TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 20, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
Confidential
Illllll~iiiiii~~~iiu~llllllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
~ INFORMATION
I11,.SERVICE
Illlllllii~~~~~~~~~~~ullllllll
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
20 May 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 20)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by IBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title, 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDOCHINA
DRV Commentators Discuss Situation in Cambodia, Indochina . . . . .
Cambodian Front Officials Report to Sihanouk on Situation . . . . .
Delegates at 14 May Paris Session Stress "Escalation" of War . . .
Mao Tse-tun", Suppor ?G amrndi an, dochii nesa Stri?ggles___-
i
1
3
4
5
Peking Notes President's Remarks on Diplomatic Initiatives . . . .
_
_
7
Call for Socialist Unity Repeated by PRAVDA, CEMA Statement . . . .
7
European CP Conference Appeals for United Action . . . . . . . . .
8
Eleven-nation Djakarta Conference on Cambodia Scored . . . . . . .
9
Military Situation in South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Ho Chi Minh's Eightieth Birth Anniversary Celebrated . . . . . . .
13
DRV Council of Ministers Resolution on Grain Policy . . . . . . . .
15
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRAVDA Editorial Article Rebuts Chinese Polemical Attacks . . . . .
17
CHINESE SATELLITE
Soviet Cent .1 Press Decries Motives Behind Chinese Launch . . . .
21
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
PRC Cancels War.;aw Meeting, Cites U.S. Actions in Cambodia . . . . 23
SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
Soviet Articles Imply Broadened Role for Warsaw Pact . . . . . . . 25
CEMA Session Carries Forward Moves Toward Integration . . . . . . . 27
Ceausescu Visit to Moscow Reflects Rising Tensions . . . . . . . . 28
Soviet, GDR Media Decry Brandt, SPD "Inconsistencies" . . . . . . . 31
Bonn's "Blackmail" at WHO Meeting Seen as Bad Omen for Kassel . . . 32
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FI3IS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 MAY 1970
3832 items)
Moscow (
Peking (3135 item:,)
`
Indochina
(22%)
21%
Indochina
(83%)
55%
[Cambodia
(19%)
15%
[Cambodia
(71%)
53%]
Lenin Centenary
(5%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(11%)
24%
Upcoming Supreme
(1%)
8%
Lenin Centenary
(1%)
6%
Soviet Elections
Canton Foreign
(0.02%)
3%
CEMA Summit
(--)
7%
Export Fair
Meeting
Mao's Statement on
(--)
3%
VE Day
(27%)
6%
Dominican Republic,
China
(5%)
5%
5th Anniversary
Warsaw Treaty
Anniversary
(0.1%)
5%
inese statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment -or party statement, or diplomatic note. Itdms of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
I N D 0 C H I N A
F13IS TRFNDS
20 MAY :1970
Mao Tse-tung's voice is added to the expressions of support for
Sihanouk's new "Royal Government of National Union" with the release
of a statement on 20 Mny. Declaring that "revolution is the main
trend in the world today," Mao expresses "warm support" for Sihanouk's
"fighting spirit" and for the Indochinese summit conference
declaration. Making no reference to aid, he repeats the standard
Peking line that the Indochinese people, "strengthening their unity"
and "persevering in a protracted people's war," will certainly win
complete victory. The statement notes pointedly that 10 days after
its establishment the Cambodian government has been recognized by
"nearly 20 countries." Peking has not directly mentioned Soviet
failure to extend recognition.
The assertion in the IF May Soviet Government statement on Cambodia
that the expansion of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina "makes even
more pressing" the need for socialist unity is repeated in the 18 May
PRAVDA editorial article, in the course of a comprehensive indictment
of Chinese policies. Routine Soviet comment, like PRAVDA, continues
to score the PRC for failing to join in "united action" in support of
Indochina.
Brezhnev comments on the "aggravated" Southeast Asia situation in a
message to an international front conference in Cairo "in support of
the Laotian people's struggle." Noting that "the insolent intrusion"
of U.S. and Saigon troops into Cambodia extended the "aggression"
into all of Indochina, he states that "peace-loving arid democratic
forces" must rally their ranks closer to end the U.S. "criminal war."
He also declares that the USSR is rendering the Indochinese people
"all-round support and assistance."
A passage in DRV Premier Pam Van Dong's 18 May Hanoi speech commemorating
Ho Chi Minh's birth anniversary could reflect concern over the continuing
Sino-Soviet polemic. In a catalogue of Ho's virtues, Dong calls him
the "clearest embodiment of proletarian internationalism," then quotes
the passage in IIo's lust will and testament on his pain at the present
discord among fraternal parties and his certainty of eventual unity.
In the first comment by a top DRV leader, Dong calls the U.S. "massive
aggression" against Cambodia an "extremely impudent challenge." He
reiterates the pledge of solidarity of the three Indochinese countries
but does not mention that the DRV has recognized the new "Royal
Government of National Unio~," noting only that "the Cambodian people"
have warmly welcomed the setting up of leading organs of the FUNK
and the new government.
DRV COMMENTATORS DISCUSS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, INDOCHINA
In addition to b*.i;tle reports of successes of the "Khmer liberation
armed forces," DRV media in the past 10 days have carried articles
ApprbdvedV, Relseasey0%% 9A':t8TAs-4,6 %%W&7 he000300030020 0 discussing
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
allied operations in some detail. The U.S.-South Vietnam objective of
clearing out Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia continues to
be generally ignored, although a commentary attributed to "Chien Binh"
(combatant), broadcast by Hanoi radio on 10 May, does say that the
Khmer people's property is being destroyed "under the pretext of
looking for communist headquarters."
A 14 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article attributed to one Tran Phu, broadcast
by Hanoi radio, calls the Cambodian operations "a repetition of
the failure of the 'Junction City' military operation three years
ago on a far larger scale." The article does not identify Junction
City as a search-and-destroy operation, however. A 13 May QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN article by "True Chien" (hand-to-hand combat), broadcast by
Hanoi the same day, says that "after only a few days" the allies
admitted that their Cambodian operations were "unsuccessful," had,
achieved "only poor results," and "could not attain the set objectives."
The article does not indicate what these objectives are, saying merely
that the allied forces "cannot save the Lon Nol-Matak clique from
danger."
Stating that the allied thrusts have been "on a 400-kilometer-long
battlefront from the northeastern part to the southeastern part of
Cambodia," the Truc Chien article goes into unusual detail regarding
the operations: on 30 April 12,000 ARVN soldiers with U.S. support
moved against the Parrot's Beak area of Svay Rieng Province; the
Fishhook operation commenced on 2 May with 10,000 men from the 1st
U.S. Air Cavalry Division, the 11th U.S. Armored Regiment, and units
of the ARVN 5th Division; on the 5th, a third offensive was launched
with 6,000 men of the U.S. 4th and ARVN 22d divisions, helilifted
from Pleiku Province in South Vietnam into Ratanakiri Province; on
the 6th, a fourth drive began with some 4,000 men mainly from the
U.S. 25th Division attacking an area of Prey Veng-Kompong Cham
provinces, and on the same day "two other offensives" were launched
in the northern part of the Fishhook area; on the 9th, there were
two new attacks by the U.S. 25th Division in the Parrot's Beak and
Fishhook areas, as well as the launching of the allied naval
expedition up the Mekong River.
Truc Chien asserts tt.,.at the "patriotic Cambodian armed forces" have been
activated ;.nd are "rapidly" developing in Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri,
Kratie, Kompong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo, Kampot,
Siem Reap, and Battambang provinces. (Sihanouk's message to the
armed forces on the 12th claimed that a large part of the population
had been "freed from the control of the Lon Nol administration in
13 provinces, including Battambang.")
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Claiming that allied forces are being rebuffed throughout Indochina,
Truc Chien cites "victories" achieved during April in South Vietnam
and Laos, noting specifically the seizure on the 28th of Attopeu in
lower Laos near the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. He calls
this a reflection of the "close coordination" of the Lao-Khmer-
Vietnamese struggles. An unsigned QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the
same day also singles out the "liberation" of Attopeu by the
"Lao armed forces and people" in reviewing the April "victories"
in Indochina.
The Chien Binh commentary broadcast on the 10th discusses what the
author calls "Nixon's five errors in Indochina"--the move into
Cambodia, the reliance on a failing Vietnamization program, the
1969 attacks in the Plain of Jars area of Laos, the overthrow of
Sihanouk, and "blind reliance" on the policy of using force to
achieve a position of strength in Vietnam. Chien Binh claims that
the United States has never been more isolated politically, with
"all mankind," except for some U.S. "lackeys" in Thailand, South
Korea, and South Vietnam, opposed to the moves.
BATTLE Vietnamese communist media continue to report "Khmer
REPORTS liberation armed forces" successes in Cambodia, with
VNA and LPA recounting action in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng,
Kompong Speu, Kratie, Mondolkiri, and Kompong Cham provinces. VNA
claimed on the 17th that Khmer liberation forces were in "complete
control" of Stung Treng provincial capital,* and on the 19th VNA
reported the "liberation" of Siem Pang district capital in Stung
Treng Province.
A Liberation Radio commentary on 19 May, reviewing "two months of
glorious victories of the Cambodian armed forces and people," takes
brief note of the action arotzd Kompong Cham city, but there is no
reference to its changing hands. The commentary claims that the
Cambodian liberation forces "annihilated more than 1,900 enemy troops"
in action around Kompong Cham and Mimot.
CAMBODIAN FRONT OFFICIALS REPORT TO SIHANOUK ON SITUATION
The situation in Cambodia is also discussed in a 10 May message to
Sihanouk by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim--the three individuals
said to be in Cambodia as government ministers and officials of the
National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). As released by Sihanouk's
secretariat in Peking and disseminated by NCNA on the 18th, the
message claims that "our armed forces" have to date "liberated
* Sihanouk in his 12 May message to the armed forces had claimed the
"capture" of Stung Treng, as well as Kratie, Senmonorom, and Chhouk.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
-4-
numerous towns and cities in the provinces of the northeast and south-
east, northwest and southwest; the capital Phnom Penh is being
menaced from all sides."
The message adds that the people in the "liberated" areas have
elected FUNK committees and "organs of power at different levels
and are ardently and enthusiastically making voluntary contributions
both in manpower and materials to the great cause of national
resistance." The three functionaries also express their thanks to
Sihanouk for their election to the FUNK CenLcal Committee's
Political Bureau and the government and for "entrusting us to
manage all the affairs of the country and mobilize our people to
fight the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys."
DELEGATES AT 14 MAY PARIS SESSION STRESS "ESCALATION" OF WAR
The VNA account of the 66th session of the Paris talks on 14 May notes
that the PRG and DRV delegations had postponed the 66th session, which
should have been convened on the 6th, until the 14th in order to
"protest against the repeated U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam"
on 1, 2, 3, and 4 May.
VNA's account of the allied presentations says that GVN delegation
head Phani Dang Lam "advanced absurd contentions and shamelessly
slandered the DRV in an attempt to justify American-Saigon 'puppet'
troops' overt aggression against Cambodia." U.S. delegate Habib,
according to VNA, "again tried to sell the so-called 'good will'"
of the Nixon Administration and to defend it "in face of the storm
of public anger in the world and in the United States against its
dragging out the aggressive war in South Vietnam, escalating the
war in Laos, and overtly sending American and Saigon puppet troops
to invade Cambodia, which have led to the expansion of the war to the
whole of Indochina." VNA ignores Habib's references to the
President's remarks on working for peace and says only that the U.S.
delegate "brazenly slandered the Vietnamese people and threatened that
the United States would take 'appropriate action,' meaning to further
intensify and widen the aggressive war against the Indochinese peoples."
V NA reports that deputy head delegate of the PRG Dinh Ba Thi,
speaking third, ridiculed the notion that the President's decision
to send troops into Cambodia would assist the U.S. troop withdrawal
program. It says Thi also refuted the "shopworn allegation"
that a U.S. withdrawal woulc allow the massacre of millions of
innocent civilians and charged that it is the United States and
"its lackeys" who kill civilians.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Recalling that the NFLSV had put forth its 10-point solution on
8 May a year ago, Thi said that at his 8 May press conference the
President had "once again opposed the legitimate demands of the
Vietnamese people and uttered insolent threats."
DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, "analyzing Nixon's recent deeds in
Indochina and his recent statements, especially in his 30 April speech
and 8 May press conference, laid bare the bellicose nature, the
obstinate and perfidious attitude" of the Nixon Administration,
according to VNA. He charged that since it assumed office, the
Nixon Administration has never really meant to peacefully settle
the Vietnam problem but "has always nurtured the illusion of gaining
a military victory and of negotiating from a position of strength."
Vy pointed out, the VNA account says, that the United States has
committed itself "totally and unconditionally" to stopping the bombings
of the DRV--a commitment which led to the convening of the Paris
conference. Repeating the allegation that the recent May bombings
of the DRV have "seriously jeopardized the work of the Paris
conference," Vy said that "if the United States continued the bombings
the DRV delegation would feel compelled to draw the necessary
conclusions" and the United States "must bear full responsibility
for the grave consequences" arising from its acts. (Although not
reported by VNA, PRG delegate Thi also said the escalation of the
war to Cambodia and the early May air attacks against the DRV
"directly threaten" the Paris talks.)
The DRV delegate echoed Thi in rejecting the President's explanation
of U.S. moves and said that "nobody sees any sigi tha, Nixon is
going to confine the invasion of U.S. and Saigon puppet - troops"
within his stated limits. Vy saw clear evidence of this in "the
operation of over 100 warships with thousands of U.S. and Saigon
troops on board sailing up the Mekong River to Phnom Penh and
Kompong Cham on 11 and 12 May," the statements by Nguyen Van Thieu
and Nguyen Cao Ky indicating that there should be no limitations to
GVN troop operations in Cambodia, and the mobilization of the GVN
navy with the participation of the Seventh Fleet for an "illegal
blockade" of Cambodia.
MAO TSE-TUNG SUPPORTS CANEODIAN, INDOCHINESE STRUGGLES
Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on Cambodia and Indochinese developments
seems designed to make propaganda capital of widespread opposition to
recent U.S. military moves and to draw attention to standard :Taoist
doctrines on revolutionary struggle. While the statement is pegged
to the "revolutionary armed struggle" in Indochina, it also expresses
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
the Chinese people's support for the current "revolutionary struggle"
in America as well as struggles and national liberation movements
worldwide.
Declaring cryptically that the danger of a new world war still
exists, Mao's statement adds: "but revolution is the main trend of
the world today." It goes on to repeat the characterization of U.S.
imperialism as a paper tiger and to declare that "a weak nation
can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big."
The passage on world war and. revolution is a gloss on a Mao statement
released in Lin Piao's report to the CCP Congress in April 1969.
Lin quoted Mao as saying regarding the possibility of world war that
there are "but two possibilities"--either a war will give rise to
revolution or revolution will prevent war. The effect of Mao's
present gloss on this doctrine is to underscore the efficacy of local
protracted struggles and to play down the dangers of a larger
conflagration.
Peking's motive for issuing the statement at this particular time is
unclear, though the timing may be related to the fact that 20 May
is the date on which a session of the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw was
scheduled to be held. An NCNA announcement the day before said the
Warsaw meeting had been cancelled in protest against U.S. actions in
Cambodia. Taken together, the cancellation and the release of the
Mao statement seem calculated to underscore Peking's support for
Sihanouk and other Indochinese forces and implicitly to accuse the
Soviets of lagging behind by not recognizing Sihanouk's new government.
BACKGROUND The statement is the first to be issued by Mao since
the 16 April 1968 statement that followed the assassination
of Martin Luther King. Mao declared then that the assassination had
shown black people that the philosophy of nonviolence is bankrupt,
and he linked the Negro struggle to the worldwide one against American
"imperialism." Mao had issued a statement on U.S. "racial
discrimination" on 8 August 1963, and similar statements over the
next year and a half dealt with the "people's struggles" in South
Vietnam, Panama, the Congo (Leopoldville), and the Dominican Repu;lic.
A 29 August 1963 statement expressing Chinese support for struggle in
South Vietnam--which was pegged to Ngo Dinh Diem's "repressive measures"
against Buddhists and others--included a reference to U.S. "violations"
of the 1951+ and 1962 Geneva agreements and declared: "Apart from those
who are deliberatea.ly deceiving the people or are utterly naive, no
one will believe that a piece of paper called a treaty will make U.S.
imperialism lay down its butcher's knife and become a Buddha at once,
or behave a little better."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
PEKING NOTES PRESIDENTS REMARKS ON DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES
Available current Peking comment does not repeat the direct charge
that the USSR is colluding with the United States in Indochina, but
a measure of the effort to keep the notion alive is evident in a
13 May NCNA comment on the President's press conference of the 8th.
Unlike Moscow and Hanoi, NCNA acknowledges the President's comments
on diplomatic initiatives, quoting him as saying "we are exploring
with the Soviet Union . . . , with Great Britain,' and with
participants in the 'conference of Asian countries' sponsored by
the Indonesian fascist regime and 'through every possible channel'
methods to see that the 'neutrality' of Cambodia and Laos is
'guaranteed.'" NCNA thus inserted ellipses where the President
remarked that the explorations with the Soviet Union had met "with
not too much success to date." NCNA routinely calls the President's
comments on diplomacy "another counterrevolutionary tactic."
The 18 May CCP Central Committee message to the VWP Central Committee
on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's birth anniversary predicts that the
Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples "will unite closely" in
their struggle. And it adds: "whether U.S. imperialism continues
to expand the war, use its accomplices or lackeys to serve its
aims, or intervenes or conducts sabotage through the United Nations
or any other international conference, it and its lackeys cannot
save themselves from complete defeat."
CALL FOR SOCIALIST UNITY REPEATED BY PRAVDA, CEMA STATEMENT
Moscow's continued call for socialist unity in the face of U.S.
"aggression" in Indochina is expressed authoritatively in the
18 May PRAVDA editorial article which replies to Chinese attacks
on the Lenin centenary.* PRAVDA recalls the assertion in the
i May Soviet Government statement that the expansion of U.S.
aggression in Indochina "makes even more pressing the need for unity
and greater co'.iesion" of the socialist, anti-imperialist, and
peace-loving forces. The article adds that this position is
shared by the "fraternal countries of socialism and the Marxist-
Leninist parties of the whole world."
Delivering a broadside at Chinese policy in Asia, PRAVDA says
that using Peking's logic "it would be better for the peoples
struggling against imperialism to be isolated from the main
* The article is discussed as a who'..:- in the Sino-Soviet
relations section of this TRENDS.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1978
revolutionary force of our time and to be left face to face with a
strong and cunning enemy." Charging that Peking thus demonstrates that
it does not intend to take concerted action with the USSR and other
socialist countries against the imperialists, the article sees the
latest events in Indochina as added proof that Peking's stand
"encourages the imperialists."
Routine comment in Moscow's Mandarin-language broadcasts on the eve
of the editorial article's appearance continued the charges of the
past few weeks that President Nixon's decision to "escalate" the
Indochina war was related to the Chinese refusal to take united
action on Vietnam.
CEMA STATEMENT A statement on Indochina adopted by the CEMA
countries at their 12-14 May meeting in Warsaw,
carried by TASS on the 14th, repeats the standard call for "closer
cohesion of the socialist countries on the basis of the principles
of Marxism-Leninism." Like the 4 May Soviet Government statement,
it says that all states that treasure peace and freedom "must show
great responsibility for further developments of events and must
show determination to help rebuff the aggressor." In decrying
intensified U.S. aggression against Cambodia, Laos, and the DRV,
the CEMA statement seems to go a step further than the Soviet
Government statement when it warns that the spread of aggression
in Indochina "not only aggravated the situation in Southeast Asia
but also led to the worsening of the overall international situation
and jeopardized the solution of many outstanding international
problems." The Soviet statement said only that the U.S. intrusion
in Cambodia "may result in further complication of the general
international situation."
EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE APPEALS FOR UNITED ACTION
Increased support for the Indochinese peoples' struggle in the wake
of U.S. "escalation" was discussed at the Paris meeting on 15 May
of representatives of 18 communist parties of European capitalist
countries. The conference issued a joint appeal and sent a letter
of support to the VWP, NFLSV, NLHX, and FUNK. VNA carries the
documents textually, and they are summarized by TASS.
The appeal declares that the parties participating in the conference
"will contribute to the strengthening of the unity of action of
the international communist movement, believing that the common
action of all the communist and workers' parties will facilitate the
victorious rallying of all anti-imperialist forces." It adds that
in view of the urgent and serious situation, the parties call for
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY ...970
"the strengthening of unity and for a more and more resolute and
sustained action against the extension of the war, and for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina." The parties address
themselves in particular to "workers and their organizations,
socialist parties, Christians, and students."
The letter to the Indochinese parties and fronts reports the European
parties' decision to further develop "political, moral, and material
isupport" for the Indochinese struggle, to demand speedy, total, and
t.nconditional U.S. troop withdrawal, and to increase pressure on
the governments of the capitalist countries of Europe to condemn
U.S. aggression. Days of action and solidarity will take place
in Europe, it says, which will contribute to the "political
isolation" of the Nixon Administration and back the antiwar movement
in the United States itself.
ELEVEN-NATION DJAKARTA CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA SCORED
STATEMENT BY The 16-17 May Djakarta meeting of the foreign
SIHANOUK REGIME ministers of 11 Asian nations on the Cambodian
situation prompts a statement on the 17th from
Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union" which "strongly"
condemns the gathering as "grave interference in Cambodian internal
affairs and a naked violation of Cambodian sovereignty." As
transmitted by NCNA, the statement says the composition of the
Djakarta conference reveals the meeting to be an undertaking
"inspired and maneuvered" by the United States, since four of the
participants are U.S. "lackeys" and the remainder are "closely
subordinated" to the United States.*
The statement declares that if the conference were "really" concerned
with Cambodian independence and neutrality, the conferees "should
in the first place condemn the United States and its lackeys for
this open aggression against the sovereignty of a member state of
the United Nations." The Cambodian problem, it adds, can be "easily
settled" by the Cambodian people themselves after the immediate
and complete withdrawal of U.S. and "lackey" troops from Cambodia.
The statement also expressed thanks to countries which refused to
participate in the conference and singles out Burma, India, Pakistan,
Ceylon, Afghanistan, and Nepal in this regard. It does not mention
that the PRC and other Asian communist countries were also invited.
* The participants were Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea,
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and South Korea, with Cambodia attending as an observer.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Although it was transmitted by NCNA some 12 hours after the Djakarta
conference communique was released, the statement fails to acknowledge
any of the substance of the communique.
PEKING Chinese reaction to the "sinister" Djakarta meeting comes
on the 20th with an NCNA report and a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article. NCNA notes that the communique "pretentiously"
calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and
for the respect by all parties of Cambodia's independence, sovereignty,
neutrality, and territorial integrity and denounces these statements
as a "deliberate attempt to mislead the people and absolve U.S.
imperialism from its crime of invasion of Cambodia." The PEOPLE'S
DAILY article scornfully dismisses the conferees' call for respect
for Cambodian independence as "downright ridiculous."
The NCNA dispatch also notes the communique's "clamor" for "a 'peaceful
solution'" to the Cambodia question by convening an international
conference and reactivating the ICC through consultations between a
three-nation committee--Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia--and the 1951E
Geneva conference co-chairmen, "etc." These appeals, NCNA says, are
no more than attempts to raise the signboard of a "'peaceful solution"'
in order "to serve U.S. imperialism in its aggression against Cambodia
and the expansion of its aggressive ',gar in Indochina." NCNA neglects
to mention that the other mission of the three-nation committee is
to contact the UN officials to seek UN action on Cambodia. But
PEOPLE'S DAILY does note that the three-nation committee is "to link
up" with the United Nations, which "everyone knows" is "manipulated
by U.S. imperialism" and which has "no right to interfere in Cambodia's
affairs." The Commentator article, unlike the earlier NCNA report,
fails to cite the communique's call for an international conference
and reactivation of the ICC.
Both the PEOPLE'S DAILY article and the NCNA dispatch shower abuse
on the conference participants, particularly on Japan and Indonesia.
The article calls the participants a "gang of vassals, accomplices, and
puppets of U.S. imperialism." The dispatch adds that "some Asian
countries boycotted and did not attend the conference," but NCNA does
not name any countries and thus does not acknowledge that the PRC
was among those invited.
HANOI AND FRONT A NHAN DAN commentary on the 20th, as summarized by
VNA, says the conference "dared not lift a finger
to condemn the U.S. aggression" in Cambodia and instead "took up
the U.S. plans of using the United Nations.nd other international
organizations and conferences to plead for the United States and
legalize the aggressive acts of the United States and its henchmen."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONKIDEN'1'IAL F13IS TRENDS
20 MAY 19'(0
NHAN DAN thus suppresses the fact that the communique urged reactivation
of the ICC. But it takes note of the communique's call for respect for
Cambodia's sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity arid
for the withdrawal of "'foreign troops" from Cambodia, "and so on,"
commenting that these statements cannot conceal the "dirty scheme
of the U.S. aggressors." On the 19th a brief VNA report cites the
communique's "dark scheme" of hoping to use the United Nations
"to interfere in Cambodia so as to lend a hand to the Lori Nol-Matak
clique in opposing the patriotic movement of the Khmer people,"
VNA mentions neither the communique's reference to an international
conference nor its reference to reactivation of the ICC.
In advance of the meeting in Djakarta, DRV and PRG media carried a
number of denunciatory press and radio commentaries, and both issued
foreign ministry statements. The DRV statement, issued on the loth,
notes that "with the exception of a handful of lackeys and satellites
of the United States," the Asian countries have refused to participate
in the conference. "Obviously," the statement contends, the meeting
is "intended to serve U.S. aggression in Cambodia." It says that "the
Vietnamese people and DRV Government sternly condemn the so-called
'Asian Conference on Cambodia' and declare that all resolutions and
recommendations adopted by it are illegal and null and void." The
PRG statement, issued the next day, similarly declares any decision
by the conference "null and void." It lists the participants,
describing their political complexions and terming the meeting a
"brazen intervention in the internal affairs of the Khmer people, and
at the same time a step of preparation for deeper involvement by the
U.S. satellites in the U.S. war of aggression against the Indochinese
peoples."
MOSCOW The first Soviet acknowledgment of the substance of the
conference communique 'comes in an 18 May English-language
broadcast which says it contains a4'hypocritical appeal for an
immediate cease-fire in Cambodia." The broadcast also says that
the communique advocates immediate reconvening of the 1951 Geneva
conference--a step which is "untimely as long as Cambodia is
occupied by American troops." This line is echoed in a Radio
Peace and Progress commentary, broadcast in English on the same day,
which adds that "an immediate cease-fire at a time when Cambodian
resistance is growing against the American-Saigon troops would be
advantageous only for Washington and the forces that support it in
Phnom Penh."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONP'i:1)l:NTIAL FiIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
A dispatch by `PASS Commentator Kharkov on the 18th acknowledges none
of the substance of the "lengthy" communique but remarks that it
"abounds in much too abstract calls which offer no effective measures
in connection with the extremely grave situation in Cambodia."
Kharkov claims that the communique amounts to an "encouragement
of the U.S. aggressive actions" and that from it an American
behi.rid- the-so cene presence in Djakarta is "rather easily discernible."
MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
There are scattered reports of current military activity throughout
South Vietnam, with the focus on engagements in areas north of
Saigon to the DMZ. PLAF military action in the Central Trung Bo
area during the early April upsurge in fighting draws praise in a
QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN article of the 15th, which singles out the
"repeated attacks" against Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam
Ranh port. A NIIAN DAN commentary of the 20th, carried the same
day by Hanoi radio, praises the liberation forces' activity in the
Nam Do Delta area since early April in their emulation drive to
commemorate IIo Chi Minh's 80th birth anniversary. A Hanoi radio
commentary on the 18th also reports instances throughout the South
of PLAF military achievements in the emulation drive.
The GVN's declaration of a cease-fire on 18 May to mark Buddha's
birthday prompts no Vietnamese communist comment. The communists
took no such initiative this year, although they had marked the
anniversaries with cease-fires last year and in 1967. In 1968, in
the wake of the Tet offensive, there was no cease-fire declaration
by either side.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL 1'13IS TflEENDs
20 May 19'(0
- 13 -
HO CHI MINH'S EIGHTIETH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED
NORTH The 8Oth anniversary of lie Chi Minh':i birth on 19 May
VIETNAM is marked by Ilanoi with a meeting sponsored by the
party, government, and Fatherland Front, editorials
in the press, and the publication of a biography of Ho and a
collection of his i0important" speeches and articles. The meeting,
held on the 18th, was attended by all the members of the party
Politburo except Pham Hung and Hoang Van 1loan. (Roan appeared as
recent]-; as 6 May at a V-E Day meeting.) President Ton Duc Thang
delivered the inaugural speech at the meeting and Premier Pharr
Van Dong gave the main address.
In his broad-ranging address, carried by VNA on the 18th and 19th,
Pharr Van Dong lauds Ho as a successor to Lenin and Marx and
enumerates his virtues as a person and a revolutionary. Ile also
claims that "the revolutionary line and strategy of President Ho
and our party are the development of the Marxist-Leninist theory,
a worthy contribution to the treasure of experience of the world
revolution."
Discussing the party's strategic line, Dong says that it is "first
and foremost a strategy of offensive" but adds that it is also "a
strategy of persistent, protracted, staunch, indomitable, and
thorough struggle." This dual guideline has been similarly spelled
out in other Vietnamese statements in the last several months, as
has Dong's injunction that "we must apply the strategy of protracted
fight to gain strength and win more and more victories as we fight."
Dong adds that the strategy requires a struggle on three fronts--
political, military, and diplomatic--"with emphasis to be laid on this
or that front depending on the circumstances of time and place,
driving the enemy more and more into a difficult and passive position,
hence to repel him step by step, defeat him part by part, before
winning total victory over him."
Pharr Van Dong echoes periodic statements since Ho's death which
have characterized the party leadership as "collective." He
declares. that "the collective leadership of our party at present
comprises the disciples, comrades, and companions-in-arms of
President Ho Chi Minh, who for dozens of years now have united and
fought around him as one man . . . ."
In touching on North Vietnamese domestic achievements, Dong
concentrates on the problems of management and organization--an
area of concern which was similarly stressed by Le Duan in his
14 February article on the party's anniversary. The "most
essential thing" for further achievements in the North, according
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
- ;L14 -
IBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 19 70
to Dorig, is to "know how to manage and organize." lie declares that
"In the management of the national economy and the people's life,
we must make fundamental and all-round calculations, which must
have big and long-term strategic significance and at the same time
mutt be very concrete and practical." He says that these
calculations must be reflected in state plans--long-term as well
a annual--and he notes that "to lead the struggle for the
realization of a plan requires organizational capacities together
with managerial capacities, which are very necessary to all of us,
first of all to the responsible comrades in state organs." Hanoi
propaganda routinely calls for efforts to fulfill the 1970 plan,
but has not in recent months noted that the 1970 plan concludes
a three-year plan begun in 1968. While other comment, like Pham
Van Dong, has stressed the importance of long-range planning, the
propaganda has not indicated whether a new plan for more than one
year will be put into effect after 1970.
SOUTH Liberation Radio on 18 May reports that a joint PRG-
VIETNAM NFLSV-Alliance meeting was held that day in a "liberated
area" to mark Ho's birthday. Chief among those reported
present was PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, who delivered the main
address. Routinely pledging to step up the general offensive to
defeat the United States and overthrow the GVN, Phat declares that
the "South Vietnamese compatriots and combatants will express their
profound remembrance of President Ho .through an emulation movement
for fulfilling all tasks set forth by the NFLSV and PRG for 1970,
especially for this spring-summer, and through their unshakable
determination to win complete victory."
Both LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) and Liberation Radio on 19 May
carry a 17 May joint NFLSV-PRG message from Nguyen Huu Tho and
Huynh Tan Phat to DRV leaders "expressing the South Vietnamese
people's gratitude to President Ho Chi Minh" on the occasion of
his 80th birthday. The message, addressed to Ton Due Thang, Le Duan,
Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, praises Ho's contributions to the
Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause. It routinely claims
"unprecedented and all-round victories" since the spring of 1968,
charges that the United States is "very obstinate, bellicose and
tricky," and scores the Nixon Administration for its Vietnamization
program, for escalation of the war in Laos, and for staging the
coup against Sihanouk and invading Cambodia.
Additional attention to the anniversary includes a 12 May special
communique, broadcast by the Front on the 13th, from the NFLSV
Central Committee and the PRG. A message was sent from Vietnam
Alliance chairman Trinh Dinh Thao, and LPA on the 18th carries
an LPA memorial editorial on Ho.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
PEKING NCNA and Peking radio on 18 May publicize the message from
the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee
of the Vietnam Workers' Party commerating H''s 80th birth anniversary.
The message eulogizes Ho as an "outstanding proletarian revolutionary"
who dedicated "his whole life to the cause of national liberation of
Vietnam and to the cause of communism." It notes that during China's
"revolutionary civil war and war of resistance against Japan," Ho
visited China "many times, shared weal and woe with the Chinese people
and fought shoulder to shoulder with them." It says he "forged a
profound militant friendship with the Communist Party of China and
the Chinese people," and that he "made important contributions to
the world proletariat."
NCNA on the 19th reports the "grand meeting" held in Hanoi the
previous day to celebrate the anniversary and on the 18th it carries
a version of the 12 May NFLSV-PRG -,pecial communique.
MOSCOW The Ho anniversary is noted in Moscow press and radio
comment and marked by a meeting of the directorate of the
Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society, but there was no official
Soviet message. PRAVDA on the 19th, according to TASS, carries
a detailed biography of Ho and comments that he was a "true
internationalist and Leninist who regarded friendship with the
Soviet people and their Communist Party as an earnest of success
for the whole of the socialist community." The paper notes that
Ho "enjoined the Vietnamese communists to continue his cause and
make a worthy contribution toward strengthening and developing
friendship and cooperation between socialist countries, toward
strengthening the unity of the entire international communist and
working class movement."
DRV COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RESOLUTION ON GRAIN POLICY
A resolution on the stabilization of grain distribution and the
sale of grain to the state, reportedly issued at a 3 March plenary
session of the Council of Ministers, is broadcast by Hanoi radio on
15 May. The broad goals of the new grain policy spelled out in the
resolution are to boost grain production; to uphold the "self-
sufficiency spirit" in solving grain problems--overcoming dependence
on the state and imports and stimulating agricultural-cooperatives
to solve their own grain needs; "to correctly implement the
principle of distribution to labor within cooperatives"--he who
works eats; to strengthen state management of grain distribution
through the country--including the elimination of waste,
speculation, and theft from the state; and to strengthen and
consolidate the worker-peasant alliance--an effort to stimulate
the flow of industrial products to cooperatives and grain from
the cooperatives to the workers.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
- 16 -
As a basic measure to stabilize the sale of grain, the resolution
stipulates that the state will, fix the norm which the peasants
must sell to the state based on the results of three harvest yields
from 1963 through 1969--the most abundant, average, and poorest.
This norm will not be raised for five years, from 1970 to 1974, and
any increase in production will be retained by the cooperatives
and the peasants, who will be free to dispose of it by developing
husbandry or selling it to the state or to those short of grain.
The day after the broadcast of the resolution, Hanoi radio carries
excerpts of a talk by Le Thanh Nghi, said to have been given at a
"March conference of local officials," discussing implementation
of the new policy. Observing that in the past the party and
government have laid down many policies concerning food, Nghi goes
on to discuss some of the weak points of the policy on collection
and distribution of food "which appeared during the struggle
against the war of destruction."* These shortcomings, according
to Nghi, result in lessened enthusiasm for production and
consciousness of the "duty to sell food to the state." He also
says that there has been a tendency to rely on the state and that,
a free market in food has been observed. He explains that this
situation has caused the state to experience difficulties in
balancing food supply and demand.
* An article on grain management and distribution by To Duy,
deputy director of the Department of Finance and Trade, which
appeared in NHAN DAN in August 1968, noted that the Secretariat
had passed Directive 149 in April 1968 on changing the direction
of grain distribution during wartime, and Decision 1,79 in June
1968 on the task of unifying the management and distribution of
grain within the state and agricultural cooperatives.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE REBUTS CHINESE POLEMICAL ATTACKS
A PRAVDA editorial article on 18 May--the first commentary on China
on this authoritative level since 28 August 1969--presents Moscow's
most comprehensive indictment of Chinese policies since the opening
of the Peking talks and appears to negate any current prospects of
a Sino-Soviet accommodation based on united action. The article is
responsive to Peking's equally authoritative joint editorial attacking
the Soviets on the Lenin centenary across a wide range of domestic
and foreign issues. It ends a period of relative Soviet restraint
on China, during which North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan spent
three weeks traveling between Moscow and Peking as well as visiting
Poland.* PRAVDA indicates that the Soviets see no hope that their
dispute with the Chinese can be muted in the name of united action,
citing "the latest events in Indochina" to renew the charge that
Peking's rejection of joint action has encouraged "imperialist
aggression." The burden of PRAVDA's attack is that Peking's policies
are designed to further Chinese great-power aims at the expense of
the communist and third-world forces as well as of the Chinese people's
own well-being.
Almost as an afterword, the editorial article addresses itself to
the Peking talks in an effort to stress Moscow's desire to keep the
negotiations alive despite the bitter polemical exchange. The
article repeats--without attribution--Brezhnev's remarks on China
in his 14 April Kharkov speech in which he urged that ideological
c?.ifferences be contained on the party level and reiterated the
Soviet interest in a border settlement. In renewing his warning
that Chinese war preparations cannot pressure the Soviets, the
article interjects a comment on the Chinese space satellite,
charging that the launching has been used to foment "nationalistic
passions" and for threats against the Soviet Union. The article
concludes by quoting from Brezhnev's Lenin centennial address
calling on the Chinese to come together with the Soviets in joint
struggle.
* In contrast to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's trips to Moscow and
Peking last October, Le Duan's travels have not been accompanied by
signs in the propaganda that the North Vietnamese have been able to
play a mediatory role in Sino-Soviet relations. See the TRENDS of
29 October 1969, page 21, and 13 May 1970, page 16.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Though in an earlier passage, cataloguing Peking's deviations in
foreign policy, PRAVDA refers to Chinese territorial claims and to
the border clashes, the article fails to imply any current
difficulties along the border or to accuse the Chinese of recent
provocations. The Chinese joint editorial had similarly avoided
suggesting a deterioration of relations directly affecting the
border confrontation. The current polemical exchange thus seems
designed as another, major exercise In the ideological contest for
authority in the communise movement, a contest the Chinese had
promised in their pronouncements on the agreement to hold the
talks last October.
The PRAVDA editorial article is largely a point-by-point response
to charges pressed in the Chinese joint editorial. Points on
which the two sides have joined issue in the latest polemical
round include the following:
+ Introducing the term "Brezhnevism," the Chinese editorial had
sharply assailed Brezhnev's leadership and personalized the
ideological vendetta. PRAVDA returns the compliment with a
bitter attack on Mao in a section damning "Maoisr:'` as a
"reactionary-utopian, petty bourgeois" doctrine. Judging from
the PRAVDA article, the -Soviets were taken aback by the Peking
editorial's citation of a previously unpublished remark by Mao
in 1956 charging that the Soviets had discarded Leninism.*
Interpreting the disclosure of this remark as indicating Mao's
personal role in initiating the current anti-Soviet attacks,
PRAVDA contrasts the newly quoted remark with Mao's praise for
Soviet policies when he was in Moscow in 1957. "An obvious fact
of unscrupulous perfidy," PRAVDA intones.
+ The Peking editorial introduced the epithet "social militarism"
in addition to the standard charges that the Soviets practice
social fascism and social imperialism. PRAVTDA replies by condemning
Maoism as a Chinese version of "social chauvinism." On the score
of militarism, PRAVDA draws on old polemical themes in attacking
Mao for believing in "the inevitability and even desirability of
war" and for being cynical about the effects of nuclear devastation.
The article portrays China as undergoing militarization in all
phases of life, though there is no attempt to depict Chinese war
preparations as a threat to Soviet security.
* As quoted by Peking, he also said the Soviets had abandoned
Stalinism, but PRAVDA chose to ignore this.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
? CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
+ The exchange has overtones of racism, with each side comparing
the other to Hitler. The Chinese editorial evoked a specter of
traditional pan-Slavic expansionism in denouncing the "new tsars"
now occupying the Kremlin. PRAVDA retorts that the Chinese have
revived Hitler's talk about the need to contain a Slavic threat.
Each side has renewed charges that the other oppresses national
minorities.
+ The Chinese editorial devoted a section to the "Brezii-ne^
doctrine," condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia and denouncing
Moscow's notion of a socialist community as "nothing but a synonym
for a colonial empire." PRAVDA's rejoinder complains that Peking
has spearheaded its foreign policy against the socialist community
and has sought to undermine the Warsaw Pact and economic integration
under CEMA. Unlike the PRAVDA editorial article last August, which
discussed Peking's line on Czechoslovakia as well as the Warsaw Pact
and CEMA, the current article ignores the Czechoslovak question.
+ Peking's joint editorial dealt relatively briefly with the third
world, accusing the Soviets of exploiting the underdeveloped countries
and trying to suppress national liberation movements. In this
connection it charged that the Soviets had helped reactionaries in
such countries as Indonesia and India to massacre revolutionaries.
The PRAVDA article, whose title calls the Chinese "pseudorevolutionaries,"
turns the chexge back against Peking by laying blame on the PRC for
the loss of tens of thousands of revolutionaries who allegedly followed
its "adventuristic" line. In a pitch for broad support against Peking,
PRAVDA rebukes the Chinese for promoting insurrection against "progres-
sive" Asian regimes (an allusion to such regimes as Ne Win's,: in Burma),
for provoking conflicts between states(bringing to mind, for example,
the Indo-Pakistani conflict), and generally for seeking to isolate
the national liberation movement from the Soviet bloc. In what may
be read as a lecture to Indochinese elements being wooed by Peking,
PRAVDA warns that to follow the Chinese line in opposition to the
Soviets would leave "peoples struggling against imperialism" face to
face with "a strong and cunning enemy." After citing current
developments in Indochina, the article impugns Peking's motives as
stemming from great-Han dreams of ruling "at least Asia, if not the
whole world."
A TASS report on the 19th, rounding up world reaction to the PRAVDA
editorial article, cites the New York TIMES on PRAVDA's criticism of
Peking regarding Indochina. The TIMES article said PRAVDA was
ambiguous on this matter, leaving it uncertain whether the Soviets
were simply charging that Peking's past failures to cooperate on
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Vietnam encouraged Washington to send. troops into Cambodia or were
saying that Peking had currently rejected a Soviet call for united
action. TASS does not resolve the ambiguity, though it quotes
only the first interpretation and ignores a reference in the same
passage to speculation that Hanoi may be seeking at the present
time to put together a united front.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE SATELLITE
FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS DECRIES MOTIVES BEHIND CHINESE LAUNCH
The 18 May PRAVDA editorial article's swipe at the anti-Soviet uses
being made of the Chinese space satellite is the first direct,
authoritative Soviet comment on any individual test in the PRC's
nuclear-missile program. It caps a succession of Soviet propaganda
items on the launch--a departure from Moscow's customary abstention
from comment on past Chinese tests after briefly reporting hem.
The editorial article, a broadside at Mao and the policies of.
Chinese "pseudorevolutionariess" points to the "military psychosis"
being fanned in the PRC and the Maoist regime's calls on the people
"prepare for war," then observes'th at "even the recent launching
of a satellite as a result of the selfless efforts of Chinese
scientists, engineers, and workers is being used to whip up
nationalistic passions and for threats against our country."
The Soviet propaganda reaction to the 24 April satellite launch
began two weeks after Moscow media tersely reported the event on
the 25th. Beginning early in May, Moscow used the proxy of foreign
press articles and foreign "observers" to impugn the Chinese
leadership's motives and to play up the role of former U.S. Air
Force Colonel Chien Hsueh-shen in making the PRC achievement
possible. The first such item, in issue No. 19 of ZA RUBEZHOM signed
to the press 6 May, was a reprint of a Paris INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE article on Chien's role in the development of the satellite.
A Moscow radio commentary in Albanian on the 13th, noting Chinese
propaganda efforts to ascribe the success to Mao Tse-tung's thought,
cited "foreign observers" as stressing the "decisive role" in fact
played by Chinn, who "became a member of the CCP Central Committee"
in May 1969. The major contribution of the American-trained Dr. Chien,
along with that of West uerman suppliers and experts, is also
emphasized in an article from the Indian weekly LINK reprinted in
LITERARY' GAZETTE on 13 May. The article estimates the cost of the
Chinese nuclear-missi.le program as six billion dollars annually--
a sum, LINK remarks, that could have been used to feed and educate
the Chinese people.
While Moscow avoids coming directly to grips with the military and
strategic implications of the launch, LITERARY GAZETTE's reprint
of the Indian article includes a reference to the launch as a
development which the world, and particularly China's neighbors,
must view "primarily against the background of the almost explosive
development rates of the military potential" of China--as an event
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
of basically "military significance." Moscow media did not report
remarks made in Geneva by chief Soviet disarmament negotiator
Roshchin, who was quoted by Henburg's DPA on 28 April as stating,
in response to a question about the effect of the launch on
armaments policy, that "this question needs detailed study" and
that Chinese participation in disarmament and arms control is
"one of the very grave pending problems" today.
Nor did Moscow publicize remarks by Soviet cosmonaut Leonov in
an interview carried in the Tokyo YOMIURI on 13 May, contrived to
project for Japanese readers an image of Soviet reasonableness
vis-a-vis a self-isolated China acting against its own interests
by refusing to ;Join the international community. Leonov said it
was the USSR's "impression" that the PRC is "wasting both money
and energy by trying to do what we accomplished 10 years ago
because China does not want to rely on the help of other nations."
Peking has itself avoided discussion of the implications of the
launch in its own comment. In a diminishing volume of propaganda
on the satellite, it has continued to publicize foreign messages
of congratulations which in some instances hail the blow dealt to
the "imperialists" and "Soviet revisionists."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
? CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
SING - U. S, RELATIONS
PRC CANCELS WARSAW MEETING, CITES U.S. ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA
In an announcement similar in timing to its cancellation of the
135th session of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks scheduled for
20 February 1969, the PRC announced on 19 May (Peking time) that
the 137th session scheduled for the 20th in Warsaw would not be
held in view of U.S. military actions in Cambodia. On each
occasion the announcement was released in Peking media early on
the day before the date of the scheduled meeting. The February
1969 cancellation, announced in a statement by the PRC Foreign
Ministry spokesman, was attributed to "the current anti-China
atmosphere" allegedly created by the United States in its
handling of a Chinese diplomatic defector. The present brief
announcement simpll quotes the Chinese side at the Warsaw talks
as having notified the U.S. side on 18 May that the PRC "deems
it no longer suitable" to hold the meeting as scheduled "in view
of the increasingly grave situation created by the U.S. Government,
which has brazenly sent troops to invade Cambodia and expanded the
war in Indochina." This was the charge lodged in the I+ May PRC
Government statement reacting to the U.S. military incursion into
Cambodia and air attacks on'the DRV in early May.
The two cancellation announcements differ significantly in their
implications for the near future of the talks. The February 1969
announcement took the occasion to denounce the "vicious features"
of the Nixon Administration and to accuse it of following its
predecessor in "making itself the enemy" of the Chinese. The
announcement said nothing about rescheduling the meeting.
Subsequent Chinese comment took a notably hard line on Sino-U.S.
relations, in contrast to essentially noncommittal comment at
the time of the Nixon Administration's inauguration. The 135th
session of the Warsaw talks was not held until January 1970.
The current announcement avoids naming the Nixon Administration
and does not refer to the state of Sino-U.S. relations. Also
unlike the February 1969 announcement, it broaches the question
of rescheduling the meeting, saying this will be decided upon
"later" through consultation by liaison representatives of the
two sides. The announcement thus manages to register protest-
against U.S. actions in Indochina, and implicitly to suggest a
contrast between Peking's purity and Moscow's uninterrupted
participation in the SALT sessions in Vienna, while indicating
to both of the other sides in the triangular relationship that
the Warsaw talks will continue.
CONFIDENTIAL .
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
-24-
MOSCOW In successive TASS dispatches on the l9th, one datelined
REPORTS Peking and the other Washington, Moscow was quick to
point up the implication that Peking's move represents
only a temporary postponement. The first dispatch simply quotes the
NCNA announcement; the second one cites State Department spokesman
McCloskey as saying the Chinese had served notice that a new-date
for the meeting would be discussed later and as having "implied that
unofficial contacts with the Chinese side would be continued."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TTHENDS
20 MAY 19'(0
SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
Romania's defiant response to Soviet efforts to tighten the reins
on the European bloc through the Warsaw Pact and CEMA forms u
pervasive undercurrent of articles surrounding the Pact's 15th
anniversary, 14 May, and the 12-14 May CEMA Council session in
Warsaw. The example of Czechoslovakia, where the Pact was invoked
to "defend the gains of socialism," is a prominent motif of
Soviet comment on the Pact anniversary. And the comment on both
events appears against the backdrop of the recently concluded
Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, which for the first time in such a
document makes defense of "socialist gains" in each country a
common internationalist duty and for the first time refers to
"socialist economic integration" in CEMA.
Romania, whose renewed bilateral treaty with the Soviets was
initialed two years ago but has yet to be signed, has made clear
its rejection of both concepts. The Romanians declined to join
the CEMA "international investment bank" established at the Warsaw
session, and a deadline of lU July for members to sign the
agreement on the bank appears to anticipate continuing efforts
to break down Romania's resistance. Romanian party chief Ceausescu's
hurried trip to Moscow on 18-19 May, after the CEMA session and in
the wake of a TASS annoi.ncement that the Warsaw defense ministers
committee will meet in Sofia "in May," appears to signal a new
round of intensified pressures on Bucharest.
Moscow's effort to emphasize Pact concerns in a wide geographical
co~.text adds another dimension to the tense state of relations.
While authoritative Soviet comment mentions Indochina and the
Middle East and evokes the Sino-Soviet situation in statements
prefacing references to the Pact forces, authoritative Romanian
articles insist that the Pact exists "only" as a defense against
"imperialist attack in Europe" and emphasize that the Romanian
armed forces are responsible solely to the Romanian party and
state.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONI'IDENTIAI, I1315 'T'RENDS
20 MAY 1970
- !6 -
SOVIET ARTICLES IMPLY BROADENED ROLE FOR WARSAW PACT
Soviet media made extensive use of the Warsaw Pact anniversary* to
underscore, on the one hand, the role of the Pact as exemplified by
the intervention in Czcchonlovakia and, on the other hand, the
"international" scope of Pact concerns. Both aspects are reflected
in RED STAR's 13 May anniversary editorial, which hails the Soviet-
Czechoslovak treaty as exemplifying the principle of "defense of
socialist achievements" and declares that U.S. "aggression" in
Southeast Asia, Israeli "aggression," and the anti-Soviet campaign
in China "demand from Soviet soldiers, as well as from our
comrades-in-arms in the fraternal socialist countries, an increased
vigilance and a constant readiness to defend socialist achievements
selflessly." The editorial declares that "the American invasion of
Cambodia compels the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact
countries to do everything possible to repulse and to stop
imperialist aggression"; and with an eye to the Sino-Soviet
conflict, it goes on to stress the Pact members' determination
"to insure the inviolability of their frontiers."
Pact Commander Yakubovskiy's anniversary article in PRAVDA on
14 May stresses in general terms that the Pact is "reliably
defending the gains of socialism" and dwells on its members'
loyalty to their "international mission." Yakubovskiy does
not directly repeat Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko's reference
in RED STAR in January to the "allocation" of individual
countries' troops to the joint forces, rather referring
generally to "diverse forms of military cooperation" includng
"regular meetings and conferences of the armies' leading
personnel" and joint maneuvers. But Shtemenko brings up
this sensitive issue again in a 14 May IZVESTIYA article,
noting that "in the interests of collective defense the
Warsaw Pact member states created the combined armed forces,
consisting of national contingents which are assigned for
joint operations."
* Radio Moscow's propaganda on the occasion amounted to almost five
percent of its total comment in the week ending 17 May--more than
double the volume devoted to the Pact's decennial anniversary in
1965. In addition to his article in PRAVDA on this year's anniversary,
Pact Commander Yakubovskiy contributed articles to leading dailies
of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria; the then Pact
Commander Grechko had marked the 1965 anniversary only with articles
in PRAVDA and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
11316 TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Yakubovskiy does call attention in PRAVDA to the presence of Soviet
troops in certain Pact countries, stressing the "lasting combat
friendship" between "the groups of Soviet forces and the personnel
of the armies of the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia."
In his article published in Prague's RUDE PRAVO and the Bratislava
PRAVDA, also on the 14th, the Pact commander is more heavyhanded
than in his Moscow PRAVDA article. in declaring that "all that one
army achieves becomes the joint property of all the allied armies."
CEMA SESSION CARRIES FORWARD MOVES TOWARD INTEGRATION
The CEMA Council session in the Polish capital, at the premier level,
was called to implement the decisions on "economic and scientific-
technical cooperation" taken by the 23d "special" CEMA Council
meeting held in Moscow in April 1969, attended by party first
secretaries as well as premiers of the member countries. The
communique on the Warsaw session, carried by PAP on 14 May, goes
beyond the April 1969 communique in calling for stepped-up
"socialist economic integration" of the CEMA countries, where
the earlier document had referred only to economic "cooperation."
The replacement of the less sensitive term with the more blatant
one follows the insertion of references to "socialist economic
integration" under CEMA--in addition to customary references to
"international socialist division of labor"--in the new Soviet-
Czechoslovak treaty.
INVESTMENT BANK In announcing implementation of the decision of
last year's meeting on creation of an "inter-
national investment bank" under CEMA, the communique lists all the
attending countries except Romania as having joined in the agreement
on establishing the new entity. It adds that the subscribing
countries "have agreed that they will have signed the agreement
by 10 July 1970."
PAP reports TRYBUNA LUDU as revealing on 19 May that the "decision"
on the new bank contains a statement to the effect that "all
decisions to be made in the bank will not be adopted unanimously,
but by a two-thirds majority of votes." The paper says this proviso
will increase the bank's "efficiency" and will also be "a precedent,
because the principle of unanimity, applied so far in all CEMA
organizations, not infrequently hampered the activity of that
organization." The new provision thus in effect serves notice
that Soviet-sponsored decisions in CEMA will be imposed regardless
of maverick attitudes like Romania's.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
The new bank's "main aim" is defined as the granting of credits for
implementation of the international socialist division of labor as
well as for development of individual countries' economies--an
apparent indication that Czechoslovakia in particular must look to
CEMA for aid in this form rather than in the kind of hard-currency
loan it had sought from Moscow during the 1968 liberalization. The
commur~que provides, at the same time, for continuation of CEMA's
International Bank of Economic Cooperation, the vehicle for
"settling multilateral accounts in transfer rubles," which had
been established by a CEMA executive committee session in Moscow
in December 1963 under the chairmanship of Romania's Birladeanu.
The communique reports another step in the integration process
in the form of a new "institute of economic problems of the world
socialist system," designed to "prepare complex elaborations of
economic problems and to further deepen and improve the cooperation"
of the CEMA member countries.
CEAUSESCU VISIT TO MOSCOW REFLECTS RISING TENSIONS
Romanian party chief Ceausescu's unheralded talks with the Soviet
party leadership in Moscow on 18-19 May, at a time when serious
flooding is occurring in Romania, underlines the strains in
bilateral relations and appears to signal a new round of Soviet
pressure on Romania to live up to its "obligations" as an ally.
A brief TASS report on the Moscow talks on the 19th says that
they passed in "an open and comradely atmosphere" and that there
was "an exchange of views"--a euphemism for serious disagreement.
TASS adds that the discussions covered the international situation,
the world communist movement, and bilateral relations and that
both sides reaffirmed their desire to "strengthen and develop
friendly relations." Another brief TASS report on the 19th notes
that the Romanian delegation--which included Niculescu-Mizil, the
RCP's chief representative for international party affairs--was
seen off at the airport by Brezhnev, Suslov, and Katushev.
Tension surrounding the talks had seemed reflected in Bucharest
radio's gratuitous emphasis, in reporting the delegation's sudden
departure for Moscow, on the unity of the people and party behind
Ceausescu. Noting that the delegation was seen off by Maurer,
Pana, and other leading party and state officials, the radio said
many Bucharest citizens also went to the airport to demonstrate
their affection for the leadership, "reasserting once again the
close unity of the people around the RCF and their total adherence
to its domestic and foreign policy."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
The hurried visit came against the background of evidently increasing
Soviet displeasure with Romania's independent behavior. A major
factor contributing to present tensions appears to be Romania's
reluctance to abandon its neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet
dispute and, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, to support Soviet
foreign policy positions. At a time when Moscow was seeking to
preserve its options in Indochina by holding off on recognition
of the Chinese-sponsored Sihanouk government-in-exile, Bucharest
took the course followed by Belgrade in promptly recognizing the
Sihanouk regime. Soviet displeasure over Romania's attitude, toward
the PRC is implied in the 18 May PRAVDA editorial article on China,
which accuses Peking of trying to "undermine" the Soviet Union's
relations with its Warsaw Pact allies and to "hinder plans for
economic integration." In the light of Romania's refusal to
participate in CEMA's international investment bank, the
implication is that Romania is susceptible to such influences.
Soviet-Romanian differences on the role of the Warsaw Pact are
prominent in propaganda on the Pact anniversary. In direct
conflict with Soviet articles underscoring the Pact's "inter-
national" role, Romanian media used the anniversary to put
pointed emphasis on its limitation to the European theater and
to reiterate that Romania will retain control over its own
armed forces. An article under the authoritative signature of
I. Iliescu in SCINTEIA on 14 May, reported by AGERPRES, cites
Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty which stipulates that the Pact
will act "in case of ar armed attack in Europe." Against the
background of Moscow's deletion of the "in Europe" clause in
bilateral pacts with its European allies, and in patent response
to such statements as Yakubovskiy's--in the 14 May PRAVDA--that
the Pact is a powerful factor for security in Europe "and other
continents," Iliescu states flatly that the alliance's "only
objective is defense against an imperialist attack in Europe."
Iliescu's article also responds to the implications of current
Soviet articles in insisting that "the sole leader of our
armed forces is the party, the State Council, the Supreme
National Command; only they can give orders to our army, and
only these can be carried out." Moscow has conveyed a picture
of joint Warsaw Pact forces ready to serve anywhere needed in
"defense of socialism." Thus Yakubovskiy, after condemning
the U.S. actions in Cambodia, declares in the PRAVDA article:
". being aware of their loyalty to their international
mission, the joint armed forces are determined to do everything
in their power to discharge with credit their duties as a reliable
shield of socialism."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
Iliescu's counter-emphasis on the control exercised exclusively
by Romanian constitutional and party bodies over military actions
recurs in other Romanian commentaries relating to the Pact
anniversary. These commentaries echo the view of the function
of the Pact and Romania's role in it that was spelled out by
Ceausescu to a group of military cadres on 5 February, in
remarks apparently responsive to Shtemenko's 24 January RED
STAR article which referred to "combined" Warsaw Pact forces.
Ceausescu made it clear in that speech that his country would
not renounce party and state control over its own armed force=.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
WEST GERMANY
SOVIET, GDR MEDIA DECRY BRANDT, SPD "INCONSISTENCIES"
Soviet and East German media hammered at the "inconsistencies"
between West German Chancellor Brandt's words and deeds as Soviet-FRG
talks resumed in Moscow and on the eve of the scheduled 21 May summit
meeting in Kassel between Brandt and GDR Premier Stoph. Commentators
have cctinued to express skepticism about Bonn's readiness to make
the concessions which Moscow and East Berlin say are essential if
relations are to improve. Extensive Soviet and GDR comment evinces
disappointment at the SPD's 17th party congress at Saarbruecken and
Brandt Is report to it.
Moscow has made no comment on the talks between Gromyko and FRG
State Secretary Bahr that resumed 12 May. But a prompt, brief Soviet
report on the reopening of the talks contrasted with Moscow's
failure to even mention the first rounds in December, February, and
March until their conclusion.
Moscow comment for German listeners on the 11-14 May
SPD congress stresses that Brandt's main address there
"clearly exposed all the inconsistencies" in the policies of the
government led by the SPD. Repeated demands that Bonn accept "reality"
and agree to recognition of the GDR and Europe's postwar status quo
suggest a concerted Moscow-East Berlin effort to confront the Brandt
government with a tough, united bargaining position.
Typically, commentator Zholkver observes in daily reports on the
cong"ess that it brought to light growing dissatisfaction among "PD
members and voters over the "open inconsistency of the SPD elite"
and the FRG Government. This was revealed, Zholkver says, in the
shelving, "under leadersLip pressure," of progressive foreign policy
resolutions favoring recognition of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse
frontier as well as in the SPD leadership's "unequivocally negative
attitude" toward domestic reforms. At the same time, Zholkver says
there was "no lack of praise" :'or FRG capitalism and monopolists and
that Brandt delivered a "eulogy" on the "aggressive NATO pact."
A Zakharov commentary on the F.'D congress, broadcast to Radio Moscow's
German listeners on the 12th, offers a gloomy evaluation of the SPD's
achievements to date under Brandt's slogans of "continuity" and
"reform." Remarking that the SPD inherited from Kiesinger's CDU
a state of "Frussian character, intellectual decay, chauvinist
nationalism, and anticommunism," Zakharov cautions that "reactionary
forces" in the FRG are gaining strength much more rapidly than the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
"active democratic forces, eE ecially within the SPD. He calls
the Social Democrats' stand or, the GDR an increasingly important
indicator of whether they are in fact committed to "peace and
social progress." And he concludes that SPD pursuit of continuity
with CDU policies in the military field and in nonrecognition of
the GDR and Europe's status quo "destroys the hopes" for renewal
of the Bonn state and West German society.
In addition to its own negative reporting on the SPD congress, East
Berlin's ADN publicizes a statement by the West German Communist
Party (DKP) executive leveling a strong attack on the SPD and the
Brandt regime. ADP! quotes the DKP statement on 15 May as saying
BrLidt "again" ignored reality and made it clear "only a few days
before the Kassel meeting" that the SPD leadership and the FRG
Government "cannot be expected to make a contribution to a policy
of peace and detente" based on international recognition of the
GDP and Europe's postwar frontiers.
BONN'S "BLACKMAIL" AT WHO MEETING SEEN AS F.'D OMEN FOR KASSEL
East German media are bitter and vituperative in discussing the
FRG's role at Geneva in the World Health Organization's one-year
postponement of a vote on GDR membership. ADN charges on the
14th that Bonn employed "transparent manipulations and blackmail"
at Geneva because it feared the World Health Assembly would admit
the GDR. A GDR Foreign Ministry statement on the 15th, carried by
ADN, calls the FRG's "impudent presumption" of special prerogatives
"indeed a bad omen" for the "proposed" summit talks. It adds that
Bonn is "fatally wrong" if it believes it can apply the same
"blackmail" policy in its talks with the GDR. The FRG's "antihumani-
tarian attitude" confirms anew that the FRG "has forfeited the
right to talk about 'humanity' and 'human alleviations,'" as
suggested by Brandt at Erfurt, the statement says.
A 16 May NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on the WHO vote postponement
points out that the FRG's delaying tactics were employed just a
week before the "scheduled" Kassel meeting. The paper contras-;s
Brandt's Erfurt assurances about "exclusion of any discrimination"
with the FRG's actions at Geneva, which it says revealed "an
outburst of the greatest hostility toward the GDR, a brutal 'no'
to equality, presumption to sole representation in WHO, and an act
of scandalous discrimination in its most provocative form."
The Warsaw PAP's Bonn correspondent reports on the 18th that political
circles in Bonn "seriously" considered the possibility of the Kassel
summit being cancelled as a result of Bonn's "forcing through" the
decision to postpone the WHO vote on GDR membership. Neither East
German nor Soviet media have mentioned this possibility specifically.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 PIAZWIP&S400875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS
? 20 MAY 1970
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PROVINCIAL MEDIA STRESS NEED FOR ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE
Recent central and provincial radio reports point to a continuation of
the Chinese leadership's drive to divide the country into semi-independent
economic units with the county as the base. Numerous press reports
applaud the success of local industry in using local resources to provide
needed agricultural equipment, fertilizer, and processing plants.
SHANGHAI A Shanghai radio commentary on 8 May, however, again
PROBLEMS raises the problem of coordination of economic efforts--a
special problem for Shanghai, which depends on other areas
for food and raw materials while -,ending most of its own output to other
areas. The radio commentary includes the admonition that the "new form
of socialist cooperation" involving extensive division of labor does
not mean "splitting up the socialist economic entity into many unrelated
departmental economies." It adds that trades and professions must be
broken down, and the worker must not only think about his own factory
or bureau but must take "the entire city of Shanghai and the t?*hole
country into consideration and firmly establish the idea of coordinating
all the activities of the nation as in a chess game."
The "chess game" thesis had been advocated by former Shanghai chief Ko
Ching-shih as a means of protecting Shanghai's raw materials supply
during the Great Leap period. The radio commentary appears to amplify
previous hints that the slogan is now also being used to explain to
Shanghai residents why they must increase their efforts to support the
rest of the country. The article criticizes "some people" who say that
production capability is limited and warns against the idea that
"cooperation must be reciprocal." Cooperation, it says, means "utterly
devoting oneself" to the national good.
EXPERIMENT The economic transformation of less industrialized areas seems
IN FUKIEN to be still in the experimental stage, but Foochow broadcasts
on 7 May illustrated how it might be achieved along lines
laid down in Mao's 7 May 1966 instruction. As in the few previous examples
of relatively complete transformation of an area, the Foochow plan is based
on the idea of making everyone a producer. The people of the area that
was transformed, the largest township in Nanping municipality, were
completely reorganized by the commune revolutionary committee: farmers
were sent to the hills to develop forestry and crops, the old or disabled
were I,:; to work on subsidiary production, and "most" of the nonagricultural
population was sent out to work in production teams.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970
- 311 -
A basic feature of the new plan, according to the broadcasts, Is an
increase in the size of the basic agricultural unit, an idea that has
been tested extensively in neighboring Kiangsi with little apparent
success. Production teams "cultivating large expanses of acreage but
short of manpower" are grouped into units called "7 May villages" with
cadres, township residents, and youth brought in to meet the manpower
deficit. All those ?;L.,.se skills are needed in the countryside have
been sent to the agricultural villages and brigades, as have handicraft
workers dependent on agricultural supplies. One apparent reason why
ther,e radical measures are not being adopted more widely may be found
in the modest results of this experiment so far. Grain production in
the commune last year, even based on the possibly inflated figure
claimed by the Foochow radio, was only 10 percent higher than in the
previous year--a very ordinary increment by stated PRC standards.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030020-0