TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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300 ( 2-~~r ;' \
Confidential
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
14 January 1970
(VOL. XXI, N0. 2)
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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
II.III!!:~uu~~uumiilllllll
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and `194, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
[uleded Ire,e wrewoOt
dewepradiey end
d~tler~iRterlee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JANUARY 1970
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Paris Talks: Restricted Sessions, "Vietnamization" Policy . . . . 2
Moscow on Paris Talks, Troop Withdrawal, McCarthy Tour . . . . . . 5
Continuing Comment on Vice President Agnew's Asian Tour . . . . . . 6
NFLSV/PRG Touring Delegritions in India, Africa . . . . . . . . . . 7
DRV Directive on Tet Celebrations . . . . . 8
Politburo Members' Speeches at DRV Meetings 8
Moscow Sharpens Attack on Chinese; Peking Issues Protest . . . . 10
Ulan Bator: MPR not a Pawn in Sino-Soviet Conflict . . . . . . . 13
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Continues to Critit:ize U.S. Mideast Proposals . . . . . . . . 15
NIGERIA
Moscow Seeks to Exploit Federal Government Victory . . . . . . . . 19
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Secretary Laird's Remarks Scored by Zamyatin, Propagandists . . . . 2'.
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
Soviet Spokesman Views U.S. Participation Favorably . . . . . . . 22
USSR AND SPAIN
Spanish CP Opposes Expanded Soviet-Spanish Relations . . . . . . . 24
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND
Warsaw Medial Give Cernik Visit Lavish Treatment . . . . . . . . . . 26
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FOR OJ.'FICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
14 JANUARY 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 JANUARY 1970
Moscow (3401 items)
Peking (3698 items)
Vietnam
(5%)
4%
Domestic Issues
(42%)*
47%
Agnew Asian Tour
(0.5%)
3%
Year-End Review of
16%
Polish--Soviet
(0.1%)
3%
People's Struggles
Diplomatic
[Middle East
5%]
Relations
[India
5%]
Anniversary
[Malaysia
3%]
Middle East
(2~)
3%
[Indonesia
2%]
Cosmonaut Belyayev's
--)
2%
Joint New Year's
(25%)
7%
Death
Editorial
U.S.-Japanese
(2%)
4%
Collusion
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
' Excludes items cn Chinese people's support of the joint New Year's
editorial.
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 1 -
VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
FBIS TRENDS
14 JANUARY 1970
INTRODUCTION
At the 49th session of the Paris talks on 8 January PRG deputy delegation
head Dinh Ba Thi devoted the bulk of his prepared statement to the
Vietnamization policy; the VNA account observes that Thi rejected the
Nixon Administration's contention that this policy is the "correct"
way for the United States to get out of the war "regardless of what
happens on the negotiation front." DRV deputy delegation head
Ha Van Lau, according to VNA, said that since the Nixon Administration
had been unable to reach its goal of negotiating from strength, it has
emphasized Vietnamization and regarded the search for a negotiated
settlement as secondary. Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged
that Ambassador Habib revived the proposal for restricted sessions--first
advanced by Ambassador Lodge at the 40th session on 30 October--and
that the communist delegates denounced the proposal in their rebuttal
statements.
Moscow continues its criticism of the Vietnamization policy and alleged
U.S. stalling at the Paris talks. Unlike Hanoi and Front media, TASS
reports that the U.S. delegation at Paris again proposed "restricted
talks" and that the DRV spokesman at the post-session press briefing
denounced the proposal. On 12 January a domestic service broadcast
briefly notes the announcement that the Army 1st Infantry Division is
to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, calling the move a "meaningless
symbol."
Peking's NCNA on 7 January summarizes the 31 December "special" PLAF
command communique rounding up 1969 communist "victories." The summary
includes the statistics on alleged allied casualties and notes the
criticism of Vietnamization and the call for continued fighting until
v?L'tory. Peking's only other current substantive attention to Vietnam
comes in a 13 January NCNA summary of a PEOPLE'S DAILY article,
atl,ribute.d to Fan Ti, which discusses the advice given President Nixon
by "the British nonentity, Robert Thompson." The article says the President
in his 15 December TV address had quoted from Thompson's report to the
White House the statement that the United States is now in a "winning
position," but it claims that Thompson had merely rehashed "old
strategies"developed under Kennedy and Johnson.
Vietnam propaganda on military action in the South focuses particularly
on the northern provinces, with VNA on the 13th summarizing a NHAN DAN
article which hails a "new victory" on 5 January in Quang Nam Province.
The PLAF reportedly "annihilated" 400 U,S. Marines in this -ction at
Cam Doi. The article also cites a series of attacks from 3 to 6 January
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in the highlands and central Trung Bo region. The state of reviews
of communist "victories" during 1969 continues with additional
;!rticles in the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN attributed to "True
Caien" (hand-to-hand combat). Liberation Radio from 11 through
13 January broadcasts a three-installment article on Vietnamization
by "Cuu Long" (Mekong).
Hanoi propaganda on DRV internal affairs Includes reports of various
recent meetings which heard speeches by Politburo members: Truong
Chinh spoke at a meeting of correspondents of the weekly THIEU NIEN
TIEN PHONG (YOUNG PIONEERS) on the occasion of its 15th anniversary;
Pham Van Dong addressed a meeting of the 4th Congress of Representatives
of the Vietnam National Union of Students; and Le Thanh Nghi spoke on
food and consumer goods production at a meeting of the Haiphong
People's Municipal Council and City Administrative Committee.
PARIS TALKS: RESTRICTED SESSIONS, "VIETNAMIZATI0N" POLICY
SILENCE ON The Vietnamese communist accounts of the 49th session
U.S, PROPOSAL of the Paris talks on 8 January fail to acknowledge
that Ambassador Habib, in a supplementary statement
after his formal presentation, repeated the proposal for restricted
sessions originally made by Ambassador Lodge in his formal statement at
the 30 October session.* Suggesting that the next session on
15 January be a restricted one, Ambassador Habib proposed that the
number of advisers be limited--he suggested that there be three, that
each spokesman could raise any subject, and that an agreed statement
be issued to the press.
In noting that both Ha Van Lau and Din Ba Thi spoke in rebuttal, the
VNA account says simply that they "severely criticized and refuted
the absurd demands of the U.S. and puppets' representatives. They
stressed that the United States must bear full responsibility for the
prolongation of the war in South Vietnam and the deadlock of the
Paris conference." There is thus no acknowledgment that they denounced
the restricted-session proposal.
ALLIED The VNA account of the session acknowledges some of the broad
SPEECHES themes of GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong's formal statement
when i'; says he "repeated the slanderous charge that the
North committed aggresoion against the South and that North Vietnam is
unwilling to stop the war and unwilling to .ego;iate. He claimed that
* The VNA account of 6he 30 October session took note of the Lodge
proposal in reporting the communist side's rejection of it. See the
TRENDS of 5 November 1969, pages 6-7.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration is a legal representative and
that in the past year it had shown goodwill and a serious attitude at
the Paris conference." VNA, of course, ignores such details of these
broad charges as Phong's assertion. that 80 percent of the communists
operating in South Vietnam are sent by Hanoi and his statement that
'the communists' scheme to take advantage of the Paris meetings to
embark on so-called diplomatic offensive" is shown in Resolution 9.*
VNA also ignores Phong's appeal for a discussion of secondary matters
in order to "create a relaxed atmosphere and to generate mutual
confidence."
The VNA.account of Ambassador Habib's statement is characteristic of
the standard cursory treatment when it notes that "the acting head of
the U.S. delegation again tried. to justify the U.S. crime of
aggression and cover its maneuver to prolong thp. war and downgrade the
Paris conference." VNA adds that "at the same time, he deliberately
eluded the two basic questions in the 10-point overall solution of the
NFL and PRG, namely the total and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. troops
and troops of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South
Vietnam, and the setting up of a provisional coalition government in
South Vietnam." VNA thus ignores Habib's reference to specific allied
proposals and his discussion of his attempts to obtain clarification
from the communist side on such things as the relationship of points
two and three in the NFLSV 10-point proposal. on the withdrawal of
U.S. and North Vietnamese troops.
DINH BA THI ON PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi, again substituting for the
1IETNAMIZATION reportedly ailing Mme, Nguyen Thi Binh,** devoted the
bulk of his formal statement to attacking military,
political, and economic aspects of Vietnamization. He repeated the
contention that the ARVN is not capable of taking over from U.S. Forces,
and he claimed in this regard that during 1969 400,000 South Vietnamese
government personnel were put out of action and that, "according to
* This was the third successive session at which the GVN delegate referred
to COSVN Resolution 9, the document captured in July which presents a
general assessment of the situation in the South and sets out broad
guidelines.
** When a U.S. reporter at the PRG press briefing after the session
asked whether Mme. Binh was better since she was known to have made a
public appearance, the PRG spokesman merely repeated that she had the
flu. As usual, neither DRV nor Liberation Front media carry the accounts
of any of the post session: press briefings by the four delegations.
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reports from Saigon," 180,000 deserted. He alleged that in areas where
ARVN units have assumed combat responsibility, they were so heavily
attacked--at Bu Prang, for example--that the Americans had to come to
their assistance. As a result, he said, U.S. forces continued to e.,gage
in combat and their casualties increased. Thi cited and took issue
with official U.S. figures on casualties--78,292, a decrease of
35 percent as compared to 1968--and repeated without attribution the
claims in the "special" PLAF command communique that, 235,000 Americans
were put out of action during 1969, a 5,000-man increase over 1968.
Much of the detail of Thi's statement, including the figures on
American casualties, do not appear in the VNA account.*
Concerning the political aspect of Vietnamization, Thi routinely described
the United States as attempting to "prettify" the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem
'administration."' In quoting Saigon press characterizations of the
government as "corrupt," Thi recalled--though this is not reported by
VNA--that President Nixon on the other hand had "extolled" Thieu as
one of the four or five "eminent statesmen in Asia." VNA notes Thi's
standard description of the accelerated pacification operations as
"terrorizing, massacring" and committing other "crimes." But VNA does
not report his statement that they "strike directly, forcibly concentrate
and tightly control the population, allegedly to destroy the Viet Cong
infrastructure," and that they then "produce phoney statistics about the
so-called control of the Saigon administration over South Vietnam."
11hi called the strong economy which the Vietnamization plan seeks to
ouild a "sheer illusion" and similarly questioned how this "beggar"
economy, based entirely on the war and American aid, can become strong.
He saw the GVN's economy at present as stagnating and experiencing
serious inflation that has caused a difficult life for the people
living under its "temporary" control. VNA reports his concluding
appeal to the United States to "respond seriously to our logical and
reasonable proposal and engage in genuine negotiations so as to settle
the Sou?.; Vietnam problem promptly instead of pursuing the illusion of
winning a military victory and a position of strength through the
erroneous way of VietnFunizing the war."
HA VAN LAU ON The VNA account of DRV Ambassador Ha Van Lau's state-
U,S~ POLICY ment notes his denunciation of the U.S. policy of
"negotiating from strength" and says he recalled
previous statements made by President Nixon and Secretary Laird in
this regard. VNA reports Lau's reference to President Nixon's order
* Liberation Radio departed from what has been its standard practice
and did not broadcast a full text of the PRG delegate's formal state-
ment at the session. The account is generally identical with that of
VNA, although with some more detail on Vietnamization.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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on "maximum military pressure" against the "liberated" areas of South
Vietnam. It also notes his recitation of other stock war escalation
charges--that the number of battalion-size or larger-size sweeps had
increased as compared to the number under the Johnson Administration,
and that there had been increases in the number of air attacks sorties
and the use of toxic chemical spraying.
VNA reports Lau's denunciation of the Nixon Administration's opposition
to the proposals made by the DRV and PRG delegation at the talks and of
Washington's "clinging" to its positions on mutual troop withdrawal and
maintenance of the GVN. VNdA's account does not, however, give the full
flavor of Lau's remarks dealing with the U.S. attitude and position.
It does not report his characterization of "all" proposals of the Nixon
Administration on the Vietnam problem--whether in the President's
14 May eight-point program or in proposals made by the Saigon government
as an embodiment of'the United States' "obdurate and impudent position"
regarding the "two crucial questions of a political settlement,"
the issues of a U.S. troop withdrawal and the South Vietn. se people's
right to self-determination.
VNA does not acknowledge Lau's reference to early U.S. proposals on
such specific questions as the restoration of the DMZ and the
prisoners-of-war issue. And it similarly fails to report Lau's
comment that Habib at the previous session put forward "nothing but
the so-called question of prisoners of war." Consistent with Hanoi's
silence on the issue, Lau did not mention that the United States at
that time released a list of missing U.S. military personnel in
Southeast Asia and again asked Hanoi for a list of U.S. prisoners
in the DRV.
VNA notes that Lau concluded his remarks by pledging to "continue to
denounce the dark schemes of the Nixon Administration" and to continue
the "Just struggle of the Vietnamese" if the United States refuses to
engage in serious negotiations.
MOSCOW ON PARIS TALKS, TROOP WITHDRAWAL. MCCARTHY TOUR
RESTRICTED The 9 June TASS report of the press briefing following
TALKS the Paris session on the 8th reports that the U.S.
delegation proposed holding "restricted" sessions and
that DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le denounced the proposal as
another proof that the United States is trying to "drag out" and
"sabotage" the talks. On the 12th the Moscow domestic service
briefly attributes to the New York TIMES a report on American efforts
to "pressure" the 1)RV and PRG delegation at Paris by,insisting on
"limited" talks and the abolition of post-session press conferences.
Thus far, Moscow has offered no comment of its own.
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When. Ambassador Lodge first proposed "restricted talks" at the 30 October
Paris session, TASS duly reported the remarks at the session and the
post-session briefing, and a 1 November IZVESTIYA article scored the
proposal, as a "maneuver" to conceal aggression and to prevent any
progress at the Paris talks,
TROOP WITHDRAWAL A 12 January TASS report of Secretary Laird's TV
interview the previous day ignored his comments on
troop withdrawal, stressing instead that he tried to "hush up" ROK
"atrocities" in South Vietnam. On the Lame day, however, a domestic
service broadcedt does report the announcement by the U.S. Command that
the Army's 1st Infantry Division is to be ~rithdrawn. The report calls
the move a "rleaningless symbol" consilering the "snail's pace" at which
troops are being withdrawn.
SEN. MCCARTHY Soviet media carry brief items on Senator McCarthy's
IN I!SSR, PARIS Moscow visit, but available propaganda has not
mentioned his visit to the DRV Embassy to inquire
about the fate of U.S. prisoners. 'Cl.e only mentions of the substance
of any of his talks with Soviet officials were in a TASS report, which
said he discussed "Soviet-American relations, including economic
ties," with the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute
of the United States, and in a domestic service report that he was
informed about reconstruction in Moscow during a visit to the Executive
Committee of the Moscow Soviet. ';'here are cursory reports of his
meetings with Supreme Soviet leaders on 7 and 8 January, his visit to
the Foreign Trade Ministry on the 8th, and his talks with Kosygin on the
11th,
On 12 January the Moscow domestic service briefly reports that McCarthy
saw Mme. Binh in Paris for talks on "ways toward a political solution"
of the Vietnam problem; and on the 14th TASS reports the communique on
Xuan Thuy's talks with McCarthy, noting that Thuy denounced the
Vietnamization policy, expressed support for the NFLSV's 10-point program,
and highly assessed the effort of the antiwar forces in the United
States which demand a speedy and complete withdrawal of U.S. troops.
CONTINUING COMMENT ON VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN Th,UR
HANOI AND Vietnamese propaganda continues to criticize Vice President
THE FRONT Agnew's Asian trip, highlighting anti-U.S. demonstrations
which greeted him. Both Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the
10th mention the demonstrations in the Philippines, Nepal, and
Afghanistan, also citing protests made by Americans stationed in
several countries he visited.
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Quoting the Vice President as saying in Saigon on 1 January that the
Vietnamization policy "is correct and being successfully implemented,"
Hanoi radio on the 10th claims that the communists' 1969 "victories"
have shown that Vietnamization has "failed." The broadcast further
claims that while Agnew praised the GIs, in fact they are "getting
more and more fed up" with the war and the antiwar movement is
spreading among them, causing "worry to the Washington rulers."
Agnew's trip to Saigon, Hanoi says, "reaffirmed the U.S. commitment
to Asia in order to tranquilize the puppets" who were afraid the
Americans would abandon them under the new Asian policy. Liberation
Radio echoes this line; the broadcast further says that Asians cannot
be fooled into fighting Asians and that President Marcos of the
Philippines was finally "forced" by the people to withdraw the Filipino
troops from Vietnam. It concludes that the "failure" of Agnew's trip
is a "result of the great and comprehensive failure of the Americans
in South Vietnam."
MOSCOW Moscow continues to assert that Vice President Agnew is
trying, during his Asian tour.. to "sell" the President's
"Guam doctrine" to reluctant Asian states. A 7 January IZVESTIYA
article by Kudryavtsev* says Agnew has been saying what President Nixon
could not say--that the Guam doctrine does not essentially change the
aggressive intentions of President Johnson's "Asian doctrine" which
proclaimed a U.S. intention of establishing dominance in Asia through
Asian regional groupings. Kudryavtsev notes that Agnew assured
Philippine President Marcos that the United States intends to "maintain
its positions" in the Pacific, emphasized in Thailand that there would
be no changes in U.S. obligations to Thailand and Southeast Asia, and
assured Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would fulfill its
obligations to its allies. Kudryavtsev cites the Washington EVENING STAR
for the conclusion that the United States seems to be trying to apply a
policy of "Vietnamization on a global scale." Thus, says Kudryavtsev,
the United States is trying to quiet U.S. public opinion with talk of
Vietnamization and troop withdrawal while seeking to use Asian reactionary
regimes to counter the Asian national liberation movement.
NFISV/PRG TOURING DELEGATIONS IN INDIA, AFRICA
The joint NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien, which had been
in India for a "friendship visit" since 13 December, departed on
8 January. According to a "press communique" carried by LPA on the
Kudryavtsev also says that Asian apprehension over American policy in
Asia includes concern over U.S. "flirting" with Peking. See the Sino-
Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.
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14 JANUARY 1970
10th, the group toured India as the guest of the All-India Peace Council
and the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, and Tien had
"cordial talks" with Prime Minsiter Gandhi, External Affairs Minister
Dinesh Singh, and Foreign Secretary Kaul. India has not recognized
the PRG and the only mention of the subject in available communist
propaganda is in a 10 January IZVESTIYA article on the visit;
IZVESTIYA says that during the delegation's stay the Indian press
"frequently" put forward demands for the recognition of the PRG and
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DRV.
LPA on 8 January reports that an NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Le Quang
Chanh visited Zambia--which also has not recognized the PRG--from
27 December to 5 January. Chanh's group had previously visited
Tanzania after touring Iraq, South Yemen, and the Sudan.
DRV DIRECTIVE ON TET CELEBRATIONS
Hanoi radio on 9 January reports that the DRV Premier "recently" issued
a directive on the celebrations of the "Canh Thant" Lunar New Year
Festival, Tet. The directive calls for "Joyful" celebrations but also
says that it must be a Tet "of resistance for national salvation and
socialist construction." As in previous years, the instructions
call on the population "to practice thrift, maintain vigilance, and
be ready to plunge into work and production with a new, stirring
revolutionary spirit."
The broadcast notes `hat the Standing Committee, of the Council of Ministers
has granted one-and-a-half days' leave to cadres, workers, and civil
servants--the afternoon of New Year's Eve, 5 February, and the first day
of the first lunar month, 6 February. It adds that workers will also
be off Saturday, 7 February, but will work in compensation on Sunday,
8 February. (In 1969, after the bombing halt of the DRV, Tet was
celebrated in the North for two days; in 1968, the year of the Tet
offensive, available propaganda gives no indication of time off for
celebrations; and in 1967, comment notes that in "some areas where
work was unfinished," only half a day was given for celebrations.)
POLITBURO MEMBERS' SPEECHES AT DRV MEETINGS
TRUONG CHINH VNA on 8 January reports that Truong Chinh, Politburo
member and Chairman of the DRV National Assembly
Standing Committee, had addressed a gathering of corr:ispondents of the
weekly THIEU NIEN TIEN PHONG (YOUNG PIONEERS) on the occasion of its
15th anniversary. On the same day Hanoi radio in its domestic service
also reports the meeting and carries the full text of Chinh's remarks,
in which he str..ssed the duty to "make all-out efforts" to educate
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young people "to correctly comply with the five teachings"* of President
Ho. Noting that a small number of students have been slow and
undisciplined learners, Chinh blames such "responsible organs" as
families, schools, and society in general for not coordinating closely
to edr;cate them.
Saying that THIEU NIEN TIEN PHONG must be a "propagandist, an educator,
and an organizer" of teenagers and children, he explains that currently
the core of the paper's tasks consists of educating youths about ethics.
Among other things, he says, the paper must advise them "to help the
organs responsible for maintaining security and order in struggling
against these bad elements, and to be vigilant against the hooligans
and counterrevolutionaries, . . "
PRAM VAN DONG On 10 January, VNA reports that Politburo member
Premier Pham Van Dong recently visited the 4th Congress
of Representatives of the Vietnam National Union of Students and "had
cordial conversations with the participants." Hanoi radio on the 9th
broadcasts Dong's remarks at the meeting, which it says was held on
6 and 7 January. Dong recommends to the students that they "endeavor
in study and training to become men and women both Red and expert as
President Ho Chi Minh wanted." He goes on to urge the students to
seek the best methods to further their study, since building socialiom
requires "many able and skilled workers" and since a contingent of
scientists and technical cadres must be trained and fostered.
LE THANH NGHI Hanoi radio on 10 January reports that on the 5th
the Haiphong People's Municipal Council and City
Administrative Committee held a conference at which Politburo member
and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi spoke. Discussing the main points "in
the trends and tasks of the 1970 State Plan," Nghi discoursed on
Haiphong's responsibility in food and consumer goods production for
1970. He reportedly also dealt with the production emulation drive to
overfulfill the 1970 State Plan which was launched on 31 December in
Hanoi.
The five teachings of President Ho to children are: to love the
fatherland and people, study well and work well, be united and observe
good discipline, observe hygiene, and be modest, honest, and
courageous.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
F,BIS TRENDS
14 JANUARY 1970
MOSCOW SHARPENS ATTACK ON CHINESE; PEKING ISSUES PROTEST
Stung by recent Chinese propaganda and resentful toward renewed Sino-
U.S., contacts, Moscow has lifted its restraints on polemics to
deliver a sharp attack centered on the Chinese war preparations
c8mpoign. In a widely disseminates. TABS report dated 9 January and
In other comment, Moscow has charged that the Maoist regime is
fostering a "military psychosis" in an effort to overcome internal
strife and to purge elements conciliatory toward the Soviets. At
the same time, Moscow has conveyed its displeasure over recent
contacts between the CPR and the United States leading to the agree-
ment to renew the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw this month. The
triangular relationship also figures in a CPR protest charging
that the Soviets have coordinated with the United States in
promoting a two-Chinas plot.
On the same day as the TASS report, Peking unofficially gave its
version of the deadlocked Sino-Soviet talks in response to Western
news reports from Moscow portraying the Chinese as taking a hostile
stance at the talks. Again using the Hong Kong paper TA KUNG PAO
as a channel for leaking their views on the talks, the Chinese
claim that the deadlock is the result of the Soviet side's refusal
to honor an agreement allegedly reached by Premiers Kosygin and
Chou En-lai in September calling for military disengagement along
the border. The TA KUNG PAO report, citing "well-informed circles,"
complains that the Soviets have not "put any restraint" on their
armed forces, but it does not charge that there have been incidents
along the border. The report seems designed to shift the burden of
blame from the Chinese for the evident lack of progress in the talks
and to reassert the priority Peking has placed on the need for
military disengagement. Appearing in an "extra" edition one day
after the CPR-U.S. agreement to resume the Warsaw talks, the report
may also have been timed to put added pressure on the Soviets.*
Moscow has used a favorite device of its own--remarks to correspondents
by Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin--to announce that the Peking
talks are continuing and to indicate Moscow's interest in keeping them
* Previously Peking implied a link between the Sino-Soviet and the
Warsaw talks. in NCNA's international service in English on 14 December,
a report on the departure from Peking that day of chief Soviet negotiator
Kuznetsov was immediately followed by a belated report on the
11 December Warsaw meeting of the CPR charge d'affaires and the U.S.
ambassador.
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alive. TASS on 13 January quoted Zamyatin as saying the talks "are
continuing and it is yet early to sum up their results." Soviet
comment on Chinese war preparations and anti-Soviet propaganda has
not spelled out any implications for the talks, though the 9 January
TABS report took note of an NCNA report describing propagandists
operating "close to the Soviet borders" who have been explaining
Mao's directives on war preparedness.
MOSCOW ON CPR The 9 January TABS report on Chinese war
MILITARISM preparations--carried in the central press and
widely broadcast--represents the sharpest Soviet
polemical attack since the moratorium on criticism of China was
imposed in the wake of _ Kosy_gin's meeting._with.. Chou in_ September.
It also contains the first direct attack on Mao during this period.
Denouncing the Chinese war preparedness campaign an an effort to
promote "chauvinist sentiments and military psychosis," TASS says
Peking's purpose is to overcome disunity in China and to consolidate
the ranks of the "Maoists." The report reacts sharply to recent
Chinese propaganda attacks, assailing Peking's New Year's Day
joint editorial--which denounced Brezhnev directly--.as containing
"particularly vicious anti-Soviet attacks." Evincing growing Soviet
iripatiencc', TABS charges that Chinese propaganda portraying a Soviet
threat ("absurd concoctions" that have been rehashed "for several
years already") has recently been presented "morejns stently than
ever."
In referring to the "Maoists"--while avoiding the once-standard formula
"Mao and his group," a code-term implying a faction without
legitimate authority--the PASS report probes possible dissension in
Peking's higher councils. TASS goes so far as to revive mentioJL
Chinese communists who allegedly favor good relatims- r th_the_,Soy~,gt
Union bu? L$~ hn.ye snfferP rP=riagla for-their attitude. According
to the report, the Maoists have {.yoked the specter of a Soviet
threat as a pretext for refusing to reinstate these communists in the
CCP. TASS singles out a Chinese commentary on two opposed views on
war, carried in the domestic service and PEOPLE'S DAILY on 24 December,
as part of the campaign "glorifying militarism and chauvinism in the
spirit of Mao's ideas." That commentary had assailed what it
described as the revisionist view that there is a reasonable group
within the enemy camp. As TASS notes, the commentary approvingly cited
Chiang Ching, a figure generally associated with radical elements
that might be expected to insist on an intransigent line toward the
Soviets.
The TABS attack is followed up on successive days by articles in
IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA charging that Peking's behavior has harmed the
communist cause. A Yakovlev article in the 10 January IZVESTIYA
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morning edition, citing Peking as an example of the damage caused by
"the rupture of proletarian internatiunaliom," charges that "the
aLmosphere of war hysteria" being created in China plays into the
hands of anticommun},ot propaganda. A similar theme is developed in
PIZAVI)A'o 11 January ?,nternational review by Kolonnichonko, who
denounces "the great-power, advonturistic, anti-Soviet course"
pursued by Peking for inflicting great damage on the communist move-
ment. Kolcunichenko describes the Chinese war preparations as being
"obviously provocative in nature" and refers to "another wave of
anti-Soviet hysteria" in the CPR.
While significantly intensifying its polemical pressure, Moscow has
also sustained its indirect attacks on Maoist doctrine in broadcasts
beamed to China. In the regular Mandarin program for the PLA, a
broadcast on 10 January argues in behalf of peaceful coexistence while
rebuking those who call for a "revolutionary war, which is allegedly
to eliminate a global thermonuclear war"--an allusion to a principal
slogan in the Chinese war preparedness campaign. Dismissing views of
unnamed theor'ticians concerning "people's war" against a nuclear-armed
enemy and "defensive warfare" designed to entice the enemy into an
unfavorable position, the commentary attributes these views to a need
to cover up the economic and military weaknesses of "those countries
which advocate such a theory and their lack of a genuine military
theory."
Moscow uses its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress as an
irritant to Peking by informing the Chinese people of the CPR's
recent dealings with Yugoslavia. Citing a report by a TANYUG
correspondent in Peking, a Mandarin broadcast on the 12th reports that
a Yugoslav freighter entered the port of Shanghai and was unloaded at
an "unprecedented" speed. The broadcast plays up the hospitable
reception accorded this ship's first visit tc Shanghai.
SOVIET-CPR-U.S. Moscow has displayed its resentment and suspicion
TRIANGLE toward renewed Sino-U.S. contacts, characterized
as Washington's "flirting" with Peking in order to
advance U.S. interests. According to TASS on 8 January, the weekly
LIFE ABROAD carried articles on this alleged flirtation from the
foreign press together with a comment by I. Kravchenko denouncing
"the perfidious attempts by militant circles" in the United States
"to complicate relations" between Moscow and Peking. Soviet comment
on Vice President Agnew's Asian tour has also played on this theme,
as in the observation by IZVESTIYA commentator Kudryavtsev (in the
8 January morning edition) that the U.S. aim is to exploit Chinese
dissidence in the interest of Washington's new Asian policy.
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1VI3IE3 TRENDS
1), JANUARY 1970
The agreement reached by th 1 United States and the CPR to renow the
Warjaw ambaosadcri.al talks has been reported without comment by Moscow.
TI;n Soviet props did, however, carry reports on the agruoment in the
names inauos which published the TABS report on Chincso war preparations,
with IZVESTIYA juxtaposing the reports and PRAVDA and RED STAR printing
them on the name page, The timing of the TASS report nuggeoto that
Sino-U.S. developments are a factor in Moscow's intensified polemics.
Poking has also given vent to its suspicions in the triangular
relationship, charging that Soviet media's coverage of Vice
President Agriew's visit to Taiwan provided support for an alleged
U.S. plot to create two Chinas. A CPR protest to the Soviet Union,
dated 9 January and released on the 11th, strains to cite evidence
from Soviet coverage of the visit indicating that Moscow regards
Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan as a country. Taking the occasion to
denounce the "Soviet revisionist social imperialists" for being
hostile to the Chinese people, the protest claims that Moscow is
mounting a "new anti-China campaign." This protest may have been
provoked by snide observations in Soviet media that Peking had not
reacted to the Vise President's affirmations of support for Chiang.
ULAN BATOR: MPR NOT A PAWN IN SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT
An article in the Mongolian paper UNEN, carried on 9 January by TASS
and PRAVDA, betrays sensitivity to the MPR's delicate position in
the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Setting out to "expose the slanderous
ftabrl%;at ions" c,.ntaired in a UPI report which aimed at "undermining
%ngolia's international authority," the LINEN article declares that
even though "fraternal international assistance was rendered by Soviet
Russia" the Mongolian people themselves, under the leadership of the
party, gained their freedom and independence in 1921. UNEN insists
that "no outside farce proclaimed our country's independence" as
alleged by UPI. Denying a statement in the UPI report that the
existing treaty with the Soviet Union is "a treaty for rendering
military aid," the paper says that on the contrary "it represents
an historic document which is strengthening and deepening the ties
of fraternal friendship between our countries and is promoting close
cooperation in all ;;,.41Qres of the economy and culture."
With respect to alleged UPI statements that "when Mao Tse-tung and
his communist supporters came to power in China many considered that
Mongolia would again become a part of China" and that "Mongolia's
location predetermined its fate to be a pawn in the struggle between
Russia and Red China," UNEN charges that the UPI correspondent "failed
to conceal the fact that he was one of those 'many people' who hoped
Mongolia would again become part of China." Noting that Mongolia
does border "on two great countries," the LINEN article states
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14
unequivocally that "throughout their history the Mongolian people
have never played the role of a 'pawn' being moved from one place
to another by others" and aceerto that "these fantasies" are nothing
more than "the audibly expressed thoughts of those who aspire to
shape the dectinieo of other peoples."
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III JANUARY 1970
MIDDLE EAST
USSR CONTINUES TO CRITICIZE U.S, MIDEAST PROPOSALS
Soviet propagandists continue to assail the U.S. proposals for a
Middle East settlement as Israel-orientod and as diverging fram tho
November 1967 Security Council resolution, which is preosed as the
"only acceptable, basin" for resolving the conflict. At the same
time, Moscow displays some sensitivity to Western press assessments
that it is to the Soviet Union's advantage to prolong the conflict,
as well as to speculation that there had been some measure of Soviet
approval of the U.S. proposals and that Moscow has now changed its
position with regard to the "Rhodes formula" on indirect Arab-Israeli
negotiations. Moscow argues that "procedural questions" such as the
form of any negotiations should be set aside in favor of working out
the "assence of concrete principles" for implementing the Security
Council resolution.
Comment tends to sidestep the question of official French involvement
in the affair of the Israeli gunboats taken from Cherbourg despite
the French embargo on arms to participants in the 1967 war; nor does
Moscow address itself to Paris' intentions in connection with French
arms deliveries to the Arab countries. Moscow pictures France as
under heavy pressure from the United States and Israel to give up
the Mirage talks with Libya, and Israel is said to seek "confrontations"
between France and the other three powers in order to "cause disarray
among the countries which want to see a settlement."
U.S. PROPOSALS A critique of the U.S. proposals by Primakov in the
14 January PRAVDA, as reported by TASS, seem3 to
follow the lines of the 23 December Soviet response to the United
States as described in the U.S. press on 13 January. Primakov charges
the American press with trying to prove that "there had supposedly
been some changes" in the U.S. position on the Middle East question
and with trying to find additional means of pressure against the Arabs.
Complaining of "impudent falsifications" by American "propaganda,"
Primakov cites an article by Joseph Alsop who "alleged in the Washington
POST that the American proposals on the Middle East conflict had been
tentatively approved" by the Soviet Union. Avoiding an outright
denial, Primakov says that the "latest strategem of U.S. diplomacy"
was prompted by increasing dissatisfaction with American policy in
all Arab countries. He assesses the American plan as shifting from
attempts to arrive at a "concerted formula" among the four powers for
implementation of the November resolution, designed to facilitate the
mission of U Thant's envoy, Jarring, to "a purely formal resumption
of this mission."
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Primi.Ucov w.k.,usec3 the United Staten of "oven changing its position"
or uome points in a pro-Israeli direction, with a view to reaching
ur.derutanding "mainly on thous issues which --?e advantageous for
laracl." lit, chargau "certain U.S, quarters" with seeking to wreck
the p+;;>ibility of agreement "not on neutral wordings but on the
dNrt:rr; ;~3 of concrete principles" of implementir.g the Security
Council resolution. Suggesting that Moscow may seek to pursue the
Middlf, Eant queution in the four-power rather than bilateral
cunuultn+,ions,PASS notes that Primakov in conclusion referred to
bosh the Big Four and bJlutaral discussions and urged "continuation
of the efforts of the Big Four powers" to find the best ways of
praw:tical implementation of all the resolution's provisions.
I car.t,ing defonuively to the idea that Soviet interests would be
better nerved by prolonging the Middle East conflict, Kudryavtsev
declares in the 11 January IZVESTIYA that behind Washinkton's
propusals lay a desire to spread the notion that "prolonction
of the war wa;; supposedly in the interests of the Soviet Union,
which allegA-tly is using it to 'advance its influence' in the Near
East," as well as a desire "to accuse the Soviet Union of everything
and thereby attempt to weaken its growing authority among the Arab
countries and peoples."
Kudrynvtsev accuses the United States of "patently deviating" from
the Security Council resolution, whose "prime condition" is
unconditional Israeli withdrawal. He ticks off complaints about
the proposals regarding the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, Sharm ash-Shaykh,
and Jerusalem, concluding that if one follows Secretary Rogers, "only
bits and pieces" of the resolution remain. He derides the legality
of Israel's territorial claims, pointing ouL that Israel'-, borders
prior to 5 June 1967 "do not correspond with those defined by the
UN decisions of 1947," when the state of Israel was created; "the
Arab countries could have claims against Israel, if they were guided
by the justice which Israel and Washington are hypocritically shouting
about." (The 1947 partition boundaries were described by PRAVDA's
Belyarev, in a May 1969 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS artic.. as the only
Israeli boundaries that could be "legally recognized.")
Noting that the American proposals are addressed to the UAR and
Jordan separately, "generally excluding Syria," Kudryavtsev maintains
that the proposals aim, as does Israel, at achieving direct
negotiations with each Arab country separately to compel them to
caritulate. Some Soviet comment in late December had described the
'~.S. plan as consisting of three separate proposals--far the UAR,
JorcI i, and Syria.
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14 JANUARY 1970
RHODES A remark by Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin, at
FORMULA his press conference reported by PASS on 13 January, rejects
Israeli interpretations of the Rhodes formula on Israeli-Arab
negotiations as being "direct talks," but--like the few prior propaganda
references to the formula--is careful not to rule out such negotiations
altogether. Zamyatin, TASS says, denied that the Soviet Union had
changed its position on the Middle East and accused Alsop of misinter-
preting the Soviet position regarding the "so-called Rhodes formula."
TASS explains that this formula appeared in 1949 "during the conclusion
of the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire agreement," the text of which "was
agreed on with the mediation of UN representatives." But the "actual
meaning now read into this formula," TASS says, is shown by Israeli
contentions that the Rhodes talks "had allegedly been 'direct' talks."
Zamyatin declared that the Soviet Union had never recognized such an
interpretation. TASS adds that "after the 'Israeli explanations,' the
United States-is again bringing forth as one of the main questions the
so-called 'Rhodes formula''; by talking about the form of negotiations,
the United States and Israel want to supplant the "main issue--the need
to agree on the main principles" of a Middle East settlement on the
basis of the November resolution.
PRAVDA's Belyayev rejects the Rhodes formula along the same lines. In
the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable program on
11 December, he explains that the formula is unacceptable to the Arabs,
"particularly since the Israelis have said that direct talks were
supposed to have taken place" on Rhodes in 1949. Thus he appears to
leave open the possibility, much as Zamyatin does, that such talks
might be considered if the Israeli interpretation were changed.
Belyayev goes on to repeat the long-standing Soviet contention that
direct talks under conditions of Israeli occupation would constitute
Arab capitulation.
In an ambiguous passage in his 11 January IZVESTIYA article, Kudryavtsev
seems to object to the Rhodes formula on the same grounds as he 'lid in
a 17 December article in LIFE ABROAD, charging in both instances that
the United States is trying in veiled form to force through the Israeli
idea of direct negotiations with the Arab countries. In IZVESTIYA, he
complains of the emphasis in the U.S. plan on "the procedure of the talks
the United States has proposed" on normalization of the situation.
Stating that the Rhodes formula was chosen as a "disguise" for Israeli
demands, he says ?'t "falseness" of this formula is striking because
the Jarring mission "has borne no results primarily owing to the fault
of American diplomacy." In ..late October, in he wake of the commotion
created by reports--and Cairt., denials--of UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's
acceptance of the Rhodes formula, Kudryavtsev had been more categorical
in rejecting the formula. He had argued in a broadcast in English to
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the Urited Kingdom that "accepting the Rhodes formula, even with Gunnar
Jarring as mediator, would signify entering into direct negotiations
with Israel before Israel cleared out of the occupied territories."
He criticized the British press for "hypocritically calling these
talks indirect, since the delegations were in different rooms at the
time and came together in one room only to sign the agreement,"
MILITARY The Kudryavtsev article in IZVESTIYA is apparently the
OPERATIONS first reflection of concern in Soviet propaganda over
the recent Israeli military exploits in attacking
sensitive UAR targets. Kudryavtsev declares that the Israeli
militarists' actions are becoming "ever more insolent and dangerous
in view of their possible consequences." One can ascertain not only
the extension of military actions, he says, but also "the preparation
for spreading them to remote regions" of the Arab countries.
TASS regularly and briefly reports Arab military operations and
Israeli "armed provocations," citing Arab military spokesmen's
statements. Reporting the Israeli operation on the night of
26-27 December against what Cairo radio called "warning posts
north of Ras Gharib and az-Zafaranah," TASS mentioned only the
latter area; it was from Has Gharib that the Israelis, as they
acknowledged on 3 January, brought back a Soviet radar installation.
Citing a UAR armed forces spokesman on the 7 and 13 January attacks
on UAR military installations near Cairo, TASS in each instance said
only that the Israeli planes were intercepted by the Egyptian air
force and were compelled to retreat.
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NIGERIA
MOSCOW SEEKS TO EXPLOIT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VICTORY
Moscow reacts to the Biafran surrender with comment underscoring an
image of the Soviet Union as a champion of African unity, contrasting
Soviet support of a legitimate government against secessionist rebels
with Western "znterferenre" represented by aid to Biafra. Authoritative
comment comes from Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin, who
remarked at his 13 January press conference, in reply to a question
about the Soviet position on aid, that genuine humanitarian aid "should
be rendered through the Federal Government at its request." Accordingly,
as quoted by TASS, Zamyatin declared that the USSR "has given and will
continue to give its support and material aid" to Lagos and that "so-
called 'aid' tc the rebels through various charity organizations" is
"nothing but interference in Nigeria's internal affairs."
An article by Korovikov in PRAVDA on the same day, reviewed by TASS,
embroiders the theme that the war has taught Nigeria "who are its
friends and who are its enemies." Repeating past Soviet charges
that Western oil monopolies played a role in instigating the conflict,
the articis seeks to blame the tragic consequences of the war on efforts
"by the imperialist powers to fan up conflicts and to supply arms and
give political support to the separatists." Moscow has on several past
occasions acknowledged Soviet "material" aid to Lagos, as in Zamyatin's
current remarks, but has never admitted specifically to being an arms
supplier.
Noting that the Western press is "clamoring" for aid missions to be
sent to Nigeria, the PRAVDA article says this indicates that "the
Western powers have not abandoned their attempts to interfere in
Nigeria's internal affairs," And an article by Khokhlov in IZVESTIYA
on the same day says the country's "progressive forces" must now
"take firmer steps to strengthen unity and to rebuff Western blackmail"
and "to prevent imperialist forces from interfering in Nigeria's
internal affairs." Neither article, to judge from the TASS accounts,
specifically mentions U.S. offers to aid the war victims; in keeping
with customary practice, thu, attack is focused broadly on the
"imperialist" West.
Just as Khokhlov in IZVESTIYA welcomes the Nigerian Government victory
with "profound satisfaction" and declares that the USSR has "always
been in favor of a sovereign and united Nigeria," so Radio Moscow tells
African listeners that Nigeria's "friends" are happy to see a tragic
period ending and that the USSR has always stood for Nigerian unity,
territorial integrity, and peace.
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It was on grounds of support for national unity that Moscow came down
unequivocally on the side of the Federal Government when the fighting
started in mid.-1967, using propaganda support of Lagos as part of the
Soviet effort to establish a political presence in the area. At the
same time, as if to keep its options open, Moscow avoided directly
attacking the Ibos, generally depicting them as pawns victimized by
the Western "imperialists" and oil monopolies. As manifestations of
world sympathy for the plight of the starving Biafrans and censure of
arms suppliers increased, Soviet propagandists sought to play down
the Soviet role and to concentrate almost entirely on the Western
powers' alleged culpability. The volume of comment and reportage on
Nigeria declined and has been very sparse even in broadcasts to Africa
for more than a year.
Now, in the current Soviet press articles as well as in news coverage
five times the previous norm in broadcasts to Africa,-?;~;oscow seizes an
opportunity to make political capital of Soviet support for the winning
side, reemphasizing its backing of Lagos in a conflict instigated and
prolonged by the "imperialists and colonialists." Wide publicity is
given a report that General Gowon has expressed thanks to Ambassador
Romanov for Soviet support.
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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
FBIS TRENDS
14 JANUARY 1970
SECRETARY LAIRDIS REMARKS SCORED BY ZAMYATIN, PROPAGANDISTS
Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zanyratin touched briefly on the recently
concluded Helsinki phase of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)
at his 13 January press conference, commenting that their results were
"positively assessed" in the USSR. At, the same time, according to the
TASS report on the press conference, Zamyatin observed that Secretary
Laird's 7 January statement on expanding the construction of the
Safeguard ABM system "confirms the existence in the United States of
forces actively resisting a limitation of the strategic arms race and
trying to create obstacles for talks on that matter" and that Laird
"frightens Americans by a Soviet menace he has himsalf invented." The
TASS account does not include Zamyatin's observation, reported in the
Western press, that the Soviet Union is confident that the next round
of talks opening in Vienna in April "will be in the same spirit that
marked Helsinki."
Zamyatin's comments follow a spate of propaganda critical of Laird's
remarks on the U.S. arms budget and the expanding of the Safeguard
system. A RED STAR article on 9 January, reporting on plans to expand
Safeguard, quoted the New York TIMES for the observation that such a step
"might prove excessively provocative with respect to the Soviet Union at
a time when certain results have been achieved at the Soviet-American
preliminary talks in Helsinki." RED STAR alluded to "officials" in
Washington who are expressing fear that the Pentagon's plans "could
exert a negative influence on the forthcoming Soviet-American talks" in
Vienna. The military paper's reference to the possible impact on SALT
is,no,; echoed in a 13 January IZVESTIYA article criticizing Laird's
remarks; IZVESTIYA says only that the plans for new weapons systems
have "caused alarm among the American public, which is legitimately
worried by the new wave of the Pentagon's military aspirations."
Over Radio Moscow, a foreign-language camentary by Vavilov on the
8th said recent remarks by the Secretary on the "alleged Soviet threat"
have been taken 'Lip by "militarist circles in the United States." Noting
that the Helsinki phase of SALT has been met with "satisfaction" through-
out the world and that the talks will resume in Vienna in April, Vavilov
stated that circles connected with the "military--industrial complex" in
the United States "are doing everything they can to prevent anything
being done to limit the arms race."
Continuing to report U.S. domestic opposition to development of multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), TASS on 9 JanuAxy said
Senator Proxmire indicated in a recent speech that MIRV testing "means
a further buildup of the U.S. nuclear potential and creates serious
obstacles for the talks on strategic arms limitation."
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EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
SOVIET SPOKESMAN VIEWS U.S. PARTICIPATION FAVORABLY
Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zanyatin, at a 13 January press
conference "devoted to questions of preparing and convening u
conference on problems of European security," states that Moscow has
informed Washington "of its favorable attitude to the participation of
the United States in an all-European conference"--an attitude which,
he adds, is shared by the other socialist countries. This is Moscow's
first direct public statement that U.S. participation is acceptable, in
contrast to long-standing Soviet ambivalence on the question in the
past. In December 1966 and July 1968,,for example, Kosygin had said
U.S. participation was a matter "to be decided by the conference
itself." More recently, the 1 December 1969 Soviet-Danish communique
and the 22 December Soviet-Luxembourg communique referred to the
participation of "all interested countries." Two days prior to
Zamyatin's declaration, a participant in a domestic service commentators'
roundtable show had remarked that the United States, "a non-European
country, claims the right to participate in the European conference."*
Zannyatin's press conference otherwise broke no new ground on the question
of a European security conference. A statement read by him--carried in
full by TASS four hours ahead of the TASS report of his remarks on U.S.
participation--stresses the favorable response to the proposal for a
conference and its timeliness. The statement endorses the agenda items
contained in the 31 October Prague declaration of the Warsaw Pact
foreign ministers--the creation of security in Europe and renunciation
of force and the widening of commercial and other ties between European
states--and assails opponents of the conference who would delay it or
overburden the agenda "with such questions as it would be unable to
decide." Wnile the statement cites no example of such questions,
propaganda at the time of the NATO Council's Brussels meeting in early
December had complained of efforts to place balanced force reduction
and the German question on the conference agenda. Western news sources
report that Zanyatin, in answer to a question, stated that the European
security conference should not discuss the Berlin problem, but this
exchange is not included in the TASS account of the question-and-answer
session.
The statement read by Zanyatin at the press conference routinely attacks
those "people" at the Brussels meeting who would prefer to switch the
work of the forthcoming conference to talks between NATO and the Warsaw
* See the FBIS SURVEY of 1 December 1969, pages 2-3, for a recent
discussion of Soviet propaganda treatment of the issue of U.S. participation.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JANUARY 1970
Pact. Such an approach, the statement says, would allow no role for
European neutrals.
The timing of the Zanratin press conference may relate in part to the
reported opening in Moscow the next day of a secret meeting of European
communist parties to discuss "the anti-imperialist struggle" and
European security. AFP reports this development on the 14th, citing
"well-informed sources" in Moscow.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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14 JANUARY 1970
USSR AND SPAIN
SPANISH CP OPPOSES EXPANDED SOVIET-SPANISH RELATIONS
While Moscow propaganda on Spain continues to dwell routinely on labor
unrest and opposition to the presence of U.S. bases, ignoring Western
press speculation about moves toward a thaw in Soviet-Spanish relations,
Spanish CP Secretary General Santiago Carrillo appeared to lend
substance to the Western speculation in an interview over the party's
clandestine Radio Espana Independiente on 5 January. In the wake of
a meet ing--reported--br Western sources-between the Spanish foreign
minister and senior Soviet officials at the Moscow airport,* Carrillo
expounded on his party's opposition to a rapprochement. Referring to
a Madrid newspaper editorial which saw Moscow and its Warsaw Pact
partners moving toward expanded ties with Spain, he said his party
had "always" opposed "political, consular, or diplomatic relations"
bt:tween Spain and the socialist countries and added--in an evident
allusion to Poland, Romania, and Hungary, which have established
consular ties with Spain--that such relations "will not be any
advantage to those who have established them." With Franco "nearing
his end," Carrillo stated, the party would have preferred that the
socialist countries continue to shun "a regime imposed with the help
of Hitler and Mussolini" so that "the prestige" of these countries
might be preserved.
FRICTIONS BETWEEN Frictions between Moscow and the Spanish CP
SPANISH CP S CPSU appear to have been exacerbated by the Spanish
party's intransigent stand on the Czechoslovak
question. In October the party's executive committee reacted to the
sanctions imposed on Dubcek and Smrkovsky with a statement charging
that the actions against the Czechoslovak reformist leaders contravened
"the conclusions of the 20th CFSU Congress" and marked a return to
"methods justly condemned by the international communist movement."
Radio Espana Independiente now suggests that Moscow may be collaborating
in the splitting efforts of two pro-Soviet dissidents who were dropped
from Spanish party leadership positions in July. On 13 December the
clandestine radio broadcast a purported letter sent to the party
executive committee by "the Committee of the Spanish Communist Party
[in exile] in the Soviet Union" protesting the activities of the two
dissidents, who it alleged were trying to "discredit" the policies of
* Confirmed by the Spanish foreign minister to have taken place
26 December, according to a 12 January AFP report,
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14 JANUARY 1970
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the party leadership by disseminating "biaacd propaganda" to party
militants. This propaganda, the latter charged, "is reprinted,
distributed, and recorded on tapes, and signatures are collected
and attached to letters demanding the measures adopted against
these two man 'be cancelled." Indicating that the two dissidents
enjoyed support from elements of the Spanish party residing in the
USSR who were receiving and disseminating their propaganda materials,
the letter alleged that "the dividing and splitting activities" of
the dissidents were "clearly expressed ir the attitude recently
adopted by groups of comrades closely connected with these men."
It complained that this divisive activity "makes it difficult for
the Committee of the Spanish Communist Party in the Soviet Urion
to fulfill its tasks."
In the course of his 5 January interview Carrillo alluded to the
two dissidents, stating that while all Spanish communists are in
favor of maintaining "the best relations of friendship with the
CPSU," they also feel that "Just as pro-China fractions were not
tolerated, so others which tried to favor any other socialist
countries could not be tolerated either."
TIRANA COMMENT A 13 January Tirana domestic broadcast seizes
on the reports of a meeting between the Spanish
foreign ministe'' tend F'uviet officials as exposing the "demagogic"
nature of "claims" by the "Soviet revisionist clique" that it
"allegedly defends the cause of socialism." Moves toward a Moscow-
Madrid rapprochement stem not from any reversal of the Franco
regime's policy of "suppression and massacre of the Spanish people,"
the broadcast says, but rather from an affinity between Franco's
policy and Moscow's. The Soviet flirtation with Spain is called
part and parcel of a policy of cooperation with ",;he most reactionary
and bloody regimes of the world within the framework of the general
U.S.-Soviet collaboration to divide their spheres of influence and
suppress the peoples' liberation movement."
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CON1'ID1 NTIAL F13I0 PHLNDS
- 26 111 JANUARY 1970
-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND
WARSAW MEDIA GIVE CERNIK VISIT LAVISH TREATMENT
I'Ul.iah madlu'u full and enthuci.itic treatment of Czechoslovak
Premlcr Cernik'u 8-1.0 January "friendship" visit to Warsaw exceeds
th' publicity usually accorded a third-ranking guo-it from a bloc
,.Quntry and contrarto with Moucow'o treatment of the holdover figure
from the discredited Dubeck regime when he visited the Soviet Union
with Husak and Svoboda laot October: the Soviet press carried
pictures and biographies of the latter two but not of Cernik, and
Konygin pointedly refrained from mentioning the Czechoslovak visitors
by name in his toast at an embassy reception. Cernik was ngain in the
Soviet Union on 3-4 December for the meeting of top party and
government leaders of the socialist states and stayed on for what
Moscow clad Prague media were to describe, upon his return home on the
13th, acs a "rest" at Kosygin's Invitation.
That Cernik has now acquired some renewed acceptability, at least in
Poland, is suggested by Warsaw media's comment on his January vielt,
which included a "cordial and friendly" meeting with Gomulka and
Cyrankiewicz on the first day. Summing up the talks after Cernik's
departure, TRYBUNA LUDU on 12 January hails "the full convergence
of views on all problems discussed" and stresses that "these were
important and fruitful talks which produced advantageous results
both for Poland and for the cause of strengthening the unity of the
socialist community." The military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI the same
day, in an article titled "A New Level of Cooperation," says the visit
served "the most vital national interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia."
The lengthy 10 January communique on the Cernik-Cyrankiewicz talks
records full agreement on the whole gamut of bilateral, bloc, and
international topics, characterizing the atmosphere of the talks as
one of "frankness and mutual confidence."
While neither the Polish press comment nor the communique alludes
directly to Czechoslovakia's past troubles with the Warsaw Five, the
two principals gave this subject an orthodox airing in their public
utterances. At a 9 January meeting at the Zeran Automobile Factory,
Cyrankiewicz asserted in notably hardline terms that a victory of
"the autisocialist forces" in Czechoslovakia in 1968 would have
meant "weakening the solidarity" of the socialist states "at a
defined sector in the southwest, with all its consequences for the
future . . ." Speaking on the same: platform, Cernik was more direct
than before in recalling at length how the "counterrevolutionary"
Forces "were shattered in 1968."r_is most explicit praise for Husak's
leadership came in a Polish radio and television interview, also on
r
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL InBIO TRENDS
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14 JANUARY 1970
the 9th, in which he noted that "since April 1969, when the new party
leadership began its zctivity, the development has been completely
normal, and favorable internal and external conditions have been
created."
Prague television carried a routine interview with Cernik on his
arrival back home on the 10th, in contrast to the total ignoring of
the premier by Czechoslovak media in their airport interviews on the
return of the CSSR party-government delegation from Moscow last
October.
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