TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 18, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

"P{ `.. App)to For Rela4'tse ~OD010 I Q895Rb0 0 0007 9'. t ; ~, {> > ~ s ~>~ .n _nd anti-Soviet propaganda," distc,.rt;ing Soviet foreign
policy. It calls t.ie foreign military bases and the troops utationed
on the island it ccurco of constant tension, and it claims "there are
no doubts as to the dangerous role" assigned to "reactionary Greek
officers" who continue to hold important; positions in the Cyprus armed
forces. *
TAGS points to the ".,~nnistent;" and "well-known" Soviet, stand of support
for the indep~cndc.rnce, sovereignty, and territorial lr.4.,~grity of Cyprus,
liquidation of fo_elg:r military bioc:;, and a peaceful Settlement without
foreign interferon :e. Stating that thc_ Soviet Union "Is keeping a close
eye or, the current development of even-,:" in and ar ~uazd Cyprus, the
statement con,:ludF with a call fc.r ,n cud to "subversive activities"
against? the Cypriot state and for "restraint and wisdom."
The last previous, 'I'AS3 tatcmunt on Cyj,rus, ar; 1e July 1967, had also
pictured the Republl': :.'f Cypru., as er.djangered by plots can ')'-.t,ed in
Greece and supported by "aggressive NAT'., circ ," armed at turning the
island into a NATO place d'armes, The 1967 statement followed periodic
propaganda charge: of intrigu,_,s against Cyprus in the attermath of the
Gr"ek coup that spring, 'L'ASS on 10 July i96 issued a brier denial of
* Nicosia riidio on the 18th reports a government npokesinan an declaring
that the Cyprus Government does not share the TASS statement's view that
Greek office:,; are involved in actions directed against Cyprus. The
spokesman added that there is "complete unanimity of view," between the
Greek and Cypriot government. co.l.:erring the handling and ,nai settlement
of the Cyprus issue.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
18 FEBRUARY 1970
Western press reports on a Soviet-Cypriot agreement on the sale of army
to Cyprus. The last formal Soviet statement on Cyprus was a Soviet
Government statement in November 1967 prompted by the tense Cypriot-
Turkish relations.
Prior to the current TASS statement, PRAVDA'a writer on Cypriot and
Greek affairs, Bragin, had dealt in several articles with the "serious
situation" resulting from the National Front's "subversive activity,"
citing assessments by President Makarios, house president Kliridhio,
and AKEL, the Cypriot communist party. In a 30 January article he
charged that Athens officers occupying command positions in the Cyyriot
National Guard were playing an "extremely challenging and provoca&?ive
role"; operating under directives of the Greek military junta, he said,
they were waging an "unbridled campaign" against the "progressive
forces" and the Cyprus Government. According to Cyprus press reports,
Bragin added, they were "slanderously attacking" Makarios and
"threatening an Athena-style military putsch." The terrorists,
Bragin said, took these activities as instruction for action and
exploded a bomb at the presidential palace as well as at the house of
AKEL General Secretary Pr.paioannou.
Bragin said the Cypriots were demanding that the government adopt more
resolute measures to deal with the "criminal bands." A commentary
broadcast to Cyprus in Greek on 2 February and in Turkish on the 4th
had welcomed approval of the preventive detention law by the House of
Representatives the week before as e. "most important event" in the life
if the republic. The new law, ratified in response to the terrorist
activities, was viewed as of "g'eat significance" for maintaining order
and safeguarding the country's security.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
COFFtfl! N`i'IAL
- 19 -
SINO - SOVIET R ELATIONS
PI3IS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1970
MOSCOW DENIES HOSTILE INTENT; TREATY ANNIVERSARY IGNORED
As the 14 February anniversary--the 20th--of the Sino-Soviet treaty
cC : ;.liance passed without notice by either aide for the fourth
successive year, PRAVDA on the 15th carried an article by an
original member of the Soviet negotiating twsm at the Peking talks
denoune,ing Western speculation over a possible Soviet attack on
China and reaffirming Moscow's peaceful intentions. The PRAVDA
article, by Soviet; sinologist S. 'i'ikhvinskiy, represents the most
car,did expression of Mo3co,,'a ecncern over opportunities accruing
to the United States to a,.quire leverage and maneuverability in the
triangular power relationship as a result of Sino-Soviet tensions.
The article interprets works such as Harrison Salisbury's recent
book on a possible Sirio-Soviet war as being an appeal to Washington
to normalize relations with the I'RC while also being addressed to
anti-Soviet elements in Peking which may be receptive to U.S.
overtures.
On the date of the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary the Moscow press
carried a TASS report on a meetinf? of activists of the Soviet-
Chinese Friendship Society who reminisced about Soviet missionary
work during "Soviet-Chinese cooperation in various stages of the
Chinese revolution." While noting that speakers at the Moscow
meeting stressed "the great significance of the friendship" between
the two peoples, the report does not mention the treaty.
Though the Tikhvinskiy article refers in general terms to Soviet
uff:ort3 to normalize stat relations with the PRC and to Chinese
territorial claims, it does not mention the Peking talks, and
PRAVDA does; not identify T'ikhvinskiy's association with the Soviet
delegation. In what mr;zr have been another of the leaks coming
from each side, S;vict Journalist Victor Louis, writing in the
London EJENING NEWS c:,n 11 February, referred to new tension on
the border and suggested that chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov
may soon be recalled? An 18 February article in the Polish paper
ZYCIF WAlHSZAWY, devoted mainly to the Sino-U.S, ambassadorial
talks in Warsaw, observes that no progress has been reported in the
Sino-Soviet talks alter four months, and It adds that this must be
kept in mind when assessing the Warsaw talks. A Moscow broadcast in
Mendarir on the 12th mentioned the Peking talks in citing a Hungarian
paper as noting that the Chinese had temporarily suspended their
anti-Soviet polemics at the time the talks opened but had subsequently
resumed them,
* `PASS transmitted the report on the evening of the 13th, with a
dateline of 11, February and an embargo for release at midnight.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
1'1315 TRENDS
18 F'EI3RUARY 19'(0
Peking has initiated no new attacks on the Soviets since its 9 February
denunciation of Moscow's dealings with Bonn. Another attack on the
Soviet leadership did appear, however, in a 17 February NCNA summary
of an article in the Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT assailing "the Soviht
Brezhnev-Kosygin renegade cl:Lque."* The PRC's observances over the
weekend of the anniversary of the South Vietnameoe PLAF failed to
attack the Soviets.
HISTORICAL REVIEWS OF Couched in terms of a denunciation of Harrison
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Salisbury's "War Between Russia and China" as
an attempt to prevent the normalization of
Sino-Soviet relations, the Tikhvinskiy PRAVDA artic1 -provides a
historical review of Soviet relations with China in an effort to counter
a picture of "age-old and irreconcilable" antagonism between the two
giants on the Eurasian land mass. In rebuttal Tikhvinskiy portrays an
unceasing Soviet struggle "to deliver China from the yoke of the
imperialist powers," pointing to Soviet renunciation of "all unequal
agreements and treaties at one time imported or, china by tsarism" and
of "all the concessions, rights, and privileges obtained by the
Russian bourgeoisie and bureaucracy,,"
Using the attack on Salisbury'"s book to present Mogcow'-s position on the
border dispute, Tikhvinskiy accuses Salisbury of falsifying the history
of the carder question, repeating "the slanderous fabrications of Chinese
nationalist propaganda on the supposed 'exploitation' of China by the
Soviet Union, on certain 'territorial seizures' by the USSR in China, and
on mythical Soviet claims to Chinese lands," and concurrently defending,
the "chauvinist, hegemonist policy of the Chinese nationalists.' territorial
claims on the Soviet Union and the MPR." This.-sort of language has been
absent from Soviet comment since a?;reement was reached to hold talks with
the Chinese.
Apart from these r`marks on the border dispute, Tikhvinskiy ignores the
past decade of Sino-Soviet relations. Accentuating the positive, he
echoes themes struck in recent installments of a continuing Radio Moscow
series in Mandarin, "Gl,,rious Chapters in the History of Soviet-Chinese
Relations," when he recalls the decisive assistance rendered to the
Chinese by the Soviets in defeating the Japanese during World War II and
in liberating large areas of China. Tikhvinskiy reminisces about the
"holiday of fries-dship" which celebrated the arrival of the Soviet army
in Port Arthur in .19.5.
The 14 February installment in the historical series in Mandarin, while
skirting the Sino-Soviet {treaty signed on that date 20 years earlier,
emphasized Soviet asci::texree to the development of Manchuria, including
* Tirana customarily names both Brezhnev and Kosygin in its attacks on
the Kremlin leadership, whereas in Peking's formulations only Brezhnev
is named.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
CON I'! DENT I Al1 I"1I.[S 'I'HI:Nl)I;
113 FEBR00Y :1970
construction o1.' the Dairen shipyard and the Port; Arthur naval bane. It
characterized the handing over of I;he Port; Arthur base to the PH'.; under
a 1954 agreement as "the greatest. contribution" of the Soviet Union Lo
the Chinese army. Also on lli February, Iic,dio M,-)aeuw'o program in Mandar.
for PLA listeners quoted three former Soviet military advisers to Chinrt:1
calling attention 'to the Soviet liberation of northeast China and to the
extensive Soviet technical and material aid to the Chinese during the
1940'0 and 1950's., The advisers expressed regret at the PIIC'u current
"ingratitude in slandering our country's tremendous material and
spiritual assistance to the Chinese people and their armed forces."
MOSCOW ON PRC The T'ikhvinskiy article, while malting reproving referent.:.
LEADERSHIP to "nationalist" elemc:nto in Peking who may be inclined
to play realpolitik with the West against Moscow, also
seems implicitly aimed at bolstering the position of what the Soviets cal.
"internationalist" elements in Peking--those favorable to an accommodatic
with Moscow. This appears to be the point of Tikhvinskly's protestations
of Moscow's peaceful intent and his rebuttal of those in the West attempt i .,;5
"to intimidate the Chinese leaders with the bugbear of a Soviet threat cu;.
to push the r9C into the arms of the United States."
Tikhvinskiy avoids mentioning Mao, but a 17 F& r1tary TASS commentary
repeatedly mentions Mao and the "Maoists" in picturing a "bitter strugglt
for leadership within the CCP at a time of party reorganization. The
Maoists, TASS says, fear that rehabilitation of party cadres might lead
to the restoration of party organs which could "again question the
leadership of the Great Helmsman and his deputy."
A 13 February commentary broad_.~.st in English to Asia. ever Moscow's
pu.-pertedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress represents the sharpest
and most detailed portrayal of divisions at the top levels of the
Chinese leadership to appear in Soviet media since the agreement to
hold talks was announced. The broadcast pictures a "bitter struggle" ove;
China's future economic courses with Mao Tse-tung pressing a "reckless
big leap policy" in opposition to "the realistic course of regulation" of
the economy "backed by Chou En-lai." Both antagonists, the broadcast st
"have groups of influential fc1lowers."
Chou has largely been spared in the virulent portraits of Mao and othe
members of the Peking hierarchy that have appeared in Soviet propaganda i'
recent years. On the positive side, he was favored with a highly unusual
fraternal gesture from Moscow when Brezhnev called him "Comrade" in a
speech on 27 October, a week after the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks.
A watershed in Soviet relations with China was the 27 November. 1966 PRAVD
editorial article which introduced the anathema formula "Mao Tse-tung and
his group." A CPSU Central Committee resolution in August that year had
referred to the policies of "Comrade Mao Tee-tung." A Central Committee
resolution in December, however, omitted the fraternal title and referred
to Mao and his group--a formulation that became standard in Soviet polemi'
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 C2 T~ RVdfiO0875RO00300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 FEBRUARY 1970
- 22 -
PARTY UNITS OF CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT CONFER
Soviet radio and press reports indicate that the restructured political
organs in the recently created Central Asian Military District near the
Sinkiang border are beginning to function.* The Alma Ata radio reported
on 16 February that the first Komsomol Conference of the Central Asian
Military District opened on that date and heard speeches by the
secretaries of the Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Tadzhik Komsomol central
committees. Reports of the inaugural meeting of the new district's
party conference on 3 February had not mentioned a Tadzhik representative,
noting only that reports were delivered by the secretaries of the Kirgiz
and Kazakh central committees.
Marking the 3 February party meeting, an article in the 3 February issue
of the Alma Ata KAZJJGISTANSKAYA PRAVDA by Major General K. A. Maksimov,
chief of the district political directrrate, emphasized the importance
of iicreasing the district forces' combat readiness in order to defend
the Soviet Union's borders. Citing the strength of the world communist
movement, Maksimov warned that "no attempts by the Peking provocateurs
will be able to undermine the unity and monolithic nature of the world
communist movement."
TASS CORRESPONDENTS REPORT MOCK NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK
A detailed description of a mock airborne nuclear missile strike against
"the enemy"--unnamed--is contained in an article by two TASS correspondents
carried in three major central Asian newspapers, Tashkent's PRAVDA VOSTOKA
and Dushanbe's KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA on 11 February and Frunze's
SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA on the 15th. Describing the thoughts and activities
of the pilots of "modern combat vehicles equipped with the latest systems
and with all manner of instruments," the article tells of avoiding contact
with "the enemy" during the flight of "many hours" covering "many thousands
of kilometers," of breaking through the air defense barriers and repelling
the attacks of fighters and air defense missiles, of launching the nuclear
missiles against a predetermined target, and of returning safely to home
base. Nothing of this kind has appeared in Soviet central media.
* The 13 November 1969 issue of the TRENDS documents initial Soviet
reports indicating that the old Turkestan Military District was divided
into a new, reduced Turkestan Military District and a Central Asian
Military District with apparent headquarters in Alma Ata.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
CON I''.!. )I N'1~CAh 1''L3i.S '.l'Itt N!);J
1)3 II ; I tNUAhY I WO
S I N0 -U. S. RELATIONS
PEKING CHARGES U.S. WITH POLICY OF HOSTILITY TOWARD PRC
The alleged downing of a U.S. drone over the llairrarr Island area on
10 February has been followed by the most direct.; charges of' U.S.
hostility toward the PRC to appear in the strewn of continent; from
Peking since the 20 January session of the Warsaw talks. Comment
in the wake of the incident claims that the drone flight was "new
evidence" that the Nixon Administration is "stubbornly pursuing the
policy of hostility" toward the PRC. A similar note was struck
in a 12 February NCNA report; on the U.S, foreign aid bill signed
into law two days earlier; in this case Peking took military aid
for Taiwan as evidence of U.S. hostility.
Peking's propaganda on the alleged shootdown follows the lines tak.:n
after the previous reported incident, on 28 October last year: are
original announcement on 11. February accompanied by a party Military
Commission commendation of the unit said to be responsible (a naval
air defense unit); a joint Commentator article in PEOPLE'S DAILY
and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY; and reports from the area of the incident
playing up themes of "igilance and war preparedness. In one
notable change, however, Commentator does not repeat a reference in
last October's article to the Nixon Administration's "'talks' tricks,"
thereby reinforcing other signs in recent comment, that Peking is
studiously keeping the record open for the forthcoming Warsaw
session. As in the case of the previous incident, Commentator
derides the Administration's professed desire for peace but fails
to mention specific issues,
An article in the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Battlefield" column of
NCNA's domestic service on 11. February seems to raise some sensitive
issues in the course of an attack on the President's announcement
regarding U.S. policy on CBW. Charg;.ng that U.S. pledges not to
be the first to use these weapons are a smokescreen for carying out
further research and development, the article quotes Stalin as
observing that. "diplomats of the bourgeoisie" appeal for peace and
friendly relations when they are preparing for war. At another
point, making the standard charge that the President is pursuing
"counterrevolutionary dual tactics," the article states that "the
revolutionary people of the world will neither believe the 'good
words' of imperialism nor be frightened by its threat." A service
message carried by NCNA an hour later instructed recipient stations
to "temporarily hold" the article. The press is not yet available
to determine weether the article was published; it was broadcast
by Radio Peking in the domestic service and in Russian, but it has
not been carried in NCNA's international service in English.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
a rtl'.I:1)h;N'r 1 At_, FBI::.; TIU NII)
18 FEBRUAkY .1.9'(0
STRATEGIC ARMS
MOSCOW CRITICIZES PRESIDENT THROUGH PROXY OF U,S1 COLUMNIST
,;ovI_ t, certaurc of the Admin.LuLrILLion'u dec.ln.lon to extend the projected
;3arcguctrd nytutenr III suatulned in a low voLume or propagrusda, draw.Lnt;
hectvi_ly on rLatemenLu or the U.:3. doment.ic opponiL.ion. L;oviet;
corrnvenLatoro, opeakiug on their own authority, tire not critical of
President Nixon's peraonrt:L role Ln the decl13ion to extend the system.
But IZVhUWIYA on 13 February attacks the President through the proxy
of an American corruncrstator, publlals.Ltsg lengthy excerpts from a
3 February Wr ihingtors POS'T' article by co,Lunu,tist Joseph Kraft pegged
to the decision on the second phrase of Safeguard announced at the
Preuldent'n 30 January press conference. Where i:3ovIcL commentators
habitually trace the decision to pressures from the ",nilitctry-
industrial complex," IZsiFSTIYA's version of the Kraft article
relates the decision to "the fundLmenLal 1'ore,.gn policy views" of
the l'reaident and his adviser Henry Kissinger, concluding that the
decision was "dictated by" the President's pro1'ounu eoavictions."
IZVE5TIYA's version of the Kraft article pictures the President as
an inveterate foe of' communism. The excerpts include the comment
that, more and more people "are now inclined to an assessment of Nixon
and Kissinger which can hardly be described as good. `this assessment
starts from the historical fact that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger
have long been regarded as being among the convinced anticommuniits
who advocate a tough line." Kraft is further quoted as remarking
that the President "in particular loves to flail his opponents foi-
displayint; excessive softness toward communists" and as adding that
both the President and Kissinger are now trying to use the threat
of a flu zer buildup "of nuclear potential, and in particular the
development of the ABM system, in order to force the Russians to
meet them halfway" on the strategic arms limitation 'talks (SALT).
The article's conclusion, according to IZVESTIYA, is that serious-
minded people are apprehensive lest the extension of Safeguard
complicate SALT to such an extent "that it will not be possible to
achieve even a limited agreement."
Kraft's article in the POST had examined at some length the U.S.
rationale since 1967 for the development of an ABM system directed
against China and the President's acceptance of the need for such
a China-oriented system, but IZVESTIYA's excerpts mention China
only once. The IZVESTIYA version says that President Nixon may in
fact believe "a new and dangerous threat" has arisen from China, but
that few U.S. officials share this view. Soviet media have
axknowledged in the past that the U.S. ABM system has been developed
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
GON10I 1)1;NT I A1, t u I;; '1'RI-MM'
1.13 10I-;1IMMY 1.9'(0
in parL rra It del r-nc ngctlnnt Cltinr-, but Muuuc:ow t-au r-0L aired thin
notion widely and unit portrayed the oyntern an oriented In the main
r-gainn t the Uu:11t.
Lille the cormnentn quoted t'ronr Itrat'L, a l'oreijn-l.rr.nt;uage talk by
01addrov over 1tad.Lo Moo cow on the 16th bringn up the theulo that
the deciuiou to extend Safcguurd in aimed in part at utrengtherring
tie U.U. bargaining pool Lion in the ucconcl round of SALT to
mid-Apri:L. Shn.khov aayn American obuerveru ace the decision an
aterruning Crorn "a denl.re to impouc conditions on the USSR during
the talku. In other words, . . . Washington is tenaciously
clinging to the policy of force."
Other Soviet propaganda highlights Cingreasional concern over the
pouulbie impact or AIM deployment on SALT. On 8 February, for
exwnple, an international review by Mikhuylov in PRAVDA rioted
Senator Mansfield's "fear" that Lite Administration's decision could
threaten SALT. And 'PASS reported on the 5th that Senators
Fulbright, Caae, and Symington hod warned of the "negative
influence" the A13M decision might have on the talks.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
-2G-
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS
USSR URGES TREATIES ON (B WEAPONS, USE OF SEABED
18 F1111UJA1 Y 1)'(0
Moscow mradia welcome the reconvening on 1'( February of the 26-nation
Geneva disarmament conference--in recouu since 30 October--in a low
volume of propagunJu calling routinely for the conclusion or treaties
outlawing chemical and bacteriological weapons and prrfithiting the
placing of masu.-destruction weapons on the seabed. Chief Soviet
delegate Hoohchin in his opening remarks called these issues the
"most important problems" facing the conferees, and an IZVESTIYA
article r.,viewed by 'L'ASS on the l'(th also underscores their Importance.
Both louhchin and IZVESTIYA conclude that apart from these key questions,
the conference must press forward with its work on a draft treaty on
general and complete disarmament, the "main task" assigned it by the
UN General Assembly.
The `PASS account of the opening session briefly reports that chief
U.S. negotiator Smith "submitted a summary of the United States' views
on a number of problems and tasks facing the committee," but it does
not elaborate. Smith had in fact suggested that the conferees discuss
chemical and bacteriological weapons separately, a tack which in the
past has drawn fire in Soviet propaganda.
A NEW TIMES commentary by NOVOSTI correspondent Beglov conveys a note
of optimism about the talks. As summarized by TASS on 11 February,
the article notes that the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms
limitation began in a "businesslike atmosphere" and concludes that
these talks in Helsinki and Vienna "should be taken as fresh
encouragement for further efforts within the framework of the
disarmament committee."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
(.;ulil'li)I,,rrTIti! I.'iil;, 'I'1111,iJD;;
Ili I ! hli!JAliY I')'j()
WEST GERMANY
STOPI-I LETTER PRESSURES I3RANDT TO NEGOTIATE FIRST WITH GDR
A canerrt,r (I rft'oI't to I)r('utiirr?,, Wrul, G(?rnvi.u CI If crI.1Or Iirr.tI(I1, In In
negot, l.IL, lug I'I rut, rnd 1'ur(?nwIt t, wi t, It th(, GDIi, rII,t,IIrt? CI ui.tt w1. t,h illy
U11'):,;H at. Poland Lit
Pr?crnlcr? :.1,opli'u I;' February .L( ttet? to Brandt, rn.1.1.ing I'or 0DR-1-10'uiurunlt, rrrgut 1tt'tOnn in lirr?ll.n (-)it rih(,r't, notice. A common thecae
running through ccnnnv,ntn.r Ien on thr [?tapir l.c'ttcr in Errol, Iter?l.lo,
Moscow, Wru'uiiW, and I'r?tr[;ur tnr(llii. Ili l,hat witch n(,got,litL.iont) would.
be the brut prooI' that Lir?rzndI'u wor(lu wll.l. be fo.'.lowrcl by deedu
allowing it oiucere dealrc Car Eaut-Wear, detente. At, the urine time,
Moscow tuna broadcriat, .l to 1'Irot, corrurenttat?y d(,tzlitit, cxpl.1ciL1y with
the, pretcnt Gromyko-lirzhr Lrtiku. Moucuw is u(lcrit so t'ar, however,
on the new ,;ovict, propoutil. t.'or ['our-power talks on Berlin.
STOPH LETTER 't'here is no inuriediate reaction available from East
Gcrrna.ri or Lovict media to West Gerrnr,n DPA reports on
18 February that Chancellor Brandt is ready to meet GDR Premier Stoph
in Last Berlin in the second or Lhird week of March, t'ollowing
preparatory meetings by lower-level officials between 23 and 27 February.
Stoph's 12 February letter to Brandt, publicized by GDR and Soviet
media on the day it was sort, was notable principally for the urgency
it attached to a meeting at the top level within one to two weeks.*
Stoph argued that the meeting should take place "as soon as possible"
because of its "urgency and funlumcntal importance," and he suggested
that. Brandt and he meet in "the GDR capital, Berlin," on 19 or
26 February for "direct negotiations." These talks would seek "to
bring about. p(:ernefu:]. coexistence rind a Lrenty settlement on normal
relations between the GDR and the FRG on the basis of the generally
recognized norms of' international law"--a stock GDR demand for years.
Stoph's letter otherwise was devoted to listing standard GDR planks
for a GDR-FRG treaty, references to the new GDR draft treaty proposed
by Ulbricht on 18 December 1969, and recriminations against Brandt
and his government for failing to respond to Ulbricht's December
proposals. Although acknowledging that Brandt:'s 22 January 1970
letter expressed readiness to negotiate with the GDR "on the basis
of equality of rights and nondiscrimination," Stoph argued that this
* The present Stoph proposal displays considerably more urgency than
a similar suggestion on 19 September 1967. At that time Stoph
suggested that two state secretaries make technical preparations for
talks; earlier proposals in May and July 1967 had suggested, respective-
ly, that this be done by foreign ministers or simply "representatives"
of the two governments.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
C0101 DENT I At, FI1 I 'l'1tP;111i;;
11_I i i;I11tIJA1tY 1.1)'(0
"r"qui eels" 1,110 two countr?Iett to "recogni. ,e 1111(1 r?eupeel, one n.nc.,l,hr,r
mutually" ns "auvere.igt- uubjJ_'Ctu ul' tnternaLlonn.l .1.aw with ((Lord.
r'l.ghtra." In it nubueclttcnl, rtmkJ1f,,tottu frnunrtge ,ltuftlt n,ppru,recl to
nl,l,nr_!t It uti.FF concll.Llnn 1'or ncgotlntlonn. III wruLe that "nrgotl.-ttiorut
oil the opening of reirt,ionn OF r(lua . rlghtn and on Lie, renurtctrtt.Lntt
OF t'orcc can lcact Lo port i tl vr' renu I l.tt un Iy 1, f bn.ued on mutual
rccoNniLion unclcr? intor?r-rtt1onrt1 .Law.
In ol-ar'p con trap t with MOncow' II 1-rtncl.i l ng Of I. Lu Own pre I. i.tilt nary
"exchrtrtgea of opit-lonu" between IHG ;,LnLe secretary Bahr and Foreign
MLnirtt,cr? Grotnyko, which conLinuc to be v.irturtl.ly Ignored, the t;OvieL
ccnt,ra.L preen published ;toph's letter on the I3th and 111th (I'ItAVDA
and LY,VEU'1'iYA carrying virtual text,), tu-c.l Moscow radio commentaries
for Gcr,ru.u- and other listeners repeatedly referred Lo thin "very
Important GDI( ir:.ltitttive." While conceding Lhat the Brtu-dt, govern-
ntent'rs approach. has (lit't'ered ttomewhiit from that of his predecessors,
Gla::unov told German .Listeners on the 13Lh that. "regrettably" the
Bonn leaders "have no far failed to take a clear otand regarding
this t'bsolutely clear problem" of bilateral recognition, which he
nail raises suspicions that the "old sole representation presumption"
to still embraced by Bont-.
Warsaw's PAP carried a Bonn-datelined dispatch on the 13th reporting
optimistically that Brandt would "express his readiness to co" to
Berlin for talks, or possibly would propose a preparatory meeting
at a lower level prior to a Brandt-Stoph meeting. The report noted
that rejection of the Stoph invitation "would undermine to a
considerable degree the credibility of West German assurances on
their readiness to negotiate." Prague's RUDE PRAVO expressed similar
views on the 14th, according to CTK, declaring that the talks "must
be between heads of governments" and that Brandt's rejection of talks
at that level "would mean a transparent obstruction and would show
that it in only defensive diplomatic maneuvering aimed at misleading
the public, rather than interest in achieving progress in mutual
relations." CTK also reported PRACE of the 111th as calling Brandt's
reply to Stoph "a public test of the sincerity of the new elements
of Brandt's eastern policy."
SOVIET-FRG Moscow's first comment on the Soviet-West German talks
TALKS on a renunciation-of-force treaty since their inception
in early December comes in an Andreyev commentary
broadcast for German listeners on the 17th. Andreyev assails West
Germany's CSU leader Strauss and the "neo-nazis" aligned with him for
opposing the talks and denies their allegations of a "sellout" and a
"so-called betrayal" by FRG spokesman Egon Bahr In Moscow. The
commentatcr insists that a "possible agreement" on reciprocal
recognition of borders "does not involve any sellout" and asserts that
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030007-5
c;O I1'I.lil t1I1l Al, VIII.:, 11110 :111):;
I (1 VI-;IbItI1AItY 111)'(0
Lhe FHG ROW hurt It() cii cry Iru1, ic, fill ,tr?uu thr world u I Lunt, ic:,u "mot?e
rnfil 11- n1,1,crr,1.ly." llr' teldu LhILL Lhr? l,r,'u