SUBVERSION IN THE ARAB GULF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100190002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 3, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI NO 0830/75
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 3, 1975
SUBJECT: Subversion in the Arab Gulf
Evidence of attempts by outside powers to gain influence
and shape events in the Arab Gulf raises some fears about mid-
dle-and long-term security of the small, but energy-important
states that'ring the eastern periphery of the Arabian penin-
sula. The tactics of Iraq, the Soviet Union, extremists in
the Palestinians community, South Yemen, and Libya may vary,
but all have been involved in clandestine operations and sub-
versive action in the Gulf.
Although there are occasional indicati
f
ons o
conflict be
.-
tween 'these external forces--Iraq end South Yemen have, disputed
'' whether Baghdad or :Aden should 'tray: the leading role in export-
ing revolution to the Gulf--more often there is a cooperation
based on a commonality of interest. For example, there is
evidence that -Soviets and some fedayeen organization have co-
operated in clandestine activity in Kuwait, and that South
Yemen, the USSR, Iraq, and Libya have jointly supported the
Dhofar rebels. To the extent that radical Arabs and the Soviets
act in concert in their effort to subvert the moderate rulers
in the Gulf, another dimension is added to the.job facing local
security forces in devising effective countermeasures.
In the following memorandum, we examine the subversive
role being played in the region by non-indigenous radical Arabs
and the Soviets Union and we speculate on future developments.'
The current dossier on subversive-action in the Gulf underlines
a number of intelligence gaps and strongly suggests that the
activities of the outside forces under review would bear close
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monitoring in the future.
The Algiers agreement, reached in early March between
'Iran and Iraq, is part of an intensive Iraqi effort to pro-
ject an image of moderation in its regional policy. We have
serious reservations about whether any substance exists be-
hind the image and whether, as some observers have optimis-
tically concluded, Iraq will end its interference in the af-
fairs of its neighbors.
Past performance does not encourage acceptance of the
new pose of Iraqi strongman Saddain Husayn Tikriti. Although
his personal charm and dynamism have favorably impressed the
Shah of Iran and many Western and Arab leaders, his record is
.that of a dedicated Baathist revolutionary and meddler in the
affairs of other countries.
We be'lieve' that the Iraqi leadership remains revolutionary
in outlook and committed to the overthrow of.those governments in
the Peninsula and the Arab Gulf not sharing Baghdad's radical ideo-
logY. ..:
Our assessment in that Baghdad has adopted a two-tiered
policy. It will actively court its neighbors on the diplomatic
level, while continuing to give aid to local clandestine groups
and otherwise interfering in domestic affairs. For a time,
however, in keeping with the conciliatory spirit of Algiers,
Baghdad may refrain from blatant involvement, such as its sup-
port in June 1974 of an effort by local Baathists to overthrow
the North Yemeni government.
The end of the Kurdish war has freed the Iraqis to focus
their energies on covert operations aimed at extending their
influence within the states of the Peninsula and the Gulf.
Baghdad has never been better prepared financially for such
undertakings. Although Baghdad is currently facing some short-
term financial difficulties, Iraq's.oil income--an estimated
$6.5 billion in 1974--is growing rapidly.
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In line with its new moderate posture, Baghdad will proba-
bly concentrate. for a while on building. clandestine assets
through an expansion of Baathist cells in the countries-of the
Gulf and increasing its aid to local dissident groups. Iraq,
moreover, may spend liberally to influence local or expatriate
Arab officials. Iraqi embassies will probably acquire additional
intelligence and security-related. personnel.
The following review of recent Iraqi activity in the Gulf
does not inspire confidence in Baghdad's professed adherence
to the principle of respect for and non-interference in the
domestic affairs of neighboring states.
In; Bahrain, the Iraqi embassy has for many years clearly
been involved in supporting Baathist and other leftist ele- 25X1C
ments.
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The Iraqis are also expending much time and money to
develop contacts and gain influence with Bahraini students
studying abroad, I
In Kuwait, Iraqi subversive activity is also conducted
by Iraqi--diplomats and Iraqi residents in the country. F
:Before-the Kuwait.__mational assembly: election in early
1.975, the Arab Nationalist Movement--Kuwait was receiving
Iraqi help in its campaign, and the Iraqi Communist Party
reportedly had offered funds, pamphlets, and organizational
assistance to the leftist Kuwaiti "State Security Group."
Iraq reportedly has some influence in the Kuwait labor move-
ment; one leader is said to be an Iraqi Baathist, and a
number of Kuwaiti trade unionists have attended the worker
education school in Basra.
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Over-the years Iraq. has given significant financial aid,
as well as aims, to the rebels in Oman's western province of 25X1C
Dhofar. PFLO members are being trained in sabotage in Iraq.
Graduates of the-course have also been sent to the other
countries of the gulf.
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,. Iraqi activity has also been identified in the United
Arab Emirates, especially
...There is little information on. activity by. Baghdad in.
Qatar, but Iraqi agents reportedly operate there. 25X1C
Libya's-.most significant involvement in Gulf subversion
has been its support of the insurgency movement in Oman's
. Dhofar province. Since` at least late 1973-, the 'Libyans have
given financial and military assistance to Dhofar rebels,
the fighting arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
.Oman. Libyan arms and military supplies.are shipped.-to.,
South Yemen, where'they are then turned over to Dhofari repre-
sentatives.
Libyan President Qadhafi has justified his interference
in Gulf affairs and support of the PFLO on the grounds that
the present governments of the Gulf states are reactionary
and should be replaced by a PFLO-led union of radical states.
Libya's strongest public statement in support of PFLO's aims
in the Gulf occurred on June 11, 1975 when Prime Minister
Jallud. threatened ,to. "turn the Gulf into another southeast..
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Asia" unlessallied forces helping Sultan Qabus were with-
drawn, and the Omani government "solves its problems" with
the Dhofaris.
Libya is also taking amore active role in other areas
f the Gulf-
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President Qadhafi's recent decision to cooperate with
the two Marxist fedayeen organizations, the Popular Front for-
the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Democratic for the Liberation of Pale stine .
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Palestinians Extremists
Most Palestinians in the Gulf are reluctant to operate
against the host governments that provide them with a secure
base and the opportunity to collect funds from the large
resident Palestinian community. The more radical "rejection-
ist" organizations, however, do not share the view of the
Palestine Liberation Organization that, for the moment,
terrorist operations should not be targeted against Gulf
installations.
The hijacking of the British Airways aircraft in Dubai
in November 1973 by an Iraqi-based group led by Fatah dis
sident Abu Nidal, along with the takeover of the Japanese
embassy in Kuwait in February 1974 by the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, forcefully demonstrate that the
radical organizations are not loath to embarrass their hosts
when it suits their purposes.' The hijackers claimed, on
interrogation, to have received their training in Iraq and
to have infiltrated Dubai. by boat,.
There is a strong likelihood that the rejectionist
organizations will mount-further terrorist oper.tions in the
Gulf and elsewhere if any progressis made in negotiations
toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. Egyptian President Sadat's
opening of the Suez Canal in early June and recent Israeli
moves could,'prompt the rejectionists to stage terrorist
spectaculars as a way of disturbing the political atmosphere.
The record indicates that the rejectionists will go after
vulnerable targets wherever located, regardless of the political
risks they incur by antagonizing other Arabs. The Abu Nidal
group in Iraq, the PFLP, and the other extremist organizations
are training operatives who could be dispatched in an effort
to derail negotiations. The Gulf provides tempting targets'
for fedayeen terrorism: western diplomatic personnel, oil
tankers and installations. In view of the current feuding
between the rejectionists and the PLO, moreover, the Gulf
could at some point become the scene of a bloody intra-fedayeen
struggle, one that the host governments might find difficult
to control.
Fatah, the most powerful fedayeen organization, has main-
tained a low profile in the Gulf, confining its activities to
fund-raising, lectures and pro-Palestinian exhibitions. -Yasir
Arafat's organization, however, should not be excluded from
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an analysis of potential threats to the Gulf sheikhdoms.
moreover, the murder o two US diplomats in the Saudi
'would be tempted to use terrorism to'make the point that the
interests of the Palestinians cannot be subordinated to those
of the negotiating parties and the superpowers. Should Fatah
mount an operation in the Gulf, BSO operatives already in
place in the area could be supplemented by other guerrillas
before the target date. This modus operandi wad used by the
?BSO:'at the Munich Olympics.-in 1972 and in the Khartoum operation.
Ara ian embassy in Khartoum in March 1973 by Fatah's terrorist
arm, the Black September Organization, shows how Fatah, like
its extremist sister organizations, can ignore the sensitivi-
ties of friendly Arab governments--in this instance both Sudan
and Saudi Arabia--in pursuit of its own objectives.
A repeat performance of the Khartoum operation could be
staged by the BSO.. in any of the Gulf states if Fatah sees
enough political advantage in terrorist action to outweigh
the political risk. Yasir Arafat might, for example, come to
believe that the Arab states and Israel were moving toward a
settlement that did not meet Fatah's minimum demands. Fatah
The Soviet Union
The USSR in recent years has shown a growing interest in
.the"Arab Gulf. Soviet moves have been probing'and exploratory.
Moscow sees the Gulf as playing a role in its overall policy
in the Indian Ocean. Not only do the Soviets wish to buttress
their relations with radical Arab states, but they want access
to shore facilities to extend the duration of deployment of
their naval forces. Western dependence on Gulf oil attracts
Soviet attention to the region. In pursuit of its strategic
objectives and national policy goals, the USSR is seeking to
expand its influence in the Gulf littoral states, but despite
its efforts, diplomatic relations have been established only
with Kuwait.
The diplomatic foothold that the USSR and its Eastern
European allies have in Kuwait, dating back to 1963, gives
them an opportunity to exert influence-on local radical elements
and to expand their sphere of action to countries down the
Gulf.
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There are about 1.00 Soviet citi2ens working in Kuwait.
These include embassy and commercial office personnel, Aeroflot
representatives,. experts of various types, Arabic language
students, and a few university professors. There are also 25X1
TASS or other press personnel based in Kuwait who frequently 25X1
travel to other parts of the Gulf
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