed that
"you cannot expectucultural exchange to go on under
conditions such as these." I
TASS on 11 December 1970 reported a foreign ministry
representation to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow informing
him that inaction by U.S. authorities regarding provocations
had rendered impossible the "implementation of the 1971 tours
to the United States by the Moscow Bolshoy Theater's ballet
and opera troupes."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONVII.)I9N'1'IAL F111G TH10NDO
:1.3 JANUAHY 1.973.
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SOVIET ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE
FIRST DIRECT PROPAGANDA MENTION OF SOVIET ABM'S SINCE FEBRUARY
An article in the journal. USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY
(Fn. 12 for 1970) by retired Soviet Air Force Maj. Gen. B. L.
Teplinskiy contains the first direct--albeit passing--reference
in Moscow propuganda to a Soviet ABM capability since last
February on the occasion of Soviet armed forces day. The article,
signed to the press on 9 December, reviews U.S. military strategy
and weaponry, including development of the Safeguard ABM system
and multiple independently targeted reentry vjhicles (MIRV's).
With regard to the latter, Teplinskiy asserts that Secretary
Laird and the "entire reactionary American press" has sought
to justify the expenditures on these weapons on the grounds
that the USSR "is allegedly 'creating forces for a preemptive
strike' arid that the MIRV program is supposedly the answer to
the development of the Soviet ABM system." Teplinskiy does
not go on, however, to comment on the references by Laird
and others to Soviet development of an ABM system.
Articles last February by Defense Minister Grechko, Chief of
the General Staff Zakharov, and Kazakh SSR Military Commissar
General Beykenov had broken a two-year pattern of reticence
on the part r Soviet spokesmen to claim a capability to
destroy incoming enemy missiles. The Zakharov article, in
IZVESTIYA on 22 February 1970, was notable for reintrodu:tion
of the April 1966 Malinovskiy formulation that the USSR's
air defense forces have the means to insure the destruction
of "any aircraft and many rockets" of the enemy.
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BERLIN
GDR PROTESTS FEDERAL REPUBLICS ACTIONS IN WEST BERLIN
A GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman on 5 January "resolutely condemned"
the "official" Presence of Federal Ministers Jahn and Genscher in
West Berlin and a meeting of the Bundestag's penal commission
there as representing "new illegal claims" by the FRG against West
Berlin which violate the city's status and the "legitimate
interests of the GDR and other states." Demanding an end to
these recent "illegal state activities" by Bonn in West Berlin,
the spokesman said they are detrimental to the interests of the
West Berliners, who are interested in normalizing relations
"between their city and the GDR."
Two days after ADN releesed this protest, Moscow's PRAVDA and
RED STAR reported it without comment in a TASS dispatch citing
ADN. IZVESTIYA, however, published a brief comment by
V. Kukushkin, who remarked that Bonn was beginning a new fear
by again flaunting its "illegal claims" on West Berlin, "which
has never belonged and never will belong to the FRG." Going
beyond the GDR protest, Kukushkin added that "such visits are
far from conducive to success" for the four-power talks on
normalization of the situation in West Berlin.
GDR RESPONSE TO Answering West German government spokesman
AHLERS' CHARGES Ahlers' charges on 11 January that the GDR
is responsible for the lack of progress in
the four-power talks, East German radio commentators the next
day accused Bonn of delaying any development in the efforts
toward European detente by linking the issues of a European
security conference, ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties, the four-power talks on West Berlin, and specific
GDR proposals--especially on GDR-FRG relations. The only way
for the Federal Republic to show its good will, one commentary
concluded, is to abandon its "nonsensical and inadmissible
demands and preconditions."
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POLAND
PARTY LEADERS TRAVEL ABROAD AS DOMESTIC TENSION PERSISTS
Six days after their one-day visit to Moscow, Polish First
Secretary Gierek and Premier Jcuroszew'cz turned up in East
Berlin on the 11th for another one-day "friendly" visit.
Their trip to the GDR had been preceded by a 6-8 January
visit there by Foreign Minister Jedrychowski; GDR Foreigr
Minister Winzer had then flown to Moscow where he presumably
reported on his talks with hiu Polish opposite number,
described as "cordial and comradely" in the communique
published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 9th.
Also on the 9th, the Warsaw domestic service reported that
during the period 4-8 January "representatives of the
Secretariat of the PZPR Central Committee paid friendship
visits to the Central Committees of the fraternal parties
of the socialist countries." The radio listed PZPR
Secretary Tejchma as visiting the SED, Olszowski the
Hungarian and Romanian parties, and Moezar the Bulgarian
CP. The Prague domestic service reported on 10 January
that.PZPR Secretary Kociolek had paid such a visit to the
Czechoslovak capital on the 5th. Like the Warsaw radio,
the Prague broadcast said the purpose of the series of
visits was to "exchange information about current
political problems and cooperation."
GDR-POLISH Held against the background of reports in
COMMUNIQUE Western as well as Polish media indicating
continued tension in the northern seacost
region, the talks on the 11th between Gierek and Jaroszewicz
and their East German opposite numbers, Ulbricht and Stoph,
produced a communique virtually identical in length and
phraseology to the 5 January statement on the Polish leaders'
talks in Moscow. As broadcast by the East Berlin radio late
on the 11th, the communique says the talks in the GDR took
place in an atmosphere of "cordial friendship and mutual
understanding" and "demonstrated complete identity of views
on all questions discussed." The two sides are pledged
to strengthen cooperation bilaterally and within CEMA
and the Warsaw Pant, to strengthei, the unity of the
socialist. states and the world communist movement, and to
support "ratification and entry into force" of the Soviet
and Polish treaties with the FRG as well.as full diplomatic
recognition of the GDR by all European states, including
the FRG.
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Like the Moscow statement six days earlier, the communique
registers no specific endorsement by the hosts of the new
Polish leaders' reform measures taken to assuage the
current crisis. It says "the Polish comrades gave informa-
tion about the present situation in the social develop-
ment of People's Poland" and about the resolutions adopted
by the 20 December PZPR plenum "in the interest of the
working class and the entire Polish people, in the interest
of the further socialist construction of People's Poland."
While the talks in Moscow had also been attended by high-
level Soviet economic figures, the East Berlin communique
lists only high-level SED leaders--Ulbricht, Stoph,
Honecker, and Axen, the SED Secretary in charge of
international party affairs who was promoted to full Politburo
membership in December.
POLISH MEDIA REPORT EXPRESSIONS OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION
Polish media have yet to confirm or deny Western news reports
of a new work stoppage in the Gdansk shipyard.* The only
indication in Polish media of any possible current work
stoppage has been a brief report in the Szczecin domestic
service on the 9th to the effect that "the management of
the port of Gdynia"--in the Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia tricity
complex--"is recalling the entire reserve of port workers
on all shifts beginning Sunday, 10 January at 2300 hours."
There was a candid report, however, in the Gdansk, Szczecin,
and Koszalin domestic service on the llth of a stormy
meeting then in progress between the Gdansk voivodship
party committee leadership and the aktiv of the Gdansk
harbor party organization. The announcer remarked at the
outset that it was impossible to mention "in an orderly
manner at this early hour" the "many essential problems"
which had been raised at the meeting, but the broadcast
included recordings of two frank protest statements: A
female voice said "we feel not only like managers of our
* The Vienna radio on the 7th mentioned a Stockholm
AFTONBLADET report from Gdansk on a strike, then underway,
of 3,000 shipyard workers who demanded the release of 200
coworkers arrested in the December riots and a personal
appearance of PZPR First Secretary Gierek in Gdansk.
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enterprise, but also in part like co-managers of our country"
and "as such, we want to know-what is happening in this
country." A male voice aimed critical remarks at an aspect
of the international socialist division of labor under CEMA,
declaring that "we have raised objections so often regarding
our contract under which we are getting 'Rekord' loading
machines from Bulgaria." The speaker continued: "Let us
take a look at this equipment. Is it suitable to work with
it here, where we are transloading general cargo? There
are parts missing, and spare parts are unobtainable." In
late 1967, a Prague commentator had similarly ventured into
this sacrosanct area, questioning the building of a certain
plant in Czechoslovakia by the Poles when the Czechoslovaks
were themselves building the same kind of plant in other
countries.
The interim radio report of the 11 January Gdansk meeting
wound up with the observation that the shipyard workers
"realize the difficulties of our country and are able to
understand them, but they believe that one must speak
frankly of them."
Also on the 1lth, the Gdansk, Szczecin, and Koszalin domestic
service carried a report of a meeting the previous day
between the Szczecin voivodship party committee and "student
groups," recounting tough stands by the students regarding
the party leadership and the official news media. The
report said the students "stressed that those responsible
for creating a situation in which the working class had to
protest were not only those who have left the party leader-
ship; the guilty ones should be sought at all levels of
the party apparatus and of administrative and economic
management." It added that "many sharp words were addressed
to the press, radio, and television," whose "silence or
omission are creating information gaps which are then
filled by foreign propaganda."
Presumably as a direct result of this confrontation, PAP
late on the llth reported the "resignation" of Szczecin
voivodship party organization first secretary Walaszek
"because of difficulties experienced in directing the
voivodship committee's work," as well as of secretary Huber
of that committee, who had addressed the 10 January
meeting with the student groups and borne the brunt of
their "questions."
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An 11 January report by the radio of Bydgoszcz--some 90 miles
south of Gdansk--reflected the incidence of unrest outside
of the coastal area as well. Recounting a meeting of Bydgoszcz
city party aktivs with first secretary Majchrzak of the voivod-
ship party committee, it cited ", critical attitude" toward
phenomena "hampering" labor organization and industrial
production--the bonus system, for example--and toward the status
of housing construction. Questions from the floor, it added,
"mainly emphasized the need to restore links be+ween the party
and the workers' class."
MEETINGS OF The PZPR has continued its series of gestures
SECRETARIAT toward making the party decision-making
process more accessible to the party rank-
and-file and the populace: A discussion on party work
carried by the Warsaw domestic service on 10 January included
the statement that henceforth meetings of the PZPR Secretariat
would be held every Friday and that the population would be
informed of the meeting results the following day. In late
December the Politburo had announced that "short reports"
of its proceedings would be made public.
Like the CPSU and most of the other East European ruling
parties, the Polish party heretofore has regularly publicized
only plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Normally
there have been no announcements of Secretariat or Politburo
meetings. The Czechoslovak party, however, has continued
the pra:tice--begun in 1968--of fre ucntly publicizing the
results of meetings of the latter two bodies.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
LINK SYSTEM OF FARMING AD'JAMCING RAPIDLY IN RSFSR
The link system of farm labor organization continues to make
headway on the local and regional levels of the USSR even in
the absence of all-out support from Moscow. The most
significant breakthroughs, however, have occurred in the
RSFSR where Politburo member Voronov--the only public
supporter of the controversial innovation in the top leader-
ship--presides. In the RSFSR full-scale conversions to the
link system, which in the past were limited to individual
farms or individual rayons, are now scheduled to take place
on the oblast level as well.
According to a report in SOVIET RUSSIA on 7 January, the
Orel obkom decided at a "recent" plenum to convert all
farms in the oblabto to the link system in the next two
tc three years. As a preliminary, each farm in the oblast
was ordered to form one or two "unregulated" mechanized
links this year. The Orel decisioa, which was called "bold"
by the SOVIET RUSSIA correspondent, was said to be based on
the results of several successful link experiments conducted
there in recent years. Reportedly, the obkom decided in
favor of the link system as a means of raising farm labor
productivity, overcoming a labor shortage, and redeploying
the farm labor force.
Similar though le--s spectacular breakthroughs have been
reported in o. parts of the RSFSR. For example,
Kalinin obkom fi:.-st secretary N. Korytkov reported that
the number of mechanized links had increased fivefold in
his oblast during the past three years, reaching a level
of more than 3,000 (SOVIET RUSSIA, 21 November). "The
future," Korytkov declared, "is theirs." This sentiment
was apparently shared by P. Yelistratov, first secretary
of the Mordovian obkom, who revealed that his obkom had
recommended the link system to all farm party organizations
in the oblast (RURAL LIFE, 27 October).
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Reports of conversions to the link system in other parts of
the RBFSR and Belorussia have appeared in PRAVI)A (6 December,
8 January), SOVIET RUSSIA (3 November), RURAL LIFE (1 January),
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (15, 30 December) and PARTY LIFE No. 21
(20 October). At the same time, articles publicizing the
productive feats of mechanized. links have appeared in PRAVDA
(17 October), IZVEBTIYA (11 October, 31 December), SOVIET
RUSSIA (15, 23 October, 4 November), RURAL LIFE (9, 16 October,
17 December) and RED STAR (11 October). SOVIET RUSSIA hae'also
continued to plug the reform editorially (2, 17 December).
Despite the steady flow of favorable commentary on the link
system in the central press, continued resistance to the
innovation may be inferred from some of the complaints raised
by link spokesmen. (SOVIET RUSSIA, 29 October, RURAL LIFE,
10 November, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 8 December). They center
on the continued failure of the agricultural establishment to
prepare guidelines for the implementation of the reform--
guidelines originally scheduled to appear by the end of 1969.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SHANGHAI SETS UP PARTY CCNr1ITTEE, FIFTH IN NATION
Shanghai established its party committee at the conclusion of
a congress held from I to 10 January, according to NCNA on
13 January. It is the fifth such new committee to be organized
at the provincial level of administration in China since the
first one was set up in Hunan on 4 December.
The 1,000 delegates elected 59 members and 17 alternates to
the Shanghai CCP Committee--somewhat larger than the
precultural revolution committee of 41 members and 15
alternates. The top leadership group of seven secretaries--
all chosen from among the leaders of the Shanghai revolutionary
committee--is smaller than the former 13-man secretariat.
Politburo members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, numbers
one and two on the Shanghai revolutionary committee, were
named first and second secretary respectively of the party
committee. (No second secretary has been specified in the
case of the other provincial-level party committees; perhaps
it was thought necessary to grant Yao the title because of
his Politburo standing.) Chou Chun-lin, commander of the
Shanghai garrison, was named secretary, the only military
man on the committee. Mao Tien-shut and Hsu Ching-hsien,
two former secretaries on the old Shanghai party committee,
were also named as secretaries as were two worker representatives,
Wang Hung-wen and Wang Hsiu-chen, both full members of the
Central Committee.
Although Shanghai set up the first party committee on the
factory level in the nation on 21 June 1969, it seemed to
lag behind other areas in rebuilding the party above the
basic level. Throughout the nearly two-year drive to rebuild
the party, only three of the 10 counties within the
municipality have claimed rebuilt committees.
PROGRESS The rate at which party committees are now
ELSEWHERE being established suggests that most areas
will set up party committees by the 50th
anniversary of the party on 1 July. There is, however,
no indication that provinces with serious unresolved
problems are being forced to set up committees on the
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basis of a central deadline. All the provincial-level
committees set up so far have been in the relatively
advanced East and Central-South regions of China. Two
other eastern provinces, Anhwei and Chekiang, have
established party committees in their capital cities,
and provincial committees will probably follow in the
near future.
The Northeast region also seems a likely candidate for
a provincial CCP committee in the not too distant future:
Shenyang, capital of Liaoning, has a municipal committee,
and Heilungkiang, a traditional cultural revolution pace-
maker, has announced 15 county party committees. Outside
these areas the most likely prospects for a provincial
committee would seem to be Tsinghai, which was among the
leaders in forming a revolutionary committee in 1967 and
recently announced party committees in two of its six
autonomous districts, and Kansu, which on 26 December
proclaimed that in many counties and municipalities"
new party committees have been formed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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