PROPOSED AID TO ANGOLAN REFUGEES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 9, 2002
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 25, 1975
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4.pdf132.83 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4 OCI No. 0451/75 Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence March 25, 1975 25X1 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Proposed Aid to Angolan Refugees REFERENCE: Kinshasa 2329 The facts and assumptions set forth in the referenced cable are essentially correct. National elections may not be held by October 31, however, as called for in the indepen- dence agreement. If elections are not held, Angola will enter into independence with a fragile coalition government composed of the three liberation groups, without Portuguese participation. Moreover, the national election law still to be drafted could include a residency requirement that would render refugees ineligible to vote. The Popular Movement would certainly attempt to get such a provision enacted al- though its chances of doing so are probably less than even. Holden Roberto and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola would be the major benefactor in any refugee re- settlement and voter registration program in Angola. Al- though the exact number of refugees is unknown, US government agencies have accepted 500,000-700,000 as a reasonable esti- mate. The bulk of these refugees have lived in Zaire since the early 1960's and during the anti-Portuguese insurgency the National Front relied heavily on them for military recruits and financial support. If these refugees return to Angola in large numbers, they will represent a powerful bloc of political support for the National Front as well as a source of military personnel. 25X1 25X1 1 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4 Secret 25X1 The absence of US support would not result in the collapse of Roberto's plan to resettle the refugees nor would it seriously hurt his chances for a major political role in an independent Angola. However, Agostinho Neto, the president of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and Roberto's chief rival, could succeed in slowing down the refugee resettlement program through his movement's representatives in the transitional government. Thus, the US would stand to gain political credits with Roberto by making alternate sources of assistance available. Although US assistance is to be offered openly and to all three liberation groups, Neto, a number of African nations that support him, the Soviets, and the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal will interpret the aid as an attempt to "stuff the ballot box" in favor of the National Front. This inter- pretation will gain credence from the fact that the National Front controls the ministries of agriculture, interior, and social affairs, on which it intends to rely heavily in administering refugee resettlement and voter registration. Beyond a shrill propaganda campaign that is likely to sound self-pitying, there is little Roberto's opponents can do to discredit the US or impede Roberto's refugee program. The possibility exists that Neto, facing a landslide vote against him, will attempt a coup out of desperation. His organization, however, is outmanned and outgunned by the National Front and would lose a military confrontation even if it were to receive massive assistance'from Moscow or Lisbon, which seems highly unlikely. US relations with Zaire might also be affected by in- volvement in refugee resettlement. Zairian President Mobutu has sought to obtain US support for the National Front for many years, particularly since the Lisbon coup. The US has turned aside his requests. Our assistance at this point, however implemented, will be interpreted by Mobutu as en- dorsement of the National Front. He will probably be encouraged to pressure the US for other types of assistance for Roberto, including military. For the moment Mobutu has had to curtail his own support for the National Front because of his government's serious financial difficulties. 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100150006-4