TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030033-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 5, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confident-.-r
Illlllll~uu~~iiiiii~lllllll~l
fOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
EN
DS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
5 AUGUST i;
(VOL. XXI,
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material 'arried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
of receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Euluded from automatic
djrngrading and
d.c6, fcarion
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and. Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
President Nixon's 30 July Los Angeles Press Conference Scored . . . 1,
Paris Talks: U.S. Policy Rout ,nely Assailed at 77th Session . . , It
Peking, Moscow Trade Charges on Indochina Policies . . . . . . . . 6
Moscow Questions Legality of U.S. Operation in Cambodia . . . , . . 7
Sihanouk Government's Radio Begins Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . 7
Recognition of PRG Announced After Mme. Binh's Ceylon Visit . . . . 9
Kirirom, Other Cambodian "Victories" Hailed 9
Action in Vietnam, "Victory" at Firebase hipcord Reviewed . . . . . 10
DRV Again Charges B-52's Attack DMZ, Claim3 Plane '?owned . . . . . 11
Communique Recounts U.S. "War Crimes" for July . , . . . . . . . 11
Sihanouk Government Officials Visit North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 12
DRV Party Issues, Slogans, Instructions on Anniversaries . . . . . 13
Laos: Souphanouvong Message Delivered to Souvanna Phouma . . . . . 15
Moscow Notes Israeli Agreement to U.S. Initiative . . . . . . . . . 17
Belyayev Discusses Cease-Fire, Withdrawal, Jarring Miosicn . . . . 19
USSR Praises "Cairo Initiative," Attacks "Arab Extremists" . . . . 22
Peking Accuses Soviets of Massing Troops in Border Areas . . . . . 26
Romanian Resistance to Soviet Presssure Draws Chinese Praise . . . 29
Bratislava Paper Weighs CSSR Obligation To Fight Chinese . . . . . 29
CHINA'S ARMY DAY
Peking Reception and Joint Editorial Highlight Observance . . .
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Fortunes of Top KGB Leaders Appear to Have Shifted . . . . . . . , 32
Shelest Snipes at Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Leadership . . . . . . . . 34
Havana Reacts Cautiously To Revived Bolivian Insurgency . . . . . . 36
ELN Documents Proclaim a Continent-Wide Struggle . . . . . . . . . 38
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 JULY - 2 AUGUST 1970
Moscow (3;:66 items)
Peking (2783 items)
Indochina
(8%)
6%
PLA Anniversary
(--)
23%
Potsdam Agreement,
(--)
6%
[Joint Editorial
(--)
5%]
25th Anniversary
Korean Topics
(6%)
20%
China
(4%)
5%
[Armistice Anni-
(1%)
9%]
Middle East
(11%)
5%
versary
UK Dock Ctrike
(0.2%)
2%
[Military Delega-
(u%)
6%]
tion in PRC
Indochiiia
(28%)
14%
Middle East
(4%)
13%
Chou In-lai on French
(--)
3%
TV
Romanian Military
(5%)
3%
Delegations in PRC
South Yemen Delegation
(--)
3%
in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services, The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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INDOCHINA
President Nixon's 30 July press conference in Los Angeles is
seized upon by Hanoi and the Front as documentation of the
perennial charge that the United States does not want a
political settlement and is bent on maintaining the Thieu-Ky
"puppets" in power. Particular exception is taken to ...
the President's opposition to a coalition government. Both
Hanoi and the Front point to the "coincidence" of the press
conference and President Thieu's 31 July TV address,
but they completely gloss over the substance of Thieu's
speech in which he reiterated the GVN's 11 July 1969 election
proposals and discussed various cease-fire options.
Routine-.level Moscow comment on the President's press
conference similarly casts doubt on the sincerity of the
U.S. desire for peace and attacks U.S. support for
Saigon's opposition to a coalition government. A 1 August
PRAVDA article by a candidate of juridical sciences questions
U.S. arguments regarding the legality of the American dispatch
of troops into Cambodia.
Peking's declining but still substantial volume of propaganda
continues to attack the U.S. "peace talks fraud." Implicit
accusations of Soviet "collaboration" with the United States
are repeated in current propaganda, including the joint
Chinese army day editorial published in PEOPLE'S DAILY,
RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. Moscow dir,:ctly responds
to--the editorial in Mandarin-language radio comment with
attacks on the PRC's Indochina policy.
PRESIDENT NIXON`S 30 JULY LOS ANGELES PRESS CONFERENCE SCORED
HANOI AND Reaction to the President's 30 July press conference
THE FRONT comes promptly on the 31st in radio commentaries
from both Hanoi and the Front. Both radios
acknowledge that the President was questioned about domestic
issues and thci Middle East crisi3 and other foreign policy
questions as well as about Vietnam. Most of the comment
obscures the precise nature and context of the President's
exchanges with reporters and falls back on broad generalizations
that he refused to comply with demands 'for a, total:;, rapid 'troop
withdrawal--thus indicating that the stubborn attitude will be
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maintained at Paris following Ambassador Bruce's appointment
as delegation head--and that he repeated his opposition to a
coalition government.
The initial Hanoi radio broadcast on the 31st says that "Nixon
had to recognize that the U.S. economic and financial
situation is dangerous and that the U.S. social situation is
in disorder, but he did not mention that the foremost cause
of this is the fact that he has continued to prolong and
extend the war in Indochina." An LPA commentary on 2 August
says that Nixon called the press conference "to hide the heavy
defeats of the United States on the battlefront and the
serious troubles in the United States?" It claims that
days before the conference, the "U.S. psywar machine" had
been set in full motion in an attempt to make believe the
President would have something new to announce, in addition
to appointing Ambassador Bruce to the Paris conference. But
LPA concludes that "public opinion had every reason to be
disappointed."
Explicit acknowledgment of the exchange in which the President
was asked whether the chances for a negotiated peace have
improved or worsened since the invasion of Cambodia was voiced
by the Vietnamese communist spokesmen in Paris. Thus, as
issued on the 31st and carried by VNA on the 1st, the DRV
spokesman's statement noted accurately that the President
expressed. his opinion that the Cambodian operation "has
weakened the other side" and thus opened brighter prospects
for peace talks. The spokesman went on to clair. that two
facts were demonstrated by this: that the Nixon Administration
is likely "to change white int-) black and defeat into victory,"
and that the Administration "advocates military victory on the
battlefield in order to win a strong position at the
conference table." The PRG spokesman's statement--also made
on the 31st and released by Vietnamese communist media on
the 1st--was somewhat less explicit regarding the details
of the exchange on Cambodia and negotiations. He said only
that "Nixon once again boasted about the false victories" in
Cambodie, and "tried to deceive public opinion by saying that
the prospects for peace through negotiations were brighter."
However, the ',PA commentary, cited above echoes the DRV
spokesman in quoting the President's remark that "the enemy
position is weaker" than before the Cambodian operation.
Other comment notes the President's remark that Ambassador Bruce
had been sent to Paris with wide latitude in negotiations,
without indicating that the remark was made in the exchange on
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the prospects for the Paris talks in the wake of the Cambodian
operation. Thus, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 2d cites the
reference to Bruce and goes on to say that the Paris talks
remain deadlocked because "of the obdurate U.S. attitude."
(English-language transmissions refer to an "editorial" in
the army paper, but Vietnamese-language casts call it a
"commentary.") NHAN DAN on the 3d refers to Nixon's "boast"
that he had appointed a senior negotiator, and observes that
given the U.S. position one might ask what Bruce can negotiate
at Paris except some questions to elide the basic problems
"such as the POW question that Nixon has given so much
pub,'icity." (Comm,:nist media did not acknowledge that the
President was asked whether Bruce had received a special
briefing about the "hundreds of prisoners held by the DRV.")
NHAN DAN says that Nixon "especially extolled traitor Nguyen
Van Thieu" whose position with rega:c,~. to negotiations he
said "was on all fours with ours." But NHAN DAN does not
acknowledge that the President's comment was in response
to a question as to whether Thieu has some positions that
would take away from Ambassador Bruce's flexibility in Paris.
As reviewed by VNA, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 2d distorts the
President's remarks when it claims thai he "even threatened"
if peace could not be achieved in negotiations, the Thieu-
Ky-Khiem clique would seek it through military victory. (The
paper thus glosses over the exchange in which the President
was asked about Thieu's reported remark that he hoped for
military victory in three years and responded that if a
settlement had nct been reached when the United States had
withdrawn under the Vietnamization policy, then the road to
take would be up to the GVN.i QUAN DO1 NHAN DAN as well
as other Hanoi and Front Propaganda quotes the President's
statement that the United States opposeE a coalition whether
imposed or negotiated, and concludes that this again demonstrates
U.S. hypocrisy regarding South Vietnamese self-determination.
A Liberation Radio broadcast -)n the 3d of a commentary from
the 1 August QUAN GIAI PHONG notes that President Nixon
"repeated the U.S. stubborn and warlike stand," and says
therefore the arrival of new negotiator Bruce will change
nothing. It repta.ts the standrad line that a change in basic
U.S. policy, not a change in negotiators, is what is needed
and demands that the United States "must" agree to the NFLSV
10-point solution, give up the Thieu regime, and agree to a
provisional coalition government.
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A spate of comment, on President Thieu's 31 July TV address
compl%?cely glosses over such details as his reiteration of the
11 July 1969 election proposals and his discussion of various
cease-fire options, claiming that he "imitated his master" in
"muttering such words and phrases" as goodwill for peace,
self-determination, and elections.
MOSCOW As usuFi., Moscow reacts promptly to the President's
press conference, with TASS on the 31st noting that
he "expressed support" for the Thieu regime, asserted that
Thieu's position "is the same as ours," and opposed a coalition
government, "negotiated or imposed."
TASS also says that the President claimed that the invasion
of Cambodia, "which extended the war" in Indochina, "improved
the prospects of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam." A
brief English-language newscast on the same day says that he
tried to "justify" the invasion of Cambodia, saying that it
brought a peace settlement in the area nearer, but that at
the same time he "made it clear" that the American position
at the Paris talks will "not change" with thr appointment
of the new delegation chief.
A Moscow domestic service commentary on 29 July again took
issue with Washington's claim that the appointment of
Ambassador Bruce as the chief delegate in Paris shows U.S.
readiness to take a step toward peaceful settlement in
Vietnam. The commentator referred to a disparaging remark
made by Ky in Da Nang about the appointment, evaluating it
as merely an attempt to calm public opinion. The commentator
also cited the coincidence of Bruce's consultations with the
leaders in Saigon and the move into Cambodia of additional
GVN troops, and his visit to Thailand during which the Thai
foreign minister. reportedly informed him of Bangkok's "negative
attitude" toward a coalition government in Saigon. The commentator
concluded that, these reports and events "give grounds for serious
doubts about the alleged peace-making nature of the mission entrusted
to him."
PARIS TALKS: U.S. POLICY ROUTINELY ASSAILED AT 77TH SESSION
PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's routine charge that no progress has
been made at Paris because of the U.S. obstructionist policy
aimed at continuing the "occupation" of South Vietnam is duly
noted in the VNA and LPA accounts of the 77th session on 30 July.
Both also note Tien's criticism of the U.S. limited troop withdrawal
and his ridicule of President Nixon's stand on free elections and the
"non-negotiability" of the South Vietnamese right to self-determination;
but there is no indication that he was responding to the President's
20 Jul press conference remarks.
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LPA reports that Tien asserted that those "who have clearly seen
the spirit of national concord" in the PRG's proposals on the
formation of a provisional coalition government "include many
persons in Saigon political circles and even in the present
Saigon administration." But the VNA account more ambiguously says
only that Tien referred to "public opinion at home and abroad"
in this regard.
Tien'c) remarks are reminiscent of those made by Mme. Binh at the
sessions lapt year from time to time. For example, at the
21 August 1969 session, when speaking about, ,the NFLSV/PRG 10-point
solution, she said that the PRG makes a clear distinction between
those who deliberately betray the country, such as Thieu and Ky,
and "the persons who., for one reason or another, still serve in the
puppet administration and the Saigon army but have come to realize
the truth ever more clearly and stand for peace and independence."
The terse VNA account of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement
duly notes his repetition of the two basic communist demands--total
U.S. withdrawal and the establishment of a provisional coalition
government. Without supplying details, VNA says that he "roundly
condemned" the Nixon Administr~.tion for prolonging and expanding
the war in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while continuing to
encroach on the DRV's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Ir.
noting his claim that the Nixon Adminstration's attempts to secure
a position of strength at the conference table are "but illusory
daydreams," the account does not detail Vy's discussing the "real
situation" on the Indochinese battlefields over the past few
months. Thus, the account fails to report Vy's citing the aban"on-
ment of firebase Ripcord in northern South Vietnam, the "liberation"
of Attopeu and Saravane by the Lao armed forces, and the control of
half of Cambodia by the Sihanouk government as belying the "boastful
fabrications of President Nixon and U.S. psywar organs." The account
also fails to note Vy's sharply worded remarks aimed at the U.S.
delegate for his engaging in the "farce of sham-negotiation and
sham-goodwill" that can deceive no one, however well-acted it may be.
The VNA portrayal of GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong's statement
is typical. when it says that he "stubbornly opposed" the demand
for an unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal and the formation of
a provisional coalition government. As for IIabib's statement,
the account says that he "tried to make black white, pretending that
'the United States has good will." VNA goes on to add on its own
authority that "everybody knows, however, that the Nixon Administration
has not changed a bit its aggressive stand and obdurate attitude."
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PEKING, MOSCOW TRADE CHARGES ON INDOCHINA POLICIES
A declining but still substantial volume of Peking propaganda
includes continued attacks on the U.S. "peace talks fraud"
and implicit charges against the USSR for "collaboration."
An "article by a worker-commentator group in the Lanchow
refinery," carried by NCNA on 31 July, accuses President Nixon
of trying to create a "worldwide Munich" in the Middle East,
Indochina, and elsewhere in the world "with the help of a
certain couzntry." And the article goes on to spec:;fy that
U.S. advocacy of a "peaceful settlement" of the Indochina
question is aimed at creating a "Munich" so as to "hang on
in the whole of Indochina." The Army Day joint editorial in
PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, carried
by NCNA on 31 July, attacks "social imperialism" and U.S.
"imperialism" for colluding "to suit their own interests
and ambitions" on the questions of the Middle East,
Indochina, and the "revival of Japanese militarism," but
does not explicitly mention an Indochina political settle-
ment.
MOSCOW Moscow replies to Peking's joint editorial in a
REPLY Mandarin-language broadcast on 4 August which
says that it "falsely distorted" the Soviet stand
on Indochina and "groundlessly" condemned the USSR for teaming
up with U.S. imperialism to "redivide the world." The broad-
cast recalls that the Soviet leaders have repeatedly expressed
the USSR's "resolute support" of the Indochinese people's
struggle, referring specifically to Brezhnev's 12 June
election speech in which he repeated promiGes of "all
necessary assistance." Reviewing the "various stages" of the
development of the Indochina issue, the commentary recalls
that it was due to the support of the Soviet Union and
"other socialist countries" that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva
agreements--which "protected the interests" of the people of
Indochina and Laos--were achieved. It adds that "at that
time, China acted in the unified ranks of the major forces
struggling against imperialism."*
* Over the years Moscow commentators have periodically
recalled that the USSR and China cooperated to attain the
signing of the Geneva agreements. A 6 April Mandarin-language
broadcast said in this connection that "at that time the
leaders of China had not yet taken open action to split the
anti-imperialist front."
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The broadcast reviews Soviet military, technical, and economic
aid to the Vietnamese and it calls China's efforts to portray
Soviet aid as "collusion" with the United States "very strange
logic," concluding that the joint editorial once again reveals
the "splittism" of the "current leaders of China."
Issue is also taken with the joint editorial's charge of Soviet-
U.S. "collusion" in a Mandarin-language commentary over Moscow's
Radio Peace and Progress on the 3d. Among other things, it
points out that the DRV and PRG leaders have time and again
thanked the Soviet Union, and says the Vietnamese regard this
"comprehensive and unselfish assistance" as the "decisive
criterion" in their victorious struggle. The commentary calls
the words of the Vietnamese an "appropriate repudiation" of
the "absurd" Peking allegation of U.S.-Soviet collusion.
P'iOSCOW QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF U.S. OPERATION IN CAMBODIA
A 1 August PRAVDA article by L. Savinskiy, a candidate of
juridical sciences, questions the legality of the U.S. military
operation in Cambodia, taking issue particularly with the
argument that the action was taken to protect American lives
in South Vietnam. He says that one cannot "take seriously
as an international legal argument" the President's statement
in his 30 April speech that as Commander-in-Chief it is his
duty to take measures to ensure the safety of U.S. soldiers.
Savinskiy explicitly questions the 5 May message delivered by
Ambassador Yost to the UN Secretary General which argued that
the episode is a question of "collective self-defense on the
part of the United States and South Vietnam." Savinskiy
contends that not only is there "not even a hint of substantiation"
of the U.S. argument that a threat to U.S. soldiers came from
Cambodian territory, but that the justification for the invasion
of Cambodia on the grounds of defending the security of American
forces in South Vietnam is "untenable" for the further reason
that the troops are in Vietnam for "criminal aggression, that
illegally."
SIHANOUK GOVERNMENTS RADIO BEGINS BROADCASTING
The Voice of the National United Front of Kampuchea began
broadcasting on 1 August as Hanoi media on 28 July had
announced it would. The first broadcasts air a Sihanouk
message to the Khmer people on the occasion of the inauguration
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of the radio station, and a statement by Hu Nim, information
and propaganda minister, announcing the founding of the radio.*
The broadcasts also carry various items related to Cambodia which
had been transmitted earlier by VNA, Liberation Radio, and the
Pathet Lao news agency.
In his message, Sihanouk invites his fellow countrymen to
listen to the radio because it is "the only authentic voice"
of the Khmer people, Phnom Penh radio having been transformed
into a "base voice of treason." He claims that the FUNK and
its liberation force, have liberated "more than half" of
Cambodian territory,,* and he again calls upon the people to
struggle to liberate the homeland and build a popular,
democratic, and progressive regime.
Vietnamese communist attention to the new radio includes
a con;.ratulatory message to its board of directors from
Tran Lam, chief editor of Hanoi radio, broadcast by Hanoi
on the lst. A Hanoi domestic service "article" on the same
day praises the radio as another of the FUNK's victories,
along with the liberation of "over half" of the country and
the establishment of "people's adc'inistrations" in "many"
provinces, districts, and villages. It says that along with
Hanoi, Liberation Radio, and the Pathet Lao radio, the new
station will contribute to the solidarity of the three
Indochinese people in their fight against the "common enemy."
Liberation Radio similarly praises the new Cambodian station
in two commentaries on the 1st.
Peking media report the original announcement, aired by Hanoi
on the 28th, that the radio would begin broadcasting. On
3 August NCNA briefly summarizes the statements by Sihanouk
and Hu Nim in the inaugural program, and on the 4th carries a
battle, report attributed to the new radio. There has, however,
been no comment from Peking on the new radio. The only
available Moscow reference to the radio is a Cambodian-language
broadcast on the 29th reporting the Hanoi announcement that the
radio would begin broadcasting.
Hu Nim is one of the ministers who Sihanouk claims is
currently in the Cambodian "liberated regions."
** A 20 July statement by Sihanouk Is government on the anniver-
sary of the 1954 Geneva agreements, publicized by Peking and
Hanoi, had claimed that the government "has practically controlled
two-thirds of the territory" of Cambodia.
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,RECOGNITION OF PRG ANNOUNCED AFTER MME. BINH'S CEYLON VISIT
LIP on 3 August carries the announcement of the official granting
of full diplomatic recognition to the PRG by the Ceylon Government.
It says that the two heads of state, Prime Minister Bandaranaike
arid President Huynh Tan Phat, "have exchanged letters a1-Dut this
question" 1.nd that r.;cognition dates from l4 July. An LPA
editorial the same day, discussing the successful conclusion
of PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh's visit to Ceylon, says the
South Vietnamese people note"with gratitude" the full diplomatic
recognition granted by Ceylon to the DRV* and PRG.
The question of relations between the governmrrits was raised
earlier by a 29 July LPA report on Mme. Binh's 27 July arrival
in Ceylon, which noted that Mme. Binh thanked the Government
of Ceylon "for its decision to extend full diplomatic
recognition" to the PRG. A 1 August LPA report r' riding up
Mme. Binh's activities during her three-day visit o Ceylon
quotes her to the same effect. NCNA on the 27th had quoted
her thanks for the decision to extend recognition, but on the
30th reported that at a meeting on the 28th she thanked the
Ceylonese Government for "formally recognizing" the PRG.
The 1 August LPA report on the conclusion of the Binh visit
reports, among other things, her meeting with Prime Minister
Bandaranaike the day of her arrival and says that on the after-
noon of the 29th, Mme. Binh and her delegation "left for home."
TASS notes her brief stopover in India following her Ceylon
visit. On the 31st, it says she "left Calcutta for home" that
day upon completion of her "offik.ial" visits to India and
Ceylon. Indian media on the 30th and 31st report that she
was going to Hanoi.
KIRIROM, OTHER CAMBODIAN "VICTORIES" HAILED
Vie-cnamese communist comment on the fighting in Cambodia
continues to portray a strongly advancing struggle, a 1 August
Liberation Radi:) commentary typically claiming that in only
four months of armed struggle the Cambodian liberation forces
have "liberated many vast areas, including a number of
* VNA on 15 July reported the Ceylon Foreign Ministry announce-
ment that day of full diplomatic recognition of the DRV as of
24 June.
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prcrinciai and district capitals, cet up people's acuninistrations,
and swiftly developed their strength in all respects, while
encircling Phnom Penh." Battle reports, as well ati commentaries,
highlight "victories" in the Kirirom area of Kompong Speu
Ur,virice and in Kompong Cham and Kampot provinces.
VIVA on the 4th summarizes a NHAN DAN commentary of the same
day hailing the "big victories" of the Cambodian liberation
forces when they "wiped out" or "routed" five battalions of
government troops in late July and "liberated" Kirirom township.
The Kirirom engagement, according to NHAN DAN, demonstrates
that the Cambcdian liberation forces have grown "quickly" s?"d
are in a position to attack the enemy at "many places at
the same time." NHAN DAN adds that the achievement "proved"
that the Lon No! government cannot be saved from collapse,
despite all the support it is receiving, including the "massive
,ise" of U . S .. B-52's.
::-)m:n'-:ntary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 4th,
summa"zed by Hanoi radio on the same day, claims that on
2'7 and 28 July Cambodian liberation forces captured 50 tons of
ammunition and supplies and routed three government battalions
at Kirirom. The paper comments that this "second great
victory" at Kirirom marks the rapid growth and progress achieved
by the liberation forces in terms of combat standards.
ACTION IN VIETNAM, "VICTORY" AT FIREBASE RIPCORD REVIEWED
Comment on the military situation in South Vietnam includes a
31 July Liberation Radio broadcast of an LPA recapitulative
report summarizing PLAF achievements during July. The report
says that since late June the PLAF have intensified their
attacks and stepped up the struggle, and it quotes the
Western press as describing the "gloomy military picture"
:~f U.S.-GVN forces in the northern provinces of Quang Tri and
Thua Thien where the allied situation is "more critical than
in any other area,"
Communist propaganda continues to focus on the "victory" on
hill 935 in Thua Thien Province when U.S. firebase Ripcord
was abandoned on 23 July. Liberation Radio on the 30th
carries a short article by one of its regular commentators,
"Nguoi Ban Tia" (the sniper), who says that the U.S. 101st
Airborne Division suffered more casualties at the firebase
than it experienced on "Hamburger Hill" in May 1969. In
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CONI0ID1 N'.P.I:AL Plitt; 7'HI;ND I
5 AUCIIIU'I' :l9'(O
VIOW OF there 1assert, Ire aukrl rhetorically how the U.UU. ml.ll.tary
commanders can claim the abandonment to be it "victory" or it
"favorable troop redeployment." Making it similar point, another
Liberation Radio commentary oil the atlanc' day rciys that the
"Americans have been well known for turning defeats into
imaginary successes." On the 31st VNA carries an ILA account
of th(. 23-day battle around the firebase and LPA the came day
transmits a commentary hailing this "brillian't: victory" over
the Americans.
The situation In southern 'I'rung Ho (GVN Nish 'Phuan, Binh Thaan,
Binh Thuy, '.L'uyen Due, and Lam 1)ong provinces) :Ls discussed in
all LPA commentary of the 31st. It says that the "most striking
aspect" of the situation in southern 'Prung Do in the past six
months Is that the guerrilla and regi r?a1 forces have "unceasingly
developed their roles in mobilizing the masses to oppose the
enemy 's pacification plan."
DRV AGAIN CHARGES B-52'S ATTACK DVZ, CLAIMS PLANE DOWNED
Hanoi radio on 4 August broadcasts a DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement released that day "strongly condemning"
the United States for "launching air and artillery strikes
against the area in the northern part of the demilitarized
zone." The statement claims that on 31 July U.S. aircraft
bombed Huong Lap and Vinh Son villages, arid that on the
following day U.S. aircraft "of various types," including
13-52's, again bombed Iluong Lap village. It adds that U.S.
"heavy guns installed south of the DMZ and naval guns" at the
same time shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Thanh villages which are
"in the northern part of the DM",." (Hanoi on 28 July had
charged in a spokesman's statement that U.S. B-52's had
bombed Huong Lap village on three consecutive days, 23-25 July. )
Hanoi radio on 2 August reports the alleged downing of an
unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane over Thanh lloa Province
that day, bringing Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to
3,358.
COMMUNIQUE RECOUNTS U.S, "WAR CRIMES" FOR JULY
The Vietnam War Crimes Commission on 1 August released a
communique on alleged U.S. "crimes" committed in both South
and North Vietnam during July, according to a 4 August VNA
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CON I i I)NN'I' I AI, [S 'I'ItIINI)
5 AUGUST 19'(O
report, '.I'he unusually brief uecount l iiLi ro mile charge ii againn1,
the Unl,Led llt.atcu. In 130111111 Vietnam, it, riuyu the United ::,t.aten
"laur)hed operation 'Pi.ckettu Wood' . to terrorize and
masr,acrc civiliarin," "wantonly ru.i.ded" ;1ou,;rr Vietuancue vil.lageu
and fieldn with U.S. planes inclt.rdLug and uucd toxic
chemicals In a number of areas. It ucoreu the Uaigon
administration for "muzzling" the press.
In North Vietnam, it charger that. t1.S, artillery from the 7th
Fleet aria from south of the I)MZ In -,6 bombardmetit u fired about
190 uhellu" on Vinh Son, Vinh Thanh, Vinh Ha, Vir b Glang, and
Vinli Lam villages in Vinh Linh area.
SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS VISIT NORTH VIETNAM
VNA on 31 July reports that, two ministers of Siliariouk's
government--Chau Geng, minister charged with special missions,
.aid Thiounn Prasith, minister in charge of the coordination
of _-ff'orts of struggle for national liberation--visited the
DRV from 23 to 30 JuA? They reportedly had talks with Phan
Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Chau Seng
has been a membe" of the government since it was announced on
5 May, and 'T'hioti..l Prasith was appointed on 15 July.
The delegation of Sihanouk's government and the FUNK which had
visited Laotian "liberated areas" from 19 to 25 July reportedly
"recently" stopped over in Ilanoi. A VNA report on the 30th
said they were "seen off," but did riot specify whether or not
they were returning to Peking. This group was also seen by
Pharr Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. A joint
communique on the delegation's Laotiar visit is carried by the
Path'tt Lao news agency on 31 July and by NCNA on 1 August.
Both, accounts of the communique indicate that it says that the
two peoples "enjoy direct assictance of the fraternal
Vietnamese people," thus going beyond the general references
to "support" among the Indochi.nes.: p-,ople in the joint
communique of the 24-25 April Indochinese people's summit
conference and in other propaganda. A VNA summary of the
Lao-Cambodian communique, on 31 July, omits this reference
to Vietnamese assistance. However, mutual "assistance" among
the three Indochinese peoples is currently mentioned in the
North Vietnamese slogans on the anniversaries of the August
Revolution and DRV National. Day, discussed below.
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(:ONP'I!)I?N'I'IAI, 1Itt:; 7.'10;141):!
5 AUGU?'I .t970
DRV PARTY ISSUES SLOGANS, INSTRUCTIONS ON ANNIVERSARIES
SLOGANS VNA. on 1t Augunt, relen.neu l.7 nlogann ifit ue 1 by the
party "woreLrtr1itt, t0 mark I.he ;'5th annivertutrten
oo1 the Aur'unt, hevol.tuLion on 19) Augunt and the " ieptember
foundin;f of the DIN. For the monL part., the current t.rl.oeanu
are nirnl.l.ar to those released by 1'NA on 18 January on the
occaa ion of the 3 February Nort!t Vietnruncnc party ( VWI')
ann.i.veruru'y, but there were -t LoLril_ of 31 ologann on the
party anniveruary.*
A change In the slogan on Indochina appear ,3 to strerigthen
Ifuuol'n pub Lie corrunItrnenL to the warn in Ct,nbodia and Laos.
'1 he current slogan, as trannmiLted by VNA in English,
advocates that the peoples of the three Indochinese
courtt.ricc. "assist" one another, whereas slogans on the
occasions of the VWI' anniversary and May Day called for
mutual "support" among the three peoples. '.I'wo additional
slogans now hail victories of the Lao and Cambodian peoples
in their alai-U.:;. struggle.
Among other changes, the current slogans offer thanks for
the "great and vrtlurtble support and assistance" of the
fraternal soc.ia.l.iut countries; slogans on the party anniversary
and May Day specifically referred to the soviet Union and
:;hind, for the first time since 1967. The party anniversary
:,.l.ogann addres' cd to individual groups in the DIN--inteilectualu,
youth, worren, etc.--are omitted from the current, n]ogana,
as they were frrtn the ones on May Day.
INSTRUCTION, 1 August instructions from the Secreturiat on
Mir_ celebration of the two anniversaries are
also p~_tb.licized on lj August--carried in full by Hanoi radio
and summarized by VNA. The instructions state that, on the
tin nis of the VWI' Pol.itburo's resolutions on the organization o1
important anniversaries in 1970** and on the present situation
* For it discussion of the party anniversary sloga--t_, see the
FBILS TREND;; of 21 January 1970, pages 13-11t.
** The April 1969 Politburo resolution on the four major
anniversaries in 1970 was not released until 8 July 1969, when
it was broadcast by Hanoi radio. For a discussion of the
r'solution and surrounding propaganda see the FBIS SURVEY,
17 July 1969, page 1.3.
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CONK'; Dl;N'1' LAl I'1311tU 'l.'HXNhJ ;
5 /111011''1.' .L9'(O
and taukn, the ob,lectivas of the rclcbratton of the two
annivcruarieu "are to mobilize all party members, people
and militarymen to step up the implementation of the
immediate tasks in order to put into et't'ccI. the slogan:
'all for defeating the U.U. aggrcuuoru and uucccuufuli..y
building socialism.'" They call for lmId.ementaLlor: of party
and state resolutions and Ito'n testcuru,rrt by satisfactorily
carrying out the movements on productive labor, developing
democracy and strengthening the cooperative membern I
collective ownership, and improving party members' quaJ Ltien,
and heightening the role of the people's democratic state.
Spelling out the "main propaganda themes" for the anniversaries,
the instructions hail successes in North and South Vietnam in
the past 25 years. They condemn the 11.5. Vietnamization
policy as a way to prolong and expand the war, warning, that
the Vietnamese people still face "difficulties and hardt,hips."
And they detail the DRV's duties, "as the great rear of the
revolution," to be "combat ready and support with might arid
main the frontline" while building socialism. Among other
domestic tasks, the instructions :,1)ccif'y the "urgent task"
of boosting agricultural production, light industry, and
handicrafts.
The instructi,..rs also spell out --even "concrete tasks" for the
organization of the anniversaries , including the launching of
a political study drive on the history of the Vietncunese
revolution and the party's revolutionary line. The documents
to be stt,died include the selected works of Ho Chi Minh, Le
Duan's "recapitulative" February article on the VWP's 110th
anniversary, parts two and three of Trrrong Chinh'c 1968 Marx
annl'rersary report, Pham Van Dong's speech to be delivered on
the 25th DRV anniversary, and documents which will be
publish-~d on the occasion of the August Revolution anniversary.
The instructions call :Dr the study drive to be carried out
"neatly and in a short time" during August and September,
"with the possibility of each unit or locality setting its
own schedule"--injunctions which probably reflect concern that
the study not interfere with production schedules.
Other tasks include satisfactorily organizing the second phase
of recruiting Ho Chi Minh class party members and "Learning
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CON 1':I: i)EN'ii. AL f I! it:1 '.I'R t:NI)S
5 AUGUS'.i' 1970
t'rorn I,he first, phauee In order t;o carry out the necond phauc
more sati u site: Lori h.,y, "* and acu.tnrhi-rg rL two-mouth production
drive In Angus I; and hep'Gernber aimed al-, fulfilling the 1970
ut;ate plan.
LAOS: SOUPf WOWONG MESSAGE DELIVERED TO SOWANNA PHOUMA
Thu first acknowledffmcnt by the Pathet Lao that the NLIIS
emissary t.'rom ",ouphrtr-ouvong arrived in Vientiane on 31 July
corner. in a 3 Auguul; Radio Pat;fret Lao report that upon his
rarrival he "pub].islred cur announcement in the newspapers. "**
According to the broadcast, the unrrourrcement--dated the
31ut--r;ny:; that his mission Is to deliver to Souvauna Phourna
a message "which discusses some problems in connection with
conditions for negotiations between delegations from both
sides," and it adds the hope that his trip to Vientiane will
be successful. Prathct Lao media have not yet been heard to
report, that the message has actually been delivered although
Vientiane media reported that; Souvanna Phourna received it
from the emissary on 3 August.
While tho broadcast of the announcement speaks ambiguously
of "conditions" for negotiations, a Radio Pathet Lao
commentary on Is August says the emissary in Vientiane has come
to discuss problems concerning the cessation of U.S. bombing
and security measures "to ereata conditions for the high-
ranking plenipotentiary rep--esentatives of both Sides to meet."
And the radio commentary routinely characterizes this as
evidence of NLHS sincerity in the face of U.S. "escalation"
and Vientiane's stubbcrrrncss.
* The VWP Politburo resolution setting guidelines for a move-
ment to improve the quality of party members and to recruit new
members, broadcast by Hanoi radio on 25 April, announced that
the pericd for recruiting new members would be from 19 May 1970
(Ho':; birth anniversary) to 19 May 1)71. VNA on 19 June
reported that the "first drive" for the admission of new party
members "had obtained satisfactory results" and that party
branches were preparing for the next drive to be launched on
the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the August Revolution and
DRV founding.
** Pathet Lao media had reported t1lat the emissary left Sam Neua
on 28 July, and according to VNA on 1 August he "stopped over" in
Ilanoi on 30 July--as had Souphanouvong's emissary in March--
continuing his Journey to Vientiane on the 31st.
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CONFIDENTIAL F111,13 TB NDS
5 AUGUU'T 1970
- 16 -
I3ACKGIIOIJND: The reference in the erniusary'u 31 July arrnourrce-
ment to negotiations between delegations "from both widen" is
consistent with a remark by a NLIIS Central Committee spokesman
at a 21 July Sam Neut press conference called to publicize the
NLIIS Central Committee memorandum of 20 July. Thus, the
spokesman referred to a meeting of plerripoLori tiarics of
"the two sides." However, the memorandum had called for talks
among "the Lao parties concerned"--language consistent with
that in the 6 March NLIIS five-point plan--leaving ambiguous
whether or not a role for the neutralists is envisaged. On 10
March Pathet Lao media said that Souphanouvong sent a message--
similar to one cent Souvanna Phouma--to Khamsouk Kcola, the
chairman of the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic
Neutralist Forces, saying he would shortly send an emissary.
Keola's reply, dated 12 March and carried by the Pathet Lao
news agency on the 14th, expressed the hope that "our meeting
will be held as soon as possible." No such exchange with
the Patriotic Neutralist Forces is known to have been
publicized in connection with Souphanouvong's current
initiative.
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CONF'IDI:N'1'IAI, FBIS '.'BENDS
5 AUGUS'i' 1970
i1IllllLL EAST
Soviet media have not yet reacted to Israel's 1- August official
reply to the U.U. initiative on a Middle East, settlement. But
:Israel's 31 July announcement of agreement is described by
Moscow as "yes" drowned in qualifications and conditions.
Moscow's stress Is on the UAH's far-sighted "political
initiative," with most comment failing to mention that it
concerns acceptance of the U.S. proposals. When the
connection is acknowledged, the U.S. initiative is largely
written off as nothing new, failing to go beyond the November
1967 Security Council resolution. Comment disparages Arab
"extremist" opposition to Nasir's "initiative," rounding
up statements of support by various Arab states and leaders,
and couching its disapproval of Iraqi recalcitrance in
terms of regretful "surprise." While not specifically
acknowledging Palestinian denunciations of the UAR action,
Moscow goes to some pains to argue that Nasir's initiative
toward a political settlement will not jeopardize
Palestinian "rights." Regarding two chief elements
in the U.U. initiative--resumption of the Jarring mission
and a cease-fire--Moscow endorses the former, meanwhile
reiterating its standard objection to direct Arab-Israeli
talks. It remain;; imprecise in its infrequent references
to a cease-fire. Soviet propaganda continues to call
Israeli withdrawal the "decisive condition" for restoring
peace but avoids definition of final borders.
f1OSCO14 NOTES ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO U.S. INITIATIVE
MAoscow first acknowledges Israel's 31 July "agreement" to
the U.S. political initiative in a 1 August TASS Russian
dispatch datelined London, which says that "the news
agencies report" that the Israeli Government in a statement
on the 31st said that it "decided to support" the U.S.
proposals. Moscow did not directly acknowledge that the
Israeli statement on the 31st said that a ministerial
committee would prepare a resolution "on the exact
formulation" of the government's reply. But the TASS
dispatch reported that according to news agencies the
reply is conditional and that REUTERS cites in par*;icular
a British Foreign Office statement saying that "p*'ecise
formulations of the Israeli reply are being defined."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
- 16 -
The Israeli reply, presented to the United States and announced
by Prime Minister Meir in the Knesset on 4 August, hats, not yet
drawn Soviet comment, but propagandists, anticipating the
response, predicted that the official answer would contain a
"great number of conditions designed to guarantee the
possibility of new maneuvers."
TASS followed up the London-datelined dispatch on the 31st
with another TASS Russian dispatch quoting President Nasir's
statement to reporters in California that the acceptance of
the U.S. proposals by the governments concerned is only a
first step. He warned, TASS says, that there is still a
long way to go on the path to a peaceful settlement, but
said that the United States will continue to further the
joint efforts of the Big Four begun in 1969.
Noting Israel's acceptance, a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
broadcast in English to Africa on 1 August says Israel put
up s show of "alleged political independence," but observers
had long predicted that Israel "would never dare go against
the diplomatic maneuvers of Washington" in the Middle East.
It pointedly recalls that President Nixon, at his 30 July
press conference in Los Angeles, said the United States
would "carefully watch" to see that the correlation of
strength between Israel and the Arabs is maintained, and
that "in case of necessity the United States would supply
all required aid to Israel."
TASS on the 31st, reporting the Los Angeles press conference,
said the President noted that Israel had not yet responded
to the U.S. initiative and that he "reaffirmed the U.S.
promise to Israel to maintain the so-called 'balance of
power," using this as a pretext to try to "build up
Israel's military superiority over the Arab countries."
The President in fact recalled his statement in his
1 July television interview in which, he said, he
indicated the U.S. Government's position "insofar as
Israel's security is concerned ai:d our commitment to
maintaining the balance of power in the Mideast."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
BELYAYEV DISCUSSES CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL, JARRING MISSION
CEASE-FIRE Moscow repots on the 30 July pres3 conference
and the President's remarks the following day
to reporters do not touch on his stress that neither side
should improve its military position during a cease-fire.
The propaganda has been vague in its references to the cease-
fire aspect of the U.S. initiative; in the most specific
statement thus far, PRAVDA's Belyayev observes in the
2 August domestic service roundtable program that a three-
month cease-fire* "is proposed for the Suez Canal zone as
well as for the other fronts of the Arab-Israeli war." He
brings ap the subject again in a 4 August domestic service
commentary, saying that the American proposal calls for
resumption of Jarring's mission and efforts to be made
with his help to bring the sides to an agreement on a
"temporary or partial" cease-fire for three months.
According to Belyayev, the Soviet Union considers that
"in the case of a partial cease-fire, it is essential
that an undertaking to this effect be made not only by
the Arab countries" but by Israel too, and that Tel
Aviv "must make such an undertaking clearly and precisely
without any trickery." It is unclear whether by "partial"
Belyayev means a cease-fire on only, certain ' fronts , or in-
volving c.neerned'governments but ekcluding -irregular forces,
or a suspension of military buildups 'inc:cease-fire areas.
U.S. ASSURANCE The 1 August English-language--Radio Peace
ON WITHDRAWAL and Progress commentary'aites "Washington
sources" for a report that the United
States has assured Israel that it will not insist on
Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories.
And Vishnevskiy, in the 2 August PRAVDA, similarly points
to the London DAILY MAIL as reporting that the U.S.
Government has assured Tel Aviv that it will provide
Israel with any aircraft and armaments required, and will
not insist on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all
captured Arab territories.
* Commentators earlier noted Israeli opposition to a
temporary cease-fire, Petrov remarking in NEW TIMES No. 28
of 10 July that Israeli Prime Minister Meir in speaking to
the Knesset had criticized "the proposal concerning a
temporary cease-fire, emphasizing here that Israel 'will
continue its present military operations' against the UAR."
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CONFIDEi.''TIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
Belyayev in the 2 August commentators' roundtable, again spells
out the Soviet position on withdrawal: The USSR, he says,
holds that the "decisive condition" for restoring peace is
"Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the
1967 conflict." Belyayev adds that the Soviet Union includes
in its formula "the question of the security of Israel's
recognized frontiers along the lines existing before the
1967 conflict." In the same vein, Belyayev declares in the
4 August com.entary that it is "particularly important" for
the Tel Aviv leaders to clearly announce that they recognize
the "necessity of the departure of Israel's troope from Arab
territories." In that event, he says, the questions of
recognition of Israel's borders "along the lines existing
prior to 5 Juna 1967 and of peace in the Middle East would
be positively settled."
In neither instance does Belyayev insist on withdrawal from
"all" occupied territories, but this stipulation continues
to appear in the propaganda, and was reiterated in the
17 July communique on Nasir's visit to Moscow. However,
it:was not spelled out in the 15 July Supreme Soviet
statement on the Middle Fast, which called for observance
of the November 1967 Security Council resolution "in its
entirety." Along this line, Belyayev declares in the
4 August commentary that in the Soviet view it is essential
for the sides involved in the conflict to declare their
readiness to implement all the points in the resolution.
He notes, in the roundtable program, that one cannot say
that all clauses cf the resolution "have always been
regarded as favors:ble for the UAR," but that Nasir never-
theless considers that all clauses must be implemented.
BACKGROUND: Stipulation of the pre-5 June 1967 lines as
the final borders has been infrequent for many monti:s :
Malik at the 19 May Security Council session maintained
that Israeli withdrawal "to the positions they held before
5 June 1967 is a key matter for a peaceful. political
settlement."
Petrov in his article in NEW TIMES No. 28 cited a New York
TIMES article of 7 May 1969 as saying that the chief point
of disagreement between the Soviet and U.S..representatives
at the Big Four consultations was the question of withdrawal.
The TIMES pointed out, Petrov said, that "at the time" when
the Soviet Union deems essential Israeli withdrawal to the
* This is reminiscent of Kocygin's remark on Israeli avoidance
of a "clearcut statement" on withdrawal in his 20 May message
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
5 June line, the U.S. position is that Israel should withdraw
to "secure and recognized borders." Turning to the October
1969 U.S. proposal to the UAR, Petrov said that "despite the
Security Council resolution's clear requirement concerning
tne withdrawal of Israeli troops" the new U.S. proposal
questioned their withdrawal from the Gaza region, "which up
until 5 June 1967 had been under UAR administration." Petrov
left the impression that Gaza might be a subject of bargaining,
for he went o:i to make the distinction that Sharm ash-Shaykh
is "primordial UAR territory" whose return; under the U.S.
proposal, would also be subject to negotiations.
JARRING Belyayev explains in the 2 August roundtable
MISSION that "the 'new American plan"' is a proposal
to renew the mission of Ambassador Jarring, who
has been authorized to "maintain contacts with the Arab
countries involved" as well as with Israel with a view to
attaining a political settlement. Belyayev declares that
the Soviet Union has always viewed Jarring's mission as
useful and believed it should be given every support. In
fact, he says, it was the Soviet representation at the
Security Council which "emphasized that the Swedish
ambassador is not some kind of mailbox but an actively
engaged representative of the United Nations working to
restore peace in the Middle East." In the 4 August
commentary, Belyayev notes that Jarring's earlier efforts
brought no results but that his mission is being reinstituted
because, "in the first place, direct talks between Arab
countries and Israel are not possible." He reiterates
Moscow's standard line that under circumstances of Israeli
occupation of their territories, the Arabs view direct
talks with Israel as complete capitulation.
Belyayev does not recall Nasir's statement, in his 23 July
speech, that Ambassador Jarring should receive directives
from the four great powers. But he does go on to say, on
the roundtable program, that the USSR "has taken and
continues taking a most active part in the four-power
consultations" and "has maintained and continues maintaining
contacts with the United States in an effort to find a
formula for a political settlement." He declares that the
Soviet Union intends to continue making efforts to insure
that peace in the area should be stable and "that we
should no longer have to contend with either sporadic or
prolonged crises, as is the case now." He explains in the
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It August commentary that the Soviet efforts to restore peace
do not, constitute "some sort of opportunist attitude" but
represent a "consistent line reflecting the interests of
world peace." He acknowledges that much must be done to
reestablish peace, and says the peoples of the world do
not want to see "President Nasir's initiative" wasted.
USSR PRAISES 'CAIRO INITIATIVE." ATTACKS "ARAB EXTREMISTS"
In a stream of praise for Nasir's "wise, far-sighted" move,
Moscow attempts to bolster the UAR's position in the face of
criticism of his acceptance of the U.S. initiative and
charges of a sellout on the Palestinian issue. Arab
opposition was first directly acknowledged in a TASS
report on 29 July on the "stand of Arab countries" noting
Kuwaiti and Sudanese approval of the UAR's action and
reporting tersely from Baghdad that the Iraqi Baath
leadership "published a statement from which it appears
that Iraq does not approve of the proposals of U.S.
Secretary of State Rogers." The same day, a broadcast
in Arabic hinted at difficulties in discussing two
"opposing lines" in the Middle East, one--supported by
the Arab countries and the Soviet Union--aimed at insuring
freedom and independence for all the area's peoples, and
the other--proponents unidentified--aimed at increasing
trouble and tension in the region,
PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in an article in
the 30 July issue, makes it clear that Arab "extremist
sentiments" are presenting a problem, but does not name
the dissenters. Dealing with the recently concluded
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Congress in Cairo, Glukhov
takes note of Nasir's remarks on the American initiative,
then turns to the UAR's "peace initiative." Without
linking the two, Glukhov depicts Cairo as having "expressed
agreement" to enter into a three-month provisional cease-
fire, to a resumption of the mission of U Th.ant's special
envoy Jarring, "invested with the appropriate pot:*ers,"
and to implementation of the November 1967 Security Council
resolution. Glukhov rejects the notion that this "desire
for peace could be taken for a sign of weakness."
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G:Lukhov Lays that in advancing a peace initiative, it "was
also necessary to overcome extremist sentiments in the Arab
world," and that it required "great political courage to
criticize these sentiments, as President Nasir has done."
In what is apparently Moscow's first reference to the ASU
question-tanid-answer session on 24 July, although not so
identified, Glukhov says that "one question" put to Nasir
concerned "a possible decline in the President's personal
prestige," and that Nasir replied it was not a question, of
his personal popularity or unpopularity but of the interests
of the country and the entire Arab nation.
On 31 July, a broadcast for Arab listeners applauds the
UAR's readiness "to realize practical measures for a
political settlement" as an action "indicating wisdom
and firmness," received with the understanding and
support "of all progressive forces throughout the
world." While refraining from suggesting any opposition,
the commentary pointedly describes as "completely correct"
the "Arab officials and newspapers" which support the UAR
attitude. As if answering criticism, the commentary
argues that the UAR stand "leaves no loophole for any
anti-Arab plan by the aggressors and their protectors."
On 1 August, the Moscow domestic service carries a
commentary by its Cairo correspondent Rassadin who
maintains that "any objective political observer" can
see proof of the sincerity of Cairo's policy in the fact
that the Egyptian leadership, headed by Nasir, "has
firmly dissociated itself from the extremist tendencies
in the Arab world." Rassadin maintains that the "over-
whelming majority of the Arab states" have given full
support to Cairo's diplomatic initiative.
ATTACK Iraqi opposition to Nasir's action is finally
ON IRAQ spelled out in a 1 August PRAVDA article
which points to support for Nasir's "peace
initiative" by the Egyptian people, says it was welcomed
by Jordan, Lebanon, and Sudan, and quotes the Kuwaiti
foreign minister as observing that agreement to resume
Jarring's mission "would hardly interfere with the
Palestinian Arab's struggle." In the light of such
reactions, PRAVDA says, one "cannot but be surprised" by
the attitude of the leadership of the Iraqi Baath Party.
The party issued a special statement "several days ago"--
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CONF:[DENTi:AL IBIS TRENDS
5 AUGUST 1970
on 28 July--formally concerning the Middle East settlement,
PRAVDA says, but "actually, as is seen from its contents,
replying to the UAR Government's position?" In Baghdad,
PRAVDA adds, "they suddenly began tc talk of 'attempts to
liquidate the Palestinian, problem' finally and so on--and
this is said at a time when President Nasir stressed that
the UAR's reply takes special note of the need to restore
the Palestine n Arabs' legitimate rights." The Iraqi Baath's
negative attitude -co Nasir':, initiative does not help the
"genuine struggle against the aggressor" and the imperialist
and Zionist forces supporting it, PRAVDA concludes.
A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on It August, without
mentioning Iraq, seems to echo Nasir's 2 August letter to
Iraqi President al-Bakr when it charges "those who are
loudly rejecting the peace initiative" with neglecting
to mention that the UAR is "assuming the main burden of
the armed response to Israel." Tsoppi finds it significant
that "those who are taking little or no part in warding off
the Israeli aggression are the ones who oppose the UAR policy
and favor i mediate war until victory," and he calls this a
"cheap kind of extremism."
IRAQI The formalities were observed in the reception
DELEGATION of an Iraqi party-government delegation which
arrived in Moscow on 4 August--a week after
Baghdad radio announced, on 27 July, that the Soviet ambassador
had that day extended the invitation. Baghdad radio says
the Iraqi delegation, led by Saddam Husayn in his state and
party pouts, includes the foreign, economy, and agriculture
ministers and a "large number of military and civilian
experts." Other than a TASS report of a statement by Saddam
Husayn on the "friendship visit," Moscow has not characterized
the nature of the visit. In reporting the fir-t session of
"the talks, which are to continue," TASS on th--~ 5th merely
says the two sides "discussed" questions of wider and stronger
Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in various spheres and "exchanged
opinions" on the Middle East and other international issues.
SILENCE Moscow has avoided mentioning Syria's position
ON SYRIA in the Arab lineup, and apparently has not
taken note of the Syrian Baath Party statement
of 31 July rejecting the November 1967 Security Council
resolution and, "in particular," Secretary Rogers' plan.
Syria has, however, sent a delegation to the conference of
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C01il"LDENTIA1, 11411; '1'I11IEU;
5 AI1011:1T 1(9'(0
!'or''If;r) (111d (1e1'c1lUe >',t'n~I,j3tars of "cnrl.f.i'UrltaaL.t.C111 11Lt6tes"
r,t)e11!nt;, 1111cr a (IOJJJ.y, Al RR'I'riIioll, i,:i bya, on the 5th;
Iraq has C.lat'ly refused to attend. A '.i.'A,)4; report from
Cairo on the 2d noted that the ministers planned to hold
a conrer.?unce "soon" In Tripoli to discuss "questions
concerning a ceLLl.ctnent? of the Middle East situation."
PALE=STINIAN Moscow has failed to acknowledge denunciations
QUESTION of Cairo by various Palestinian organizations
for "liquidating" the Palestine question by
its acceptance of the American proposals. But Radio Peace
and Progress, Iii a Yiddish broadcast to Israel on t- August,
plays up leaflet. "printed by the Palestinian liberation
organizations" and distributed In occupied territories
welcoming Egypt's decision. The leaflets, the broadcast
points out, say that the UAR supports a Middle East settle-
ment in which the "rights of the Palestinian nation will be
resT;ccted."
Sensitivity to the Palestinian issue is displayed in a
Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 4th which asserts
that implementation of the Security Council resolution is
sound to "make Tel Aviv take into consideration the
legitimate rights and interests of the Arab peoples,
including the Palestinian people." 'T'ile broadcast complains
that "quarters in some Arab countries" try to "cause
confusion" about this matter, even portraying the
struggle for withdrawal as in conflict with the
Palestinians' struggle for their rights. The commentary
argues that the struggle against the "Israeli policy of
ok.:cupation and annexation is the best and most effective
method to consolidate tl.= gust struggle of the Palest! ,ian
people for national liberation." No talk about the
Palestinians' rights "can take the place of genuine
practical actions in this field," it declares.
In the FBIS TRENDS of 29 July, page 14, second paragraph,
first sentence, the phrase "transmitted. in the Russian
service while Nasir was still speaking" should be deleted.
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S I i40-SOV I ET I;ELAT IONS
11,11NIJ, TIt1;Nha
5 AlIG(RI'1' 111)'(0
PEKING ACCUSES SOVIETS OF MASSING TROOPS IN BORDER AREAS
Poking has marked Army Day on 1 Au. uuL by cul.:l I ng attention to
the UovLet; inilltary buL Ldup alone, the border while generally
maintaining Its polemical routrrrint on Gino-UovLet I.uuuCU. A
,Joint editorial In PEOPLE'S' DAILY, f1;D lOLAG, and I,.1:B ItA'TloN
ARMY DAILY charges that "social lmperialiurn" has "not for a
..Ingle day relaxed Its preparations to attack China" and is
amusing troops In border area.., claiming uimultrurcouuly--in
order to weaken Chinese vigilance and delude world opinion--
that it poses no threat to China. The editorial stresses a
need for high vigilance and seeks to counter any tendency
within the PLA to relax its guard.
In ;ontrast to the joint editorial, whose primary focus is
on the Soviet problem, PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng's
speech at a Peking reception marking the anniversary consisted
mainly of attacks on the United States. Consistent with recent
Chinese comment, Huang obliquely rebuked Moscow for aiding the
United States in promoting "Munich plots" in Indochina and the
Middle East. Huang's approach, before an audience that included
DPRK and Rornanian military delegations among foreign visitors,
typifies Peking's effort to enhance its standing among anti-
U.S. forces while muting its rivalry with Moscow.
The joint editorial's reference to hostile Soviet troop
deployments seems designed to portray the PRC to the world
as the innocent party in the dispute and to underscore for
the Chinese the importance of continued vigilance. In context,
and particularly considering Peking's propensity for using
anniversaries as the occasion to air grievances against its
adversaries, the editorial appears to reflect more the
relative easing of tension sir.ce last year rather than any
adverse development in Sino-Soviet relations. Unlike last
year's joint editorial on the PLA anniversary, the current
one does not mention the border clashes nor point to any
'recent incidents, and it avoids the direct attacks on the
Soviet leadership that marked not only last year's editorial
but also the polemical blast at Moscow on the occasion of
the Lenin centenary this April. While calling for preparedness
against surprise attacks by "imperialism and social imperialism,"
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14,13U; 11'l0,14N)
5 AIIGI RIT 19'(0
-It t~~rirrl ev.lnr:e; Little concern over ILn Lmmi.nent attack
~cn l r-l'crs to r,1't'orL; by the two superpowers to uubver. L" Chinn
in the hop' apt' (1.1vid1ng up the country "none day,"
That. felt Irrg is marl; ing ut;c of the ['I.,A anniversary to remind the
nrtr>,y and people of* the continuing need for vigilturce is
r;ut;g' st ed by the edttor1t-1.'a Irwinterrce that the PLA "absolutely
trrus;t, not, relax in the least" its will to fight. An added
rcpr :al' directed it "t"ry drinking that, relaxes the will to
t'.Ight tr.nd beliLLlcs the enerrky" acemsto imply that there is it
tendency toward laxity or toward lowering the priority of war
pr?ieparedr.eus nteauures. The editorial calls on the PIA send all
the people to be able to cope with "complex situations of any
kind," and It urges that the PLA's combat effectiveness be
rained in "an all-round way."
The vigilance theme is, made more pointed in propaganda on
nationwide celebrations of the anniversary. An NCNA report
said fishermen using the Ussuri River related "many facts
they saw which laid bare the crimes of social imperialism
in massing its troops" along the border. Also mentioning
an area in Sinkiang wi_ere clashes occurred last year, the
report sit:id frontier troops "spoke of their own experience
to expose and condemn the monstrous crimes perpetrated by
a..cIal. imperialism." On 1 August last year NCNA issued an
account of Soviet oppression of minoritie_ in Central Asia
which included charges that the Soviets had established
mi i le sites and c,,ncentrated troops ' in the area and had
carr-Led out armed provocations on the border.
As or. they occasion of the May Day rally and again at the
time of the rally on Mao's 20 May statement, Peking has
signaled its intent to sustain the Sino-Soviet border
talks--notwithstanding its anti-Soviet polemics--by
ingl.ing out the presence of Soviet negotiators at the
talks. NCNA's account of the Army Day reception noted
the attendance of V. Ganko:ovskiy, , the deputy head of the
Soviet delegation and the ranking representative in the
absence from Peking of the chief negotiator.
SOVIET Moscow has used its broadcasts to China to
COMMENT present its own version of the PLO's history
and to rebut Peking's anti-Soviet charge:,, A
1 August commentary in Mandarin carried in Radio Moscow's
program for the PLA reminded listeners cf the exploits of
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CONFIUI;N'I'IA1
AI1GU;;'I' 19't0
rrucl- 1'LA heroes ac:; Chu Te, lbo Lunt;, crud 1'cng 'Pc-hunt and
expressed regret; over their preucnt ;itRte of, near-o1)iLvion
or dLugrace. A Radio Peace anU Progr?c:.s conuncntary In
Mandarin on the annLvcr.uary, giving
Moe. :ow 't Ilse on the
p,_rvero[on oof' the PLA'u role during the cultural revolution,
pointed out that the (Iium!usal of i'eng wc.trc the prelude to
the appointment; to PLA leaderohl.p of' th_ rc loyal to the
personality cult.
Another Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progreso,
on the 3d, took Issue with the Chinese point editorial's
charges of Soviet collusion with the United States on
the Indochina and Middle Ea: t questions . It also took
exception to the passage on Soviet troop deployments,
which it interpreted as charging a Soviet. intention to
invade China. Radio Peace and Progress on the 4th
~crr;i,luirred that the Chinese have uued the anniversary
to ['cut anti-Soviet sentiments. Mentioning the border
talks, it quoted Brezhnev's 12 June speech charging that
the Chinese have impeded. the negotiations.
Soviet central media have continued to refrain from
originating comment on China, though Moscow has been
drawing on the growing body of East European comment
to convey the Soviet bloc's views on Chinese developments.
LITERARY GAZETTE on 29 July carried a Czechoslovak article
on Pcking'3 foreign policy--the third such article from
East European papers to be reprinted in Soviet weeklies
in late July.
Overtones of border tensions were contained in an article
in SOVIET RUSSIA on 2 August discussing reclamation and
agricultural development of two Soviet-held islands in
the Amur near Khabarovsk. The article referred to the
islands' "military history of glory" in citing past
examples of border fighting during the Civil War and
during the Japanese occupation of northeast China. 't'here
was no reference to the current Sino-Soviet border dispute,
but the discussion of the economic benefits to be derived
from cultivation of river islands suggests a Soviet
determination to stand firm on claims to disputed islands.
Earlier, a PRAVDA book review on 7 July was used to
denounce Chinese territorial claims or Siberia and to
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t;r)N Fl 1)EN'l't.A1, V111:; 'I.'Itl:r4I)U
5 Al ICUJU'I' J9'(0
11xlrr('::; rcnoive to hold Ito ground In the (litthute.
'f'h' rulnual rrr~utrion of the joint Ui.no-:;ovict connn.luuL.ori for
tr,rlr r r Lvr r n,J,vlgrtt.i.on opened on 10 July; there have been
no nrut ~urrc~ rnrnIs ul.rrce then.
ROMANIM RESISTANCE TO SOVIET PRESSURE DRAWS CHINESE PRAISE
Romturta has used the visit of its defense minister to Pelting
to rrrrssure the Chinese that its military obligations within
the Novi cat bloc r?rc directed toward Europe and do not embrace
:1lno-Uoviet relations. Speaking at a Peking banquet on
30 July, Defense I41niioter lonita declared that in case
"unperialisirr launches aggression in Europe," Romania will
"fulfill its, duties as a Warsaw Treaty state." He followed
this by reiterating, the Romanian line of friendly relations
with "all" the uocr.allst countries and went on to offer an
encomium to Sino-Romanian relations.
On the same occasion Iiuang Yung-sheng praised the Romanians
for resisting Soviet pressures aimed at furthc- integrating
the Warsaw Pact countries' armies. Huang observed that the
Romanian armed forces have repeatedly frustrated the attempt
of "those assuming the posture of an overlord" to issue
orders "to the armies" of other countries and have safe-
guarded Romanian control. over the army. Huang cited
Romanian party chief Ceausescu's pointed remarks that
only the Rcman.ian leaders can issue orders to th'ir-army.
BRATISLAVA PAPER WEIGHS CSSR OBLIGATION TO FIGHT CHINESE
A Czechos.iovaic commentary on 28 July addresse itsel:' in the
most specific terms of any of Moscow's European allics to
date on the sensitive subject of the obligation to fight
on the Chinese borders under the terms of its bilateral
mutual defence treaty with the USSR. Keyed to the 6 May
Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as "the basis of our security,"
the article appears on tha eve of the second anniversary
of the repressive 3 August 1.968 Bratislava Declaration and
.in a Bratislava sour-a--the trade union daily PRACA.
Czechoslovak propaganda on the anniversary has stressed
the "international duty" to "defend socialist gains," a
formulation from the Bratislava document that was
incorporated in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.
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CON1"11 1' N'I' [AL 1"131.11 '1.'H.ENIMJ
5 AUGUST 1970
While noting that Article 10 of the bilateral pact "now"
obligates "the two states" to "render comprehensive
assistance in the event of an armed attack by any state,"
llorak's article candidly views the sending of CSSR troops
to the Far East, in the event of a Gino-Soviet war, as a
possibility but as not a very likely eventuality. Thus
it takes unprecedented liberties with the "equality"
doctrine in Soviet-allied relations in pointing out
that "Soviet aid to us" woL.'.d be "decisive" and the mutual
obligation "primarily serves Czechoslovakia," since the
latter's aid to the USSR "can always be only auxiliary."
Acknowledging that "Western propaganda has started to
develop theories on Czechoslovakia's duty to send its
soldiers to'.the Chinese border" in the event of a USSR-
PRC war, the article registers abhorrence oP such a
(?onfilet, adding that while such a war would constitute
"'l world crisis" the "direct participation of Czechoslovak
soldiers would hardly be in the forefront of consideration."
At the same time the article develops a rationale for
possible CSSR troop involvement in the Far. East. It
points out that in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia
"we would be sent Soviet soldiers coming from the most
eastern parts of the USSR," as it recalls was the case
in World War II.
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CONI'ID.)P;N'L'IAL 1"I31.. 'l'RRNDS
5 AIJCU;11' 1970
- J.I. -
CHINA'S ARMY DAY
PEKING RECEPTION AND JOINT EDITORIAL HIGHLIGHT OBSERVANCE
The I. August Army Day was greeted in standard fashion with a
joint PEOPLE'S DAILY/RIND FLAG/LIi3ERA'V..ON ARMY DAILY editorial,
a speech by Chief' of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, and personal
appearances by Chou En-lai :Lnd other Politburo members. The
oditorl al and Iluang's speec.7 stressed issues of international
relations,* although they referred briefly to the PLA's
cultural revolution role and its continuing tasks in the
work of "three supports and two militaries." In contrast,
last year's Joint editorial, even though it sharply attacked
the USSR for "armed provocations" on the border, primarily
stressed the PLA's role in domestic affairs. It quoted a
"latest instruction" from Mao on the need to "work meti,;ulously"
in the domestic area; it noted that the cultural revolution
"continues to develop in depth"; and'it enjoined they PLC, to
"energetically support and help consolidate the revolutionary
committees at all levels." This year's editorial makes no
reference to the revolutionary committees, nor does Huang.
The reception given by the Ministry of National Defense was
attended by most of the active Politburo members usually in
Peking except for Mao and Lin. Wu Fa-hsien, who had been
out of public view for a month, was present. Chu Te, who
had not surfaced for May Day, also appeared, although none
of the other old and inactive marshals showed up and Peking
chief Hsieh Fu-chih remained absent. Of the provincial
leaders, only Shanghai chiefs Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-
yuan were in Peking, making a rare joint appearance there.
FOREIGN Greetings on the anniversary follow the pattorn
MESSAGES of recent years, with messages from friendly
countries such as the DRV, the DPRK, and Romania
but none from the Soviet Union or its orthodox allies. The
Albanian message, as well as editorial comment, is punctuated
with attacks on the Soviets by name; these are duly reported
in PRC media. The last Soviet message on the anniversary was
in 1967.
* Discussed in the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this
publication.
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AUGU;J'.1' 1970
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FORTUNES OF TOP KGB LEADERS APPEAR TO HAVE SHIFTED
Shi ['ts In the YGU command appear to have occurred in recent
months . In Tture the r'irnt deputy chairman of' the KGB,
N.:3. Zakharov, was apparently shunted aside, and possibly
supplanted, by the other first deputy chairman, his junior,
G.K. 'Tsvigun.* 'In July the longtime chairman of the
Ukrainian KGB was replaced by an official apparently sent
from Moscow.
In June there were two signals that Zakharov's status is
in doubt. Ile failed to sign the obituary of the deceased
Ukrainian KGB first deputy chairman, 13.3. Shulzhenko, even
though other USSR KGB deputy chairmen did so: S.K. Tsvigun,
V.M. Chebrikov, A.M. Malygin and L.I. Pankratov (RADYANSKA
UKRAINA, 6 June). Subr:cquently, in the mid-June Supreme
3:r iet elections, he was not reelected a deputy; the
.orm,2r KGB chairman who had promoted him to first deputy
chairiuan, Semichastnyy, also was not reelected a deputy.
KGB first deputy chairman Tsvigun was reelected, however.
In 1966 Zakharov had been the only KGB deputy chairman elected
to the Supreme Soviet (Tsvigun was elected as Azerbaydzhan
i\(3Lj chairman), and only he and deputy chairman S.G. Bannikov
were elected delegates to the 1966 party congress. Zakharov
had been promoted from an administration chief to first
deputy chairman in 1963 under KGB chairman Semichastnyy,
But when Semichastnyy was demoted in May 1967 and replaced
by Yu. V. Andropov, Andropov quickly brought in two new men
who had previous ties with Brezhnev. Maj. Gen. S.K. Tsvigun,
a Ukrainian, was released as Azerbaydzhar KGB chairman on
22 June 1967 to become KGB first deputy chairman.
Dnepropetrovsk second secretary V.M. Chebrikov left the
Ukraine soon afterward to become KGB deputy chairman; he was
relieved as chairman of a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet commission
in October 1967.
* Zakharov rose to high position under former KGB chiefs
Shelepin and Semichastnyy. Tsvigun was appointed first
deputy chairman under the current KGB chief Andropov.
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5 AUGUST 1.970
T-ti v 1 gun had been u leader of the Moldavian MVD--prenwnably deputy
min.Lster--during t3rezhnev'u tenure an Moldavian Central Committee
t.'irut secretary from July 1950 to October 1952; Tovigun was
elected a candidate member of the Moldavian Central Committee in
1952 and 1954 and worked in state security organs throughout this
period.* Chebrikov had worked under Brezhnev's protege
V.V. Shchcrbitskiy in Brczhnev's home base of Dnepropetrovsk.
Since mid-1967 there have been two first deputy chairmen,
Zakharov and Tsvigun, but Tovigun's influence may have
exceeded that of iiic senior. Tovigun's former deputy
G.A. Aliyev (Azerbaydzhan KGB deputy chairman 1964-1967)
was chosen by Moscow in mid-1969 to take over party leadership
in Azerbaydzhan--a very unusual promotion for a KGB leader--
and to initiate a thorough purge in the republic. Aliyev has
demonstrated his pro-Brezhnev sympathies by devoting much
more attention to Brezhnev in his speeches thm have most other
such leaders. Further, since mid-1969 Tsvigun i,cs been more
in evidence than Zakharov, greeting or seeing off 13rzhnev and
Podgornyy on 3 October, 14 October and 18 October 1969, speak-
ing at higher party school courses (IZVESTIYA, 4 November) ai:-,l
representing the KGB at an MVD meeting (RURAL LIFE, 10 December,.
Zakharov did greet the returning Brezhnev and Podgornyy on
23 July 1969, but his only other recent appearance was before
a seminar of leaders of Shelepin's trade unions (TRUD, 25 March
1970).
UKRAINE On 20 July V.F. Nikitchenko, longtime chairman of
KGB CHIEF the Ukrainian KGB, was transferred to unspecified
other work (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 21 July). The
transfer may have been unexpected inasmuch as Nikitchenko had
been reelected to the Supreme Soviet just a month earlier.
It is worth noting that Nikitchenko's replacement apparently
came from Moscow rather than from among his subordinates.
The new chairman, Lt Gen. V.V. Fedorchuk, presumably of
Ukrainian origin, has made speeches in Moscow and written
articles on intell:Llence matters for Moscow journals in recent
years. He has had n,) apparent official connection with the
Ukraine and was not i=ong the Ukrainian KGB officials signing
first deputy chairman Shuizhenko's obituary in June.
* Another Ukrainian now in a top security job--present USSR
MVD Chief N.A. Shchelokov--worked in Dnepropetrovsk with Bre?,.hnev
and followed Brezhnev to Moldavia in 1951 to take a leading
post there.
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Nikitchenko had been Ukrainian KG13 chairman since 1954; he was
appointed to the post while Podgornyy was cadre--second--
secretary of' the Ukrainian Central Committee. Nikitchenko was
a deputy secretary of Kharkov obkom from 191414 until sometime
around 1950; Podgornyy was Kharkov first secretary during the
period 1950-1.953.
SHELEST SNIPES AT DNEPROPETROVSK OBLAST LEADERSHIP
At a Ukrainian Central Committee plenum in late July Ukrainian
First Secretary Shelest pointedly criticized the party leader-
ship of Dnepropetrovsk, the home base of Ukrainian Premier
and CPSU Politburo candidate member V.V. Shcherbitskiy, as
well as of Brezhnev and Kirilenko. Shelest's sniping appears
part of the longstanding rivalry between him and the
Dnepropetrovsk faction, which is represented in the nine-man
Ukrainian Politburo by both Shcherbitskiy and Dnepropetrovsk
First Secretary A.F. Vatchenko. This move may be a result
of Shelest's strengthened position since he weakened the
second most powerful faction--the Donetsk group--by shunting
its leader,'Ukrainian Second Secretary A.P. Lyashko, into
the ceremonial post of president in wid-1969 and by removing
Lyashko's protege V.M. Tsybuako from the key post of Central
Committee cadres chief in April 1970.
Although Shelest did not criticize oblast first secretary
Vatchenko by name, he focused criticism on a Dnepropetrovsk
rayon and held the oblast leadership responsible for the
shortcomings. With Vatchenko awaiting his turn to speak,
Shelest singled out "the Nikopol rayon of Dnepropetrovsk
oblast" for low grain yields and for fulfilling grain plans
only three times in the last nine years. Even while
acknowledging that agricultural leadership in Nikopol has
shown some improvement and that the rayon would gather a
respectable harvest this year, he turned the rayon's past
shortcomings into criticism of the oblast leadership: "But
how was it possible that he lagging of one of the oblast's
biggest rayons was tolerated for so many years? Can one call
this effective, skilled and demanding leadership?"
(RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 July). Citing the nunber of farms
failing to fulfill the plan in Dnepropetrovsk and five other
oblasts, he warned thaw every nonfulfillment of grain plans
"must be evaluated as political failure in work, and
principled party conclusions must be drawn from this."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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In referring to the past nine years, Shelest also encompassed
the period of Shcherbitskiy's tenure as Dnepropetrovsk leader
(July 1963-October 1965). Although Shelest implied that
Nikopol leaders had worked poorly for many years, they were
being warmly praised for their successes in 1967--in, for
example, a 9 January 1967 PRAVDA article by Yuriy Chernichenko
and a 26 January 1967 PRAVDA editorial.
Shelest's relations with the Dnepropetrovsk organization have
probably been strained since his rapid promotion from Kiev
first secretary to Ukrainian Central Committee secretary
(August 1962) and then to first secretary (July 1963) under
Podgornyy's patronage. When Podgornyy was promoted from
Ukrainian first secretary to CPSU Central Committee secretary
in mid-1963, he reshaped the Ukrainian leadership in his
own interests. Shelest became first secretary and Podgornyy's
Kharkov protege N.A. Sobol became second secretary, while
Brezhnev's associate Shcherbitskiy was demoted from premier
to Dnepropetrovsk first secretary. Former Donetsk first
secretary I.P. Kazanets became premier, and his protege in
Donetsk, Lyashko, moved up to Ukrainian Central Committee
secretary. At the December 1963 CPSU Central Committee plenum
Shcherbitskiy lost his candidate membership in the CPSU
Presidium and his seat was given to Shelest.
After Brezhnev defeated Podgornyy's challenge in 1965 and humbled
Podgornyy's Kharkov proteges, Shcherbitskiy was returned to
the post of premier and also candidate member of the CPSU
Presidium.
The latest divisive episode appeared to be Dnepropetrovsk's
1968 campaign against writer Oles Honchar's novel The Cathedral.
Shelest ignored the campaign, which apparently because of
lack of top-level support failed to shake Honchar's position
as Ukrainian Writers Union head.
Shelest is now certainly a power in his own right and, while
the Dnepropetrovsk group has remained a rival faction, he
appears to enjoy good relations with Dnepropetrovsk pa';riarchs
Brezhnev and Kirilenko. Ukrainian press treatment of
Kirilenko--who as D%epropetrovsk first secretary 1950-1955 had
promoted Shcherbitskiy and Vatchenko to be his top deputies--has
been especially favorable.
CONFIDENTIAL
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L A T I N AM E R I CA
HAVANA REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO REVIVED BOLIVIAN INSURGENCY
So far Havana has provided only reportage, without comment, on
the 19 July attack by the Bolivian National Liberation Army
(ELN--the guerrilla organization founded by Che Guevara) on a
U.S.-owned goldmining installation in Bolivia. A PRENSA LATINA
report on the 24th did note that the ELN foray led to all Bolivia
being placed under a state of siege, "Just as it was three years
ago." The report went on to observe that the conversion of
three provinces into military zones "could affect the guerrilla
operations," and it concluded that the government "seems to have
control of'the situation."
Havana has reported that Cuba will furnish asylum for 10 ELN
members who were released from jail in Bolivia and flown to
iL.e in exchange for two West German technicians captured
L. the KN raid. Statements by the released ELN members
have a_.;~o been publicized in Cuban media. Two documents
released by ELN following the 19 July attack were transmitted
by PRENSA LATINA's office in Chile to Havana on 22 July and
broadcast the next day by Radio Havana in a Quechua-dialect
program for Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador--but not in other
monitored Havana broadcasts.
CASTRO'S Havana's relatively cautious propaganda reaction
DILEMMA to the ELN's long-awaited "return to the mountains"
probably reflects a desire to avoid any implication
that the ELN is operating under Cuban tutelage. Following up
his renewal of trade relations with Chile earlier this year,
Castro would like to overcome Cuba's hemispheric isolation
by restoring bilateral relations with several Latin American
states. But he does not want to leave himself vulnerable to
charges by Latin American revolutionaries that he is betraying
the guerrilla cause on the continent for the sake of national
self-interest.
This quandary was illustrated in Castro's 22 April Lenin Day
speech, in hich he defended himself against charges--made by
Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo, once supported by
Castro--that he had forsaken the cause of Latin America in
order to develop the Cuban economy. He promised to continue
to support "genuine" revolutionaries, but not the revolutionary
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"impo,oters;" he had backed In the past. At the same time, he
embraced a doctrine of revolutionary pluralism for Latin
America; noting that no two revolutionary paths are ever
identical, he affirmed that Cuba's support for revolution
is not confined to guerrilla movements solely but extends
to any government that follows progressive domestic policies
and. attempts to free itself from the "Yankee imperialist yoke."
Castro also appears to be attempting to mend his relations
with the orthodox Latin American CP's, a probable outgrowth
of his much-improved relations with the USSR. A high-ranking
Chilean CP official recently visited Havana and had lengthy
talks with Castro. Although Castro in the past scored the
Chilean party for its reliance on traditional politicking
rather than revolutionary action, PRENSA LATINA on 24 July
reported a statement by the party official affirming that
relations between the party and Cuba "were never broken"
and asserting that Castro told him "we might have had
differences of opinion but never a problem."
To Cuban-oriented Latin American guerrillas, Castro's
overtures toward "bourgeois reformist" Latin American
regimes, his interest in mending relations with Latin
American CP's, and the Moscow-Havana rapprochement may
well appear as a betrayal of revolutionary principles.
Although Castro's 26 July speech dealt exclusively with
domestic matters, in a postscript to the speech, announ'ing
that Guevara's hands and. death mask had been received in
Cuba, he appeared to reaffirm, defensively, Cuba's continuing
commitment to revolution in Latin America:
We do not want to construct a paradise on the edge
of a volcano. We work with zeal and with confidence
in the future . . . . One day we will have to be a
part of the community of Latin American peoples, of
the revolutionary peoples of Latin America. Some
day our fatherlands will cease to be fragments of a
continent that is subjugated by imperialism. We are
the pioneers of this revolutionary path, the first,'
but not the only ones
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ELN DOC11ENTS PROCLAIM A CONTINENT-WIDE STRUGGLE
The documents released by ELN--noted above--utressed that the
liberation struggle must follow a continental strategy. One
document was entitled "We Have Returned to the Mountains" and
signed by ELN commanders, including "Chaco" Peredo, self-
proclaimed successor to his brother us chief of the ELN. It
was largely a reaffirmation of Guevara's thesis that the Bolivian
struggle is a key part of a continent-wide struggle; in
explaining why non-Bolivians are enlisted in ELN ranks, it
declared:
For us, as for Bolivar and Che, the fatherland is
America, the fatherland is not just where one is born,
but rather where one is ready to die or conquer in the
struggle against the enemy of the peoples . .
Foreigners are the agents of the CIA and their
collaborators in our country. A revolutionary is
not a foreigner anywhere.
The other document issued by the ELN, entitled "To the
People of Latin America" and signet', by Chilean, Peruvian,
and Brazilian ELN members, expanded on this point. It
emphasized that the Bolivian people view as strangers only
those who have "always divided America in order to devour
her more fully," not those who "come to offer their lives
for Bolivian liberation." It recalled Che's notion that
Bolivia was "the key territory" for initiating the
continental war of liberation, a "Vietnam" which will
"radiate outward." The foreign ELN members defined their
task as the concentration of "our best efforts" in Bolivia
while "preventing the enemy from concentrating his forces
here."
The document signed by the ELN commanders derided the
Bolivian CP, which Castro has accused of betraying
Guevara. It scored the CP's efforts to forge an
alliance with the national bourgeoisie, and contrasted
the alleged effectiveness of the guerrillas with the
impotence of the communist parties: "While 15 years
ago the communist parties were of little concern to
Yankee imperialism, today the guerrilla nightmare does
not let it sleep." Alleging that Guevara's death
"proved" the efficacy of guerrilla warfare and "the
force of the theory of the guerrilla centers," it issued
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CONK'I1)P,'N'I'.1AI, hli:f'i 'l'10;N1X1
AUGUt3T 1910
it thinly veiled blu:;L at orthodox cornmunluLu, terming them
"p:leudorevolutionary opeclou" who "continue 'creating
('c>ncliLionu' Iride rinl.te.ly, letting their organ:Lzationu
'ripen' until, they rot, and talking abutrueL.ly about the
revolution."
The commanders indicated that the ELN for the present must
"do without the traditional party methods and wuyu and
organize ourselves politically with a basically military
structure." This thesis Is consistent with the doctrine
expounded by French Marxist Regis Debray, who argued in
"Revolution in the Revolution?" that autonomous rural
guerrilla orgunizationi operating independently of urban
political parties would constitute the revolutionary
vanguard.
The document sought to win adherents from the Bolivian CP
and other leftist parties by noting that the commanders
who signed it formerly belonged to various leftist
organizations, including the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking
Bolivian CP's, and had found them "inadequate for the
necessities of the revolution." It noted chat statements
of sooport from political parties backing the ELN were
"not enough," and that the guerrillas did not need "applause"
or "counsellors." Calling for participation in the armed
struggle, "which, is what now defines a revolutionary," it
expressed a need for "comrades to fight by our side and
share with us the risks and victories." ANSA on 24 July
reported that the Bolivian CP youth organization had issued
a note disavowing the guerrillas. The note said that tile
decision of "many university leaders who have returned t-)
the mountains, with all the heroism it entails, does not
seem to us to be the most responsible attitude," but a
reflection of "the despair of ultraleftist groups."
TUPAMAROS On 1 August Havana media reported on a
letter sent by ELN leader "Chato" Peredo
to the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan urban guerrilla movement.
The ELN leader lauded the collaboration between his
movement and the Tupcmaros, and he said that. the latter's
assistance facilitated the ELN's return to the mountains."
This cooperation, Peredo said, "eliminates artificial
frontiers" and demonstrates that "the ideas of Bolivar
and Che have begun tc take root." The letter did not
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Indicate what, t'orm collaboration between the two organt'utiunr
had assumed, but, 1.1, utatcd that '.In the Immediate future, we
must give more evidence of integration not only with cooperation
t,ut, a.l.uo in the exchange of comradeu."
In tliiu context, It may be noted that in ulgning the document
noted above, "To the People of Latin America," the Chilean,
Peruvian, and Braz.i.l.icur ELN members indicated that they also
represented others who could not sign for reasons of ;security.
Peredo'u letter lauded the T'upamaros for providing an
excunpie . . . worthy to us and to all revolutionaries,"
and he indicated that the ELN would try "to imitate" the
Tupumuroo, although in contrast to its urban-centered actions
the ELN would operate "in the mountain:."*
* Havana comment last June prai::ed the Tupamaros as an example
for other Latin American revolutionaries, and claimed that their
tactics have been adopted throughout the southern cone of South
America. See the TRENDS of 1 July 1970, pp. 36-38.
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