TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: September 23, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~IIIIIIIIIII!!IIIIII~~~I
RENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
23 September 19'TO
(VOL. XXI, NO. 38)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis sport is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
dedar ification
CONFIDENTIAL
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L FBIS TRENDS
23 SEPTEMBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Paris Talks: Eight-Point "Elaboration" of PRG 10 Points . . . . . 1
Soviet Media on PRG Proposals at Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Moscow's East European Allies on Binh Statement . . . . . . . . . 8
Sihanouk Presses RGNU Legitimacy, Sends Delegation to DPRK . . . . 9
Laos: Contacts Apparently Suspended During Souvanna's Trip . . . 11
TASS Urges Arab Solution, No Foreign Intervention in Jordan . . 13
Moscow Gives Factual Accounts of Jordanian Situation . . . . . 14
Reports of Syrian Intervention, Damascus Denials Noted 15
Moscow Notes Arab "Working Conference" In Cairo . . . . . . . . 18
USSR Notes U.S. Military Moves, Nixon Mediterranean Visit . . . 19
No Mention of Airline Hostages, Hijackings "Regretted" . . . . . 22
Comment on Meir Trip Scores U.S. Aid, Encouragement to Israel . . 22
USSR Supports Jarring Mission, Attacks Israeli Obstruction . . . 24
Peking Says U.S. Instigated Attacks on Guerrillas in Jordan . . 27
East Germany, Yugoslavia, Albania Issue Statements on Jordan . . 28
Belgrade Welcomes Announcement of Presidential Visit . . . . 31
Tito Calls For New Government Body to Preserve Country's Unity . 32
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Regime Hardliner Joins Appeal For intellectual Involvement . . . 34+
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shortages in Raw Materials Openly Acknowledged by-RED FLAG . . . 36
LATIN AMERICA
Peking Reacts Cautiously and Belatedly to Allende Victory . . . . 38
Moscow Stresses Alleged Machinations to Bar Allende From Office . 39
Havana Warns of Military Coup or Outside Intervention . . . . . . 39
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
23 SEPTEMBER 19(0
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 SEPTEMBER 1970
Moscow (3682 items)
Peking (2644 items)
Middle East
(5%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(41%)
35%
[Jordan
(--)
4%]
[CCP Central
(25%)
12%'j
[Golda Meir
(--)
1%]
Committee Plenum
in U.S.
Indochina
(21%)
11%
Indochina
(6%)
8%
[DRV Economic
(1%)
9%]
[Vietnam
(5%)
6%]
Delegation in PRC
Luna 16
(--)
5%
[Cambodia
(5%)
3%]
UN General
(--)
5%
USSR-FRG Treaty
(2%)
10%
Asseiribly
Middle East
(3%)
9%
China
(4%)
3%
U.S. A)tomobile &
(--)
R%
USSR-FRG Treaty
(1%)
3%
Railroad Workers
British CP, 50th
(.?-)
2%
Nonalined Conference
(6%)
7%
Anniversary
Singapore Premier
(--)
2%
....n Lusaka
Ma-'s Inscription for
(--)
6~~
:.n USSR
Japanese Workers,
8th Anniversary
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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23 SEPTEMBER 1970
INDOCHINA
J.)RV media give wide publicity to PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen
Thi Binh's statement at the 17 September session of the Paris
talks in which she declared that if the United States agrees to
a total troop withdrawal by 30 June 1971, there can be immediate
discussion of the question of releasing prisoners as well as the
question of security for the withdrawing troops. There has been
no substantive Hanoi comment, however; and Xuan :huy, in his
brief statement at the session endorsing Mme. Binh's eight-point
"clarification" of the 10-point position, mentions neither the
timetable for withdrawal nor the explicit call for the formation
of a new Saigon "administration," excluding Thieu, Ky and Khiem,
as the first step toward a coalition government.
Moscow pi,ornptly reported the substance of the PRG "initiative,"
and supporting propaganda includes a commentary by TASS' Kharkov
on the 21st which says the question of how soon the prisoners
of war are released now depends only on Washington's decision.
TASS reports on the 23d that Chairman Podgornyy, speaking at a
luncheon honoring visiting Indian President Giri, praised the
PRG's "new, constructive proposals" and said that the wor'.d
public expects "reciprocal steps" from the United States.
Judging from the TASS account, he mentioned none of the substance.
Peking media have not discussed the PRG proposal. But in keeping
with the practice of reporting almost all statements from
Sihanouk's government, NCNA on the 23d carried a brief 18 September
statement from the Royal Government of. National Union (RGNU)
which supports the proposal put forward "at the Paris conference"
as an "explanation and clarification of the 10-point solution."
Peking generally ignores the Paris talks; it not only has failed
to endorse the NFLSV 10-point solution of May 1969 but dicL not
even mention the existence of the proposal until October--in
reports of a Peking speech by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu T1,.o.*
In a 17 September message to the Khmer Buddhist monks, Sihanouk
denies Phnom Penh charges that he has allied himself with Vietnamese
communist "aggressors" in Cambodia and urges that the absence of
recognition of his government by "certain European communist
countries" does not signify support for the Lon Nol re3ime, but
rather can be explained by "certain interests" of these governments.
PARIS TALKS: EIGHT-POINT "ELABORATION `1 OF PRG'S 10 POINTS
Hanoi has given unusual publicity to the 84th session of the Paris
talks on 17 September at which PRG Foreign Minister Binh submitted.
ApR b g e ' 0 5 o er , page , an -$
~f9 October 1969, pages 9-10.
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her eight-point "elaboration and clarification" of the NFLSV
position. As in the case of the 8 May 1969 session when the
NFLSV's 10-point solution was introduced, DRV media carried the
full texts of both Mme. Binh's and Xuan Thuy's formal statements
rather than the usual summaries.* VNA first carried an "account"
of the session which included lengthy extracts of the communist
speeches but totally ignored the allied statements. VNA
followed this shortly with a transmission of the full texts.of
Binh's and Thuy's statements. The VNA press review of the 18th
notes that all Hanoi dailies announced the news of Mme. Binh's
presentation in "big headlines" and carried the full texts of
the communist statements. Hanoi radio carried the VNA account of
the session promptly on the 17th and rebroadcast it four times
the following day. The radio normally carries a report of the
session the following day. In a rare move, VNA also carried
reports of the post-session briefings by the DRV and PRG delegation
spokesmen.** There has been no independent comment from DRV media,
but Hanoi has disseminated Front comment and rounded up favorable
foreign reaction.
In addition to carrying the text of the PRG st&tement, Front
media on the 18th carried an LPA commentary recapitulating the
proposal and followed up on the 19th with a dispatch from.LPA's
Paris correspondent Truong Tung providing local color. Tung--
whose last known dispatch was carried by Liberation Radio on
29 November 1969--says the session of 17 September can be compared
to the first session in January 1969, the 8 May session when the
NFLSV's 10-point solution was introduced, and the 12 June session
dealing with the formation of the PRG. Tung adds that the 84th
session at which Mme. Binh's "important document" was presented
will also be recalled as an "important event" because it was the
first session at which all four chief negotiators were together
since late 1969, when Henry Cabot Lodge resigned his post.
FIRST POINT: U.S. Point one of Mme. Binh's proposal, with its
WITHDRAWAL, POWS new call for a U.S. decision to withdraw
from South Vietnam by 30 June 1971, is an
"elaboration" of the call for unconditional U.S. withdrawal out-
lined in the second of the NFLSV's May 1969 10-point solution.
* See the 14 May 1969 TRENDS, pages 2-5, for a discussion of
the 10-point proposal.
** There were precedents for this in March and April 1969.
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The current proposal is also a variation of one first made at
the 44th session on 11 December 1969; at that time Mme. Binh
proposed that if the United States would agree to withdraw in
six months, the parties could then enter into a discussion on
ensuring the safFcy of withdrawing troops. PRG delegate Dinh
Ba Thi explained at the 30 December session that a six-month
period had been selected because only a rapid withdrawal
would bring a prompt end to the war and that this 1 ngth of
time was long enough to effect the withdrawal. The six-month
proposal has been repeated periodically since December, most
recently at the 6 August and 3 September sessions.
A totally new element in point one is the suggestion that
once the United States agrees to the 30 June timetable, the
question of the release of prisoners can be d..scussed
immediately. In the 10-point solution the prisoner-of-war
issue was cited in point nine--which said that "to resolve
the aftermath of the war, the parties will negotiate the
release of the military men captured in the war." VNA's
report of DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's press briefing
includes his statement that "the question of captured military
men would include U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam."
LPA Paris correspondent Truong Tung says in his 19 September
dispatch that when the DRV spokesman made this statement,
there was visible enthusiasm among the newsmen, "especially
the American newsmen."
The PRG's "elaboration" on troop withdrawal leaves unclear the
status of the final point in the 10-point solution: Point 10
says that the parties shall reach agreement on "international
supervision" of U.S. and allied withdrawal of troops and materiel.
FOLLOWUP The LPA commentary reviewing the PRG proposal,
COfrMENT carried by the news agency and Liberation Radio on
the 18th and published iii iNHAN DAN on the 19th,
calls the time limit regarding withdrawal "reasonable. and
logical." And an article in the NFLSV journal GIAI PHONG,
broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 22d, says that the first
point, with its proviso for a discussion of the release of
prisoners given U.S. agreement to withdraw by next June, is a
very good tasis for the United States to "honorably extricate
itself" from South Vietnam.
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 19th makes no refeeence to
the PRG proposal when it cites numerous calls in U.S. political
circles for a fixed timetable for a total U.U'. withdrawal.
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It recalls the Democratic Party resolution last February which
suggested an 18-month timetable as typical of opposition to
President Nixon's three conditions for continued "piecemeal"
troop withdrawal. And it quotes from articles by Senator
Muskie and Townsend Hoopes opposing the Administration's
policies. (Hanoi radio on 30 August broadcast lengthy excerpts
from the Muskie article which appeared in the 5 July New York
TIMES.)
COALITION, Point three* of the PRG "elaboration" contains
OTHER POINTS standard denunciations of the "warlike and
fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration." But
it goes on to say directly that the restoration of peace
necessitates "the formation in Saigon of an administration
without Thieu, Ky, ana n. iem." This demand in the past has been
in terms of the "overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" and
formation of a "peace cabinet."
+ Point four of the "elaboration" is similar to points four and
five of the 10-point proposal. It calls for free general elections
to elect a new general assembly that would work out a constitution;
it says that "no party shall usurp for itself the right to
organize general elections and lay down their modalities," and it
calls for the formation of a provisional coalition government
to organize the new elections.
+ Point five now stipulates explicitly that a provisional
coalition government will include three components: persons
from 1) the PRG, 2) the Saigon administration--"really standing
for peace," and 3) various political and religious tendencies
standing for peace, independence and neutrality, and democracy,
including those who for political reasons have to live abroad.
Included in point five is the statement that the "provisional"
coalition government would pursue a foreign policy of peace and
neutrality. The sixth of the 10 points said "South Vietnam"
will carry out a policy of peace and neutrality.
The LPA commentary on the 18th presents the PRG as being partic-
ularly conciliatory in suggesting that a provisional coalition
government made up of three factions prepare general elections.
Point two of the PRG "elaboration" is point three in the
10-point solution--the question of Vietnamese armed forces in
South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among
themselves.
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It says that the PRG does not demand for itself a monopoly in
this regard, although it is "defeating the United States and
is controlling a majority of South Vietnamese territory."
The latter claim, in the past a staple of Front comment, has
been absent from recent propaganda; and no Front Iropaganda
since December has repeated the old claim to control over
four-fifths of the territory; the last known claim using the
figure in Hanoi propaganda was in July 1969.
+ Point six describes the process of reunification in terms
similar to point seven of the 10 points.
+ Point seven is a new interjection which says merely that
"the parties will decide together on measures aimed at'ensuring
the respect and correct implementation of the provisions agreed
upon."
+ Point eight, unlike the 10 points, explicitly mentions a
cease-fire. But it says only that "after the agreement on and
signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and
restoring peace in Vietnam, the parties will implement the modalities
that will have been laid down for a cease-fire-in South Vietnam."
XUAN THUY STATEMENT, In his formal statement at the Paris session
OTHER DRV SUPPORT uan Thuy declared that the DRV delegation
"fully approves and supports these
elaborations by the delegation of the PRG" because they are in
keeping with the 10-point solution which the DRV has "unreservedly
approved and supported." Xuan Thuy added that Mme. Binh's eight-
point proposal is of "very gree+ significance," and he called
on the U.S.-GVN side to "carefully study" it. "I hope," he added,
that "you will give a serious rei;ponse so that our conference may get
out of its deadlock and promptly reach a correct peaceful settle-
ment of the Vietnam problem." However, he repeated none of the
s'abstance.
Further DRV support for the proposal is offered in a speech by
Fatherland Front representative Hoang Quoc Viet and in a resolution
adopted at a 21 September meeting in Hanoi marking the 25th
anniversary of the Nam Bo resistance. Speaking at the same
meeting, according to the 22 September radio account, Truong
CongDong, acting chief of the PRG special representation in the
North, hailed the proposal and said it had been "fully approved
and supported" by the DRV. (The original 10-point proposal had
been welcomed in a statement adopted at a special meeting of the
Fatherland Front Presidium.)
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ALLIED REMARKS There is no mention in the VNA account of the
remarks made at the -session by Ambassadors
Bruce or Lam. However, VNA's report of Nguyen Thanh Le's
post-session briefing says that Le "sharply criticized"
Ambassador Lam's speech and also criticized, the prepared state-
ment of Ambassador Bruce as containing "empty words." VNA
notes that Le referred to Bruce's additional remarks to the
effect that the United States will not impose any government on
the South Vietnamese people and respects their right to
self-determination. VNA further quotes Le as commenting that
these remarks are an "old trick" of the Nixon Administration to
maintain the "puppet regime" and U.S. neocolonialism in South
Vietnam.
LPA correspondent Truong Tung's dispatch also comments on the
allied side's reaction by claiming that GVN delegation spokesman
Nguyen Trieu Dan, in his press briefing after the session, was
"embarrassed" when he said there was "nothing new" in Mme. Binh's
statement even after an American journalist questioned him on
the points concerning captured military men and the provisional
coalition government.
FOREIGN Liberation Radio on the 20th and VNA on the 22d
REACTION carried reports playing up favorable worldwide
reaction to the PRG proposals, including comment
from the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cuba,
and the Lao Patriotic Front. Support in the Sihanouk government's
18 September statement is singled out in separate Hanoi radio and
VNA items on the 22d.
Hanoi radio on the 21st also says "U.S. political circles are
welcoming the new peace initiative." It cites reported remarks
of Senator Cooper urging that the proposals be studied and
quotes Senator Gore as commenting they are "very interesting."
According to Hanoi, "U.S. senators paid special attention" to
Mme. Binh's statement that if the United States agrees to
withdraw allied forces by 30 June 1971, the FLAP will not attack
the withdrawing forces.
SOVIET MEDIA ON PRG PROPOSALS AT PARIS
Moscow's first reports of Mme. Binh's Paris statement came in
brief Russian- and English-language TASS dispatches from Paris
at 1334 and 1352 GMT on 17 September, respectively, which
reported her call for agreement by the United States to withdraw
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its troops by 30 June 1971. But the dispatches went on
erroneously to quote her as saying that in this event the PRG
"is ready to set free all prisoners of war captured during
the conflict." This incorrect formulation was repeated in
some English-language newscasts. However, it appears to
have been a Moscow error in translation and not a deliberate
distortion, since a longer TASS dispatch from Paris some
hours later, as well as a prompt domestic service newscast
and subsequent comment, have rendered her formulation
accurately.
For example, a TASS dispatch from Paris transmitted in English
at 1828 GMT cited Mme. Binh as having said that if the U.S.
Government declares it will. withdraw its troops before
30 June 1971, "the sides will be able to immediately open
talks on the question of guarantee of withdrawal from South
Vietnam of all troops of the United States and the troops
of its camp and on the question of release of prisoners
of war." A TASS report printed in PRAVDA on the 18th said
that "the PRG proposes to hold talks to come to an agreement
on measures to guarantee the security of the withdrawal of
all American and allied troops. At the same time, the PRG
is ready to discuss the question of freeing all prisoners of
war."
Followup Soviet comment praising the "new, important initiative"
stresses the points on troop withdrawal and on formation of a
coalition government. A foreign-language commentary by Soltan,
broadcast widely on the 18th, says that the PRG's "principled
stand" on the "pivotal point" on total withdrawal of U.S.
and all' i .ed troops is "unchanged," but that to show-its good
will the PRG has "advanced many new proposals" clarifying the
10 points, the implementation of which could bring a political
settlement "out of the present stalemate." Soltan stresses the
point regarding the announcement ~jf a U.S. withdrawal by
30 June 1971, after which the sides would "immediately engage
in discussions about" the questions of the security for the
withdrawal and the release of prisoners of war. Soltan also
emphasizes the point on formation of a "provisional government
of broad coalition" Consisting of members of the PRG, certain
members of the Saigon administration, and representatives of
various forces in Vietnam and abroad.
A similar line is taken in a RED STAR article by Col. Aleksey
Leontyev and in an IZVESTIYA article, both on 19 September.
Leontyev concludes by noting that although the U.S. delegate
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"reacted negatively" to the initiative, it may not be the United
States' last word; he adds that if the United States reacts
seriously to the proposals, "it will have a real opportunity"
to extricate itself from the war. The IZVESTIYA article says
that the United States and Saigon delegates were "obviously
caught unawares" by the PRG statement and that the U.S.
representative's statement at the press conference that the
proposals "contain nothing new" was met with "laughter among
the journalists." A TASS commentary by Kharkov on the 21st
says the United States has long been trying to "move to the
forefront" the question of prisoners of war, and now the
timing of their release depends on Washington's decision.
TASS has also promptly publicized some favorable comment from
U.S. senators on the PRG statement. On the 18th TASS reported
that U.S. Congressmen are particularly interested in the
assertion that the PRG would not attack withdrawing U.S.
troops and would be willing to reach agreement on measures to
guarantee their security. It cited Senator Cooper as saying
that "this proposal should not be turned down" and Senator
Gore as calling the initiative "interesting." Other TASS
reports cite Senators Brooke, Hatfield, and Dole as urging the
Administration to study the initiative carefully. On the 23rd
TASS says that Senator Muskie, alsc calling for a study of the
initiative, told the Senate that "the solution of the question of
American war prisoners could be achieved only through a political
settlement of the Vietnamese problem at a conference table."
MOSCOW'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES ON BINH STATEMENT
All of Moscow's East European allies have reported Mme. Binh's
"new initiative" in Paris, and all except Prague thus far are
known to have briefly reported in the press her proposal that
if the United States agrees to withdraw troops by 30 June 1971
the sides could immediately engage in discussions on measures to
ensure the security of the withdrawing troops and-on the release
of all American prisoners.
The only comment on the prisoner- issue thus far comes.from
Warsaw. A 19 September TRYBUNA.LUDU article Pays it will no
longer be possible to continue "anti-Vietnam propaganda on the
question of the 'unknown fate of American POW's,'" since their
release now depends entirely on Washington's own decision. A
19 September ZYCIE WARSAWY editorial on the initiative similarly
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says that "the possibility of rapidly freeing American prisoners
of war undercuts the argument of war forces in the united States
who assert demagogically that responsibility for the fate of
these prisoners rests with the Vietnamese side."
SIHANOUK PRESSES RGNU LEGITIMACY, SENDS DELEGATION TO DPRK
Statements by Sihanouk and his government defending the J.egalit-,-
and legitimacy of the RGNU continue to be publicized. In a
"special message to the Khmer Buddhist monks" dated 17 September--
carried by NCNA on the 20th and by the FUNK radio from the 20th
to the 22d, but apparently not by VNA--Sihanouk calls upon the
bonzes to support his government and not be led astray by the
Lon Nol regime.
Among other things, Sihanouk rebuts Phnom Penh's argument that
he has "collaborated with communism" and allied himself with
the "Red Vietnamese aggressors in Cambodia," charging that the
Americans and their "puppets" are trying to shift the blame for
aggression onto the Vietnamese communists. On his own authority
Sihanouk ~enounces charges of "so-called communist Vietnamese
aggression" and "imaginary" Vietnamese "invasion" of Cambodia.
But he cites an 11 September USIS cable in responding to reports
by the Phnom Penh regime that the head of the Mohanikay Buddhist
sect called members of the VPA "bandits." The cable, he says,
quotes a Cambodian officer as saying that "if the Viet Cong
comes next time, don't send us the South Vietnamese soldiers.
We can handle the Viet Cong better than we can handle the South
Vietnamese." Sihanouk further quotes the cable as saying that
"the North Vietnamese soldiers" reportedly go out of their way
to show respect to the Cambodians and that there has never been
a reported case of "extortion or racketeering by North Vietnamese
on any highway in Cambodia."*
* VNA has apparently ignored this Sihanouk message, although
Hanoi did acknowledge an earlier Sihanouk reference to the
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. Hanoi radio reported Sihanouk's
references to Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia in his
20-21 March statement, quoting him as saying that "the Vietnamese
resisting American imperialism infiltrated into our country. This
infiltration, which I myself have denounced to the world many
times, is not a new question. Moreover, the infiltrations have been
reduced considerably in recent days." See the TRENDS of
25 March 1970, page 13.
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Further responding to charges that he collaborates with
communism, Sihanouk asks rhetorically if the Lon Nol group
does not also "collaborate with communism," since it has
"extravagantly lauded" the USSR and most of the East European
countries for "standing on the side of its government" and
for having refused to recognize the RGNU. Later in his
message Sihanouk lists the 24 regimes which he claims have
recognized the RGNU and asserts that the only countries which
have recognized the Lon Nol government de jure are imperialists
and colonialists who do not have Cambodia's interests at heart.
He argues that the communist states of East Europe, despite
Lon Nol's claims of their support, have not given their
"official recognition" to the regime in Phnom Penh. Some
have publicly acknowledged Sihanouk as the legal heat', of state
of Cambodia, says t';e message, and the political parties and
fronts of these countries have "officially recognized" the
FUNK. Sihanouk adds that the "refusal" of "certain European
communist countries" to recognize the RGNU does not signify
that they support the Lon Nol regime, but can be explained
rather by "certain interests of their own of these governments."*
APPOINTMENT OF On 19 September NCNA carried a "communique"
VICE MINISTERS by the FUNK Political Bureau and the RGNU,
dated the 17th, announcing the names of
"seven persons now fighting in Cambodia" whose "nomination as
vice ministers" has received the "highest approval" of Sihanouk.
The communique--also carried by VNA on the 21st and by the FUNK
radio on the 22d--adds that the "competence of several ministries
will be transferred into the country in the near future."
The communique repeats the claim that "more than two-thirds"
of the country, embracing "nearly three million inhabitants,"
is already "completely liberated" :,.nd that the city of Phnom
Penh is "actually isolated and encircled by the peoples'
forces." (Sihanouk'.s message.to.the bonzes. reiterates that
* On 13 July NCNA carried a RGNU foreign ministry statement
rebutting a "distorted report" by a Canadian correspondent
which cited Sihanouk as saying he was "disappointed" with
the USSR's refusal to recognize his government. The statement
said Sihanouk had in fact told the correspondent that the
Soviets may not have recognized the RGNU merely because "the
interests of the Soviets and ours do not coincide."
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five provinces are "completely liberated" and lists some 16
others as being "hal:? liberated.") For these reasons, says
the communique, 3.t was decided at the FUNK Central Committee
meeting of 20-21 August to enlarge the responsibilities of
the leading members fighting in Cambodian "liberated areas"
and to appoint Khieu Samphan--one of the three ministers said.
to be in Cambodia--as deputy prime minister concurrently with
his post as minister of defense.*
DELEGATION TO On 17 September Pyongyang's KCNA reported
NORTH KOREA the arrival, at the invitation of the DPRK
Government, of a RGNU delegation led by
Dr. Ngo Iiou, minister of public health, religious, and social
affairs. Ngo Hou had previously led a FUNK delegation which
visited Laotian "liberated areas" fro,n 19 to 25 July at the
invitation of the NLHS.
The group was received in Pyongyang on the 184,it by DPRK
Foreign Minister Ho Tam and was entertained a?,; a Cabinet
banquet that evening, according to KCNA reports on the 19th.
At the banquet the Korean speaker, the chairman of the
agricultural commission, claimed that Sihanouk's recent vis.Lt
to North Korea (15 June-1 July) had further developed the
"militant friendship and solidarity"'of the two peoples and
recalled that Kim Il-song at that time promised continued
"moral and material assistance."
LAOS: CONTACTS APPARENTLY SUSPENDED DURING SOUVANNAIS TRIP
The Pathet Lao news agency on 23 September publicized
another message from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma in the
continuing exchange between the two princes on the matter of
the site and level of talks between the Laotian parties. Dated
the 20th, the message expresses "regret" that Souvanna has
gone abroad, thereby "dragging out" preparations for a meeting
of plenipotentiaries of the two princes in Khang Khay.
Scuphanouvong complains-that he has received no official
reply to his 30 August message in which he announced the
* A 22 August "press communique" on the FUNK Central Committee
meeting, carried by NCNA and VNA on the 24th, had noted that
the nomination of "several vice ministers from the personages
who are now fighting in Cambodia" was approved, but did not
give any names.
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nomination of his plenipotentiary, Phoune Sipraseuth, and asked
Souvanna to appoint his own plenipotentiary. Souphanouvong says
in the current message that his special envoy, Tiao Souk
Vongsak, who has been conducting preliminary talks with Souvanna,
"will return to Sam Neua to report to me about the situation."
He concludes by suggesting that Souvanna, upon his return
to Vientiane, indicate whether he "deems it necessary to pursue
the discussion on the preparation for the meeting between our
two plenipotentiary representatives."
Souphanouvong's message fails to mention Souvanna's 29 August
message to Tiao Souk Vongsak naming Pheng Phongsavan as his
plenipotentiary and suggesting that they meet in Vientiane
during Souvanna's absence, a suggestion Souk had rejected
in a message publicized by Pathet Lao media on 1 September.
There is no available Pathet Lao response to a 10 September
letter to Souk from Pheng saying that he was prepared to
meet with Phoune at a date and place to be mutually agreed
upon.
Souphanouvong also fails to mention Souvanna's suggestion,
made at the time of his departure for his trip abroad on
2 September, that the two princes meet in Paris. This suggestion
had been denounced by plenipotentiary Phoune Sipraseuth in a
7 September Pathet Lao news agency interview, but in a "press.
communique" on the same day Tiao Souk Vongsak did not flat'.y
reject the idea, noting that he had reported the suggestion to
Souphanouvong and was awaiting instructions. He expressed the
belief that Soth Pethrasy, the permanent NLHS representative
in Vientiane who had gone to Sam Neua last month to report to
Souphanouvong on the progress of the talks, would soon return
to Vientiane with Souphanouvong's views. On 22 September the
Pathet Lao radio reported Soth Pethrasy's return on the 18th,
but cited him only as complaining in an arrival statement that
Souphanouvong's 30 August message had received no official reply.
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MIDDLE EAST
Soviet propagrLnda stresses the need for an end to the fratricidal
fighting in Jordan and cautions that outside intervention would
only further complicate and widen the crisis. A low-keyed TASS
statement of 19 September, issued on the third day of the fighting
between Jordanian and Palestinian forces, calls for an Arab solution
and admonishes unidentified parties against foreign armed interven-
tion. And Podgornyy, in a speech on the 23d at a luncheon honoring
the Indian president, puts the Soviet Union "firmly on record for
inadmissability of external interference ire the developments in
Jordan, whatever the pretext."
Soviet media publicize a succession of statements by U.S. officials
and press reportage on military preparations, pointing out that
the United States is again, as in the past, planning armed
intervention on the "pretext" of protecting American citizens.
Moscow's cautious attitude regarding any Soviet action is
exemplified by the fact that a tingle commentary--broadcast
in Arabic and Turkish on the 18th--voices the stereotyped slogan
that the "Soviet people" "cannot remain indifferent" toward the
bloody events in Jordan.
Mosr:ow for he most part provides carefully balanced, factual
accounts of the developments. Jordan's charge of Syrian
intervention is noted, along with Syria's denial. Following
Secretary Rogers' 20 September statement condemning Syria's
intervention, Moscow implies that the forces involved are
Palestinian and--without denying Syrian action--cites Damascus'
rebuttal of the U.S. accusations. Husayn's request to the Big
Four for assistance in obtaining a Syrian rollback, which
according to U.S. press reports was delivered on the 21st,
has not been acknowledged by Moscow.
Soviet commentators see Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's
visit to the United States as aimed primarily at obtaining
further military deliveries and economic assistance, as well
as U.S. support for Israel's obstruction of the Jarring mission,
and at persuading the United States either to intervene in
Jordan or to approve Israeli intervention.
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Moscow's profession o concern that the Jarring talks should
proceed is underlined in a Nikolayev article in the 22 September
IZVESTIYA which rejects accusations that the UAR is violating
the cease-fire agreement and countercharges that it is Israel
which is violating the truce. The article is notable for its
implicit acknowledgment of Soviet involvement in the problem of
resolving the missile emplacements on the Suez Canal and
reinstituting the Jarring mission.
TASS URGES ARAB SOLUTION, NO FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN JORDAN
The short TASS statement of 19 September, essentially an appeal
for avoidance of outside intervention in the Jordanian conflict,
is vague as to the identity of the foreign circles said to be
cL:,templating such actions. The statement does express "alarm"
at reports of movements in the eastern Mediterranean by the U.S.
Sixth Fleet, which has "more than once" been used against the
Arab national liberation movement. But it goes on to refer to
"other reports" of plans of foreign military intervention by
"definite circles in certain countries"--which could apply to
Syria as well as to the United States or Israel. Reflecting
Soviet concern at the prospect, TASS says such a development
of events would aggravate the conflict in Jordan and the
situation in the Middle East, and would "essentially complicate"
the international situation.
TASS expresses the hope of "Soviet official circles" that the
peoples, governtr-nts, and leaders of Arab countries and Arab
organizations will do everything possible to achieve the
speediest cessation of the fratricidal war in Jordan. Reiterating
Soviet opposition to foreign intervention, TASS mildly declares
that all who cherish peace and come out for strengthening
international security "cannot put up with" such a development.
And it concludes with a generalized pledge of Soviet support
for the Arabs' "just struggle" for full independence and
"national development" and xeace in the world.
MOSCOW GIVES FACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF JORDANIAN SITUATION
Developments in Jordan have been reported factually, with a
virtual absence of editorializing. Comment is careful to avoid
blaming either side: Thus a Shishkin article in the 19 September
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RURAL LIFE observed that "dual power" has long existed in Jordan,
with both regular Jordanian army and "quite large and strong
subdivisions of Palestine guerrillas" stationed on its territory.
A,serting that the guerrillas "react violently" every time Israel
"makes a further attempt to sabotage a peaceful settlement,"
S',iishkin said that the Palestinians denied "rumors" that the
guerrillas were responsible for the apparent assassination
attempt against Husayn on 1 September, and that the Palestinian
resistance holds "reactionary elements incited by Western
intelligence agents" responsible for the armed skirmishes which
followed.
In its reportage on developments, TASS on the 16th noted the
statement of the new military government stressing that its
main task was to end the army-fedayeen clashes and achieve
implementation of cease-fire agreements; it also
reported fedayeen leader Arafat as stating that events in
Jordan were aimed at striking at the Palestinian movement,
which would defend itself. On the 17th TASS in reporting
the fighting which erupted that day duly took note of charges
by both sides.
TASS on the 19th reported Nasir's request to Husayn for a
temporary cease-fire "for even 24 hours," and Husayn's intention,
in reply, to order a cease-fire; "however," TASS said, Jordanian
commander in chief al-Majali just an hour later issued an
ultimatum to the guerrillas demanding their capitulation within
three hours. Noting Nasir's message to Arafat with an appeal
for a cease-fire, TASS said that no answer had yet been received
bur. that a guerrilla spokesman in Baghdad had declared that the
cease-fire proposal would not be accepted by the guerrilla
leadership. Later that day, TASS reported that Husayn had
given orders for a cease-fire and the Palestinians had been
informed of this decision by Nasir's representative visiting
Amman. The following day TASS reported that despite Husayn's
cease-fire order to his troops, figh;ing had flared up in the
north with new force.
REPORTS OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION, DAMASCUS DENIALS NOTED
Moscow's first report on Syrian intervention came in a TASS
roundup of developments on the 20th, which reported Amman
radio as saying that a Syrian armored brigade crossed the
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Jordanian border near ar-Ramtha and attacked Jordanian troops.
Units of the regular Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), based in
Syria, are in action in the north, `L'ASS added (on the previous
day it had reported that PLA regular units "with a base In Syria"
had joined the battle on the guerrillas' side). The Jordanian
Government, PASS said, sent a protest to the Arab League against
the entry of Syrian troops into Jordanian territory and demanded
an urgent meeting of the League Council ti:) discuss the situation.
But, TASS added, according to a REUTERS report from Beirut,
Syrian head of state al-Atasi. denied the Amman radio report "on
fighting between Jordanian troops and the Syrian armored brigade
as an invention." A domestic service broadcast of this reportage,
also on the 20th, failed to mention the Syrian denial, instead
adding a sentence citing a Jordanian command communique as saying
that as a result of fierce fighting the Syrian tanks were stopped
and turned back. But an Arabic-language broadcast included the
Syrian denial.
ROGERS Moscow's first reference to Secretary Rogers'
STATEMENT 20 September statement regarding Syrian interven-
tion appears in reportage by Moscow radio's Beirut
correspondent Seyful-Mulyukov, broadcast in Arabic and the
domestic service on the 21st. He noted that the Jordanian
situation is becoming more complex despite efforts by the UAR
and unspecified "other powers"--he did not say Arab--to end
the dispute; the cryptic remark could denote Soviet efforts to
intervene with the Syrians. Taking the tack that the units
involved in the ar-Ramtha fighting are Palestinian fcrces, `?he
correspondent noted fighting in the area between Jorr'lanian units
and PLA forces and "regular units of the Palestine resistance
which had not hitherto taken part in armed clashes." No sooner
were reports of these battles published, he said, than "Washington
and London started shouting about an armed attack by Syria against
Jordan." }.e said that Secretary Rogers "directly accused Damascus"
but that the Syrian Government immediately rebutted the American
accusation, pointing out that the United States was seeking a
pretext to intervene in Jordan. The correspondent added that
Washington and London, pursuing "this very purpose," were
disseminating "provocative rumors about the so-called Syrian
danger."
Subsequent mentions of the Rogers statement have obscured its
application to Syria: A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on
the 21st said only that the Secretary had spoken of the "possibility
of further expansion" of the Jordanian dispute, and the domestic
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service on the same day similarly cited Rogers as saying the
Jordanian events are "fraught with the danger of an extension
of the Middle East conflict."
Rounding up news agency reports on the fighting, Moscow's domestic
service on the 21st noted an AFP dispatch from Damascus that the
Syrian Foreign Ministry denied that its forces are participating
in military operations on Jordanian territory, and e ted the
MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as repoi-ting that the Palestinians
now control the northern area of Jordan. In an Arabic-language
broadcast late on the 21st, Moscow noted that Jordanian military
governor al-Majali, in a statement broadcast by Amman radio, said
that Syrian armored units were participating with the fedayeen in
battles in ar-Ramtha and Irbid. The Jordanian statement, the
broadcast added, pointed out that two battalions of armored
vehicles were advancing toward Irbid from the border. It is
known, Moscow said, that Syrian head of state al-Atasi has
denied Amman radio reports auout Syrian forces' entry into
Jordan and participation In operations against the Jordanian
army. Moscow domestic service broadcasts on the 22d continued
to portray "resistance detachments" as holding the northern areas
of the country, citing the Palestinian radio for reports that
Jordanian planes for the first time bombed PLA positions in the
Irbid area.
PODGORNYY ON In his 23 September speech Podgornyy seems to
INTERFERENCE implicitly acknowledge that the Soviets have
made representations to Syria with regard to
intervention in Jordan. lie says it is "urgently necessary" to
put an end as soon as possible to bloody clashes in Jordan, to
terminate discord between Arabs, and attain "a just agreement
between the Jorda~iiar. Government and organizations of the
Palestinian resistance movement." The Soviet Union, Podgornyy
goes on, "has been consistently coming out for this also in
its appeals made recently to a number of states, both those
belonging and not belonging to the area,, firmly stressing the
inadmissibility of external interference in developments in
Jordan under any pretext whatsoever."
IRAQ, In a roundup of 18 September TASS and AFP
LIBYA dispatches on the situation, PRAVDA on the
19th said that Amman radio had warped against
any foreign intervention whatsoever. PRAVDA attributed to AFP
a report that the Cairo AL-AHRAM said that despite the
Palestinians' appeal for interference on their side, Iraqi
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troops had been withdrawn from az-Zarqa, and that "many people
believe" the Iraqi. forces, which have been in Jordan since the
June 1967 war, were preparing to return to their own country.
Moscow has apparently not acknowledged the 20 September Libyan
statement proposing the formation of a join Libyan-Algerian
force "to prevent new clashes" or, if necessary, unilateral
Libyan action to deal with the situation.
MOSCOW NOTES ARAB "WORKING CONFERENCE" IN CAIRO
Nasir's acceptance of a proposal by Tunisian President Bourguiba
for an Arab summit conference in Cairo to discuss the situation
was reported by Moscow on the 20th. Late on the 21st, TASS and
Moscow in Arabic reported that the conference would be held in
Cairo on the 22d, and listed the countries which had expressed
readiness to attend; the Arab broadcast included Syria, but
TASS, about an hour later, lid not. Moscow is not known to
have reported Syrian head of state al-Atasi's arrival in Cairo
and meeting with Nasir on the 21st.
Both the TASS and Arabic-language T,-:ports noted that Arafat had
stated his willingness to participate, but TASS on the 22d,
.reporting postponement of the opening of the conference, said
Arafat had informed the participants that "because of the
situation" there was no possibility of his com=.ng to Cairo,
and suggested the conference participants come to Amman. TASS
added that at Tunisia's suggestion a "special delegation" of
four--representing Tunisia, the UAR, S*.idan, and Kuwait--left
for Amman to meet with Husayn and Arafat, and that the conference
would begin after studying the results of the delegation's visit.
A commentary in Arabic on the 22d underscored the need for
"effective tangible steps urgently" to stop the bloodshed in
Jordan and settle the differences between the Jordanian
authorities and the fedayeen. The decisive word in this
"naturally" rests "above all with the Arabs themselves," it
said. Calling the emergency summit meeting in Cairo "an
urgent vital necessity;" the broadcast added that the "personal
meeting of the majority of Arab leaders" is necessary to
"establish collective effective measures" to rectify the
situation in Jordan as soon as possible.
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USSR NOTES U.S. MILITARY MOVES, NIXON MEDITERRANEAN VISIT
Both prior and subsequent to the TASS statement, propagandists
express concern at statements and press reports in the United
States and Israel on the possibility of armed intervention in
Jordan. Comment broadly accuses Tel Aviv and "imperialist
circles" of striving to split the Arab world, weaken the
Arab "'Liberation movement," and u:ltimate.iy wreck efforts for
a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. Moscow says
no Arab side can gain from the bloodshed in Jordan, and calls
for a quick end to the fratricidal struggle and prevention of
outside interference, which,, it cautions, would further aggravate
the dangerous situation.
In his 23 September speech Podgornyy says the fratricidal
conflict in Jordan gives rise to "serious concern and anxiety,
particularly in connection with the threat of direct interference
of external forces, indicative of which are movements of the U.S.
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and other facts."
Matveyev and Glukhov, writing in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA,
respectively, on the 19th, cited only the "suspicious
activity" of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean
as evidence of imperialist designs to stir up tension in the
region and exploit the deteriorating situation. In the
20 September PRAVDA, S'-.relnikov pointed to Pentagon reports
that U.S. aircraft carriers and assault ships with Marines
have been sent to the Middle East, and that C-130 transports
have been transferred to American bases in Turkey and Greece,
while the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg has been brought
to combat re',diness. Strelnikov said that an "official group"
in the White House headed by Kissinger is studying "two
possible alternati,res--intervention by Israeli troops, or
American intervention."
Strelnikov, and other comment, picks up the Chicago SUN-TIMES
report, "after Nixon's chat" with the paper's publishers and
editors, that Washington is weighing possibilities of interfering
in Jordan "under the pretext of 'defending and evacuating American
citizens.'" TASS on the 19th had referred to the Miami HERALD's
report that the President, at a news briefing in Chicago on the
16th, did not exclueB the possibility of armed intervention by
"the United States or Israel" in Jordan, and had said that in
certain conditions the United States "would prefer that Israel
undertake this intervention."
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Vasilyev, in RED STAR on the 20th, also pointed to the Miami
HERALD report, representing it as saying that at a private
briefing for journalists President Nixon said that
"safeguarding the security of U.S. citizens in Jordan
would be a pretext" for U.S. armed interference. Noting
Pentagon reports that additional ships and over 1,000 Marines
are being transferred to the Mediterranean, and that this
"show of military force" is being presented merely as
"'certain measures' in the event of having to 'evacuate'"
Americans from Jordan, Vasilyev scoffed that the scale and
nature of the military preparations led one to doubt this
explanation. Such a number of aircraft and warships with
tanks and Marines, he said, are not necessary to evacuate
about 300 Americans from Jordan.
TL propaganda also links reports on a U.S. decision to
resume full-scale arms shipments to Greece with the situation
in the Middle East. A Kuznetsov article in PRAVDA on the 22d,
according to TASS, recalled that Greece is the only country in
the eastern Mediterranean which grants unrestricted use of
its ports to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. He cited the New York
TIMES as "acknowledging" that the Administration would like
to have free use of Greek airports "for military purposes in
case it wants to intervene" in the Middle East crisis.
Ccmment also points to activity at the British sovereign
bases in Cyprus. And Kobysh in the 20 September IZVESTIYA
noted "confused and contradictory" statements by British
officials appearing in the press, a defense ministry
representative declaring, for example, that Britain is
'snot taking any military steps caused by the crisis in Jordan,"
but at the same time confirming the arrival in Cyprus of
detachments of British commandos.
A Shakhov commentary broadcast in the domestic service and
in English to Great Britain on the 22d found the present
situation reminiscent of the summer of 1958 when "U.S. and
British interventionists attacked Jordan and Lebanon" after
similarly concentrating troops in the eastern Mediterranean..
PRESIDENT'S Moscow media promptly report the 15 September
TRIP announcement that President Nixon is planning
an eight-day trip to Europe beginning on
27 September which will include the viewing of Sixth Fleet
maneuvers aboard the carrier Saratoga in the Mediterranean,
as well as visits to Italy, Spain, Britain, and Yugoslavia.
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The focus of propaganda is on the implications for .the Middle East,
although the visit is also portrayed as an effort on the part of
the President to aid the Republican Party in the upcoming
congressional elections and to assess the situation in Europe
in the wake of the signing of the FRG-Soviet treaty.
Barsukov, writing in IZVESTIYA or, the 17th, asserts that while
the White House announcement says the trip is important for
promoting "the start of the era of negotiations," U.S. observers
"are regarding it as a military demarche and a demonstration of
U.S. military strength in the Mediterranean, which is directly
adjacent to the center of the Near East conflict." Barsukov
goes on to take note of the fact.that the President will visit
NATO headquarters in Naples and view naval maneuvers, and quotes
NBC for the observation that the visit "is to serve to remind
the Arab countries of the U.S. military presence in the
Mediterranean."
A Ratiani international review in PRAVDA on the 20th cites the
New York DAILY NEWS for the assertion that the President decided
on the trip "after the obvious failure of U.S. policy in the
Near East" and the Washington POST's observation that the main
aim of the trip "is a snow of military force. during the visit
to the Sixth Fleet." According to Ratiani, observers link the
trip with "the patronage which Washington is giving the
Israeli aggressors, with the attempts to squeeze the Arab
countries, and also with a desire to raise the spirits of
the NATO warlike circles somewhat." Like Vice President Agnew's
trip to Asia in August, Ratiani says, the President's tour in
Europe and the Mediterranean is meant to demonstrate the U.S.
presence.
Ratiani does not directly link the President's trip to reports
of possible U.S, intervention in the Jordanian crisis, although
earlier in his article he says that the United States, "under
the pretext of a 'possible need to defend' American citizens
and other foreigners in Jordan," has moved the Sixth Fleet
closer to the Middle East. And Arabic-language broadcasts on
18 and 22 September, peggeci,to the Jordanian crisis and Sixth
Fleet movements, take note of the President's scheduled trip.
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An Arabic-language commentary on the 21st, touching briefly on
the trip, says the Mediterranean stopover represents "a flexing
of muscles," the picking up of a "cudgel . . . to hinder and
weaken the Arab peoples' national liberation struggle." And a
participant in +he domestic service commentators roundtable on
the 20th says the visit to the Sixth Fleet "cannot.be considered
a contribution to the cause of peace in that vast and restless
area."
NO MENTION OF AIRLINE HOSTAGES, HIJACKINGS "REGRETTED"
Moscow predictably does not refer to the fate of the airline
hijacking hostages still held in Jordan, but Soviet disapproval
of the hijackings is again made evident in passing references:
Mayevskiy in the 17 September PRAVDA mentions this "regrettable
incident" perpetrated by "ex'cremist groups" of Palestinian
partisans, and notes that tie Palestine Liberation Organization's
central committee disassociated itself from such actions.
Mayevskiy cites the Britis'i CP organ MORNING STAR as criticizing
the hijackings but at the same time calling it hypocritical to
condemn one side and ignore Israel's "repressive actions," many
times "in excess of the Palestinian extremists groups' terrorist
acts."
In NEW TIMES No. 38 (Russian edition 18 September),.an article
by Ustakov on the hijackings underlines denunciations by
"many Arab cress organs" and recalls the Security Council's
9 September resolution expressing concern at the threat to
civilian lives and calling for the immediate release of all
passengers and crew without exception. NEW TIMES, too, while
condemning .thee "extremist acts," says the "progressive
world public" cannot close its eyes to the.cauoe. The hijackings,
it explains, "extreme though they may be," are a reaction to
Israel's anti-Arab policy.
COMMENT ON MEIR TRIP ATTACKS U.S. AID, ENCOURAGEMENT TO ISRAEL
Moscow's propaganda on Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's four-
day visit to the United States (17-20 September) views the trip
as an effort to "coordinate" the policies of the two countries
in the Middle Ea.^..t. PRAVDA correspondentStrelnikov on'the
20th sa;rs the aim of the trip was threefold: to make arrangements
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for new deliveries of American weapons and for economic assistance
to Israel; to "obtain the solidarity" of the United States for
Israel's "tactics of sabotaging the contacts" with Jarring; and
"to attempt to coax the United States into military intervention
in Jordan or to receive a mandate for Israel to intervene."
IZVESTIYA correspondent Barsukov,.also on the 20th, sets forth
essentially the same three aims of the Meir visit. Moscow says
that in addition to her quest for U.S. military and economic aid
Mrs. Meir had "other business" in the United States. Strelnikov in
PRAVDA, for example, says that she came to the United States "to
organize a campaign for the recruitment of American citizens of
Jewish nationality into the Israeli army and also a campaign for
monetary" support for Israel from Zionist organizations.
On balance, Moscow's propagandists conclude that Mrs. Meir was
satisfied with the results of her trip. TASS and Radio Moscow on the
21st, for example, publicize her television remark of the previous day
that her request for arms deliveries and new loans "had been
received with understanding and sympathy." And a domestic service
commentary on the 20th, citing REUTERS, says that Israeli Ambassador
to the United States Rabin "was very pleased." He "could not contain
himself," the broadcast says, telling Western journalists that "we
have got all we wanted." Scattered comment does point.to.some
dissatisfaction on the part of Israel.. But an Arab-language commentary
on the 21st concludes that hints in the U.S. press of "alleged
differences" between the United States and Israel are "nothing more
than a smokescreen" to try to conceal the fact that the "U.S. ruling
circles met in full all the Israeli extremists' demands."
Drawing on Western press reports, commentators state that the sum total
of military and economic aid to be granted Israel by the United States
following Yrs. Meir's talks with President Nixon and other U.S. officials
on the 18th is in the range of 500 million to one billion dollars. They
note that she had hoped to obtain consignments of such "offensive
weapons" as Phantom and Skyhawk jet aircraft, helicopters, missiles,
radar equipment, and other arms; in Strelnikov's words, she is not
returning to Tel Aviv "empty-handed."
An 18 September TASS report on Mrs. Meir's meeting with the President
picks up the New York TIMES report on that day that the United States
will supply Israel with "another 32 Phantoms," and that even before
the White House meeting Washington had agreed to supply-Hawk, Shrike,
and Walleye missiles. A participant in the 20 September domestic
service commentators' roundtable program also takes note of the story,
observing that the United States will provide Israel "not with 18
Phantoms, as was indicated earlier, but with 32." In connection with
the supply of missiles, a domestic service report on the 18th says
that "at present a group of U.S. instructors is in Israel training
Israeli pilots in the use of Shrike missiles."
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'PASS on the 19th reports Secretary Rogers' meeting he previous
day with Arab diplomats who expressed concern over press reports
of new arms shipments. The group's spokesman, the Kuwaiti
Ambassador, is quoted as saying that Washington's consignment
of arms to Israel "will undermine a search for a peace settlement
in the Middle East."
BORDER TASS on the 21st, reporting Mrs. Meir's New York
QUESTION address to Zionist organizations, says that she
asserted Israel must have borders which would
ensure its security and which could be defended, "a thesis
repeatedly used by Tel Aviv extremists as a cover for their
plans to annex the occupied Arab territories." A 19 September
`PASS report of Mrs. Meir's press conference in Washington the
previous day said that she confirmed she had sought Washington's
support for the establishment of "so-called 'safe borders of
Israel.'" According to this plan, TASS added, Israel does not
intend to withdraw its troops from Arab Jerusalem, the Golan
Heights, the Gaza Strip, Sharm ash-Shaykh, and the strip of
the Sinai Peninsula along the Aqaba Gulf to Sharm ash-Shaykh.
USSR SUPPORTS JARRING MISSION, ATTACKS ISRAELI OBSTRUCTION
Comment on the Meir visit routinely assails Israel for its
"torpedoing" of the Middle East peace talks under Jarring.
Propagandists assert that the United States, with its
"encouragement" of Israeli "expansionist" ambitions, forgets
its own declarations about its efforts for a peaceful
settlement and "dangerously helps Tel Aviv" in sabotaging
Jarring's mission. And Moscow complains that the White
House "brought no new pressure to bear to bring Israel back
to the negotiating table."
An Arabic-language broadcast on the 18th of an IZVESTIYA
commentary said that Mrs. Meir in her arrival statement in
New York asserted that Israel would agree to the resumption
of contacts under Jarring "only if certain conditions were
created, and that this was the essence of her scheduled talks
with President Nixon." The commentary did not spell out
these conditions--the rollback of missiles allegedly emplaced
following t' 7 August cease-fire.
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23 "'El" MI-DER 19'(O
Propaga'idie;to reject the Israeli allegation that UAR "violations"
of the cease-fire standsui.ll by emplacing missiles in the Suez
Canal have justified Tel Aviv's withdrawal from the peace talks.
They counter that it is Israel which is in fact violating the
cease-fire and that continuing "obstruction" of the Jarring
mission is nothing more than an effort to retain the occupied
Arab territories indefinitely. `L'ASS on the 16th reported the
State Department statement that d.,,, "officially admitting" that
Israel violates the cease-fire agreement, and observed that
State Department spokesman McCloskey "tried to give the
impression" that the violations are limited to reconnaissance
flights in the prohibited zone at the Suez Canal.
A RED STAR editorial on the ].9th, in the course of routinely
castigating "imperialist" machinations around the world, also
charged that the "Tel Aviv rulers," using "false accusations
,against the UAR as a pretext," are openly sabotaging the
contacts aimed at a Mi:.dle East political settlement. The
editorial would seem, however, to be mainly for internal
consumption: The concluding passage brings up the forthcoming
24th CPSU Congress, noting that it will be marked by new
achievements in "strengthening the USSR's economic and military
might. "*
USSR SUr.PORT The Soviet Union's own continued support for
FOR TALKS the Jarring contacts is reaffirmed in the
Nikolayev article in the 22 September morning
edition of IZVESTIYA. Defensive in tone, the article
rebuts at length "crude insinuations" against the UAR
and the Soviet Union "trying to acc.ise them of frustrating
* The editorial, after affirming the USSR's "love of peace,"
goes on in standard fashion to state that the Soviet Union
remains ready "at any time and at any place to give a crushing
rebuff to any aggressor if he dares to encroach on the security
of our great motherland, and of its allies and friends." This
formulation in which "friends" as well as allies would be
protected has been used by Soviet leaders periodically since at
least early 1965. For example, Brezhnev, speaking in Leningrad
on 10 July 1965, said that while the USSR is constantly
striving for a lessening of international tension, "our country
is ready to give a resolute rebuff to any encroachments on the
security of the Soviet people and their friends and allies."
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;'3 Li1;l'1-'EMl3EU 19'(()
-26-
tlhe MIdd.Lo [:uut pol.itlcal. uctt:Lcmcnt?." While Nikolayev cites
the Amcricun prcuu and "various groups" of Israeli uupporteru
as the authors of these charges, he at one point says that "the
United States" deslrea, through "creating a funs about imaginary
'UAR violations' ttid insinuations against the USSR," t.e conceal
Israel's desire to aggravate the situation in Lhc Middle Eliot.
At another point, referring to publicity in the United States
for "all sorts of American 'initiatives' and 'constructive
proposals' on 'saving' peace" In the Middle East, Nikolayev--
ae_mingly alluding to bel.ind-the-scenes activity--says that
under cover of "occasional insignificant actions and diplomatic
t.^tivity, the United States" is giving direct support to Israel's
"aggresuive policy."
Nikolayev insists that the UAR "is observing" the cease-fire
and that Israel's charges of UAR violations "appear, at least,
false"; they have been "explained" in the UAR Government
memorandum which says "no new missiles" have been placed "by
the Egyptian side" in the Suez Canal zone since the cease-fire.
Ile countercharges that Israel is violating the agreement with
reconnaissance flights over Egyptian territory and strengthening
of its installations along the Suez Canal, facts "acknowledged"
by the State Department.
The article complains specifically of comment by Joseph Alsop
calling the cease-fire "a 'flagrant provocation' and the Soviet
Union's approval of this important constructive step '.down-
right deception.'" And it complains that Roscoe Drummond
"bemoans the fact that 'the Kremlin has destroyed our faith in
the possibility of the establishment of a stable peace in tha
future.'" Nikolayev adds that "certain Americans" who "in other
situations enjoy the reputation of being relatively sober and
responsible people" are speaking in union with Alsop. It would
not be worth drawing attention to this "anti-Soviet escalation
of the American press," Nikolayev adds, were it not so "damaging
politically, clouding both the chances of a Middle East peace
and the entire international situation."
Outlining the Soviet position, Nikolayev declares .that the USSR,
not being a party to the cease-fire agreement, "has supported
and is ready to support it." He recalls that the Soviet Union has
submitted its "own plan" for a settlement, aimed at establishing
not a shaky armistice but a'just and stable peace. And he says
that contacts through Jarring could become a "workable form"
for achieving agreement between the conflicting parties, and
that the temporary armistice creates a favorable atmosphere for
these contacts, and "for this very reason" was supported by the
Soviet Union.
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'23 111i:['T1;M[if;I{ .ig'7U
PEKING SAYS U,S. INSTIGATED ATTACKS ON GUERRILLAS IN JORDAN
Vollowirrg a J'1OPLL:' ; DAILY Commentator article on 19 September
which offered Pckirrg'u first authoritative comment on the fight-
ing in Jordan, a I'RC Government statement on the 2lst condemns
the United E'tateu for "instigating the reactionary Jordanian
military auti:oritics" to attack the Palestinian guerrillas and
vaguely warns the United Stat,eu against launching "a new military
adventure" in the Middle East. The statement calls on "the
Palestinian and other Arab peoples" to "pcrsi:tt in unity, per-
severe in armed struggle, fear no threat and refuse to be deceived"
in order to frustrate "all military attacks and political schemes"
of the United States.
As in other Chinese comment and reportage, the statement does not
mention King liusayn, referring to the Amman regime as "the reaction-
ary military government of the Kingdom of Jordan." While thus taking
account of a possible accommodation in Jordan pros^rving a monarchy
which the Chinese may not wish to repudiate, Peking has also left
its commitments in the conflict so indeterminate as to allow maximum
flexibility in responding to developments. The statement says the
Chinese government and people "firmly support" the Palestinian
guerrillas in "fighting back in self-defense." As for possible
American interven".on, the statement merely forecasts that the
United States would "inevitably end up in ever more tightening
the nooses around its neck."
Both the government statement and the Commentator article call
attention to U.S. military moves in the Eastern Mediterranean
and other contingency plans. Commentator quoted a State Depart-
ment spokesman as having "brazenly" announced that U.S. military
intervention in Jordan could not be ruled out. An NCNA report on
the 20th claimed that the Nixon Administration summoned Israeli
Premier Meir to Washington for secret talks to work out "coordi-
nated plans for encircling and attacking the Palestinian people's
armed forces."
Peking's reaction to the fighting in Jordan began with an NCNA
report dated the 18th which claimed that the miltiary government was
established accord'.ng to U.S. instructions in order to suppress the
Palestinian armed struggle, split the Arab countries and people, and
realize "the 'Middle East Munich' scheme." The PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator, noting that "an extremely grave situation" has emerged
in Jordan, linked this development with the Rogers plan for a Middle
East peace settlement. Commentator warned that the United States and
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i'trael are colluding with "pro-U.S. forced in the Arab countrica"
to wipe out the Palcatiniatt guerrillas and to pave the way to a
peace settlement.
As before the current outbreak of fighting in Jordan, Peking has
been carrying a stream of reports citing radical Arab elements
opposed to the Middle East peace initiatives and in favor of armed
struggle. An NCNA dispatch datelined Damascus on the 19th report-
ed a rally on the previous day at which Syrian head of state al-Ataui
categorically rejected the November 1967 Security Council resolution
and the Rogers plan vhile pledging to place "all we possess in this
country at the disposal of the Palestine revolution." Daily NCNA
reports on the Jordanian situation have not broached the question of
Syrian participation in the fighting. The reports play up the ex-
ploits of the Palestinian guerrillas and feature the role of the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
Peking has not directly attacked the Soviet position in the course
of the current fighting in Jordan, though NCNA on the 21st trans-
mitted an Albanian commentary which characteristically denounced
"the Soviet social imperialists" as well as the United States for
plotting against Arab unity. The initial NCNA report on the Jordan
fighti:,, had alluded to the Soviets in saying the Rogers plan had
been undertaken "in collusion with another 'superpower,'" and the
government statement contains a passing reference to the "coll.abo-
ratc.r" of the United States.
BACKGROUND: The PRC had last issued a government statement on
Middle East developments on 6 June 1967 in connection with the
Arab-Irraeli war. That statement expressed support for the UAR,
Syria, "and other Arab states" and people waging war against
Israel. The statement harshly assailed Moscow for allegedly
having connived with Israel and revealing itself as a betrayer
of the Arabs.
The last previous PRC Government statement was on 4 May 1970 in
reaction to the U.S. military incursion into Cambodia.
EAST GERMANY. YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA ISSUE STATEMENTS ON JORDAN
East Berlin is the first of Moscow's East European allies to come
out with authoritative comment on the current Jordanian crisis,
with an ADN statement on 22 September calling for "an immediate
end to the bloodshed" and "an immediate understanding" among the
Arab states. "Competent quarters in the GDR," the statement says,
"express concern that this fighting seriously harms the anti-
imperialist movement of the Arab peoples and harbors the danger
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23 Lli0,PTEM13I111 1970
of' a new military conflict In the Middle Eaat." It adds that
"thrcuto of in:;crvenL1on" by the United Utatca and Israel are
"dnngerouoly aggravating the situation."
A statement made for TANJUG by Yugoslav Premier Ri.bicic on the
20th, Tito's remark,,, In his Zagreb speech the following day, and
an Albanian Government statement on the 22d constitute the only
other authoritative East European reactions to data. Romania
has abstained entirely from comment, and there Is little avail-
able comment from elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, Poland's ZYCIE
WARSZAWY and Bratislava PRAVDA, however, notably depart from the
general avoidance of criticism of either side. The Polish paper
censures the "extremists" forgiving Husayn an opportunity to
attack them, while the Slovak paper denounces the Jordanian
Government for serving "imperialist and reactionary" interests:
+ ZYCIE WARSZAWY's 19 September article, entitled "Blood on
Jordanian Sands," blames the bloodshed on "the irresponsible
extremism of Dr. ilabbash and his comrades" who flaunted "the
law and humanitarian principles" and dealt "a deadly blow to all
that the Palestinians have achieved and what Fatah led by Arafat
has managed to win." According to PAP's review of the article,
it adds that Husayn "has only been waiting for an appropriate
opportunity, and this has been provided to him by Dr. Habbash's
conduct."
a- Bratislava PRAVDA's article on the 21st, reviewed by CTK, calls
"the attack of the Jordanian military government against the
Palestinian guerrillas" an "organized part of the efforts of the
imperialist and reactionary circles which are interested in
heightening the differences in views in the Arab world on a
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." Despite "certain
differences" among the Arab states, the paper argues, they should
resist "imperialist" pressure by coordinated action.
YUGOSLAV Yugoslav Premier Ribicic's statement for TANYUG on
REACTION 20 September appeals to the Jordanian Government and
the Palestinian organizations to stop the bloodshed
and seek a negotiated settlement to their differences. The state-
ment emphasizes that "any foreign interference or military inter-
vention in the Jordan events, under any pretext, will be a flagrant
violation of the UN Charter and a further violation of the terri-
torial integrity of Jordan that will further complicate the already
extremely dangerous situation."
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In his Zagreb spa?'!E ".ie next day, largely devoted to internal
matters, Tito expreebed serious concern over the Jordanian develop-
ments: "Things are be;.oming more entangled among the Arabs them-
selves, and the Sixth Pleit is coming nearer and nearer; and
Israel desires this to extricate itself in this manner, to make
its aggressive ventures against the Arabs pay . . . ."
ALBANIAN The Albanian Government statement on 22 September
STATEMENT warns that the situation in the Middle East "consti-
tutes a great danger to peace and international
security." It predictably accuses the United States and the Soviet
Union of being mainly responsible for the Jordanian fighting,
alleging that "the main aim of the United States is direct military
intervention in Jordan." Also characteristically, it professes
confidence that the Palestinian guerrillas will defeat "Jordanian
reaction" and "destroy all revisionist-imperialist plans."
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YUGOSLAVIA
BELGRADE WELCOMES ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL VISIT
Belgrade has reacted cordially to the 16 September announcement
that President Nixon will visit Yugoslavia during his 27 September-
5 October trip to Europe. All the Yugoslav dailies played up
the announcement on their front pages, in many cases accompanied
by a picture of the President. The daily POLITIKA on the 17th
carried o dispatch from its Washington correspondent hailing the
planned visit as an example of "the era of negotiation, which
replaces the era of confrontation." The dispatch also called
the visit "confirmation of the long years of friendly atmosphere
in American-Yugoslav relations" and went on to say that the
American press has stressed the view that "Washington esteems
Yugoslavia's honorable and independent position." The other
major Belgrade daily, BORBA, on the same day carried a dispatch
from its London correspo:dent quoting She TIMES as saying the
Yugo,~lav leg will be "the most im*.)ortant stage of the tour."
Commenting on the projected visit, in his regular press
cor:ference on the 17th, as reported by TANYUG, Yugoslav Foreign
Secretariat spokesman Vujica remarked that "mutual cooperation
in various fields is developing favorably between Yugoslavia
and the United States" on the basis of "independence, mutual
respect, equality, and noninterference." Despite existing
"differences" between the two countries, he said, good relations
and dialogue "are contributions to coexistence,"
SOVIET, EAST Moscow has reported without comment that the
EUROPE MEDIA President's itinerary will include Yugoslavia.
Sparse East European comment includes the
observLtion by Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on 17 September that the
projected meeting with Tito "is explained by American sources
as consultations with 'Nasir's friend,' who could transmit
Washington's views to the UAR President, and also as 'a
demonstration of friendship toward a communist state which is
not a Warsaw Pact member.'"
A 21 September Tirana radio commentary on the trip mentioned
in passing that the President will visit Yugoslavia. Tirana
denounced the entire tour as "a counterrevolutionary plot"
to step up "blackmail and threats against the peoples of this
area, especially the Arab peoples."
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TITO CALLS FOR NEW GOVERNMENT BODY TO PRESERVE COUNTRY'S UNITY
Moscow's 'PASS reported promptly but very briefly on 22 September
President Tito's Zagreb speech the day before in which he called
for a sweeping reorganization of the Yugoslav Government under a
new "authoritative body with full responsibility" that would
"secure the unity" of the country. Noting only that Tito
announced plans for a "collective presidency," TASS reported
none of his rationale for a move clearly designed to counter
potential threats, both external and internal, to the integrity
of the Yugoslav state following his departure from the scene.
As quoted by TANYUG and Radio Zagreb, Tito spoke of the need for
a collective body, among other things, to counter speculation
"abroad" that the Federal Republic might "disintegrate" when he
departs--and, by implication, that the situation would then be
ripe for foreign exploitation. He remarked that speculation in
Yugoslavia itself on his possible successor underlines the
possibility that a "grave crisis" would develop over constitutional
rights that had been given to him as president--rights which,
he added cryptically, "are sometimes violated." He said the
reorganization "will not suit some" and will "pull the rug out
from under the feet of certain tendencies which are present
in some circles of our country."
The new body, Tito said, would promote efficiency in government
and prevent "disagreements" between the republics and the
Federation, chiefly related to economic problems. The allusion
is evidently to efforts by the richer republics--such-as
Slovenia and Croatia--to pit their increasing authority
against federal powers to channel investment funds into less
developed republics. An apparent aim of the new collective
body would be to strengthen the Federal Government's hand in
coping with mounting economic problems and in insuring that
economic de-ielopment is spread evenly throughout the country.
Tito emphatically denied that the reorganization plans were
initiated from below as a device to remove him from office.
He mentioned that he had been in office for "a long time"
but "would nevertheless wish to have a little more possibility
to engage a little more in some other things." In an evident
appeal for broad consensus, he envisaged the new "presidency"
as including leading republic and party officials as well as
representatives of "all principal social-political organizations."
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The new body, he noted, will "free the League of Communists and
its leadership from those everyday matters in which they are now
engaged." He announced that the party would consider the plan
at its next session but that it was still subject to "changes"
and that no final decision would be taken until a broad debate
had taken place--presumably in the republics, where any effort
to enhance the Federal role may be expected to encounter
opposition.
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-31--
CZECHOSLOVAK IA
REGIME HARDLINER JOINS APPEAL FOR INTELLECTUAL INVOLVEMENT
Underscoring the Husak regime's concern over continued hostile
noninvolvement on the part of the country's intelligentsia,
until recently the leading target of conservative attacks
during this year's "exchange of party cards," arch-conservative
CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Vasil Bilak has shifted to
a more conciliatory tack in stressing the indispensability of
the country's intellectuals. In a 20 September speech at a
peace rally in Gottwaldov, Moravia, Bilak echoed the speech
made 10 days earlier in Ostrava by the more moderate Husak in
declaring that "socialism is growing from the work of workers
and farmers, but it cannot do without the active participation
of the intelligentsia." This point was highlighted by CTK
in its report of Bilak's speech.
The former Slovak CP First Secretary also echoed Husak in insisting
that "we are not casting out or rejecting anybody, not even those
people who wavered recently because they let themselves be
deceived," and in denying any intent to "install some sort of
'barracks communism'" or to "imprison our opponents."
HUSAf SPEECH The Czechoslovak party's more conciliatory
IN WiRAVN stance toward the predominantly liberal
intelligentsia apparently has Soviet approval.
TASS on 11 September and PRAVDA the next day carried extensive
accounts of Husak's 10 September Ostrava speech ~:pelling out
the new, softer policy toward the intellectuals.
The Soviet accounts reported the CPCZ First Secretary as stating
that "in the past year the CPCZ was backed in its work primarily
by the working class and working peasantry" while "a large
part of the intelligentsia stood aside to a considerable extent."
The latter group, Husak added, "found itself in a greater state
of confusion in 1968 and 1969 than were the workers." He went
on to declare that "the time has come to embark on big political
work among all the strata of our intelligentsia," claiming in
the same breath that "the process of differentiation has reached
such a degree by now that a considerable--even the decisive--part
of the intelligentsia has crossed over to our positions."
Registering a desire "to give everyone the opportunity to
demonstrate with concrete deeds his attitude toward socialism,
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23 SEPTEMBER 1970
to the political course pursued by the "PCZ," Husak said "no
artificial walls should be erected which would push into our
adversaries' camp anyone who is not an opponent of socialism
and does not wish to be one."
At the same time, Hu.sak was less explicit than before in again
denying that political trials were impending. He remarked
only that "no permanent purged are being prepared in
Czechoslovakia" and "the Central Committee plans nothing of the
kind."
INTERVIEW Balancing the TASS and PRAVDA accounts of Husak's
WITH MOC conciliatory Ostrava speech, the Moscow domestic
service on the 21st carried a hardline interview
with RUDE PROVO Chief Editor Moc on the occasion of the paper's
50th anniversary. Moc told Radio Moscow's Prague correspondent
that in 1968-69 "the then leader of the Central Committee, Dubcek,
willingly" tolerated alleged demands by the "rightists"--
inte].lectuals--to free the paper from Central Committee control
and make it an organ of "the whole party, responsible to no one."
The Moscow domestic service's initial brief report of a speech
by Husak at a Prague meeting on the RUDE PRAVO anniversary--
attended by PRAVDA editor Zimyanin and other foreign communist
editors--singles out Husak's orthodox rejection of any peaceful
coexistence or compromise in the sphere of ideology.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SHORTAGES IN RAW MATERIA.!S OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY RED FLAG
An article in RED FLAG No. 9, broadcast by Radio Peking on
17 September, has openly acknowledged that some raw materials
are in short supply. The article blames the shortages on "the
rapid development of industrial production," which has resulted
in "temporary difficulties, encountered in the course of advance."
Through appeals for increased local efforts to fill gaps in the
supply of certain materials, especially fuels, Peking has often
implicitly indicated that specific shortages do exist, but the
usual formula is that raw materials are plentiful and can be
uncovered through perseverance. The current article allows for
new discoveries, but its main point is that old products must be
made out of new materials. In one example a coal mine used
stones as props instead of wooden poles, and in another a paper
mill has utilized straw in its operation.
Following usual practice, the article warns that state aid is not
possible in most cases and the localities must solve their own
problems; but no unit is to accept the notion that "production is
not possible when raw materials run short." As another means of
ending shortages, the article F ,tulates a basic rule of develop-
ment: knowledge of the economical uc- of raw materials develops
constantly, and once "the characteristics of a raw material are
understood" its consumption rate per unit of product will be
reduced. This thesis has been a feature of the frequent
campaigns to save on c.al consumption, calling for the develop-
ment of more efficient stoves.
One factory is said to have reduced the weight of its major
products by one-third and to have used lesser quantities of
high quality steel through new product design. But the quality
of the new products apparently still worries some people, to
whom RED FLAG imputes the argument that "if new raw materials
are used the quality of the products cannot be certain." The
article derides this idea as conservative, pointing out that
"the history of the development of modern industry" shows that
materials used in products do change with time.
While local units are expected to bear the brunt of their own
shortages, they are not to act in complete isolation. "Upper-
level organs and supply departments" are to exert all efforts
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to expanding the sources of raw materials, and efforts should
also be made by all units to supply "fraternal" units with
needed materials. This theme of coordination of raw materials
was sounded a number of times during the spring, especially
by Shanghai, which issued a number of pleas that the country
be treated as a "coordinated chessborad." Articles at that
time indicated that one reason for the current shortages is
the regime-inspired expansion of small plants, which drain
off some supplies from the large producers.
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CHI LEAN ELECTION
PEKING REACTS CAUTIOUSLY AND BELATEDLY TO ALLENDE VICTORY
Peking waited until 17 September to report; and comment, cautiously,
on the It September electoral victory of leftist coalition candidate
Salvador Allende in Chile, An NCNA commentary on the 17th, widely
broadcast by the Peking radio, avoids any reference to Allende's
professed Marxism or to the support he received by the pro-Soviet
Chilean Communist; Party, describing him simply as the. "candidate of
the Popular Unity coalition and leader of the socialist party" and
ascribing the election outcome to "mass struggles." The commentary
also avoids any mention of Allende's public commitment to establish
relations with the PRC,,
Allende's success posed a dilemma for Peking. Ignoring it entirely
would have scorned a development that could afford the PRC a unique
opportunity to establish a diplomatic presence in Latin America, while
playing it up too enthusiastically would place Peking in the position
of approving a product of the "parliamentary road to socialism" which
it is on record as opposing.* The NCNA commentary thus skirts the
ticklish aspects, discoursing on Allende's election victory as a pro-
duct of "struggles" in the form of strikes and land seizures, against
a background of mounting Chilean popular opposition to "U.S. imperial-
ism's ruthless oppression, plunder, and exploitation."
NCNA duly notes Allende's failure to win a majority and the consequent
necessity for the Chilean congress to choose between Allende and
Allesandri. Unlike Havana and Moscow, however, it says nothing
about alleged efforts to bar his accession to power.
Consistent with Peking's position on the parliamentary road and its
attitude toward the Soviet-backed local communist party, Peking media
had carried no comment on the election campaign, But an article
appearing in the pro-Peking Chilean publication CAUSA MARXISTA-
LENINISTA, edited by NCNA's Chilean correspondent, censured Castro
for endorsing the Chilean electoral route to socialism. As trans-
* Peking does not comment frequently on Latin American affairs. But
its position on the parliamentary road was spelled out, for example, in
a 25 January NCNA commentary reviewing Latin American anti-U.S. "strug-
gled" in the sixties. The commentary concluded that Latin American re-
volutionaries have "gradually realized that only by opposing counterre-
volutionary armed force with revolutionary armed force can they complete-
ly overthrow the reactionary role of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."
NCNA added that these revolutionaries "firmly repudiated 'peaceful tran-
sition,' the 'parliamentary road,' and other fallacies spread by the
modern revisionists in an attempt to undermine their armed struggle."
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mined to llavana in an information diupatch from I'ItIsNUA LATINA'u
UanLlags correspondent, the article said "Fidel Cttutro publicly
espouses the opportunity fallacy of 'to socialism through elec-
which has tragically awakened the people who trusted in
the pacifist, farce."
MOSCOW STRESSES ALLEGED MACHINATIONS TO BAR ALLENDE FROM OFFICE
Soviet comment on the Chilean election outcome continues to de-
pict a concerted effort by U.S. and Chilean "reaction" to keep
Allende from assuming office, at the same time emphasizing the
Chilean people's determination to frustrate such conspiracies.
While some Moscow propaganda has implied that Christian Democratic
Party support for Allende in the 214 October congressional vote is
almost a foregone conclusion, a 16 September Moscow domestic service
commentary by Valentine Mashkin suggested that the issue was far
from decided and broac'ied, uncritically, the notion that Allende
would have to make concessions to the Christian Democrats in order
to gain their support. Observing that the Christian Democratic
Party "holds in its hands the key" to the selection of Chile's
next president, Mashkin noted that the Christian Democrats; were
demanding guarantees that Allende will not pursue an ultraleftist
course:
The Christian Democratic Party can be defined as one standing
to the left of center. Allesandri's line is seen by the
party as too far to the right. Allende is more acceptable
to them as a politician. However, many of the Christian
Democrats are afraid lest Allende stands too far to the left.
It is precisely this fear that prc^ipts the Christian
Democrats to ask Allende beforehand and obtain guarantees
from him that his policies will not be of an extreme left
nature
position" to get their way, Mashkin acknowledged obliquely that
their aim is to secure guarantees that a democratic system will
continue: The party, he said, wants to retain constitutional
protection for "freedom of action fc'r the rightwing press and
rightwing trade union centers."
Commenting that the Christian Democrats are in "a very strong
HAVANA WARNS OF MILITARY COUP OR OU", 'S I DE INTERVENTION
Havana comment highlights the possibility cf a military coup or an
assassination to prevent Allende from taking over the presidency,
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at; the u wnc time evoking a threat of Argentlnc military inter-
vention. Thus a Radio Havana commentary on the 16th, reporting
that Argentine army chief General Alejandro Lanuaae was visiting
Washington, declared that Argentina is acting "as a loyal servant
of the Yankee imperialists" and playing the role of "a sort of
special gendarme to put pressure on neighboring countries having
difficulties with popular movcrnents~" It would not be "Strange,"
Havana concluded, for Lanusae "to play a top role in Yankee
imperialism's schemes concerning Chile--Schemes being denounced
by Salvador Allende." In the course of the 1 August interview
with Chilean newsmen in which he cndorr,od the Chilean electoral
path to socialism, Castro had warned of alleged U.S. plans to
use Brazil and Argentina as policemen on the continent, playing
"the some role as that of Thailand in Indochina," but concluded
that their intervention in any Latin American country would
only precipitate a continental revolution. He also said it was
important for Chile to be assured that Peru "cannot be used by
imperialism" as a weapon against her. More recently, in a
10 September speech to the Lusaka nonalined conference, Cuban
Foreign D:inister Raul Roa mentioned the Allende victory and re-
marked that in Latin America "there is no lack of pseudogovernments
that aspire to play the repugnant role of a Latin American Thailand."
PUBLICITY FOR On the 17th Havana media carried a communique
M1R STATEMENT issued by the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), a Castroite organization dedicated to
armed struggle and hostile to the electoral path pursued by the
forces it pejoratively terms "they traditional left." While hailing
A.L.ieude's victory as signifying "a tremendous advance in the
political conscience of the workers," the MIR indicated that it
would support Allende only if he "takes over without an alliance
with the Christian Democrats and without compromising his program."
The communique indicated that the MIR's faith in the eventual
necessity for armed struggle had remained unshaken by the Chilean
election. Alleging that Allende's victory has produced "an
impasse" between the workers and the landholders and industrialists,
it concluded:
This will be resolved only through a confrontation between the
rural and urban poor and the holders of riches and power. This
confrontation has been put aside for now, but sooner or later
it will have to come Pbout, and it will undoubtedly be
violent . . ~ . The armed struggle is today more than ever
in force.
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The communique stated that the MIR's "armed apparatus" is prc-
pared to contribtite to the defense of Allende's electoral vic-
tory. There is no available Havana comment on the communique.
There had be:,n considerable conflict between the Chilean CP and
the MIR during the election campaign, with the communists alleging
that the MIR, by provoking violence, was abetting "rightist" plans
to prevent an Allende electoral triumph. Radio Havana reported
on 31 August that the Chilean CP organ EL SIGLO had accused the
MIR of acting as "a counterrevolutionary agent." According to
the broadcast, the paper charged that an MIR statement urging
workers to prepare for a general strike and the occupation of
plants, as well as to stockpile explosives and firebombs, coincided
with "rightwing plans to create chaos and prevent the triumph of
the joint leftist candidate." A Santiago radio station reported
that Chilean CP Politburo member Orlando Millas, addressing a
central committee plenum on the 14th, had offered "amnesty to
members of the MIR as long as the MIR militants behave well and do
not create new problems."
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