TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 6, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000341
Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~I
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
6 May 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 18)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/88WIA RDAP85T00875R000300030018-3
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the TJS Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person; is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
fulud.d f'.. aufomWlc
downpmding and
d.dauifcoIon
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
i
DRV, PRG Score U.S. "Aggression" Against Cambodia . . . . . . . . .
.
1
Hanoi Says Escalated Air Strikes May Affect Paris Talks . . . . . .
.
4
Kosygin Reads Government Statement on Cambodia, Air Strikes . . . .
.
5
PRC Calls Actions in Cambodia, Air Strike3 "Grave Step" . . . . . .
.
8
Moscow, Peking Trade Charges on Indochina Policy . . . . . . . . . .
"
10
Royal Government of National Union" of Cambodia Announced . ' , .
11
Hanoi Attention to May Day, Ho Chi Minh Birth Anniversary . . . . .
.
15
South Marks May Day, Southern Trade Union Anniversary . . . . . . .
.
15
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Statement Denounces U.S. For Reliance on Force . . . . . . .
..
18
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Polemics Concentrated in Broadcasts to the PRC . . . . . . .
.
19
MIDDLE EAST
Kosygin Acknowledges Soviet "Military Advisers" Are in uAR . . . . .
21
AUSTRIA
Moscow Cautious on Socialists, Reaffirms Opposition to EEC . . . . .
24
SPANISH CP AND CPSU
Communique on Moscow Talks Skirts Contentious Issues . .
2C
Dissident European Parties Back Spanish Communists . . . . . . . . .
2
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Contention Over Brezhnev Role Evident in Nomination Reports . . .
30
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Mao, Lin Make Usual May Day Appearances, First Since October . . . .
32
CHINESE SATELLITE
Peking Uses Proxy of Foreign Parties to Hail PRC Prowess . . . . . .
34
East European Media View Chinese Launching with Concern . . . .
.
34
Romania Asserts Independent Stance with Favorable Comment . . . . ,
,
36
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 19 70
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 APRIL - 3 MAY 1970
Moscow (3425 items)
Peking (2688 items)
Lenin Centenary
(69%)
26%
Indochina
(17%)
4C%
[Brezhnev Speech
(221% )
6%]
[Indochinese People's
(--)
34%]
May Day
(0.4%)
22%
Summit Conference
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
6%]
[Cambodia
(15%)
6%]
Indochina
(8%)
17%
Firs'c PRC Satellite
(18%)
29%
[Cambodia
(5%)
11%] May Day
(-_)
16%
[Indochinese People's
(--)
4%] Malayan CP 40th
(--)
4%
Summit Conference
Anniversary
VE Day 25th Anniversary
(1.%)
8%
Joint Editorial on
(21%)
3%
China
(5%)
8%
Lenin Centenary
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in. the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
INiOCHINA
President Nixon's 30 April TV speech in which he announced that U.S. as
well as GVN ground troops were being sent into Cambodia prompts govern-
meat statements from the communist countries, Consistent with the
fiction that Vietnamese communist forces are not operating in Cambodia,
the statements gloss over the President's explanation that the allied
aim is to discover and destroy the headquarters for the communist
military operations in South Vietnam. On 2 May the DRV issued both
a government statement denouncing the "overt aggression" against
Cambodia and a foreign ministry statement protesting the "large-sca.la"
air strikes against North Vietnam. The 6 May declarations by the LRV
and PEu Paris conference delegations postponing the session scheduled
for that day until the 14th come as a logical sequel to the foreign
ministry's warning that the bombings "will seriously affect" the talks:
Soviet concern over U.S. actions ir, dramatized by Kosygin's unprecedented
If May press conference where he read the government statement which
condemned the military intrusion into Cambodia and charged that the
air strikes against the DRV "violated the commitments undertaken in
the agreement that served as a basis for the four-sided Paris talks."
The statement was noncommittal regarding any specific Soviet action,
and Kosygin replied to a reporter's question on increased aid to the
DRV with the remark that the question "will obviously be reviewed."
The PRC Government statement one the 4th also assails both the actions
in Cambodia and the "resumed bombing" of the DRV, calling them "an
extremely grave step" to expand the war. While the statement calls
the actions "frantic provocations" against the Chinese as well as
the Indochinese peoples, it does not go beyond the pledge of "powerful
backing" and "all-out support and assistance."
Peking media on 5 May carried Sihanouk's announcement of the formation
of a Cambodian government in exile along with Chou En-lai's letter
formally recognizing the new government as the "only legal" one. TASS
reported the proclamation of the government in exile within an hour
after the Peking broadcast, but at this writing Soviet recognition
has not been mentioned. DRV recognition is announced by Hanoi media
on the 6th.
DRV. PRG SCORE U.S. "AGGRESSION" AGAINST CAMBODIA
NIXON Authoritative Hanoi reaction to the President's speech
SPEECH came on 2 May with the release of statements from the DRV
delegation at the Paris talks and a DRV Government statement
denouncing the "aggression" against Cambodia. The PRG Government
statement was not published until the 4th, but a PRG Foreign Ministry
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
statement on the 30th had responded to the preceding day's announce-
ment of the U.S.-supported GVN operation in the Parrot's Beak area
of Cambodia. The 1 May statement by the PRG delegation at Paris was
not carried by LPA until the 4th.
Neither the official statements nor routine propaganda directly
acknowledge President Nixon's explanatory remarks on tie necessity
to clear out the communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. The DRV
Government statement says merely that the President "multiplied
slanders" against the DRV; the PRG statement goes a bit further
when it observes that he "brazenly and slanderously accused the
PRG and DRV of waging aggression against Cambodia." Both the
statements as well as routine propaganda ridicule the President's
statement that the allied action in Cambodia is aimed at saving
American lives in South Vieteam.
The government statements and other propaganda refer to the
Indochinese summit meeting as evidence of Vietnamese-Lao-Khmer
solidarity, and both Hanoi and the Front pledge wholehearted
support to the "fraternal" struggles in Indochina. The D:RV state-
ment expresses the "belief" that "brothers and friends" worldwide
will strengthen their support for the three struggles, while the
PRG statement "appeals" for "increased support and aid" for the
Indochina struggle. LPA reports on It May that PRG Foreign Minister
Binh called on French Foreign Minister Schumann on the lst, when
she informed him of the recent Indochinese summit meeting and
spoke of the "extremely serious situation created by the U.S. direct
armed aggression in Cambodia." LPA also reports that she reaffirmed
the resolve of the PRG and South Vietnamese people "to stA.nd shoulder
to shoulder with the fraternal Khmer people to win back independence
and freedom."
Press and radio comment on the President's speech includes a
NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d which observes that the
decision to move into Cambodia was taken 10 days after the President
delivered his speech "boasting about the so-called sc'heme to
restore a just peace to Vietnam and Cambodia." Commentator levels
personal abuse at the President, claiming that "Nixon lied" when
he said that the U.S. ac'ion was aimed at protecting the interests
of the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians: "he is the biggest
pix,ate and the most vicious liar." Other such vitriolic comment
includes a 4 May LPA commentary which is replete with personal
epithets and a Hanoi radio commentary on the 3d which says the
President's arguments were those of a "brazen-faced brigand."
Liberation Radio says on the 3d that the President is continuing
"Johnson's decayed colonialist scheme" in persevering with the war
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
for more than a year. This commentary notes the President's reference
to a possible Republican loss at the polls in 1970 and to his own fate
in 1972; it says "Nixon recklessly used crafty arguments to
psychologically stir up" the American people when he said he would
rather be a one-term President than see the United States become a
second-class power and lose its first war in hv'.story. There is
frequent reference to U.S. domestic opposition to the President's
decision. The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d, for example.
notes that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested a meeting
to question the P;-esident--"the first such request in 51 years."
The President's remarks on aid to Cambodia are glossed over for the
most part, but VNA on the 2d does accurately quote him as saying that
the United States would agree to the shipment of "small arms and
other equipment which the Camoodinrl army needs and can use now for its
defense." A Hanoi radio commentary on 1 May observes that the President
"let it be known" that the United States and its allies "will do their
'best to provide weapons and equipment for the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak
clique." But a Liberation Radio commentary on the same day ignores
the President's remark that Cambodia could not easily utilize massive
amounts of military assistance and claims that he "supported" the
Lon Nol regime's request for "large amounts of military aid."
ARVN OPERATION Reaction to the 29 April announcement of the U.S.-
supported ARVN operation in Cambodia includes the
assertion by DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy at the 65th session of the
Paris talks on 30 April that the operation is a "new, extremely serious
escalation by the Nixon Administration." LPA's account of the session
reports that PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi "strongly condemned" the
Nixon Administration for sending U.S. and GVN troops into Cambodia to
launch a military operation on 29 April. There was no such explicit
reference in the text of Thi's prepared statement; while he may have
made such remarks in the rebuttal portion of the session, LPA and
VNA normally do not report rebuttal remarks in such detail.
Front media on the 30th released a PRG Foreign Ministry statement saying
that the operation announced on the 29th "surpasses" all previous ones
conducted by the United States and the GVN against Cambodia. There
is no comparable official DRV statement, but the action is scored in
Hanoi radio comment on the 30th, and a NHAN DAN commentary on 1 May
uses language identical to Vy's at Paris in calling the operation a
"new, extremely serious escalation."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
HAN0I SAYS ESCALATED AIR STRIKES MAY AFFECT' PARIS TALKS
AIR STRIKES Large-scale U.S. air strikes against targets in North
ON 1, 2 MAY Vietnam on 1 and 2 May are protested in the 2 May
DRV Foreign Ministry statement--the first such state-
ment at this level in more than a year. DRV protests against air
strikes have usually taken the form of statements by a foreign
ministry spokesman; the last such statement was issued on 23 April,
protesting alleged attacks on 19 April. The last foreign ministry
statement on U.S. air strikes in the North was issued on 29 January
1969; it denounced alleged B-52 raids, describing them as "the most
serious acts of war" against the DRV since the bombing halt.
The current foreign ministry statement charges that on 1 and 2 May
the United States sent more than 100 aircraft "in several groups to
launch large-scale attacks on populated areas" in Quang Binh and
Nghe An provinces. It claims that "many" civilians were killed or
wounded, "including 20 children."
The statement links the air strikes with other U.S. actions, charging
that "this is a deliberate action carried. out simultaneously with the
overt U.S. aggression against Cambodia and the extension of the war
into the whole of Indochina." It maintains that "frenzied U.S. acts
of war" have revealed the United States' losing position "in the face
of the force of militant solidarity binding the three Indochinese
peoples." In its routine conclusion that the United States will be
held responsible for all consequences of its actions, tie statement
describes the attacks as a "new act of war escalation."
IMPACT ON The foreign ministry statement goes beyond any
PARIS TALKS previous protest from the ministry or its spokesman
when it suggests that the air attacks may undermine
the Paris talks. It calls the attacks "a violation of the U.S.
commitment to stop completely the bombing of North Vietnam" and warns,
in a later passage, that they "will seriously affect the Paris
conference on Vietnam."* Prefacing this warning is the assertion
that "these U.S. war acts against the people of the DRV have further
* After the 1 November 1968 U.S. bombing halt, but before the opening
of the expanded Paris talks in January 1969, several DRV Foreign
Ministry protests over alleged U.S. attacks on the North charged that
the actions were at variance with the U.S. bombing halt declaration.
And a 26 February 1969 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement,
responding to speculation about possible U.S. retaliation for communist
action in the South, recalled the U.S. pledge to halt the bombing and
charged that "by continuing to encroach upon DRV sovereignty and
security, the Americans have violated their own commitment."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
laid bare the aggressive, extremely warlike and obdurate features
cf the Nixon Administration" and "have exposed the hypocrisy of the
deceptive talks on 'peace and goodwill' so often repeated" by the
Administration.
AIR STRIKES A 2 May VPA High Command communique* claims that two
ON 3, 4 MAY U.S. planes were downed during the attack on Quang
Binh on that date,.and a news report on the 3d claims
two more planes downed that day as well as "many" hit by ground fire.
The total of planes allegedly downed is substantially increased on
5 May; a communique from the VPA High Command charges that U.S.
planes carried out daily raids from 1 to 4 May against "populated
areas and economic sites" and claims a total of 13 planes downed
during those four days. Pinpointing the areas allegedly attacked,
it lists Quang Ninh, Le Thuy, Tuyen Hoa, and Ninh Hoa districts in
Qu.ang Binh Province and Ky Son, Dien Chau, and Nghia Dan districts
in Nghe An Province.
A news report in Hanoi's domestic service on the 5th details the
additional claims of downed planes. It says that two F-105's were
downed over Quang Binh on 4 May and that three had been brought
down over Quang Binh on the 1st. "According to an additional
report," the radio states, Nghe An and Quang Binh armed forces and
people brought down four more planes on 2 and 3 May. Hanoi now
claims that a total of 3,351 U.S. aircraft have be downed over the
North.
The Administration's announcement of an end to the stepped-up bombing
is acknowledged in a 5 May Hanoi domestic radio commentary. The
commentary says that a. Defense Department spokesman "was compelled"
to declare a halt to the air raids, but that he "maintained a warlike
tone" in saying the United States is ready to act whenever necessary
to protect pilots flying reconnaissance aircraft over the North.
"This indicated," the radio comments, "that the Americans have not yet
renounced their scheme to stage air raids against the North whenever
they deem it necessary."
KOSYGIN READS GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON CAMBODIA, AIR STRIKES
Soviet reaction to the President's announcement is highlighted by
nosygin's 4 March press conference at which he read the Soviet Government
statement condemning the intrusion into Cambodia. This is the first
government statement on Indochina since that of 2 November 1968 which
* The las-c VPA High Command communique was issued on 28 January,
hailing the alleged downing of three U.S. planes.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
welcomed the halt of the U.S. bombing of the DAN and the expansion
of the Paris talks. The statement does not refer explicitly to
Soviet aid, although it says that the President "uttered a threat
addressed to those states that would decide to come forward in
support of the victims of U.S. aggression." And in response to
a reporter's question, Kosygin says that the question of increased
aid to the DRV "will obviously be reviewed." The statement says
that the U.S. escalation of aggression "makes even more urgent
the need for uniting and strengthening the cohesion of all the
socialist, anti-imperialist, and peace-loving forces." It
concludes with the vague assertion that the Soviet Government "will
draw the appropriate conclusions for its policy" from the U.S.
course of action in Southeast Asia.,
The statement does not mention the Vietnamese communist presence,
saying only that Washington justifies its move into Cambodia as
"allegedly necessary for saving the lives of American soldiers"
who are supposedly being "threatened by somebody." In reply to a
question on the subject, Kosygin said at his press conference: "I
am not informed about precisely how many Vietnamese troops there
are in Cambodia, or if there are any there at all," But the U.S.
press says, he added, "that American troops cannot find any Vietnamese
troops in Cambodia at all."
The government statement also denounces the recent bombings of the
DRV by which it says the United States has "grossly violated the
commitments undertaken in the agreement that served as a basis for
the four-sided talks in Paris." It adds that through the "war" in
Cambodia and the bombings President Nixon has "practically cancelled
out the recision of his predecessor, President Johnson, on the
cessation of the bombing." In his press conference, Kosygin avoided
responding directly to a question on the USSR extending its good
offices i?c help achieve a political settlement in Paris: He said
merely that 'he USSR welcomed the Paris meetings and that the
United States is to blame for the lack of progress there.
The government statement is followed up by a PRAVDA editorial on the
5th which accuses the United States of using "scorched-earth tactics"
in Cambodia and denounces the "barbaric air raids" on the DRV which
contravene the U.S. undertaking on the bombing halt.
TASS STATEMENT Prior to the President's speech, Moscow had reacted
to the 29 April announcement of a U.S.-supported
South Vietnamese operation in Cambodia witn a 30 April TASS statement
which charged that the American military had committed a "new act of
aggression testifying that Washington wants to spread military actions
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
throughout the whole of the Indochinese peninsula." TASS denounced
the United States for "flagrantly flouting the 1954 Geneva agreements,
and warned of a deteriorating situation throughout Southeast Asia.
The statement expressed support for the joint declaration of the
Indochinese people's summit conference, and asserted, as did Kosygin,
? that the Soviet Union has always respected and respects the neutrality
and independence, the soveriegnty and territorial integrity of
Cambodia.
OTHER COMMENT Routine-level Moscow comment on the 29 April. announce-
ment of the GVN operation similarly denounced the
"unconcealed aggression" as leading to a "further exacerbation" of the
situation in Indochina. A radio commentary in English to North America
by Afonin on 30 April says the U.S. penetration of Cambodia ",striki.ngly
resembles" the escalation of the war in South Vietnam and Laos--with
the United States first supplying weapons, then advisers and instructors
and troops to protect them, and finally troops for combat missions.
Moscow comment on President Nixon's speech before the release of the
government statement glossed over the substance of the President's
argument and condemned the "aggression" against Cambodia. Soviet
propaganda generally cites as U.S. motivation for the action the need
to protect American troops in South Vietnam from "some kind of
threat allegedly coming from Cambodia." But Col. Aleksey Leontyev
in a broadcast to North America on 3 May, without explictly mentioning
the President, ridicules reports that "the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese troops are fighting the new regime in Cambodia." And a
Washington-datelined dispatch in PRAVDA on 1 May acknowledges that
the announcement of the 29 April operation said the aim was "striking
blows at the Viet Cong bases."
Consistent with its glcssing over of the substance of the President's
speech, Moscow does not discuss his promise to "do our best" to supply
small arms and equipment to Lon Nol's forces for defense purposes.
Earlier, Soviet propaganda criticized the United States for approving
the dispatch of a shipment of weapons via South Vietnam and for
considering Lon Nol's aid request.
Statements denouncing the U.S. "i'avasion" of Cambodia have been issued
by the Soviet peace committee and other organizations which express
"support" for the "Just struggles" in Indochina and praise the
Indochinese people's summit conference. Beginning on 4 May, there a.e
reports that mass protest meetings and rallies are being held in towns
throughout the USSR.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
PRC CALLS ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA, AIR STRIKES "GRAVE STEP"
In its reaction to President Nixon's announcement on military actions
in Cambodia, Peking has continued its effort to associate its interests
with the anti-U.S. forces in Indochina while leaving its commitments
in the conflict vague and undefined. A PRC Government statement on
4 May--the second such statement on Cambodia in a week--assails both
the actions in Cambodia and the "resiuned bombing" of the DRV as "an
extremely grave step" by the United States to expand the war in
Indochina. The statement introduces a new element in authoritative
Chinese comment on Indochinese developments by calling the U.S.
actions "frantic provocations against the Chinese people" as well as against
the Indochinese and other peoples., The statement does not,-however, assert
a stronger Chinese commitment, pledging "powerful backing" and "all-out
support and assistance" to the Indochinese peoples and urging the latter
to unite and persevere in protracted war.. It does not repeat the stronger
warning contained in the 26 March PRC Foreign Ministry statement on Laos
that the Chinese "will not sit idly by" in the face of U.S. actions there.
A 5 May PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial follows up the statement by subjecting
the President to virulent personal abuse as "an extremely ferocious
war criminal" whose speech fully revealed "U.S. imperialism's arrogant,
unreasonable, Machiavellian, and brazen features." The editorial seems
to pull back a step from the government statement in charging that the
U.S. actions in Cambodia constitute a grave provocation against the
people in Asia and the world but failing to specify China. Its offer
of Chinese support is similar to that in the statement and is in keeping
with Peking's long-standing position on Vietnam, pledging "powerful
backing" for the Indochinese countries and terming the PRC their
"reliable rear area."
Assessing the Nixon Administration's Asian polU..:.`Les in light of the
new developments, the editorial observes that the "wishful thinking"
underlying the Nixon Doctrine foresaw the use of "puppets and
accomplices" but that events in Indochina forced the President,
acting "desperately like a cornered dog," to send troops into Cambodia.
* The formula "all-out support and assistance" has not been commonly
used in Peking's pronouncements recently, though Chou En-lai used the
formula in defining the PRC's "duty and obligation" toward the
Vietnamese in a speech before a visiting NFLSV delegation on 8 October
1969 and at the 26 April banquet of the Indochinese summit conferees.
A PRC Government statement dated 7 August 1965 pledged "all-out
support and assistance" to the Vietnamese "up to and including the
sending, according to their need, of our men to fight shoulder to
shoulder with them to drive out the U.S. aggressors."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09CoA!62 A 35T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/0$6iff"YA'kDP85T0087 ~0 1970 030018-3
The ed:.Lorial also claims that the decision has stripped off the
Nixon Administration's "mask of 'peace'" and that it han no
intention to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam. The editorial does
not draw any implications for China or other parts of Asia, portraying
a situation in Indochina in which the United States will sink deeper
into "the vast ocean of people's war" and encounter "a more disastrous
defeat" at the hands of the Indochinese people.
Peking's first reaction to the President's speech came in an NCNA
dispatch dated 2 May cha'ging that the United States had initiated
"a war of aggression" against Cambodia and denouncing the President
in notably abusive terms as "an executioner whose hands are dripping
with the blood" of the Indochinese people. Assailing the President's
rationale that the action was aimed at clearing out enemy sanctuaries
in order to protect American troops in Vietnam, NCNA argued that
according to this logic the United States may next attack "another
county" under the pretext of protecting its personnel in some other
place. Neither this dispatch nor subsequent comment has mentioned
the President's statement that the U.S. actions are in no way
directed against the security interests of any nation.
Quoting the President's remark that the United States will continue
efforts to end the war at the conference table, the NCNA dispatch
claimed that the President's aim is "to force the Indochinese peoples
to sign a treaty of surrender." This is the closest Peking has come
in current comment to mentioning the Paris talks, An NCNA report on
the 2 May DRV statement denouncing U.S. air attacks in North Vietnam
did not include the reference to the Paris talks, merely quoting the
statement as saying that the raids exposed the hypocrisy of the Nixon
Administration's "deceptive talks on 'peace' and 'good will.'"
SIHANOUK Sihanouk's initial reaction to the President's speech
REACTION was contained in a press statement dated 2 May and
transmitted by NCNA on the 14th. While quoting the
President as explaining that the United States must clean out
"Viet Cong and North Vietnamese sanctuaries" in Cambodia, Sihanouk's
statement claims that the U.S. action was dictated by a need to
preserve the life of the Lon Nol regime. The statement cites--without
subscribing to--the view attributed to the Western press that
Cambodian forces fighting under the banner of the National, United
Front of Kampuchea will isolate and then recapture Phnom Penh.
In his own name Sihanouk predicts that 'the Vietnamese, Laotian,
and Cambodian peoples, "having already formed an Indochina united
front," will be able within the "next several weeks and months" to
deal "telling blows and completely defeat" the United States and its
"lackeys" ri Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane. The statement does
not me)ition China.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08I rrI ' I'RDP85TOO87SOOO8.O30018-3
6 MAY 19 70
The statement renews the plea contained in an appeal by Sihanouk
dated 30 April (carried by NCNA on the 2d), reacting to allied
military incursion.- into Cambodia prior to the President's speech,
that governments sever diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol
regime. It also mentions the Geneva agreements, charging that the
United States has "deliberately destroyed" the agreements and
pointing out that the danger to American soldiers will no longer
exist "once Nixon makes the decision" to respect the Geneva
agreements and to withdraw U.S. troops from Indochina. The state-
ment does not raise the question of a new conference on Indochina.
MOSCOW, PEKING TRADE CHARGES ON INDOCHINA POLICY
INTERNATIONAL Following Peking's 24 April explicit criticism of
CONFERENCE Soviet UN representative Yakov Malik's remarks on
a i,qw Geneva conference, Chou En-.lai makes an
oblique attack on the Soviet position. NCNA on 3 May carries a
speech Chou delivered at the 26 April banquet, at the conclusion of
the Indochinese summit, in which he charged that the United States
is trying to sabotage the Indochinese peoples' united struggle by
means of a "so-called peaceful settlement of the Indochina question
through the convocation of international conferences." In a thinly
veiled allusion to the Soviets, Chou added that "some people have
expressed in words" their support for the Cambodian people's struggle
but "facts have proved that they are tailing closely after U.S.
imperialism."
A Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the
27th had responded to Peking's 24 April criticism of Soviet "collusion"
with the United States, though without acknowledging the reference
to Malik. And a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 3 May says that NCNA
has "spread a rumor that the Soviet Union made a proposal at the
United Nations on the Cambodian issue" which was "warmly welcomed"
by U.S. imperialism. Thus, Moscow still failed to acknowledge
that the point at issue was a new international conference.
It was left to Kosygin in his 4 May press conference to break Soviet
silence on a Geneva conference.* In response to a question from a
Moscow radio correspondent, Kosygin said that "the decisive word"
rests with the Indochinese, but he went on to observe that now seems
the time not for meetings but for actions "to stop the U.S. intervention
* TASS had reported the 1 April French proposal on possible broad
negotiations on Indochina as well as the 10 April comments on the
proposal by Le Duc Th~3, DRV adviser to the Paris delegation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08IO9 .CI i, Bqq03
1q003 0018-3
6 MAY 1970
in Cambodia." Kosygin echoed other recent Moscow propaganda when he
said "we have a negative attitude"-toward Indonesia's proposal for a
"conference of U.S. allies" on Cambodia. Moscow has apparently not
acknowledged that Asian communist countries had been invited to the
conference scheduled for mid-May in Djakarta. TASS on 5 May notes
that such neutral countries as India, Burma, and Ceylon have rejected
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik's invitation.
SOCIALIST A 5 May Mandarin-language Radio Peace and Progress
"UNITED ACTION" broadcast cites the appeal in the Soviet Government
statement "for uniting and strengthening the
cohesion" of socialist and other peace-loving forces. And it goes on
to say that "more than once" the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries proposed to the Chinese leadership "the holding of tripartite
talks by the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam and summit meetings among
the socialist countries to provide support to the DRV," all of which
were turned down by the PRC. The commentary adds that the inception
of U.S. bombing in February 1965 gave rise to the proposal that "all
socialist countries issue a joint statement" condemning the United
States and supporting the DRV, but that the Chinese leadership opposed
it.
BACKGROUND: On 3 March 1965 a statement on Vietnam issued by the
19-party consultative meeting in Moscow said that "the Marxist-Leninist
parties regard it as their international duty to strive for the
unity of action of all progressive and democratic forces in order
to render resolute support to the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese
people." In February 1966 Tirana had disclosed that in January the
Polish Central Committee sent a message to the PRC regarding a bloc
meeting on the coordination of aid to the DRV and NFLSV and had
asked for bloc support of such a meeting. In March 1966 the Hamburg
DIE WELT carried excerpts of a "secret" CPSU letter which said that
the CPSU had twice proposed a tripartite summit meeting on coordination
of aid.* Moscow propaganda has on rare occasions referred to these
initiatives in general terms similar to the current commentary.
"ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION" OF CAMBODIA ANNOUNCED
Peking media reported on 5 May that at a press conference that day
Sihanouk read a proclamation announcing the formation of a new
government--the "Royal Government of National Union under the
* See the FBIS BLOC SURVEY of 2 March 1967, pages 3 to 17 for a
chronology of the Sino-Soviet polemic on support for Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T0087? O9,RQ X30018-3
CONFIDENTIAL 6 MAY 1970
leadervhip of the National United Front of Kamphchea" (FUNK).* The
proclamation says that pursuant to Sihanouk's 23 March statement, an
"extraordinary congress" was held in Peking attended by "qualified
representatives of various circles of Cambodia," and the government
was founded with Penn Nouth as prime minister. The proclamation
states that the tasks of the new government, as spelled out in the
March statement, are to unite the people in the struggle to oppose
U.S. aggression and overthrow the rule of Lon Not and Sirik Matak
and, after the winning of victory, to establish an independent,
peaceful, neutral, democratic, and prosperous Cambodia. The new
government reportedly will "absolutely, respect" all international
agreements, treaties, and pacts entered into before the 18 March
coup. The belief is also expressed that the government will
receive "militant sympathy and fraternal support" and will be
recognized as the only legal government of Cambodia.
Other Peking broadcasts list the names of the 12-member government
and the 11-member political bureau of FUNK. The new government and FUNK
political bureau include members of Sihanouk's entourage, former
ambassadors who rallied to Sihanouk, and three former National Assembly
deputies who had vanished three years ago after being accused by
Sihanouk of being Khmer Reds. (On 10 April VNA had carried a statement
by the three former deputies expressing "full support" for Sihanouk's
23 April proclamation.)
Peking media also carry the political program of FUNK which was
reportedly adopted at the congress and made public by Sihanouk at
the press conference. The aim of the program, to develop the five-
point declaration made by Sihanouk on 23 March, is to realize the
broadest national union for fighting the American imperialists;
"overthrow" the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "dictatorship"; defend the
independence, peace, neutrality, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity of the country within its present frontiers; and build
a "free and democratic regime of the people." FUNK, says the
program, "coordinates" its struggle with that of the fraternal
peoples of Vietnam and Laos on the principle that "the liberation and
defense of each c-untry are the affairs of its own people and that
the mutual suppc. t among the three peoples must be based on mutual
respect."
* A fuller NCNA report of the press conference on 6 May cites
Sihanouk as saying that the government is "not a government in exile
because it has its basis at home. We have our army at home. When-
ever we liberate a village, a county, or a city we will set up a
legitimate administration there."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FEIS TRENDS
6MAY19r0
On foreign policy the program notes FUNK's adherence to the standard
principles of national independence, peace, neutrality, nonalinement
and solidarity and friendship with all peace-loving peoples and
governments. It also affirms adherence to the five principles of
peaceful coexistence and the "spirit" of the UN Charter, adding that
it will not join any military alliance. The program repeats,
without attribution, the pledge in the joint declaration of the
summit conference that each of the three Indochinese states will
assist each of the others according to the wishes of the country
concerned. Cambodia, it says, "is ready to make concerted efforts
with Laos and Vietnam to make Indochina genuinely a zone of
independence, peace, and progress."
RECOGNITION OF The government proclamation, first carried in the
GOVERNMENT Peking domestic service at 1121 GMT, was followed
six ;i1inutes later by another domestic service
broadcast of a letter from Chou En-lai announcing that the PRC
Government "formally recognizes" the new government as the only legal
government of the people of Cambodia. The letter is addressed to
Sihanouk as head of state of Cambodia and chairman of FUNK and to
Penn Nouth as prime minister of the new government. The letter
states that the PRC formally severs all diplomatic relations with the
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "righ?L;ist renegade clique" and will withdraw
its diplomatic agencies, personnel, and specialists from Phnom Penh.
Chou notes that the new government was founded at the "critical
juncture when U.S. imperialism has blatantly invaded Cambodia" and
declares that the Cambodian people's anti-U.S. patriotic struggle
has "entered a new historic stage." He expresses confidence that the
Cambodian people and their new government, "united with the fraternal
people of Vietnam and Laos" and supported by peace-loving countries
and peoples of the world, "persevering in armed struggle and in
protracted struggle," will certainly win final victory.
DRV recognition of the new government as "the sole legitimate and legal
government of Cambodia" comes in a 6 May message from Pham Van Dong
to Penn Nouth. A congratulatory message the same day to Sihanouk
from Ton Duc Thang and Pham Van Dong invokes the "sacred provisions"
of the joint declaration of the Indochinese summit conference in
reaffirming the "promise" of the Vietnamese people, Fatherland Front,
and DRV Government "to do their best to strengthen their militant
solidarity with the fraternal Khmer until total victory." The DRV
leaders claim that the new government and the political bureau of
FUNK "faithfully" represent the will and aspirations of all social
strata and political tendencies among the Cambodian people, noting
also that FUNK has "at its disposal vigorous armed forces and possesses
vast liberated regions."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY l9'(o
Within an hour of the initial Peking domestic service announcement,
'PASS carried a brief report of the proclamation of the new government
and of the FUNK political program, specifying that the congress was
held on 3-4 May. Thus far, Moscow has made no mention of recognition.
At his It May press conference Kosygin called Sihanouk the "lawful
head of state" but acknowledged that he had been "removed." The
Soviet premier avoided a direct answer to a question as to which
Cambodian government the USSR recognizes, saying merely: "We
recognize the neutralist government of Cambodia. We recognize an
the government of Cambodia the one which pursues a policy of peace
and not a policy of war."
At this writing, other countries which have announced recognition of
the new government include Albania, Cuba, Syria, and Iraq. North
Korea's Kim Il-song sent Sihanouk a message "welcoming" the new
government as the "sole, legal government of Cambodia." Similarly,
Romania's President Ceausescu, according to the Bucharest domestic
service on 5 May, sent Sihanouk a telegram expressing "congratulations"
on the founding of the new government without specifically referring
to recognition. Radio Belgrade reported on 6 May that the Federal
Executive Council that day "took a decision on the official
recognition of the Royal Government of National Unity of Cambodia."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TBLNDS
6 MAY .1970
HANOI ATTENTION TO MAY DAY, HO CHI MINH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY
North Vietnamese media report that a meeting was held in Hanoi on the
evening of 30 April to mark 1 May labor. day. Among those attending
were Ton Due Tilting, Truona, Chinh, 11hum Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap.
(The VNA English-language account of the meeting lists Phwn Van Dong
ahead of Truong Chinh, but the usual order--placing 'T'ruong Chinh
after T'tiang--is used in Ilanoi'o Vietnamese-'language radio and VNA
transmissions.) Opening remarks were offered by Phani Van Dong and
Lhe main speech was given by Iioang Quoc Viet, president of the
Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions. Both speakers took the occasion
to call attention to the recent Indochina summit conference and to
score U.S. policy as outlined in President Nixon's 20 April speech
on the withdrawal of another 150,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam. 'bong
declared, among other things, that the conference was a "stern
answer" to the U.S. policy of Vietnamization and to "the other
imperialist countries and the reactionaries in some countries in
Asia who are trying by every means to serve the policy of intervention
and aggression of the U.S. imperialists in Indochina and Cambodia
and legalize the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak fascist raci*,t clique."
The 1 May NIfAN DAN editorial similarly scored "reactionary ruling
circles in a number of Asian countries" which are "attempting to get
together to save the U.S. and its henchmen." Noting the Vietnamese
people's dedication to strengthening their own solidarity and the
solidarity of the Indochinese peoples, the editorial adds that they
also endeavor to contribute to the "restoration and strengthening of
the solidarity and unity of mind in the socialist camp and among
fraternal parties."
Hanoi on 2 May releases slogans commemorating Ho Chi Minh's 80th
birth anniversary--on 19 May--and a 29 April party Central Committee
Secretariat instruction on the anniversary.
SOUTH MARKS MAY DAY, SOUTHERN TRADE UNION ANNIVERSARY
The two workers' anniversaries--May Day and the 27 April anniversary
of the South Vietnam Liberation Trade Union Federation--prompt a
flurry of propaganda hailing the workers' struggle. The commentaries,
praising the solidarity of the workers' movement, all claim that the
movement has developed greatly in recent months. LPA says on the 30th
that a number of GVN assembly deputie'i have been won over to the
workers' side. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 1st claims that, along
with the struggle movement, the workers "have positively participated
in the armed activities" against the allies and have "set up many
armed units" which are a "permanent threat" to the allies.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL 101318 TRENDS
6 MAX 1970
- 16 -
A May Day appeal to the Saigon people from the Saigon municipal people's
revolutionary committee, broadcast by Hanoi on the 30th, declares that
the Saigon people "have entered the moot desperate phase o their
struggle" against he allies. It calls on the people to make "all-
out efforts to defeat" Vietnamization, develop "real political and
armed forces," a!ad concentrate attacks on the Americans and the T'hieu
regime. A GIAI PHONG editorial, published in the 1 May commemorative
issue and broadcast that day by the Front, claims that a "united
action front" against the allies 1 being formed, gathering students,
workers, and sick and disabled vete:oans in their struggle against the
"repressive measures" of the GVN.
Scattered military action throughout the South continues to be reported
along with reviews of the upsurge in fighting in early April. Hanoi,
in a broadcast on the 3d, alleges that an allied operation "Tat Thang"
(Certainly Victorious) was defeated in the northern Kontum area from
1 to 26 April, with 2,467 allies annihilated, including 35 U.S.
advisors. At Dak Seang alone more than 230 were annihilated, accord-
ing to the broadcast.
DAK SEANG POWS Liberation Radio on the lot and 2d asserts that the
allies violated a ceasefire which had been demanded
in a 28 April offer from the Dak Seang PLAF command to release, on the
29th, wounded allied prisoners captured in the Dak Seang area.* The
radio charges that allied troops and aircraft were dispatched to attack
the release area. The PLAF on the 28th had called for a ceasefire
during the release and stipulated that the prisoners be picked up by
unarmed helicopters.
APRIL FIGHTING LPA reviews April "victories" on the 2d, maintaining
that the "April drive of attacks" inflicted heavy
allied losses and that ARVN divisions, "chiefly those who are 'bearing
the brunt of the war'" in test areas for Vietnamization, sustained
heavy losses. In the delta, according to LPA, the population in
allied-controlled areas rose up to destroy strategic hamlets and
pacification teams.
On 5 May LPA carries a comprehensive report on alleged allied casualties
in the first 20 days of April, claiming that 50,000 allied troops were
killed, wounded, or captured, including nearly 20,000 GIs. More than
* The 28 April offer to release the prisoners was discussed in the
29 April TRENDS, pages 16 and 17.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
12,000 military vehicles and over 500 aircraft were reported destroyed.
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, in an editorial on the 5th, cites these same figures
and says these feats caused a "serious setback" to Vietnamization.
The editorial adds that attacks were aimed at U.S. troops--a "prop"
of Vietnamization?--and that the peopJa struck hard at ARVN forces--
"an essential means" for the Americans to carry out Vietnamization.
It maintains that the "process of offensives and uprisings" has been
accelerated and that greater "victories" were won in April than in any
other month so far in 1970.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
U. S, -- SOVIET RELATIONS
SOVIET STATEMENT DENOUNCES U.S. FOR RELIANCE ON FORCE
The Soviet Government statement read by Kosygin at his televised news
conference in Moscow on 4 May constitutes, overall, the USSR's
strongest official attack to date on the Nixon Administration's
policies. Particularly striking is the observation that "it is
obvious that the U.S. Administration is following an aggressive
course in its policy, proceeding from the assumption that a mighty
power cannot act in international affairs in any other way but by
the use of force."
The statement stops short of declaring flatly that the incursion
of U.S. troops into Cambodia will have an adverse effect on U.S.-
Soviet relations, a formulation which Kosygin and other Soviet
spokesmen have used in speeches in the past in regard to the U.S.
"aggression" in Vietnam. But the statement says that the actions
in Cambodia "may further complicate the overall international
situation," and it asks rhetorically how one is to understand the
President's repeated statements on moving from an era of confrontation
to one of negotiation. It goes on to question whether it is
possible to talk seriously about the President's desire for fruitful
talks to solve urgent international problems at a time when
Washington is "crudely trampling on" the 1954 and 1962 Geneva
accords and is "undertaking more and more new actions that
undermine the mainstays of international security."
In what may be interpreted as a reference to the strategic arms
limitation talks in Vienna, the statement further questions the
value of an international agreement to which the United Statpa
subscribes "or to which it is prepared to subscribe if it
unceren:,)niously violates the obligations it assumes."
In response to a question from a correspondent of the Bulgarian
RABOTNICHESKO DELO regarding the reported observation by a White
House spokesman that the USSR "must weigh the entire complex of
mutual relations"--including the Vienna talks--in reacting to the
U.S. "tactical invasion" of Cambodia, Kosygin said that the President
is ."in fact attempting to threaten us to some extent." It would have
been better, Kosygin added, if the President had "weighed his actions"
before moving into Cambodia. Responding to a question from a West
German correspondent on the possibility of the Vienna talks breaking
up as a result of the actions in Cambodia, Kosygin reaffirmed that
the Soviet delegation went to Vienna to hold "serious talks." He
stated that the talks must take place in an atmosphere of trust, but
"at a time when agreements are broken, when there is such an informal
attitude vis-a-vis all sorts of international laws, of course this
arouses watchfulness on our part, and one must say that these actions
by the United States do nct strengthen mutual trust."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
SING-SOVIET RELATIONS
In the aftermath of the polemical evchanges at the time of the Lenin
centenary celebrations, both sidc:_ signalled their intent to keep
the Sino-Soviet talks alive and, by implication, to keep tensions along
the border under control. At his press conference on 4 May Premier
Kosygin, in reply to an Italian correspondent who asked when the talks
would be resumed, denied that the talks had been broken off and remarked
? that the question had not arisen from either side. Earlier, NCNA's
report on May Day celebrations in Peking attended by Mao singled out
the presence of the deputy chief of the Soviet delegation at the talks.
There had been no announcement on Sovie'. chief negotiator Kuznetsov's
return to Moscow, in contrast to the time of his return last December
when Peking issued an announcement designed to put pressure on the
Soviets to have Kuznetsov resume participation in the negotiations.
Peking's May Day celebrations included only passing polemical jabs at
the Soviets. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, drawing inspiration from the
launching of the PRC's first earth satellite, aimed a characteristic
barb at "Brezhnev and company" for having predicted that China would
find the going impossible unless it joined Moscow's socialist community--
"that is, unless it became a dependeti^v cf bocial imperialism."
SOVIET POLEMICS CONCENTRATED IN BROADCASTS TO THE PRC
While Soviet broadcasts to China sustain their virulent attacks on
Mao and his policies and vigorously prei3s Moscow's ideological views,
more authoritative comment has played down the China question and
avoided the border dispute. Kosygin's 4 May remarks on the Peking
talks, observing that the Soviets are approaching the matter
"constructively" and are discussing "a whole number of questions"
with the Chinese, failed to criticize the Chinese attitude and
struck a note of moderation reminiscent of Soviet comments soon
after the talks opened last October, There has been no renewal of
charges made by Brezhnev and Kirilenko on 14 April that Peking's
anti-Soviet campaign impairs the talks.
Brezhnev's brief May Day speech did not mention China. Sino-Soviet
tensions were aired, however, by Khabarovsk party chief Shitikov in
his May Day speech carried by the Khabarovsk radio. Reflecting
that border region's special concern with events in China, he
denounced the anti-Soviet campaign and war hysteria in China as the
product of the "great-power chauvinistic policy of the Mao Tse-tung
clique."*
* in another development involving officials in the Soviet border regions,
the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, V.F. Tolubko, was one
of three officers to be promoted to army general, according to RED STAR on
1 May.
Approved For Release 2000/08/0960c f5T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAX 1970
The border issue is raised in an article on China in LIFE ABROAD No. 18
(1 May) by German communist Otto Braun. Entitled "Shots on the Ussuri
and the Maoists," the article was excerpted from his memoirs and was
published earlier in a GDR weekly. Braun depicts Mao as a cunning,
power-hungry individual who liquidates party members opposed to his
policies, vacillates between the United States and the Soviet Union,
and, as confirmed by the CCP's ninth congress, has "finally and
irrevocably departed from Marxism-Leninism."
Soviet broadcasts beamed co China, accounting for the bulk of current
Soviet comment on the PRC, follow standard themes in seeking to exploit
discontent among such groups as the Chinese youth, national minorities,
intellectuals, and the PLA. Although the recently resumed attacks on
Mao by name are carried by both Radio Moscow and the purportedly
unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, commentaries containing malicious
personal abuse directed at Mao and his entourage are broadcast only by
Radio Peace and Progress. Pointed efforts to arouse anti-Peking
sentiment among the non-Han peoples are illustrated by Mongolian
broadcasts over Radio Peace and Progress seeking to promote resentment
against Maoist policies and anti-Soviet activities in Inner Mongolia
and charging that Mao v ants to annex the MPR.,
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
MIDDLE EAST
KOSYGIN ACKNOWLEDGES SOVIET "MILITARY ADVISERS" ARE IN UAR
Responding to a correspondent's request that he confirm or deny the
Israeli Government's 29 AT_il charge that Soviet pilots are taking
part in operational missions in Egypt, Kosygin acknowledged at his
4 May press conference that under an agreement with the UAR Government
? "our military advisers are attached to the UAR troops." He explained
that the object is to "combat Israeli aggression," which is occurring
"only because of the great assistance of the United States." As for
the advisers' responsibilities and assignments, he said only that
"the respective fuulctions of our military advisers are being
coordinated with the UAR Government." Moscow thus far apparently
has not seen fit to give Kosygin's statement any further publicity;
rather, it is countering with revived charges that citizens of the
United States and other Western countries are serving in the Israeli
forces,
Prior to Kosygin's remark, the meager Soviet propaganda response to
Israel's charge concerning Soviet pilots hr..d dealt with it--as Cairo
did--in roundabout fashion, ignoring the substance. TASS on 30 April
reported the UAR official spokesman as "speaking about the anti-Arab
and anti-Soviet campaign fanned up" in Israel. Belyayev in the 1 May
PRAVDA rioted the "unprecedented political furore" in Israel but brushed
over the nature of the charges in elain.ing that "the deliberately false
allegations about the Soviet Union" are "unfounded." He insisted that
the Soviet Union "firmly and consistently" supports a peaceful
settlement, with Israeli withdrawal as the "cornerstone" of such a
solution. Noting that Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban "threatened
that Egyptian resistance to the aggressor's provocations" must lead
to fulfillment by the United States of its undertaking to insure
Israel's security, Belyayev said "observers" interpreted this as a
signal of Israel's desire to secure new Phantoms and Skyhawks. He
referred to the British GUARDIAN's comment that Israel was exerting
pressure not only for more jet planes but also "to get wider American
participation in the operations against the Arabs," and he noted news
agency reports that the Egyptian forces "recently increased their
resistance" to the Israeli "provocations "
In PRAVDA on 4 May, Mayevskiy also sidestepped the issue of Soviet
pilots in remarking on Israel's "new anti-Soviet and anti-Egyptian
provocations." He cited the Cairo AL-AHRAM as saying that Israel
tries to "present the matter in such a way as if 'the technical and
strategic successes achieved by the Egyptian air force and ground
troops are not Egypt?'s-own;aotions.'" Such statements are calculated
to get additional U.S. military assistance, he said, claiming that
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
Tel Aviv relies in vain on military pressure on the Arabs, whose
armed forces "accumulate experience and deal ever stronger. blows at
the Israeli occulauion forces." Washington seems to have expected
new complaints from Tel Aviv and "expressed 'a serious concern,"'
Mayevskiy added. He remarked that it was hardly possible to rule
out further U.S. steps in support of Israeli policy, thus creating
an impetus for further prolonging the Middle East conflict,
BACKGROUND Moscow indicated the presence of "Soviet experts" in
the UAR on at least one occasion in the past, in an
Arabic-language broadcast on 9 November 1969 dealing with Nasir's
6 November speech to the UAR National Assembly. The broadcast
said Nasir "once again mentioned that the Soviet Union is the
Arabs' friend and is giving them the necessary weapons; Soviet
experts are giving their knowledge on the use of these weapons."
When Nasir discussed his request for "the deployment of Soviet
experts with the armed forces" in some detail in a 27 March speech
last year, TASS in reporting this speech merely noted that he
"pointed to the great role the Soviet Union played in strengthening
the UAR's defense potential."
There are few other available propaganda suggestions of a Soviet
role encompassing more than arms deliveries. A Moscow Arabic-
language broadcast last October said "it is known" that the Soviet
Union aids the Arabs militarily not only by supplying arms "but
also by providing extensive fighting experience." And the Moscow
domestic service on 10 January this year referred to a RED STAR
article by an air force officer who said the USSR was assisting the
Vietnamese and Arab struggles with Soviet "experience and weapons. "
In the past few months Soviet propaganda has adhered to the standard
line that the USSR will continue supplying the "necessary aid" to
enable the Arabs to "increase their defense strength." The 16 February
TASS statement declared that "as long as" Israel "tramples underfoot"
the UN decision, the Soviet Union will "render the necessary support"
to the Arab states in "strengthening their ability to uphold their
security "
"VOLUNTEERS" IN The charge that the United States is "allowing"
ISRAELI FORCES American citizens to fight in the Israeli army
was resurfaced by Soltan in a 30 April foreign-
language commentary built on the theme that Washington will be
reconsidering its decision on further deliveries of planes to
Israel. The charge of U.S. citizens' participation in the Israeli
forces has appeared sporadically in the propaganda since the initial
exploitation of the issue last fall. A Tsoppi commentary in January,
for example, claimed that South African pilots, "together with American
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/Opo A~85TO0875RQ0030000330018-3
IMIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
-23-
fliers, are bombing Arab cities and villages," and Glukhov asserted
in the 29 March PRAVDA that "American citizens have been authorized
to serve in the Israeli army."
TASS on 25 April picked up a Cairo AL-AHRAM report that the UAR
Government had "authentic information" on British servicemen in
the Israeli armed forces. And on 3 May TASS cited the Cairo
weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF as saying that as many as 3,500 foreigners
from 12 countries, including the United States, Britain, South
Africa, Canada, and Australia, serve with the Israeli forces.
Commenting on the ROSE AL-YUSUF report,a Moscow domestic service
commentary asserts on 5 May that Washington, London, and Bonn are
"carefully concealing their military cadre assistance to Israel";
Western officials, it says, deny that there are any American and
British citizens or other foreign subjects in the Israeli army,
claiming that there are only people who came from Western countries
and took Israeli citizenship. This, the broadcast flatly says, "is
a lie; nearly 15,000 regular officers, who are called volunteers,
are serving in the Israeli army" and have no thought of renouncing
their "American or, say, West German citizenship." The "volunteers
serve," the broadcast adds, in the Israeli air force, navy, and
armored troops and "pabticipate in military operations." The
commentary says it is clear that any Western government has only to
raise its finger to end the recruiting of its citizens for the Israeli
army, but "the whole point is precisely that many Western countries
help Israel in every possible way."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
- 24 -
AUSTRIA
6 MAY 1970
MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON SOCIALISTS, REAFFI,MS OPPOSITION TO EEC
Initial Moscow comment on Austria's first minority government, farmed
by the Socialist Party on 20 April, reflects traditional Soviet
antipathy toward Austrian efforts to associate with the Common
Market and concern that Austria's "permanent neutrality" be preserved.
Moscow's treatment of the Socialists now, as the new ruling party,
is markedly more reserved than in April 1966, when Soviet media
openly blamed the Socialists' "anticommunism" and their "slanderous,
fabricated" anti-Soviet slogans for 'their election losses and the
installation of an exclusively People's Party government. The tone
of Soviet propaganda noticeably softened in broadcasts to Austria
following the failure of efforts to form another grand coalition
between the Socialists and the People's Party, By contrast, East
German comment registers strong skepticism and suspicion that the
two dominant parties may yet establish a coalition aimed at "decFivirg"
Austrian voters,
MOSCOW ON EEC A Zakharov commentary broadcast to Austrian listeners
AND NEUTRALITY on 29 April typifies Moscow comment on the new
Socialist government. Discussing at length the
important role played by neutral countries in promoting European
security and cooperation, Zakharov concludes that a "positive" Austrian
role in this endeavor would yield "the most positive results" for
Austria's own prosperity and security. Optimism would be unjustified,
he warns, if the new government "were to stake its hopes on participation
in the so-called 'little European integration."'
Zakharov points out that the EEC's ultimate aim is political union and
repeats the standard Soviet warning that participation in such "economic
and political integration" would be "absolutely incompatible" with
Austria's neutral status. He does not, however, raise the usual
specter of "West German monopoly interests" controlling the EEC and
seeking to infiltrate further into the Austrian economy. The
commentary lays stress on various negative aspects of an EEC
association status for Austria, concluding that Austria would be
"merely the seventh wheel of this no longer up-to-date vehicle" at
the price of granting the EEC's biggest monopolies a "privileged
position" in Austrian markets.
An earlier Zakharov commentary for Austrian listeners, on the 24th,
argued along similar lines and also stressed the value of trade with
non-EEC countries, claiming that Austria's economy "derives incomparably
more advantages" from trade with the East, the EFTA countries, nonmembers
of the EEC, and non-European countries, An Austrian association with the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
- 25 -
EEC "could never even come near making good the losses" Austria
might suffer in these other markets, the commentator declared.
Soviet press comment in mid-April, prior to the breakdown of
Socialist and People's Party coalition negotiations, used the
25th anniversary of Vienna's liberation from "German fascist
invaders" for strong reminders about the importance of Austrian
neutrality and repeatedly mentioned "large-scale infiltration" of
West German capital, accompanied by an "ideological offensive" and
the financing of rightwing parties. An IZVESTIYA article on 12 April
blatantly called it "a strange position, to say the least," when "some
people in Austria" try to "define the country's neutrality L. their
own way" and even "declare that the alpine republic itself will
determine the extent of its obligations under the state treaty." The
article included a reminder that the four major powers "guarantee"
Austria's neutrality and an admonition that "only strict observation"
of the state treaty and neutrality can protect the country against "any
unpleasant events" and insure independent development.
SKEPTICAL COMMENT Although recent East German propaganda on the
FROM EAST GERMANY GDR's own activities aimed at promoting relations
with Austria suggests a moderate approach, a
22 April East Berlin radio comment by Wolker expressed fundamental
skepticism about the trend in Austria's policies even after announcement
of the Socialist minority government. Wolker noted that despite the
abortive negotiations with the People's Party, the Socialist leadership
"does not at all reject a coalition with this bourgeois party" and
that the talk continues about renewing coalition negotiations this
summer.
Wolker concluded that behind these "statements, assurances, and
political maneuvers" are indications that the two parties have agreed
to set up "a new model of governing" that is really very old and has
proved "excellently suited for the deception of the voters." He pointed
to the examples of the United States and Britain where, he said, the
two parties exchange roles as political conditions change. Conceding
that the Socialist party "could" bring about announced social reforms,
Wolker concluded that the Austrian Socialists mast still prove their
determination to do so.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL
- 26 -
SPANISH CP AND CPSU
COMMUNIQUE ON MOSCOW TALKS SKIRTS CONTENTIOUS ISSUES
FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
Controversial icsues separating the Spanish Communist Party and the
CPSU are evaded in a communique released by Soviet media on 2 May,
after a high-level meeting in Moscow on 29 April. In addition to
generally -:.gnf)ring controversial subjects, the communique contains
several indications that the Spanish party has been prevailed upon to
soften its anti-Soviet stance? A less than fully harmonious encounter
is suggested, however, by the communique's description of the atmosphere
as one of "frankness, mutual respect, and comradeship."
The Spanish CP has antagonized Moscow by its continuing outspoken
opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its advocacy of a
uniquely Spanish model of socialism. On the other hand, Spanish
communists have evinced dismay over signs that Moscow and its East
European allies are moving toward a rapprochement with the Franco regime,
as well as cver indications that Moscow is supporting the splitting
activities of two pro-Soviet dissidents, Eduardo Garcia and Agustin Gomez,
who were dropped from party leadership positions last July and expelled
from the party in December.*
The importance cow assigns! to patching up relations with dissident
West European parties was underscored by the prominence of the Soviet
representation, which included CPSU secretaries and Politburo members
Suslov and Kirilenko and party secretary Ponomarev. Party Chairman
Dolores Ibarruri and Secretary General Santiago Carillo led the Spanish
CP delegation.
While staying away from the sore point of Czechoslovakia, the communique
proclaims general Spanish CP "support for the peaceloving foreign policy
of the USSR." It says "both delegations stress the great importance of
the results of the international conference of communist and workers
parties in 1969," and it uses the ambiguous formulation that inter-
national communist unity must be assured by "respect for the independence
of communist and workers parties in the irreconcilable struggle against
imperialist ideology and any manifestations of opportunism." The Spanish
party signed the main document on the 1969 international party conference,
but only after Carrillo expressed his party's "serious reservations" about
it in his speech to the conclave.
* For a discussion of Spanish CP reaction to Western press reports of a
Moscow airport meeting between the Spanish Foreign Minister and Soviet
Foreign Ministry officials last December, and of an intimation by the
Spanish CP organization in the USSR that Moscow was collaborating in the
divisionist efforts of the two dissidents, see the FBIS TRENDS of
14 January 1970, pages 24-25, and of 21 Jar;Liary 1970, page 25.
Approved For Release 2000/08R W~ -k P85TOO875ROOO3OOO3OO18-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
-27-
The communique makes no reference to the issue of the socialist states'
dealings with Franco--anathema to the Spanish party--but refers vaguely
to the necessity for intensifying "the joint struggle of both parties . . .
against the hotbeds of fascism in Spain, Portugal, and Greece" and
expresses CPSU solidarity with the Spanish CP's efforts to unify the
"progressive and democratic forces of Spain with the aim of establishing
a democratic system in the country."
A Spanish CP Executive Committee statement last January had evinced
concern over reports of the Spanish Foreign Minister's Moscow meeting
and called upon Poland to refuse -to sell coal to the Franco regime that
would be used to offset a shortage stemming from a strike of Asturian
miners. Since then the Spanish party has frequently admonished socialist
states to refrain from dealings with Franco. Thus, an Executive Committee
May Day statement carried by the party's clandestine Radio Espana
Independiente on 30 April appealed "to the comrades of the socialist
countries not to take any political steps which might be interpreted
as a rapprochement with or recognition of the Franco regime." The
Spanish CP's agitation had little effect. The Poles apparently ignored
its call last January for a Polish disclaimer on the proposed coal
shipment to Spain. At the French CP Congress in February French party
dissident Roger Garaudy attacked the Poles--without directly naming
them--for assisting Franco's strike-breaking activities by shipping the
coal. And on 27 April Spain's EFE agency reported that the Polish
deputy minister of commerce had arrived in Madrid "to sign commercial,
economic, navigation, and industrial cooperation treaties."
PRO-SOVIET Articles in the Si.anish party organ MUNDO OBRERO by
DISSIDENTS Carrillo and Ibarruri, broadcast by Radio Espana
Independiente, have registered the party's continuing
concern over the splitting activities of ousted pro-Soviet dissidents
Garcia and Gomez. In an article broadcast on 29 March, Carrillo
indicated that the schismatics were calling for the party to hold "a
democratic congress." Undoubtedly aware that the dissidents hoped to
use such a congress to oust the present party leadership, Carrillo
argued that a democratic congress was "impossible" while the party
continued to operate under clandestine conditions,
Alleging that the "splitting work" of the pair had exposed the party
to "police repression," Carrillo cited an instance in which Madrid
communist students learned that police patrolling the university were
instructed "that a leaflet by Eduardo Garcia and Agustin Gomez was
to be distributed at the university grounds and that they should
not prevent its distribution." Although Carrillo stated that, the
police had prepared the leaflet themselves and that the two dissidents
"had nothing to do with this," he concluded with the admonition that
"all splitting activities are used by the police as provocations against
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
.
6 MAY 1970
the party." He denied that the party's failure tu ,.blicize the
platform of the oplitters signified a reversal of its committment
to open political discussion, declaring:
We did not publish their platform because it was not
really a theoretical political exposition; it was a
list of insults and slanders against the Central
Committee. Moreover, the splitters, having an excess
of funds, had already published it,
Carrillo's reference to the dissidents' abundant funds could be read
as an oblique allusion to Soviet material support.
Ib arruri's article, broadcast on 7 April, did not directly refer to
the dissidents, but it was clear that she had them and their
supporters in mind when she referred to views in the party "which
are foreign to democratic centralism and tend to introduce in our
ranks the idea that the party leadership should accept the opinion of
a group or of a basic organization even if it is wrong or contrary to
party norms," She promised that such tendencies would be "liquidated,"
since "they entail conceptions foreign to the organic and political
structure of the party, based on democratic centralism."
DISSIDENT EUROPEAN PARTIES BACK SPANISH COMUNISTS
European parties which approve of the Spanish CP's opposition to the
invasion of Czechoslovakia and share its espousal of pluralistic roads
to socialism have demonstrated their support. Thus, in marking the
50th anniversary of the founding of the Spanish party on 15 April,
the Romanian party sent a particularly cordial greetings message which
commended the Spanish communists for efforts "to overcome the current
difficulties" in the international communist movement and to develop
interparty relations on the basis "of equality and noninterference in
the internal affairs of other parties."* A SCINTEIA article on the
anniversary lauded the Spanish communists for backing a unity "based
on the complete independence of parties to work out their political
line and on the application of the general principles of Marxism-
Leninism to concrete conditions in every country." SCINTEIA approvingly
quoted MUNDO OBRERO as affirming that while each party must obey the
principle of democratic centralism internally, "in the international
movement it is impossible to proceed from this principle."
* The CPSU greetings message included the admonition that "the struggle
against any manifestations of opportunism and revisionism" is the
guarantee of "success for the entire communist movement and each of its
detachments."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONPIDEN'I'IAL F13IS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
Yugoslav approval for the Spunioh CP's independent line was
manifested in laudatory treIALrnent of the party In a 31 March
BORBA supplement on the West European parties. An article on
the Spanish CP by Badivoj Nikolic noted that It "argues the
conception of political pluralism on the road toward socialism,
particularly in the developed countries, as distinguished from
revolutions which have developed in different situations." Nikolic
stressed the Spanish party's insistence on "the right of the
international communist movement to submit its opinion on the problems
arising in the socialist countries" and took note of its contention
that communists in capitalist states have a legitimate interest in
"democratization and the supersedure of bureaucratic methods" in
socialist countries.
Affinity between the Spanish and the Italian CP's was underscored in
a communique issued last January after talks between the two parties.
"In accordance with the decisions taken by the two parties on the
events in Czechoslovakia," the communique stated, both parties
"reaffirmed that the independence and equality between the socialist
states, as well as respect for the autonomy and unity of the communist
parties and nonintervention in their internal affairs" must provide
the foundation for "the real unity of the communist movement."
ISSUE OF "SPANISH" Carrillo's MUNDO OBRERO article condemning the
ROAD O SOCIALISM ousted pro-Soviet dissidents affirmed the
party's commitment to pursuit of its own road
to socialism, promising that "socialism will take a special form in
Spain and will have its own peculiarities which are deeply democratic."
At the same time, he made it clear that Spanish socialism will have
little in common with that practiced in Eastern Europe and, implicitly,
in the USSR:
We know that the Spanish working class cannot wait in Madrid
for the arrival of the socielist countries' tanks in order to
take over power. These tanks will not arrive. And so much
the better, for socialism will be more socialist and will know
how to defend itself better if it is the people . . . who with
their own intelligence and their own efforts and sacrifices
achieve victory for socialism, and if this victory is won in a
democratic process . . . .
The Spanish CP has reacted to recent efforts by Moscow media to
denigrate those who favor the notion of "many roads to socialism."
An article in the 5 April MUNDO OBRERO noted that in connection
with the invasion of Czechoslovakia "a trend" has appeared "to
negate the diversity of forms and models which socialism needs if it
is to be victorious under the many different conditions of today--a
diversity bound to become even greater when socialism triumphs in
developed capitalist countries." The article concluded with a thinly
veiled admonition to the CPSU: "To deny the diversity of the communist
movement means to deepen its divisions.'
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 C ADkb$'5T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONTENTION OVER BREZHNEV ROLE EVIDENT IN NOMINATION REPORTS
Press treatment of the nominations of Soviet leaders for Supreme
Soviet candidacies in late April reflects Brezhnev's enhanced
status in the hierarchy as well as contention over his favorer?,
position. TABS accounts of local nomination meetings published
in PRAVDA and in most other central papers on 25 and 26 April
set Brezhnev above his colleagues by reporting flattering
characterizations of him, only faint praise of Kosygin and
Podgornyy, and nothing about the other leaders. By contrast, in its own,
more balanced report, IZVESTIYA on 25 April characterized Kosygin,
Podgornyy, Suslov, and Kirilenko along with Brezhnev as important
leaders.
T,.SS' initial favored treatment of Brezhnev may have generated
objections. On 30 April TASS presented a more balanced account which
included flattering characterizations of Kosygin and Podgornyy and
somewhat diluted praise for Brezhnev, whose achievements were
associated with the Politburo and Central Committee rather than being
treated as personal accomplishments.
During the 1966 Supreme Soviet electoral campaign PRAVDA had avoided
reporting praise for any individual Politburo member--a reticence in
contrast to PRAVDA's current reports of tributeo to Brezhnev by
the local figures nominating him: "All the Soviet people well
know L.I. Brezhnev as a true Leninist. In his post of General
Secretary of the Central Committee he has shown himself an outstanding
political figure"; Brezhnev is a "brilliant example of serving the
cause of Lenin and the CPSU" (PRAVDA, 25 April); and "all his life
and activity is an example of selfless service to the working class
and the workers of the country" (PRAVDA, 26 April). The only other
top leaders praised in the initial TASS accounts were Kosygin (he
"has trod a long and glorious path") and Podgornyy (his "enormous
work in the responsible post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Presidium").
FIRST ACCOUNT Reporting a tribute to Brezhnev as "the Leninist type
IN IZVESTIYA of leader, a firm Marxist-Leninist who gives all his
strength, energy, and talent as an organizer to the
cause of building a communist society in our country," the 25 April
IZVESTIYA also cited a characterization of Kosygin as "a true Leninist,
an important political and state figure"; of Podgornyy as "a prominent
figure of the Leninist Communist Party and Soviet state"; of Suslov
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
as "a prominent party and state figure," and of Kirilenko as one who
"firmly and unwaveringly implements Leninist policy." In accounts
published on 24 and 26 April 1966, IZVESTIYA had also presented a
carefilly gradated picture: Brezhnev was "a true son of the Communist
Party, an important international political figure and fighter for peace
? in the whole world"; Kosygin was "a true Leninist, an important
organizer and political figure who gives all his strength, experience,
and knowledge to the building of a communist society"; and Podgornyy
was "an important figure of our party and state."
IZVESTIYA's account this year confonnad to 'the more complete reports
in the local Moscow city organ MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. All the statements
of praise reported in the central press were taken from nomination
meetings in Moscow city.
30 APRIL The TASS account of-the electoral campaign published in
ACCOUNTS PRAVDA on 30 April, in a marked change from the initial
ones, contained a flattering characterization of Kosygin
as "a prominent party and state figure, a skilled organizer who gives
all his strength to the service of the motherland," and of Podgornyy
as "an important party and state figure, a skilled, energetic leader."
But Suslov continued to be slighted: rather than quoting the
nominating speaker's comments about Suslov, this TASS report noted
only that the speaker had "told of the life and public activity of
M.A. Suslov . . . . "
At the same time, praise of Brezhnev seemed slightly toned down in
later accounts through the device of associating his accomplishments
with the collective instead of singling him out personally. Thus
MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, which published numerous statements of praise
for Brezhnev on 25 and 26 April, carried only one such statement
on the 30th. Moreover, while MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA's account of the
local campaign on 25 April reported a statement that Brezhnev's
"achievements in creating the material-technical base of communism
and in defending and rallying the ranks of the international communist
movement are great," a 30 April TASS account in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
attributed these achievements to the institutions of power as well:
"During recent years the CPSU has done significant work in raising
the leading role of the party, resolving economic tasks, and widely
developing socialist democracy in our country," and "this is
primarily the achievement of the CPSU Central Committee, the
Politburo, and Comrade L.I. Brezhnev." This statement--still a
considerable boost for Brezhnev--was also carried in PRAVDA,
IZVESTIYA, and other papers on 30 April.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
PRC Ii4TERNAL AFFAIRS
MAO, LIN MAKE USUAL MAY DAY APPEARANCES, FIRST SINCE OCTOBER
Pekit.g reports of May Day festivities highlight the PRC's utilization
of Mao's thought 'to launch China's first artificial satellite. Mao
and Lin Piao, making their first public appearances since October at
a mass Peking rally reported by NCNA on 2 May, listened with the crowd
to the strain of "The Last Is Red" :..s the satellite passed over.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, released by NCNA on 30 April, also
marked the holiday with self-congratulatory paeans to the PRC's
achievement. In 1969 there was no editorial comment for May Day,
but a joint editorial on 4 May marked the 50th anniversary of the
May Fourth Movement. In 1968 a joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial was issued on 1 May.
NCNA's account of the rally reported Mao, "in excellent health and
high spirits," speaking animatedly to those on the rostrum and
waving to the cheering masses. Lin mounted the rostrum with Mao but
was not described as talking or waving jointly with Mao as he was
in NCNA's account of last year's celebrations; last year both Mao
and Lin reportedly "waved" at the crowd and stopped "again and again"
to talk to guests. This year's rally report referred only to Mao's
chatting with those on the platform and waving to the crowd, though
a 1 May NCNA dispatch described in detail Lin's actions along with
Mao's at the reception of Sihanouk on the rostrum.
There were fewer Politburo members at this year's celebrations in
Peking than in 1969: only 16 of the 25 full or alternate Politburo
members--including Mao and Lin--were reported present, compared with
24 last year. The NCNA report explained that the list included
only those Politburo members "now in Peking." Four of those
absent--Hsu Shih-yu, Chen Hsi-lien, Chang Chun-chiao, and Li Hsueh-feng,
all chairmen of provincial or municipal revolutionary committees--
may yet appear in provincial accounts of local rallies; the chairmen
of the Hupeh and Kwangsi revolutionary committees and the chairman
of the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee have already been
reported at such rallies.
Hsieh Fu-chih's absence is the most difficult to explain, since three
low-level members of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee,
of which he is chairman, appeared at the Peking rally and were
mentioned in the NCNA report. The three apparently inactive
Politburo members, Chu Te, Tung Pi-wu, and Liu Po-cheng, as well as
a vice chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, Yeh Chien-ying,
also failed to appear at the Peking rally; none has appeared in public
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL F}3IS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
since October. Former Politburo members Chen Yi, Hsu Hsiang-chen,
and Nieh Jung-chen, listed immediately after the Politburo members
as vice chairmen of the Military Commission of the Central Committee
last May Day and again in October, were not mentioned this year.
Listed immediately after the Politburo this year were several vice
chairmen of the National People's Congress (NPC) and of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, lending credence to
reports that formal government restructuring may soon culminate in
an NPC session. Except at government functions, these vice chairmen
are usually listed after the Central Committee members.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
-34-
CHINESE SAT EL LITE
PEKING USES PROXY OF FOREIGN PARTIES TO HAIL PRC PROWESS
A continuing substantial volume of Peking propaganda on the flight of
the Chinese satellite launched on 24 April includes prominent play for
messages of congratulation from friendly parties and groups abroad,
playing on the familiar themes that the launch was a victory of Mao's
thought, an encouragement to revolutionary peoples worldwide, and a blow
to the trinity of "U.S. imperialism, the Soviet social-imperialists, and
all reactionaries in the world."
While still refraining on its own authority from discussing the strategic
implications of the launch, Peking uses the proxy of foreign well-wishers
to project a picture of enhanced PRC military prowess. Thus NCNA on
4 May carried the text of a message from the Spanish Communist Party
(Marxist-Leninist) which observes that "this new progress made by
People's China In space science and technology has strQngthened the
defense capabilities of your great country to opp., the policy of
constant threats and provocations by the U.S. impe. lists and Soviet
social-imperialists." A 1 May NCNA roundup of foreign reaction quotes
a Japanese peasant to the effect that the weight and quality of the PRC's
first satellite "surpass by far" those of the first Soviet and U.S.
vehicles and that the launching "greatly increases the world people's
strength for opposing aggressive wars."
The only high-level PRC comment publicized since the launch announcements
is in speeches delivered by Chou En-lai on 25 and 26 April at banquets
for delegations attending the summit conference of the Indochinese
peoples. On the 25th, according to NCNA on 2 May, Chou called the
space satellite a "gift" to the conferees, a victory of the Chinese
people, "and also a victory for all of us." According to the 3 May
report of the se.:ond banquet, Chou said that the launch "is progress,
yet it is not sufficient, and we must continue to exert ourselves. We
believe that the Chinese people will certainly catch up with and surpass
the world's most advanced level in industry, science, and technology."
EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA VIEW CHINESE LAUNCHING WITH CONCERN
While Moscow is silent on the Chinese satellite, having reported the
launching briefly on 25 April, various East European media have commented
* To date Peking has devoted no central press comment or radio commentary
tc the launch. Three of the Chinese nuclear tests occasioned central
press comment--the first 3 n October 1964, the test of the nuclear missile
in October 1966, and the hydrogen-bomb detonation in June 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
- 35 -
critically on Chinese motives and expressed concern about the
implications of the launching. Thus an article in the Bratislava
PRAVDA on 28 April speculates on the possible effect it may have on
disarmament efforts. The report of the launch, the paper says,
"was recorded in Vienna with particular attention" even though this
first step by the Chinese represents more of a symbol than evidence
of a capability to catch up with the USSR and the United States.
It is a fact, the commentary adds, that at a time when Washington
and Moscow are engaged in efforts to limit strategic arms, those
weapons "are sought after by a state which so far has refused to
conform with or submit in any way to the past results of the
efforts for world disarmament" and which pursues domestic and
foreign policies marked by "adventurous extravagance." The article
remarks that the PRC achievement has not drawn the kind of response
earlier launchings by other states have received because "modern
weapons are falling into the hands of those who so far have refused
to respect the realities of the world--into the hands of those whose
past propaganda and views concerning atomic weapons arouse no good
feeling at all."
Budapest's MTI on the 29th reviews an article in that day's MAGYAR
NEMZET which points out that the launch demonstrates a Chinese
capability to produce long-range missiles. The article says it is
not possible "to assess realistically any series of events in the
Far East and Southeast Asia, and this applies even to problems beyond
the regional borders" such as disarmament, without taking Chinese
political aspirations into consideration.
Warsaw's domestic service on 2 May remarks on the propagandistic aspects
of the satellite launch, commenting that the Chinese have chosen to
orbit a satellite which broadcasts a song about Mao "instead of
transmitting to earth data that could augment the knowledge of
scientists about space." Declaring that China is "still far away
from a leading position in the field of rocket technology," the
commentary says the PRC is at the same stage of development as the
USSR in 1957 and the United States in 1958. It goes on to note
that the "Western press" recently carried reports about "interesting
transactions" between Peking and Bonn resulting in the PRC's purchase
of a subsi,antial volume of arms and products for the arms industry, and
it quotes the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI as having said that "only
thanks to Bonn's assistance were the Maoists able to increase their
rocket technology." The commentary does not indicate when NOVOSTI
made this allegation; an IZVESTIYA item following the October 1966
Chinese nuclear-missile test had reported a West German press article
on a contract. allegedly signed by a West German missile expert for
the construction of a rocket base in the PRC capable of launching
missiles with a range of 650 kilometers.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 MAY 1970
-36-
ROMANIA ASSERTS INDEPENDENT STANCE WITH FAVORABLE COMMENT
Consistent with Premier Maurer's congratulatory message to Chou En-lai,
Romania asserts its independent posture and its policy of good relations
with "all" socialist countries by carrying cordial comment on the
Chinese feat in the party organ SCINTEIA. A 30 April article in the
paper, reviewed by AGERPRES, says the satellite launch "has been
received with great satisfaction by public opinion in Romania" and
calls it important both scientifically and from the point of view of
international political life. The achievement, the article says, is
"a contribution to the assertion of the superiority of socialism, to
the strengthening of the world socialist system, the might of which
increases following the development, flourishing, and strengthening
of each socialist country and nation."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030018-3