TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 18, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
Confidential
~IIIIIIIIIIII~Iillllllllllll~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
18 March 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO, 11.)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 . Cb -RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
E.d.ded born aWOrnoik
dorngrodinq end
d.O." (iolion
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA=RDP85TOO875ROO0300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Paris Talks: 12 March Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Son My Anniversary, Protests Against U.S. "Crimes" . . . . . . . . . 3
Solidarity Week, Antidraft Week, 19 March Anniversary . . . . . . . . 4
VPA General Political Department Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
DRV Youth Groups Renamed After Ho Chi Minh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Soviet Media Publicize Sihanouk Talks in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . 7
DRV, PRG Blame "Rightists" for Attack on Embassies . . . . . . . . . 8
NCNA Statement Denies Cambodia Embassy Attacked . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Kosygin Rejects President's Call for Geneva Consultations . . . . . . 12
Hanoi Continues Praise for NLHX Program, Criticism of Nixon . . . . . 13
Pathet Lao Scores U.S. Demand for DRV Troop Withdrawal . . . . . . . 15
Peking Scores Alleged U.S. Combat Presence in Laos . . . . . . . . . 15
Moscow Defends Position of Soviet Jews, Assails Zionism . . . . . . . 17
USSR Speculates on Phantom Decision, U.S. Military Involvement . . . 19
STRATEGIC ARMS
Soviet Press Sustains Attack on U.S. Stand on Arms, SALT . . . . . . 21
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
TASS Statement Denies Soviets Preparing Attack on China . . . . . . . 23
USSR AND EAST EUROPE
Moscow Assails "Selfish" Nationalism, Calls for Integration . . . . . 26
Soviet Maneuvers Imply Warning to Dissident Communist States . . . . 27
GDR Demands Brandt State Views on Draft Treaty at Erfurt . . . . . . 30
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 MARCH 1970
Moscow (3812 items)
Peking (3034 items)
China
(5%)
9.5%
Domestic Issues
(50%)
47%
[TASS Statement
(--)
4%]
Indochina
(6%)
7%
Middle East
(14%)
9%
[Laos
(6%)
7%]
[Zionism and
(2%)
5%]
[Vietnam
(--)
--]
[C
]
Soviet Jews
ambodia
(--)
--
Indochina
(5%)
8%
Kuo Mo-Jo' s Tour
(0.3%)
7%
[Laos
(1%)
4%]
[Nepal
(003%)
4%]
[Vietnam
(3%)
4l]
[Pakistan
(--)
3%]
[Cambodia
(--)
0.1%]
Middle East
(4%)
6%
Soviet Military
Maneuvers
(--)
6%
U.S.-Soviet Cultural
Agreement
(0,1%)
3%
Makarioa Assassination
(--)
3%
Attempt
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the : rends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
- 1 -
VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
HIGHLIGHTS
PARIS TALKS: VNA's arcount of the 58th session of the Paris talks on
12 March features DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's discourse on the
stock theme that U.S. actions in Vietnam and Laos contradict U.S.
professions of a desire to settle the Vietnam conflict peacefully.
A standard attack on the Saigon government was made by PRG representa-
tive Nguyen Van Tien, who had last substituted for delegation head
Mme, ;,inh at the 44th session. VNA does not mention that both dele-
gates denounced previous U.S. suggestions for private talks.
DOWNED U.S. DRONES: VNA claims on the 14th that a U.S. reconnaissance
drone was downed that day over Haiphong and alleges on the 17th that
another was downed over Nghe An Province, bringing Hanoi's total of
U.S. planes downed over the North to 3,335. Seven planes have been
.claimed by Hanoi this year; the last previous alleged downing was on
17 February.
SOUTH VIETNAM: Liberation Radio on the 17th takes note of the 14 March
terrorist attack in Saigon, claiming that extensive damage was done in
a bomb attacx on an administrative building in the third precinct. A
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 14th praises efforts to destroy allied
tanks and armored vehicles and says the resulting allied losses deal
"heavy blows" at Vietnamization.
U~S, "CRIMES": Vietnamese communist comment on the anniversary of the
16 March 3.968 Son Nay "massacre" includes a 12 March southern War Crimes
Commission statement, which charges that the incident at Son Nay was not
an isolated one, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 16th, which refers to
the Son Nay anniversary as "International Day Against U.S. Imperialist
Crimes." Alleged U.S. crimes in the North and South in the first half
of March are reviewed in a crime commission communique carried by VNA
on the 18th.
MOSCOW PROPAGANDA: Soviet propaganda supports the "Day Against U.S.
Crimes." A 16 March commentary in Mandarin over the purportedly
unofficial Radio Peace and Progress uses the occasion to score China
for refusing to participate in a united front against U.S. "aggression"
in Vietnam and to charge that Peking hopes the war will not end.
NORTH VIETNAM: According to a 7 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report, the VPA
General Political Department "recently" held a conference which reviewed
policies anti noted problems in their implementation. On 11 March VNA
carries a VWP Central Committee resolution renaming DRV youth organiza-
tions after Ho Chi Minh.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
PARIS TALKS: 12 MARCH SESSION
PRG ATTACK PRG representative Nguyen V,-.n Tien,* who last headed
ON THE GVN the PRG delegation to the meetings on 28 November 1969,
devoted his statement at the 56th session to a discussion
of President Nixon's consistent position that the South Vietnamese
people's right to self-determination is not negotiable. Viewing this
position as representative of the "obdurate" American attitude and as
part of an Administration effort to deceive public opinion, Tien asked
rhetorically whether the existence of the Thieu-Icy-Khiem administration
is consistent with the right of self-determination. In response, he
launched into a stock diatribe on the nature and actions of the "puppet"
regime, including "cases of repression and persecution within the
Saigon administration itself."
Tien routinely contended that American persistence in maintaining
U.S. forces in South Vietnam and in supporting the "puppet administra-
ti.on" has impeded the progress of the Paris conference. He scored the
United States not only for "evading its responsibility" to "renounce"
the Saigon administration but also for "resorting to maneuvers in an
attempt to legalize it--for instance, to allow it to hold 'private
talks' and organize the so-called 'free elections."' Neither the VNA
nor the LPA account of the session mentions this statement.
DRV CRITICISM The VNA account of the session indicates that DRV
OF U.S. ?OSITION representative Nguyen Minh Vy continued to develop
the standard theme that the Nixon Administration's
recent actions do not match its professions of u desire to settle the
Vietnam conflict peacefully. He coupled a standard attack on
Vietnamization with the claim that "many people in U.S. political
circles" also say the Vietnamization policy is aimed at prolonging
the war. VNA does not report that Vy specifically cited the views
expressed by Senator Muskie in his 5 March speech at the National
Press Club.
VNA notes Vy's charge that the Nixon Administration considers the
Paris negotiations to be secondary to its policy of Vietnamization and
that it maintains a delegation at the conference "for the mere sake
of form.." VNA does nct report that Vy went on to score the U.S.
delegation for having at "recent" sessions "sought to elude the
fundamental questions we raised and advanced proposals on private
meetings, restricted meetings, disct!ssion of specific questions,
VNA on 16 March and LPA on the 17th carry accounts of the departure
of PRG delegation head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh from Paris for a visit
to Algeria. She was seen of'f by Nguyen Van Tien and DRV delegation
member Nguyen Minh Vy, among others, according to VNA.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
etc."* The VNA account records Vy's routine accusations that the
Nixon Administration does not really want to settle the war peacefully
and instead has intensified the war in South Vietnam, stepped up "acts
of war" against the DRV, escalated the war in Laos, and downgraded
the Paris talks "so as subsequently to sabotage" the conference. Vy's
review of statistics on alleged U.S. activities against the North in
February--including the number of reconnaissance missions, bombing
raids, B-52 strikes, and shellings of the northern part of the DMZ--
repeats charges contained in the DRV War Crimes Commission communique
released on 4 March.
ALLIED SPEECHES True to form, VNA brushes off the remarks of the
U.S. and GVN delegates, saying they "shed more light
on the adamant position of the United States and its henchmen." It
notes that GVN representative Nguyen Xuan Phong--substituting for chief
GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam, who is visiting some West European
capitals--"prattled about the so-called 'free elections' and 'respect
for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination' raised
by traitor Nguyen Van Thieu."
VNA says that Ambassador Habib** again took up the POW problem while
"eluding the fundamental problems" contained in the NFLSV-PRG 10-point
solution. It does not mention that Ambassador Habib did not deliver
any formal prepared statement.
SON 14Y ANNIVERSARY, PROTESTS AGAINST U.S. "CRIMES"
Front attention to the 16 March anniversary of the 1968 Son My
massacre is highlighted by a War Crimes Commission communique dated
12 March and broadcast that day by Liberation Radio. The communique
claims that the Son My incident was not an isolated one and describes
* It is not clear what sessions Vy was referring to. At the 8 and
15 January sessions the U.S. delegation formally repeated its bid for
private restricted meetings., Communist media predictably ignored the
post-session piess briefing by U.S. delegation spokesman Ledogar on
12 March at which he commented that there is a standing, open invitation
for the communist side to engage in private meetings and that the
original proposals in this regard made by the delegation last September
still stand, but that the proposals were being repeated at the .12 March
session.
** VNA's English-language report on the session identifies Ambassador
Habib as "deputy head" of the delegation; but this seems to be a VITA
translation error, since VNA reports in French and Vietnamese follow the
usual practice of identifying him as "acting" delegation head.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
- it -
"new massacres" in the South, including "crimes" in Quang Ngai and Quang
Nam in October and November 1969 which have been previously denounced
in propaganda. As usual the communique alleges that "massacres" have
become more numerous-.and systematic since President Nixon came to power.
It further asserts that "at the behest of the White House and Pentagon"
the allies have resorted to "unprecedented war maneuvers to completely
destroy large areas," and it concludes that the people will punish
the allies for their crimes.
A NHAN DAN editorial on 16 March states that the Vietnamese people and
"world public opinion" are denouncing U.S. "crimes" on the occasion of
the 16 March International Day Against the U.S. Imperialists' Crimes in
South Vietnam. The editorial, summarized by VNA, charges that the
allies are effecting Vietnamization by resorting to "barbarous war
maneuvers," A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 16th, broadcast that
day by Hanoi, concentrates on the Son My incident, echoing other
propaganda aiid labeling the Johnson and Nixon "cliques" the "cruelest
war criminals in history."
A communique from the War Crimes Commission released by VNA on 18 March
rounds up U.S. "crimes" during the first half of March. In enumerating
alleged crimes in the South, the communique routinely mentions U.S.
bombing but also attacks Vietnamization and cites Senator Muskie's
comments on 5 March at the National Press Club that the President's
Vietnamization policy can only be a formula for perpetuating the war.
The communique also attacks the Saigon administration for its action
against news publications in the South and states that on 14 March
Ambassador Harriman, "former U.S. chief negotiator" at the Paris
talks, "criticized the arrest and prosecution of Tran Ngoc Chau as an
obvious attempt to silence all South Vietnamese who want peace through
a negotiated settlement." (The quotation is taken from the statement
of the Democratic Party's National Committee, which was made public
by Harriman, responding to the President's 18 February Foreign policy
report.)
SOLIDARITY WEEK, ANTIDRAFT WEEK, 19 MARCH ANNIVERSARY
Hanoi and Front media round. up examples of foreign support occasioned
by the 20th anniversary ~)f National Anti-U.S. Day on 19 March and the
13-19 March week of solidarity with the Vietnamese people, as well as
the 16 March day against U.S. "crimes." A few news reports also note
activities in the United States in connection with the current anti-
draft week, and Hanoi publicizes messages from various DRV organizations
to peace groups in the United States to mark the antidraft week. A
14 March message from the Vietnam Solidarity Committee With the
American People, addressed to the New Mobilization Committee, declares
that "along with your antirepressions counteroffensive, your antitax
day and other activities in your spring offensive, your aritidraft
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
actions this time show the ever more strengthened determination of
the American people in their struggle for an immediate end to the
Only scattered propaganda items are available so far on the 19 March
anniversary of the 1950 Saigon uprising. On the 17th Liberation
Radio broadcasts a letter from Nguyen Huu Tho to the people of
Saigon commemorating the anniversary. The radio reports that the letter
was read by Tho, who had not been reported to have appeared. in public
since November 1969 and thus missed the activities marking the NFLSV
anniversary in December. A belated report on a 12 February meeting
marking the PLAF anniversary--contained in a 16 March Liberation Radio
broadcast of a 25 February QUAN GIAI PHONG article--indicates that Tho
did not attend that meeting. He last attended a PLAF anniversary
meeting in 1966.
VPA GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CONFERENCE
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reports on 7 March that the VPA General Political
Department convened a conference "recently" to review the implementa-
tion of 1969 policies and "propagate the goals and contents of 1970
policies." Maj. Gen. Le Quang Dao, deputy director of the General
Political Department, and Le Dinh Thiep, vice minister of interior,
attended the meeting. The paper reports that the implementation of
policies toward families of heroes and combat troops has made "great
progress." Without spelling out the nature of the problems, the
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report evinces concern over failure "to carefully
comply with regulations and to continue studying the proposals on the
determination, improvement, and amendment of a number of policies."
DRV YOUTH GROUPs RENAMED AFTER Ho CHI MINH
VNA on 11 March carries the text of a resolution issued by the
Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee renaming the Vietnam Work-
ing Youth Union, the Vietnam Young Pioneers Organization, and the
Vietnam Children's Organization after President Ho. The resolution
indicates that the action was sparked by a proposal from the Vietnam
Working Youth Union. The resolution routinely lauds Ho's attention
to youth and his stress on the importance of their education. It
:ails the bearing of "Uncle Ho's" name "a very great honor and respon-
sibility of the younger generations," and it calls on the youth to
follow Ho's example. It also calls on committees of the party,
administration, trade unions, and other groups to fulfill their
responsibility for training "revolutionary generations for the future,"
The name change prompts a flurry of propaganda echoing the resolution
and expressing the determination of young people to carry out their
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
-6-
tasks. Hanoi radio and VNA, on the 11th and 12th respectively, report
a "recent" enlarged conference of the Working Youth Union Central
Committee addressed by Vu Quang, first secretary of the youth group.
The accounts note that the conference adopted a letter from the
group's central committee to the VWP Central Committee, a letter to
the Young Pioneers and children, and an appeal to cadres and members
of the Youth Union. In addition, VNA on the 12th reports the publi-
cation of a special issue of the party paper NHAN DAN greeting the name
changes and notes editorial comment in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN and the youth paper TIEN PHONG (VANGUARD).
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CAMBODIA
18 MARCH 1970
SOVIET MEDIA PUBLICIZE SIHANOUK TALKS IN MOSCOW
The Cambodian National Assembly vote to remove Sihanouk from his post
as Chief of Ctate, announced by Phnom Penh Radio on 13 Aarch, has not
been mentioned in comm:u.ist media rs of this writing. The reported
move took pice while Sihanouk was in Moscow, cn his way home from
Paris in the wake of 11 March incidents in Phnom Penh in which Cambodian
demonstrators ransacked the DRV and PRG embassies to protest Vietnamese
aggression" against their country.
Sihanouk arrived in Moscow on 13 March and had talks with Podgornyy and
Kosygin and met Brezhnev on the 17th for talks which TASS characterized
as "warm and friendly." A TASS English report of Sihanouk's talks with
Podgcrnyy and Kosygin on the 14th dues not indicate their substance,
merely noting that the leaders "discussed questions of further development
of relations between the Soviet Union and Cambodia" and "exchanged
opinions on a number of international problems " The conversation, TASS
says, t,, ok place in an "atmosphere of sincerity and friendship." The
Moscow domestic service version describes the atmosphere as being one of
"frankness and friendship."*
A similar TASS report of talks on the 16th adds that the sides noted
that the "aggression of American imperialists in Vietnam, armed U.S.
intervention in Laos, Provocations of American and Saigon troops
against Cambodia and violation of her neutrality were the main reasons
for the aggravation of the situation in Indochina and in Southeast Asia
a-i a whole." A Budapest MTI version of the report adds--in a passage
not ^a;rried by TASS--that the sides expressed the conviction that if
the United States ceased aggression in Vietnam and intervention in Laos
and desisted from provocations toward Cambodia, and if "all states"
respected Cambodia's neutrality and. territorial inviolability, "this
would result in a restoration of peace in Indochina and would improve
the atmosphere in Southeast Asia as a whole."
The TASS report on the 16 March talks notes that the Soviet Government
confirmed its respect for Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity
and asserted that the USSR would continue to support Cambodia, "headed
by her national leader Samdech Norodoin Sihanouk," in its struggle against
"imperialist" provocations and interference. (In a telegram to his
* There does not appear to be any special significance in the TASS English
usage of "sincerity" where the Moscow domestic uses "frankness" (otkroven-
nost). The meaning of the usual Russian word for sincerity (iskrennost)
is more or less synonymous with frankness (otkrovennost), the term more
commonly used in Soviet communiques on visits.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
- 8 - 18 MARCH 1970
mother reported by AFP on 18 March, Sihanouk said the Soviet leaders
told him that the policies of the Cambodian "right wing" were "extremely
dangerous" and that they offered him "aid of many kinds" to restore
order and neutrality in Cambodia--aid which Sihanouk turned down, He
reportedly quoted Kosygin as warning that if the "extreme right" in
Cambodia continues to deal "low blows" to the Vietnamese, there will
inevitably be war between Cambodia and Vietnam.)
Sihanouk's departure from Moscow is reported by TASS on 18 March, the
first report noting that he left "for home." Another TASS report some
25 minutes later changes this to read merely: Sihanouk "left here."
Sihanouk has been scheduled to visit Peking after his stop in *Moscow.*
Both TASS reports note that Kosygin saw Sihanouk off at the airport.
DRV, PRG BLAME "RIGHTISTS" FOR ATTACK ON EMBASSIES
The 11 March attacks on the DRV and PRG embassies in Ihnom Penh drew
a relatively conciliatory propaganda response from the Vietnamese
communists. Hanoi and PRG media promptly picked up Sihanouk's statements--
including an 11 Mach telegram to his mother--placing blame on "-yightwing
elements" and the Americans. The Vietnamese commu.~ist media describe the
incidents as inconsonant with Sihanouk's "line," thereby further absolving
him of personal responsibility. The DRV and PRG choxges d'affaires ad
interim protested the incidents and demanded compensation, but called at
the same time for a meeting to remove "problems" in relations with
Cambodia. They did not specify that the "problems" included Cambodia's
demand that the DRV and PRG withdraw their tror:ps from Cambodian territory
by the morning of 15 March, Followup Vietnamese communist propaganda,
including three NHAN DAN Commentator articles, stresses the need to
settle pending questions and strengthen the solidarity of the Indochinese
countries against the "common enemy," the United States.
Moscow and Peking both carry reports of the initial DRV and PRG protests,
Sihanouk's 11 March telegram to his mother, and the DRV and PRG proposals
for a meeting with Cambodia. Moscow's reports are prompt, but Peking's
first, belated acknowledgment comes in a 16 March NCNA "authorized"
statement, followed by other NCNA reports.
* Peking has not so far mentioned Si.hanouk's pending visit. Phnom Penh
media on the 16th, but not Peking, reported an exchange of messages
between Chou En-lai and Sihanouk in which Chou expressed pleasure at
Sihanouk's acceptance of his invitation to visit Peking and Sihanouk
expressed gratitude for''Chinese arrangements for the forthcoming visit.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
-9-
11 MARCH Hanoi first acknowledged the sacking of the DRV and PRG
INCIDENTS embassies in a VNA report the following day which noted
that the respective charges d'affaires had met with
Cambodian Foreign Minister Phurissara to protest the actions. According
to VNA, they "stressed that +'ese acts ran counter.;to the line" of
Prince Sihanouk, impaired Cambodian-Vietnamese friendship, contravened
international law, and "only benefited the U.S. aggressors." Liberation
Radio carried an identical report on the 13th.
On the 13th VNA reported the 11 March message from Sihanouk in Paris
to his mother, quoting his expression of "deep sadness" at the events
and his claim that the actions were organized by "individuals aiming
to destroy irreparably the friendship between Cambodia and the socialist
bloc, throwing our country into the arms of a capitalist, imperialist
power." VNA predictably omitted Sihanouk's expression of understanding
of "the motives which aroused our compatriots', anger."
Also on the 13th, VNA reported Sihanouk as declaring in his speech over
French TV that the "right" had used his long absence to try to "change
the political and ideological orientation of Cambodia" and force it'~
into the "American camp." VNA naturally ignored his announcement that
he would go to Moscow and Peking to ask them to tell the "Viet Minh" and
"Viet Cong" to leave Cambodia, and 1.s warning that if they did not do
so Cambodia might "go over to the American camp."
A NEAN DAN Commentator article on 14 March stresses Vietnamese determina-
tion to defend solidarity with the Cambodians, blaming the embassy
sackings on "a number of saboteurs" who want to harm the friendship
of the two countries. The Commentator article cites Sihanouk's French
TV speech, noting his charges that there had "certainly been contacts
between the Americans and the Cambodian right wing" and that the United
States would like to "penetrate" Cambodia to change its politics and
ideology. The article accuses the United States of scheming to pit
the Indochinese people against each other in accordance with the "Nixon
doctrine" of "making Asians fight Asians." It praises Sihanouk for his
"clearsighted leadership" and resistance to U.S. "threats and encroachments,"
and it says the Vietnamese regard the Cambodians as their "comrades-in-arms
against the common enemy," U.S. imperialism. Liberation Radio, in
commentaries on the 13th and 14th, similarly stresses the need for
solidarity among the Indochinese peoples against the "common enemy."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCII 1970
TRIPARTITE
MEETING
Hanoi and Liberation media did not report the EKG notes
to the DRV and PRG, publicized in the Phnom Penh domestic
service on 13 March, demanding that the two governments
withdraw all their troops from Cambodian territory by the morning of
15 March. Instead, on the 14th, VNA reported that the DRV charge
d'affaires called on the Cambodian Foreign Ministry and informed it of
a DEW Government "proposal on a settlement of problems arising between
the parties concerned." Without identifying the "problems," the proposal
demanded that the RKG punish those responsible for the embassy incident
and pay compensation, stressed the DRV's desire to maintain good-neighbor
relations with Cambodia, and suggested that "to remove hindrances" to
relations between the two countries, the parties concerned meet on
15 March or at any other time suitable to Cambodia. On the 15th,
Liberation media carried a similar proposal made by the PRG charge
d'affaires,
Both Hanoi and Liberation media followed up the proposal to hold talks
with comment. A NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 15th called for
negotiations settle pending questions in the interests of Vietnamese-
Cambodian friendship. It said the "deep cause" of "complicated problems"
in the relations between the two countries was "the aggression by the
U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam and their schemes to abolish the
independence and neutrality of Cambodia," and it urged that the two
countries "unite" to fight "U.S. aggression." LPA commented in a similar
vein on the 15th.
Another NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 16th, praising the agreement
on the meeting, "welcomed" reports that Sihanouk's mother had "intervened
firmly" to put an end to acts of violence against Vietnamese property in
Phnom Penh. At the same time, expressing "regret" that "statements and
articles in a number of Phnom Penh papers" had continued to generate
"national enmity" and to present the Vietnamese "as the aggressor against
Cambodia," the Commentator article called upon the Cambodian aide to make
efforts to create a "favorable atmosphere" for talks.
Cambodia's agreement to hold a meeting of the three governments on the
16th'was promptly reported by Hanoi, but Moscow media so far carry the
only available communist reports that the meeting actually took place.
There is thus far no communist acknowledgment of the outcome of the
talks, at which Western media say no progress was made.
The DRV acknowledges for the first time, and denies, reports of Cambodian-
North Vietnamese military clashes in an 18 March VNA report of a Hanoi
radio commentary. The commentary says that on 16 March AP carried a
"ccoked-up story" that "a battle had taken place between two Cambodian
and North Vietnamese battalions for four hours" in Svay Rieng Province.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
Calling this a maneuver by the U.S. imperialists to provoke enmity
between Cambodia and Vietnam, the commentary cites APP as reporting
that "reliable sources" in Phnom Penh had denied that the clash took
place.
NCNA STATEMENT DENIES CAMBODIAN EMBASSY ATTACKED
Peking first acknowledges the 11 March disturbances in Cambodia on
the 16th with an "authorized" NCNA statement* which says that
following the Phnom Penh events "a rumor came from Phnom Penh that
Vietnamese nationalu in Peking demonstrated in front of the embassy
of Cambodia in China and wrecked" it. NCNA adds that on 14 March
a press release of the Cambodian "Opposition Cabinet"--presumably
the publication LE "CONTRE-GOUVERNMENT" DU SANGKUM REASTR NIYUM--
exp.ressed hope that the rumor was fabricated. NCNA pronounces the
rumors "complete fabrications" by people with "ulterior motives"
and says that Chou En-lai pointed this out to the Cambodian
ambassador on the 15th, expressing regret over the Phnom Penh
incidents. The Cambodian ambassador, according to NCNA, said that
the embassy and its personnel were "perfectly safe." Hanoi briefly
reports the NCNA denial in a VNA commentary attributed to Hanoi radio
on 18 March. (Sihanouk's message to his mother from Moscow, as reported
by AFP on the 18th, said Chou En-tai had expressed to him--through
the Cambodian ambassador--China's "concern" over the events in Phnom
Penh, adding that "for the moment China maintains its calm over the
provocations with which its Phnom Penh embassy is threatened.")
* This is the first authorized NCNA statement since 20 July 1969, when
NCNA refuted African charges that the PRC issued stamps featuring
"revolutionary leaders and groups" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
There has been no known previous NCNA statement on Ce bodia.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
LAOS
KOSYGIN REJECTS PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR GENEVA OONSULTATIONS
Kosygin's message to President Nixon rejecting the President's
"support of the proposal for consultations between the signatories
of the Geneva conference on Laos" was summarized by Radio Moscow
late on 15 March but has yet to be publicized in full. The message
is responsive to the President's announcement on 6 March that he
backed Souvanna Phouma's bid to the Soviet and British Geneva
cochairmen--in letters to them on 28 February--for consultations
under Article IE of the 1962 agreement on Laos. Kosygin's letter--
also summarized in the press--does not directly acknowledge that the
President sent Letters of his own to the cochairmen asking their help
in restoring the 1962 agreements. Kosygin calls the President's
"support" for Souvanna's move "unrealistic in the present situation"
when the United States is "expanding armed interference" in Laos and
the coalition government "has been paralyzed as a result of the actions
of the rightwing forces."
Kosygin's letter gives the first official Soviet support to the NLHX
five-point program, stating that "it is necessary to begin the
restoration of peace in Laos by consultations between the political
forces of the country" and that the NLHX has put forward a "concrete
and very realistic five-point program for a settlement." The letter
briefly reviews the content of the five points and repeats the demand
that the bombing be halted "completely and unconditionally." It goes
on to stress the necessity "first and foremost to stop American
interference in Laotian affairs" and of "Vientiane not departing from
the position of neutrality envisaged by the Geneva agreements."
Kosygin welcomes the "contacts being arranged" between Souvanna and
Souphanouvong and expresses the belief that "if American intervention
is stopped" the contacts "would make it possible to reduce tension in
Laos and create conditions for a political settlement." He declares
that the Soviet Government will "continue to make every effort to
get hostilities in Laos stopped and conditions created for the
development of the country in peace, independence, and neutrality."*
* There is no available communist mention of the 11 March French statement
calling for an end to all foreign intervention in Laos and a return to the
1962 Geneva agreement. Rejecting any "false solution," the statement
offered French help in reaching a "true" solution "when the time comes."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
Soviet comment, including an IZVESTIYA article by Matveyev on 12 March
and a PRAVDA article by Korionov on the 14th, expressed continuing
concern over alleged U.S. escalation in Laos. On the 17th TASS
promptly reports that Jndersecretary Richardson, testifying before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the day before, "made it clear
that the United States is not going to end its military operations in
Laos" and said "specifically" that the chief executive "does not need
Congressional approval to continue bombing raids in Laos." `PASS notes
that Senator Fu.lbright made public Secretary Rogers' earlier comment
that the United States has no "present" plans for using ground troops
in Laos, although this did not mean the Administration would not consider
such plane in the future. TASS reports Richardson's qualification of
Rogers' statement that Congressional approval of such a move would be
sought, noting that he said the Administration would not feel committed
to ask Congress.
A later TASS report on the 17th notes briefly that Secretary Rogers,
speaking on television that day, reiterated that the United States had
no present plans to send ground combat troops to Laos but that this did
not rule out the possib4-lity of the President reconsidering his attitude
if the situation required. TASS does not, of course, report that Rogers
expressed concern over present communist military actions in Laos.
Some Moscow ccmment attributes to the United States a strategy for
spreading aggression throughout and even beyond Indochina. Aleksey
Leontyev, for example, in a commentary broadcast in English to South
Asia on the 13th, says Washington regards Laos as "an important
strategic area in Asia, a kind of gateway to Asia which can be used
for the suppression of the national liberation movement in Indochina."
He notes in this connection that Laos has common borders with North
Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, and "other countries," without naming China.
A domestic service broadcast on the 13th points to a coincidence between
U.S. attempts to "extend the Vietnamese war to neighboring Laos" with
the "intensification of American provocations" against Cambodia--that
is, the attacks on the DRV and PRG embassies there.
HANOI CONTINUES PRAISE FOR NLHX PROGRAM, CRITICISM OF NIXON
Hanoi continues its enthusiastic praise for the NLHX five-point program
with publicity for a "grand meeting" sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland
Front in Hanoi on the 12th. The Hanoi domestic service on the 13th
reports that Tran Huu Duyet, Secretary General of the Fatherland Front,
voiced the Vietnamese people's "full support" of the five-point program--
an "initiative of paramount importance." He referred to the Vietnamese
and Laotian people's "mutual aid" and said they have always "stood side
by side" in the struggle against the common enemy. Phau Phimphanchan,
the director of the NLHX Information Bureau in Hanoi, thanked the Vietnamese
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
- Ill -
for their support, saying that the Vietnamese people are "not only
close neighbors but also trustworthy comrades in arms." He added
that "our long-tested militant solidarity and fraternal kith-and-kin
relations" have been further consolidated through struggles against
the French and the Americans.
Both speakers at the meeting repeated the demand in the 6 March NLHX
statement that "to create conditions for the parties concerned in
Laos to meet" the United States must stop all acts of intervention
and aggression, "first and foremost stop escalating the war and
bombing Laotian territory without posing any condition whatsoever."
A 16 March NHAN DAN commentary carries forward Hanoi's criticism of
President Nixon's 6 March statement, saying that "the situation in
Laos is utterly grave and varies completely from Nixon's allegations."
It takes issue with the President's remarks to *'ie effect that the
United States has "only over 1,000 advisers and military men of various
kinds" in Laos, that the United States has no combat troops in Laos,
and that no American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground
combat operations. After enumerating other alleged U.S. moves to escalate
the war in Laos--including intensified bombing--the commentary labels
President Nixon's statement that the United States wants to see a return
to the Geneva agreements, leaving the Laotian people to settle their own
differences in a peaceful manner, a "deceitful allegation" that has
been unmasked by realities.
Speaking at the 12 Mesrch session ~jf the Paris talks on Vietnam, nRV
delegate Nguyen Minh Vy called the President's statement an "open
admission," although only a partial one, of the fact that the United
States has for years "directly taken part" in the war in Laos. He
cited the 6 March NLHX statement and the 9 March DRV Government statement
in tracing the origin of the present tension in Laos to U.S. escalation,
and he repeated the demand that the United States "first of all" stop
escalating the war and "completely and unconditionally put an end" to
the bombing so that the parties concerned can settle the internal affairs
of Laos themselves.
PRG COMMENT Following customary practice, the PRG echoed Hanoi's
support for the NLHX with official statements of its
own. A PRG Government statement dated 11 March, carried by LPA on the
13th, supports the NLHX five-point program. (The PRG Foreign Ministry
had similarly endorsed the 20 February NLHX Central Committee statement
on U.S. B-52 bombings in the Plain of Jars.) Further support for the NLHX
program is expressed in an LPA editorial, publicized on 13 March, which
also criticizes President Nixon's 6 March statement for advancing the
"piratical argument" that the aim of U.S. bombings in Laos is to preserve
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FISTS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
U.S. lives in South Vietnam. The military victories in the Plain of
Jars are applauder i.n two messages on 8 March, one from Nguyen Iluu Tho
and Huynh Tan Phat to Prince Souphanouvong and the other from the PLAF
Command to the LPLA High Command, both carried by Liberation Radio on
14 March.
PATHET LAO SO)RES U.S. DEMAND FOR DRV TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Publicity for the five-point NLHX program and criticism of the
President's 6 March statement continued in Pathet Lao media, with a
15 March Pathet Lao radio commentary charging the President with
setting conditions for a Laos settlement. The commentary says the
President "arrogantly demanded that the so-called North Vietnamese
troops be pulled out of Laos," making the withdrawal "a condition for
a meeting between all sides concerned with the Laos problem." It adds
that the U.S. State Depprtment harp "clearly stated that Washington regards
the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Laos as its basic condition
in settling the Laos question," and it cites AFP as reporting on 12 March
that Souvanna Phouma said "U.S. bombing raids would end only when the
North Vietnamese troops are withdrawn." The Pathet Lao commentary also
scores RLG General Kouprasith Abhay for playing the "farce" of displaying
DRV prisoners at a Vientiane press conference on the 12th.
Communist media are not known to have mentioned the press interview granted
by Soth Pethrasi, the NLHX representative in Vientiane, in which--as reported
by Western sources--he said that a "total and unconditional American
bombing halt" was a "precondition" for talks between the Laotian parties.
IZVESTIYA on 14 March does report, citing AFP, that Pethrasi'said that "as
soon as the raids on Laos cease the NLHX will be ready to begin talks with
American representatives on freeing the U.S. pilots taken prisoner in
Laos." A panelist in the 15 March Moscow domestic service roundtable
discussion takes similar note of Pethrasi's remark.
PATHE T LAO The Pathet Lao radio reported on 16 March that Prince
EMISSARY Souvanouvong's emissary--whose appointment had been
announced by the radio on the lath--had "left the
liberated area for Vientiane" on the 16th to carry messages to
Souvanna Phouma and the King. On the 18th Hanoi's domestic service
reported his arrival in the DRV capital the preceding day.
PEKING SCORES ALLEGED U.S. OOMBAT PRESENCE IN LAOS
Peking comment continues to avoid bringing up the idea of a peaceful
settlement in Laos, focusing on charges of U.S. aggression. An NCNA
commentary on 13 March broaches the issue of Chinese security in
noting that American airmen fly support missions in "liberated areas"
of Laos and in "areas close to the borders of China and the DRV." This
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
-16-
18 MARCH 1970
commentary cites the "U.S. peeao" as divulging that the United States
has been sending in "large numbers of advisers" for a "long time" and
that "recently" it sent in "ground forces" in civilian guise to take
"direct part" in attacks. NCNA also asserts that U.S. troops stationed
in South Vietnam and Thailand have repeatedly crossed Laotian borders to
carry out combat missions, after which some return to their bases and
others remain in Laos. NCNA does not acknowledge that such charges were
made by Senator Cranston on 9 March.
Other NCNA commentaries point to alleged activities of the CIA in Laos,
citing the Western press. NCNA says such activities expose President
Nixon's "lies" about "reducing U.S. involvement" in Laos. A "worker-
peasant-soldier battlefield article" by a PLA man, carried by NCNA in
Chinese on 12 March, once again labels as a "complete lie" President
Nixon's 6 March statement that U.S. involvement in Laos is designed
"to protect American lives and to create conditions for restoring peace
throughout the Indochinese peninsula."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW DEFENDS POSITION OF SOVIET JEWS, ASSAILS ZIONISM
Soviet comment on the Middle East has markedly diminished, from 14 percent
of total comment to nine percent in the week ending 15 March. More than
half this material (onsists of anti-Zionist propaganda, along with
publicity for statements by Soviet Jews denouncing "anti-Soviet slander"
by Israel and professing support for the Soviet policy of seeking a
peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The protest campaign
as such has virtually disappeared from the propaganda--the last available
report of protest meetings came from TASS on the 12th--and material on
the Middle East has tended to lose its place of prominence in TASS press
reviews in the last few days. As the third subject in the review on the
18th, however, TASS does say the papers continue to publish letters from
Soviet people "expressing their indignation" at Israeli behavior.
ANTI-ZIONIST The anti-Zionist drum-beating goes into the fourth- week,
CAMPAIGN sustained at a high volume; the material is broadcast to
a wide range of foreign audiences, so far excluding
apparently only the Yugoslavs. The propaganda stresses standard themes
of the "racist" and anticommunist" nature of Zionism and its "class
essence" which "meets the interests of the bourgeoisie and not the people."
Commentaries cite Lenin on the question of anti-Semitism and again hail
the efforts of working Jews in Israel and other countries, at the same time
praising the "courageous" Israeli Communist Party for demanding cessation
of the "aggression unleashed by the Zionists" in the Middle East.
Propagandists also dwell on the common topic of "U.S. imperialist support"
for Zionism, a 10 March TRUD article warning of the dangers of the
"triple alliance" of "U.S. imperialism, Israeli militarism, and inter-
national Zionism."
Occasional broadcast attention to Zionism in the past year has not
approached this level of publicity, and Moscow's motives in extending
ths present campaign at this volume are unclear. The Zionist aspect,
along with protests by Soviet Jews, entered Moscow's broad campaign against
Israeli "aggression" some four days after the first publicity, on
20 February, for protest meetings in the USSR. The protest campaign
seemed to peak on 2 March--a "day of world protest against bombing of
civilians," according to a 21 February annouhcement in Cairo by the
secretary general of the World Peace Council. The 2 March protest day
might have been timed to coincide with the deadline for the U.S.
decision on further deliveries of aircraft to Israel; President Nixon
had said at his 30 January press conference-that a.decision would be
made within the next 30 days.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 19'lO
- 18 -
The the"xy that the Soviet protest campaign presaged an announcement
of some "important Soviet decision" had been aired by Cairo AL-AHRAM
editor Haykal in a Cairo television interview on 10 March--when the
campaign of protest meetings was already abating. Speaking about
Soviet arming of the Araos during the interview, Haykal said that
after the 1967 defeat the USSR "established a direst air bridge with
us" and "did not withhold assistance." He seemed to indicate, however,
that the Soviets had not agreed to all UAR equipment requests, remarking
that "it gave us all that was requested of it, or at least all that was
agreed upon."
Background: Zionism received broadcast attention last May in a series
of Moscow broadcasts in Arabic based on a book by Ivanov, "Beware of
Zionism." And in December last year anti-Zionist articles by Plotkin
in the 12 December PRAVDA and by Berenshteyn and Fridel in the 14 December
IZVESTIYA were publicized in foreign-language broadcasts. The PRAVDA
article argued that the "Jewish question" was solved in the USSR by the
October Revolution and claimed that anti-Semitism was "profoundly
alien to the Soviet people."
The IZVESTIYA article, responding to Israeli Prime Minister Golda
Meir's "initiation of the latest anti-Soviet subversion" in a "prov,-
cative speech" to the new Knesset, insisted that charges of anti-
Semitism in the USSR were "blatant fabrications." IZVESTIYA's
comments on the question of emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel have
not reappeared in current anti-Zionist propaganda: the paper noted that
the Knesset had adopted a resolution stating that the Soviet Union
should allow those who desire to emigrate to Israel to do so. The
paper asserted that "in principle Soviet law resolves with the greatest
democracy the question of those who wish to emigrate," and it added:
When certain Soviet Jews (they were mainly elderly people) have
desired to leave the USSR and join their relatives abroad, includ-
ing those in Israel, they have received and are receiving such an
opportunity. If the granting of such an opportunity in relation
to Israel has been complicated in the last two and a half years,
none other than Israel is to blame for this; because of its
aggression against the Arab countries the USSR has broken off
diplomatic relations with it.
SOVIET JEWS Moscow acknowledged a statement by pro-Zionist Soviet
Jews reported by Western correspondents, IZVESTIYA on
the 12th complaining of the correspondents' circulation of "an anonymous
-Letter, which they called 'a statement by a group of Moscow Jews' who
are ready, the 'statement' says," to set off for Israel. Claiming that
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
the style of "this 'document'" is "remarkably similar to the slanderous
writings" by Western specialists in "ideological diversion and slander,"
IZVESTIYA cautioned the correspondents that they are not accredited to
the USSR as representatives of international Zionism, "and this must
be remembered."
Moscow implicitly responded on the 12th to Western press reports from
London on the same day that an appeal had been received from Jews
in Riga, Latvia, to be allowed to emigrate to Israel. The domestic
service reported on the 12tr that Latvian Jews at a press conference in
Riga protested "criminal actions" of the Israeli "extremists" and
"resolutely rebuked the Israeli leaders who try to falsify Soviet
policy on the nationality question." The Riga Jews' statement continued
to get propaganda attention, with TASS reporting the press conference
on the 13th and PRAVDA the following day publishing a TASS report of the
statement.
Statements by Ukrainian Jews are also played up in the propaganda,
and on the 18th TASS reports a letter by a group of Soviet Jewish
physicians "demanding an end to Israeli aggression." Moscow at the
same time responds to Israeli statements in the United Nations regard-
ing treatment of Jews in the USSR. TASS reported on the 16th that
the Soviet mission at the United Nations sent a letter to the
Security Council president "strongly protesting" the circulation as
an official Security Council document of a statement by Israeli
Foreign Minister Eban containing "pronouncements of a clearly
slanderous character on questions which are fully and completely
within the internal competence of the USSR."
USSR SPECULATES ON PHANTOM DECISION. U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
Soviet propaganda continues to bring up the impending decision on further
U.S. aircraft deliveries to Israel. Noting American press speculation
on the question, Mayevskiy in the 12 March PRAVDA says one gets the
impression that U.S. officials are reviewing American policy in the
Near East and that "this is fraught with even greater interference in
the affairs of this region under cover of an anti-Soviet hubbub."
Commenting on articles by columnists Reston and Alsop and remarks by
Eugene Rostow, Mayevskiy says Reston's and Rostow's remarks had
"something suspiciously in common" with Alsop's "appeals for open U.S.
military intervention in support of Israel," and he wonders if there
are not some people in Washington "thinking about a 'Near East Vietnam'"
to save the U.S. oil profits in the area.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
RED STAB on the 15th, pointing to Israeli impatience over the delaying
of the U.S. decision "beyond the promised period," says the accumula-
tion of weapons and the creation of a military industry have always
been the foremost concern of "Israeli Zionist leaders," whose policy is
one of force. Only the help of "imperialist powers" in supplying and
producing arms, and the constant training and retraining of military
cadres explain Israel's military supremacy over the Arabs, RED STAR
says, dismissing the "myth" of "special qualities" of the Israeli
army and unusual abilities of its commanders. Acknowledging Israeli
air superiority "for the present," RED STAR cites Nasir's remarks on
a UAR pilot shortage in a LE MONDE interview. The UAR training pro-
gram "after some time" will undoubtedly alter the present air balance,
the paper says, adding that Tel Aviv, aware of this, is seeking to
enlist in the Israeli forces "a still greater number of military
specialists--mercenaries from Western countries--and above all pilots."
CHARGES OF DIRECT An article in IZVESTIYA on the 15th by Svetlov
U.S. INVOLVEMENT charges that the United States is not only
supplying arms but is "closing its eyes to the
direct participation by AmeLican citizens" in Israel's "aggression."
Recalling the "U.S. Government, decision" to "permit Americans to serve
in the Israeli armed forces without losing their citizenship," Svetlov
asserts that Israel is recruiting U.S. soldiers in West Germany on
short-term contracts for service in Israel, "with the private knowledge
of the American military authorities." TASS on the 17-;h picks up a Cairo
AL-AHRAM report that 80 U.S. pilots of Jewish nationality have been
"invited to Israel to pilot Phantom planes." In the 4 March PRAVDA
Glukhov had said it was common knowledge that the supply of Phantoms
to Israel began in September 1969 and that "a group of pilots, who
retained their American citizenship, left the United States for Israel."
The only monitored reference to Soviet volunteers comes from an Arab
source. The Damascus office of the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported on
the 15th that Mufti of Central Asia and-Soviet Kazakhstan Babakhanov,
visiting in Jordan, said that Soviet Moslem youth are reporting to the
mosques to register their names "as volunteers in the ranks of the
strugglers to save al-Aqsa Mosque and the occupied lands in Palestine."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
STRATEGIC ARMS
SOVIET PRESS SUSTAINS ATTACK ON U.S. STAND ON ARMS. SALT
A spate of central press articles sustains the Soviet propaganda attack
on U.S. weap,)ns programs and thi U.S. approach to next month's
strategic ar.,4 limitation talks (SALT) in the wake of the authoritative
7 March PRAVDA Observer article which underscored Soviet concern over
U.S. defense policy. Most notably, an article in the 14 March IZVESTIYA
by chief editor L. Tolkunov is on balance more negative than the PRAVDA
Observer article, though it concludes that there is still hope for
braking the arms race. Tolkunov says it is obvious that the strategic
arms talks must not be used as a "screen to conceal a stepped-up arms
race" and that Washington must realize this "while there is still time
and the opportunity has not been lost." An International Review article
by V. Korionov in the 15 March PRAVDA echoes the Observer commentary in
reaffirming the USSR's "seriousness" toward the impending Vienna talks
and in calling "a serious, honest approach" an indispensable condition
for the success of the negotiations.
The Tolkunov article, which sums up the writer's impressions during a
recent visit to the United States, deplores the decision to move for-
ward with plans for the Safeguard ABM system, particularly its timing.
Tolkunov acknowledges that Secretary Rogers and other high U.S.
officials assured him that the United States does not wish to deceive
the USSR in the Vienna phase of SALT and "aspires to talks on a serious,
dispassionate basis and with consideration of objective reality." He
also notes that these officials said the decision related only to
budgetary questions and "cannot have an effect on the course" of SALT.
But "other American figures," Tolkunov says, view the decision as
"evidence of a strengthenirg of those military and political circles
which do not want to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union."
He points to a stepup in activities of those interested in a new spiral
of the arms race--"consciously planned actions calculated to thwart
possible agreement," directed by "the same old military-industrial
complex . . . screaming about the Soviet threat." And he cites Senator
Mansfield for the statement that "the extension of the ABM system may
jeopardize" SALT.
CONCEPT OF In assailing the activities of the military-industrial
"SUFFICIENCY" complex, Tolkunov appears to reverse an earlier posi-
tive Soviet propaganda assessment of President Nixon's
choice of the phrase "nuclear sufficiency." Comment following the
President's 27 January 1969 press conference had welcomed his use of
this word ;.n place of nuclear "superiority;" a foreign-language broadcast
the day after the press conference noting the belief of "some observers"
that this "fundamental change" in phraseology reflected a "more realistic"
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBI S TREZDS
18 MARCH i370
approach to questions of foreign policy, A PRAVDA artS.cle on 29 January-
1969, noting the President's use of "sufficiency," said he explained
that the notion of superiority "has a detrimental effect and gives an
impetus to a new ambitious arms race." Tolkunov now comments that
"the verbosity of such terminology [sufficiency] well suits its authors."
He remarks that sufficiency "sounds sensible and nonaggressive" while
leaving "total room for maneuver," since "in absolute terms the level
of 'sufficiency' is in no way defined or restricted: it can be any-
thing, including an unrestrained arms race." Naming Secretary Laird as
the chief spokesman of those advocating nuclear "supremacy," Tolkunov
says that t'aere are in fact no contradictions between them and the
"sufficiency" spokesmen and that the two groups "closed their ranks
when the Ad-ministration dragged the Safeguard bill through Congress."
DECISION The PRAVDA Observer article had not mentioned MIRV's and
ON MIRV'S Tolkunov mentions them only briefly, noting that a
report of the Stockholm International Peace Institute
sees SALT "threatened" by the U.S. decision to develop MIRV's. But
IZVESTIYA articles on 12 and 18 March and a RED STAR article on the
14th are pegged to the 11 March announcement by Air Force Secretary
Seamans that the United States had decided to proceed with deployment
of the weapons system as early as June 1970. The RED STAR article,
by Berezin, charges that during the last few months the Pentagon has
tried to "put spokes in the wheels of the 'Helsinki-Vienna' express"
and that the MIRV decision represents one such spoke. Noting expressions
of concern in the foreign press that +,he decision endangers SALT,
the author concludes on his own authority that it poses "a serious
threat" to the talks and that it has been taken "for the benefit of,
and under pressure from, America's powerful military-industrial
complex."
The MIRV decision had been reported promptly by Radio Moscow on the
11th and treated in a foreign-language commentary by Vavilov the
following day. TASS on the 12th reported at some length on Congressional
opposition to MIRV deployment, including Senator Percy's suggestion that
the United States "freeze immediately" the production of offensive and
defensive strategic missiles and advance such a proposal at SALT.
Reporting Secretary Rogers' 17 March remarks on television, TASS says
he defended the Administration's plans to begin deployment of MIRV's
and "maintained that these plans would not affect" the Vienna talks.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
TASS STATEMENT DENIES SOVIETS PREPARING ATTACK ON CHINA
Issuing a TASS statement on 14 March denying that the Soviet Union is
undertaking military measures along the Sino-Soviet border in preparation
for an attack on China, Moscow has again sought to counter Western
speculation over Soviet intentions and has reaffirmed a resolve to
improve Sino-Soviet relations through the Peking talks. In taking
exception to Western "insinuations" regarding Soviet actions on the
border, the TASS statement seems designed to offset an impression that
Moscow is seeking to exert military and psychological pressure on the
Chinese. The statement may be intended not only for the propaganda
record--in effect rebutting leaked Chinese charges of Soviet military
pressure on the border--but also to bolster those elements in Peking
favorable to the negotiations and subject to pressures from hardline
elements.
Peking is silent on the border dispute and has initiated no new attacks
on the Soviets, although the Chinese keep the ideological conflict alive
through the proxy of "Iranian revolutionarius" who have attacked Brezhnev
and Kosygin by name.
TASS STATEMENT The "authorized" TASS statement of 14 March,* published
in the central press and widely broadcast, dismisses
Western reports of "major military actions" by the Soviets on the border
with China as anticommunist propaganda inventions designed to hamper the
Peking talks and to increase tension in Sino-Soviet relations. According
to the statement, released as the "Dvina" exercises in Belorussia were
concluding, the Soviet armed forces "are on their routine duty, raising
their combat efficiency under their usual plans and programs and
strengthening the defenses of the Soviet state throughout its territory."
The statement complains that the Western reports--attributed to "the
bourgeois press and the ruling circles of certain imperialist states"--
are taken up by Chinese propaganda in the current war preparedness
campaign,
* There have been TASS statements in recent months on a variety of
subjects, though not on Sino-Soviet relations. The last such statement
involving China was a 14 July 1966 statement denouncing Western reports
of Soviet-U.S. collusion on Vietnam as being designed for use by anti-
Soviet elements in Peking.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFl1)FNT'1AL 1'BIG TR ND J
1.13 MARCH 1970
Mc cow hau publicized the backing of itr, allies for the TA3G statement
-in a 1March TABS report on publicity for it in the presr; of Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, The East German and Romanian press
reported the statement on the 15th.
OTHER SOVIET A KOMMUNIST article on now party rules adopted by the
COMMENT CCP'G ninth congresu, available in a TASS review of
12 March, accuses "the present leaders of the CCP" of
substituting "Maoism for Marxism-Leninism" and of "actually moving to
create a fundamentally new political organization, an organization based
in its structure and activities on personality cult, extreme centralism,
m.11tariza+:ion, and abandonment of democracy within the party. For its
aims and tasks this is a nationalistic, chauvinist organization with a
pronounced anti-Soviet slant."
The last KOMMUNIST article devoted to China, charging the "Maoists" with
an adventurist policy toward the national liberation movement, appeared
in issue No, 12, signed to press 12 August 1969. Suslov's article on
Leninism in KOMMUNIST No, 15, signed to press 10 October 1969, made a
passing reference to concern within the world communist movement over
"the adventurist, chauvinist policy of the present leaders of the CCP,"
In the first direct attack on Peking to be registered in a bilateral
document since the opening of the Peking talks, a joint communique
issued on a CPSU delegation's visit to Finland--carried by PRAVDA on
11 March--says the CPSU and the Finnish CP call for the preservation
of international communist unity "through a decisive rebuff to anti-
Leninist ideology and practice of Maoism."
NEW TIMES (No. 11, dated 12 March), commenting on Chinese foreign
policy, observes that the Chinese are attempting to divert attention
from U.S, hostility and to transfer the Chinese people's indignation
to the Soviet Union, And LITERARY GAZETTE on 11 March reprints a wide-
ranging Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU article on the Chinese domestic issues of
party restoration and internal political struggles, opposition to
resettlement and ruzzti^ation, and war preparations and anti-Sovietism,
A passage on China in a PRAVDA article on 7 March by Col, S, Lukonin--
entitled "V, I, Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland"--has
overtones that may be construed as directed at impatient hardline
elements in the Soviet military itching for a crack at the Chinese,
After stating that the "core" of Lenin's doctrine on the defense of
the socialist fatherland lies in party leadership over military affairs,
the article says Lenin condemned attempts "by the army or individual
military organs" to break away from party control, and it refers to
the situation in China today as an illustration of the violation of
this doctrine, The reference to China may have been intended not only--
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
18 MARCH 1970
perhaps riot even mainly--an a polemical slap at Peking but also an a
subtle way of raising the question of party control over those in the
military advocating more forceful measures against the Chinese.
Brez.hnev has associated his authority as party chief with counsels of
moderation toward China, ao in his reference to Soviet "presence of
mind and restraint" in a conciliatory speech on 27 October last year
endorsing the opening of the Peking talks a week earlier. In an
article in the August issue of PROBLEMS OF PLACE AND SOCIALISM at a
time of severe Sino-Soviet tensions, Brezhnev had pointedly asserted
that the Soviets would not be provoked into rash acts. The passage in
the PRAVDA article--written by a colonel with a background as a political
officer--may have been intended as a warning to the military to stay
within bounds prescribed by the Brezhnev leadership in dealing with China.
PEKING Peking remains silent on the border dispute. PRC media have
not reported the 6 March editorial in the Tirana ZERI I
POPULLIT charging that Moscow is seeking to form integrated Warsaw Pact
units which would be sent to the Sino-Soviet border for use against
China. Consistent with recent Chinese practice, in which there have
been occasional polemical sallies against the Soviets but no sustained
polemical campaign, Peking has not initiated an anti-Soviet attack
since the 7 March NCNA denunciation of the recently concluded Soviet-
U.S. cultural exchange agreement. The Chinese have, however, flaunted
their ideological rivalry with Moscow by disseminating an article
attributed to "Iranian revolutionaries" which recalls the pant decade's
upheavals in the world communist movement. As summarized by NCNA on
the 15th, the article mocks at Khrushchev and "his successor Brezhnev-
Kosygin clique" and likens "Soviet social imperialism" to traditional
imperialism. There is no mention of current Sino-Soviet troubles.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
USSR AND EAST EUROPE
I'131.0) '1'R1;ND5
18 MA1tCH 19'(0
MOSCOW ASSAILS "SELFISH" NATIONALISM, CALLS FOR INTEGRATION
Intensifying Soviet propaganda prcuuure on Romania is apparent in a
ocric:u of' co-mnenta.rleu by Semen Vladlmirov broadcast by Radio Moscow
predominantly to Romanian audiences from 10 to 15 March--dateu
coincident with the Soviet armed forces' "Dvinu" maneuvers in
Belorussia.* Vladlmirov, described by Radio Moscow as "an international
arfairo expert," comes down hard on the evils of "selfiuh nationalism"
and cites the need for strengthened political and economic "integra-
tion" in the socialist bloc to meet an ever-rising "imperialist threat."
He also at-eoueo repeatedly that the test of socialist credentials is
a country's attitude toward the USSR and, by implication, its foreign
policies.
Vladimirov's comments are notable for blatant reminders that when the
so-ialist countries determined that socialism was in danger in the
GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, they were
"obliged" to take joint action to set things right. They are also
notable for a pointed reference to the lasting historical importance
of the Warsaw letter of 1968 that preceded the intervention in
Czechcs 1ovalcia .
The Vladimirov talks fit with a sharpening Soviet propaganda line on
the need to strengthen "collective" defense measures--a trend which
may be related to Moscow's efforts to secure greater support from its
East European allies in the conflict with the PRC. Romania's neutralist
posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute and its continuing opposition to
Soviet integrationist pressures appear to be the principal targets of
Vladimirov's attack on "deviations" from proletarian internationalis.m.
The first in the series of talks, broadcast on the 10th, acknowledges
that "correct relations between the socialist countries are not a
simple matter" and points out that "the problem is aggravated by the
fact that among the governing party ranks in a number of socialist
countries there are often attitudes and policies which represent a
deviation from Marxism-Leninism and from socialist internationalism."
* The maneuvers, discussed in the second article in this section of the
TRENDS, drew exceptional propaganda fanfare and carried overtones of
warning to the Yugoslavs, Romanians, and Albanians, who were the targets
of the largest amount of comment for European listeners. Vladimirov's
commentaries were beamed to Romanian audiences in a total of 10 broad-
casts. There were seven broadcasts of parts of the series to Poland,
six to Albania, five to Hungary, and two to Bulgaria.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030011-0
CON1,'IDEN'.1'IAL FUIU 'T'RENDS
18 MARCII :1.970
The countricu are unidentified, but the reference to "governing party
ranks" gocu beyond Moscow's usual; less pointed allusions to "elements"
or "those" who hold offending viewpoints. Elsewhere in the same
commentary Vladimirov uses the PRC and pre-August 1968 Czechoslovakia
as illustrations of the "lessons" that can be drawn on the need to com-
bat both left and right revisionism. But throughout the talks, he
makes it clear that his chief target countries are in Eastern Europe.
One of Vladimirov'u central themes is the obstacle nationalism poses
to building world socialism. Declaring in the 10 March talk that to
be a true internationalist one has "to think not only of one's own
nation," he charges that the l;est is trying "to use the remnants of
nationalism in the socialist countries, the existence of narrow local
interests, of national selfishness, the rush of certain groups or
leaders for transitory advantages to the detriment of the basic
interests of world socialism and the international workers movement."
Vladimirov goes on to recall that "when the working class was threatened"
in the GDR, in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia, the socialist countries
were "called upon to give the enemy a counterblow through joint action."
Recalling the 1968 Warsaw letter, he says that "though the years will
pass and the causes which gave rise to the nuances in the wording of this
document will be forgotten, the letter itself remains a historical event,
a record of collective communist thinking which found an upsurge at the
time of real serious danger to socialism." He echoes a theme in the
hardline 7 March Lukonin article in PRAVDA on "Defense of the Socialist
Fatherland" when he states flatly that "the attitude toward the USSR
has become the touchstone of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, to the cause
of socialist internationalism."
In talks broadcast on the 12th and the 15th, Vladimirov argues the need
for closer bloc economic and political ties based on the analogy of
the experience of the Soviet republics. During the early stages of
socialism in the USSR, he says, the republics realized the need to set
up "a uniform econony of the entire land and understood the need for
military alliances" and "the unification of their forces." He
recalls thy., at the time Lenin had warned against "all attempts to
violate this unification as an absolutely inadmissible phenomenon, as
a betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international
imperialism." If the republics had not set up their political and
economic alliances, Vladimirov st%ys, socialism would have been
extinguished. He adds that "tiis experience must be borne in mind
when determining the plans for building the socialist community of
nations in the new international situation."
In his final talk on the 15th Vladimirov points to the socialist
community's "concern with strengthening their integration from the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL A'illS 'BENDS
18 MARCII 10'(0
Political. arld econornl.c point of.' view." lie dismi.auen allegations by
"bourgeois and reviu.Lonaut propagandIuta" that this would in any way
limit the sovereignty of the member atutes. Returning to the analogy
of the Soviet experience, he concludes: "If we think for a moment of
the essence of the social tranal'orrnation brought by socialism to the
USSR, we can then underutund that socialism does not at all mean the
disappearance of' nations but their true flourishing and multilateral
development. 'T'his development is taking place not on the ground of
bourgeois nationalism and and;ernational friction, but on the basis of
socialism and Internationalism, on the basis of friendship and
fraternity between socialist countries. This situation prepares the
condl.?ons for the future fusion of nations under the conditions ef
world communism. 11
SOVIET MANEUVERS IMPLY WARNING TO DISSIDENT COMMUNIST STATES
Unprecedented propaganda fanfare for the Soviet armed. forces' "Dvina"
maneuvers in Belorussia from 10 to 15 March, pitting victorious
"Northern" forces over a "Southern" enemy, carries overtones of a warning
to the recalcitrant southern European states--Romania, Yugoslavia, and
Albania. In a speech at a military review in Minsk at the end of the
maneuvers, Defense Minister Grechko* used language reminiscent of
Soviet statements at the time of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia,
when the Warsaw Five moved in to defend "the gains of socialism" which
Dubcek had failed to protect. Grechko declared in Minsk that the
Soviet armed forces "will always vigilantly guard the great gains of
socialism and will honorably fulfill their patriotic and internationalist
duty."
Radio Moscow devoted a sizable six percent of its total comment during
the week ending 15 March to the "Dvina" maneuvers, in contrast to less
than one percent for the last p?evious Soviet troop exercise of
comparable scale--the "Dnepr" maneuvers of September-October 1967.
Soviet domestic media carried the most comment; foreign beaming was
heaviest in Mandarin, with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania the main
audience targets in Europe,
As in the case of the Warsaw Pact "Oder-Neisse" exercises in Poland
last September, an implicit lesson is hammered home for southern
* Brezhnev was preser.t on the platform with Grechko, having arrived in
Minsk on the 13th amid a spate of Western conjectures regarding a serious
challenge to his and Kosygin's leadership by a Suslov-led faction in the
CPSU Politburo. Soviet media report only that Brezhnev "spoke" during
an analysis of the exercises on the 14th and at a Belorussian Communist
Party reception for the participants on the 15th, without indicating the
contents of either speech; they note that he left for Moscow later that
day after talks with Belorussian party leaders.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
-29-
16 MARCH 1970
European communist dissidents through propaganda stress on the victories
of the "Northern" forces in the "Dvina" maneuvers over the "Southern"
or "enemy" forces. Permeated with excitement and awe at the prowess of
the personnel and power of the weaponry, Soviet media's battle reports
praise "the precision bombing and missile launching of the 'Northern'
aide." The Northern commander "'decided to utilize nuclear weapons"
(simulated) when other means failed to repulse an "enemy" attack,
according to a report carried in TRUD on the 13th.
Reflecting the Warsaw Pact organizational changes decided on at Budapest
in March 1969, TASS says the exercises and final. review were watched by
Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy and "representatives of the staff of
the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries" as well as military
attaches of these countries--thus begging the question of whether or not
a Romanian representative was present. Moscow had not so directly related
the 1967 "Dnepr" maneuvers to the Warsaw Pact; on that occasion it listed
high-ranking defense officials in attendance from a broad spectrum of
communist countries, including Romania and Yugoslavia.
The opening of the "Dvina" maneuvers was reported by press organs of
most of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carrying
subsequent daily reports accompanied by pictures. The exercises so
far have been ignored by the media of Albania and Romania. The
Bucharest SCINTEIA on the llth--the day after the maneuvers started--
carried a Moscow-datelined report of a CEMA electric power meeting in
the Soviet capital, listing the participating countries including
Romania and Yugoslavia.
A press review broadcast by Radio Belgrade in Russian to the USSR on
13 March quotes the Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA as commenting that "such
maneuvers, motivated by bloc policy, are a negative counteraction to
the processes of lessening tension and promoting cooperation," com-
paring the "Dvina" maneuvers to "the recently held maneuvers of NATO
forces in Norway under the name of 'Arctic Express.'" The Yugoslav
army paper goes on to stress the "serious anxiety" evoked by "all
this," adding that "maneuvers of such a character . . . have nothing
in common with the legitimate right of every independent country" to
hold exercises "for the sole purpose of strengthening its defense
forces and defending its own independence, self-dependence, and free-
dom."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONI"IDEN'i''iAL FD"13 TRENDS
18 MARCH 1.970
WEST GERMANY
GDR DEMANDS BRANDT STATE VI EWS ON DRAFT TREATY AT ERFURT
Euit German media, 71aiming for the GDR all the credit for the summit
meeting between FRG Chancellor Brandt and GDR Premier Stoph to be held
19 March at Erfurt, East Germany, atreus pervasively that the GDR's
Iraft treaty for establishing relations betwce.n the two states is the
only agenda topic and t, Brandt "must" at last take a public position
on it. Daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorials emphasize the "conciliatory"
and "reaaonable" attitude of the GDR and its readiness for negotiations,
while reiterating that the draft treaty is the sine qua non for establishing
GDR-FRG relati.ins.
Soviet media rely largely on East German sources for extensive reports on
the summit agreement. Moscow also publicizes GDR comment and, emphasizes
the "decisive" nature of the impending meeting in low-volume, restrained
comment of it3 own. Scv.'.et media have maintained silence on the interrupted
talks in Moscow between FRG negotiator Bahr and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Polish media report that West German and Polish trade negotiators agreed
on a 1970 trade protocol on 16 March after failing to settle "certain
essential problems" of a long-term Polish-FRG trade accord.
GDR MEDIA The initial East Berlin radio announcement late on 12 March
ON SUMMIT concerning the agreement on an Erfurt summit meeting pointed
out that Erfurt had been proposed by the GDR. Subsequent
East German comment repeatedly emphasizes that the agreement resulted
solely from the GDR's initiative and was achieved despite the "dogmatic"
attitude of Bonn, which "until the last moment" had "categorically
maintained, with provocative intent," its insistence on a Brandt visit
t:~ West Berlin in conjunction with an East Berlin summit.
GDR commentators state repeatedly that the GDR expects to discuss solely
it3 draft treaty, submitted last December by Ulbricht. For example,
-:ommentator Van Schni.tzler declares on the 12th: "On the negotiating
table at Erfurt is nothing else but the GDR draft for a treaty between
Bonn and Berlin on the establishment of normal relations on the basis
of international law--no more and no less." He adds that at Erfurt
"the Brandt government will have a chance to prove itself and to make
the Federal Republic honest at long last." A 13 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
comment, tracing GDR efforts in past years to establish relations with
the FRG, views the summit agreement as evidence of "the serious readiness
of the GDR to negotiate" and the "great spirit of accommodation" the
GDR has shown. On the 14th the same paper calls the GDR's "considerable
concession" on the summit site an expression of "genuine willingness" to
negotiate, while questioning whether the Brandt government is of the same
mind. This and other NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentaries and editorials through
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970
the 17th contrast the GDR's "reasonable" and "realistic" viewpoint
with the attitude of "revanchiat" rightwing opponents of detente in
the FRG, noting at the same time that there are also many "reasonable"
people in Brandt's own SPD who "urge" him to recognize the GDR. On
the 16th the paper calls on Brandt to seize the "genuine and very
concrete chance" to abandon past "disastrous, revanchist" policies
and begin a "peaceful coexistence" policy with the GDR.
A tone of ultimatum is injected into NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's 17 March
editorial. After berating Brandt for failing to comment publicly on the
GDR draft treaty submitted three months ago, the editorial says "the
time to make up his mind will end for Herr Brandt on Thursday," and
Brandt can "no longer delay" a statement on the draft.
Evidence that the GDR has not closed off its options and anticipates
further meetings after Erfurt is provided, however, in an 18 March
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary and an Ulbricht interview with a French agency
released in East German media late on the 17th. While the NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND commentary reaffirms that the Erfurt summit must discuss
the GDR's draft treaty, it appears couched in more moderate terms
than earlier propaganda; it appeals to Bonn to renounce subordination
to U.S. global strategy and assume "an independent policy of realism
and commonsense," and it concludes that if Bonn seizes the present
chance to start anew, "the opportunity exists for continuing negotiations
through the Erfurt talks." Commenting on the Erfurt talks in the French
interview, Ulbricht says: "We can only wish success to these talks so
that they mey be the starting point for further talks on a treaty of
mutual relations of a nondiscriminatory nature on the basis of
international law."
QUESTION OF An East German effort to equate Chancellor Brandt's
RECOGNITION appearance at Erfurt with implied FRG recognition of
the GDR is evident in the presentation of details on
summit arrangements by Gerhard Schuessler, deputy head of the GDR
Council of Ministers office, as reported on the 13th by ADN and on GDR
television. Schuessler stressed that Brandt and his delegation would
be met at the Erfurt station by Stoph and the GDR delegation "in the
manner corresponding to international usage when there is a meeting of
the heads of government of sovereign states" and that throughout the
visit the Brandt delegation "will be treated in the GDR in accordance
with international protocol procedure," as befits a meeting of heads of
"two independent sovereign states."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300030011-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCII 1970
SOVIET VIEW Soviet comment utreuses that the Erfurt meeting will be
OF SUMMIT a "dooisive" test for the Brandt government. Moscow
commentator Zakharov tells German listeners on the 13th
that "the declarations of the politicians on the Rhine" that they support
establiuhing relations with the GDR "on the basis of eq'1a1 rights and
without discrimination" will be subjected to "a decisive trial" at Erfurt.
Z?kharov adds that "the maneuvers of Bonn diplomacy" in the preparatory
talks in Berlin "prove" that Bonn must study international law before
the Erfurt confrontation if it really wants "clearcut relations under
international law" with the GDR.
Remarking that "extreme rightwing forces" in the FRG still oppose the
summit meeting and any effort to reach agreement with the GDR, a Moscow
domestic service commentator suggests in a roundtable discussion on the
15th that Bor:;: must "adopt a realistic position if it wants to see serious
progress" in establishing GDR-FRG relations "based on peaceful coexistence."
Such relations, he adds--in a veiled reference to FRG negotiations with the
USSR and Poland--"play a major role in the matter of achieving detente"
and a stable European peace. TASS correspondent Borisov also acknowledges
on the 13th that FRG spokesmen expressed satisfaction with the Erfurt site
agreement and that Brandt himself expressed hope for reasonable results
from the summit talky, and he reports briefly Foreign Minister Scheel's
expression of hope that the Erfurt meeting will be the "first step toward
improvement" in FRG-GDR relations.
OTHER VIEWS OF Pre-summit comments by Polish, Czechoslovak, and
SUNWIT PROSPECTS Hungarian media uniformly express the view that the
GDR-FRG negotiations will be difficult and long but
that the ultimate result of these and anticipated future talks will be
-ritical in determining whether a real East-West detente can be achieved
in Europe. Hungarian commentators offer the most favorable appraisal
of West German intentions, MAGYAR HIRLAP commenting on the 14th,
according to MTI, that the SPD-FDP government "has taken the possibilities
[for detente] more seriously than its predecessors and has made use of
them." Polish commentators stress the importance of FRG agreement'to
establish normal relations with the GDR, based on international law.
PAP commentator Guz writes on the 13th that the Erfurt talks will become
"probably the most important criterion" by which to judge whether the
Brandt government "is ready to recognize the European realities or
whether it will continue to adjust itself to them only halfway."
Czechoslovak commentators generally offer more pessimistic views on
Erfurt. A RUDE PRAVO comment reported on the 18th by CTK, for example,
insists that "Brandt is not interested in the international recognition
of the GDR" because it would force him to "give up attempts to influence
and undermine the socialist order in the GDR." FRG "soundings" in talks
with the socialist countries are merely a "fig leaf" to hide trbditional
West German revanchist aims, RUDE PRAVO argues.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030011-0