TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 15, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

2000{ X09;;' C~(;ti-f''iDP85T~08751'~Oi?03b00ti00'15=T;
s
M UN
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
Confidential
~IIIIIIIIIIII~~~~!IIIIIIIIII~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~I II I IIII I II I III I IIIIIII~~~~
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
15 April 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 15)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
[utodod born eWoinodc
do,,nprodinp and
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Paris Talks: Le Due Tho Departure, 9 April Session . 1
DRV, PRG Score "Massacre" of Vietnamese Residents in Cambodia . 3
Hanoi, Front Media Emphasize Support for Sihancuk . . . . , , , . . 6
Peking Publicizes Further.PRC Support for Sihanouk . . . . . . , 7
Brezhnev Scores Vietnamization, Ignores Cambodia and Laos . . . 8
Action in South Vietnam Called "Widespread Offensives" ? , 8
DRV Claims Downed Plane, Scores Perot Mission on U.S. POW's . 10
Hanoi Prepares for May Day Celebrations, Issues Slogans . . . . . . . 11
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Brezhnev, Semenov Hope for Constructive Talks in Vienna . . . ? . . . 12
APOLLO 13
Kosygin Message Pledges Soviet Aid in Rescue Operations . . . . . . , 14
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Brezhnev, Kirilenko Speeches Break No New Ground on China . . . . . . 15
Peking Denounces Soviets for Collaboration With Japan . . , . . . , , 17
USSR Assails Israel for Raid on School, Muted on Sisco Tour . . . , . 19
Brezhnev Reaffirms That Israeli Withdrawal Is Key to Peace . ? . . . 21
Soviet Media See No "Tangible Results" of Brandt-Nixon Talks . . 23
Polish Commentators See U.S.-FRG Discord on Brandt Ostpolitik . . 24
GDR Terms FRG Charges Against Stc'*ph "Grave Provocation" . . . . . , , 21+
ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
Tirana, Belgrade Show Interest in Improved State Relations . . . . . 26
HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Party Spokesmen Disagree on Two-Front Ideological Struggle . . ? . , 28
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Brezhnev Reiterates Complaints Made at December Plenum . . . . . . . 30
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Apppantr e0 g,Gag,&2 /dlgme A- bI 68tmygvFkO@ ~000~30015-6. 31
CONFIDENTIAL,
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 19'(0
MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 12 APRIL 1970
Moscow (3818 items)
Peking (3372 items)
Lenin Centenary
(21%)
35%
Chou En-lai in DPRK
(1%)
50%
[WPC Moscow
(7%)
7%]
Indochina
(51%)
23%
Meeting
[Cambodia
(49%)
20%]
Middle East
(3%)
E%
[Vietnam
(1%)
2%]
Indochina
(6.5%)
5%
[Laos
(1%)
0.02;
[Vietnam
(3%)
2%]
Domestic Issues
(30%)
11%
[Laos
(1%)
2%]
PRC Economic Delegation
(--)
3%
[Cambodia
(0.3%)
--]
in Pakistan
China
(5%)
4%
Albanian Leader Gogo
(--)
3%
Nushi's Death
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propr,ganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
INDOCH INA
Hanoi media's first allusion to the 1 April French cabinet statement
suggesting general negotiations leading to "a zone of neutrality
and peace" in Indochina comes in VNA's 12 April report of Le Duc Tho's
response to reporters' questions upon his departure from Paris on
the 10th. But the cryptic VNA report does not acknowledge the
substance of the French proposal, noting only that Le Duc Tho
expressed hope for a "translation into deeds" of Foreign Minister
Schumann's "recent" declaration to him that "the French Government
was pursuing de Gaulle's policy regarding Indochina." And VNA
ignores Tho's concluding observation--which TASS reported on the
10th--that a Vietnam settlement is the necessary basis of a settlement
for all of Indochina.
Vietnamese communist media's continued focus on Cambodian developments
features DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements protesting the
"massacre" of Vietnamese residents by the Lon Nol regime. A declining
but still substantial volume of Peking propaganda on Cambodia continues
to publicize Sihanouk's statements, including the one thanking
Chou En-lai for his expression in Pyongyang of PRC Government support
for the deposed prince, Minimal Soviet propaganda on Cambodia stresses
alleged U.S. involvement in Cambodian affairs and includes reports on
the "massacre" of Vietnamese civilians.
Souvanna Phouma's 9 April response to Souphanouvong's message last
month on a Laos settlement is summarized on the 13th by the Patriotic
Neutralist radio, which cites Vientiane radio as its source. Pathet
Lao media report that the reply was handed in Vientiane to an NLHX
official who stopped in Hanoi "on his way to a liberated area" to
deliver it to Souphan ouvong. A commentary monitored with poor
reception from the Patriotic Neutralist radio on t",, 13th and 14th
denounces Souvanna's reply, among other things coaplaining that he
denied that U.S. "interventicn and aggression" is the crux of the
Laotian question and placed the blame o:1 the DRV. The broadcast
calls Souvanna's letter a "trick tc, avoid settlement."
PARIS TALKS: LE DUC THO DEPARTURE, 9 APRIL SESSION
Hanoi media did not acknowledge Le Duc Tho's 10 April departure from
Paris until the 12th, when VNA said that "the special advisor" to the
DRV delegation "left for home last Friday." TASS on the 10th had
promptly reported his departure, and on the 11th a brief Moscow
domestic service item said he had arrived in Moscow as a "member of a
party delegation" to the Lenin birth c,i,tenary celebration.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
While glossing over Tho's remarks on the French proposal for general
negotiations,* VNA reports Le Due Tho's reiteration of the standard
communist charge that the United States is expanding the war to the
whole of Indochina in an attempt to make use of military pressure
to negotiate from a position of strength. VNA also notes that Tho
prefaced his routine remarks on the Paris talks with the statement
that "the course of events last week was not what the United States
had expected" and cites his forecast that with their "militant
solidarity" the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would achieve
finel victory. Tho's characterization of the Lon Nol regime in
Cambodia as "extremely reactionary" is noted by VNA along with his
assertion that should the French Government back Lon Nol, "far
from contributing to the restoration of peace in Indochina, it
would harm the basic interests of the Indochinese people, . . ."
PARIS SESSION The communist delegates at the Paris session on
9 April gave relatively cursory attention to
Cambodia, in contrast to their detailed remarks in recent weeks.
Thus, PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien made no direct reference to the
coup. DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy mentioned it only in passing
when he said that the Nixon Administration, far from keeping its
promise to end the war, has escalated the war i:c Laos, "staged a
coup d'etat in Cambodia," and attempted to expand the war to the
whole of Indochina. In the context of U.S. "crimes" against the
Lao and Cambodian peoples, Tien said without elaboration that U.S.
infantrymen stationed in South Vietnam have on "many occasions"
encroached upon Lao and Cambodian territory. He also declared that
a rapid, uncone'.itional U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam
would not only be the to the end of the Vietnam war but
would "help settle the Laos and Cambodia problems."
Tien buttressed his standard denunciations of the pace and size
of the U.S. troop reductions with assertions that "several
American generals still arrogantly urge military victory and demand
the suspension or indefinite prolongation of the 'piecemeal troop
withdrawal' program, which has already been severely condemned by
public opinion at large." Tien asked rhetorically whether the
call for a suspension of the withdrawals was not therefore "an
avowal of the fiasco of the Vietnamization of the war."
* At 1715 GMT on 10 April the VNA service channel from Hanoi to Paris
requested "urgent" transmission of the text of "Comrade Le Due Tho's
answers to questions concerning the French proposal." The DRV press
spokesman, in his briefing after the 9 April session of the Paris
talks, had said that his government had not yet stated its position
on the French proposal. As usual, Hanoi media did not report the
press briefings.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
Nguyen Minh Vy claimed that the "credibility gap" between the
Administration and the U.S. public had become "wider and deeper."
He pointed to the "recent and unprecedented" event when "the state
of Massachusetts endorsed a bill prohibiting the President from
sending its citizens to fight in Vietnam," which Vy said might
be called "the mutiny of one entire state."
The VNA account as usual glosses over the allied speeches, saying
U.S. delegate Habib put forth "the well-worn proposal on he
withdrawal of foreign forces from South Vietnam' and again raised
the so-called 'POW question."' VNA thus ignores Habib's remark that
the increase in the level of communist military action in South
Vietnam is incompatible with sericus negotiations; it also
ignores his supplementary remarks in which he specifically rejected
communist allegations concerning events in Cambodia and Laos as
well as in South Vietnam. VNA says GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam
voiced the "slander" that the DRV has "interfered" in Laos and
pursued an "expansionist policy."
DRV, PRG SCORE "MASSACRE" OF VIETNAMESE RESIDENTS IN CAMBODIA
The Vietnamese communists authoritatively denounce the alleged
0-10 April massacre by Cambodian troops of Vietnamese residents
near Prasaut, Svay Rieng Province, with DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry
statements on 12 and 13 April.*
The DRV statement asserts that the Cambodian authorities "herded"
more than 300 Vietnamese residents--mostly old people, women, and
children--into a camp and shot and killed about 1CO of them during
the night. The statement adds that since the Lon Nol regime toc^k
power it has launched "an anti-Vietnam campaign by persecuting
Vietnamese residents," trying to "sow discord" between the
Vietnamese and Khmer people, and claims that the massacres are
calculated to hide the fact that the regime serves U.S. imperialism.
The statement says the massacres also show "the clique's confusion"
in the face of the Khmer people's growing struggle and the "righteous
indignation" of people throughout the world. The "peoples of Vietnam
and Cambodia," it declares, are resolved to unite in "opposing the
reactionary policy" of the Lon Nol regime.** It concludes with demands
Hanoi continues to expand its Cambodian-language radio programming.
The addition of a half-hour in Cambodian on 5 April was followed by the
addition of another half-hour on the 10th, bringing the total to six
half-hour programs daily.
** A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 29 March, denouncing
the Lon Nol regime's nti-Vietnamese terrorism, does not include this
formulation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09C0L9MP 65TOO875ROOO3OOO3OO15-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
-1E-
that the regime stop its repression of the Vietnamese residents,
compensate the victims' families, and answer for the safety of all
Vietnamese residents.
The PRG statement calls the massacre an attempt by the regime to
cover up its opposition to the South Vietnamese people's "Just
resistance" and to "mislead" the Khmer people who, responding to
Sihanouk's appeal, are "resolutely opposing" the coup-makers and
their "U.S. bosses." Echoing the list of demands in the DRV state-
ment, it demands in addition that the regime set free all
Vietnamese whc are "groundlessly detained." The PRG statement
concludes with a call upon the "people and governments of the
freedom- and justice-loving countries, the democratic and humanitarian
organizations the world over," to condemn regime acts of persecution
and massacre of Vietnamese residents and to "take effective measures
to check their criminal acts."
A "condolence message" sent to the DRV Government and the PRG from
Sihanouk in Peking, reported in Hanoi and Front media on the 13th
and 14th, condemns the massacre and asserts that the "crime" will
only further tighten the "friendship, brotherhood, and militant
solidarity" between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, who will stand
"shoulder to shoulder" in fighting to overthrow the "traitors" in
Phnom Penh and Saigon.*
DENIALS OF The foreign ministry statements on the massacre do not
VC PRESENCE explicitly bring up the issue of the Vietnamese
communist military presence in Cambodia. However, a
12 April NHAN DAN article does comment briefly that the "atrocity" is
part of an effort by Khmer "ultrarightists" to level a "trumped-up
charge" of "aggression" against the Vietnamese. Other Hanoi and
Front comment not pegged to the massacre continues to directly deny
the Vietnamese communist presence in Cambodia, A Liberation Radio
commentary on 12 April, for example, once again scores the Lon No?
government's claim that the Vietnamese "directed" pro-Sihanouk
demonstrations and that the Viet Cong have attacked the provinces
along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. It also cites the BBC as saying
On the lr+th Phnom Penh issued an Information Ministry communique
denying that a massacre occurred, asserting rather that the Vietnamese
civilians were caught in a crossfire and that their deaths were an
"error of war." The statement does add, however, that it must be
noted that "Viet Cong forces have repeatedly used Vietnamese residents
in Cambodia as an auxillary force in their aggression."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
on 31 March that "the news that many Viet Cong units were advancing
toward Phnom Penh originated from panic, and no one believed it."
An 11 April LPA commentary denounces as "shameless calumny" a Phnom
Penh radio report that Sihanouk "received a big sum from the PRG
and the NFLSV in exchange for the Cambodian head of state's assistance
to them."
Continued Hanoi criticism of Lon Nol's request that the 195+ Geneva
Conference cochairmen reactivate the ICC and that the UN Security
Council send an observer team to Cambodia to check Vietnamese
communist involvement comes in an 8 April NHAN DAN article, which
repeats charges that this is an effort to "legalize" the coup d'etat
ana to propagate the "slander" that Vietnam ig committing "aggression"
against Cambodia.
LPA on 15 April carries an "authorized" statement regarding claims by
news agencies of the United State6 and the Lon Nol "clique" that the
liberation armed forces "capturea some foreign correspondents in
Cambodia." LPA labels such claims a "dirty trick" to "slander" the
liberation armed forces and to mask U.S. interference in Cambodia.
U.S. AID A 15 April Hanoi domestic broadcast denounces Lon Nol's
announcement the day before that he considers it
necessary to accept "all foreign aid from whatever sources,"
asserting that he thus "openly asked the Americans to give military
aid to Cambodia." Hanoi says this statement reveals the "clique's"
intention to ask for U.S. weapons to suppress the "patriotic struggle
movement of the Khmer people and to resist the South Vietnamese
people," but it does not acknowledge Lon Nol's _emarks on the
Vietnamese communist military presence in Cambodia. The broadcast
also says the British DAILY TELEGRAPH revealed a "secret agreement"
according to which Saigon "will supply Cambodia with U.S. weapons."
Peking's NCNA also reported this British story on the 11th.
The 8 April NHAN DAN article denouncing an ICC and UN role also
documents the Lon Nol regime'., pro-U.S. character despite its claim
to neutrality. NHAN DAN repeats that the regime "recently said it
'might' ask for military aid from the United States," reiterates
the charge that U.S. weapons were shipped by the "Columbia Eagle,"
and adds that other U.S. vessels also delivered weapons even before
the coup.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
HANOI. FRONT MEDIA EMPHASIZE SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK
Vietnamese communist media publicize 12 April messages to Sihanouk
on the occasion of the Cambodian new year from the DRV's Ton Duc Thang
and Pham Van Dong and the PRG's Nguyer. Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat.
The messages express pleasure over the Khmer people's struggle for
their national rights in response to Sihanouk's call for "national
salvation," and both reassert DRV and PRG policies of respect for
Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial
integrity within her existing borders.
On the 11th, VNA reported an 8 April communique issued by Sihanouk's
"private secretariat" denouncing the UN Secretariat for failure to
publish a communication from Sihanouk on the grounds that it was a
"nongovernmental communication." VNA scored the UN Secretariat's
argument that it deals only with horities which are apparently
in control of the government of a menioer country," calling this
"ridiculous" inasmuch as the Secretariat refuses to deal with the
"authorities in control" in China, dealing instead with a "tiny
group of puppets" in Taiwan.
On 10 April VNA carried a statement by "three Cambodian National
Assembly deputies" expressing "full support" for Sihanouk's 23 March
proclamation. The statement does not mention Sihanouk's 4 April
message to his compatriots, but the deputies do say that "renouncing
our personal interests and departing from our beloved families and
parents, we have left for the jungle to join the people in conducting
political and armed struggle during the past few years" with the
aim of realizing the ideal of uniting the entire people in the anti-U.S.
struggle. The statement denounces the Lon Nol regime and claims that
it is "in utter confusion before the Cambodian people's political and
armed struggle, which is spreading throughout the country in both
town and countryside, and even within the administration of the coup-
make-;.-s." (On the 14th Phnom Penh released an Information Ministry
statement saying that Sihanouk had accused the three deputies of
being Khmer Reds and that they had relinquished their functions and
vanished three years ago.)
VNA EDITING Sihanouk's "second message to his compatriots," which
OF SIHANOUK NCNA transmitted textually on 4 April, was carried in
truncated version by VNA on the 7th. While reporting
some of Sihanouk's references to the Cambodians' "resistance and armed
revolution," the VNA version deletes two paragraphs in which he
requested his compatriots "not to hold peaceful demonstrations"--which
could cost unnecessary lives--but to "go into the jungle" and join the
resistance where "the zones held by our guerrillas are numerous."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
Also deleted is Sihanouk's message to compatriots in the army, police,
and other administrative posts to the effect that "U.S. imperialism"
would not be able to continue to protect for more than one or two
years "its lackeys Thieu-Ky and company in Saigon, Souvanna Phouma
and company in Vientiane, Kittikachorn and company in Bangkok, and
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak and company in Phnom Penh." And VNA omits
Sihanouk's reference to "socialist Vietnam, North and South," having
recognized Cambodia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within
its existing frontiers as well as his statement that "upon the word
of its very high-ranking leaders and in the presence of no less
important witnesses, it has only recently again committed itself
solemnly to make its nation, people, and youth respect all this in
the future."
PEKING PUBLICIZES FURTHER PRC SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK
Chou En-lai's official expression of Chinese "Government" support for
Sihanouk, voiced in Pyongyang on 5 April, is followed by another
expression of support for Sihanouk's five-point declaration of
23 March in the joint PRC-DPRK communique on Chou's visit, released
on the 3th,* Sihanouk's 6 April message to Chou expressing "lasting
and unbounded gratitude" for the "firm, clearcut, and powerful support"
of China, "our greatest and most faithful friend," was carried by
NCNA on the 9th and has been widely rebroadcast by Peking radio.
Peking continues wide dissemination of other Sihanouk statements and
of pickups of foreign statements of support for Sihanouk. There are
editorialized reports--usually pegged to foreign sources--of develop-
ments in Cambodia, including the alleged massacre of Vietnamese
residents and continued pro-Sihanouk demonstrations. NCNA also picks
up Hanoi comment denouncing Lon Nol's call for a reactivation of the
ICC and the dispatch of a UN observer team. An 11 April NCNA
commentary denounces U Thant's recognition of the new government in
Cambodia and his refusal to circulate a communication from Sihanouk,
but Peking does not refer to Taiwan in this connection as VNA did.
* The volume of Peking's propaganda pegged specifically to
Cambodian developments dropped from some 50 percent in the past
two weeks to 20 percent during the week ending 12 April. This
figure does not, however, include the expressions of Chinese
support voiced by Chou En-lai in Pyongyang and contained in the
PRC-DPRK communique. Fifty percent of Peking's broadcast comment
during the past week was on the PRC-DPRK talks.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
A "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield column article" carried by NCNA'a
domestic service in Chinese on 8 April charges that the United States
instigated the Cambodian coup to expand the war in Indochina, having
met with "miserable defeat" on the battlefield in Vietnam and Laos.
It adds that the coup was carried out under a "smokescreen of 'peace,'"
the United States whitewashing its "counterrevolutionary crimes" with
talk of peace.
NONA.! INED NCNA items of 12 and 13 April report that Penn Nouth,
CONFERENCE the "personal representative" of Sihanouk, led a
delegation to the preparatory meeting of nonalined
countries in Dar es Salaam. NCNA publicizes a press release by the
delegation stressing the "illegality" of the Lon Nol regime,
mentioning that it also sent a delegation to the conference. The
statement asserts that the Lon Nol government is not nonalined and
therefore should not be admitted to the conference, but there is no
acknowledgment that the delegates to the, conference voted to set up
a subcommittee to study the question of Cambodian representation.
BREZHNEV SCORES VIETNAMIZATION, IGNORES CAMBODIA AND LS
In his 14 April Kharkov speech Brezhnev denounces the U.S. Vietnamization
policy but does not mention Laos or Cambodia. He says the Americans
have given a new "facade" to their failing Vietnam policy, replacing
escalation with Vietnamization, but maintains that this does not
mean a suspension of aggression--merely a conversion of it into a
"fratricidal war" between the Vietnamese. Stating that the Vietnamese
are resolved to achieve the freedom and independence of their homeland
by any means, military, political, and diplomatic, he concludes that
the Soviet people are on their side and wish them the "speediest
implementation" of their "national aspirations" and a "stable peace."
He does not mention the NFLSV 10-point program for a settlement.
Criticizing Vietnamization in a 16 October speech at a dinner for the
visiting DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, Kosygin had said Vietnam needs
not Vietnamization but Oust and honest peace," the basis of which
should be the NFLSV's 10 points.
ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM CAI 1 Fn "WIDESPREAD OFFENSIVES"
Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to report the stepped-up
military action since 31 March. VNA on the 14th typically cites
Western sources in reporting the shelling of Saigon on the night of
the 13th. The first substantial comment comes in a Liberation Radio
broadcast on the 14+h of an article in QUAN GIAI PHONG (Liberation Army)
attributed to Commentator which characterizes the attacks this month
as "widespread offensives and uprisings." Commentator claims the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
recent; "victories" prove that no force can stop the PLAF's strong
offensive initiative. Reviewing the attacks since late March,
he says they have resulted in the annihilation of many q,llied
troops and much materiel. Commentator also claims that these
victories have resulted from the close coordination of the military,
political, and proselyting struggle, and he cites alleged uprisings
in this connection. He concludes with the routine claim that the
current victories have dealt a heavy blow to the Vietnamization and
pacification plans,
Other current attention to pacification and Vietnamization includes
a commentary by "Cuu Long" (Mekong) broadcast by Liberation Radio on
the 11th. Cuu Long wrote a similar commentary on Vietnamization which
was broadcast by the Front in installments from 11 through 13 January.
Leading off his current commentary by examining the "substance" of
Vietnamization and claiming it is a "new phase of defeats," Cuu Long
defines the objectives of the plan in routine terms: to strengthen
ARVN and the GVN so that U.S. troops can be withdrawn, and to prolong
the war to achieve U.S. objectives in Vietnam.
As in his January commentary, Cuu Long elaborates on the cruelty and
"crimes" of Vietnamization in general and claims that the allies
are using pacification in an effort to undermine the people's
solidarity and devotion to freedom. Examining the long-term "scheme
of Vietna;,,tzation," he says the allies are creating a basis for
protracted fighting, actively organizing political forces to continue
opposing the revolution in the future, and seeking ways to implant
spies in the revolutionary ranks in order to undermine the revolutionary
administrations.
Discussing the "actual situation of Vietnamization and its prospects,"
Cuu Long cites defeats in key areas such as the delta, increased U.S.
casualties, and lack of confidence in the program. He concludes
that Vietnamization is a "hopeless path" leading to defeat and to
President Nixon's "political grave." The allies are trying to "beset
our people with difficulties," he says, but they will overcome every
hardship and continue attacking, thus "smashing" Vietnamization.
CURRENT Attention to particular actions in the recent fighting includes
ACTION comment on the siege at the Special Forces camp at Dak Seang.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 13th calls the siege a
"new defeat" for clear-and-hold and for Vietnamization which proves
that the ARVN cannot "avert disastrous defeat." A Liberation Radio
commentary on the 11th claims that after annihilating almost half
the allied forces in the initial attack on the camp, the PLAF has
firmly encircled and isolated it. Citing attacks on allied reinforce-
ments, the commentary says the situation continues to be "very critical."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
On the 12th VNA quotes UPI as saying, that at least 595 allied t:roops
have been "wiped out" around Dak Seang, and on the 11th VNA cit(a U.S.
military authorities as disclosing that 651 allied troops were
wiped out there. An LPA account on the 12th of the attacks in
northern Kontum on the 25-kilometer defense line from Dak Seang to
Tan Canh claims that more than 1,200 allied troops, including
22 Americans, were wiped out. The item says more than 200 allied
troops were killed or put out of action at the camp during the
first week in April.
Comment hailing the communist "victory" at Song Mao, Binh Thuai:
Province, on the night of 31 March includes a QIJAN DOI NHAN DAN
article summarized by Hanoi radio on 8 April. The army paper
applauds action in which the communists allegedly controlled t;'te
battlefield in an hour, calling it proof of the progress of PLAF
combativity and offensive prowess. A VNA mention of the same
article, also on the 8th, reports it as stressing that Song Mao
was a blow to Vietnamization, A commentary broadcast by Hanoi
radio on the 8th claims that more than 1,000 allied troops, including
more than 200 GI's, were killed or captured at Song Mao.
DRV CLAIMS DOWNED PLANE, SCORES PEROT MISSION ON U1S, POW'S
The latest of Hanoi's periodic claims of downed U.S. aircraft comes
in an 11 April Hanoi radio report that an unmanned U.S.
reconnaissance plane was downed over Haiphong that day, bringing
Hanoi's total to 3,337. The last previous claim was that an RF-4C
was downed over western Quang Binh Province on 30 March.
H. Ross Perot's recent trip to Vientiane and Saigon in connectic,
with his attempts :) contact U.S. prisoners in the DRV is scored in
a QUAN DOI NHAN L,'A article on the 9th and in two Hanoi radio
commentaries the next day. The most detailed attack on this "new
psychological warfare farce of the Nixon Administration" comes in a
broadcast in Vietnamese to the South: It notes that Perot had
chartered three planes to transport "nearly 100 journalists" and
U.S. "aggressor pilots' dependents" to Saigon, and it ridicules the
notion that the prisons where "U.S.-puppets have detained South
Vietnamese patrio`.s" are run humanely. The commentary dismisses as
a "trouble-making plot" Perot's trip to Vientiane and his request
at the DRV Embassy for permission to visit U.S. pilots in the DRV.
Saying that he came to Vientiane again even though the DRV policy
had been explained to him, the commentary recalls that in December
he had arrived in Vientiane with food and medicine and "demanded"
authorization to delivery the supplies to the POWs--an action aimed
at "sabotaging" DRV regulations on sending packages to U.S. personnel.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
The Hanoi commentaries reiterate the standard line that DRV policy
toward the prisoners is humane and just despite the fact that they
Vre "war criminals" and that the DRV is not bound by the Geneva
convention.
HANOI PREPARES FOR MAY DAY CELEBRATIONSr ISSUES SLOGANS
A circular on May Day celebrations issued 13 April by the Vietnam
Workers Party Secretariat, carried, by VNA on the 34th, says the
stress this year will be on the achievements in fighting and production
of' both North ind South Vietnam, on stimulating the productive labor
movement in the North and tightening the "militant solidarity" among
the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Also on the l4th, Hanoi
radio carried the May Day slogans--a brief list of 12, as compared
wit'. 29 last year, containing generalized calls for support of the
"anti-U.S. national salvation resistance" and socialist construction
in the North. It seems li'z.ely that the list is abbreviated because
a list of 31 slogans was issued on 18 January this year--published,
VNA said, to celebrate the 3 February party anniversary.'
* See the TRENDS of 21 January 1970 for a discussion of this list
and for background on previous May Day slogans.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENT tAL FIiIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 19'(O
- 12 -
STRATEGIC ARMS LIIIITATION
BREZHNEV, SEMENOV HOPE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS IN VIENNA
In his wide-ranging speech in Kharkov on i1 April--broadcast in the
domestic service--Brezhnev says the USSR would "welcome a sensible
agreement" at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which open
in Vienna on the 16th.* He states that if the U.S. Gcvernrnent
sincerely desires a treaty and if the American public succeeds in
overcoming "the opposition of the arms manufacturers and the military,"
prospects for the Vienna talks "may be viewed positively." Echoing
the line current in Soviet propaganda since the first round of the
talks in Helsinki, he asserts that the USSR for its part will try to
see that the talks prove useful.
While reiterating
Soviet support for disarmament measures, Brezhnev
interjects the statement that the USSR has created "a reliable means
of restraining any aggressor." In what may be an allusion to U.S.
plans for proceeding with deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and
MIRV's, he warns that "we shall answer any attempts by any party
whatsoever to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union by
making the required increase in our own military might to guarantee
our defense." And a foreign-language commentary by Stolpovskiy on
14 April repeats--without attribution--Brezhnev's warning that the
USSR will respond with a "corresponding increase" in the USSR's
defense capability. A threat of possible countermeasures had appeared
last month in routine propaganda on the U.S. decisions on ABM's and
MIRV's.
* Since his 3 July 19 8 speech, when he noted that an agreement had
been reached between the USSR and the United States about an exchange
of opinions on strategic arms limitation, Brezhnev had broached such an
arms agreement only once. At the international communist conference in
Moscow last June, he said the USSR was prepared to reach an under-
standing on general and complete disarmament, "on measures for limiting
and restraining the arms race, above all tl.e race for nuclear missile
weapons."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONT'IDLN'T'IAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APi1IL 1970
- 13 -
Brezhnev winds up his remarks on strategic arms with the observation
that American circles "with an interest in the arms race" have become
more active and have made "slanderous assertions that the USSR intends
to increase arms production in any case"--an "old ruse of the
rnLlitarists . . . to get more allocations for military preparations."
Politburo member Kirilenko touches briefly on SALT in a speech
broadcast by the Yerevan domestic service on the 14th, like Brezhnev
stressing that success depends on the United States. The talks, he
sciys, "can produce positive results if an honest effort is made by
the United States to solve all problems and not to try for unilateral
gains."
In his arrival statement reported by TASS on the 14th, Deputy Foreign
Minister Semenov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna
talks, used language comparable to that of his opening statement in
Helsinki last November in declaring that solution of the "'important
and complex" problems under discussion would be a major contribution
to the strengthening of peace and security. The Soviet Government has
instructed his delegation to hold talks in "a businesslike, constructive
spirit," Semenov asserted, adding: "We would like to hope that the
American side will display the same approach."
Prior to the Brezhnev and Kirilenko speeches, the last elite spokesman
to bring up SALT was Kosygin, at the 5 March Moscow ceremony for
deposition of the instruments of ratification of the nonproliferation
treaty. The Soviet premier declared on that occasion that the USSR
attached "great importance" to the dialog, that it was approaching
the talks in "all seriousness," and that good will on the part of
both sides was needed.
SENATE Reporting on 10 April the passage of a Senate resolution
RESOLUTION calling on the President to introduce at the Vienna talks
a propo;;al for an immediate halt in the deployment of all
offensive and defensive strategic weapons, TASS says "political observers"
have noted Senate concern over the Administration's "refusal to explain
its position in its approach to the forthcoming talks." Attention is
drawn, TASS says, to the fact that "President Nixon personally spoke
against this resolution last month, describing it as 'inappropriate'"--
an allusion to the President's comment at his 21 March press conference
that the resolution is "irrelevant" since its subject "is what SALT is
all about." Moscow did not report these remarks at the time, and the
10 April TASS item does not go on to explain why the President considered
the resolution "inappropriate."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDEN'T'IAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
-11;-
APOLLO 13
KOSYGIN MESSAGE PLEDGES SO'/IET AID IN RESCUE OPERATIONS
TASS on 15 April carried the text of Premier Koaygin's message to
President Nixon informing him that the Soviet Government had
instructed civilian and military authorities to use "all means"
available to aid in the rescue of U.S. as(,.onauts Lovell, Haiso,
and Swigert. The message says "we follow with concern" the
flight of the disabled Apollo 13 and wishes the "courageous"
astronauts a safe return to earth. Fifteen minutes after it
transmitted the message, TASS reported that two Soviet ships In
the Pacific had changed course "on order of the Soviet Government"
and set sail for the area of the expected spashdown.
Minimal Soviet coverage of the early stages of the Apollo 13 flight
had been straightforward, promptly reporting the blast-off on the
11th and noting that the mission was to land two astronauts on the
moon. TABS and the domestic service reported early on the 14th
that the main power unit on the spacecraft "became almost completely
inoperative as a result of an oxygen leak," that the moon landing
was cancelled, and that the craft would correct it-3 trajectory
for a return to earth on the 17th. Some three hou.-s later the
domestic service carried a fuller report on the "serious complications,"
saying that the reasons for an "explosion" on board the craft were
not yet known. It added that NASA spokesmen indicated that there
was "no direct threat to the lives of the astronauts."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
- 15 -
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
FBIG TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
BREZHNEV, KIRILENKO SPEECHES BREAK NO NEW GROUND ON CHINA
Specchr?s on 14 April by Brezhnev and Kir.iicnko--containing the first
c1it:c-level remarks on China wince the same two leaders' speeches in
October and February, respectively--fail to register any new movement
in Sino-Soviet relations while reflecting the darker polemical atmosphere
surrounding the half-year-old Peking talks. Viewed against the back-
ground of recent Soviet coiamont, whose major themes they echo, the
speeches seem to indicate Moscow's intent to follow a middle course of
persevering in the talks while seeking to isolate the Chinese in the
international communist movement?
An approach on two levels, distinguishing state from party relations,
is reflected in Brezhnev's statement in his 14 April Kharkov speech
stressing a desire to contain ideological differences at the party
level while persisting in the effort to reach an agreement that would
turn the Sino-Soviet border into "a line of neighborliness, not
hostility." That Moscow is holding to a firm bargaining stance at
the talks seems indicated in his remark that the Soviets are not
departing from their "legal and principled" position and are defending
their borders. If there has been any breakthrough in the talks or an
accommodation along the border, Brezhnev did not take this occasion to
publicize it.
Moscow's polemical offensive after the propaganda standdown :Last fall
is reflected in Brezhnev's 14 April speech as contrasted with his
conciliatory remarks on 27 October, which included the unusual fraternal
gesture of calling Chou En-lai "Comrade." Where the October speech
avoided polemics, Brezhnev has now denounced the Chinese for impeding
the talks by promoting an anti-Soviet war psychosis. Renewing a warning
made in recent authoritative Soviet comment, he admonishes the Chinese
that pressure tactics on their part will be futile and that the Soviets
have "strong nerves." Brezhnev is vague in mentioning the Peking
leadership, limiting himself to a reference to the "organizers of the
war hysteria" in China.
T'he impression of immobility in Sino-Soviet relations is underscored by
a comparison of Kirilenko's 14 April speech in Yerevan with his speech
on 5 February to the French ~P congress. Following substantially the
same script in his remarks on China in both speeches, Kirilenko has
again deplored the atmosphere created in China around the talks and has
promised a furthe_' prosecution of Moscow's ideological case against
Peking.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CON6'ID[ N'TIAL [''BIS TRENDS
1.5 APRIL 1970
- 16 -
OTHER LITERARY GAZE`TE on 5 April carried three Items on China:
COMMENT an article by a Chinese describing the mass deportation
of cadres to "7 May schools" in the countryside, tin article
on extravagant Chinese claims of miraculous rc:su1Lu from acupuncture
under Mao's guidance, and a report commemorating a Chinese poet. The
article on the 't May schools--"essentially a type of concentration
camp"--denounces Mao for subjecting cadres to arduous and cruel physical
labor and ideological rectification in order to erase their "Marxist-
Lcninist world outlook."
An article in SOVIET RUSSIA on the 10th assails Harrison Salisbury for
his books on the siege of Leningrad and on a possible war between the
Soviet Union and China. Dealing only briefly with the latter book,
which was the subject of a long PRAVDA article by Tikhvinskiy on
15 February, the article charges that Salisbury's "perfectly obvious"
aim is to incite "the most adventuristic elements" in Peking to attack
the Soviet Union.
The sensitive matter of the condition and treatment of minorities in the
Central Asian borderlands has become the subject of a Soviet central
press article for the first time since the agreement to hold the Peking
talks was reached. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on 7 April, discussing
an anthology of Uighur poetry printed over 20 years ago in what is now
the Sinkiang region of the PRC, deplores the repressive impact of the
cultural revolution on Uighur cultural figures and calls attention to
the "hand of fraternal help" extended by the Soviet Union to "the
unfortunate children of Eastern Turkestan"--.language with provocative
overtones of separatist sentiment and Soviet mischief-making among the
non-Han peoples across the border. Although mild compared with inflammatory
propaganda on this subject that has formerly appeared in the Soviet press,
the article represents still another line of attack in Moscow's current
polemical campaign ranging across a broad front.
One day after the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article, a broadcast in Tashkent's
Uighur service--a principal forum for Soviet propaganda on the Central
Asian minority peoples--evoked the memory of the "National Liberation
Army of East Turkestan," the spearhead of a movement promoted by the
Soviets which revolted against Chinese control in the 1940's. The
broadcast pointedly reminded the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities
in Sinkiang of this separatist movement and denounced Peking for
reneging on promises of autonomy for the minorities. The Soviets had
resumed broadcasting propaganda on this subject soon after the Peking
talks had opened, long before anti-Chinese polemics returned to the
central media.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONIIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
In broadcasts to China, Radio Moscow initiated a Mandarin-language
~jcrieo on 10 April responding to recurrent Chinese charges of a Soviet
:rurr2ndcr of Siberia to exploitation by foreign interests. The
broadcasts have insisted that Siberian development is being carried
out by Soviet capital and technicians to serve the interests of the
Sc?vlet people.
One of Moscow's infrequent references to the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty
of alliance appears on 12 April in the !6th in the now sporadic Kapitsa-
Bedenchenko series in Mandarin on "Glorious Chapters in the History of
Soviet-Chinese Relations." The reference tippears in the course of a
discussion of past examples of Soviet and PRC political and military
cooperation on international issues, such as the Taiwan crises and
the Korean, Vietnamese, and Laotian conflicts. A broadcast in Mandarin
on the 10th, invoking Lenin on the need for unity of anti-imperialist
forces, interprets Peking's line on the world countryside opposing the
world cities as setting the colored peoples of the world against the
white.
PEKING DENOUNCES SOVIETS FOR COLLABORATION WITH JAPAN
Following Chou Fn-lai's 5-7 April visit to the DPRK, with its clear
overtones of opposition to Soviet dealings with Japan, a lengthy NCNA
correspondent's report on the 13th details signs of growing cooperation
between Moscow and Tokyo as evidence of a betrayal of the Soviet people
by their "revisionist renegade clique." In addition to taking derisive
note of letters from Podgornyy and Kosygin calling for cooperation with
Japan, the report characteristically takes a swipe at Brezhnev, this
time for his proposal of an Asian collective security system. Strong
Chinese attacks on the proposal last summer coincided with Peking's
sharpened focus on Brezhnev as the chief Kremlin target.
While ignoring Peking's own current negotiations with Japan on trade,
NCNA notes accusingly that the amount of the USSR's trade with Japan
ranks first among Soviet trade "with Western countries." The report
also claims that Soviet-Japanese cooperation is an "extension" of Soviet
collaboration with the United States, though it does not develop the
theme of encirclement of China which formerly marked Peking's polemics
on Soviet-U.S. collusion. The emphasis rather is on Moscow's alleged
interest in drawing closer to Japan in opposition to the PRC, providing
still another sign of Peking's concern over Japan's assuming a pivotal
role in Asia in the future.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
Consistent with Peking's general restraint in approaching bilateral
Sino-Soviet issues, the NCNA report treads carefully in treating
the military implications of'Soviet-Japanese.. cooperation. Thus it
charges that the Soviets have expanded economic-ties-with Japan in
recent years in order to make use of Japanese economic strength to
build "bases of aggression" in Siberia and the.Soviet Far East, and
it claims that Japanese exports to the USSR rapidly increased
following Moscow's "intensified arms expansion.. and war preparations";
but there is no mention of the border conflict or of a Soviet threat
to the PRC. Peking has remained-silent on the border-question and
has ignored Moscow's propaganda campaign about Chinese war preparations.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
MIDDLE EAST
USSR ASS,'%ILS ISRAEL FOR RAID ON SCHOOL, MUTED ON SISCO TOUR
Moscow's propaganda attention to the Middle East, which had been gradually
diminishing over the past four weeks, takes an upward turn again with
prompt expressions of outrage over the-8 April Israeli attack that resulted
in the death of Egyptian schoolchildren. Within two days Soviet media
were reporting a scattering of protest meetings in the USSR and a series
of statements by public organizations and individuals calling for
punishment of the "aggressor," as well as rcunding up foreign reaction.
In the case of the 12 February Abu Zabal raid, on which Moscow built a
voluminous propaganda campaign, protest meetings did not begin until
four days after the release of a TASS statement, which was itself
issued four days after the raid. The current protests do not seem to
be gathering momentum, and it seems doubtful that the school bombing
will spark a second campaign of similar proportions. Comment routinely
charges the United States with hypocrisy in expressing regret over the
incident while continuing to support Israel.
Limited, restrained comment on the visit of Assistant Secretary of
State Sisco to Cairo points out that the Israeli raid was conducted with
U.S. Phantoms on the eve of Sisco's Middle East tour and asks how the
United States can befriend all countries in the area, supporting both
the "aggressor" and his victim at the same time.
UAR SCHOOL On the 10th Moscow acknowledges the controversy over the
INCIDENT target of Israel's 8 April raid, the UAR insisting that
the Israelis hit a school in the village of Bahr al-Bagar
in ash-Sharqiyah Province and Israeli Defense Minister Dayan maintaining
in a statement on the 8th that the area hit was a mill y,ary target where
the Egyptians had "irresponsibly" located a school. A domestic service
commentary says Dayan tried to justify the act by "alleging ghat the
school was situated within a military target--an old device" and claims
that raids on civilian targets are no accident but part of a premeditated
policy aimed at forcing the Arabs to agree to a settlement on Israeli
terms.
Commentator Tsoppi, in foreign-language broadcasts on the 10th and 11th,
rejects Dayan's "monstrous arguments" that the Israeli planes attacked
a military target, remarking that "Dayan, if anyone, knew there were no
military targets in the vicinity." Similarly, a panelist in the 12 April
domestic service roundtable program finds the idea that the children
were killed because they were within a military target "absurd, fantastically
unthinkable," and also insists there were no military targets "whatsoever"
around the school.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
Comparing the Bahr al-Baqar incident to the Son My episode in Vietnam,
the roundtable panelists and other commentators disparage the State
Department statement on the school raid.. Panelist Druzhnin sounds a
common theme in arguing that without U0S. deliveries of arms and money
and U.S. moral and political support for Israel, peace might have been
restored long ago. A commentary in Arabic, broadcast on the 9th,
asserts that if Washington really wants peace in the region it "should
have promptly stopped the supply of any arms to Israel and checked the
Israeli rulers "
SISCO IN UAR Moscow has given low-keyed attention to Assistant
Secretary Sisco's 10-14 April visit to Cairo. TASS
on the 11th, citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), briefly noted
his arrival and his talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riyad. In the
conversation, TASS said, Riyad set forth UAR views on the crisis,
emphasizing the need to implement the November 1967 Security Council
reso.lu''ion providing for Israeli withdrawal and to restore the legal
rights of the Palestinian people. Also on the 11th and again on the
14th, TASS played up unfavorable Lebanese press comment,
On the 12th TASS reported the Sisco-Nasir talks that day, and Moscow's
domestic service on the 13th, noting that the meeting lasted over two
hours, cited MENA for the report that no statement was published after
the meeting. Moscow added that Sisco would fly to Jordan on the 14th
and would then visit Israel (he in fact left Cairo for Israel via Cyprus
on the 14th), Moscow said that "political observers" believe Israel intends
to ask Sisco for new loans amounting to .1.,5 billion dollars, an increase
over the 1 billion "demanded" by Israel last September, in view of the
"enormous armaments expenditure which has led to serious economic
difficulties." The broadcast said Washington has "already suet" the
Israeli wishes, Secretary Rogers at. a press conference in March having
promised Israel 100 million dollars in economic aid.
Moscow's Arabic-language service reported on the 12th that Nasir in a
speech the previous day had condemned the United States for supplying
Israel with aircr.aft.. A commentary in Arabic bn the 13th pointed out
that Nasir "strongly criticized" the United States at a time when Sisco
is touring Middle East countries trying to dispel Arab "anger and
indignation over Washington's anti-Arab policy." In view of U.S. support
for Israel, the commentary dismissed as "hypocrisy" Sisco's remark in
his arrival statement--not so identified in the broadcast--that the
United States wants to be a friend of all countries in the area. Sisco's
assurance, also in his arrival statement, that the United States favors
implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution was
disparaged by Tsoppi in a 3 April foreign-language commentary which
stressed that the Arabs are ready to fulfill all points of the resolution,
including those guaranteeing Israel's sovereignty, on condition that
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
21
Israel withdraw ,it's tzioop's: ~'f Tsdppil saild. that i.,those.~whb :see, Ca,'gie;am. Hof ;.,i
hope in t'le situation following Washington's decision to postpone the
supply of further planes'.to) Iera6_1? are deluding themselves, in that
the United States has pledged to replace Israeli-aircraft losses--"a
guise for fresh deliveries."
BREZHNEV REAFFIRMS THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS KEY TO PEACE
In his 14 April Kharkov speech, Brezhnev.restates.the Soviet position
that withdrawal of Israeli troops, from the occupied territories is the
only road to a peaceful solution in the. Middle East. This will be
achieved, he says, "as soon as the U.S. leaders understand the entire
hopelessness and danger of their present.. connivance-with the Israeli
aggressors." Brezhnev declares that the prestige of:the United States
and "other Israeli patrons" has never been as low as it is now in the
Arab world and the world as a whole. But he holds "the imperialists,"
rather than the United States specifically, to blame for the "highly
explosive situation" in the region, claiming that they are not reconciled
to the fact that the people of the Arab countries are setting out On the
path of independent development and social progress.
Podgornyy, speaking at a banquet in Teheran. on 25 March, had similarly
characterized the situation as "tense and explosive" and had argued that
Israeli "ruling circles, supported by imperialist and Zionist circles,"
were committing new armed provocations and sabotaging a political
settlement. The Israeli Government's "reckless. policy," Podgornyy said,
represented a. danger to the peoples of the Middle East countries as well
as to countries "in adjacent geographical areas" and to peace and
international security.,
In an uncommon formulation, Brezhnev says that "if it were only a
question of securing the right to security of every state in the
Middle East," peace in the area could have been restored long ago.
He suggests that this has been prevented by the fact that the present
Israeli leaders, with their "excessive ambitions. and expansionist plans,"
and their "overseas patrons" both "need tensions." The Israeli Government
is thus endangering the security of its own people., whose future lies in
good-neighbor relations with the Arabs, he says.. Soviet propaganda has
argued in the past that Israeli policy operates to the detriment of the
Israeli people, but references to the security angle are infrequent.
In one,.such reference, a Shakhov foreign-language commentary last
December complained that '%zhat is called the guarantee of Israel's
security" means the incorporation of occupied Arab lands.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL F'BIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
-22-
Having in`-,:oduced his remarks on the Middle. East with the remark that
the "progressive" Arab regimes have withstood. the. "Israeli aggression"
and become stronger and that Arab friendship with the. Soviet Union and
the socialist world has also grown stronger, .Brezhnev winds up the
passage with a pledge of support for the Arabs. The socialist countries,
he says, are ready to give the "Arab peoples" the "necessary aid" to
thwart the "plans of aggression" in the Middle.East.. Soviet propaganda
had seemed to draw a distinction in the past between. Soviet "support"
for the Arab "peoples" and Soviet assistance to. Arab states. But for
the past two months at least, there has been no distinct pattern in the
support statements. Thus, in early February Kirilenko said at the French
CP congress that the Soviet Uni-)n is rendering "all-round support and
assistance to the people" of the Arab countries; the TASS.statement of
16 February spoke of providing the "necessary support to the Arab
states"; Podgornyy was reported by TASS on 3 March as saying the USSR
renders "utmost support to the Arab countries and peoples"; and routine
comment has employed a variety of combinations.
In a speech in Yerevan on the 1)+th, Kirilenko calls it the duty of all
communists and peaceloving forces to render comprehensive support,
"including armed support," to people struggling against imperialism.
The Soviet Union, he says, has rendered and will render to the Vietnamese
and Arab people "such aid as is required by the interests of their just
struggle."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
WEST GERMANY
SOVIET MEDIA SEE NO "TANGIBLE RESULTS" OF BRANDT'-NIXON TALKS
Soviet commentators conclude that FRG Chancellor Brandt's 10-11 April
talks with President Nixon "did not produce any tangible results,"
that "serious disagreements" between the United States and the FRG
persist, and that the United States disapproves of Brandt's detente
policy despite public expressions of support. Minimal comment from
East German media reiterates the line established before the talks
that both "imperialist" countries agree on most international issues
and that Brandt is badly mistaken in linking his policy with the
Nixon Administration.
Typical of Soviet comment, a Levin commentary broadcast in the Moscow
domestic service on 13 April concludes that Press Secretary Ziegler's
"claim" that the talks were "very valuable" only "expressed emotion
lacking any specific basis." While observing that on a number of
European problems the U.S. and FRG positions "are so close" that the
exchange of views was only a formality, Levin says Ziegler gave a
"diffuse" reply to a question on whether the President had "reassured"
Brandt of support for the FRG's Eastern policy and even disagreed
with the use of the term "reassured." Levin goes on to describe U.S.
foreign policy as having "nothing in common with the interests of
relaxing tension in Europe." It "gives a hostile reception" to
any detente-oriented proposal, including proposals for a European
security conference, the commentator adds, and "one should not be
surprised if Washington tries to hamper Bonn if the latter wants to
make even a minimal contribution" to solving European problems.
One of the most negative Soviet evaluations of the Brandt government
in current propaganda appeared in a Zakharov commentary broadcast to
German listeners on 9 April. Dwelling extensively on "militarist"
aspects of the Brandt coalition, Zakharov said the U.S. visit by
Brandt and Defense Minister Schmidt and their "military-political
program for the Bundeswehr and NATO" demonstrate that the present
Bonn cabinet's policy "is mainly a military" one and that Bonn "does
not emphasize the necessity for detente in Europe." The U.S. talks
confirm that "Bonn still has not" reconciled itself to the
European status quo, Zakharov declared.
A panelist in a Moscow domestic radio roundtable on the 12th asserted
that the Brandt-Nixon talks failed to settle the long-standing
problem of FRG payments to maintain U.S. troops in Europe and added:
"nor can this argument be settled." The same panel noted that "U.S.
and West German imperialists" are united by their "common endeavor to
strengthen the position of capitalism in Europe and to increase tension
with the aim of perpetuating NATO and strengthening it."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
15 APRIL :1910
POLISH COMMENTATORS SEE U.S.-FRG DISCORD ON BRANDT OSTPOLITIK
Polish comment on Brandt's talks with President Nixon oeiZen upon
Brandt's "highly significant statement's" on hia Ea.3tern policy at
the National Press Club to assail him for lack of deeds to follow
up his words, while suggesting that President Nixon has reservations
about the FRG's'astern policy.
PAP dispatches on the 12th and 14th stress that although President
Nixon "in principle" and "generally" expressed approval of Brandt's
Eastern policy, the President "refrained from taking a stand" on
"individual moves" within that policy, and his press secretary
"bypassed in silence many relevant problems" the two leaders
discussed, particularly the U.S. "military presence" in Europe.
A GLOS PRACY article on the 14th, quoted by PAP, points out that
so far Brandt "has only declared his readiness" to reach agreements
with the East but in fact has "made no concrete political moves
yet." It adds that if Brandt continues to confine himself to
"der~larations and demonstrations of goodwill," he will only
strengthen such rightwing leaders as Strauss, Barzel, and Kiesinger.
Polish impatience with the "slowness" of Brandt's Eastern policy
moves is also reflected in an 11 April ZYCIE WARSZAWY commentary
evaluating Brandt's first six months in office. Recalling initial
cautions that Poland would judge Brandt by "deeds, not words," the
paper concludes that so far Brandt's efforts to achieve his policy
goals have been "a total fiasco." Granting that a "change in tone"
is clear, the paper declares that the "avalanche of pronouncements
and declarations" has by no means facilitated a West German
"reappraisal" of policy toward Poland but has actually hampered it.
West German publicity for the mere fact that Bonn has been talking
with Warsaw represents a "conscious attempt to misinform international
public opinion," the paper says. It adds that Brandt seeks to display
to the world "not a real change" in West Germany's policy on Polish
boundaries but only "the fact that it is holding talks with Poland,"
or "the appearance of a new game."
GDR TERMS FRG CHARGES AGAINST STOPH "GRAVE PROVOCATION"
A 14 April statement by "competent circles of the GDR Government,"
carried by ADN, vigorously denouncetj West German "fascists" for a
"new grave provocation" against the GDR in the form of murder charges
brought against GDR Premier Stoph. The charges were filed by a
rightwing West German publisher on 10 April, evidently in hopes of
preventing Stoph's scheduled second summit meeting with Brandt at
Kassel on 21 May.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS PHEND;3
15 APRIL 19'(0
The belated GDR reaction fails to spell out the subutancc of the
charges against Stoph "anti associates," which according to DPA on
the 10th include "murder and other grave capital crimes committed
at the Berlin wall and at the zonal frontier." DPA sayr they were
filed by NATIONAL ZEITUNG editor Gerhaxd Frey. The GDR statement
calls the action a "monstrous occurrence" and a "grave provocation
against the GDR arid its efforts to establish normal and equal
international relations between the GDR and the FRG." It adds
that th' development casts a "revealing light" on the FRG
situation, where "fascists are permitted to publicly pursue
murderous incitement against GDR statesmen" and even FRG judicial
organs "encourage such neonazi provocations."
The GDR statement makes no specific reference to the 21 May Kassel
summit but demands the curbing of "neonaxism and revanchiam" in
the FRG. East Berlin television commentator von Schnitzler, however,
remarks on the 11th that this and other steps by the West German
Government "contrast" w;th FRG public statements in Bonn and at the
Erfurt summit. Von Schnitzler adds that SPD leaders Wehner, Schmidt,
Ehmkc, and Franke are "nearing the standpoint" of such rightwing CSU
leaders as Strauss, who see% to "disrupt all talks between Bonn and
Berlin."
`.LASS has promptly and fully reported the GDR protest statement in its
English transmission late on the 14th, but no Soviet comment is
available.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDIsN'I'IAL T'1311; T'IilE;ND"
15 APRIL 19(0
ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
TIRANA, BELGRADE SHOW INTEREST IN IMPROVED STATE RELATIONS
I~ rther signs of a warming trend in Albanian-Yugoslav relations are
manifout in Belgrade's reaponuc to a lengthy ZEHI I POPULLIT editorial
article on 5 April which pagyu tribute to the Yugoslav role in World
War Ii and utreuscu that deupltc ideological differences, the two
countries' efforts to preserve their independence constitute a common
historical bond.* The Yugoslav press and Foreign Secretariat have
responded positively to the apparent Albanian overture, expressing
cautious hope that, bilateral. cooperation may be improved.
ALBANIAN The Albanian editorial ar:;icle is entitled "The
OVERTURE Significance of the National Liberation Struggle in
the History of the Yugoslav People." Pegged to the
29th anniversary of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, it is notable
for praise of the bravery and historic revolutionary tradition of
the Yugoslav partisans, as well as for vituperative condemnation of
Bulgarian atf.cmpts to "belittle and negate" their achievements. The
article argues that Bulgarian press efforts to demean the Yugoslavs'
own contribution to their country's liberation serve "the hegemoniatic
and aggressive aims of the Kremlin tsars toward Yugoslavia."
Zhivkov' s "clique and its Moscow masters," the paper charges, hope
that by such a campaign "they will be able to create a situation for
their friends, the criminal Rankovic and company, to achieve their
Great Russian Sims."
Granting defensively that the Yugoslav "people" understand Albania's
"irreconciliable ideological differences with the Yugoslav
leadership," ZERI I POPULLIT nevertheless assures them that "the
Albanian people will always be at their side" in the event that
"common enemies" should threaten their freedom and independence.
The assurance carries an implication of the obverse--the hope that
the "courageous" Yugoslavs will reciprocate should Albania be
* Earlier signs of a shift in the Albanian line toward Belgrade in
the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia were
apparent in an 11 April 1969 ZERI I POPULLIT editorial which praised
the Yugoslav "people" and expressed Albanian readiness to support
Yugoslavia in the face of "any aggression." See the 16 April 1969
issue of the TRENDS, page 12.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS T'HEND3
15 APRIL 1970
YUGOSLAV An article in 1301t13A on '( April, reported by TANYUG,
RESPONSE notes with uatiufaction "the tribute" paid to the
Yugoslav people by the Albanian paper and accepts
the idea that the two countries share a common bond in efforts to
maintain their independence in the face of foreign presEures.
Emphasizing the importance of their common interests as opposed
to their continuing differences, the article says: "These
interests may be simply reduced to the maintenance of national
sovereignty, strengthening the independence of our two countries,
and insuring equality in International affairs." This is
especially true, BORBA concludes, "under conditions when the
small countries are increasingly exposed to outside pressures and
interference and when they are denied the right to the autonomous
road of national development."
At a press conference in Belgrade on 9 April, replying to a question
from Prague's RUDE PRAVO correspondent, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat
spokesman Vujica assured him that Yugoslavia has alwtya attached
significance to developing relations with Albania and is currently
"taking concrete steps to normalize them in every field in which
there is mutual interest." He added, according to TANYUG, that he
"favorably assessed" the ZERI I POPULLIT article concerning "the
common struggle" of the peoples of Albania and Yugoslavia "to
preserve the freedom and independence of their countries."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONFIDENTIAL 10131S THENDS
J.'5 APRIL 197O
- 1'li -
HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PARTY SPOKESMEN DISAGREE ON TWO-FRONT IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE
Two recent pronouncements by ?.!ading Hungarian party ideologist Zoltan
Komocsin--in Prague's RUDE P'!,AVO and Budapest' o TAIISADALMI SZEMLE--
underscore the Hungarian party's determination to continue its line of
balanced "two-front struggle" against rightist revisionionn and. leftist
dogmatism, despite an expressed appraisal of the "countcrrevo.Lutiono"
In Hungary in .1956 and Czechoslovakia In 1968 as purely "rightist"
deviations. Komocsin's statements amount to a rebuttal of the position
taken in March by an official party spokesman in occupied Czechoslovakia
to the effect that the main struggle must be directed against the
rightists and that the two-front-struggle slogan inevitably leads to
"centrism."
Consistent with the main document of the June 1969 international party
conference, Moscow's propaganda since the 1968 Czechoslovak liberalization
hats stressed the struggle against right and left "opportunism"--the
Czechoslovak and Chinese deviations, respectively--but has exhibited
caution toward the Hungarians' application of the two-front-struggle
concept to their "socialist democracy." Thus, Brezhnev's speech at
the 25th Hungarian liberation anniversary meeting in Budapest on
3 April and PRAVDA's editorial on the occasion did not include any
mention of right and left deviations, while Kadar's speech at the
meeting duly cited the two-front struggle, with emphasis on the
Hungarian party's avoidance of "rigid dogma" and "stereotyped patterns"
in the building of socialism.
In his interview with RUDE PRAVO on 4 April, keyed to the Hungarian
liberation anniversary, Komocsin declared that the need for "the
struggle on two fronts is justified by objective reality." The
requirements of the class struggle demand avoidance of "rightist
revisionism," and "the struggle against pseudoleftist, sectarian
dogmatism will ensure that . . . we can always approach the realiza-
tion and solution of problems in a creative and re/olutionary spirit."
He added that "it is the deviation against which we do not fight that
becomes the main danger"--a utilitarian paraphrase of the line of the
1957 and 1960.Moscow conference documents that while revisionism is
"the main danger," dogmatism can also become the main danger at
different stages in the development of individual. parties. Defensively,
Komocsin asserted that concentration on both right and left deviations
"naturally does not mean a centrist attitude." He added that "it is
necessary to uncompromisingly oppose centrism, which wavers oetween
the correct class Marxist-Leninist opinions and an open compromise and
betrayal of class interests."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONI"IUL.NTl:AL 1013110, '1'IiENDS
:L5 APRIL 19'(O
The scone line lu pursued In Kornocu:tn'u annivcruary article In the
April luuue of the Hungarian party monthly TAIiSADALMI S'LEMLE.
According to the summary carried by MPI cn the 8th, Komocsin
"forcefully underlined the fact that a two-front fight 'naturally
does not mean some kind o1' centrist conduct"' and that "we must
continue to take uncompromising stands against ccntrium, which
fluctuates between the Marxist-Leninist class view and open
compromise, class treason." This disclaimer was preceded by
rcw,arko on revisionism and dogmatism which are virtually identical
with Komocsin's comments on the subject in the RUDE PRAVO Interview.
In both the interview and the article Komocsin reiterated past
statements by Kadar--pointedly recalled by Brezhnev at the 3 April
meeting--to the effect that national interests must not be asserted
to the detriment of proletarian internationalism.
CZECHOSLOVAK Evidently with the Hungarians in mind, a four-part
POSITION series of articles on ideology by Slovak Communist
Party Secretary Ludovit Pezlar in the 10-13 March
issues of Bratislava PRAVDA had wound up with a condemnation of
the two-front ideological struggle notion. In the final installment,
while granting that "the danger of a 'leftist' faction cannot be ruled
out," Pezlar warned that
if the present Czechoslovak party leadership brought up
in the present conditions in our country the slogan of a
struggle on two fronts, it would not avoid being accused
of centrism--of an attempt o waver between two extremes
at the cost of serious compromises made first of all with
rightwing forces.
Pezlar invoked "all the documents" since the November 1968 CPCZ plenum
resolution in declaring that of "all the dangers" the Czechoslovak
party must face, "the rightwing elements, their platform, and the
rightwing faction in the party are the main targets" of the party's
offensive. As in earlier installments, he pointed out that the danger
from the left does not compare with that from the right, since "there
is no 'leftwing' political platform." He concluded that "pror?lamation
of the 'struggle-on-two-fronts' slogan would mean nothing but service
to rightwing and antisocialist" forces and would "hamper the normalization
process."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
CONF'IDEN'TIAL I'BIJ TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BREZHNEV REITERATES COMPLAINTS MADE AT DECEMBER PLENUM
In Kharkov on 13 and 14 April, Brezhnev delivered two nationally
televised and broadcast speeches to two days. The first of these
was largely a rehash of themes apparently raised at the December
plenum and made public in the 13 January PRAVDA editorial: a
call for more progress in the scientific-technical area, improved
labor discipline and productivity, structural changes in management,
and criticism of unnamed officials for deficient sense of
responsibility and discipline. Brezhnev's failure to make any
sharp criticisms or new proposals reflects again the ineffectiveness
of the present efficiency campaign in bringing about any meaningful
changes.
Although new first deputy chairmen of Gosplan and the State
Committee for Science and Technology were appointed sometime in
early April, these changes simply point up the indecision characteristic
of the campaign. (The appointments were announced only indirectly
on 11 April when PRAVDA reported that T.I. Sokolov had been
replaced as Orel first secretary and L.N. Yefremov as Stavropol first
secretary so that they could take up their new posts in Gosplan
and the science and technology committee.)
Serious shortcomings in Gosplan and the scientific-technical area were
attacked at the December plenum, but no action was taken for four
months. When moves to improve economic leadership finally did occur,
they were on the second-string level, and there has still been no
indication that anyone has been replaced: Yefremov apparently joins
first deputy chairman V.A. Trapeznikov in the science and technology
committee, and Sokolov joins three other first deputy chairmen at
Gosplan (A.A. Goreglyad, V. Ya. Isayev, and V.M. Ryabikov). One
notable feature of the move is the intrusion of career party officials
Sokolov and Yefremov into organs formerly led exclusively by longtime
government and economic officials.
In his 13 April speech, Brezhnev briefly noted that 1970 is to be
"the year of another congress of our communist party."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030015-6
CONF'IDEN'TIAL IBIS TRENDS
15 APRIL 1970
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SHANTUNG CORE GROUP LEADERS NAMED, VISIT "ADVANCED AREAS"
Tsinan radio, in a 4 April report on the dispatch of local study groups
to advanced areas in the country, identified two more Shantung
Provincial Revolutionary Committee (RC) vice chairmen, Li Shui-ching
and Li Yao-wen, as members of the Shantung "party core leading group."
Mu Lin, also an RC vice chairman, had previously been identified as
a member of the core group, in a 12 March Tsinan broadcast.
The composition of the Shantung party core group indicates the growing
influence of old cadres restored to power after being criticized
in the cultural revolution. Mu Lin, former Shantung vice governor
and party secretary, was recently promoted. from the provincial
standing committee to vice chairman of the RC. Li Shui-ching and
Li Yao-wen have served as military leaders in Shantung since the
1950's.
There have been public references to provincial-level core groups for
Inner Mongolia, Heilungkiang, and Kwangtung also in recent months,
but core-group leaders have been identified only for Shantung.
Shantung lags behind most other provinces, nonetheless, in reporting
progress in reconstructing local-level party units. The Shantung
study groups are going to visit Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang,
Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Hunan, Honan, and Shanghai to learn from "their
advanced experiences"--possibly in the field of party-building,
although the propaganda is not explicit on this point. All these
areas, except perhaps Shanghai, have reported fairly substantial
progress in party reconstruction; Hunan and Heilungkiang widely
publicized the setting up of the first new county party committees
for their areas.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030015-6