TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030055-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: December 16, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~ Illllllluimiiiiiii~llllllll i
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~IIIIIIIIII~~~IIIIIIII II~~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
16 DECEMBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, No. 50)
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 CONFIDEN I
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and pres3 media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person Is pro-
hibited by law.
OAOUP 1
[uludrd Irene eulereelk
derrngredinp end
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
DRV Launches "Readiness" Campaign with Party-Government Appeal 1
NFLSV-PRG Statement Endorses DRV Appeal to "All Compatriots" . . 4
PRC Joint Statement Supports DRV Appeal, PRG Peace Plan . . . . 4
Moscow Notes DRV Appeal, Offers No Substantial Comment . . . . . 6
DRV, Front Score the President, Laird for "Bombing Threats" . . . 7
PRC Decries U.S. "Threats," Defends DRV Right to Support South . 8
Moscow Says President's Remarks Mean Continued Aggression . . . . 9
Paris Talks: Allied Proposal for Release of POW's Ignored . . . 11
Chemical Warfare Scored at Paris Talks, Scientists' Meeting . . . 12
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR Stresses West Berlin Status as "Separate Political Entity" . 14
Ulbricht Grudgingly Backs Pact Line on Rapprochement with Bonn . 17
Moscow, Bloc Allies Carry Sanitized Accounts of Ulbricht Speech . 19
Bucharest, Tirana Provide Own Interpretations of Berlin Summit . 20
CZECHOSLOVAK PLENUM
Moderate Husak Line Takes on Tougher Anti-Rightwing Hue . . . . . 22
POLISH RIOTS
Warsaw Communique Acknowledges Two-Day Outbreak in Gdansk . . . . 25
SPAIN
Moscow Protests Spanish Trial of "Basque Patriots" . . . . . . 27
Peking Sees Trial as Beginning of End for Franco . . . . . . . . 28
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Soviet Editorials Diverge on Industrial Priorities
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Hunan First to Establish Provincial Party Committee . . . . . . . 31
Table: New Party Committees at County or Higher Level . . . . . 33
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: MOSCOW KEEPS ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY
PROPOSAL ALIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
16 DECEMBER 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 DECEMBER 1970
Moscow (3855_items)
Peking (2983 items)
Supreme Soviet Session
(--)
20%
Domestic Issues
(27%)
30%
Warsaw Political Consulta- (14%)_1%
Indochina
(11%)
30%
tive Committee Meeting
[Air Raids on
(5%)
22%1
in Berlin
Indochina
(8%)
5%
North Vietnam
Korea
(4%)
6%
China
(4%)
4%
U.S. Rail Strike
(--)
6%
Middle East
(4%)
3%
Jaran
(14%)
5%
Luna 17 and Lunakhod
(1%)
3%
Invasion of Guinea
(10%)
5,
Basque Trial
(0.4%)
2%
Angela Davis' Trial
(0.2%)
2%
These statistics are based. on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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16 DECEMBER 1970
INDOCHINA
Hanoi has launched a major propaganda campaign calling for vigilan?,e
? and combat readiness in the wake of the 21 November U.S. air strikes
against the North. Hanoi media on 10 December issued an unprecedent-
ed joint party-government appeal to "compatriots and combatants
throughout the country" which denounces U.S. "serious acts of war"
against the DRV and insists that no threat will prevent the North
from supporting the struggle in the South. An accompanying order
on implementation of the appeal, issued by the Vietna:: People's
Army High Command, includes a call to detect planes, shoot down and
capture many "air pirates," and "be resolved to wipe out" enemy
commandos and infantry.
Official Front endorsement came on the 114th with a joint PRG-NFLSV
statement--accompanied by an appeal from the PLAF Command--which
warns ambiguously that the South Vietnamese people and army
"resolutely will not tolerate any venturous U.S. military acts
against the DRV."
President Nixon's 10 December press conference, in which he
declared that reconnaissance would continue and that DRV targets.
would be hit if U.S. forces in the South were threatened by North
Vietnamese infiltration, prompts further assertions that the DRV
and the Front cannot be intimidated. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article
on she 12th, by military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant), is
particularly abusive, calling the President "the number one
American liar" for "expanding on the fabrication" about an under-
standing it connection with the 1968 bombing halt.
Peking encd,rses the DRV party-government appeal with ajoint
party-governme~t statement of its own on the 13th which supports
the "sacred duty" of the people in North Vietnam to assist the
struggle in the South. And a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 12th
juxtaposes an endorsement of the appeal to a denunciation of the
President's declaration that the DRV would be bombed if U.S. forces
in the South were threatened.
Moscow promptly reported the DRV Party-Government appeal, but there
is no authoritative Soviet comment on either the appeal or the
President's press conference. Soviet media on the 14th, reporting
that Kosygin was given the appeal by the DRV ambassador that day,
quotes the Soviet leader as saying only that the USSR will continue
to give the Vietnamese "the necessary aid and support." Hanoi
media, on the other hand, reported that Kosygin expressed indig.iation
at the new U.S. "acts of war" and expressed "full support" of the PRV
appeal.
DRV LAUNCHES "READINESS" CAPIPAIGN WITH PARTY-G)VERNMENT APPEAL
Is 1CLI lea f
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combatants" was the opening gun in a concerted propaganda campaign
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on vigilance and combat readiness. Hanoi propaganda following
the 21 November U.S. air strikes contained numerous calls for
heightened vigilance and readiness, and a NHAN DAN editorial on
the 8th seems to have presaged the party-government appeal when,
Mike other propaganda, it called on the population at large
rather than specific defense forces to maintain vigilance.
Along with the appeal, Hanoi released the order on its implementa-
tion from the VPA High Command. It-also announced that the
Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee presidium bad held
an "extraordinary enlarged session," chaired by DRV President
Ton Duc Thang, which issued a statement after studying the
appeal. There are reports that meetings are being held and
statements issued by various groups and mass organizations in
the DRV. Editorial exhortations wcre Published by QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN on the 11th and in NHAN DAN on the 11th, 12th, and
15th, and there are at least passing references to the joint
appeal in most Hanoi radio and press commentaries since the
10th. The VNA review: of the Hanoi press say that '.'much space"
is devoted to the appeal and to the "warm response" it has
received throughout the communist world. According to VNA,
official statements from the Front, Pyongyang, and Peking are
carried textually along with reports of comment from Kosygin.
and other leaders. On the 12th, VNA carried a quotation from
Ho Chi Minh which it said was published on the papers' front
pages:
No bombs or shells can cow our people and no
wily words deceive them. We Vietnamese are
resolved to fight till not a single U.S.
aggressor is left on our beloved land.*
The party-government appeal presents a standard bill of
particulars to show that the United States is bent on pursuing
its aggression in Indochina, is only paying lip service to
peace, and is preventing the Paris conference from making any
prcgress. It echoes recent propaganda in condemning U.S.
"bombing, strafing, and commando activities" last month and in
refuting U.S. statements about an understanding at the time
This quotation appeared in ho Chi Minh's message to NFLSV
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tno, on the occasion of the release of the
Front's political program, as carried by VNA on 13 September
1967.
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of the bombing halt that reconnaissance flights over the DRV
would continue. It asserts that "arrogant threats of war" and
plots for new military adventures against the DRV come from
weakness, not strength, and that the Vietnamization policy is
not working.
The appeal is directed broadly &o the people of the North,
exhorting them to boost production as well as maintain
vigilance; it goes on to appeal specifically to "people and
combatants" in the Fourth Military Zone (the one just above
the DMZ) and in South Vietnam, to members of the VWP and
of the Ho Chi Minh Labor Youth Group, and to overseas
Vietnamese.
Much of the language of the appeal is reminiscent of propagcnda
during the years of the air strikes against the North, partic-
ularly in the insistence that there is no basis for the
"illusion" harbored by the United States that it can prevent
the North from supporting the South and in the assertion that
the DRV is an "independent and sovereign state, a member of
the socialist camp," whose territory is "inviolable." On the
other hc.nd, the appeal is rot marked by particularly bellicose
threats or warnings; it falls back on the stereotyped pledge
to continue the war of resistance, which it predicts will be
crowned with success. It also endorses diplomatic as well as
political struggle and says that the correct way to settle
the problem is in the PRG's 10 points and eight-point elabora-
tion.
ORDER FROM VPA, The order from the VPA High Command
QUAN DOI KHAN DAN typically singles out such things as
defending property, insuring security,
and maintaining unity amor.g the armed services, the people, and
the party along with its military appeals. In the latter it
says thn military must shoot down planes, capture pilots,
"wipe out commandos and infantry,'- and keep communications
and transport open "in all circumstances."
Elaborating on the order, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the
11th expresses determination to destroy enemy planes--whether
reconnaissance or combat, "whether they arrive en masse or
singly"--and capture "alive many aggressor pilots." It says
"regarding commandos, whether they come from the sky, from
the water, or sneak into our country across the borders, we
are determined to quickly annihilate or neatly capture'them,
not to let any of them escape." And "regarding enemy infantry
troops, if they set foot on the sacred land of the northern part
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of our country, we are determined to fight them to cut off their
retreat and to use the enemy's blood to water our beloved rice
paddies."
NFLSV-PRG STATEMENT ENDORSES DRV APPEAL TO "ALL COMPATRIOTS'
The Front welcomes the DRV appeal in a Liberation Radio commentary
on the 11th and a LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY editorial the next day.
Official endorsement comes on the 11th in a joint NFLSV Central
Commjttee-PRC statement and an appeal from the PLAF
Command to all "cadres and combatants."
The joint statement echoes the DRV appeal in saying that in.the
face of "new U.S. acts and schemes" it is necessary to declare
that the Vietnamese nation is one and that the United States
must stop its aggression. The statement asserts that the NFLSV
and PRG "are resolved to mobilize the South Vietnam liberation
armed forces and people to persevere in and step up" their
resistance until the United States withdraws its troops and "the
puppet army and administration topple." And it warns that the
South Vietnamese people and army will "resolutely not tolerate
any U.S. military venturous acts against the DRV and crimes
against their northerr kith and kin."
The statement echoes the DRV appeal in expressing determination
to "stand shoulder to shoulder' with the people throughout.the
country and in Laos and Cambodia, and it warns that "neither
impudent threats nor brutal war moves can shake the iron-like
determination of the armLi forces and people of South Vietnam."
PRC JOINT STATEMENT SUPPORTS DRV APPEAL, PRG PEACE PLAN
Peking supports the DRV appeal with a joint-party-government
statement of its owzi, carried by NCNA on the 13th. The state-
ment scores the United States for committing "monstrous crimes"
in South Vietnam and "barbarous raids and war blackmail"
against the North while at the same time trying to "prohibit
the Vietnamese people from putting up any resistance." It
supports the right of the Vietnamese to defend themselves
and the "sacred duty of the people in the northern part of
Vietnam to support and assist their kinsmen in the South."
It concludes with an expression of firm support for the
Indochinese people and the assertion that any U.S. military
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adventures against the Vietnamese people or other people of.
Indochina are also "provocations against the Chinese people and
the revolutionary people of the world."*
The PRC Party-Government statement was preceded by an 11 December
NCNA report--also noted by VNA the next day--that Chou En-J.ai
received the DRV ambassador, who presented him with the DRV.
appeal. In a "very cordial and friendly conversation," NCNA
said, Chou En-tai denounced the bombing as an indication of the
United States' "weakness" and "firmly supported" the Vietnamese
people in their war. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, carried by
NCNA on the 12th, also supports the DRV appeal as a "powerful
reply to the flagrant provocations and military adventures"
of the U.j. imperialists. It expresses the conviction that
if the Indochinese peoples persevere in "protracted war," they
will drive out the U.S. "imperialists." It quotes Mao's
assertion that the Chinese people provide a "powerful backing"
for the Vietnamese people and that Chinese territory is their
"reliable rear," and it concludes by reiterating the line ..
that the Chinese people consider it their duty to,"support and
assist" the Vietnamese people's struggle.
On the 16th NCNA reports low-level meetings of "armymen and
civilians" being held throughout China to support the 13 December
PRC statement and to condemn U.S. bombing of the DRV.
ENDORSEMENT OF In referring to the U.S. "pipe dream" of
NFLSV PEACE PLAN using bombs to force the Vietnamese into
submission and gain at the conference table
what cannot be achieved on the battlefield, the statement
registers Peking's first endorsement of the NFLSV/PRG peace
plans: It says "in their 10-point overall solution and eight
supplementary points, the NFLSV and PRG have long set forth
the correct way for the settlement of the Vietnam question."
The statement gives no indication of the specific substance of
the proposals, however. It merely adds that if the Nixon
Administration really wants a peaceful settlement it must
unconditionally withdraw troops and let the Vietnamese settle
their own affairs.
* A PRC Gcvernment statement on 14 May 1970, assailing the
U.S. incursion into Cambodia and the bombings of the DRV,
similarly characterized U.S. actions as "frantic provocations
against the Chinese people." See the TRENDS of 6 May 1970,
page 8.
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In the past Peking has been notably reluctant to even mention
the peace plans on its own authority, much less characterize
them as "correct." Unwillingness to make such an endorsement
was pointed up in joint communiques in October 1969 on the
occasion of visits of NFLSV/PRG and DRV delegations in Peking:
the communiques recorded the view only of "the Vietnamese
side" that the NFLSV solution is the "correct basis" for a
settlement.*
MOSCOW NOTES DRV APPEAL, OFFERS NO SUBSTANTIAL COR4ENT
Unlike Peking, Moscow avoids authoritative comment on the
10 December DRV Party-Government appeal although on the 14th
TASS and the domestic service reported that Kosygin received
the DRV ambassador, who handed him the appeal. The brief
TASS report--also broadcast by Moscow radio in Vietnamese--
said that at the meeting, held in a "friendly and cordial
atmosphere," Kosygin promised that the USSR would continue
to give the Vietnamese "the necessary aid and support."
VNA's report, on the 15th, adds that Kosygin expressed
indignation at the new U.S. "acts of war," which he called a
"salient feature" of present Administration policy; that he.
recalled that in their 2 December statement the Warsaw Pact
members condemned the U.S. "aggressors"; and that he expressed
the USSR's "full support" of the 10 December DRV appeal.
There is only routine-level Soviet publicity for the appeal,
and no substantial comment. TASS on the 10th promptly
carried a summary of the appeal as well as of the VPA High
Command order urging combat readiness, and the summi.ries were
published in PRAVDA on the 12th. Also on the 12th, a TASS
dispatch from Hanoi reported that meetings were being held
throughout the DRV in response to the appeals. On the*14th,
TASS again briefly reported on such meetings in the DRV and
mentioned a NHAN DAN commentary supporting the appeal.
* For background on Peking's first, belated reference to the
NFLSV 10-point solution, see the TRENDS of 29 October 1969,
page 9. See the TRENDS of 4 November 1970 for references in
Peking propaganda to the NFLSV/PRG's eight-point elaboration.
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Zhukov, in a PRAVDA article reported by Moscow radio on the 14th,
notes in passing that the DRV appeal declared that the DRV is an
independent and sovereign state and a member of the socialist
camp and says that it shows Vietnamese determination to retaliate
against U.S. encroachments. The appeal is also briefly mentioned
in the course of a 12 December PRAVDA article by Bolshakov on.
the U.S. step-up of the arms race in general. Referring to
President Nixon's "threats" in his press conference, Bolshakov
says the DRV appeal stresses that the aggressors will receive a
"decisive rebuff" from the Vietnamese people, who are "supported
by the countries of the socialist community." This passage,
which is picked up in a 13 Decem b?r VNA report on foreign
support, is omitted in the TASS summary of the article.
DRV, FRONT SCORE THE ,RESIDENT, LAIRD FOR "BOMBING THREATS"
The first monitored Hanoi reference to the President's 10 December
press conference came in the 12 December NIiAN DAN editorial,.
broadcast almost 24 hours after Liberation Radio had first
mentioned the press conference--first briefly at 0500 GMT on the
11th and in a radio commentary at 1400 GMT that same day. The
NHAN DAN editorial is pegged to the DRV party-government appeal
and only briefly mentions the press conference, noting that the
President said reconnaissance would continue and that missile
bases and other targets in the North would be bombed if U.S.
troops in South Vietnam were attacked by "liberation troops."
More substantial comment came in a "Chien Binh" (Combatant)
article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 12th,
broadcast by Hanoi radio an hour after the NH1AN DAN editorial.
The Chien Binh article is personally. abusive, calling the
President "the number one American liar" and saying that "his
reasoning is very weird"--in demanding safety for the
"aggressors" but not for their victims. Chien Binh also says
that "Nixon's arrogance has reached its zenith" when he gives
himself the right to order attacks against the DRV,at any
time and any place without even a fabricated justification.
The article goes on to say that "militarily, Nixoz,'s scheme
is aimed at undermining our economic and military potential and
at blocking the North's support for the South; psychologically,
the aim of the pattern of staging raids is so that the enemy
will be unable to forecast U.S. reaction."
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A 12 December NHAN DAN Commentator article on the press conference
is mentioned briefly by VNA English but is not known to have been
broadcast by Hanoi radio. However, VNA, in its transmission to
Havana for the Hanoi radio correspondent there, quotes Commentator
as observing that the President's "arrogant threats" help everyone
see his "war madness." Unlike other available Hanoi propaganda,
it acknowledges the exchange at the press conference on the issue
of release of POW's and says that when "dealing with the Vietnamese
rejection of U.S. tricks on the so-called exchange of war prisoners,
President Nixon called the Vietnamese people 'an international
outlaw. " On the 12th, Hanoi radio -broadcast the text of the Paris
DRV delegation spokesman's statement on the press conference which
also broaches the POW problem. Among other things, it says that
"by his statements on 10 December, Nixon wanted to make believe
that the sole subject of the Paris conference is to discuss the
so-called POW problem, while stubbornly keeping complete silence
on the question of ending the U.S. aggression."
The Liberation Radio commentary on the 11th, like other Front
propaganda, is similar to Hanoi conimert in deprecating the
notion that there was an "understanding" at the time of the
1968 bombing halt whereby U.S. reconnaissance over the DRV would
continue. Front propaganda also vehemently condemns the. -
President for declaring that he would order bombing of targets
in the DRV if the U.S. forces in South Vietnam are threatened.
HANOI RADIO ON Prcmptly on the 16th, a Hanoi radio
LAIRD "THREATS" commentary scored Secretary Lairds remarks
in his press conference the day before.
Citing "Western news reports," it says he hinted that if the
DRV does not show good will at the Paris talks, the United
States may resume the bombing of the North; and it adds that he
repeated threats that so long as the "U.S. air pirates" are.not
released, some U.S. troops will remain in South Vietnam. The
commentary routinely concludes by saying "Laird's arrogant
allegations again unmask the extremely bellicose nature of the
Nixon Administration, which is successively resorting to all
kinds of pretexts to prepare for new military adventures against
the DRV."
PRC DECR!ES U.S. "THREATS", DEFENDS DRV RIGHT TO SUPPORT'SOUTH
Peking's initial report of the President's press conference--an
NCNA Chinese-language report on the 12th, repeated by NCNA in
English the next day--singles out the President's remarks on
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bombing North Vietnam. NCNA notes that the President said that
U.S. planes, if fired upon, will bomb missile sites and the
military complexes around them. It alludes to his comments on
DRV infiltration into the South when it says he warned that he
would order bombing of "military positions and'supply routes.
in North Vietnam" to protect remaining U.S. forces in South
Vietnam "if the people in North Vietnam support their kith and
kin in the South."
NCNA also rejects the President's "pretext" for aggression--the
claim that there was an "understanding" that reconnaissance.
flights would be allowed to continue. Maintaining that such.a
claim is a "lie," NCNA asserts that at a 23 November press
conference a State Department spokesman became "tongue-tied"
when asked about the understanding. The NCNA report also
notes briefly that President Nixon further revealed his
"vicious design" when he spoke of the decision to provide 255
million dollars in aid-to Cambodia..
The only other available Peking. references to the press
conference come in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial carried by NCNA
on the 12th, which supports the 10 December DRV appeal, and
in a 13 December NCNA summary of a NHAN DAN Commentator article.
Both items score the President's remarks on the bombing and. on
the "understanding" in terms similar to the initial NCNA report
and defend the DRV people's right to "support" their compatriots
in the South.
MOSCOW SAYS PRESIDENTS REMARKS MEAN CONTINUED AGGRESSION
Moscow gives President Nixon's 10 December press.conference only
routine-level attention,.with initial reaction coming in brief
items in foreign radio broadcasts on the 11th rather than from
TASS. The TASS report, in a departure from customary practice,
was delayed until 1833 GMT on the 11th, but it is, as usual,
published in the next day's PRAVDA. TASS observes that the
President's remarks confirmed a U.S. intention to "continue its
aggressive policy in Southeast Asia" despite public opinion and
affirmed Washington's desire for "continued aggression".against
the DRV rather than for a peaceful political settlement.
TASS says the President declared that the United States would
continue the reconnaissance.flights and that he would order
air strikes against missile sites and military complexes.
around them if the planes were fired on. Stating once again that
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this is a violation of the U.S. "pledge" of a full and unconditional
bombing halt, TASS adds that the President stated further that.he
would order bombings. of such targets. as "military objects" in
the DRV, mountain passes leading to. South Vietnam, and military
communications if he concluded that "there is a threat to the
remaining U.S. troops in South Vietnam."
The TASS dispatch, like Vietnamese communist: reaction, does not
mention.the.Presiclent's comments on a.cease-fire. But an English-
language radio report does - say he "rejected the proposal. to. extend
the Christmas cease-fire in South Vietnam," neglecting to*mention
that he pointed out that it was the DRV which turned down the
proposal.
Followup comment acknowledges.little.of the substance of the
President's statements in denouncing his "threats" against-the
DRV. A PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov, summarized by Moscow
radio in English to North America on the 14th, asserts that the
President's "threats" to resume the bombing of North Vietnam
came as the climax of a "mounting propaganda campaign" begun
at the tins= of the 21-22 November bombings and the airborne
operation at Son Tay. The raids, Zhukov says, aroused the
indignation of the socialist countries, which expressed their
solidarity with the DRV in the 2 December Warsaw Pact statement.
Zhukov maintains that the only way out of the impasse for the
United States is to "jettison the Dulles policy of strength
and find a solution to the problem by peaceful negotiation"
leading to the withdrawal of U.S. troops and an opportunity
for the Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs.
A 14 December domestic. service commentary by Zerin.refers to
statements by Secretary Laird as well as by the President and.
says it seems that. Washington "has taken decisions fraught
with many complications in the international situation." On
12 December.TASS reported.the "stormy. debate" in the Senate.
Foreign Relations Committee hearings.at which Senators-. Fulbright.
and Symington criticized the President's remarks as indicating.
further escalation. TASS added that Secretary, Laird, testifying
before the committee, again affirmed the Administration's
intention to carry out bombings "in case of necessity." A
13 December PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko and a TASS commentary
the next day say Laird goes even further than the President,
threatening to use "the lack of progress at the Paris talks"
as a "new excuse" for bombing.
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On the 15th TABS promptly reported Secretary Laird's press
conference announcement that day of his intention to visit
Southeast Asia in January to review the progress of Vietnamization,
the military situation, and the military aid programs. TASS.
commented that the trip. appears to be connected with?U;S.plans
for "continued aggression" in Southeast Asia,*saying Laird declared
that the United States intends to continue its military.presence
in Vietnam. TASS also noted briefly that Laird "again?attempted
to justify" the bombing raids and the commando operation.
PARIS TALKS: ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR RELEASE OF POW'S IGNORED
The VNA and LPA accounts of the 94th Paris session on 10 December
note that PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh denounced
the United States for "carrying out a war of extermination" in
her statement, which was largely devoted to alleged U.S. chemical
warfare. VNA notes that DRV representative Xuan Thuy took
exception to U.S. charges that the DRV is not interested.in.
negotiating at Paris. Stating that the DRV and PRG governments
have sent their delegates to Paris with "good will and serious
intent," Thuy charged that if the conference has made no
progress it is because the Nixon Administration has withdrawn
its troops "only with calculated slowness" and refuses to.
announce a time limit for withdrawal and "to give up the
Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration."
VNA gives no indication of the nature of the allied proposal
for the immediate release of all North Vietnamese prisoners.held
in the South in exchange for GVN, U.S., and other allied prisoners.
The account merely. says the U.S. and GVN delegates put forth "the
question of 'exchange of POW's' in an attempt to cover-up their
abominable crimes." It does report Mme. Binh's acknowledgment
and rejection of Ambassador Bruce's suggestion that-meetings
on the POW question begin the next day so that immediate
progress could be made. VNA says that "concerningthe-'proposal"'
of the U.S. and GVN delegates "for the discussion tomorrow,
December 11, of the so-called question of 'exchange of-prisoners
of war,"' Mme. Binh stated that the question of prisoners could
be discussed "today" if the United States would agree to a troop.
withdrawal before 30 June 1971. Noting Xuan Thuy's additional
comment on the question, it says he "denounced the U.S. and
Saigon delegates' perfidious scheme in their proposal on the
so-called question of POW's.which is only aimed at covering up
the U.S. crimes of aggression."
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CEASE-FIRE VNA notes that after delivering her prepared'state-
ment Mme. Binh read a declaration on cease-fire,
but the account offers no explanation of why it was presented and
thus does not indicate whether it was related to calls in the .
United States for an extended cease-fire over the holidays. The
declaration was essentially.a restatement of the two basic
points of the PRG proposal--on U.S. agreement to withdraw by
30 June 1971 and the formation of a provisional coalition
government by the PRG and a Saigon administration without
Thieu-Ky-Khiem--along with her assertion that in those events
there would be cease-fires with the United States and the ARVN,
respectively.
.ORV delegate Xuan Thuy, according to VNA, declared "full support"
of Mme. Binh's statement on the cease-fire question.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SCORED AT PARIS TALKS. SCIENTISTS' MEETING
At the Paris session on 10 December Mme. Binh devoted her formal
statement almost exclusively to a. denunciation of the U.S. "war
of extermination," particularly chemical warfare, presenting
detailed statistics to document her case. Xuan Thuy also devoted.
a considerable portion of his statement to chemical warfare,.but
the extent of his remarks. is not reflected in the VNA account,
which says only that he condemned U.S. chemical warfare in South
Vietnam and called for an end to the war that is "the origin of
all crimes."
The communist delegates did not mention the international conference
of scientists held in Paris from 12 to 14 December, but it.zeems
likely that their diatribes were made with the conference in mind.
There were DRV and PEG delegations at the conference, and
Vietnamese communist media on the 12th h-publicized messages to.
the conference from DRV Premier F:,am Van Dong.and PRG President
Huynh Tan Phat.
VNA coverage of the conference includes P. report on the-15th that
a resolution was.adopted "pointing to the great harm caused" by
U.S. chemical warfare in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.. A
NHAN DAN editorial on the 19th, as reviewed by VNA, claims that
the results of the conference are a. very strong condemnation of
"the warmongering and barbarous U.S. imperialists" and a "new
political setback" for the Nixon Administration.
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USE OF CHEMICALS On III December Hanoi released a DRV Foreign
IN QUANG BINH Ministry spokesman's statement which charges
that on the 6th the United States "sent a
formal-'Lon of aircraft to drop noxious chemicals on a populated
area in Bo Trach district, Quang Binh Province," causing "much
damage to the crops and animals."* T1e spokesman "sternly
condemned this barbarous crime" and demanded that the United
States cease "all acts of war" against the DRV.
A 27 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement,
protesting alleged U.S. strikes against the DMZ, had charged
that U.S. aircraft spread toxic chemicals on Vinh Quang, Vinh
Giang, Vinh Son, and Vinh Thanh villages on 25 August,
"poisoning many people." See the TRENDS of 2 September 1970,
page 14.
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR STRESSES WEST BERLIN STATUS AS "SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY"
East German authoritative statements--highlighted by Ulbricht's
9 December speech at the 14th SED Central Committee plenum-_
stress repeatedly that it is important now, during the four-
power talks on West Berlin, that NATO and Bonn in particular
end "provocative acts" aimed at changing the "international"
status of the "separate political entity" of West Berlin.
Ulbricht hewed to the Warsaw Pact line on the Berlin settlement
issue. "In complete conformity" with the 2 December statement
on European security issued by the Pact's Political Consultative
Committee, he placed the GDR on record as hoping the four-power
talks on West Berlin would produce a mutually acceptable agreement
"which is in accord with the interests of detente as well as with
the needs of the West Berlin people and the legitimate interests
and sovereign rights of the GDR." The formulai;ion in the Pact
statement--that an accord must meet the wishes of the West Berlin
population and the interests of the GDR--had in turn been a
paraphrase of Brezhnev's observations in Yerevan on 29 November.
Ulbricht prefaced his remarks on a possible Berlin settlement
with a reference to the GDR proposal of 29 October for an exchange
of views with the FRG. "If the FRG Government were to end its
unlawful interference as a state in West Berlin," he said, "the
way would be clear for a GDR-FRG agreement on reciprocal transit
traffic." He added that such an agreement would have a positive
effect on the four-power talks.
In apparent allusion to the recent traffic tie-ups around West
Berlin, Ulbricht followed his remarks on a Berlin settlement
by taking note of the "tremendous noise" in the "imperialist"
press in connection "with transit traffic across GDR communication
lines." He observed that West German goods and people can reach
the city only via the GDR's communication lines, and he concluded
that the GDR "is in various ways interested in the transit of
goods and persons via FRG communication lines."
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Ulbricht had last treated the Berlin question at length in an
8 November interview over GDR radio and television. He did not
mention the four-power talks on that occasion,* confining his
remarkn to FRG-GDR and GDR-West Berlin relations. On the
mattor of talks between the FRG and GDR, he reaffirmed GDR
readiness--"provided there is a cessation of any activity by
other states in West Berlin that runs counter to the status
of that city under international law and that violates the
interests of the GDR and other socialist states"--to resume
talks "on questions concerning the transit of mutual passenger
and goods traffic." In this formulation, he added, "every
word has its weight."
As if to make it clear that the FRG-GDR talks do not involve
the question of access routes to West Berlin, Ulbricht went
on to state in the interview that agreements between the two
German states "and between the GDR and West Berlin Senat would
be important contributions to improving the situation." A
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on 5 November was more pointed,
declaring that "no agreements concerning West Berlin's
passetiger and goods traffic can be concluded between the GDR
and the FRG"; this matter "can be settled only by the GDR
and the West Berlin Senat."
FRG-GDR On 11 December ADN charged West Berlin Mayor Klaus
CONTACTS Schuetz with supporting the "illegal acts" of Bonn
politicians--the "aggressive presence" of the CDU/
CSU parliamentary faction and "other provocations" in West Berlin--
in denouncing his "document" delivered that day to the office of
the GDR Council of Ministers in East Berlin. Citing "informed
sources," ADN noted that the document bore no address and no
signature and called for a "gesture of good will" from the GDR.
ADN did not indicate the substance of the Schuetz document,
which according to the West German DPA calls for a "one-time"
agreement allowing West Berliners to visit relatives and
friends in the East during the coming holidays and asserts that
this would not prejudice the four-power talks on West Berlin.
* His interview came only four days after the ninth session of
the talks. The communique on the session went beyond those on
the previous and subsequent ones, declaring that "progress was
achieved in some essential aspects of an agreement sought by the
four powers." TASS and ADN accounts of the communique included
the passage on "progress."
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ADN complained that Schuetz' "attitude" is not conducive to
promoting the four-power talks and that he has "prevented
relevant talks and settlements between the GDR Government and
the West Berlin Senat." It concluded by urging Schuetz to
contribute to the normalization of relations between the GDR
and West Berlin, noting that the GDR has "repeatedly" declared
its willingness to do so. Moscow media have not yet been
heard to mention the Schuetz proposal.
Monitored GDR propaganda has not directly mentioned the FRG-GDR
talks between state secretaries Bahr and Kohl since their last
meeting on 27 November, when ADN released a joint statement on
the meeting in which the two sides "agreed to continue the
exchange, of views." A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary the following
day stated that if Bonn ceases its activity in West Berlin,
which is "contrary to the city's status under international
law . . . and infringes upon the interests of the GDR and other
socialist states," the GDR Government "is prepared to enter into
negotiations with the FRG Government on questions pertaining to
the mutual transit of persons and goods." The paper repeated
the argument that the USSR and the three Western powers have
never recognized that West Berlin belongs to the FRG and urged
Bonn to contribute to detente in Europe by ending its "disruptive
policy" regarding West Berlin.
TRAFFIC In the pattern of Ulbricht's 9 December speech, GDR
SLOWDOWN media have referred only obliquely to the traffic
slowdown on the autobahns between West Berlin and
the FRG which began on 28 November. ADN reported on 3 December
that the Soviet embassy in East Berlin had rejected a protest
from the Western Big Three against "the measures" taken by the
GDR authorities in connection with the CDU/CSU parliamentary
faction's meeting in West Berlin. In addition, the clandestine
"German Freedom Station 904" on 3 Decembei ridiculed the idea
that Ulbricht was "to blame" for the West Berlin situation,
asking rhetorically "who can blame the GDR if it reacts" to
provocations.
The first monitored Soviet mention of the traffic slowdown came
on 8 December in a Viktor Andreyev radio commentary beamed to
Germany, two days before the 12th meeting of the four-power
talks on West Berlin. Labeling the CDU/CSU meeting in West
Berlin "provocative" and denying that "responsibility for the
aggravation of the situation around West Berlin and the traffic
routes leading to this city" rests with the GDR and the Soviet
Union, Andreyev called the GDR authorities' actions "Justified
countermeasures."
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Moscow comment--including the Andreyev commentary and a 7 December
TASS commentary by Kornilov on the Polish-FRG treaty--decry such
"provonations" as the CDU/CSU meeting and FRG President Heinemann's
6-8 December visit to West Berlin at a time when negotiations are
under way which might produce a "new outlook" toward West Berlin.
ULBRICHT GRUDGINGLY BACKS PACT LINE ON RAPPROCHEMENT WITH BONN
In reporting to the SED Central Committee on the outcome of the
2 December Warsaw Pact Berlin meeting, Ulbricht dutifully expressed
support for the Pact's policy of promoting European detente and
stated the GDR's willingness to negotiate with the Wnst Germans.
But his continuing suspicions about the implications of Bonn's
Ostpolitik and some bitterness over his communist allies' reactions
to it were clearly reflected in the address.
In explaining the Pact's decisions to his SED colleagues, Ulbricht
drew heavily on the Pact Political Consultative C;mmittee's
statement on European security following the 2 December Berlin
meeting, singling out passages that had seemed--against the back-
ground of speculation about Soviet-GDR discord--to project the
image of a united bloc solidly backing the East Germanz. Thus he
paraphrased the statement's reference to the GDR's important role
in Europe, the Pact members' commitment to uphold GDR sovereignty,
and the call for GDR admission to the United Nations and other
international organization:. Ulbricht followed the Pact line in
noting that "new elements" have emerged in Europe, responsive to
the coordinated political initiatives by the socialist states.
In this context he dutifully cited Bonn's treaties with Moscow and
Warsaw as contributions to European security but predictably saw
their major significance in terms that have applicability for the
GDR, praising them for recording "in terms of international law
the realities that have emerged since World War II."
In a later passage he acknowledged that at the Berlin meeting he
had "consented" to Warsaw's establishment of diplomatic relations
with Bonn, adding that "we are convinced that our positions
correspond to the interests of the GDR people." But in an
ensuing cryptic remark he seemed to imply that the treaty was a
foregone conclusion and that he could do little else but consent:
"Meanwhile, as is common knowledge, the Polish-West German treaty
has been signed . . . ."
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In a gratuitous passage, Ulbricht seemed to register bitterness
over Brandt's cordial reception in Warsaw. Polish media had
given notably warm coverage to Brandt's statements and activities,
larded with personal praise of Brandt for his display of
courage in promoting European detente. Taking note of Brandt's
gesture in kneeling before the memorial to the victims of the
Warsaw ghetto, which Polish media had publicized, Ulbricht reminded
the Poles that he had himself been among "the first Germans to bow
their heads in reverence to the many millions of victims of fascist
terror in Poland." Depicting the GDR as a loyal ally of Poland
for more then 20 years, he also recalled that it was his regime
which "concluded the first trade agreement and agreed on a joint
GDR-Polish declaration on the Oder-Neisse line."
Ulbricht's discussion of the arguments for European detente advanced
at the Pact's Berlin meeting seemed to betray his own reservations.
Without identifying the speakers (although Ceausescu may have been
one of those he had in mind), he said "it was repeatedly stressed"
at the meeting that the socialist states were not the only ones
interested in. detente and that the FRG and. some other NATO states
and "even certain CDU quarters" are interested in an early implementa-
tion of the Moscow-Bonn and Warsaw-Bonn treaties. But this, he added,
"does not prevent the CDU/CSU from attacking the Brandt-Scheel
government with nationalist slogans, and it will not prevent them."
As if to indicate that he had pressed this line at the Berlin meeting,
he emphasized that the conference was "Justified" in noting that "the
policy pursued by the rightwing forces in the FRG and the United
States could seriously harm the interests of the FRG and its citizens."
Ulbricht went beyond his Pact colleagues in reassuring his SED
listeners that his assessment of Bonn's new Eastern policy "and
its intention to penetrate the socialist countries by means of
social democracy remains unchanged." This hardline statement
was juxtaposed to his expression of the GDR's willingness to
"strive to develop state relations on the basis of international
law with the FRG within the meaning of peaceful coexistence."
Sensitive to the possible domestic implications of even such a
limited detente with Bonn, Ulbricht underscored the idea that
the GDR would keep its ideological guard up to combat the
"intensified anticommunist campaign emanating from political
forces in Bonn."
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MOSCOW, BLOC ALLIES CARRY SANITIZED ACCOUNTS OF ULBRICHT SPEECH
Soviet And East European sensitivity to Ulbricht's interpretation
of the Warsaw Pact Berlin meeting and his hardline appraisal of
Bonn's motives and policies is reflected in meager, sanitized
coverage of the address. A relatively brief TASS account of the
speech on 10 December sought to depict Ulbricht as an enthusiastic
supporter of Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, at the same
time standing firm--with the united support of his Pact allies--
on his principled relations with the West Germans. Thus TASS
quoted Ulbricht's approving comments on the treaties (largely
paraphrases of the Warsaw Pact document) and ignored his bitter
comments on Brandt's warm reception in Poland, his unchanged
assessment of the dangers of Bonn's Ostpolitik, and his criticism
of the Social Democrats, as well as his portrayal of an intensified
anticommunist campaign emanating from Bonn.
TASS picked up Ulbricht's comments that the treaties between West
Germany and the USSR and Poland introduced "new elements" into the
European situation and created improved "conditions for the further
struggle for peace and security in Europe," as well as his rejection
of special "intra-German relations" short of diplomatic ties
between two sovereign states. TASS also singled out Ulbricht's
remark that if Bonn renounced its "illegal interference" in the
affairs of West Berlin, this would undoubtedly open the way to
an agreement on transport between the GDR and the FRG and would
undoubtedly "have a positive effect" on the four-power talks.
Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU, Prague's RUDE PRAVO, and Budapest's MAGYAR
NEMZET similarly singled out this statement in their accounts of
the speech. The Warsaw paper also said "the GDR is convinced,
W. Ulbricht stressed. that there will be a discussion and
negotiations with the FRG on the basis of international law."
Predictably, TRYBUNA LUDU and the other East European bloc papers
did not pick up Ulbricht's comments on Brandt's reception in Warsaw.
MAGYAR NEMZET's report wez anique in reporting the GDR leader's
statement that his assessment of Bonn's Ostpolitik has not changed,
but the Hungarian article as a whole depicted Ulbricht as a supporter
of European detente.
Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, which usually awaits Moscow's cue on
sensitive issues, limited itself to a 50-word BTA report noting
only that the SED Central Committee met and was addressed by
Ulbricht; BTA gave no details of the speech.
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Bucharest's SCIENTIA on 11 December reported Ulbricht's remarks in
much the same way as the rest of the bloc; but in line with
Romania's interest in promoting a European security conference,
the paper stressed Ulbricht's statement that "there do not exist
any objective motives for postponing the calling of the conference
or for again demanding preliminary conditions."
BUCHAREST, TIRANA PROVIDE 04N INTERPRETATIONS OF BERLIN SUMMIT
SCINTEIA A frontpage article in SCINTEIA on 5 December by
ARTICLE Ion Fintinaru offered the Romanian public an
authoritative interpretation of the Warsaw Pact's
Berlin summit, depicting it as a contribution to European detente
and in effect as a boost for Romania's own policy of pursuing
increased contacts with the West.* In contrast to the general
Soviet bloc portrayal of the meeting as a demonstration of unity,
Fintinaru said the session provided a forum for "a broad exchange
of views" on international questions and again illustrated "the
possibilities of reaching joint decisions through comradely talks . . .
decisions which are meant to serve unity and internationalist
solidarity." He went on to note that Ceausescu reasserted
Romania's foreign policy principles and took "an active stand"
on the questions examined at the meeting.
In passages that apparently reflect Ceausescu's efforts to push
actively and seriously for European detente, Fintinaru stated
that Romania's policy of normalizing interstate relations in
Europe, particularly its establishment of diplomatic relations
with Bonn in 1967, had contributed to "the positive course of
political life in Europe, to the assertion of the realistic forces
of the FRG, and to the development of interstate relations with
the FRG." As if to assure the East Germans that Romania's increased
ties with Bonn will not adversely affect its relations with the GDR,
he added: "It is a well-known fact that Romania has consistently
worked and continues to work for the normalization of all states'
relations with the GDR . . . and nurtures feelings of profound
sympathy for and solidarity with the GDR."
* SCINTEIA has frequently followed up major bloc meetings with
signed articles by such leading political commentators as Fintinaru,
explaining the even in terms of Romania's foreign policy orientation
and in effect indicating that Bucharest maintained its independent
line.
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In another passage evidently addressed to those members of the
Soviet bloc who have reservations about Bonn's OstpoliV.k,
Fintinaru granted that enemies of detente a%d revenchist forces
still Hxist in the West and in Bonn, but argued: "It is precisely
for this reason that further actions must be taken to consolidate
the position of the realistic forces promoting a policy of coopera-
tion and to isolate the reactionary circles." In this context the
article made a strong pitch for holding a European security conference,
which it said would be "a major stag: along the path of consolidating
peace in Europe, without procrastination or prior conditions." Whether
the conference takes place or not, the article seemed to imply,
Romania "will continue to make its full contribution to the policy
of promoting detente, trust, and inter-European cooperation, for
the attainment of the vital desideratum of security in Europe."
BASHKIMI An article in the Albanian daily BASHKIMI on 7 December,
ARTICLE entitled "Conspiracies and Intrigues Against the GDR,"
sought to make propaganda capital of the indications of
discord between the GDR and its Pact ally-s. BA:'HKW said the
Pact's Berlin meeting had been hurriedly convened to pressure the
GDR into making "concessions on West Berlin," and it added that
what Moscow asks of the East German people "is tantamount to
surrender to the demands of the West German monopolies and their
allies." Picturing the leaders of the GDR as reluctant to accede
to Moscow's demands, the article said the Soviets "are loudly
publicizing the possibility of the GDR's admission to the United
Nations in exchange for concessions on West Berlin."
The article was also critical of the Poles, depicting them as
"impatiently awaiting the signing of the Polish-West German treaty
so that they can get the benefits of Bonn's credits."
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CZECHOSLOVAK PLENUM
MODERATE HUSAK LINE TAKES ON TOUGHER ANTI-RIGH`rWING HUE
The plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ) held on
10-11 December, after several reported postponements, generally
confirmed Husak's moderate course but gave scant comfort to
elements hoping for a possible softening of pressure on "the
right wing." While announcing no intensified purge, the
plenum's resolution on "party unity" was pointedly orthodox
in identifying the right wing as still "the main political
danger."
The plenum confined itself to one expulsion from the party but
selected for this action a prominent symbol in the person of
former Premier Cernik. Without elaboration, as reported by
the Prague domestic service on the 13th, the plenum "confirmed
the expulsion of Oldrich Cernik from the ranks of CPCZ members."
Unlike Dubcek, Cernik had not gone through the intermediate stage
of having his party membership "suspended" before he was finally
expelled. Bearing a less liberal image than Dubcek, he had been
kept on as premier until January 1970, when he was replaced by
Strougal.
The only other announced personnel change was the removal of
moderately conservative Frantisek Penc from the CPCZ Secretariat,
"in connection with being entrusted with other tasks," and his
replacement on the Secretariat by the more conservative Oldrich
Svestka. In what may reflect a further downgrading of the
federative system, Svestka, currently chief editor of the Czech
Party Bureau weekly TRIBUNA, was removed as Secretary of the
Czech Party Bureau in connection with his promotion to the CPCZ
Secretariat. In the compromise settlement worked out in Moscow
in August 1968, Svestka had been dropped as chief editor of
RUDE PRAVO and lost the CPCZ Secretariat membership that went
with the editorial post. He now returns to that body with the
more prestigious designation of "Secretary and member of the
CPCZ Central Committee Secretariat."
Penc's "other tasks" were clarified on the 14th when the Prague
radio reported that President Svoboda had nominated him as
Czechoslovak ambassador to Poland. The broadcast said Penc was
received that day by Husak and Strougal and that Husek thanked
him "for the work he had done as Secretary of the party Central
Committ e.
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HUSAK SPEECH As presented in a lengthy summary by CTK on
14 December, Husak's main address at the
10 December session of the plenum' emerges on balance as a
hardli:ie statement for the CPCZ First Secretary, although it
includes some characteristically conciliatory assurances to
liberal elements. In passages carried by CTK as direct
quotations, Husak declared that "the rightwing danger continues
to remain the chief danger, and the struggle against it is the
major front in our political battle." He characterized the
period since his accession to leadership of the party in April
1969 as one of "fierce struggle of Marxist-Leninist, left
forces of our party against rightist opportunism." Downgrading
the idea of compromise, Husak went on to say that "we may be
patient and sensitive with regard to confused individuals, but
we must not tolerate opportunist, revisionist views and groups
within the party and activities of antisocialist forces in
society, because that would be the seed of new problems and
new crises." He added that there would be no toleration of
"revisionist subversion in whatever 'reformatory' guise."
Reporting on the results of the January-September 1970 "exchange
of party membership cards," Husak said 326,817 persons had been
dropped from the CPCZ since the start of this year, amounting
to a 21.67 percent drop in membership during that period. At
the same time, he appeared to give a positive cast to the whole
period since the start of the 1968 reforms in noting that "since
1 January 1968" party membership had decreased by 475,731, or
28 percent. Husak stressed at the same time that despite the
reduction in party ranks--which still leaves the CPCZ as
proportionately the largest of the European ruling parties,
constituting almost 10 percent of the country's population--
the CPCZ "remains a mass party" with "approximately 1.2 million
members."
* The speech was first summarized briefly by CTK and the
Prague domestic radio on the day it was delivered. CTK's
lengthy summary four days later was finally followed, on
15 December, by what appears to be a text in RUDE PRAVO. The
RUDE PRAVO version, while couched in the first person and
suggestive of full text by its length, is not labeled "text."
It is not yet available in full translation.
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The speech included a characteristic assurance that a "differentiated,
individual approach" would be used toward "the former members of the
party" expelled in the card exchange. Husak urged that the party
support the development" of former members' "working initiative"
and "gradually, according to the results of their efforts, to make
it possible for them to take part in public affairs." He went on
to urge the winning over of "all honest members of the intelligentsia,"
adding that this task would be difficult and complex because a
"considerable" part of the intelligentsia "was under the influence
of various radical, aggressive groups of rightists" who were "mostly"
recruited from the intelligentsia', own ranks.
The CPCZ leader stuck to his moderate line in stressing that the
party's recent difficulties stem from the Novotny era--the period
following the 13th CPCZ Congress in 1966--as well as from the
period after January 1968. He noted in this connection that a
document submitted for "discussion and approval" by the plenum
was entitled "Lesson Drawn From the Crisis Development in the
Party and Society After the 13th Party Congress." That document
is not mentioned in TASS' 14 December report of the documents
adopted by the CPCZ plenum, and the fairly brief TASS report
of Husak's speech carried in PRAVDA on the 10th ignored his
reference to the 13th congress as well as his conciliatory
remarks on the expelled party members and the intelligentsia.
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POLISH RIOTS
WARSAW COMMUNIQUE ACKNOWLEDGES TWO-DAY OUTBREAK IN GDANSK
The Warsaw domestic service at 1500 GMT on 16 December "acquaint-
ed" listeners with the contents of a "communique issued by PAP,"
according to which "on 14 and 15 December, in Gdansk, serious
street incidents took place." These were the first public dis-
turbances acknowledged in Polish media since the student riots
in Warsaw and other Polish cities in March 1968, in the wake of
the Czechoslovak liberal reforms. The disturbances are attributed
to "hooligan" elements, as in 1968, but their more serious nature
is registered in the communique's report that "six persons were
killed."
The communique's circuitous explanation of the circumstances of
the riots--triggered, according to Western news sources, by a
rise in food prices--is that "making use of the ;;,ituation created
among the workers of the Gdansk Shipyard, adventurist and hooligan
movements, which have nothing in common with the working classes,
demolished and burned several public buildings and robbed several
dozen shops." It goes on to say that "murder has been committed"
against members of the militia who intervened to restore order and
that there were "also many seriously wounded." While claiming
that the "adventurist" elements have been defeated and public
order restored, the communique adds a warning that the authorities
"will react with all firmness to all disruption of public order
and to all antistate actions."
Some two and a half hours before the Warsaw domestic service
report, a partially intelligible item monitored on 1,301
kilocycles, the frequency normally used by Gdansk radio, inform-
ed inhabitants of the "Tri-Cities" (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot) that
"in connection with yesterday's events, all necessary steps"
were being taken to restore order. Unlike the PAP communique,
this broadcast appeared to jibe with Western news reports that
the disturbances were affecting other coastal cities besides
Gdansk.
The March 1968 student riots had been followed by announced
dismissals of high officials in economic ministries, many of
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whom were parents of the rioters) and regime statements stressed
the "Zionist" aspect of those disturbances. Some 10 days after
the initial outbreak, Gomulka delivered a defensive, conciliatory
speech on the subject which was punctuated by heckling from his
audience.
Moscow's domestic service carried the text of the PAP communique
on the Gdansk riots four hours after Warsaw media first reported
it,
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SPAIN
MOSCOW PROTESTS SPANISH TRIAL OF "BASQUE PATRIOTS"
In an unusual amount of propaganda attention (;o a Spanish event,
Soviet media have been publicizing protests and demonstrations
in Spain, the Soviet Union, and -throughout Europe in support of
the defendants in Spain's "shameful trial of 16 Basque patriots."
Since the military trial of the "patriotic democrats" began on
3 December, Moscow has reported protest activities by the Spanish,
French, Italian, and West German communist parties, a large number
of Soviet organizations, and groups in Chile, Finland, and Vene-
zuela.
A statement by the Soviet Jurists Association, carries' in Moscow's
domestic service on the 11th, charged that "tortur^ anal ill treat-
ment" of the defendants and "terrorizing of the defense" by the
"ignominious tribunal" constituted "a violation of the g,inerally
accepted principles of t..,e United Nations." Soviet viol-.nist
Oistrakh, according to TASS on the 15th, cancelled his planned
December tour of Spain in protest against the trial and "the
arbitrary actions of tl.e Spanish authorities": "I cannot go to
Spain where young workers and students are on trial there with
six of them facing a death penalty."
A PRAVDA commentary on the 7th characterized the trial as "an
attempt of the Spanish authorities to suppress wide popular
actions for democratic and social progress"; TASS commentator
Kornilov on the 8th said it "recreates the darkest, grimmest
pages of the medieval Spanish Inquisition"; and TASS on the 10th
called the trial "a screen to cover persecution of civil rights
fighters." The Spanish Government's 14 December decision to
suspend the personal liberties of all Spaniards for six months
was noted on the following day in Moscow's domestic service,
which commented that "the authorities are obviously preparing
the ground for the announcement of stiff sentences and for try-
ing to meet head-on the inevitable fresh wave of popular indigna-
tion."
Mori than a third of Moscow's comment on the Basque trial has
linked it with the Angela Davis case in the United States.
Typically, a 15 December PRAVDA article alleged that "the brutal
repressions against freedom fighters" such as Angela Davis and
the 16 "Basque patriots" have "evoked a wave of wrathful protests
by the Soviet public and millions of upright people in the whole
world."
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Maaitored Soviet media have not mentioned the kidnapping of a
West German consul in Spain on l December--an action for which.
the Banque Nationalist Movement claims credit, warning that the
fate of the consul will depend upon that of the 16 Basques on
'trial. Moscow has, however, registered sensitivity to the
implications of such actions by going on record in opposition
to kidnapping as a matter of policy. An 11 December TASS report
on a Paris session of European Council foreign ministers, in
which the West Germans participated, noted that "the problem of
defending diplomats against kidnapping" was on the agenda. A
12 December domestic service broadcast on the recent kidnappings
in Canada cited "the inability of the terrorist tactics and the
recent violence to solve the fundamental issues of the struggle
for social justice" in Canada and contended that terrorist actions
"would bring no advantages even to the terrorists themselves and
can be very dangerous to the country's democratic forces."
PEKING SEES TRIAL AS BEGINNING OF END FOR FRANCO
Peking propaganda has viewed the strikes and protests in Spain
surrounding the trial of the Basques as the start of "a large-
scale struggle against fascist persecution and i'or democratic
rights" which has "violently shaken the fasc..;t dictatorial rule
of Franco." NCNA on the 13th chronicled events in Spain in
protest against the trial and related the allegedly "bestial
persecution" of the defendants by "the reactionary court." Alleg-
ing that "a vigorous massive struggle against the fascist Franco
regime has broken out in Spain," a signed article in PEOPLE'S
DAILY on the 14th predicted that "the day is not fax off when the
reactionary Franco rule is put to an end."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SOVIET EDITORIALS DIVERGE ON INDUSTRIAL PRIORITIES
Signs of high-level discord over economic policy are evident in
divergent press treatment of the 1971 economic plan unveiled at
the recently concluded USSR Supreme Soviet session. The
divergences concern priorities within heavy industry, rather
than between heavy industry and other sectors of the economy.
Presumably, the policy differences arise from the squeeze on
resources created by the decision to maintain defense expenditures
at a high level, to increase allocations to agriculture in the
new five year plan, and to continue to increase consumer goods
production at higher rates than producer goods in 1971.
The divergetices are reflected in different listings of branches
of industry that are said to promote technological progress and
are scheduled to receive preferential treatment in the 1971 plan.
In his report to the Supreme Soviet on 8 December, Gosplan chief
N. K. Baybakov gave the following listing: "electric power,
machine building, chemical, petrochemical, oil, and gas." These
branches of industry, he stated, are scheduled to grow more
rapidly than industry as a whole in 1971 (PRAVDA, 9 December).
Baybakov's listing is contradicted by the editorials in PRAVDA
and IZVESTIYA on 12 December, following the conclusion of the
Supreme Soviet session. PRAVDA's editorial, which echoes the
sentiments of the so-called "metal-eaters," identifies the
favored branches of industry as follows: "in the first place
ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, oil, coal, chemical,
electrotechnical, machine building, and electric power."
IZVESTIYA provides a different listing, which is more it
line with Baybakov's: "electric power, gas, chemical,
petrochemical, and machine building."
These divergences are particularly noteworthy because both
editorials draw heavily from the verbatim text of Baybakov's
report. Moreover, the authoritative nature of the report
is beyond question; before delivery to the Supreme Soviet,
it was cleared by the USSR Council of Ministers (early
November), a joint meeting of the permanent commissions of
the Supreme Soviet (12 November), the Pres:Wium of the trade
union hierarchy (13 November), and the CPSU Central Committee
plenum (7 December).
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16 DECEMBER 1970
As if to paper-aver these divergences, IZVESTIYA on 13 December
reprinted PRAVDA's editorial of the 12th in its entirety, as
did all other central papers of the 13th. This belated and
unprecedented exercise in "monolithic unity" merely served,
however, to underscore the disarray already exposed.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
HUNAN FIRST TO ESTABLISH PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE
China's first reconstructed party committee at the provincial
level was announced for Hunan, Mao's home province, on
lk December. The NCNA account, widely publicized by Radio
Peking and in the press, reported that the committee was elected
at a provincial party congress convened from 24 November to
It December and attended by 920 delegates.
Following a mass visit to Shaoshan, Mao's birthplace, the
delegates "discussed and approved" the report of the provincial
party core group and then proceeded to elect the new party
committee of 75 full members and 15 alternates. The new
committee immediately held a plenary session to select its
three top leaders. With the approval of the CCP Central
Committee, Hua Kuo-feng was named first secretary, Pu
Chen-ya secretary, and Yang Ta-yi deputy secretary of the
new committee. Prior to the cultural revolution, Hunan's
party committee was headed by a 13-man hierarchy of first
and second secretaries followed by several secretaries and
alternate secretaries as well as ordinary members.
Hua, a veteran party secretary of the old provincial
committee, has been acting chairman of the Hunan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee. NCNA now also identifies him for
the first time as acting head of the provincial party core
group. Although Hua is a civilian, the PLA is strongly
represented within the leadership of the new committee.
Both Yang and Pu hold key positions within the Hunan
Military District as well as vice chairmanships on the
Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee. The NCNA
account praises the new party committee for its faith
and reliance on "the PLA and the great majority of the
cadres."
Pu Chan-ya spoke at the congress on behalf of the provincial
party committee and cautioned the party representatives of
local workers, peasants, leading cadres, and PLA units in
attendance as well as the newly elected committee members
to "guard against arrogance and keep in close contact with
the masses" in order to advance their ideological revolu-
tionization.
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Hunan, which reported the first rebuilt county-level committee
in the nation a year ago, has led other provinces in rebuilding
the party at and below the county level. A Changsha broadcast
of 4 December, which for the first time indicated that a "great
majority" of basic-level party branches and a "majority" of
counties in Hunan have set up new party committees, was echoed
in the NCNA report on the new provincial committee.
MUNICIPAL The first rebuilt city committee for a provincial
COMMITTEES capital was indicated by the Chekiang provincial
radio on 8 December. The broadcast referred to
the Hangchow municipal party committee in a report on the need
for Hangchow's leading cadres to continue their study of Mao's
works.
On 9 December Nanking radio reported the re-establishment of a
city municipal party committee for Wuhsi, a major Kiangsu city.
The committee was formed after a party congress met in the city
from 21 to 27 November. The report identified Hsu Shih-yu,
chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee and
commander of the Nanking Military Region, as head of the
provincial party core group for the first time. Yang Kuang-li
was also identified as a member of the party core group. Yang
holds concurrent positions as vice chairman of the, provincial
revolutionary committee and deputy director of the political
department of the Nanking Military Region.
Finally, Hofei radio on 13 December referred in passing to a
municipal party committee for Wuhu, a city in Anhwei Province.
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NEW PARTY COMMITTEES AT COUNTY OR HIGHER LEVEL
Provincial- Faxty Committees:
level Unit County City Diacrict Province
Anhwei 6 2
Chekiang 18 1
Fukien 4
Kiangsi 7
Kiangsu 10 1
Shanghai 3
Shantung
Honan 14
Hunan 21
Hupeh 5
Kiangsi 1
Kwangtung 15
Hopeh
Inner Mongolia
Peking
Shansi
Tientsin
Heilungkiang 15 1
Kirin 5
Liaoning 2
Kansu 7
Ningsia 3
Shensi 1
Sinkiang k
Tibet
Kweichow
Szechwan
Tibet
Yunnan
Note: Information is as derived primarily from provincial radio broad-
casts; some new committees are reported also in the central media. No
provincial broadcasts are carried by the radios of Inner Mongolia,
Kweichow, and Szechwan.
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SUPPLENEiJTARY A R T I CLE
MOSCOW KEEPS ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSAL ALIVE
Soviet spokesmen have kept alive, with little elaboration,
Moscow's concept of an eventual Asian collective security
arrangement as first proposed by Brezhnev in a 7 June 1969
speech at the international party conference in Moscow.
Professing a desire to see such a system embrace "all"
Asian countries and assuring the Chinese that the proposed
system is not directed against the PRC, the Soviets have
enunciated some preconditions for the establishment of
the system which place it implicitly in a post-Vietnam
context.
The need for an Asian collective security system continues
to be reaffirmed periodically in general terms in Soviet
leaders' speeches and in routine propaganda. A typical
recent reference appeared in a 19 November IZVESTIYA
article by the paper's authoritative commentator Matveyev,
broadcast only is Vietnamese by Radio Moscow. In the
course of a general discussion of Southeast Asia, Matveyev
claimed that the Soviet proposal "is gaining increasingly
broad support in Asia" but cautioned that "of course, its
practical implementation requires much effort." Low-key,
passing references to the Asian security theme have recurred
sporadically in Moscow broadcasts, particularly in Mandarin
to Southeast Asia and in Japanese.
In discussing the "longer-term task" of creating "a system
of collective security in areas of the globe where the
danger of another world war, of armed conflicts, is
concentrated," Brezhnev had said in his 7 June 1969
speech that "the course of events is also putting on the
agenda the task of creating a system of collective
security in Asia." Foreign Minister Grom~yko,who has
been the principal spokesman for the proposal, followed
up in his 10 July 1969 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet,
stating that the proposal required serious sturdy as well
as discussion and consultation among the interested
states. Speaking before the UN General Assembly on
19 September 1969, Gromyko again raised the issue of
creating "an effective system of collective security
in Asia" and urged that "all the states in the region"
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give thought to and work for its creation. In his 21 October
1970 speech at the current UNGA session Gromyko made a passing
reference to the proposal, noting that "general support is
being given to the principled approach on which our proposal is
based" and that the plan provides for "participation in Asian
regional cooperation by all the Asian states."
PRECONDITIONS SUGGEST POST-VIETNAM TIME FRAME
Matveyev, anticipating Brezhnev's proposal, had suggested in
IZVESTIYA as early as 29 May 1969 that "the liquidation of
foreign military bases" in Southeast Asia would furnish "the
prerequisites for creating bases of collective security."
And references to the proposal in the past half-year have
reinforced the impression of a long-term project envisaged
for the post-Vietnam period.
The first specification of preconditions for establishment of
the system proposed by Brezhnev appeared in the 19 July 1970
communique signed by the CPSU and Japanese Socialist Party
(JSP) following the visit of a JSP delegation to Moscow. In
the communique the CPSU unilaterally reaffirmed "its readiness
to strive to create a system of collective security in Asia"
and stated that "the first step on this path must be the
cessation of imperialist aggression in Asia and the withdrawal
of American troops from this region." A Tokyo press report
of the talks cited Suslov for the further prerequisite of
"cancellation of the collective and bilateral security pacts
against the socialist forces in Asia and the Pacific region,"
but this was not reported in Soviet media.
In a 14 August speech in Pyongyang, Mazurov said that the
i
11 mplementation of an Asian collective security system
presupposes" an end to "imperialist" aggression in Asia
and the withdrawal of U.S. forces "and the forces of the
U.S. accomplices" from the territory of the Asian countries.
This demand for withdrawal of the forces of U.S. allies was
repeated in the same context in Soviet broadcasts to Japan
in September.
REFERENCES TO MEMBERSHIP IN SYSTEM
Moscow has on occasion denied that the proposed system is
directed against the PRC and in at least one instance has
suggested that the United States could be a party to it.
In his 10 July 1969 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet,
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Gromyko branded as "absolutely groundless inventions" the
"insinuation" of "certain circles" that the proposal was
"directed against some single country or group of countries."
He said the Soviet concept assumed the collective efforts "of
all Asian states."
Similarly, IZVESTIYA's Matveyev in an article on 3 August 1969
denied that the Soviet proposal was a question of the
"encirclement of China" and chided the Chinese leaders by
recalling that in the past they had "repeatedly expressed
themselves in favor of the creation of a collective security
system in the Pacific Basin and in the Far East."* In an
interview published in Tokyo's YOMIURI on 6 April 1970,
Podgorrjy stated that the proposed system "cannot be directed
against any country or group of countries."
Although Malik in a 28 October 1969 speech to the UNGA's First
Committee said "it is self-evident that only sti'.tes that
belong to a given geographical region can take final decisions
concerning the possibility and expediency of building up
regional security systems," thus seemingly excluding the United
States, the idea of U.S. participation seemed to be entertained
in an 18 November 1969 speech in Tokyo by Professor Georgiy
P. Zadorozhnyy of the USSR International Affairs Research
Institute. As reported on 19 November by the Tokyo YOMIURI,
which characterized the speech as "a trial balloon" launched
by Soviet authorities, Zadorozhnyy stated that although the
Soviet-proposed Asian collective security organ would be "a
pan-Asian organ embracing all Asian. nations" and "the United
States is not an Asian nation," the United States nevertheless
"has interests in Asia" and therefore "should participate in
the organ." Soviet media did not report the speech.
There has been no complete enumeration of other potential
participants in the proposed system, but Soviet spokesmen
have suggested that its membership would consist of nations
stretching from Japan through Southeast Asia to Turkey. As
quoted it, YOMIURI, Zadorozhnyy stated that Australia, New
Zealand, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey "would be allowed to join
* In his 20th CPSU Congress speech in February 1956,
Khrushchev had welcomed Chou En-lai's August proposal
for a collective peace pact in Asia.. In his October 1960
speech before the UN General Assembly, Khrushchev endorsed
Chou En-lai's August 1960 proposal for a "peaceful nonaggres-
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the organ." Commenting that "the Middle East is also Asia if
one discounts, of course, North Africa," a participant in a
17 August 1969 Radio Moscow commentators' roundtable mentioned
Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, L.nd Iran.
SYSTEM NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY AFFAIRS
While Soviet media have carried no suggestion as to either the
organizational structure or the substance of the proposed Asian
collective security system, indications of possible Soviet
thinking have appeared in the Japanese press. Tokyo's JIJI
on 5 September 1969 reported that Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov told visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi that the
plan "was not military in character" but "also included economic
cooperation." In his April 1970 interview with YOMIURI, Podgornyy
similarly played down the military aspect of the proposed system
in asserting that it could provide for a wide, mutually advantageous
"political, economic, and cultural cooperation" among the participants.
Zadorozhnyy made the only intimations as to the organizational
structure of the system in his 18 November speech in Tokyo when
he reportedly said that "it would be necessary" to establish a
general assembly, security council, and expert committees; that
each member nation would have one vote in the assembly, which
would elect the council members; and that "an international
conference" would determine which "big nations" would become
"standing directors" of the council and how many "non-standing
directors" would be appointed.
MOSCOW CLAIMS FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL
Apart from general claims that the proposal has met with "great
support and understanding" from the peoples of Southeast Asia,
Soviet media have occasionally cited instances of support from
specific countries. For instance, a panelist in the 17 August
1969 Radio Moscow roundtable program noted that "many utterances
by distinguished figured' supporting the Brezhnev proposal included
statements by leaders of India and Malaysia. NEW TIMES (No. 40,
Russian edition, 2 October 1970), citing a TASS interview with
Singapore's Prime Minister Le Kuan Yew, recorded him as."viewing
with interest the possibility of ensuring collective security in
Asia."
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PRC DENOUNCES SCHEME AS ANTI-CHINA PLOT
Chinese comment on the Brezhnev proposal has depicted it as a
Soviet effort to intrude into Asian affairs and to form an
anti-China coalition of Asian nations. Chou En-lai promptly
attacked the proposal on 13 June 1969 as a new step in Moscow's
efforts to create "a new anti-China military alliance" and
warned Asian countries not to abandon their independence by
participating in Soviet schemes for regional economic cooperation.
NCNA on 25 July 1969 branded the proposal "an anti-China, anti-
people, counterrevolutionary burlesque staged by the Soviet
revisionist renegade clique by conjuring up the ghost of John
Foster Dulles" and his SEATO system.
Although Chinese media heavily attacked the proposal in this
vein throughout the summer of 1969, there has been only
occasional mention of it in recent months in line with Peking's
general polemical restraint toward the Soviets. Thus a
3 September 1970 joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY and the
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, attacking Soviet flirtations with the
Japanese, accused "the social imperialists" of wooing "Japanese
militarism" to "rig up a so-called 'Asian collective security
system' against China, against communism, against the people
and against the revolution." Describing the proposal as a
Soviet scheme "to undermine the friendly relations between
China and Pakistan," an NCNA correspondent's dispatch from
Rawalpindi on 24 September recalled that this "vain attempt
to carry out anti-China criminal activities" under the
signboard of regional economic cooperation "was firmly
boycotted by the Pakistan people."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030055-2