TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 24, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
24 June 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 25)
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CONFIDENTIAL,
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It Is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its content? to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Eulud.d Irom au.omnlit
downgrading and
d.tla/lifitollon
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 JUNE 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Cambodian Action Desr.ribed, Indochina "Victories" Hailed . . ,
1
Activities of Ministers in Sihanouk's Government , ? , ?
2
Paris Talks: Routine Demands for U.S. Withdrawal Repeated . . . . .
3
VNA Belatedly Notes +,VN Plan to Release DRV Prisoners . . , . , ,
5
Moscow Scores U.S. "Aggression," Silent on Conference Issue . . . . ,
5
Souphanouvong Sends Second Letter to Souvanna on Laos Talks
8
Hanoi Claims Shelling of DRV, Assails June "Crimes" . . . , . , . . ,
9
DRV National Assembly Delegation VlkLtito East Europe . . . ? . . . . .
KOREA
10
DPRK Announces Founding of "Marxist-Leninist Party" in ROK . , , . .
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
11
Moscow's Offensive Abates, Peking Continues Restraint . . . . . . . .
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
13
PRC Says Time Not Suitable for Setting Warsaw Meeting Date . . . . .
BRITISH ELECTIONS
16
Moscow Cautious on Implications of Conservative Victory . . . , . , ,
WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS
18
Moscow Sees No Change in Brandt Policy Despite CDU Politicking
EUROPEAN SECURITY
19
Budapest Meeting Discusses Pact's Stand on Security Conference .
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
21
Dubcek and Cernik Removed From Latest Positions
USSR SUPREME SOVIET
23
Some Central Committee Members Not Reelected as Deputies , . . .
CCP REBUILDING
25
Increased Activity on Eve of 1 July Party Anniversary , , , . . . - .
27
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
24 JUNE 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 JUNE 1970
Moscolr (3669 items)
Peking (3135 items)
Supreme Soviet Elections
(36%)
18%
Indochina
(37%)
8%
[Brezhnev Speech
(12%)
6%]
[Cambodia
(25%)
30%]
Soyuz 9
(7%)
12%
[Mao's Statemelit
(1%)
6%]
China
(7%)
6%
[Vietnam
(6%)
5%]
Indochina
(3%)
7%
[Laos
(1%)
3%]
Kosygin Speech at
(--)
)4%
Domestic Issues
(17)
21%
Luncheon for
Somali Government
(--)
9%
U Thant
Anniversary ,,f
(--)
3%
Delegation in
PRC
Nazi Invasion
Middle East
(4%)
li%
of USSR
Romanian Leader
(26%)
3%
International
(9%)
3%
Bodnaras in
Communist
Party Meeting
PRC
Sino-Japanese
3%
in Moscow,
lst Anniversary
Swedish Premier Paline
(--)
2%
Fishery Talks
in USSR
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted a3 commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor cignificanee.
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IND0CHINA
Vietnamese communist attacks on the Nixon Administration's
"aggression" throughout Indochina and alleged duplicity at the
Paris talk-- continue along standard lines. The tone is typified
by a Hanoi radio commentary on 19 June, pegged to the President's
TV speech on the economy on the 17th, which says that "if Nixon
re"rises to look at the truth and to put an end to the war, the
U.S. economy will undergo unpredictably more serious consequences,
and his career will collapse like Johnson's."
Soviet attacks on U.S. "aggression" in?Cambodia'and he rest of
Indochina include a 21 June PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov which
is notable for its direct censure of the President. Zhukov does
not discuss U.S. Indochina policy in the context of Soviet-U.S.
relations. But in conclusion he does quote Brezhnev's remark, in
his 12 June election speech, that by the expansion of the war
into Cambodia, U.S. leaders are merely expanding their military
and political defeats both in Indochina and beyond.
Current Soviet propaganda is not marked by the attacks on Peking's
Indochina policy that had become a propaganda staple since the
inception cf the Cambodian crisis. But Peking's most direct,
though still implicit, criticism of Moscow's policy on Cambodia
comes in the 25 June joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY
editorial on the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean
War. It says that at a time when Asian peoples are strengthening
their unity in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, "there are
certain persons who are collaborating with U.S. imperialism in evil
doings . . . , ever:. maintaining dirty relations with Lon Not and
his like."
While Peking had not commented independently on Soviet failure to
recognize the Sihanouk government, NCNA on 12 May carried an attack
by the Burmese CP, which said that "the Soviet revisionist clique
dares not denounce the counterrevolutionary Lon Nol clique by name
and has not dared up to now" to recognize Sihanouk's government.
Allusions to the Soviets also seemed evident in Mao Tse-tung's 20 May
statement in which he noted pointedly that the new Cambodian govern-
ment had been recognized by "nearly 20" regimes, as well as in Kang
Sheng's 9 June banquet speech for a delegation from Romania in which
he praised that country as one of the first to extend recognition.
CAMBODIAN ACTION DESCRIBED, INDOCHINA "VICTORIES" HAILED
Propaganda on recent military action in Cambodia includes Liberation
and Hanoi broadcasts on 19 and 20 June, respectively, which cite
the Western press in reporting the cutting off of Phnom Penh. Hanoi
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observes that "the Cambodian patriotic forces have severed all
roads linking Phnom Penh with the provinces, thus making the
capital almost completely isolated." VNA on the 20th, citing the
Information Bureau of the United National Front of Kampuchea (FUNK),
rounds up selected military actions in June and says that Chhep
and Chey Seng districts of Preah Vihear Province were "completely
liberated" on the 13th when the local armed forces and people "rope
up in insurrection." VNA also mentions action adjacent to the
Thai bord.er, saying that the "patriotic forces" on 19 June attacked
government forces in Pai Lin "about two kilometers from the Thai
border."
In hailing the "victories" of the first 15 days of June on the
battlefields of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Liberation Radio on
the 19th comments that the "most striking point" of the Cambodian
situation during the first half of the month was that the "Cambodian
revolutionary forces continued to develop -y leaps and bounds,
qualitatively and quantitatively." LPA on 20 June routinely
describes the exploits of the "armed forces and people in Indochina;"
as attaining a "new stage" in the respective anti-U.S. struggles of
the three peoples.
Comment on the war in South Vietnam includes an 18 June QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN commentary which does not dwell on military feats but
stresses the importance of strengthening bases in "liberated areas."
The DRV army paper says it is neces.;ary to "build political organs"
in areas under allied control and to develop guerrilla warfare in
adjacent aretis to contain the enemy.
PATHET LAO DENIAL OF Following Hanoi's denunciation on the 13th
TROOPS IN ANGKOR WAT of the "fabricated news" put out by the
Phnom Penh regime that 10,000 Vietnamese
communist troops, including Pathet Lao and Chinese elements, were
quartered in the Angkor Wat temple complex, the Pr_thet Lao news
agency KPL issued an "authorized" denial dated 17 June. As
publicized by Pathet Lao radio on the 18th and by VNA on the 20th,
the statement "absolutely" denies "foreign reports from Cambodia"
to the effect that Pathet Lao units were operating it Siem Reap-
Angkor Wat area of Cambodia.
ACTIVITIES OF MINISTERS IN SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT
DELEGATION Li On 19 June VNA cited t.io FUNK information office
INDIA, CEYLON as reporting that a delegation of the Royal
Government of National Union, led by Foreign
Minister Sarin Chhak and Minister of Popular Education and Youth
Chan Youran, had spent the week of 10-17 June in India, where they
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2h JUNE 1970
were received by and had a "cordial talk" with Prime Minister. Gandhi,
External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh, and Foreign Secretary Kaul.
VNA noted that Mme. Gandhi affirmed "sympathy with and respect for
SE.mdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia," expressing
hope that the Cambodian people would soon recover the peace,
independence, and neutrality of Their country. VNA said the
delegation left India on the 17th to visit "a number of African
countries." An 18 June NCNA report of the meeting with Indian
officials adds that Sarin Chhak, asked at a press conference if there
was any possibility that Sihanouk would "come to the conference
table" with Lon Nol, responded by asking r.etorically how it would
be possible for Sihanouk to hold talks with a "traitor."
On the 23d, NCNA reported that the delegation visited. Ceylon from
the 18th to the 22d. Neither VNA nor NCNA has raised the question
of possible recognition of Sihanouk's government by India* or
Ceylon. But AFP on the 22d described the visit to Ceylon as an
effort to add it to the countries which have recognized the
government; the report noted that according to Chhak,
Mrs. Bandaranaike said Ceylon would not recognize the Phnom Penh
regime healed by Lon Nol. (AFP reported that the delegation left
on the 2%d for Cairo.)
PEKU;G MEETING OF LPA reported on 19 June, as Peking had
PENN NOUTH, MME. BINH done earlier, that PRG Foreign Minister
Mme. Binh had met with Chou En-lai in
Peking on the 17th. Another LPA item the same day said that she
also met with Sihanouk and his prime minister, Penn Nouth, while
in Peking. (On the 18th PTI reported that Mme. Binh will visit
India from 20 to 26 July, having been invited by External Affairs
Minister Dinesh Singh last September when he was in Hanoi for Ho
Chi Minh's funeral.)
PARIS TALKS: ROUTINE DEMANDS FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL REPEATED
Consistent with recent practice, the VNA account of the 71st se-sion
of the Paris talks on 18 June glosses over much of the detail of
the communist delegates' speeches and barely acknowledges the
allied delegates' remarks. PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien reiterated
* The Bombay PTI reported on 18 June that Sihanouk's government
is "expected shortly" to set up an "information bureau" in New
Delhi and that the question was discussed by Sarin Chhak during his
visit.
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-4-
in standard terms the two basic demands--a complete U.S. withdrawal
and the establishment of a provisional coalition government. The
LPA account., but not VNA, notes that Tien reiterated the PRG's
proposal that if the United States would declare its intention to
unconditionally withdraw all its forces within six months, then
the parties concerned would discuss the withdrawal timetable
as well as the question of insuring safety for the withdrawing
troops.
The VNA account reports that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy termed
a "hoax" U.S. delegate Habib';, remark at the previous session that
the United States was prepared to act on the principle of a
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam. But it does
not acknowledge Vy's criticism of the "driblet" withdrawals and
the Administration's refusal to announce a timetable for complete
withdrawal, or his caustic remark that despite the President's
claims he in fact has no timetable. The account notes Vy's
observation that the United States is still pursuing its
unreasonable demands at Paris but omits his specification of
these demands as the call. for a mutual troop withdrawal--which
Vy routinely described as a "notorious" proposal--and maintenance
of the GVN.
VNA reports Vy's comment that President Nixon's statements in his
3 June address regarding continued U.S. air strikes in Cambodia
and the possibility of continuing ARVN ground operations in
Cambodia amount to "a completely new version" of the policy the
President had enunciated at his 3 May news conference. (The
account, however, does not fully report that Vy presented his
version of what the President said on 8 May--that intruding U.S.
forces would go no further than 35 kilometers and that by 30 June
all U.S. and Saigon troops would be withdrawn and all U.S. air
support missions would cease.)
ALLIED As in last week's account, VNA fails to offer its
SPEECHES usual terse description of the allied delegates'
presentations. Nor does it even extend the courtesy
of naming Ambassadors Lam and Habib. VNA simply says that "for
all their phraseological efforts, the delegates of the U.S. and
Saigon administration failed to make their arguments sound in any
way different from what they had said previously, which largely
illustrated the United States' unwillingness to stop its policy
of aggression and to negotiate seriously for a fair and just
settlement of the Vietnam problem."
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VNA BELATEDLY NOTES GVN PLAN 10 RELEASE DRV PRISONERS
A VNA "authorized" statement on 23 June conveys the DRV's belated
? reaction to GVN delegate Lam's announcement, at the 11 June Paris
session, of his government's intention to release a group of
North Vietnamese wounded prisoners and captured fishermen on
11 July. Ignoring the fact that the issue came up at Paris,*
the statement says that "on orders from the United States," the
Saigon administration on 11 June again raised the issue of
releasing a group of 24 North Vietnamese fishermen and 62 "other
people who were arrested and have been illegally detained by
them in South Vietnam and whom they call 'North Vietnamese
prisoners of war.'" It states categorically that "since all
Vietnamese citizens have the right to live on Vietnamese territory,"'
the United States and the Saigon administration "must free all
Vietnamese patriots illegally arrested and imprisoned in South
Vietnam."
The statement concludes by stating that past practice must b.
followed and by outlining provisions, including release of the
prisoners at the 17th parallel or at a place adjacent to the
sea areas of the DRV. The statement routinely calls on the
United States and the GVN to immediately free all other DRV
"citizens" who have been illegally arrested and detained.
MOSCCvv SCORES U.S. "AGGRESSION," SILENT ON CONFERENCE ISSUE
ZHUKOV An unusually sharp attack is leveled at President
IN PRAVDA Nixon by Yuriy Zhukov in a 21 June PRAVDA article
which has been summarized by TASS and broadcast by
Moscow radio in foreign languages including Vietnamese and
Cambodian. After graphically describing the action in Cambodia,
including casualties sustained by civilians, Zhukov says that
"all this President Nixon dares to call concern for 'consolidating
peace throughout the world,' at the same time boasting that his
operation in Cambodia 'has proven the most successful throughout
this prolonged and arduous war!' Such an interweaving of
brutality and hypocrisy is truly monstrous." Despite this direct
attack on the President, Zhukov does not discuss U.S. Indochina
policy in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations. But in conclusion
he does quote Brezhnev's remark in his 12 June election speech that
* See the 17 June TRENDS, page 5.
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by expanding the war "Washington leaders are expanding only the
scale of their future defeats on a military and political front,
both in Indochina itself and beyond, and in their own country
also."
The bulk of the article consists of quotations from the foreign
press, and Zhukov cites reports that even after the withdrawal
of U.S. ground troops from Cambodia "the level of military actions
will remain higher than at the end of April" through the use of
allied "puppets" and U.S. "artillery, air, and material assistance."
He (-:ven accuses the Uni'ed States of using "nuclear blackmail,"
saying the Western press has noted that nuclear weaponry is
present in the region of Southeast Asia. Noting Soviet support
for the Cambodians, Zhukov says the Soviet Government has expressed
"sympathy and support" for the Cambodian struggle and recalls the
14 May CEMA statement and Brezhnev's 19 May message to the Cairo
conference on Laos.
U THANT IN Moscow's avoidance of the issue of a conference on
MOSCOW Indochina is pointed up in its treatment of UN
Secretary General U Thant's Moscow visit.
Consistent with Soviet media's failure to acknowledge U Thant's
11 June call for a 15-nation conference, propaganda on his
17-21 June visit not only fails to mention a political settlement,
but says little about Indochina. On the 19th TASS quoted Thant
at a Kremlin luncheon as denouncing the "barbarous war" in
Vietnam and criticizing "recent events" in Cambodia, and :.
as adding vaguely that the conversations "showed that his attitude
to the war in Cambodia coincides almost completely with that of
the Soviet Union."
Vietnamese communist media are not known to have mentioned Thant's
Moscow visit, although both Hanoi and the Liberation Front
denounced his 11 June call for a conference. Peking says nothing
about a political settlement on its own authority, but PTCNA
azd Peking radio have carried LPA and VNA commentaries denouncing
U Thant's statement on a conference.*
* Communist reaction to U Thant's statement is discussed in the
17 June TRENDS, pages 8-9.
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SOVIET-SWEDISH The Soviet-Swedish communique on Prime Minister
COMMUNIQUE Olof Palme's visit, carried in the Moscow domestic
service on the 19th, says both sides underlined
the need for "all foreign troops" to be withdrawn from Indochina
and for the peoples of the region to have the opportunity to decide
their own future. It adds that both sides pointed to the need for
? a "political solution to the Vietnam problem on the basis of the
Geneva agreement of '1954.11
But Kosygin in a luncheon speech on the 17th, as reported by TASS,
said merely that peace-loving states "demand an end to American
aggression in Indochina and strict respect for the right of the
peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to decide independen?.ly their
own affairs."
DJAKARTA CONFERENCE Soviet propaganda is not known to have
THREE-NATION MISSION mentioned the Moscow visit of the Djakarta
conference three-nation mission which met
with Gromyko on 17 June. But according to Djakarta's ANTARA press
agency on the 18th, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said
that on the issue of an international conference Gromyko merely
referred to Kosygin's 4 May remarks that the initiative should come
from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. And on the 22d ANTARA quoted
Malik further as reporting that Gromyko stated that the Soviet
Union had never wanted the ICC suspended in Cambodia--a remark that
Malik said showed that the USSR shared the view of the Djakarta
conference, which wanted to reactivate the ICC.
Although Soviet propaganda ignores th'. presence of the mission, an
attack on the Djakarta conference along the lines of earlier
comment appears in a TASS commentary on the 18th, published in
IZVESTIYA the next day. It repeats earlier propaganda in charging
that the conference was composed of "direct accomplices of U.S.
aggression in Indochina" and that it constituted an attempt to
"divert attention" from the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. It concludes
with the standard demand for a U.S. troop withurq.wal.
The three-nation mission is mentioned briefly in a communique on
talks between Japanese and Chinese fishery associations, carried by
NCNA on 20 June. The communique merely scores the mission for
engaging in "scheming activities of all descriptions" but does not
mention its visit to Moscow.
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SIHANOUK Speaking in Pyongyang on 19 June Sihanouk once again
REMARKS decried the "maneuvers" of the Djakarta conference
governments of Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, "in
conspiracy with U Thant," to undermine the anti-U.S. front "under
the pretext of bringing peace to Cambodia." He went on to demand
that the United States respect the Geneva agreements of 1954 and
1962, saying that "no new international conference" is needed.
"All that is necessary," he said, is for the United States to withdraw
its troops and those of its allies "immediately, unconditionally, and
totally." He had seemed less categorical at a Pyongyang banquet
on the 15th when he said that "we, of course, do not refuse a
peaceful solution of the Cambodian problem" but that if the United
States does not accept troop withdrawal "no conference is
acceptable to us."
Peking's NCNA, carrying considerab:,, reportage of Sihanouk's visit
to Korea, has transmitted the full text of his rally speech. On
the other hand, the brief TASS account includes the call for U.S.
troop withdrawal and adherence to the Geneva agreements but deletes
the reference to a conference.
SOUPHANOUVONG SENDS SECOND LETTER TO SOU\'ANNA ON LAOS TALKS
On 18 June the Pathet Lao news agency released another letter from
NLHX Chairman Souphanouvong to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma,
answering the latter's 9 April letter defining the RLG position
on negotiations and the NLHX five-point statement of 6 March.
Souvanna's letter had been in reply to Souphanouvong's first letter,
dated 10 March and delivered in Vienti,.ne on the 22d, which
pressed the NLHX five-point proposal and urged that Souvanna agree
to "an immediate, complete, and unconditional halt to the U.S.
bombing raids against Laos to create conditions for all parties
concerned in Laos to negotiate and to solve Laotian internal
affairs." In his reply on 9 April Souvanna reaffirmed that the
U.S. air strikes would cease once the North Vietnamese forces
withdrew from Laos.*
In his current letter Souphanouvong makes the standard charge that
U.S. actions in Laos--the bombings, the introduction of Thai and
South Vietnamese "mercenaries," and the repeated "nibbling attacks"
* Souphanouvong's first letter is discussed in the 25 March 1970
TRENDS, pages 15-16. The NLHX five-point statement is discussed
in the 11 March TRENDS, pages 6-8.
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on the patriotic forces' zones--have created a "grave situation."
Ile expresses "hope" that Souvanna Phouma "will join us in finding
positive measures" to achieve a peaceful settlement in Laos and
prevent new U.S. "military adventures." Souphanouvong reaffirms
that the five-point NLHX statement of 6 March constitutes the
"correct basis" for a settlement and says again that "the Lao
patriotic front is ready to meet the other parties concerned
immediately after the complete and unconditional cessation of the
U.S. bombardments against Lao territory."
TASS promptly summarized the letter on the 19th, VNA having carried
it on the 18th. Peking thus far has ignored the letter.
HANOI CLAIMS SHELLING OF DRV, ASSAILS JUNE "CRIMES"
A 20 June DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement claims that the
United States "launched artillery attacks from positions south of
the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and from the open sea" against Vinh
Son and Vinh Giang villages in the northern part of the DMZ on
16 June. On 18 June, it says, U.S. aircraft fired rockets at
fishing boats of the coastal areas of Ky Xuan Village, Ky Anh
district, Ha Tinh Province. It further charges that the United
States also launched artillery attacks from positions south of the
DMZ against some areas of the northern part of the DMZ, "using toxic
chemical shells, thus affecting many innocent people." In standard
fashion, the spokesman "sternly condemned these criminal acts" and
demanded an immediate halt to all actions violating DRV sovereignty
8 security.
The most recent previous ministry spokesman's protests, on 27 and
30 May, charged the United States with using B-52's to bomb the DMZ.
U.S. "war crimes" committed in both North and South Vietnam in the
first half of June were documented in a DRV War Crimes Commission
communique, carried by VNA on 18 June. Routine in nature, the
communique enumerated charges of continued reconnaissance flights,
alleged U.S. bombings in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh
Linh area, and offshore naval patrols said to threauen the "normal
life and activites" of fishermen. It scored "indiscriminate U.S.
bombing raids against populous areas near Saigon" and "stepped-up
repression" by the GVN against youths, students, Buddhists, and the
press.
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2)r JUNE 1970
DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION VISIT TO EAST EUROPE
On 23 June VNA reports the composition of' a DRV National Assembly
delegation, headed by Hoang Van Hoan, Politburo member and vice
chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, which will
"pay a friendship visit" to a number of socialist countries in
Eastern Europe at the invitation of their national assemblies.
(The communique of the last National Assembly Standing Committee
meeting reported by VNA on 11 June, had noted that the committee
had decided to send a delegation "to several fraternal socialist
countries.") On the same day, VNA notes that the delegation left
Hanoi that day and was seen off by Truoug Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh.
An NCNA item on the 21.l cryptically reports that the delegation had
arrived in Peking that afternoon "on its way to other countries."
It says they were welcomed at the airport by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien,
who gave a banquet in their honor that evening.
A NHAN DAN editorial on the 24th describes the delegation's tour as
"an event of important significance for the further consolidation
and development of the existing relations of friendship between
the DtIV National Assembly and people and the national assemblies
and peoples of the brother countries." The paper notes the "great
importance" the DRV attaches to the "friendship, militant solidarity
and mutual support" between it and the other socialist countries.
Recalling a similar visit in July-August 1965,* it says that the
current visit "again shows the determination of our state and
people to fulfill" the task of strengthening solidarity. It
routinely thanks the countries for their "hearty support and
assistance." Going on to hail the "strength of unity and struggle"
of the three Indochinese peoples as "invincible", it stresses that
the socialist countries'"support and assistance" make up an
"important factor" for their victory. It declares that in the
present stage the "sympathy and support of the brother socialist
countries bears a significance of even greater importance."
* The delegation in 1965 was similarly headed by Hoang Van Hoan
and it visited the PRC, DPRK, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union.
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CONP:i:DFN'.I''I'Ah T'n:1: ; '.I'RI;N!)
;!)i JUNL 1970
KOREA
DPRK ANNOUNCES FOUNDING OF "MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY" IN ROK
On 20 Juric KCNA announced the establishment; of a "Marxist-Leninist
party" in South Korea, reporting that "South Korean revolutionaries"
formed the "central committee of the Revolutionary Party for
Reunification" In August 1969 and adopted a party manifesto and
program.* Later on the 20th KCNA carried a NODONG SINMUN editorial
effusively praising the founding of this "Marxist-Leninist party"
as a "historic event" and a "new turning point" in the South
Korean revolution. The editorial recalls that many times in the
past Kim I1-song has emphasized the necessity of building such a
Marxist-Leninist vanguard party ir, the South to guide the
revolution. It says the building of the party now "fully meets
the urgent demands of the development of the South Korean revolu-
tion and completely accords with the subjective and objective
situation prevailing in South Korea."
KCNA says that the Revolutionary Party for Reunification was
formed in March 1964 as "an illegal revolutionary organization."
`i'bis is apparently the same organization as--or an outgrowth of--
the United Revolutionary Party first known to have been mentioned
in August 1968. Although KCNA in English now refers to the
"Revolutionary Party for Reunification," the version in Korean
is Tongil Hyonmyong Tang--the same Korean title of what has
previously been referred to in English as the United Revolutionary
Party. Further evidence that the parties are identical is that
the founding date of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification,
March 1964, has previously been cited as that of the United
Revolutionary Party. The "organ" of the new party, REVOLUTIONARY
FRONT, has been identified in the past with the United Revolutionary
Party, although the "Journal" CHONGMAEK has been given more
publi city.
Calls for a vanguard "Marxist-Leninist" party date back to
Kim I1-song's speech at the Fourth KWP Congress in September
1961 and appeared repeatedly in subsequent propaganda. References
KCNA says the details were reported in a "recent" issue of the
party organ REVOLUTIONARY FRONT. It says the manifesto and program
were published "recently" in a number of foreign papers, including
the U.S. BLACK PANTHER, the Manchester GUARDIAN, and several
African and Japanese papers. The documents are known to have
appeared in the Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE on 10 March 1970.
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F11I:C 'L'1 1 NDS
?h JUNE' 19'(0
W :.cattcred "revolutlon+rry organizati.orru" appeared concurrently
but with no uuggculion that any of thorn was a forerunner of the
MarxLot-Leninlut party. E3ince August 1968, the United Revolutionary
Party huu received considerable publ.Lcity au an "underground
rcvcLutionary organization" to whLch a fairly elaborate organiza-
tional :structure was attributed. In one known instance, it
.l-i February 1969 NODONG S?NMUN cd.Ltorial article denouncing the
^xc~.uti~n :in the BOK of one of the party's leaders, it was
eal..Icd a "Ma.rrxLnt-Leninlut underground revolutionary organiza-
tion. "*
MANIFESTO The inanifcuto clairnu that "local organizations" of
E PROGRAM the "revolutionary party" were formed "long ago"
and that now the "central leading body" has been
organized. The Revolutionary Party for Reunification, it says,
is a "new-type Marxist-Leninist party" guided by him I1-song's
:.dca of "chuche," the "original embodiment of Marxism-Leninism
in the present era and in the actual conditions of our country."
The party's first task, says the manifesto, is to "carry out the
people's democratic revolution in South Korea," overthrow the
"corrupt, colonial, sernifeudal system," set up a "people's
democratic system," and accomplish national unification.
The 12-point party program calls for the overthrow of the
colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and the establishment of
an "independent democratic government." It includes points
on land reform, nationalization of industry, labor laws, women's
rights, cultural development, education, and public health, and
it calls for the formation of "national self-defense ar.,ied
forces," the realization of "independent diplomacy," and
"friendship with the anti-imperialist peace-loving countries."
It concludes with a reassertion of the goal of "independent
peaceful unification of the country."
* See the 27 February 1969 FBIS SURVEY, pages 11-15, for a
discussion of the propaganda on the execution of the party leader
and background on calls for a "Marxist-Leninist party" in the
South. Propaganda on the execution of another party leader is
noted in the SURVEY of 17 July 1969, page 16. A discussion
of "revolutionary organizations" in the South may also be found
in FBIS Special Report on Communist Propaganda RS. 91 of 10 December
1968, "Pyongyang Statements since April 1968 on Korean Unification
and the South Korean 'Struggle."'
CONFIDENTIAL
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CON P1 1) 1,;N'1'1AJ, P1310 TRENDS,
24 JUNE' 19'(0
SING - SOVIET R ELATIONS
MOSCOW'S OFFENSIVE ABATES, PEKING CONTINUES RESTRAINT
Au Peking continues by and large to maintain its propaganda ntanddown
toward the Oovietu, Moucow'u polemical offensive act oft' by the
18 May 1'HAVDA editorial article seems to have spent its force.
Since puibIication oC ci.cction L1pecches delivered by the three top
soviet Lcaduru from :LO to 12 Junc, the Soviet central press has
ignored China, with the bulk of Moscow's connnent on China appearing
in broadcasts beamed to the Chineuc.
TRUD ON Apart from citing the leaders' speeches, which blamed
BORDERS the Chinese for causing an impasse at the Peking talks,
Soviet propaganda ha,s avoided the border question.
However, an article in TRUD on the 12th, appearing on the third
day of the successive speeches by Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Brezhnev
attacking the Chiresc for impeding the Sino-Soviet border talks,
discusses in suggestive detail how the Soviets and Turks arc going
about redemarcating their border. The article does not mention any
borders other than those with Turkey, but its discussion is replete
with implications for the Sino-Soviet negotiations. In a PRAVDA
article on 28 May the Soviet border guards commander, Col. Gen.
P. Zyryanov, had mentioned the Sino-Soviet talks alongside references
to work on demarcation of the Soviet borders with Turkey and Ircn.
Presented is the form of reportage from a site where work on
delimiting the border is being conducted, the TRUD article explains
that redemarcation has been rreccnsitated by changes wrought by nature
since border treaties were signed in the 1920's. Among such changes
it cites those affecting river beds and islands which have disappeared,
have joined the other country's bank, or have been newly formed.
Explaining that the border is always the most sensitive barometer
of interstate relations, the article observes that the slighte,-,t
complication in any sector, "even the tiniest," can lead to "serious
conflict." For this reason, it adds, the Soviet Government offered
to make the existing border "more precise," and talks were held in
which an agreement was reached on the basis that there would be an
exact balancing of awards of land to each side In the course of the
redemarcation.
The approach set forth in the article suggests how the Soviets might
be prepared to make adjustments with the Chinese on such questions
as the disputed river islands. 't'hus, it would be compatible with
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CON10iU1iN'.t':I:AI:P'J:IIS '.l.'fENI)S
211 JUNE 1q, (O
l,iriu appror.rc}r for Moucow to granL to the Chinese certain iuiarrdu
over which the Sovictu have exerciucd Jurisdiction, receiving in
exchange Chirrcnc acknowledgment of Soviet pouucooion of iulando
regarded as more valuable to Soviet security. At the same time,
the, article reflecLs Moucow'u inuiutenco that in principle and as
it whole the Soviet borders are fixed, admitting only of a more
precise demarcation to eliminate tunb:iguiticu and to take account
of rruLural changer..
NCNA ON The Chinese have permitted themselves various polemical
SOVIETS slaps at the Soviets, while avoiding giving an
impression of intent to reopen major polemics which
might alienate the Asian parties the Chinese have been trying
to cultivate. NCNA on 18 June took to task a m'.nor Soviet
"expert on Japan" visiting that country for having appealed in
it speech for Soviet-Japanese cooperation to cope with revolu-
tionaries in China, Vietnam, and Korea. Though the NCNA report
contains a passing reference to "the renegade features of the
Soviet revisionists," it is mainly designed to score easy points
at the expense of Moscow's reputation among the Asian parties
without undercutting the effects of Peking's current polemical
restraint.
According to NCNA, citing a report in MAINICHI, the Soviet speaker
indicated that Asia is the most dangerous area in the world
because it contains three of the four split countries--that is,
Ching, and Taiwan, North and South Korea, and North and South
Vietnam. NCNA thus contrived to play on Pyongyang's concern
over Soviet dealings with Japan and to associate Peking's claim
on Taiwan with North Korean and North Vietnamese aspirations for
reuniting their divided countries.* The NCNA report has been
given wide dissemination -.n Peking broadcasts, presumably in
keeping with NCNA's explanation that it was reporting the speech
"specially for the entertainment of all."
Japan also figured in another reminder of Peking's rivalry with
Moscow, an NCNA report on the 22d that Chou En-lai and Kuo Mo-jo
had received the Japanese authors of "Is the Soviet Union a Socialist
Country?" and members of a visiting Japanese "antirevisionist"
youth delegation.
* A Peking joint editorial dated 25 June, marking the 20th anniversary
of the outbreak of the Korean war, also seeks to associate Peking's and
Pyongyang's irredentist claims by charging in its opening sentence that
20 years ago the United States "launched a war of aggression against
Korea, and two days later it occupied by force China's sacred territory
Taiwan province."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS 'RENDS
24 JUNE 1970
Peking's propaganda against the renewal of the Japan-U.S. siecurity
treaty, highlighted by a 23 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, avoided
attacking the Soviets while playing on common interests of the PRO
and the D1'RK vis-a-vis Japan. Peking's Joint editorial on the
Korean war anniversary, however, indirectly attacks the Soviets
in charging that unnamed "certain persons" are "collaborating with
U.S. imperialism in evil doings, fraternizing with the Japanese
reactionaries, and even maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol
and his like."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREP,DS
211 JUNE 1970
- 16 -
S I N G-U , S. RATIONS
EL PRC SAYS TIME NOT SUITABLE FOR SETTING WARSAW MEETING DATE-
Peking announced on 20 June that the Chinese liaison officer for
the Warsaw talks notified his American counterpart that day that
it would not be suitable at this time to set a date for the next
session of the ambassadorial talks. The announcement said the,
date for the next session will be discussed "at the proper time"
through the liaison personnel.
Unlike Peking's announcement on the postponement of the meeting
scheduled for 20 May, which cited the U.S. incursion into
Cambodia as the reason for the postponement, the current
announcement points only to the fact "that both sides clearly
understand the current situation." Thus the announcement care-
fully leaves the door open for a resumption of the talks after
the United States winds up its involvement in Cambodia, while
indicating to Moscow that Peking intends to continue using this
channel as part of its effort to acquireleveraga against the
Soviets.
Chinese comment on the Nixon Administration and Indochinese
developments seems inconclusive regarding what sort of atmosphere
surrounding Sino-U.S. relations ti;ould be regarded as suitable for
a resumption of the Warsaw talks. A commentary carried by NCNA
on 7 June for domestic publication indulged in venomous personal
vilification of the President, but, significantly, it was not
disseminated abroad by NCNA and has been monitored from Radio
Peking only in Korean and Japanese. Comment on Washington's
declared intent to withdraw American troops from Cambodia by
30 June has characterized the U.S. position as d.aceitful and
designed to mollify the American people. NCNA on tra 7th and
PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 8th, discussing the President's 3 June
speech, no;;ed that he indicated U.S. bombing of Cambodia would
continue after the withdrawal and Saigon troops would remain,
thus showing that the United States is persisting in its
"aggression."
A 14 June NCNA report on remarks by Secretary Rogers on the
7th and 9th observed that "Rogers, just like Nixon, hypo-
critically declared" that American troops would be withdrawn
from Cambodia. NCNA described the promised withdrawal as "a
lame attempt" to appease public opinion and "a smokescreen
for continued aggression." After quoting the Secretary as
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24 JUNE 1970
- 17 -
saying the United States hopes the Lon Nol regime does not fail,
NCNA said Washington intends under the Nixon doctrine to use its
"lackeys and puppets" to carry on the fighting in Indochina but
predicted that the United States "will have to take the field
again" when "it turns out that its lackeys cannot win the war
? either." NCNA termed any attempt by the "three traitorous
cliques" in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok to form a military
alliance "under the aegis of U.S. imperialism" a provocation
against, the people in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a
whale, but it failed to define the PRC's stake in the matter.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 JUNE 1970
B R I T I S H , ELECT I ONS
MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON IMPLICATIONS OF CONSERVATIVE VICTORY
Moscow treats the upset victory of the Conservatives in the
18 June British Parliamentary elections as a vote not so'much
for the Conservatives as against the policies of the Laborites,
both domestic and foreign. Pre-election comment had described the
differences between the two'parties on. foreign. policy as negligible
and portrayed, the contest as being waged primarily,over domestic
issues--essentially minor questions of reform within the'Briti-sh
capitalist system. Commentators now picture the vote as an
expression of deep dissatisfaction with Labor's economic policies
and as a rejection of U.S.-oriented foreign policy positions
from which the new government will have to draw the appropriate
conclusions.
Addressing British listeners on the 22d, a Radio Moscow commentator
suggested that one conclusion the Heath government might draw from
the election was the need "to put maximum effort into restoring
Britain's prestige on the world scene as a big power"--a policy
which "entails a more independent foreign policy course than the
one the Labor Party was following." Citing the fact that citizens
in the 18 to 20 age group were permitted to vote as one factor
contributing to the outcome, a panelist in the 21 June domestic
radio roundtable observed that the majority of British young
people" opposed U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and voted against
"the Labor leaders' subservience to U.S. foreign policy."
Prognostications are avoided in Moscow's typically cautious initial
comment on the vote. Panelists in the roundtable broadcast saw
the defeat of the Labor government as a vote against its positions
on such issues as NATO and entry into the Common Market--issues
cited in Moscow's pre-election comment as areas of agreement
between Laborites and Conservatives. A 20 June broadcast in
English tailored for African audiences contained the only speculation
on a specific foreign policy course of the new regime, seeing as
"well-grounded" the hopes of South African and Rhodesian
"racialists" that the Conservative government will "strengthen
contacts with them, lift the embargo on arms deliveries to South
Africa, and reopen its mission in the Rhodesian capital."
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- 19 -
WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS
FBIS TRENDS
24 JUNE 1970
MOSCOW SEES NO CHANGE IN BRANDT POLICY DESPITE CDU POLITICKING
Low-volume Moscow propaganda on the 14 June West German Laender
elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and the Saarland
concentrates on attacking CDU efforts to "torpedo" Brandt's
Ostpolitik but concludes that these efforts have been largely
unsuccessful and that the elections will leave Brand.t's policy
substantially unchanged.
The size of the CDU vote is traced to the support of voters from
the "neo-Nazi" NPD. On this point, commentator Potapov, partici-
pating in a domestic service roundtable on 21 June, remarked
that the "revanchist and chauvinistic slogans" used by the CDU
"were literally copied word for word from the program" of the NPD.
There is nothing surprising in this, the commentator added, because
"the neofascists' program and the CDU's political concepts are
in many ways similar," notably in their demands for "sole
representation" of the German people and for a revision of the
results of World War II.
Potapov said the CDU had leveled "wild attacks" on the "realistic
aspects" of Brandt's policies toward the problem of strengthening
European security and broadening relations with the socialist
countries: The CDU has in fact attacked "what I would say is
precisely the encouraging prospects that have opened up lately
in relations, in particular between the Soviet Union and the
FRG." He concluded that the CDU, by "Juggling" the results of
the elections, seeks to place in doubt the FRG's contacts with
the Soviet Union and to foil sny possibilities for detente in
Europe.
Commenta;ors largely ignore the election setbacks suffered by
the FDP, the minor party in the coalition, and the possible
consequences for government policy. Potapov observed that
the elections have not brought about any large-scale changes
in the positions of political forces in the FRG and that Brandt
and other government leaders have stated that their outcome
will not influence the political course of the present
government." On the 16d;h, the Moscow domestic service had
briefly reported that Brandt, in remarks to SPD officials,
had indicated that his government would "continue its course
rnd strive to achieve its aims."
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24 JUNE 1970
An international review article in the 21 June PRAVDA by Ratiani
Joins Potapov in favorably assessing Brandt Is foreign policy.
According to Ratiani, Brandt "has been accused of every mortal
sin merely because a few positive elements have entered his
government's policy, elements which, should they be developed
and implemented in practice, would have a favorable effect on
the European situation." Leveling a largely pro forma attack
on the CDU, Ratiani goes on to allege that Washington is
displeased with Brandt's policies also. The article cites a
Washington POST report that some "high-ranking figures in the
Nixon Administration are alarmed that Brandt might display
excessive zeal" in his attempts to reach agreement with the
USSR, Poland, and the GDR. It goes on to quote from Henry
Kissinger's "The Troubled Partnership: A Reapprisal of the
Atlantic Alliance," which it says reflects the "real position"
of the White House on the dangers of the FRG's initiating
"independent" steps toward the GDR.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 JUNE 1970
EUROPEAN SECURITY
BUDAPEST MEETING DISCUSSES PACT'S STAND ON SECURITY CONFERENCE
The communique on the 21-22 June Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact
foreign ministers, released by TASS on the 23d, again endorses
the long-standing proposal for an "all-European conference" on
security, noting that "a relevant document was unanimously approved"
and "will be communicated to the governments of all interested
states." Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski was reported by the
Warsaw radio on the 23d as saying that a number of documents "to be
published in the next few days" would "throw further light on the
outcome of the conference."
GDR Foreign Minister Winzer, in remarks carried in East German
media after his return to Berlin on 23 June, said that the new
Pact proposals would be circulated among "the European states"
and then published. Winzer's use of the term "European states"
is more restrictive than the communique's "interested states."
Moscow, for its part, had long been ambiguous and ambivalent on
the matter of U.S. participation in such a conference. But a
foreign ministry spokesman, in a 13 January 1970 press conference,
said Moscow had informed Washington "of its favorable attitude to
the participation of the United States in an all-European conference,"
adding that this view was shared by the other socialist states.
Soviet propaganda since then has only infrequently broached the
question of U.S. participation.
The communique on the Budapest meeting reports that the participants
exchanged information on bilateral and multilateral contacts held in
recent months on the question of holding a conference and took note
of the "positive" response to the proposals put forward in Prague
last October. The Prague meeting, the last previous gathering of
Pact foreign ministers to discuss European security, had set forth
a two-point agenda for a conference: renunciation of the use of
force and the broadening of economic and other ties.
According to the communique, the Budapest participants stressed
that direct participation of interested states at all stages of
preparation for the conference was desirable. Teking this into
consideration, the communique concludes, the foreign ministers
reached agreement on "further important steps" aimed at insuring
the success of a conference--steps designed "to achieve agreement
on an agenda acceptable to all interested states and the methods
of preparing the all-European conference, which could be started
in the near future."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 JLi.3 1970
"REACTION" TO Scant availal ~ comment from Eastern Europe includes
NATO MEETING a 21 June Budapest broadcast which, after noting
that the Budapest gathering followed the NATO
Council session in Rome by less than four weeks, commented that "the
quick reaction shows.in itself that the socialist countries have
found positive elements in the Rome documents." The broadcast said
the Rome meeting marked the first time NATO had gone beyond
generalities with regard to a Europ ari security conference and
had replied to the March 1969 initiative of the Warsaw. Pact.
Moscow propaganda at the time of the NATO meeting, while noting
that the Italian foreign minister had been given the task of
circulating that gathering's declaration among interested. countries,
had portrayed the document as a ruse to delay the convening of a
European security conference.*
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Marko, in remarks reported by CTK
on the 23d, said that the NATO Council in Rome "could not take
a negative stand" toward a conference on European security,.
concluding that "the future will show . . . whether the approach
of the NATO countries toward European security and cooperation
will be more concrete end constructive."
There has been no Soviet comment on the Budapest session so far.
Moscow reported the scheduling of the meeting in a brief TASS
item on 19 June, and confined its treatment of the gathering
to reportage.
* Moscow's propaganda treatment of the 26-27 May NATO foreign
ministers' meeting is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 May 1970,
pages 25-26, and 3 June 1970, pages 18-19.
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24 JUNE 1970
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1?UBCEK AND CERNIK REMOVED FROM LATEST POSITIONS
The stepped-up drive against the top leaders of the 1968
liberalization was underscored as Czechoslovak media announced
the almost simultaneous removal of former CPCZ First Secretary
Alexander Dubcek and former Premier Oldrich Cernik from their
latest posts.
DUBCEK The Prague domestic service on 24 June said President
Svoboda "has recalled Alexander Dubcek" from the post
of Ambassador to Turkey and "entrusted him with another function."
An Ankara radio report on 30 May, never confirmed by Czechoslovak
media, said Dubcek had returned to the CSSR that day. The Ankara
report took note of reports both that Dubcek, "suspended" from the
party since January, would be finally expelled and that he had
returned to visit his ailing mother.
High-level personal attacks on Dubcek continue in Czechoslovak
media, presumably setting the stage for the fallen leader's
expulsion from the party during the current "exchange of party
cards" and his possible prosecution in a political trial.* Thus
a 17 June RUDE PRAVO article by CPCZ international department
head Pavel Auersperg, commemorating the first anniversary of the
June 1969 Moscow international party corference, stressed that
"as a result of the grave errors of Diibcek's leadership" the
Czechoslovak party was "strongly affected by rightwing opportunism"
in 1968-69.
CERNIK On 23 June, CTK reported that Svoboda had recalled Cernik
from the minor post of Minister Chairman of the Committee
for Technical and Investment Development, "at his own request,"
with no indication of assignment to any other function. Cernik
had joined publicly--in a low key--in the denigration of Dubcek
which led up to the latter's dismissal as party First Secretary
in April 1969, thus apparently buying time and making possible
his retention of the premier's post until 28 January 1970, when
he was succeeded by Strougal and downgraded to his latest position.
He has not so far been the target of the public vilification
directed at Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and other more liberal
leaders of the 1968 experiment.
* Western news sources reported on the 23d that Czechoslovak
Ambassador to Denmark Anton Vasek has asked for political asylum in
that country for himself and his family, presumably to avoid recall
and disciplinary action in the current purge.
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2) JUNE 1970
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EULOGY The further downgrading of Dubcek and Cernik was
OF HUSAK preceded, on the 22d, by an unusually fulsome
personal eulogy of Gustav Husak, in a Prague domestic
service commentary which noted, among other things, that the CPCZ
First Secretary is "often compared to Wladyslaw Gomulka and Janos
Kadar"--other leaders who emerged from internal political upheavals.
Defensively, the commentary went to considerable lengths to show
that Husak had been an obstacle to the plans of the "rightist
opportunists" since the start of the January 1968 reforms and
had thus been the target of attacks by their press organs.
SOVIET Soviet propaganda shows continued circumspection in
RETICENCE dealing with events in Czechoslovakia. Thus a two-
part serie3 on Czechoslovakia by Mayevskiy in the
19 and 20 June PRAVDA does not mention either Dubcek or Cernik,
singling out for attack only Smrkovsky, Kriegel, Mlynar, Spacek,
and others who have already been finally expelled from the party.
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Cof1F'.1DENT I AI.,
USSR SUPREME SOVIET
I"111::1 T10 ;ND,,'
'I .JUNI 1.970
SOME CENTR/kL COMMITTEE MEMBERS NOT REELECTED AS DEPUTIES
Except. for those who are serving us umbtiaaadora and those who
have been retired or dismissed from their official positions Vince
1966, virtually all Central Committee members raid candidate members
have been reelected an Supreme "lovict deputlcu, according to the
list pubilahed on 17 June. The handful who for no apparent reason
were not reelected may be In danger of fulling to be reelected to
the Cen true. Committee as well, at the forthcoming party congrer,u.
One significant omiaol.on from the list of deputies is L.N. Yefremov,
recently removed as Stavropol first secretary to become first deputy
chairman of the state committee for science and technology. If
Yefrcmov's new post does not warrant Suprcme Soviet mr:mbership, it
probably does not warrant Centrul Committee membership either.
T.I. Sokolov, removed as Orel first secretary to become Gooplan
first deputy chairman coincident with Yefremov's transfer, was
reelected as a deputy.
Prospects for two of Shelepin's fading proteges appear dim. Former
KGB chairman V. Ye. Semichastnyy, now a first deputy premier of the
Ukraine, was not reelected, unlike the other two Ukrainian first
deputy premiers, N.A. Sobol and N.T. Kalchenko. Semic hastnyy's
successor as Komsomol first secretary, S.P. Pavlov, now chairman
of the state committee for physical culture and sports, was also
not reelected to the Supreme Soviet.
Also dropped from Supreme Soviet membership were two prominei.t
republican leaders who previously showed no signs of slipping:
Ukrainian Central Committee Secretary V.I. Drozdenko--the only
top Ukrainian leader excluded--and RSFSR first deputy premier
K.G. Pysin. The other RSFSR first deputy premier, A.M. Shkolnikov,
was reelected.
Two recently dismissed high-level propagandists, N.N. Mesyatsev
and N.A. Mikhaylov (chairman of the r'dio-television committee
and of the publishing committee, respectively) were not reelected.
V.I. Stepakov, rumored on the way out as Central Committee
agitprop chief, also failed to be reelected--unlike most of his
fellow Central Committee section heads. There are reports, still
unconfirmed, that Stepakov and Mesyatsev are to be appointed
ambassadors, and their omission from the roll of deputies would
be a natural consequence.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 JUN1 1970
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:;tepakov in particular will. riot necessarily be deprived of
Central Conunittec membership, however, if he goes abroad as
ambauuador to China. A number of high-level political figures
dent out an ambassadors as a form of exile in the pact have
subsequently been reelected to the Contra]. Committee:
P.A. Abrusimov, A.B. Ari3tov, A.V. Baoov, I.A. l3encdiktov,
A.M. Puzanov, anC, S.V. Chervonenko.
Also dropped from the Supreme Soviet were the new ambassador to
Denmark, N.G. Ycgorychev, and the former '.PASS director,
D.P. Goryunov, now ainbassador to Kenya; they may well not be
reelected to the Central Committee. Cinema committee chairman
A.V. Romanov, also rumored on the way out, was reelected a deputy
to the Supreme Soviet--perhaps an indication that he is to remain
as cinema chief.
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F'I31S '. RENDS
24 JUNE 1970
C C P R I 1.D I INCREASED ACTIVITY ON EVE OF 1 JULY PARTY ANNIVERSARY
On the eve of the 49th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party
(("CP), to be commemorated on 1 July, there is increased propaganda
attention to party organs and party rebuilding. Several provincial-
level conferences on party rebuilding are reported, mention is
made of provincial party core groups in the northeast area, Kirin
forms Its i'irot county-level party committee, and Peking refers
openly for the first time since the Ninth Congress to a reorganized
party committee at the municipal level.
Provincial meetings on party rebuilding have been reported by
Heiiungkiang and Kwangtung, the only provinces to claim rebuilt
municipal-level party committees, and seem aimed at providing
new party-building achievements to celebrate the CCP anniversary.
A 12 June Harbin radio report on Heilungkiang's 12 May-1 June
conference on party building, which was conducted by the
provincial party core group, warned that efforts to rebuild
the party still faced possible obstruction both from the right,
opponents of "the mass line," and from the left, those who
negate the party by overemphasizing the mass line. Canton radio
on 14 June reported that the Provincial Revolutionary Committee--
not the party core group--conducted the Kwangtung conference,
which was attended by leadership cadres of special districts,
counties, and municipalities.
Earlier, on 23 May, NCNA reported a provincial-level conference
in Hunan on party rebuilding, and on 29 April the Hupeh radio
reported a provincial telephone conference on the subject. In
mid-June, Tsinghai, Hannan, and Shensi reported provincial-level
directives calling for new mass campaigns to study the party
constitution.
KIRIN COUNTY On 17 June the Changchun radio, announcing the
COMMITTEE formation of the Huaite county party committee,
stated that Wang Huai-hsiang, chairman of the
Provincial Revolutionary Committee (PRC) and "leader of the CCP
core group" of the PRC, attended the Huaite county congress which
elected the new committee. A KIRIN DAILY editorial, also broad-
cast on 17 June, welcomed "the first county-level leading organ
of the party established in our province according to the new
party constitution." Condemning those who mistakenly separate
"the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Party Centra.L Committee"
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI G TRENDS
24 JUNE 1970
from basic-level party organizations and "regard the basic-level
party organizations as something dispensable," the editorial
dismissed such thoughts as incorrect and reflective of a "weak
party concept." It warned that basic-level party organizations,
"especially those below the county level," are vital because
without them "party leadership will become ineffective."
While provincial-level party core groups, presumably the fore-
runners of provincial party committees, have also been mentioned
in recent broadcasts from Kwangtung, Heilungkiang, Tsinghai,
Shantung, and Shensi, the Kirin broadcast is the first to
s,.iecify that the PRC chairman is also head of the party group.
(,Shantung recently identified a number of members of its core
group, inc!,:ding presumed acting chairman Yang Te-chih, but
without specifying relative ranking. In 1967, Shansi and
Tsinghai broadcasts had stated explicitly that the chairman
and first vice chairman of their PRC's served also as head
and deputy head of the core groups.)
CITY-LEVEL On 13 June, suddenly overcoming its apparent
COMMITTEE inhibitions against publicizing rebuilt party
committees above the basic level, Radio Peking
praised the Maoming municipal CCP committee in Kwangtung
Province for its work in industrial coordination. Originally
welcomed by Canton radio on 1 February, the municipal
committee had not been mentioned in central media. As
recently as 2 June, in a similar report on Maoming activities,
NCNA spoke only of the leadership of the municipal revolu-
tionary committee, although a Canton radio account of the
same activities lauded the municipal party committee.
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