TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030047-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: October 28, 1970
• Content Type: TRANS

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~Illlllllumumiulllllll~~
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
28 OCTOBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 43)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on mat; e1al carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affectir'
the national ciefense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from ourornc`It
dorng,adinr and
detlor,lt alien
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
Comment on U.S. Plan Stresses Withdrawal, Self-Determination . . . 1
Cambodia: "Partition" Concept, Idea of DRV-Lon Nol Talks Scored . 3
Hanoi Signs Aid Agreements with Soviet Union, Albania . . . . . . . 4
Stockholm Conference on "War Crimes" Publicized by DRV, USSR . . . 6
DRV Protests Alleged B-52 Strikes in Demilitarized Zone . . . . . . 7
DRV Enacts Penalties for Crimes Against State, Private Property . . 7
Pathet Lao Scores Souvanna's Appointment of Plenipotentiary . . . . 8
Soviet Middle East Policy Reiterated in UNGA Session . . . . . . . 9
Moscow Gives Limited Attention to UNGA Middle East Debate . . . . . 12
UNITED NATIONS
Gromyko Presents Annual Foreign Policy Review at UNGA . . . . . . . 13
Gromyko Touches on U.S.-Soviet Ties; TASS Cites Nixon Remarks . . . 16
U.S. AIR INTRUSION
USSR Registers Protest in Statements to United States, Turkey . . . 18
SOVIET PLANE HIJACKING
Moscow Continues to Press Turkish Government for Extradition . . . 21
CEAUSESCU IN U.S.
Bucharest Features, Moscow Virtually Ignores Washington Visit . . . 23
SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS
CPV Anniversary Marked with Fanfare in DPRK, PRC . . . . . . . . . 25
Chinese Korean Comments Reflect Divergent Approaches . . . . . . . 25
Chinese Snipe at Soviets; Mos..,)w Re(ulls Soviet Aid . . . . . . . . 28
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
New "Radio Peace and Progress" Service for Overseas Chinese
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shortcomings of Leading Groups Continue to be Highlighted . . . . .33
Rebuilt County Party Committees by Province . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Appeal for Market Economy Published in NOVY MIR . . .
BOLIVIA
? . 36
Cuban Media Increasingly Hostile to Torres Regime . . . . . . 39
Moscow Largely Noncommittal in Comment on Torres . . . . . 42
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER lc;
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 OCTOBER 1970
Moscow (3825 items)
Peking (3349 items)
October Revolution
(1%)
7%
Korean Issues
(9%)
26%
Anniversary Slogans
[20th CPV Anniversary
(-
,9%]
Middle East
(7%)
6%
[DPRK Government Delega-
(5%)
7%]
[New UAR Government
(4%)
3%]
tion in PRC
Gromyko UN Speech
(--)
5%
Domestic Issues
(16%)
22%
Indochina
(9%)
5%
Indochina
(43%)
14%
China
(3%)
4%
[Nixon Speech
(17%)
7%~
Allende Elected
President of Chile
(0.1%)
4%
(Sihanouk Statement
on UN
(--)
3%1
USSR Plane Hijacked
to Turkey
(--)
3%
PRC-Equatorial Guinea
Diplomatic Relations
(1%)
5%
WFTU 25th Anniversary
(10%)
2%
PRC-Canada Diplomatic
(5%)
5%
Zond 8
(--)
1%
Relations
USAF Plane Downed in
Armenia
(--)
1%
Warsaw Pact, Maneuvers
(1%)
1%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1970
INDOCHINA
Continuing Hanoi and Front propaganda on President Nixon's 7 October
five-point proposal on Indochina compares it unfavorably with the
PRG's 17 September eight-point elaboration of the NFLSV's May 1969
10-point solution. Particular stress in current comment, is on the
need for the United States to.set a timetable for total withdrawal
and to cease supporting the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime. A series of
articles in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN analyzes the
U.S. Vietnamization policy, with one on 23 October saying that the
President's "so-called" peace initiative was intended to buttress
Vietnamization, "now in its most crucial phase."
Moscow's continued criticism of the President's plan includes the
pro forma charge, voiced by uromyko in his 21 October UNGA address,
that the proposal does not provide for the Vietnamese to settle
their own problems. Gromyko reiterates support for the PRG
proposals, and Moscow complains that the President said nothing
about the PRG's "constructive initiative" in his UNGA address on
the 23d.
Peking continues to publicize foreign criticism of the President's
speech. There is no new Chinese comment on the proposal,
although it was briefly mentioned in the course of an attack on
U.S. policy by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 24 October
rally marking the 20th anniversary of the entry of Chinese
"volunteers" into the Korean War.
COMMENT ON U.S. PLAN STRESSES WITHDRAWAL, SELF-DETERMINATION
Criticism and "rejection" of the President's 7 October proposal
are repeated in continuing Hanoi and Front propaganda as well as
in the Vietnamese communist delegates' statem:nts at the 89th
session of the Paris talks on 22 October. Much of the comment
obscures the nature of the President's proposals, and a NHAN
DAN Commentator article--as reviewed by VNA on the 27th--goes so
far as to ignore the substance of the five points entirely.
Commentator "rejects" the President's plan and then presses for
acceptance of the PRG eight-point "elaboration," specifying
that it calls for U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971 and
for establishment of a Saigon adminintration without Thieu, Ky,
and Khiem which in turn would participate in forming a provisional
coalition government. A 28 October NHAN DAN commentary on the
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28 OCTOBER 1970
President's UNGA address of the 23d says cryptically that the
President's talk of "cease-fire, negotiations, and insuring
the rights of prisoners" was an attempt to prove his good will.
As reported in the VNA account of the 22 October Paris session,
PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh again called for a response to
her eight-point plan, and the DRV's Xuan Thuy* declared that
the Vietnam problem can be settled "only" on the basis of that
plan, which he said offers a "correct" solution to all the
points raised by the President. Thuy stated again that the
DRV "fully rejects" the President's proposals and "all the
tortuous and fallacious justifications of the U.S. side."
Consistent with standard practice, Vietnamese communist media
have not publicized the post-session press briefing at which
DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le remarked, "Perhaps you remember
that we have used many terms to reject Mr. Nixon's so-called
initiative. If you wish, I shall recapitulate all the terms
that have been used: we reject it entirely, totally, flatly
and definitively."
VIETNAMIZATION A series of QUAN DOI NHAAI DAN articles on
22, 23, and 26 October signed Chien Binh
(Combatant )* discusses the U.S. Vietnamization policy at
length, typically pointing to setbacks and predicting its
ultimate total failure. The first article says that the progress
anticipated by the Administration is not being made. It argues
that time is not on the side of the United States and that the
President is being pressed by the time limit of his term in
office while the Vietnamese will carry on the fright to the end,
"no matter how long that may be."
* VNA reported on 25 October that Xuan Thuy had arrived in
Budapest two days earlier on a friendship visit. Budapest media
report that he is a guest of the Hungarian Government and. has
seen Foreign Minister Peter and Premier Fock.
** Articles signed with the pseudonym Chien Binh appear periodi-
cally in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. His last known article was in the
2 July issue of the army paper. President Nixon's explanation
of Vietnamization in his 3 November 1969 address was criticized
by Chien Binh in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on 30 November.
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The article on the 22d does not mention the President's peace
proposal, but the one on the 23d says it is aimed at buttress-
ing and serving the U.S. Vietnamization program. The article
echoes other cowmen in charging that the President's professed
willingness to discuss a timetable for a complete withdrawal
is a device to evade compliance with the popular demand that
the United States announce a definite timetable for withdrawal.
Chien Binh adds that the President's intention it to maintain
an important part of U.S. troop strength for a long-term
occupation of South Vietnam.
Chien Binh also observes that the President's proposals are
closely associated with the "main political objective" of the
Vietnamization plan--that is, to maintain the Saigon administra-
tion in power. He adds that "as everybody knows," President
Nixon, in discussing the political settlement issue, did not
refer to Thieu, Ky and Khiem by name but made remarks which
"clearly reveal that he is bent on keeping this clique in
power forever." Moreover, Chien Binh asserts, "it is obvious
that the U.S. aggressors' diplomatic schemes and practical
action on the battlefields are aimed at helping the puppet
Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique organize and be able to control the
political situation in South Vietnam when a political solution
occurs."
In the article on the 26th, Chien Binh cites the internal
situation in the United States among factors that will assure
the defeat of the U.S. policy. He derides the Administration's
view that a united front has been formed in support of the
President's new peace initiative. Stressing the decisive
importance of the "rear" in a war, he maintains that the prolonga-
tion of the war has caused the U.S. rear to become "the scene
of insurmountable troubles and difficulties . . . which have
created a tremendous pressure that Nixon cannot counteract."
CAMBODIA: "PARTITION" CONCEPT, IDEA OF DRV-LON NOL TALKS SCORED
FUNK-RGNU A 22 October FUNK-RGNU joint statement, summarized
STATEMENT by VNA on the 26th and carried textually by NCNA
on the 27th, denounces an alleged Washington-Phnom
Penn "scheme" to partition Cambodia. Earlier comment from the
Sihanouk regime had warned that partition would result from
acceptance of the proposal in President Nixon's 7 October speech
for an international conference on Indochina. But the President
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is not mentioned directly in the joint statement's criticism of
efforts "by any organization or individual" to plan or convene
"an international conference" to camouflage aggression,
legitimize the Lon Nol regime, and partition Cambodia. Saying
that the FUNK and RGNU will not accept any "compromi8e solution,"
the statement reiterates demands spelled out in the 11 October
RGNU statement on the President's speech: cessation of the
bombings and shellings of Cambodian territory', withdrawal of
"American advisers" and the armed forces of U.S. "henchmen,"
and a total end to "ants of war provocation and intervention."
NHAN DAN ON A NHAN DAN commentary on 24 October, as
"PEACE TALKS" summarized by VNA, saf the "Vietnamese people
sternly denounce and categorically reject"
a Phnom Penh proposal for peace talks with the DRV, reported by
AP on the 17th. "This perfidious maneuver," NHA1`I DAN says, is
an attempt to misrepresent the situation in Cambodia, where the
FUNK "liberation forces" are recording "ever greater victories"
against the Lon Nol-Matak regime. NHA11 DAN adds that by
declaring its willingness to hold peace talks with North Vietnam,
the Cambodian "flunkeys" want to slander the Vietnamese people,
"disown the just struggle of the Khmer people," and at the same
time lend support to President Nixon's proposal for an Indochina
peace conference.
HANOI SIGNS AID AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIET UNION1 ALBANIA
SOVIET-DRV Soviet and North Vietnamese media on 23 October
AGREEMENT announce that agreements on economic and
military aid* were signed in Moscow on the 22d.
The DRV delegation headed by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, a member
of the Party Secretariat, began its stay in Moscow on 7 October,
arriving there from Peking where it had signed an aid agreement
with the Chinese. The Soviet delegation in .ne talks was headed
by Vice Premier N.A. Tikhonov. Premier Kosygin was present at
the signing ceremonies and received the DRV delegation on the
22d. (Past DRV delegationi.?--led by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh
Nghi since 1965--have been received by Kosygin or Brezhnev or by
* There were similar cryptic announcements of agreements
signed in 1965, 1966, and July 1968. However, some of the types
of materials were listed in the announcements of agreements
reached in September 1967, November 1968, and October 1969.
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28 OCTOBER 1970
both, but Kosygin is known to have attended the signing of
agreements with Nghi only in September 1967. Vice Premier
V. Novikov has previously headed the Soviet delegation.)
A trade agreement between the two countries, also signed on
the 22d, is reported in a 26 October VNA item which notes
that Vietnam will deliver to the Soviet Union bananas, coffee,
tea, clothing, knitwear, handicraft articles, and other items
and that the Soviet Union's exports to the DRV will include
fertilizers, fuel and lubricants, machinery, transportation
equipment, and raw materials.
The new aid accords are welcomed editorially in the DRV party
paper NHAN DAN on the 24th with the standard comment that
they constitute "another expression of the warm and vigorous
support and great and all-si"ed assiatan-2e" of the Soviet
Union. The editorial recalls past authoritative Soviet
statements of support for Vietnam, including Brezhnev's
remarks in his 2 October Baku speech endorsing the PRG's
17 September eight-point initiative.
Moscow comments on the agreements in a 24 October broadcast
in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress. The broadcast
says the agreements provide for economic and military
assistance and "an enormous loan to the DRV." It reviews
past Soviet aid to the DRV and scores "the present Chinese
leaders" for trying to sabotage Soviet-DRV relations,
vilifying Soviet aid to Vietnam, and refusing to join with
the UC3R in a united front in support of Vietnam.
ALBANIA North Vietnam's annual aid agreement with Albania
was signed in Hanoi on 23 October, according to
a VNA report on the 24th. The agreement on "non-refund
economic aid" for 1971 was signed by DRV Minister of the
Premier's Office Tran Huu Duc and Albanian Ambassador Jorgji
Shuli. In November 1969 an Albanian aid agreement was signed
by the head of a DRV economic delegation visiting Tirana; in
1967 and 1968, aid agreements were signed by ambassadors
either in Tirana or Hanoi. An article in the 25 October
NHAN DAN welcomes the agreement and says that the party,
government, and people of Albania have "warmly supported and
assisted" Vietnam.
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STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON "WAR CRIMES" PUBLICIZED BY DRV. USSR
The Conference of the International Commission to Investigate
U.S. War Crimes, which met in Stockholm from 22 through
25 October,* has to date occasioned routine reporting from
Hanoi and Moscow media. TASS said on the 25th that the
commission is composed of "prominent lawyers, scientists,
and public figures of 15 countries" and that at its session
that day it elected its "leading bodies and 14 permanent
members" and chose Stockholm as its permanent seat. TASS
noted that L.N. Smirnov, chairman of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, was elected a permanent member
of the commission from the Soviet Union.
The TASS report on the 25th also mentioned that a document
was endorsed at the session that day which concludes that
Vietnamization and the extension of the war throughout
Indochina is a "pre-planned policy, the aim of which is to
make Vietnamese kill the Vietnamese." A Moscow broadcast
on the 22d had said the conference would be mainly devoted
to the investigation of U.S. "crimes" perpetrated since
President Nixon took office.
Vietnamese attention to the conference includes publicity
for messages from DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and PRG
President Huynh Tan Phat, both carried in Hanoi media on
the 23d. Dong's message calls President Nixon's 7 October
peace package a "typical example" of U.S. "peace maneuvers."
Hanoi radio reported on 23 October that the heads of the
DRV, PRG, Cambodian, and Pathet Lao delegations addressed
the conference's first session, "condemning U.S. crimes in
each country" and "unmasking the crafty and stubborn nature
of Nixon's so-called peace initiative and advancing the
correct solutions to the Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
problems.".
* This is the first conference held by the commission set up
last March by the Fifth International Stockholm Conference on
Vietnam, which was attended by representatives of some .50
countries. See the TRENDS of 1 April 1970, page 1.
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28 OCTOBER 1970
DRV PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 STRIKES IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE
For the second time in two weeks, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokes-
man has protested alleged B-52 strikes in the DMZ. According to
Hanoi radio on 27 October, the United States sent "many warplanes,
including B-52 bombers, to bomb and strafe Huong Lap village in
the northern part of the demilitarized zone" on the 25th. The
protest routinely "condemned these criminal acts" and demanded
an end to all U.S. acts violating the DRV's sovereignty and
security.
On the 28th, Hanoi radio alleged that an unmanned U.S.
reconnaissance plane had been downed over Ha Tay Province
that day. Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes now stands at
3,363.
DRV ENACTS PENALTIES FOR CRIMES AGAINST STATE. PRIVATE PROPERTY
Current Hanoi propaganda publicizes two decrees on the punishment
of crimes against socialist and private property, passed by the
DRV National Assembly Standing Committee on 21 October. The
decrees list various crimes along with various possible perpetra-
tors and outline punishments--to be meted out according to the
nature of the criminal as well as the crime.
According to a communique broadcast on the 22d, the committee,
presided over by Truong Chinh, "discussed and approved" the
two decrees. On the 23d President Ton Duc Thang signed the
orders for their promulgation.
Hanoi radio on the 23d broadcast the text of the decree on
punishment for crimes against state property and the text of
Presidential Order No. 1)+9/LCT for its promulgation. A
NHAN DAN editorial the next day hailed the issuance of the
decree. On the 25th, Hanoi radio broadcast the texts of the
decree on punishing crimes against citizens' private property
and the DRV President's Order No. 150/LCT promulgating it. A
NHAN DAN editorial of the 25th greeted its passage.
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PATHET LAO SCORES SOWANNAIS APPOINTMENT OF PLENIPOTENTIARY
The first NLHS acknowledgment of Souvanna Phouma's 27 September
message to Souphanouvong, announcing the appointment of his
plenipotentiary for talks with Souphanouvong's representative
on a Lao settlement, comes in an interview with NLHS pleni-
potentiary Phoune Sipraseuth, carried by the Pathet Lao news
agency on 27 October.
In messages of 30 August and 20 September, Souphanouvong had
complained about Souvanna Phouma's failure to name a pleni-
potentiary. Phoune Sipraseuth now says that Souvanna appointed
the plenipotentiary and also a "government delegation" in his
capacity as Premier of the National Union Government; he
repeats the NLHS charge that Souvanna's administration is
illegal and a U.S. instrument and has no competence to
negotiate. Souvanna, he says, is merely a representative
of the "Vientiane party, one of the Lao parties concerned";
and as long as Souvanna does not "overcome the pressure of
the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen," there can be no
meeting be'Uween plenipotentiaries "of the two princes."
On 28 October the,Pathet Lao radio reported that Phoune
Sipraseuth sent a message to Pheng Phongsavan, Souvanna
Phouma's plenipotentiary, advising him that Tir,,o Souk Vongsak
would return to Vientiane "soon" and asking for cooperation
in the latter's efforts to prepare for a meeting of the
plenipotentiaries. Souk, Souphanouvong's "special envoy" in
preparations for a plenipotentiaries' meeting, had returned
to Sam Neua on 28 September after having been in Vientiane
for some two months conducting contacts with Souvanna Phouma.
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MIDDLE EAST
Gromyko in his remarks on the M-.ddle East in his 21 October UNGA
address hews to standard Soviet positions on long-standing issues
in the Arab-Israeli dispute. He does not touch directly on the
matter of a cease-fire extension, but implicitly acknowledges the
problem of rectification of cease-fire standstill violations in
advocating prompt resumption of the Jarring mission unhindered by
"artificial" demands. He shows concern to set the record straight
with regard to accusations of bad faith in international relations
in rejecting charges of Soviet violation of the cease-fire agree-
ment. But consistent with his general tone of moderation, he does
not indulge in countercharges regarding U.S. actions.
Gromyko and other propagandists again note UAR denials of
violations of the cease-fire agreement and commentators cite Cairo's
explanation:., that only redeployment of missiles has occurre,41.
Limited comment on the UNGA Middle East debate, along with other
propaganda, points to Egypt's readiness to extend the cease-fire
"on condition" that the Security Council resolution is implemented
and Jarring's mission resumed. Moscow contrasts this with Israel's
refusal to return to the talks until the "breaches" of the cease-
fire agreement by the UAR are "corrected."
Kosygin's widely publicized message of congratulations to UAR
Premier Fawzi again underlines the themes of continuity of
political course in the UAR, Arab anti-imperialist unity in a
search for a Middle East political settlement, a.n.3 strengthening
of UAR-Soviet friendship and,coop~.ration. TASS notes that the
new UAR cabinet is unchanged with the exception of Haykal's
resignation as guidance minister. TASS also reports new Soviet
Ambassador Vinogradov's presentation of credentials to President
as-Sadat on the 22d; MENA says that Vinogradov on the 25th met
with Fawzi for an hour and also presented Brezhnev's congratula-
tions to the new Arab Socialist Union secretary general, and was
received by as-Sadat on the 27th.
SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY REITERATED IN UNGA SESSION
GROMYKO Gromyko responds at some length, in the section of
ADDRESS his speech on the Middle East, to charges of Soviet
bad faith in international relations. He rejects
"fabrications" that the Soviet Union violated the terms of the
cease-fire agreen:--~nt and observes, for the first time, that
there was "never any attempt" on the part of the United States
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28 OCTOBER 1970
"to discuss anything like cease-fire terms with the Soviet
Union." He explains these "trumped-up allegations being
disseminated in the United States" as an effort to cover up
U.S. and Israeli actions which he says are "complicating"
the search for a political settlement. Here he interjects a
reference to "fabrications" about "some kind of invented
Soviet arrangements in Cuba allegedly jeopardizing" U.S.
security. If there really is a desire to build relations
with the Soviet Union on the basis of confidence, he says,
then there "must be no room for any falsity in foreign
policy."
Prefacing these comments, Gromyko insists on Soviet orientation
toward achieving peace in the Middle East in remarks that may
have been an implicit response to Western speculation on Soviet
complicity in, or support for, Syria's military intrusion into
Jordan during the recent fighting. Thus he declares that no
one should ascribe to the Soviet Union any intention of
"prompting somebody in the Middle East in any direction other
than that of peace." He stresses that "if we are doing any
prompting, we are prompting the entire course of events.
toward peace and peace alone for all states."
Grom},rko reiterates the standard Soviet positions on basic
elements in the dispute, offering the usual support for the
"legitimate rights" of the Arab peoples, "including the Arab
people of Palestine," and again calling for Israeli troop
withdrawal from all occupied territory. He repeats the
Soviet formulation on the right of Israel to exist, calling
for the establishment of peace within the context of
recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
political independence of all states of the region. At
another point, noting that Israel says it is seeking a
secure existence, Gromyko says that this is provided for in
the November 1967 Security Council resolution and that the
Arab states "directly interested" in eliminat..ng the "after-
math of the Israeli aggression" are willing to do what is
required by the resolution if Israel withdraws its troops.
Urging prompt resumption of the Jarring talks, Gromyko says
that agreement on the related issues must be formalized in an
"appropriate document," and that to promote such an agreement
the Jarring mission should be reactivated forthwith, "without
emburdening it with all kinds of artificial combinations
and demands." While he does not call for Big Four recommenda-
tions to Jarring--such an idea has been advanced by Cairo, and
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28 OCTOBER 1970
appeared in the Soviet-French declaration on Pompidou's recent
visit to the USSR--he does juxtapose the remark that the four
powers, as well as "other states" represented at the General
Assembly, must contribute to the establishment of peace.
Qromyko routinely blames Israel for blocking the Jarring
contacts because of its desire to retain the occupied
territories. fie mentions only in passing the matter of
deliveries of "offensive weapons" to Israel by unspecified
"patrons," although routine propaganda assails the United States
for its arms aid.
NIXON TASS on the 23d, reporting President Nixon's speech
ADDRESS at the United Nations, acknowledges his remark that
it is essential that the United States and the
Soviet Union join in efforts toward avoiding war in the Middle
East and toward developing a climate in which the nations of the
region can live in peace. TASS on the 24th and a Soltan foreign-
language commentary on the 27th complain that the President said
nothing about the need for Israel to implement Security Council
Resolution 242 or about the resumption of contacts under Jarring.
An Arabic-language commentary on the 24th asks the value of the
President's call on the two powers to help consolidate the
forces of peace when the United States has increased military
and financial assistance to Israel.
MEETINGS OF BIG FOUR, Moscow's domestic service on the 24th
SECURITY COUNCIL briefly reports the statement issued
after the Big Four foreign ministers'
meeting with U Thant. It cites the statement as saying the
ministers had a "useful exchange of opinions" with U Thant
and Ambassador Jarring, and that the four powers will strive
for a peaceful settlement on the basis of Resolution 242 and the
creation of conditions for the earlie,3t renewal of frab-
Israeli contacts and an extension of the cease-fire. The
broadcast also notes that the statement points out that the
four powers will continue their consultations on the Middle East,
holding another meeting on 28 October. (While TASS has almost
invariably carried a standardized brief announcement of past
four-power ambassadorial meetings at the United Nations, it
curiously failed to report the 13 October meeting.)
TASS on the 22d reported the communique issued after the
21 October Security Council meeting in which foreign ministers
of the Coundil member countries participated for the first time.
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20 OCTOBER 1970
In the communique, TAUS said, the Council members reaffirmed
their, conviction that Resolution 242 must be supported and
implemented in all its provinionn, and that with thin aim
In view all parties concerned must cooperate to promote the
establishment of a just and lasting pence. A Kurdyumov
international review In PRAVDA on the 25th, citing the
Council communique, called for the "speediest possible" renewal
of the Jarring mission to achieve a peaceful political settle-
ment.
MOSCOW GIVES LIMITED ATTENTION TO UNGA MIDDLE EAST DEBATE
Moscow gave the UNGA debate on the Middle East, which opened
on the 26th, little advance publicity, with only a few passing
references and TASS' brief report on the 25th that Gromyko,
meeting with UAR Foreign Minister Riyad the previous day,
discussed questions regarding the debate. Noting the opening
of the discussion, a broadcast in Arabic on the 26th says
some "imperialist press organs" stress that the discussion
in apt to bring about a deterioration of the situation, and
claims that Israel and its "patrons" fear "new scandals"
concerning their "criminal and dangerous policy." TABS the
same day reports Riyad's speech at the opening of the debate,
noting that the question was included on the agenda at the
UAR's demand.
The Soltan commentary on the 27th asserts that the initiative in
raising the question in the General Assembly again shows the
intention of UAR and other Arab leaders to obtain a peaceful
settlement. Soltan makes one of the two available references
to a possible UNGA resolution, remarking that Israeli leaders
declared in advance that no matter what decision Is taken by
the General Assembly, Israel will not consider it compulsory.
He charges the United States with trying to "torpedo" any
Middle East discussion in UNGA in order to prevent the United
Nations from undertaking any efforts toward the reestablishment
of peace; when this proved impossible, he adds, Washington
openly prompted Tel Aviv to take an intransigent position and
announced the supply of more tanks and Phantoms to Israel.
Earlier, a broadcast of the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace
and Progress, in English to Africa on the 25th, had pointed
out that discussions in the UNGA First Committee showed that
the "vast majority" of UN members favor withdrawal of foreign
troops from all occupied lands. "If such sentiments were
embodied in concrete decisions" by the General Assembly, the
broadcast said, this would help move the Middle East conflict
out of the deadlock.
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CON1'IUIINT'IAL FDIC THENDO
28 OCTOBER 1970
UNITED NATIONS
GROPIYKO PRESENTS ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW AT UNGA
Joviet Foreign Minister Gromyko'n 21 October address to the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) pays the customary obeisance to
the principles or peaceful coexistence--observing that the UN
Charter contains those principles, advanced by Lenin--and
stresses the importance of proposals of the socialist countries
on disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the
strengthening of international security.* Regarding the last
point, Gromyko recalls the Soviet Initiative last year urging
the United Nations to examine the problem of guaranteeing inter-
national security, and he halls the socialist countries' draft
declaration on this problem now under consideration in the Fir,it
Committee. In assessing the activities of the United Nations
over the past 25 years, he says they are positive "on the whole,"
and he praises the part played by Secretary General U Thant.
DISARMAMENT Gromyko rejects "a pessimistic approach" to
aisarmament and declares that the USSR, for
Ito part, is prepared to "go all the way, up to general and
cumplete disarmament" despite the obstacles to achievement of
this goal. Presumably with the French as well as the Chinese
in mind, he says that as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned,
'twe have emphasized more than once that participation in it of all
nuclear powers is an indispensable condition." In his speech
last year, Gromyko had similarly noted the importan^e of the
participation in an agreement "by all the nuclear powers," then
as now failing to name the PRC.**
* The speech gets the customary wide publicity, with TASS and
Moscow radio carrying excerpts and summaries and the text appearing
in the press. The fullest version has appeared in the press
consistently for the past seven years.
** The notion of disarmament talks among the nuclear powers is
repeat..d in the 13 October Soviet-French declaration issued
following Pompidou's visit to the USSR. The suggestion for such
talks had been advanced by the French in November 1965, during
Couve de Murville's visit to Moscow, and the notion was endorsed
in subsequent Soviet-Frenn.n declarations including those following
de Gaulle and Kosygin visits in 1966.
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An in last year's speech, Gromyko lists disarmament agreements
reached--the partial tent-ban treaty, the ban on the military
use of outer space, and the nonproliferation treaty--and
suggests that one of the current UNGA session's main tanks
should be to insure that all the states of the world accede
to the nonproliferation treaty.
In his review of other partial disarmament measures, Gromyko
includes one--the liquidation of foreign military bases--
which he did not mention last year. The revival of thin
long-standing proposal now may be part of an effort to draw
attention to U.S. overseas bases in the wake of Washington's
recent charges of S^viet construction of a submarine base in
Cuba. Notably, the 26 October USSR Government statement to
the United States on the violation of Soviet airspace near the
Turkish border calls the maintenance of U.S. bases around the
Soviet Union "a moot serious source of danger" which does not
square with statements by U.S. leaders favoring an improvement
in Washington-Moscow relations.
As he did last year, Gromyko asks for approval of a treaty
banning the deployment of mass-de.truction weapons on the
seabeds and for an agreement banning chemical and bacteriological
weapons, drafts of which are before the Assembly. He also calls
for the creation of nuclear-free zoneR "in different parts of
the world" and for the cessation of underground nuclear tests.
The one proposal he mentioned last year that he does not bring
up this time is the call for a halt in the production of
nuclear weapons and liquidation of stockpiles.
Gromyko takes brief note of the upcoming SALT round, observing
that the USSR "would like to voice the hope that the talks
will finally bring about positive results."
COLLECTIVE Treating European problems, Gromyko hails the
SECURITY 12 August FRG-Soviet treaty along standard lines,
observing that both sides benefit from the
accord and citing its importance for the strengthening of peace
in Europe. He hails the FRG Government for showing "a more
realistic approach" to outstanding problems but warns that
there are forces active in Europe which "dislike detente" on
the continent and "still cling to their rash plans of
recarving the map of Europe."
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The Soviet Foreign Minister restates Moscow's long-standing call
for an all-European conference, which he says would constitute
an Important stop toward the strengthening of European security.
Ile also reasserts bloc readiness to accept U.S. and Canadian
participation--a position formalized in the memorandum issued
following the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers in Budapest.
Gromyko mentions the continuing Big Four negotiations on the
Berlin problem, observing that the USSR Is earnest in its
approach to them and declaring that an agreement "on the
questions that arise there is possible." Consistent with
Moscow's sparse propaganda on the talks, the last session of
which was held on 9 October, he says that positive results
depend on the good will of all the participants.
The idea of an Asian collective security system, advanced by
Brezhnev in his 7 June 1969 speech at the Moscow conference,
is touched on more briefly than in Gron'ko'a speech mast year.
He alleges that there is "general support" for the idea of
creating a collective security system "providing for participation
in Asian regional cooperation by all the Asian states."
MEMBERSHIP ISSUE Having omitted from his 1969 speech the
customary call for admission of the FRG
and the CDR to UN membership and restoration of the PRC's
"legal rights" in the United Nations, Gromyko this year
reveits to his earlier pre.ctice of urging admission for all
three. He cites the United Nations' fundamental principle
of universality and finds "no justification for the fact that,
to this day the PRC has been deprived of its legitimate place
in the United Nations." The USSR, he says, is for "the full
restoration of rights in the United Nations to the PRC."
While not restating the specific demand of previous years
for the expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese, Gromyko
characterizes the PRC as "a power which alone cw; L-