TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030045-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 21, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
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TRENDS
in Communift Propaganda
Confidential
Confidential
21 OCTOBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 42)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by PHIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
tecluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 OCTOBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
DRV and PRG Continue Criticism of Presidentls.Peace Proposal .
.
1
Sihanouk "Communique" Again Assails Nixon Initiative
5
Moscow Press Compares Nixon, PRG Peace' Proposals
6
Communists Continue to Denounce Cambodian Republic
9
DRV Protests Alleged B-52 Strikes in DMZ
10
Allies Accused of "War Crimes" in Cambodia, South Vietnam . .
. .
10
Front Comment Reflects Allied Pacification Gains in Vietnam .
. .
11
MIDDLE EAST
Primakov in PRAVDA. Reviews Soviet Proposals for Settlement . .
.
12
Moscow Welcomes Jordanian-PLO Accord, Downplays Clashes
15
HIJACK INCIDENT
Soviets Acknowledge First Hijacking, Demand Extradition
17
CUBA SUBMARINE BASE
Moscow Sees U.S. Charges as Sign of Return to Cold War
21
Cuban Commentator Notes Soviet Reminder of Missile-Crisis Pact
.
23
PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS
Relations With Canada Add to Peking's Diplomatic Momentum . .
? .
24
PRC NUCLEAR TEST
Peking Media Silent on Reported Atmosphere Nuclear Test
28
ROMANIA
Media Play Up Ceausescu Tour, Defend Ties With West
29
Moscow Lectures Those Who Put National Interests First
30
YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR
Moscow Publicizes Gus Hall Attack on Tito, Nonalinement
32
Soviet Weekly Reprints Yugoslav Comment Welcoming Nixon Visit
. .
34
Belgrade Media Assail Soviet Publication of Hall Attack
35
CONFIDENTIAL
(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS'
23 OCTOBER 1970
C ONYENTS (Continued)
WARSAW PACT
Yakubovskiy, Ulbricht Speeches Climax Maneuvers in GDR 37
SOVIET SLOGANS
Few Changes in October Slogans Register Recent Developments 40
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Dnepropetrovsk Gains as New Ukraine Cadre Chief Appointed . . .
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Senior Cadres Enjoined to Study Mao More Carefully 44
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
21 OCTOBER 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 OCTOBER 1970
Moscow (3958 items)
Peking (3206 items)
WFTU 25th Anniversary
(0.1%)
10%
Indochina
[Brezhnev Greetings
(--)
4%]
[Nixon Speech
Indochina
(7%)
9%
[Lao "Independence
Middle East
(8%)
7%
Anniversary"
[UAR Presidential
(--)
4%]
[Cambodian Republic
Referendum
Domestic Topics
Pompidou in USSR
(7%)
6%
DPRK Workers Party
UNGA Session
(0.1%)
4%
Delegation in PRC
[Gromyko Arrival
(--)
2%]
PRC-Canadian Diplomatic
Statement
Relations
China
(2%)
3%
DPRK Workers Party
TABS Denial of Cuba Bari:a
(--)
2%
25th Anniversary
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures Ln parentheses indicate volume of cum:milt during the preceding week:
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(11%)
43%
(2%)
17%
(--)
13%
(3%)
10%
(44%)
16%
(--)
5%
(--)
5%
(3%)
3%
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INDOCHINA
"Rejections" of President Nixon's five-point proposal on Indochina,
voiced on 14 October in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement and by
PRO President Huynh Tan Phat, have been repeated by the communist
delegates at the Paris session on the 15th and by propagandists.
Both Hanoi and the Front ridicule White House "allegations" that
the "rejection" is only the communists' bargaining trick and that
the United States still hopes Hanoi will continue to consider
this proposal.
Other followup Hanoi propaganda includes an article in the DRV
party organ NHAN DAN on the 18th, an article most notable for
its length--almost a full page in the newspaper--and for its
authorship by "Observer" (Nguoi.quan sat) rather than by the
commonly used "Commentator" (Nguoi binh luan). Observer does
not specifically reiterate Hanoi's rejection of the five
points but sets out to demonstrate that the communist stand
is correct and reasonable and that President Nixon's proposal
1.,3 motivated by domestic political considerations and reflects
no real desire for a political settlement.
Moscow radio and press comment continues to deprecate President
Nixon's 7 October peace plan as an effort to placate public
opinion in view of the forthcoming elections, and a 15 October
IZVESTIYA article ridicules the President's statement that the
proposal could lead to "a generation of peace." The IZVESTIYA
article and a PRAVDA article the next day make a detailed
comparison of the PRG's 17 September initiative with the five-
point proposal and dismiss the President's plan as aimed not
at peace but at continued aggression.
Peking originates no further.authoritative comment on the
President's proposal following the 13 October PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article, but PRC media promptly publicize the
"rejections" of the proposal in the 14 October DRV Foreign
Ministry statement and in the LPA interview with PRG President
Phat. In summarizing Vietnamese commmist comment, NCNA excises
references to the Paris talks; however, it includes references
to the PRG's eight points,.and for the first time it acknowledges
some of their substance in the course of reporting Phat's remarks
on the proposal for a three-party provisional coalition govern-
ment.
DRV AND PRG CONTINUE CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT'S PEACE PROPOSAL
The statements by the communist delegates at the 88th session of
the Paris talks on 15 October and other propaganda say again
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that President Nixon's 7 October five-point proposal is not a
"serious response" to the PRG's "correct" position as outlined
in Mme. Binh's 17 September eight-point "elaboration" of the
10-point position. The VNA account of the session notes that
both the PRG and DRV delegates "sternly criticized and rejected"
the President's proposal, quoting respectively from the LPA
interview with PRG President Phat and from the DRV Foreign
Ministry statement.
Propagandists insist that the President was forced into
making his "so-called initiative" by the wide, favorable
response in the United States as well as the rest of the world
to the PRG's eight points. LPA's Paris correspondent, in an
article carried by Liberation Radio on the 15th, questions
the President's statements that his address had been in
preparation since last summer. The NHAN DAN Observer article
says the President's 7 October speech was not a serious peace
initiative but was in fact a reaction to the 17 September
PRG proposal just as the President's eight-point plan of
14 May 1969 had reacted to the NFLSV's 10-point initiative..
Administration statements that the communists' response to
the President's proposals should not be treated as an
absolute rejection are noted promptly in a Hanoi radio
commentary on the 16th. It says that even after the foreign
ministry statement "resolutely rejected" the proposals, "the
White House still spread the ambiguous allegation that this
Is only the communists' bargaining trick and that the United
States still hopes Hanoi will continue to consider this
proposal." The commentary calls this "a most brazen maneuver
to deceive public opinion in the face of a patently obvious
truth," namely the "firm attitude" toward "Nixon's fraud"
expressed in formal statements issued by the Pathet Lao and
Sihanouk 'a government as well as by the DRV and the MG.
Another Hanoi radio commentary on the 19th calls Administration
refusal to acknowledge the "rejections" of the President's
plan "a brazen psychological warfare trick in his campaign
to gain votes for his Republican Party in the November
elections." The broadcast says the Administration wants to
distract U.S. public opinion and "confuse some people in the
United States in face of the sharp analysis and criticism by
world public opinion of Nixon's speech, which is full of
tortuous and sophistic arguments." Liberation Radio on the
20th also notes that although the U.S. "so-called peace
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3
initiative" was "completely rejected" in formal statements by
the PRG, the DRV, Laos, and Cambodia, "Nixon, and his propaganda
machinery have continued to brazenly and gratuitously claim
that these statements are part of the communists' propaganda
technique, that the United States has not yet considered them
a definite rejection." The Liberation Radio commentary is
typically abusive of both the Vice President and the President,
and it concludes that perhaps the latter will understand the
communists' response only "when the U.S.-puppet troops in
Indochina are soundly beaten and Nixon himself is buried
alive, like Johnson, by the U.S. people in a political tomb."
CEASE-FIRE The MAN DAN Observer article on the 18th,
like Xuan Thuy in his statement at the Paris
session, repeats the line that agreement to a standstill
cease-fire while more than 400,000 U.S. forces remain in
Vietnam would be tantamount to legalizing U.S. "aggression,"
U.S. military "occupation" of South Vietnam, and the Saigon
government's position. Observer declares that "as for the
South Vietnamese people, they will not be allowed to strike
at the country-invading and country-sellingcliques" under the
proposed cease-fire. Observer, Xuan Thuy, Mine. Binh, and
routine comment invoke the usual rejoinder that the people's
resistance to aggression is "legitimate right of self-defense."
Like the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 14th, Xuan Thuy
recalled in Paris that in 1965 the United States had proposed
a cease-fire and unconditional negotiations. He said that in
1965 it was a cover for the U.S. escalation in South Vietnam
and that now the President's cease-fire call is a cover to
serve the Vietnamization program, prolongation of the war,
and occupation of the Indochinese countries "for a long time."
As was the case last week, there is no acknowledgment in the
propaganda of the fact that President Nixon called for
international supervision of the proposed standstill cease-fire.
INDOCHINA NHAN DAN's Observer and the statements of the
CONFERENCE two communist delegates in Paris reiterate the
charge that the President's proposal for an
Indochina peace conference is "an ugly trick to deceive public
opinion." Observer and Xuan Thuy assert that the crucial
question is to change U.S. policy and end the aggression in
Indochina, not the form of the conference. Observer also claims
that the conference proposal was aimed at downgrading the Paris
conference.
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TROOP WITHDRAWAL Xuan Thuy's statement and the Observer
article echo the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement in complaining that the President is linking a U.S.
troop withdrawal with an Indochina-wide settlement and "is
thus setting new conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops."
And comment generally denounces the President's proposal as a
renewed call for a mutual troop withdrawal. The communist
delegates in Paris, reiterating their position on a total
troop withdrawal, maintained that the 30 June 1971 deadline
is "more than sufficient" for a troop pullout.
President Nixon's announcement in Hartford, Conn. on the 12th
that the rate of withdrawal is being speeded up and that
4o,000 more American troops would be withdrawn by the end
of the year, as part of the planned withdrawal of 150,000
troops to be completed by spring 1971, is typically ridiculed
by Hanoi and Liberation radios on the 14th and 16th,
respectively. In addition, both note Secretary Rogers'
recent statements that the U.S. combat role would be ended
by spring 1971 and Secretary Laird's announcement regarding
the termination of the draft by mid-1973. Both say these
announcements were aimed at "fooling the U.S. voters" and
at mollifying U.S. antiwar sentiment.
POLITICAL Xuan Thuy responded to each of the three
SETTLEMENT principles on a political settlement
enunciated by the President. Thuy said "it
is understood" that the President was "speaking about
elections in South Vietnam" when he said that the United
States would respect the outcome of the political process
agreed upon. "It should be noted here," Xuan Thuy coamented,
"that the NFLSV spoke about elections in South Vietnam long
before Mr. Nixon. The crucial question is who 14111 organize
these elections?" Thuy's statement, like other %2omment,
reiterates the proposal for elections organized by a
provisional coalition government as spelled out in the PRG's
eight points. And Observer in NHAN DAN scores President
Nixon for rejecting the "reasonable, sensible" PRG proposal
and for saying that it constituted an annexation by one side.
POW RELEASE Comment on the President's proposal on the
release of prisoners says that the first of
the PRG's eight points offers the correct way to solve that
issue. Mme. Binh asked why, if the United States were really
interested in the release of its prisoners, it refused to
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declare that it will withdraw its forces by 30 June 1971, so
that the parties could enter into immediate discussions on
this matter, She added that "we are prepared to release all
captured American militarymen after agreements on this issue
have been reached." The NBAN DAN Observer article says the
President's refusal to accept the PRG's eight points demonstrates
that he "does not care a whit about the fate of captive Americans,
but only seeks to deceive public opinion and serve his party's
interests in the current election campaign."
SIHANOUK "COMMUNIQUE" AGAIN ASSAILS NIXON INITIATIVE
A "communique" issued by Sihanouk's "office," dated 12 October
and carried by NCNA on the 15th, comments on a number of
passagesYin President Nixon's 7 October speech. It does not
deal with the five points systematically, but it does comment
to some extent on all exceptAhe troop-withdrawal. proposal.
An 11. October RGNU statement and Sihanouk at a.10 October
press conference had discussed those points which particularly
pertained to Cambodia--the standstill ceasefire and the inter-
national conference.
The communique says that the cease-fire proposal is aimed
merely at preserving the Lon Nol regime, since the military
situation in Cambodia at present is unfavorable to the pro-
American forces. The FUNK has "liberated" two-thirds of
Cambodian territory, it says, and "it is likely that in a
few months our FUNK will control four-fifths of Cambodia."
The communique does not mention the question of inter-
national supervision of a cease-fire, although Sihanouk
had rejected:such a possibility in his earlier press conference
statement,
On the issue of an international conference, the communique
claims, as Sihanouk had done in his 10 October press
coyference, that the "partition" of Cambodia would result
from such a conference. It also repeats the position that
a conference is unacceptable if the Lon Nol regime rather
than the RGNU is invited.
The communique dOes not directly acknowledge the President's
argument that an Indochina conference is necessary because
of DRV aggression throughout Indochina. But it goes on
immediately to quote and rebutt. the President's statement
that Nwth Vietnamese troops are carrying out aggression in
Cambodia. At the same tire, it repeats the line that the
A
kpproveit&le8W060/4pitblileCOVRD11745I00876110003001030045-3
a slo u qely legitimate and that they have "the right to form
a common front of struggle."
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The communique cites the President's statement that the release
of all prisoners of war would be an act of humanity, but it
does not mention his reference to captured journalists; it
comments only that the United States is responsible for
"genocide" in Indochina and is the one who should practice acts
of humanity toward the Indochinese people--for example, by
stopping the bombing. Earlier comment on the President's
proposal had not mentioned the prisoner issue.
MOSCOW PRESS COMARES NIXON, PRG PEACE PROPOSALS
Moscow publicizes Vietnamese communist comment rejecting the
President's peace proposal,- including the 14 October DV
Foreign Ministry statement and the interview with PRG i President
Phat on the same day, but it has not thus far noted the- U.S
interpretation of the rejection as a bargaining move?.- However,,
a 21 October TASS report of the President's campaign tour
says that "despite the fact" that the DRV and PRG representa-
tives have rejected the plan, the President, speaking in Gratidi
Forks, North Dakota,- again' contended that his initiatiVe.
"the most generous proposal in international diplomacy." A,
16 October Moscow radio' commentary in. English notes
that, even after the PRG and DRV rejected i the plan, "iniericanl
government spokesmen continued to praise- it as- a constructive.
step toward a peace settlement."
Continued Moscow radio and press criticism. of the- President''S,
proposals is highlighted by articles ixi IZVESTIYA on 15 October
and in PRAVDA on. the 16th which discuss specific points in.
more detail. than previous comment and' compare them. with. the,
PRG 's 17 September initiative.. Both articles echo other.
propaganda in saying the U.S. proposal was motivated by
political considerations. The IZVESTIYA- article, by YUriy,1
Mineyev, says that public pressure, "which the Republican.
Administration cannot fail to heed in view of the- forthcomit-np
congressional, elections ,." has compelled' the Administration', to,
take a political action aimed i at reducing criticism,. of the-
United States'. continuing aggression and its "obstructionist"
position at the Paris talks. Commenting_ in a similar vein,.
Ivan Shchedrov says in PRAVDA that one of the motivew of the
speech was to suppress, on the eve of the November elections-,..
growing antiwar sentiment and demands for the withdratial of
Atnerican troops from Indochina.
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CEASE-FIRE The "crux" of President Nixon's program, says
Mikheyev, is his proposal for a standstill cease-
fire under international control." This is the only known Moscow
acknowledgment of the international supervision aspect since the
initial TASS report of the President's speech. The commentator
observes that acceptance of the proposal would mean that U.S. and
alliedtroops' "criminal actions" in South Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia would be "protected by the authority of international
controllers." Earlier commant on the President's speeches had
not spelled out the PRG position on a cease-fire, but Mikheyev
now says this "realistic cease-fire program," unlike the U.S.
proposal, would not be a screen for aggression since it
provides for a cease-fire "after the signing of agreements
on an end to the war and the restoring of peace in Vietnam."
TROOP Shchedrov in PRAVDA, in referring to elaborations
WITHDRAWAL on the President's speech by Administration
officials, says "the White House" explained that
even if the cease-fire were adopted, the question of full
withdrawal of American troops would depend on "the level of
the enemy's combat activity." He adds that it was also "stated
officially" that U.S. troops "may be withdrawn in 12 months,
but only in the event of acceptance of all five points of the
American plan."
Commenting on the troop withdrawal proposal itself, Shchedrov
avoids--in keeping with past propaganda--any specific reference
to the President's expression of readiness to negotiate a
timetable on complete withdrawal as part of an overall
settlement, although he does recall that the PRG initiative
called for U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971.
Shchedrov acknowledges that the President expressed
readiness to withdraw troops, but under a settlement based
on principles set forth earlier. The article notes that "an
official White House spokesman" explained that this is not a
question of "unilateral withdrawal."
Like some earlier comment on the troop withdrawal issue,
Mikheyev 1.n IZVESTIYA complains that President Nixon failed
to propose a concrete deadline for the withdrawal of troops.
Mikheyev asserts that the President insists on withdrawal
"only within the framework of a settlement based on those
principles which he outlined earlier and advanced in his
speech of 7 October." But the only "principle" Mikheyev
recalls is on U.S. troops being withdrawn only as the South
Vietnamese army becomes stronger.
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POLITICAL The Mikheyev article claims that the President's
SETTLEMENT call for a political settlement that would reflect
the "existing balance of political forces" means
maintaining the present Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration in power.
The article neglects to mention that the President also said
the United States would abide by the outcome of the po:itical
process agreed upon.
In noting that the President called for a political settlement
that would meet the aspirations of the South Vietnamese people,
Shchedrov in PRAVDA points to the President's statement that
"the demand of those who seek 'the right to exclude whomever
they wish from the government" is "unreasonable and unaccept-
able" and calls it a "transparent allusion" to the PRG's call
for an adminIutration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem. Shchedrov
cites the "official White House representative" as stating that
the United States "fully supports" the Thieu-Ky government.
INTERNATIONAL The President's other points are discussed
CONFERENCE; POW'S more briefly in both articles. Shchedrov
asks if it makes sense to call for an
Indochina conference at a time when the United States is
obstructing the Paris talks, attempting to "torpedo" the
preparations for the Laotian leaders' talks, and ignoring the
FUNK's proposals.
Both articles contrast the President's proposal on unconditional
release of prisoners of war on both sides with the "realistic"
stand of the PRG, which says that it will begin a discussion
of prisoner release only after the United States pledges a
troop withdrawal. By refuting this proposal, Shchedrov says,
the United States is "openly threatening" that there will
still be no progress at the Paris talks. Mikheyev dism.Lsses
the President's proposal on prisoner release as an effort
to play on the feelings of the American people.
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COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO DENOUNCE CAMBODIAN REPUBLIC
Government statements issued by the DRV and PRG, on the 15th
and 17th respectively, endorse the joint Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU
statement of 10 October which had denounced the proclamation
of the Cambodian republic the day before. The DRV and PEG
statements, like the Chinese Government statement of the
10th, call the proclamation of the republic "deceitful and
illegal" and claim that the RGNU is the sole legal Cambodian
government.
UNITED An attack on the republic also appears in a '
NATIONS Sihanouk statement on the 25th anniversary of the
United Nations, dated 14 October and carried by
NCNA on the 19th.* Sihanouk denounces UN "crimes" and charges
that the organization has become "an accomplice of the U.S.
imperialists." Sihanouk scores U Thant for, among other
things, "turning out" Cambodian Ambassador Huot Sambath and
agreeng with Washington to accept the representative of the
"Lon Nolite putschists." Sihanouk also decries the fact that
Cheng Heng, "illegal head of state of the illegal 'republic,"
has been invited to participate in the UN anniversary
celebrations.
* An earlier Sihanouk statement on the UN anniversary, dated
15 September, had criticized U Thant's decision to regard the
Lon Nol regime as the government of Cambodia. See th?
30 September TRENDS, page 7.
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DRV PROTESTS ALLEGED 3-52 STRIKES IN DMZ
Hanoi media on 16 October note a DRV Foreign Minintry spokesman's
statement issued that day charges the United Staten with dispatching
B-52 planes* to bomb the northern part of the demilitarized zone
(DMZ). The protest says that on 13 October, U.S. B-5.1's and
11nevera1 other types of aircraft" dropped "a great quantity of
demolition and steel-pellet bombs onto Huong Lap village in the
northern part of the DMZ."
The foreign ministry, as usual, "vehemently denounced and sternly
condemned" the alleged "criminal" acts of the United States and
reiterated the demand for an end to all U.S. encroachments on
DRV sovereignty and security.
ALLIES ACCUSED OF "WAR CRIMES" IN CAMBODIA, SOUTH VIETNAM
CAMBODIA An alleged massacre of Vietnamese residents in Bak
Preah village, Battambang Province, on 13-15 September,
is denounced in PRO and DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements
publicized on 13 and 14 October respectively. The statements claim
that the villagers, mostly Vietnamese, were killed during bombing
and strafing raids by aircraft sent by the United States and the
Phnom Penh and Saigon "lackeys." The PRG statement--said to have
been issued on the 10th--alleges that the Phnom Penh government has
been rapressing and massacring Vietnamese residents ever since
last March and adds that the Bak Fresh village incident reveals
the hypocrisy of the claim that the Saigon administration defends
the life and property of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia. The
DRV statement charges that on U.S. orders the Lon Nol regime has
been "colluding" more and more closely with the Saigon administration.
A flurry of DRV and PRC Foreign Ministry and Government statements
from late March to early May had denounced alleged "massacres" of
Vietnamese residents of Cdinbodia, but the issue has not been
raised authoritatively since then.
* The most recent protests regarding B-52's were two foreign
ministry spokesman's statements issued on 13 and 27 August.
See the TRENDS of 19 August 1970, page 13 and 2 September,
page 14.
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SOUTH VIETNAM Communist claim of allied war crimes in Gouth
Vietnam during the firet nine months of thin
year are rounded up in a 13 October communique by the aouthern
war crimes committee. The communique, carried by LPA on the
19th, firat or all pcores alleged "terror raids" and the
-oncentration and "masaacre" of civilirna under the allied
pacification program, liating several specific examplea. In
decrying alleged repreanion of the urban population, the
statement, as usual, cites the arreat and "torture" of otudento
and "muzzling" of the press. In paricular, it relaten actions
by the government against the paper TIN SANG. The "torture
and imprisonment of patriota," use of "toxic chemicale and
poison gas sprays," and B-52 raids against populated arean
are also charged.
FRONT COMMENT REFLECTS ALLIED PACIFICATION GAINS IN VIE1NAM
Liberation Radio touches indirectly on allied pacification
successes in a 15 October commentary which takes note of the
return of peasants to secure areas. The commentary io aome-
what more open than most propaganda in acknowledging that the
allies are allowing the return of the peasants to their land,
but it typically obscures the significance of this policy by
claiming that it was a "concesaion" prompted by the "people's
strcmg struggle." The radio goes on to claim that this
development is proof of allied failures and that "a new
revolutionary spirit is prevailing in the countryside."
But at the same time it acknowledge? communist setbacks in
the past by saying that this favorable situation is occuring
"after nearly two years of see-saw battle between us and
the enemy."
The commentary, which is pegged to the 6th anniversary of the
death of the Viet Cong martyr Nguyen Van Trol, routinely
evils for continued efforts to counter allied pacification
efforts. Among other things, it declares that it is necessary
to "mercilesaly punish those betrayers of the revolution who
have guided the enemy in his attacks on the revolutionary
bases, the 'Swan' and 'Phoenix' spies, policemen, and secret
agents."
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MIDDLE EAST
Moscow comment on Middle East developments is highlighted by the
15 October PRAVDA article by Ye. Primakov reviewing Soviet
proposals for a peace settlement?the first extensive discussion
of Soviet proposals in more than eight months. Primakov sustains
the nttack against Israel and the United Staten as the parties
responsible for the continuing crisis in the Middle East. He
also views as "completely groundless" the calculation that
pressure on the USSR will succeed--"whether in regard to the
so-called 'violations' of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal Zone
or the meetings of the four powers' representatives on the
Middle East crisis."
Other propaganda also continues Moscow's criticism of the
Israeli boycott of the Jarring talks and the U.S. withdrawal from
the Big Four deputies' talks at the United Nations. There are
further rejections of U.S. and Israeli "allegations" about UAR
violations of the stand-still aspects of the cease-fire. And
TASS reports that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad, on the 18 October
TV program "Issues and Answers," said U.S. photographs of the
area did not prove violations since they showed missiles which
were on site before 7 August. TASS also notes that Riyad
countercharged the United States with violatiag the agreement
by supplying "offensive weapons" to Israel during the
cease-fire.
Earlier, Soviet media reported that Riyad, in his 16 October UNGA
address, asserted that the "so-called initiative" on the Middle
East "was actually thwarted by the United States itself" through
its supplying of arms to Israel. Moscow has publicized the report
in the 18 October Washington STAR on the "secret" delivery of
Phantom aircraft to Israel.
Soviet media 116.11 the election--in the 15 October referendum--of
as-Sadat as the new UAR president. Stress is on his avowed
intent to pursue Nasir's policies, including the maintenance of
close ties with the USSR. The TASS report of al-Sadat's speech
on the 19th notes his assertion of willingness to extend the
cease-fire "if serious and effective contacts are held." On the
other hand, Moscow cbscures Israeli remarks on extending the
cease-fire; a Moscow broadcast on the 17th contrasted Riyad's
expression of UAR readiness to extend the cease-fire with Premier
Golds Meir's warning, to the Israeli Labor Party, that "the country
be ready for a new round in the Arab-Israeli war."
PRIMAKOV IN PRAVDA REVIEWS SOVIET PROPOSALS POR SETTLEMENT
The 15 October Primakov PRAVDA article, entitled "The Path To a
Just Peace," comes on the heels of a NOVOSTI handout last month
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which hod also treated Soviet proponala; the NOVOETI pamphlet,
however, wan not publicized in the mans media. Primakov had
briefly touched on the Soviet proponals in a lengthy article
on the Middle Ealt in the monthly journal USA: ECOVOMICS,
POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY (No. 9, signed to the preou on
11 September 1970).
The current Primakov PRAVDA article haa been broadcant by
Radio Moscow to foreign audiences, Including the Arab .4or1d,
and han occasioned a spate of comment pointing to "favorable"
world reaction to the Soviet proposals.* Primakov says the
proposals have been formulated "wits consideration being
given to those involved in the conflict aa well as to the
bilateral and quadripartite consultations" on the questions
of a Middle :2ast oettlement. The propoaals, he Dam are
not in the form of an "ultimatum."
Urging Israeli acceptance of the proposals, Primakov says
Tel Aviv can entertain no hope of Arab capitulation or the
slackening of Soviet asciatance, and he cites Brezhnev's
2 October Baku apeech and the USSR-UA R communique following
Kosygin's visit th the UAR, at the time of Nusir's funeral,
for the assertion that the USSR offers "complete support" to
the Arab nauae. Primakov rejects the "empty" hope that the
Soviet position will change following Nasir's death.
SUBSTANCE OF THE In its review of the Soviet proposals,
SOVIET PROPOSALS the Primakov article seems particularly
notable on three pointo: the inter-
jection of the notion of a two-stage withdrawal of Israeli
troops from the occupied territories; the suggestion that
UN forces be introdueed at "several points" along the frontiers;
and the call for a "mutually binding agreement" between the
two sides in the 'liddle East--language which hud also appeared
* The title of the article is identical to that of the last
previous article which discussed Soviet proposals in detail--
by Ye. Maksimov in the 27 January 1970 PRAVDA. The substance
of the December 1968 Soviet proposals had fir-t been outlined
in a 25 January 1969 PRAVDA article by Vasilyev. For a
discussion see the TRENDS of 28 January 1970, pages 16-19.
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21 OCTOBER 1970
in the NOVOUTI pamphlet. (The Maksimov article 'ant January
had opoken of "a document agreed upon by both video.")
Primakov nayn that Israel's withdrawal from all Arab lands
occupied in 1967 and the eotablishment of a nimultaneously
pot and stable peace in the Middle East are "organically
interconnected and mum'. be examined Jointly." He notes that
the Soviet propooalo npecify that an soon the document
agreed upon through Ambassador Jarring in handed over to
the United Nations, the two olden will ':eefrain from actions
which contradict the cessation of the state of war. He adds
that
legally, the cessation of the state of war and
the establishment of the state of pencil comes
at the moment of completion of the Inmeli
forces' withdrawal (the evacuation can be
implemented in two stages) from territories
occupied in June 1967.
Primakov does not elaborate on the two stages; however the
Vasilyev article in PRAVDA on 25 January 1969--which had first
outlined the substance of the December 1968 Soviet proposals--
had given some attention to a two-stage withdrawal covering a
two-month period. In the first month, according to Vasilyev,
Israeli forces would withdraw to "certain intermediate lines"
and in the second month they would pull back to the lines
they held before 5 June 1967. Neither Maksimov last January
nor the NOVOSTI pamphlet had mentioned any such two-stage
withdrawal.
Asserting that security of borders in the age of rapidly
developing military technology is best guarah eed by their
"universal meognition," Primakov says that Israel should
concern itself with establishing frontiers corresponding to
the lines existing on 4 June 1967. Maksimov had noted the
need for Israeli troops to withdraw "behind the line" on
which they were situated "up to 5 June 1967." The call for
pre-5 June 1967 lines is of long standing.
The Primakov article recalls the obligations demanded of the
two sides after settlement of the Middle East conflict under
the terms of the 22 November 1967 Security Council Resolution
(No. 242). The Soviet propoeals, Primakov adds, provide for
the establishment of demilitarized zones on both sides of the
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frontiers, the introduction of UN forces* "ILL neveral pointn,"
cnd "direct guarantees by the four permanent member staten
or the Security Council or UN Security Council guarantees."
hin article in USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY
Primakov had alno spoken of the introduction of UN forcen
"Into a number nf placen" along the frontier.) Both Maksimov
last January and NOVOSTI had included ensentially the name
elements, specifying, however, that the UN forcen should be
located in the Gaza strip and in the )harm anh-Shayk area.
in the course of hip review of the proponaln, Primakov
reaffirmn, by implication, the Soviet conviction that Torael
han the right to exint, observing that the UCSR "han proceeded
and continuen to proceed from all the Middle Emit state'
right to secure and independent national existence."
Renolution of the Palestinian quention, he nayn, is banic
to any stable settlement in the Middle Emit. Like Maksimov
and NOVOSTI, he recant) UN resolutionn demanding the
return of refugees to their homeland or the payment of
compensation for their property. In Primakov's words, "we
consider all the more inadmisnible attempts to implement
'nelf-determination' for come by completely depriving othern
of their national rights."
MOSCOW WELCOMES JORDANIAN-PLO ACCORD. DOMPLAYS CLASHES
Moscow welcomea the 13 October agreement between King Husayn
and Arafat regula-;ing the relations between the Jordanian
Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as
a new impvrtant step aimed at putting an end tc, the fratricide."
Consistent with earlier comment on the situation in Jordan,
a broadcast for Arab listeners on the 15th said that Tel Aviv
had benefited most from the ci,113 -war in that country last
month and "could not conceal it satisfaction over the fact
* A LIFE ABROAD article (No. 41, signed to the press 7 October
1970) scores the notion of possible U.S. and Soviet participa-
tion in a UN peacekeeping force. Drawing on Western press
reports, the author says that "the U.S. military is dreaming"
of such a force, hoping it will allow U.S. intervention in
events in the Middle East and thus "seal forever Israeli
occupation of Arab territory." For background see the TRENDS
of 2 September 1970, page 21, and 12 August 1970, page 20.
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21 OCTOBER 1970
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that the Arnim were fighting among themnolven instead of
directing their weapons against the common enemy."
Propaganda following the agreement han stressed that life in
Amman and most other parts of Jordan hu a returned to normal,
acknowledging, however, that there have been clashes. Thus
Arab listeners were told on the 18th that "tension coatinuen
to exit in the north of the country, where armed clashes
took place yesterday" between government troops and today/Jen.
TAOS on thm 19th cited statements by npokeomen for both
sides, each alleging that the other opened fire larst. The
same TAO item concluded with a quotation from the communique
of the inter-Arab committee in Jordan to the effect that
"the incident which occurred was of a limited nature and
will have no effect on the progress in the cause of gradual
normalization of the situation" in the country. According
to a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 20th, the situation
in the north has returned to normal. This broadcast went
on to charge that Western news agencies in the Middle East
sought "to cause a stir about the individual clashes that
took place in four villages in the Irbid area, in an attempt
to prove that the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement to settle
the dispute had been violated."
In a related development,. IZVESTIYA observer Matveyev,
participating in the 18 October commentators' roundtable
broadcast in the domestic semice, defended the Soviet role
in Jordan during last month'3 civil war. He rejected the
allegation of "American propaganda" that the Soviet Union
had adopted some sort of unclear position at the time of the
events in that country, asking rhetorJeally: "Who does not
remember that it was the Soviet Union itself which stated
for all to hear that it opposed any outside interference
in the internal affairs of Jordan?" The authors of this
"American prowenda" are not identified. But it seems
noteworthy that earlier in the same broadcast Matveyev took
Max Frankel of the New York TIMES to task for speculating--
in a 15 October article--on a "crisis of trust" between the
United States and the USSR. (Matveyev- of course, did not
acknowledge any such detail as Frankel's observation tt
Washington believes Moscow tolerated the Syrian thrust into
Jordan if it did not actually collaborate in it.)
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HIJACK INCIDENT
FBI? TRENDS
21 OCTOBER 1970
SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGE FIRST HiJACKING. DEMAND EXTRADITION
TASS promptly reported the firot publicly acknowledged successful
hijacking of a Soviet airliner--to Trabzon, Turkey on 15 October--
and Soviet media have carried continuing reports on the return
of the passengers and crew, the Turkish handling of the '
hijackers, and the demands of an "indignant" Soviet public
and world public opinion for return of the culprits to the
Soviet Union for trial.* Both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have
buggested that any further delay in Turkish extradition of
the two hijackers will bode ill for Soviet-Turkish relations.
IZVESTIYA noted on the 17th that this was "not the first
hijack attempt" nn a Soviet plane, mentioning that an
unsuccessful hijack attempt had been made "on a plane also
from Batumi" four years ago. TASS on thl 18th recalled a
1961 attempt by three armed bandits on a Soviet aircraft who
demanded that the pilot "take the plane abroad." Moscow is
not known to have publicized these incidents at the time, nor
is it known to have reported hijack attempts on East European
planes. When Soviet media have reported hijackings in the
West, they have generally mentioned them well after the fact
and with little detail.
Following a TASS announcement on the 16th of the return of the
hijacked airliner's crew and passengers--but not of the two
hijackers, a Soviet father and son--Moscow media initiated a
low volume of comment designed to glorify the Soviet crew and
particularly the slain stewardess, to blacken the character of
the elder hijacker, and to generate a groundswell of Soviet
public opinion demanding extradition.
* Although Belgrade's domestic service quoted "a spokesman of
the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation" as denying reports on the
hijacking of a Soviet passenger plane, TASS an hour later
briefly detailed the incident and noted that the Soviet Govern-
ment had asked for extradition of "the criminals-murderers" and
return of the Soviet plane and citizens. The TASS acknowledgment
on the 15th came approximately eight hours after REUTERS had
reported the incident.
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The crew wan Predited with saving the lives of the passengers
by following the hijackers' instructions to land in Turkey,
although a domestic service broadcast on the 18th--giving
"now details" about the event--quoted the wounded captain as
saying he had thrown the aircraft "from side to side" but was
finally compelled to land in Trabzon "to keep the passengers
from being killed."
Moscow played up the heroism of the stewardess, who according
to TASS was "shot dead pointblank" when she attempted to .block
the hijackers' entranile into the pilots' cabin. IZVESTIYA
on the 17th reported her impending marriage and cited a
commendation she had received in April for her conduct during
an airborne fire. PASS reported that thousands of people
attended her funeral on the 20th and that she has become
Han example for Soviet young people." Her name "has .been
entered in the book of honor of the Komsomol Central Committee
together with the names of other heroes of the Soviet youth,"
according to PASS, and the pupils of her school in'Udmurtia
"decided to name their Komsomol organization after her,"
PRAVDA on the 18th characterized the elder hijacker as an
embezzler, black marketeer, and domestic tyrant who had
corrupted his son and "drawn him into the crime and murder.'"
Although the initial REUTERS report of the incident said
that the hijackers were "both of Jewish origin," no such
statement has appeared in Soviet media.
EXTRADITION Initial Moscow reports that the Soviet Govern-
ment had asked the Turkish authorities to
extradite "-the criminals-murderers" for trial in the Soviet
Union have evolved into .reports of "wrath and indignation among
101 Soviet people," who are "justly demanding extradition .of
the criminals and their .severe punishment by a Soviet court."
Moscow media report a continuing stream of letters and telegrams
demanding extradition--from scientists, engineers, aviation
officials, trade union functionaries, railway personnel, and so
on.
Hounding up foreign support for the Soviet extradition demands.,
MISS on the 20th claimed that "the public and the press in 'many
countries" stress the "absolute justness" of extradition. The
.roundup included GDR, Polish, and Czechoslovak press reactions
and quoted the Warsaw central airport director as asserting
that "the Turkish authorities cannot but 'understand the grave
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responsibility that will rest with them if they defend the air
bandits who have blood on their hands."
Reacting to a Trabzon court's refusal to issue arrest warrants
for the two hijackers, TASS on the 19th said the court's "more
than strange" verdict contravened "generallj known facts."
TASS observed that the hijackers' fate will now be decided by
the Turkish Ministry of Justice but stated that they "mUst
face a Soviet court for their crimes and must be punished."
Allusions in both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA to possible detrimental
consequences for Soviet-Turkish relations came only after the
Trabzon court's decision. A PRAVDA dispatch from Turkey,
carried by TASS on the 20th, pointed to "certain quarters in
Turkey that systematically seek to wreck the development and
strengthening of genuinely good-neighborly SoViet-TUrkish
relations" by arguing that extradition would "allegedly
'shake the dignity of Turkey.'" The correspondent said "all
upright people in Turkey" are confident that the Turkish
Government "will not cast aspersions on Turkish-Soviet
relations because of two air pirates."
IZVESTIYA commentator Kudryavtsev, in an article reviewed by
TASS on the 20th, suggested that "it would be madness" for
Turkish officials to believe a further delay in extradition
"would contribute to raising the country's prestige." He
asked: "Is it worth casting a shadow over relations with a
neighboring state just for the sake of two bandits?" The
Soviet public, Kudryavtsev said, believes an "immediate
solution" of the extradition question would show the desire
of the Turkish side not to let relations between the two
countries be "harmed."
Kudryavtsev said the Turkish criminal code "includes an
article on the extradition of foreign criminals" but did
not elaborate on its provisions. He recalled the 1969
incident when Bulgarian authorities extradited to 'Markey
the hijacker of a Turkish aircraft which had landed in
Bulgaria, and he asserted that at the recent 58th conference
of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in the Hague the Turkish
delegation had "unanimously voted for a resolution which
raised clearly and definitely the question of the extradition
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of criminals hijacking planes under the threat of the use of arms."
But he did not indicate what the Soviet stand had been,* nor did
he say how the issue was resolved.
4 At variance with Moscow's current strong demands for extradition,
a rare discussion of hijackings as a problem of international law--
in the 23 September LITERARY GAZETTE by candidates of juridiclal,
.sciences Kolosov and Emin--claimed that the 1963 TOKm.convention
Aenvisaged with respect to .hijackers 'the administration of justice
by states in accordance With their own national legislation.'"
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CUBA SUBMARINE BASE
MOSCOW SEES U.S. CHARGES AS SIGN OF RETURN TO COLD WAR
Soviet comment following up the 13 October TASS denial that the
USSR was building "its military base" in Cuba has used the issue
Increasingly to charge the Nixon Administration with seeking a
return to the cold war and the era of confrontation. This
propaganda parallels allegations in Soviet propaganda, doting
generally from the President's Mediterranean trip, to the
effect that American actions in the Middle East are symptomatic
of an intention to forego the search for bilateral agreements
in favor of a return to cold war politics.
A 14 October Moscow radio commentary, broadcast widely to
foreign audiences, opened on the note that had dominated
initial Soviet comment on the U.S. reports of construction
of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, alleging that the U.S.
reports have had the "short-term" aim of justifying increased
military spending. It went on to develop the charge that the
"long-term" goal is to "aggravate the world situation," say-
ing the U.S. press is now "stating bluntly" that Washington
plans "to return to the path of confrontation and give up
the search for cooperation." The commentary cited the U.S.
withdrawal from the four-power deputies' talks on the Middle
East and--for the first time in Soviet media--"persistent
rumors that the strategic arms limitation talks will be
scaled down."
The notion that charges about construction of a Soviet base
were conjured up, among other things, to impair the prospects
for a successful outcome of SALT has recurred. For example,
a NEW TIMES article summarized by Radio Moscow on the 15th
assailed those who have used the "concoction" about the base
to engender anti-Soviet hysteria, hoping thereby "to wreck
the possibility of agreement on such questions as the stopping
of the strategic arms race." And a 16 October TABS commentary
alleged that in addition to the motives of promoting military
spending and gaining votes "for representatives of the right
wing of the Republican party" in November, a third underlying
motive was that of "definite circles in the United States to
use any pretext, any ruses and lies to throw the world back
to the worst time of the 'cold war.'" The commentary imputed
to e U.S. journalist the view that "knights of the cold war"
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are trying to promote the notion that "Russians are not to be
trusted," with the aim of "torpedoing the strategic arms
limitation talks" and blocking ratification of the FRG-USSR
treaty.
A Radio Moscow cnmmentary broadcast to Latin America on the
14th said U.S. accusations about a Soviet base were aimed at
convincing Latin Americans that "danger emanates from the
USSR and Cuba" and thus at blocking the trend in the
hemisphere toward broadening relations with socialist
countries and reestablishing ties with Cuba. Expounding
on the threat allegedly posed by the existence of numerous
U.S. military bases in Latin America, this commentary
recalled--as the earlier Soviet press comment had done--that
the USSR h-a "repeatedly" proposed the liquidation of
foreign military bases in the United Nations. It added
that the Soviet Union "has in general no military support
points outside its national boundaries, including Cuba."
The commentary also charged that one of the purposes of
"Pentagon strategists" in spreading "such gross falsification"
was "to poison the atmosphere of sincere friendship between
the USSR and Cuba."
Moscow and Havana media have continued to ignore U.S. reports
on the mcvements of the ships remaining from the Soviet task
force which arrived at Cienfuegos on 9 September. There has
been no reaction to the 16 October U.S. Defense Department
announcement that a Soviet submarine tender and an accompanying
tug had moved from Cienfuegos to the Cuban port of Mariel,
or to statements by U.S. officials on the 15th that two Soviet
barges remain in Cienfuegos. But Moscow has made frequent
reference to the 13 October statement of Assistant Secretary
of Defense Daniel Z. Henkin that it now seemed "less likely"
that the Soviet Union was planning a submarine base. Several
commentaries have cited Henkin's statement in playing up the
idea that the TASS statement put Washington in the embarrasslag
position of having to disavow its earlier allegations.
Typical comment along these lines appeared in an 18 October
PRAVDA article by N. Bragin who said Washington politicians
were "now maneuvering to escape somehow from a delicate
situation" and cited the Henkin statement as evidence. Bragin
concluded by recalling the proverb "a lie has short legs."
The same proverb has been cited in othP: Soviet press articles,
among them a front-page IZVESTIYA article on the 15th which
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noted that after the "lie" had been spread all over the world,
"now even Pentagon and State Department official circles are
hastening to disown it." U.S. officials, IZVESTIYA said,
have now conceded that what was initially termed "a Soviet
base" has turned out to be "two barrack-huts similar, according
to the comparison used by official Washington sources, to
hen-houses and also of a tennis court and a football pitch."
The IZVESTIYA article noted that U.S. State Department spokes-
man McCloskey had described the TAdS statement as "positive"
but refused to comment when pressed by "spiteful reporters"
to indicate whether this meant it was "truthful."
A PRAVDA article on the 15th, enttled "On Cots' ::oaches'
Legs," alleged that "Washington falsifiers are now moving
into reverse" and pointed to reports of White Houee and
State Department "embarrassment." It concluded: "They can
only blame themselves . . . By their own hands they have
exacerbated even further the 'crisis of confidence' in the
United States."
CUBAN COMMENTATOR NOTES SOVIET REMINDER OF MISSILE-CRISIS PACT
The monitored Cuban acknowledgment of the Soviet reaction
to the American reports came on 14 October in a domestic service
commentary which mentioned the Soviet recollection of the 1962
Soviet-U.S. agreement but did not take note of the actual denials
of construction of a Soviet military base. Charging that the
United States has been trying "to create an uproar over the
submarine base here in Cienfuegos, Cuba," the commentary said
the Soviet Union "reminded them of the Kennedy-Khrushchev pact"--
in fact described by Moscow as an "understanding," of course
with no mention of Khrushchev personally--"so that they would be
mindful of everything lest on account of one illusion they
might have another with regard to Cuba." This appears to be a
circuitous allusion to the notion that the 1962 agreement
entailed commitments on both sides, including a no-invasion pledge.
The author of the commentary, Guido Garcia Inclan, was also the
commentator who made Havana media's only prior reference to the
submarine base issue--in a 1 October radio talk mentioning briefly
that U.S. newspapers "have been giving wide play to the
submarine base that they say the Soviets are building in Cienfuegos."
Garcia Inclan's prose is often tortuous and less than coherent.
His format on 1 October was a radio feature entitled "Letter From
Freddy," which he uses sporadically; "Freddy" purports to be a
former Cuban journalistic colleague now working for a Miami news-
paper. Garcia Inclan usually devotes his talks to Cuban domestic
problems, frequently taking up such subjects as red tape, labor
. ? ??,, ?
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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS
FDIC TREND'S
21 OCTOBER 1970
RELATIONS WITH CANADA ADD TO PEKING'S DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM
Peking haa sought to me the establiahment of diplomatic relations
with Canada to give new force to it!) diplomatic momentum and itm
campaign to erode the influence of the two auperpowera. A
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 15 October, two days after the
releane of the joint communique announcing agreement to eatabliah
PBC-Canadian diplomatic relations, reaffirms Pekingla commitment
to the principle!) of peaceful coexistence and offers a reassurance
that the Chinese do not interfere in other countrien' affairs.
Calling Canada a "big country" on the American continent, the
editorial praise!) Canadian foreign policy as refleeting a desire
to pursue an independent courae and as demonatrating that
attempt? by "one or two Isuperpoweral" to control other
countries' policies have become "more and more unfeasible."
Peking thus in effect invites other ccuntriea to join it in
finding common ground for aecuring leverage against superpower
dominance. This has been a major ingredient of Peking's)
attitude toward such countries as France and Romania, which
have been credited with following paths independent of the
United States and the Soviet Union. Peking's agreement on
diplomatic ties with Canada picks up and updates its line at
the time when France recognized the PRC in January 1964, before
the exigencies of the Vietnam war and the cultural revolution
drove the Chinese into isolation. It may be recalled that
Peking's doctrine of the intermediate zones between the
United States and the socialist camp--which served at that
time as an ideological rationale for the PRC' s flirtation
with Western countries--included Canada along with West
Europe within the "second intermediate zone" comprising
developed capitalist countries.
TAIWAN ISSUE The 13 October joint communique, in which
Canada explicitly recognizes the PRO
Government as "the sole legal government of Chin,," contains
a compromise formula for dealing with the Taiwan question.
On the one hand, Peking was able to include its claim that
Taiwan is a part of the PRC's territory. Canada, however,
merely "takes note of this position" in the communique.
Canada's noncommittal position was clarified in a statement
by Eternal Affai..s Minister Sharp explaining that the
Canadian Goverrment eoes not consider it appropriate to
either endorse or challenge Peking's stand on the status of
Taiwan.
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In January 196, a terse two-sentence Joint communique had
simply announced agreement between the PRC and France to
entablish diplomatic relations and to exchange ambannadorn.
At that time Peking issued a clarifying statement by a PHC
Foreign Ministry spokesman putting on record itn claims
that the PHC is the nolo legal government or China and that
Taiwar is part of China's territory. An in the present cane,
there was alto a mopulo DAILY editorial hailing the event
as an example or peaceful coexistence.
In commenting on the PHC-French ngrement to open diplomatic
relations, the 29 January 19614 PECPLEIS DAILY editorial was
at pains to counter the view that Peking had relaxed Ito
opposition to "two Chime and that establishment of diplomatic
ties with France would unlock the door to ouch an arrangement.
The current editorial, after confidently noting that the two-
Chinan approach has been increasingly spurned, shifts attention
to what It derides an "the new gimmick" of "one China, one
Taiwan" advaneed by the United States as a result of failure
of the previous approach. Peking's shift in focus registers
satisfaction--in contrast to the uncertainty after French
recognition in 19614--over the immediate termination of
Nationalist China's diplomatic mission in Canada. But it
also reflects concern over the Taiwa independence movement
and the possibility that Taiwan's status will be left
indeterminate even as more countrier enter into diplomatic
relations with the PRC. The editorial repeats the standard
pledge that the Chinese people "pre determined to liberate"
Taiwan.
The editorial refers to "some superficial changes" made by
the United States in moving away from the two-Chinas approach.
Peking has remained silent on the specific initiatives taken
by the Nixon Administration to improve relations with mainland
China, though there have been generalized attacks on Washington's
professed desire to relax tensions. In the most authoritative
remit statement on the Taiwan question as "the crucial issue"
In Sino-U.S. relations, Huang Yung7sheng on 27 June this year--
speaking on the occasiori?Of the 20th anniversary of the U.S.
if occupation" of liallitin--dec.lared that a relaxation .of relations
Is "out of the question"-tifiless the United States withdraws its
armed forces from Taiwan. An NCNA commentary on the same
occasion made much of the continuing U.S. commitment to the
Chiang Kai-shek regime in documenting allegedly hostile actions
by the United States despite the President's call_for improved,
relations with the PRC.
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21 OCTOBER 1970
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OTHER Apart from We PEOPLE'N DAILY editorial, Peking has
ISSUES made no further comment An its own name on the
establishment of diplomatic ties with Canada. Li
linien-nien, speaking at a banquet for a DPRK delegation on the
15th, not only failed to mention it but also ignored the Taiwan
question--a subject which has figured prominently in the Sinn-
Korean nontw.... this year and wan raised by the North Korean
speaker at the banquet. The question of Chinese representation
in the United Natilnn, which wan ignored in the PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial, hal been rained by proxy in Peking's publicity for
comment from Aibanin, the sponsor of the perennial resolution
calling for the seating of the PRC. An 18 October NCNA summary
of a BASIIKIMI commentary on the establishment of PRC-Canadian
diplomatic ties highlighted the Tirana paper's condemnation of
the United States for obstructing recognition of the PRC's
:rights in the UniteC Nations.
The implications of the event for Sino-Japanese relations are
discussed in a 19 October NCNA roundup of Afro-Asian comment.
Reflecting Peking's hopes for stimulating public press ,3r,,t within
Japan tc move that country toward a position more favorable to
the PRC, the NCNA report quoted a Japanese news agency as
saying the news of the establishment of PRC-Canadian diplomatic
relations has aroused "uneasiness within the Sato group." A
Japaneee paper was cited as saying that a trend within the
ruling Liberal-Democratic Party aimed at establishing relations
between Japan and the PRC has been strengthened by this
development.
RELATIONS WITH Peking's diplr.matic momentum was given
EQUATORIAL GUINEA another boost with the release on
20 October of a joint communique
announcing the decision of the PRO and the Republic of
Equatorial Guinea to establish diplomatic relations. In
the communique Equatorial Guinea recognizes the PRC as
"the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese
people," a formulation that accedes more fully to Peking's
claims than in the case of Canada. The communique invokes
the five principles of coexistence as the basis for
developing relations between the PRC and Equatorial
Guinea. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.on PRC-Canadian
relations also cites the five principles, but the joint
communique on those ties mentions only three of the
principles, omitting the ones on nonaggression and peaceful
coexistence itself.
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Thr.t Peking may be angling for a more favorable vote at the
United Natio= thin aenaion in auggested by its "diacovery"
of Equatorial Guinea, a country which it had previoualy
ignored. An NCNA dispatch dated three day? before the
announcement or diplomatic relation() reported at some
length on the 12 October celebration? of the second
anniveraary of the country's independence. Peking's
broadening effort to win good will is alao reflected in
Chou En-lai's 19 October measage to Fijila prime minister
on the occanion of the proclamation of thqt country'a
independence.
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PRC NUCLEAR TEST
PEKING MEDIA SILENT ON REPORTED ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TEST
Peking media have not no far acknowledged the PRCIa 11th nuclear
test--its first in more than a year--reported by the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission to have been a three-megaton atmospheric
explosion on 14 October in the Lop Nor tenting area. The only
other detected test not publicly acknowledged by the PRC wan
the seventh on 24 December 1967. Nearl; a month after that
test, a 19 January 1968 Tokyo broadcast quoted Chou En-lai
as telling a visiting Japanese goodwill delegation that Peking
had made announcements of its nuclear tests "whenever new
properties were obtained."
The first six Chinese tests were publicly announced on the day
they were held, and the eighth was announced the following
day. All were followed by publicity for nationwide celebrations.
The last detected tests, on 23 and 29 September 1969, went
unpublicized by Chinese media until 4 October and occasioned
no followup comment or reports of celebrations.
There has been no mention of the AEC announcement of the
11th test in monitored Soviet or East European media.
Moscow's normal practice is to wait for Peking's announce-
ments!, then to report the tests very briefly, citing NCNA.
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21 OCTOBER 1970
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ROMANIA v*",s,
MEDIA PLAY UP CSAUSESCU U.S, TOUR, DEFEND TIES WITH wEsr
Romanian media are devoting extensive coverage to President
Ceausescu'a visit to the United States, which lulgan on
13 October, playing up the warmth of his reception and
pointing to the prospect--and propriety--of further Romanian-
U.S. cooperation. While emphasizing that the UN Jubilee
session is the reason for the "unofficial" visit to the
United Staten, Bucharest media also reported Ceausescu'u
statement upon arrival that he hoped to meet with President
Nixon.
An article in the party daily SCINTEIA on 18 October by
foreign affairs editor Caplescu, as reviewed by AGERPRES,
said that wherever Ceausescu traveled, "the reception
extended to him was marked by the selfsame warmth, esteem,
and respect for the head of the Romanian state." It went
on to underline "the real possibilities that exist for
intensifying bilateral relations on an economic, commercial,
and technical-scientific level, as well as for establishing
forms of cooperation in production."
In a passage clearly designed to defend Romania's right to
pursue such relations, Caplescu added: "These are obvious
ideas since they express a vivid reality of our days?namely,
that every country, big or small, has something to give or
to get as part of the flow of material and spiritual assets,
that this flow has to be freed of restrictive measures,
amplified on the basis of equal rights and in the spirit of
mutual advantage." Although Romania is "a socialist country
that focuses its foreign policy on relations of close friend-
ship and cooperation with the socialist countries," Caplescu
argued, "Romania at the same time militates for expanded
relations with all the world countries, regardless of their
social and political systems, as a modality of the promotion
of peaceful coexistence, of creating a climate of trust,
security, and mutual regard."
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CEAUSESCU ADDRESS The Bucharest domestic service carried a
TO UNITED NATIONS live relay of Ceausescu's speech before
the UN General Aasembly on 19 October,
and the Romanian press the next day gave the address lavish
publicity. Predictably, Ceaueescu restated the fundamentals
of Romanian foreign policy and made a atrong plea for inter-
national detente and an end to the policy of intervenqon in
the affairs of other states: "Events have shown that the time
of the policy of domination and dictate has passed, that the
peopleu can no longer be forcefully brought to their knees.
This demands the founding of interstate relations on new
bases, on equality and mutual esteem; it demands that in the
settlement of international issues the peoples' desirec and
national interests be considered." The "national state," he
added pointedly, "will have an important role to play for a
long time to cone in the development of society."
MOSCOW LECTURES THOSE WHO PUT NATIONAL INTERESTS FIRST
Soviet media have not commented directly on Ccausescu's visit
to the United States, but Radio Moscow's current broadcasts to
Romania indirectly reflect Soviet concern over Romania's
movement toward the West by a renewed emphasis on the duties
imposed by proletarian internationalism and the evils of
"narrow" nationalism. These themes are recurrent in Sovi!A
propaganda for the Romanians but have not been featured
prominently, in gratuitous lectures, since March when a
series of talks by Vladimirov pointedly criticized those
who shirked their "in.vnationalist duties."
Most notably in the current period, a Radio Moscow commentary
by Vladimir Menshikov broadcast only to Romania on 18 October
underlined the notion that cooperation among the socialist
countries is based on "proletarian internationalism"--the
"main factor contributing to the development of each socialist
country, enhancing its prestige in the international arena,
and insuring its security." The main task of each communist
party, Menshikov lectured, is to "observe consistently a true
balance of unity between national and international duties;
for the observance and the defense of national interests must
not be to the detriment of the interests of socialism as a
whole."
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Menshikov addqd that "to loan toward the national element and
to forget the interests e the unity of the socialist camp
Inevitably leads to pctit bourgeois nationalism." Invoking
Lenin to drive home the poins.,, the commentator recalled that
Lenin wan "implacable toward those who wanted to lock up
socialism in their national house; and he vehemently
criticized those who, for the sake of narrow national
interests, betrayed the interests of the general struggle
for socialism."
A commentary by Vladimir Ilyin broadcast to Romania on the
same day, pegged to the anniversary of the entry of German
troops into Romania during World War II, recalled how
Western powt.s had used reactionary Romanian rulers as
pawns in a game with Hitlerite Germany. By contrast, the
commentator declared, the Soviet Union has stood
consistently for Romanian independence, a fact
demonstrated today by the close cooperation between
the two countries and registered in the recently signed
Romanian-Soviet treaty.
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YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR
MOSCOW PUBLICIZES GUS HALL ATTACK ON TITO. NONALINEMENT
An article by U.S. Communist Party chief Guo Hall reprinted in
the 9-1') October issue of LIFE ABROAD (TANJUG reported that it
first appeared in "the small American DAILY WORLD") uses President
Nixon's 30 September-2 October visit to Yugoslavia as :.110 takeoff
point for the strongest public attack on Tito and his nonalinement
policy to appear in Soviet media in recent years. Equating
nonalinement with "opportunism" and accusing Yugoslavia of
selling out the class utruggle for future trade benefits from
the United Staten, the article appears contrived both to diacredit
Tito within the nonalined movement and to counteract the
attractiveness Tito's nonbloc course might have for other
countries as a means of obtaining economic and ttchnological
advantages. In dubbing nonalinement "a blind alley for the
socialist countries," the article also seems to have implications
for the Romanians, and its appearance in LIFE ABROAD came on
the eve of Ceausescu's U.S. visit.
The same issue of LIFE ABROAD contains the first substantial
Soviet reaction to President Nixon's Yugoslav visit, in the
form of lengthy excerpts from the Yugoslav press calculated
to portray a Yugoslav-U.S. rapprochement.
?ROPAGANDA Moscow had last leveled a full-scale attack on
BACKDROP nonalinement as practiced by Belgrade in two
talks by IZVESTIYA political commentator
Kudryavtsev broadcast by Radio Moscow to Africa on 5 and 8
February this year. The talks did not name Tito or Yugoslavia
but were broadca&t while Tito was touring Africa. Assailing
the idea that "nonalinemmt should lead to the creation of a
third force between socialism and capitalism," Kudryavtsev
noted that "some" seemed to want to "create a special camp
with membership confined to the nonalined states, claiming
that in so doing they are guided by the desire to increase
the influence and power of the emerging states in the inter-
nationaa field." Reiterating Moscow's definition of the
kind of nonalinement it can live with, Kudryavtsev argued
that true nonalinement "does not mean political neutrality"
and "proves worthwhile only when it is anti-imperialist in
both form and content."
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Thin consistent Soviet approach resurfaced on the eve of the
8-10 September nonalined conference in Lusaka, when some Soviet
comment briefly evinced concern that the meeting might be
diverted from its proper "anti-imperialist course" by "Western"
machinations. Comment after the meeting was over expressed
gratification that the conference had not been "diverted from
its LAU-imperialist course," registering apparent satisfaction
that Soviet policies had not come under attack in the conference
documents and particularly that the documents did not allude to
Czechoslovakia.
It was in the context of the polemics generated by Titols public
condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia that Moscow had
leveled its last direct attacks on Yugoslavia for espousing
nonalinement. The last specific Soviet attack on Yugoslavia's
nonalinement policy appeared in PRAVDA UKRAINY on 4 October
1968: "As is known, the Yugoslav leaders fight for 'a policy
of nonalinement.' But if one follows the position of the
leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it
becomes obvious that this is a position of alinement with the
anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia and the whole anti-
imperialist chorus." It was also during this period that
Soviet propaganda last included comment directly critical of
Tito.
The current use of LIFE ABROAD and of the proxy of the Soviet-
lining CPUSA chief Gus Hall* to denigrate the Yugoslav leader's
policy suggests a desire on Moscow's part to counter any
impetus the nonalinement movement may have gained at the Lusaka
meeting while sustaining Qe general restraint vis-a-vls Belgrade
that has been observed in Soviet media since the fall of 1969,
following Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Belgrade;
direct polemics ceased at that time, although Moscow continued
sporadically to level indirect attacks at unnamed "revisionists"
which elicited reactions in Yugoslav media.
-------
* Hall's address to the June 1969 international communist
conference in Moscow, published in PRAVDA on 15 June, 7.1osely
followed the Soviet line as enunciated by Brezhnev at the
conference, indicting those who "negate internationalism" and
denouncing "the Maoists." Hall also lectured those communists
who would remain silent "in the struggle against the anti-Soviet
campaign." Radio Moscow testified to Hall's standing with the
Soviets by devoting a substantial three percent of its comment
to his 60th birthday in the week of 5-11 October this year.
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GUS HALL In a manifest effort to lower Tito's stock in the
ON TITO Arab world, Gus Hall's article attacks the Yugoslav
President "for not going to Egypt to pay his last
respects to President Nasir" so that he could instead receive
"the esteemed guest" from the United States--"the world head-
quarters of the counterrevolutionary forces." Expanding on
this theme, the article goes on to catalogue alleged U.S.
"counterrevolutionary" efforts in the Middle East, Latin
America, and Vietnam and to denigrate Tito's "guest" as "the
commander and chief of the armed forces that are continuing
to kill thousands of men, women, and children in Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia." The article also takes Tito to task for
"his speech about the great powers" which put the Soviet
Union, "the most formidable enemy of imperialism," on the
same level as "the imperialist power committing the most
blatant aggression and exploiting the entire world . . . ."
Although the article says Tito's ostensible motives for
welcoming the President were economic, it argues that the
underlying reason was a Yugoslav policy of nonalinement which
amounts to abandonment of the class struggle: "The basis
of the whole problem is the nonclass policy, for it is
impossible to adopt a resolute position against imperialism
and continue to appear the champion of 'nonalinement."
Drawing a lesson for others who might wish to follow Tito's
coursP, the article calls nonalinement "a blind alley for
the socialist countries" because it leads to disunity, to
divisions, and to the weakening of "progressive" forces.
Gus Hall adds: "As with any policy based on opportunism,
the advantages [of nonalinement] are very short-lived,
because in return for a few handouts, imperialism wishes
to obtain proper behavior in the future." The proper
path for the socialist countries, the article lectures
in conclusion, is the policy of "class duty which leads
to unity and to the growing might of the forces which are
struggling against capitalism."
SOVIET WEEKLY REPRINTS YUGOSIAV COMMENT WELCOMING NIXON VISIT
The same issue of LIF2 ABROAD that carries the Gus Hall attack
on Tito's nonalinement policy reprints undated articles on
President Nixon's recent visit to Yugoslavia from the Belgrade
dailies BORBA and POLITIKA. The Soviet weekly injects no
comment of its own, but the reprints serve in effect to
document a portrayal of Yugoslavia moving into the Western
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The excerpts from BORBA point to favorable prospects for the
development of better U.S.-Yugoslav re2ations, cooperation,
and mutual understanding deriving from the President's visit
and from Tito's acceptance of an invitation to visit the
United States. The excerpts from POLITIKA characterize the
Tito-Nixon meeting as an embodiment of both leaders' aspirations
to seek "bridges for negotiation and exchanges of opinion,"
rather than as an attempt to achieve "unanimity in their views."
They conclude by calling the meeting "an important and weighty
contribution to the development of bilateral relations."
While LIFE ABROAD thus duly acknowledges, via the POLITIKA
comments, the fact that President Nixon and Tito restated
and recognized differing U.S. and Yugoslav views, the impact
of the reprints as a whole is to project a picture of warming
U.S.-Yugoslav relations and growing affinity.
There has been no direct Soviet comment on the Yugoslav leg
of the President's European tour. Until the appearance of
this issue of LIFE ABROAD, Soviet media had done no more
than report the visit.
BELGRADE MEDIA ASSAIL SOVIET PUBLICATION OF HALL ATTACK
Belgrade media have reacted promptly and strongly to Moscow's
publicity for Gus Hall's article, The most authoritative
reaction came on 15 October in the party weekly KOMUNIST,
which rejected "Hall's view that the right to a dialogue on
terns of equality with one world power is the prerogative only
of another world power." As quoted by TANYUG, the journal
added that "evidently Hall does not care to know that during
Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia the American President heard
Yugoslavia's views about the developments in Southeast Asia,
in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean, and elsewhere, in
addition to the understandable efforts that were made to seek
ways of cooperation acceptable and useful to the two countries."
The Yugoslav journal took particular note of the fact that
Hall's article was published in LIFE ABROAD, thus "giving it
publicity which is in glaring disproportion to the influence
which its author has on the workers and political life in his
country and on events in the international workers movement."
Because of this, TANYUG said, KOMUNIST "holds that the meaning
and the very appearance of Hall's 'critique' must be interpreted
in connection with this subsequent publicity."
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Zagreb's VJESNIK, the first to react to the Hall article,
charged on the 10th that the CPUSA chief was "expressing
opinions derived from other people"--views that are easily
recognizable." BORBA and VJESNIK on the 11th both carried
a TANJUG report calling the Soviet reprint of the Hall
article "a rude attack on Yugoslavia, on her nonalined
policy, and on President Tito."
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WARSAW PACT
YAKUBOVSKIY. ULBRICHT SPEECHES CLIMAX MANEUVERS IN GDR
Speechr3 by Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovokiy and the GDRIs
Walter Ulbricht, as leader of the hoot country, highlighted
the 18 October Magdeburg rally at the windup of the "Brother-
hood [or Comradeship] in Arms" exercises of the seven Pact
members and exemplified the unusually heavy political emphasis
of propaganda surrounding the 13-17 October military
spectacular.
Both leaders asserted the firm unity of all the Pact member
countries against U.S. backing of "revanchist" West German
forces in the framework of NATO. "Together with their
partners in the aggressive NATO bloc," Yakubovskly declared,
"the United States arranges military strength demonstrations
in Europe near the borders of the socialist states, continues
its dang.::rous arms race, and supports the forces of
militarism and revenge in West Germany." Ulbricht, recalling
that "Comrade Leonid Brezhnev emphatically called for
vigilance" in his Baku speech of 2 October, prefaced a
lengthy diatribe against the Bundeswehr with the claim that
the just concluded exercises "leave no doubt that the
unity and cohesion of the socialist military alliance is
closer than ever."
The unusually pretentious slogan of the maneuvers, "Brothers
in Arms--Class Brothers, Invincible When United, No Chance
for the Enemy," was in keeping with the extensive propaganda
fanfare surrounding the exercises, plans for which were first
announced on 15 September. There were effusive reports of
welcoming friendship rallies for the foreign troops arriving
in the GDR in the first days of October and of preliminary
joint training exercises prior to the start of the maneuvers
on 13 October. A major segment of the foreign personnel,
including Yakubovskiy and Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko,
left on the 19th, according to ADN. The Budapest MTI on the
20th said the total personnel involved in the exercises was
"about 100,000."
A large part of ADN's 18 October report of the conclusion of
the maneuvers is devoted to a detailed listing of the East
German and foreign leaders in attendance. The GDR, Poland,
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Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria were represented by their
defense ministers from the outset, while the WISH and
Hungary were represented by lonser figures until the arrival
of Grechko and Czinege, respectively, during a later phase.
Romania was represented throughout only by First Deputy
Defense Minister and Chief of Staff Colonel General Gircorghe.
Guests from outside or Europe included Mongolian Defense
Minister Batin Dorj as well as Cuban Defense Minister and
Deputy Premier Raul Castro and DRV Deputy Defense Minister
Major General Tran Sam.
ROMANIAN ROLE Participating for the first time in
maneuvers in a country of the northern
"iron triangle" of the GDR, Poland, and Czec;Ioslovakia,
Romania has publicized in its media only the start and
finish of the exercises in the GDR, with no comment. The
first report, headlined "Military Exercises on the Territory
of the GDR," appeared in SCINTEIA on the 7th, four days after
East German media had reported the arrival of the Romanian
military personnel in the country. SCIDEMI,t said only that
the maneuvers were being held "in accordance with the battle
training plan" of the Pact forces, listed the participating
countries, and noted that the GDR's Hoffmann would be in
charge. It added that "a divisional general staff from our
country" would take part--suggesting a small contingent, while
"Romanian troops" were mentioned repeatedly in the East German
reports.
On the 18th, the Bucharest radio briefly reported the end
of the maneuvers, listed the participating countries, and
mentioned that "a festivity" at the windup was attended by
Ulbricht.
East German media went out of their way to highlight Romanian
participation in the exercises, while Soviet reports and
commentary generally made no special point of Bucharest's
role. On the 16th, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND quoted a Romanian
Colonel Scrieciu, "chief of staff of e tank unit," to the
effect that "his unit regards participation in the maneuvers
as a great honor." The colonel allegedly "reaffirmed the
friendship between the Romanian people and the people of the
GDR and between the armies of the two countries and valued
the GDR's successes in building socialism." During a relay
of the Magdeburg festivities on the 18th, East Berlin radio
commented that by its participation in the maneuvem
Romanian People's Army proved to all the world it.; loyalty
to the socialist militarj coalition."
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YUGOSLAV Belgrade media commented generally along cuatomary
COMMENT Jim). TANJUG reported POLITIKA an remarking on
the 18th that "big military maneuvers on the European
continent involving powerful military forces of the bloc military
alliancea are arouaing, with reaaon, intermit and caution." The
paper obaerved that "even when they are of a mostly routine
nature, maneuvers of thip kind, viewed in thu long run, contain,
an a rule a certain dose of preseure on all aidee and "by this
very fact are not a good omen for the further stabilization of
European conditions."
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21 OCTOBER 1970
SOVIET SLOGANS
FE4 CHANGES IN OCTOBER SLOGANS REGISTER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Following recent practice, the newest pet of the CPSUlo semi-
annual slogans, appearing in PRAVDA on 18 October in ant;.cipation
of this year's October Revolution anniversary, confines specific
mentions of foreign countries to the major world trouble spots
and contains few substantive changes. Alterations in the
foreign-affairs group reflect developments since the release of
the last set of slogans for May Day--the widening of the war in
Indochina, the problem of Arab unity in the wake of Naair's
death, and the August signing of the Soviet FRG-treaty.
INDOCHINA The May Day slogan greeting the Vietnamese people,
described as struggling heroically against "the
aggression of American imperialism" and for their "freedom and
independence," broadens now into a greeting (No. ),9) to "the
peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, who are waging a heroic
struggle against American imperialism's intervention and for
their countries' freedom and independence."
In the May Day list the second slogan on Vietnam had supplanted
an earlier call for an end to aggression against the Vietnamese
with a broadened call for an end to "U.S. aggressive designs
in Southeast Asia and the barbarous war" against the Vietnamese.
This slogan now (No. 50) calls for "an end to the barbarous
war in Indochina." Correspondingly, where in the May Day
version this slogan demanded complete and unconditional
withdrawal of U.S. and "satellite" troops from South Vietnam,
the current version calls for a complete and unconditional
withdrawal "from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." A final
"Hands Off Indochina!" is added for good measure.
MIDDLE EAST The May Day call upon peoples of the world to
demand an end to Israeli "aggression" in the
Near East and "immediate withdrawal of Israeli ';roops from
occupied Arab territories" is retained (No. 51), but with the
adjective "immediate" removed. The second and concluding
sentence in the May Day version, "May the solidarity of the
Soviet people with :,eoples in Arab countries grow stronger and
develop!", is now moved to the end of a new, second slogan on
the Middle East (No. 52) which reflects Soviet concern over
the situation after Nasir's death in calling upon peoples of
the Arab states to strengthen their "unity and cohesion in the
struggle against imperialist aggression."
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EUROPE A previous slogan asking peoples of the world to
struggle "against revanchium and neofancinm in the
Federal Republic of Germany" in deleted in tacit recognition
of the signing of the Soviet-FRG treaty on 12 August. A
general plea for vigilance against the intrigues of
unidentified "forces of reaction and revanchiam--the enemies
of relaxation of tension" io injected into the slogan urging
European peoples to develop cooperation. The slogans thus
register the change in Soviet-FRG state relations while
retaining, in indirect form, the thrust of continuing propaganda
cautioning against "forces" in West Germany who oppose the
goals of Brandt's Ostrolitik.
Curiously, at the same time, a specific call for intensified
struggle "to create an effective system of collective
security" in Europe is deleted from the slogan on European
cooperation, which now urges Europeans in general terms to
"advocate more actively the transformation of Europe into a
continent of table peace and peaceful cooperation between
states." Routine propaganda continues to advocate a conference
looking toward a European "collective security system."
IMPERIALIST In the only other substantive change in the
AGGRESSION foreign-affairs group, a plea to working people
everywhere to struggle for "peace, democracy,
national independence, and socialism" now includes a call to
struggle "more acti7ely against imperialism's aggressive
policy"--a reflection of cuvrent propaganda attacking the
U.S. Administration for manf,festing increased aggressiveness
across the board.
DOMESTIC A number of new topical slogans refer to the
AFFAIRS forthcoming 24th CPSU Congress mid the July CPSU
plenum and reflect the regime's current concerns
over iniustrial efficiency and agricultural production. In
anct.he:: innovation, the CPSU is defined (No. 11) as "the
militant vanguard of the working class and all working people,
political leader and organizer of the Soviet people in the
struggle for communism." The previous formulation, dating
from the May Day 1969 slogans, merely stated that the CPSU
"confidently guides the Soviet people along the Leninist path
to the victory of communism."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
DNEPROITROVSK GAINS AS NEW UKRAINE CADRE CHIEF APPOINTED
MOLOD UKRAINY on 3 C7tober identified Dnepropetrovsk City First
Secretary A. A. Ulanov as the new head of the Ukrainian Central
Committee organizational-party work section. Ulanov, a protege
of Dnnpropetrovak Obkom First Seomtary A.F. Vatchenko,
replaces V.M. Toybulko, a close protege of A.P. Lyashko,
formel Ukrainian Second Secretary and now chairman of the
Supreme Soviet Presidium.
This is the second key republic-level organizational post
awarded to a Dnepropetrovsk man this year. At the March 1970
Ukrainian Komsomol congress Komsomol Second Secretary
Skiba, installed by Lyashko in May 1968, was replaced
by Dnepropetrovsk Komsomol First qecretary A.M. Girenko
(MOLOD UKRAINY, 28 March 1970), Subsequently Girenko, as
cadre supervisor, presided over Komsomol personnel changes
in Zhitomir in May and Vinnitsa in June and -wrote an article
on organizational work in the 22 August MOLOD UKRAINY.
These changes suggest that Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest
has had to share with the rival Dnepropetrovsk faction the.
key posts in cadre and Komsomol work opened up by the
eclipse of Lyashko. Lyashko was replaced by I.K. Lutak as
Ukrainian second secretary in June 1969 and transferred to
the honorific poxt of Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman--
thus removing a potential rival to Shelest. Lyashko's
decline was confirmed by the subsequent demotion of several
of his former subordinates. In January 1970 Central
Committee chemical secaon head A.V. Avilov was transferred
to the post of minister of chemical industry, a post
abolished six months later. In April Kiev First Secretary
F.P. Golovchenko was demoted to motor transport minister,
and Central Committee cadre section head V.M. Tsybulko was
transferred to Kiev where he became obkom first secretary.
And in June Ukrainian Foreign Minister D.Z. Belokolos was
removed and named ambassador to Zambia.
Ulanov played a leading role in the campaign against Oles
Honchar's novel Sobor organized by his chief, Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast First Secretary Vatchenko, assailing Honchar in the
4 June 1968 SOVIET CULTURE for "sinning against the truth."
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Shelest did not publicly participate in the ant..-Honchar
campaign, which failed to shake Honcharla position an writers
union chairman. Ulanov wan last identified as city first
secretary on 12 March when he wrote an article in SOVIET
CULTURE urging a crackdown on liberalism in theaters.
Vatchenko has had considerable success in promoting the
careers of his proteges in recent years. Dneprodzerzhinsk City
virst Secretary V.F. Dobryk was elocted Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast
arst secretary, and Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Second Secretary
V.M. Chebrikov was appointed USSR KGB deputy chairman. In a
September issue of PARTY LIFE (No. 17) Vatchenko bragged about
his successes with cadres, noting in particular that the
former Krivoy Rog City second secretary, V.S. Makarenko, "now
works in the Ukrainian Central Committee apparatus."
The neighboring Zaporozhe hierarchy also appears to have
benefited from these changes. G. Kryuchkov, cadre section
head in the Zaporozhe obkom in 1965, was identified in
RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 29 September as deputy head of the
Ukrainian cadres section. Kryuchkov may well share the views
of his sup,?rior, Ulanov, cn literature, since the Zaporozhe
newspapel3 (ZAPORIZKA PRAVDA and INDUSTRIALNOYE ZAPOROZHE)
joined the 1968 Dnepropetrovsk attack on Honchar's novel about
the Zaporozhe Cossacks.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SENIOR CADRES ENJOINED TO STUDY MAO MORE CAREFULLY
Since 9 September, when the second plenum of the Ninth CCP
Central Committee was publicized, there has been increasing
propaganda attention to the need for more study of Mao's
thought at the leadership level. RED FLAG No. 10, released
on 20 September, declared that "at this time we must pay
special attention to the experience of the leading cadres
in successfully studying philosophy." A few days later,
the joint editorial for National Day stressed that the grave
leadership responsibilities of leading cadres, "senior cadres
in particular," make it all the more incumbent on them to
constantly remold their thinking through the stu4y. of
"Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought." And both the
editorial and an article in RED FLAG No. 11 dredge up an
old Mao quotation enjoining "members of the Central Committee
and senior cadres" to study more intensively.
Such injunctions, coupled with the unexplained nonappearance
of two Politburo members at the National Day rally, may be
intended to carry a warning to backsliders. Among the many
provincial commentaries echoing the calls for improved study
by cadres is a revealing HSINHUA DAILY editorial broadcast by
Nanking radio on 13 C'tober. Only through close study and
conscious implementation of Mao's line--the editorial warns--
can cadres "recognize in good time and resolutely repudiate
any erroneous tendency that runs counter" to Mao's line.
Exuding self-assur4nce, the editorial even references the
Book of Odes in quoting the saying that "everyone can make a
beginning but very few can persevere through to the end,"
and concludes that "it is the same in making revolution."
Driving home the warning, the editc,rial continues: "It is
just as Comrade Stalin said--'When a car cuts a corner, you
will observe that someone is always thrown out of the car.'
We must learn from this kind of lesson."
LEFTISTS A RED FLAG N . 10 article transmitted by NCNA
IN TROUBLE? on 7 October indicates that some of those who
were "intellectual revolutionaries" during
the early stages of the cultural revolution may again be in
trouble. The article is by th- writing group of the Shanghai
Municipal Revolutionary Committee, an organization that once
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might have been considered a haven for litera leftism. But
the Shanghai leaders have apparently said farewell to their
past; the article highlights 'thf! struggle in the Shanghai high
compression cylinder plant where "in the second half of 1967
leadership over mass criticism was largely usurped by some
so-called writers with a highly questionable political back-
ground." That these literati were extreme leftists is made
clear by the charge that they feel "we have to give differing
consideration to those who are early and those who are late
In making revolution or in rebelling"--a charge frequently
made against the left as the revolution waned.
The tone of the article is almost entirely in support of the
status quo insofar as power is concerned, although the need
for continual criticism is stressed and there are warnings
regarding the ever-present class enemy. In one instance a
class enemy was blamed for corrupting the younger workers,
who were loafing on duty and making the veteran workers angry.
The cadres supported the veterans but were unsuccessful in
checking the "evil trend" until they found an old capitalist
who could be purged for inciting the youth.
AT THE Although the implications for higher-level
COUNTY LEVEL cadres may be the more dramatic, propagandists
are stressing the need for cadres at county
level and below to deepen their study of Mao's thought and
thereby strengthen their party spirit. An increase in central
media publicity for rebuilt party committees at the county
level may be designed to provide models for the cadres
emulate.
While provincial media reported the first reuilt party
committee in the nation last Der.ember, the central media
did not mention any new county unit until last June. Then
Peking began reporting on such units, at the modest rate of
about one per month. During the first two weeks of October,
however, five county committees have been publicized by
central media. The reports uniformly portray the leadership
of the county committees as overcoming initial arrogance
and unwillingness to go to basic levels for work and study.
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Radio Peking on 6 October broadcast an article written by the
secretary of the Lintien county party committee in Heilungkiang
on the necessity for leadership cadres to do manual work. The
party secretary, before he corrected his views through study,
felt he "was too busy to handle routine work" and incorrectly
believed it was n-vt necessary for the party committee's "top
leader" to go to lower levels to do manual work and study.
An earlier 28 September NCNA report, publicizing the Wangkuei
county committee, also in Heilungkiang, indicated that at one
time "some leading members were arrogant and complacent" and
when problems were discovered they "put the blame on the
cadres at the commune and brigade levels." NCNA claimed that
after study had been carried out within the committee the
leaders were better able to solve problems by "first examining
themselves" and then carrying evq-. a "small rectification within
the leading group."
NCNA on 9 October publicized for the first time the nation's
first county committee tet up after the Ninth Party Congress.
NCNA reported that leading members of the Changte county
committee in Hunan, formed 10 months ago, are actively
conducting ideological revolution with the aid of the masses.
The report praised the Changte leaders for carrying out
"three open-door rectifications" since December and for
taking part in collective labor. NCNA noted that, since
August, 29 of the committee's leading members have worked
an average of 43 days each in productive labor.
On 15 October NCNA lauded the Kaoho county committee in
Kwangtung for always welcoming comments from the masses
and "accepting supervision by them" in party consolidation.
The report cautioned, however, that "in such a situation
some people mistakenly regard relying on the masses as
depending on them." The Kaoho party leaders correctly
understood that it was necessary to gain the "help" of
the masses without actually depending on them in order
to carry out successfully "one's task of consciously making
revolution." The report applauded the secretary of the Kaoho
committee--NCNA was r?areful to point out that he had been
secretary of a count3 party committee prior to the cultural
revolution--for persuading members of the revolutionary
committees in the county to pay attention to this problem.
Thereby, the secretary enabled leading members at all levels
to observe the "new trends of party committees in ideological
revolutionization."
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