PROSPECTS FOR(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100170010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 30, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI NO. 0682/75
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence-
May 30, 1975
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Prospects for Pakistan
Key Points
-- Internally, Pakistan probably will remain stable during
the next two years.
Externally, we foresee no major threat to Pakistan's
security and territorial integrity in this time frame.
- Indian leaders are not likely--in this short term--
to see their interests as being served by new attempts
to promote turbulence or territorial disintegration
in Pakistan.
- President Daoud of Afghanistan will probably avoid
an overly aggressive policy-toward Pakistan in
order to avoid serious dangers to his own regime.
- The Soviet Union will continue to arm and assist
India and Afghanistan, but will not seek to promote
major instability in Pakistan.
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The sudden assassination or incapacitation of Bhutto
could markedly change the above predictions. It would
create a much less stable situation.
- Likely developments would include: a drawn-out
struggle for power in Islamabad; an upsurge of
unrest, particularly in the frontier provinces;
and perhaps a takeover of the government by the
armed forces.
- The armed forces might have difficulty, as they
did in the late 1960s, in restoring order to the
country.
Looking beyond the next two years, there are other
scenarios that might produce a resurgence of Pakistan's
historical instability.
Bhutto's penchant for using repressive tactics
against his opponents could backfire. Strong
opposition could flare up over a number of issues,
and the armed forces could grow tired of helping
Bhutto fight his political battles.
?At some point the military might attempt
to seize power once again, with the same
results described above.
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- It is also possible that internal pressures in
India or Afghanistan could lead those countries
to adopt more aggressive policies toward Pak-
istan.
-- Any prolonged period of turbulence would heighten
Islamabad's need for support from nations interested
in preventing the disintegration of Pakistan.
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Discussion
Domestic Stability
1. During his 3 1/2 years in power Prime Minister
Bhutto has made steady progress in consolidating his
control over Pakistan. Bhutto and his Pakistan People's.
Party remain overwhelmingly dominant in Punjab and Sind,
where about four-fifths of Pakistan's people live. Most
of the people seem to view Bhutto as abetter alternative
than rule by the military or by any of Pakistan's other,
politicians. Most Pakistanis still
credit Bhutto for having put Pakistan back on its feet
following its humiliation by India in 1971. Opposition
groups have generally remained weak, unfocused, and poorly
organized.
2. Bhutto and his party are less popular in Pakistan's
other two provinces, the North-West Frontier Province and
Baluchistan. In both provinces, opposition to domination
by the central government remains substantial and local
branches of the People's Party are not yet well developed.
Bhutto, however, has made considerable progress in tightening
his hold over these provinces through energetic politicking,
suppression of the opposition, and adroit use of his government's
military, financial and administrative resources.
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3. Disruptive activity, perhaps abetted by
neighboring Afghanistan, could increase in these twa frontier
provinces during the "next year or two, but the Pakistani
armed forces will probably keep such unrest from reaching
unmanageable proportions. Many observers had expected
a sharp increase in violence in the North-West Frontier
Province after Bhutto suppressed the main opposition
party there in February on charges--still unproven--that
the party was behind the assassination of his chief politi-
cal lieutenant in the province. So far, no such upsurge
has occurred, possibly because the young militants who might
cause such trouble--as well as their backer . s in Afghanistan--
are aware that Pakistan's security forces are likely to
deal harshly with them. It is also possible that the .
dissidents are still trying to get themselves organized.
4. In Baluchistan, there also had been some expecta-
tion of a revival this spring of insurgent activity by
tribesmen opposed to central government control. So far,
however, Baluchistan has remained generally calm. A sizable
army presence, political maneuvering by Bhutto's supporters,
continued incarceration of his main opponents, and heavy
new government spending on economic development have con-
tinued to keep the province relatively quiet.
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5. Local political elements resistant to domination
from Islamabad were recently ousted from power by the
People's Party in still another area, the semi-autonomous
Azad Kashmir region in northern Pakistan. After months,
of energetic campaigning and political maneuvering, Bhutto's
party won elections in mid-May that gave it control over the
Azad Kashmir government.
6. The economy: The past few years have been dif-
ficult ones economically for Pakistan., Economic problems--
inflation (around 25 percent in 1974), rising unemployment,
periodic shortages of agricultural inputs including water
for power and irrigation, and a lack of now private in-
vestment--may have recently begun to cause some erosion
in the Bhutto regime's popularity. The urban middle and
working classes and students appear increasingly discontented
over economic issues, particularly inflation.
7. At the same time, there are some positive signs
in Pakistan's economy. There are good prospects for in-
creased wheat production starting next year. Over the
longer run, given its prospects for fertilizer production
and the harnessing of water resources, Pakistan has the
potential to become self-sufficient in food production.
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World market conditions for Pakistani exports are also
improving. Bhutto, moreover, appears assured of sub-
stantial financial assistance from Islamic oil-producing
countries; over $1 billion has been promised. In fact,
his success in obtaining foreign assistance has enabled
Pakistan to, weather the international recession better
than many underdeveloped countries.
8. In any case, the government's armed strength,
together with Bhutto's proven ability'to keep opponents
divided, disorganized, and on the defensive, probably
will enable him to suppress any unrest that might arise
from economic causes over the next couple of years. .
9. The armed forces, still the ultimate arbiter of
political power in Pakistan, have remained loyal to the
Bhutto regime. Since the debacle of 1971 they have shown
little interest in resuming responsibility for. governing
the country. The US decision last February to lift the
embargo on arms sales to South Asia is seen in Pakistan
as an important success for Bhutto and has boosted his
stock among military officers.
10. Bhutto's sudden death or incapacitation could
give rise to serious instability in Pakistan. No other
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politician enjoys widespread national support,. and
Bhutto has done little to groom a successor. His
disappearance could trigger a drawn-out struggle for power
among various politicians and perhaps an increase in
popular unrest--particularly in the frontier provinces,
where dissidents might see new opportunities because
of governmental weakness in Islamabad. In such a
situation, the armed forces might well decide to resume
control of the government. They would not necessarily
find it easy, however, to-restore stability.
Pakistan and Its Neighbors
11. Although the Indians and Pakistanis continue
to view each other as adversaries, we have no solid
evidence that either India or its Soviet ally is trying
to foment unrest or instability in Pakistan. In our
view, neither New Delhi nor Moscow believes its best
interests would be served at this time by major turbulence
in Pakistan or by its dismemberment. Afghanistan
supports efforts by Pathan and Baluchi tribesmen in
Pakistan to weaken Islamabad's control over the frontier
provinces, but we have no evidence that either Moscow or
.New Delhi is giving active or direct support to these
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Afghan efforts. President Daoud', moreover, is aware-that
a major confrontation with a militarily superior Pakistan
could create very serious problems for his country and
his regime.
12. The Pakistanis, for their part, are not likely
to initiate hostilities with either the Indians or the
Afghans over the next couple of years, although it is
conceivable that they might impose a border closing on
landlocked Afghanistan if they decide Kabul's meddling
in the Pakistani frontier, areas has gone too far. Given
India's military superiority over Pakistan, Bhutto is un-
-likely to initiate a major confrontation over Kashmir,
the main unresolved Indo-Pakistani problem.
13. Bhutto will continue to attach very high priority
to maintaining good relations with Iran, with China and--
to a slightly lesser extent--with the Arab nations and
the United States. He will look to all of these countries
for further economic assistance and military equipment.
Bhutto sees Iran as the emerging military power in the
Persian Gulf region, and as a continuing partner which
shares Pakistan's interest in containing threats to stability
that arise in or around either country.
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14. The USSR: The Soviet .Union continues to arm
and assist India because it views India as the key
country on the subcontinent and as a useful bulwark against.
China. It continues to arm and assist Afghanistan because
it views that country as belonging, for geographic reasons,
within the Soviet sphere of influence, and wants a friendly
regime there.
15. The Soviets, however, do not'seem anxious to
create new instability in South Asia. The status quo there
generally serves their interests. Moreover, major trouble
between countries in the region could create costly, risky
new obligations to assist Soviet clients.-
16. Although the Soviets presumably remain interested
in acquiring greater access to the Arabian Sea, we believe
it unlikely that they would seek to promote the disintegration
of Pakistan in an attempt to reach this objective. In any
case, even if Pakistan were to break apart, the Soviets
would not necessarily achieve this.goal. India, for
example, has opposed naval domination in the region by
any great power, including the Soviets.
17. The Soviets would prefer to coax the Bhutto
government--which receives substantial Soviet economic
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development, assistance--to abandon or dilute its pro-
Chinese, pro-US, pro-CENTO orientation in favor of
closer Soviet-Pakistani ties. They will not, however,
give this objective priority over the maintenance of
warm Indo-Soviet relations. They would like to persuade
Pakistan to ascribe to the longstanding "B rezhnev
plan" for a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security
pact--a concept which Pakistan, like other South Asian
countries, views as anti-Chinese in purpose and has
therefore been unwilling to endorse.
18. We have no evidence of any firm Soviet offers
of military aid to Pakistan in recent years.
19. - India: Despite its commitment to the "Simla
process", which calls for resolving Indo-Pakistani
differences through negotiations, India remains profoundly
distrustful of Pakistan. The technical and training
assistance India is providing the Afghan armed forces is
designed, at least in part, to foster a sense of uneasiness
in Islamabad. New Delhi apparently believes that a Pakistani
government which continually has to look :over its shoulder
at Afghanistan will be less able to focus on Indo-Pakistani
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trouble spots such as Kashmir. Similarly, the Indians
are fully aware that their May 1974 nuclear test, which
demonstrated their ability to develop nuclear weapons
should they decide to do so, contributes to Pakistani
nervousness.
20. But we do not see any signs that India is
planning to move aggressively against Pakistan in the
foreseeable future. Although the Indians would like
to see Pakistan even weaker militarily than it is now,
they are generally satisfied at this time with the status
quo in Indo-Pakistani relations; India is now the dominant
power on the subcontinent and has the upper hand on
Indo-Pakistani issues such as the Kashmir question.
21. The Indians maintain--and we tend to accept--
that they have no particular interest in creating in-
stability in Pakistan; they probably recognize that,
turbulence in a neighboring state could spread into
India, already beset with economic'and social problems.
Under present foreseeable circumstances the Indians have
little or no reason for attempting to seize any portion
of Pakistan. They know this would invite a Chinese and
perhaps an Iranian reaction, would antagonize a broad
range of western and middle Eastern aid donors, and--if
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successful--would raise all the security and other
problems that would accompany an attempt to control a
hostile, captive population.
22. We do not anticipate that these Indian
positions will change under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership.
Furthermore, we expect Mrs. Gandhi to remain in office,
although perhaps with a reduced parliamentary majority,
after the national elections to be held within the next
nine months.
23. We' do not view. India's efforts to build up its
navy and become more active in the Indian Ocean as necessarily
a sign of aggressive intentions toward Pakistan or other
countries. The Indians claim their own security interests
require that they be strong enough to deter "threats" from
the sea. They have generally been ambiguous and inconsistent
when specifying where they think such threats might,come
from. The drive to expand the navy may reflect more a
desire by New Delhi to attain major power status.
24. Afghanistan: Afghanistan, by contrast, is trying
to promote trouble in Pakistan in an effort to end,'or at least
weaken, Islamabad's control over the frontier provinces.
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The Daoud regime, since taking office in mid-1973,'
has kept up' a steady stream of vituperative anti-Is .amabad"
propaganda, to which-Pakistan has responded with'equally
shrill invective. Kabul, moreover, has been providing
sanctuary and support to Ajmal Khattak, a leading Pathan
dissident from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.
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25. President Daoud probably will not, however,
launch an all-out effort to wrest the frontier areas
away from Pakistan, barring a collapse of internal order
and stability in that country or the outbreak of war
between Pakistan and India. Daoud knows Pakistan's army
is much stronger than Afghanistan's. He probably also
realizes that if he provoked a war with Pakistan, he could
nnot count on Moscow or New Delhi to.rescue him from
disaster, although they would probably furnish some diplo-
matic and material support. Fairly good evidence indicates
that the governments of the Soviet Union and India have
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Daoud well remembers, moreover, that Afghanistan's
confrontation with Pakistan over the frontier issue in
the early 1960s led to a border closing that hurt Af-
ghanistan economically and helped topple him from power.
Finally, Daoud presumably is aware that Iran would be
likely to side with Pakistan in such a confrontation.
The Longer Run
26. Beyond the next two years, it is possible,
although by-no means certain, that Bhutto's control
over the country might start to slip, just as President
Ayub's did in the late 1960s. Whether this happens
will depend largely on factors that are unpredictable at
this time--the state of Pakistan's economy, the success
or failure of Bhutto's future political manipulations
in the frontier provinces, attitudes toward the government
of students and organized labor, and developments in India
and Afghanistan. If things should'start to go badly for
Bhutto on several fronts, he may find it harder to continue
successfully to apply tactics of confrontation and repression.
Military leaders, many of whom have not always trusted
or admired Bhutto, might grow tired of having the armed
forces fight his political battles. The army's numerous
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Pathan soldiers might balk at taking harsh action against
their fellow tribesmen in the frontier region. The
military could seize power at some point, but they
Arab oil-producing states for money and military equipment.
It would also seek greater Chinese and US aid. It would
particularly rely on Iran for assistance against a renewed
insurgency in Baluchistan.
29. In return for financial and military support
from the Arab countries, Pakistan probably would offer
to augment its already substantial military advisory
programs in those countries. Pakistani military advisors
-increased foreign military and economic assistance.
such a situation Islamabad would look to Iran and the
might not find it easy to restore control over a turbulent
situation.
27. Bhutto's unexpected death or incapacitation at
any point during this longer time frame would probably
have much the same impact as it would have if it occurred
during the shorter run (paragraph 10).
28. Any major upsurge in domestic turbulence could
cause Bhutto--or a successor government--to seek substantially
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and technicians presumably would also be provided `to
Iran if it wanted them.
30. Pakistan's dependence on outside powers for
help would increase even further-if the Soviet Union,
India, or Afghanistan were to intervene, either overtly
or covertly, in an effort to exacerbate Pakistani in-
stability and promote the country's disintegration. We
see Kabul as somewhat more likely than Moscow or New
Delhi to engage in such meddling. Almost any Afghan
regime in the late 1970s will probably retain designs
on Pakistan's frontier'provinces, although a successor
to Daoud might not be quite as avid as he has been on
this issue.
31. Soviet and Indian policies toward an unstable
Pakistan in the late 1970s are less predictable. Those
policies will depend to a considerable degree on the
state of Moscow's and New Delhi's relationships at he
time with other major powers. The existing status quo
in South Asia, with Pakistan viable but not capable of
threatening India militarily, generally serves the purpose
of both India and the USSR.
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32. In the case of India, policy toward Pakistan
may be affected by India's domestic situation. Economic
and political problems could cause New Delhi to look
outside India's borders for adventures that might divert
domestic public attention. Pakistan, which the Indians
distrust and want to see kept weak, would be a logical
target. On the other hand, really acute economic
troubles--for example, a succession of"poor harvests
and consequent severe food shortages--could make it very
difficult for India to be assertive toward Pakistan or any
other neighbor. In such a situation India would be pre-
occupied with its own problems, lacking in financial
and material resources for outside adventures, and more
dependent than usual on foreign powers that would not
look kindly on Indian meddling in Pakistan. But even
in this kind of climate, some degree of covert-Indian
aid to dissidents in an unstable Pakistan could not be
ruled out, and this would heighten Pakistan's need for
financial and security assistance from its friends.
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