CUBA, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND CASTRO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100100011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 130
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cuba, Its Institutions and Castro
by
October 1974
State Dept. review completed
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CUBA, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND CASTRO
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CONTENTS
PAGE
Summary 1
Chapter One INTRODUCTION
Government, Castro Style 9
Safety Valves 11
Counterproductive Exile Actions 13
Taking Cuba's Pulse 14
Guessing Wrong 15
Key Historical Factors 17
Violence an Accepted Way of Life 18
Democracy a Stranger 21
Corruption a Friend 24
Revolutionary Aspirations Denied 25
Chapter Two OLD INSTITUTIONS SCORNED
Weaknesses Exploited 29
The Legislature 30
The Military 32
Political Parties 35
The Judiciary 36
The Church 39
The Press 45
Chapter Three NEW INSTITUTIONS MOLDED 54
Cuban Workers Central Organization 55
The Carrot and the Stick 60
Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution 62
CDR Organization and Philosophy 67
The Federation of Cuban Women 70
The Small Farmers Association 73
Youth Organizations 80
Chapter Four THE SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY
Origin 88
The "Old" Communist Party 90
The "New" Communist Party 92
The Political Bureau 94
Reorganizing the Government 97
Restructuring the Party 100
The Current Party Structure 101
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(Cont.:_nued)
PAC
Chapter Five THE SECURITY FORCES
(luerrilla Origins 104
After the Victory 106
A Society Militarized 108
illphasis on the Reserves 112
The Regular Forces 114
Chapter Six THE SCENE TODAY 117
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CUBA, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND CASTRO
SUMMARY
When Fidel Castro assumed power in January 1959,
he had--in theory at least--one major strategic goal:
to improve the lot of the Cuban masses. With this
end in mind, it was simple to justify such subsequent
actions as the elimination of internal opposition, the
methodical destruction of Cuba's pre-revolutionary
institutions, and the deliberate alienation of the US.
If he was to bring about economic and social justice,
he needed to ensure the consolidation and perpetuation
of his own rule and it was therefore necessary to
liquidate, or at least reduce to a minimum, any domestic
or foreign influence that might threaten his control.
Although he went about this task in a seemingly hap-
hazard fashion in the early days of his rule, his
actions during that period followed one steadfast
political thread, that of maximizing his popular sup-
port and minimizing his opposition.
In his zeal to remake Cuban society, he was care-
ful to proceed only as fast as circumstances would
allow, making good use of his oratorical ability to
sway the masses and avoiding moves so radical that
they might provoke a reaction too strong for him to
handle. Rather than attempting to sweep the past
aside overnight, he spent the first two years of his
administration in discrediting and dismembering vir-
tually all of Cuba's pre-revolutionary institutions.
With a few laudable but futile exceptions, they tumbled
before his onslaught without resistance. Because they
had served the people so poorly, their passing oc-
casioned only token outcry from a population disen-
chanted with its puppet legislature, powerless judi-
ciary, corrupt military establishment, prostituted
politicians, and alien Church.
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2rtala, key historical factors
ni eiiminating or emasculating Cuba'
mach easier. Cuba's democratic trao
item l902--barefy halt a century of
:nd was marked from the very beginni
Lion, wholesale corruption, and a cc
Lward extremism and an inability te
Ll.cal parties, with the exception oi
were shaped around an individual rat
icular philosophy anu this prevented
trong partisan political structures
i;Landing the test of time or of pros
H_lity needed for prcmoting comproma
alternative to violence.
ade Castro's task
old institutLons
_tion dated only
practical experience--
1g by US interven-
sistenu tendency
compromise. 1?oli-
the Communist party,
ler than a part-
Lae growth of
capable of with-
ding the fiexi-
e as a preferred
he other hard, violence had become such an
accepted way of achieving and retainng power that
astro's use of it to liquidate any apposition con-
i4tituted merely a continuation of normal poiiticai
dfe. Moreover, Castro promised a total breaJ? with
Hie evils of the past and thus reprc.sented the ful-
-illment of revolutionary ambitions gLich has been
,onsistently frustrated ever since the initial strug-
gle against Spanish domination broke out in 1868.
history was clearly eastro's ally.
Lo replace the ulscarded instiLutions and provide
solid base for nis rule, Castro developed new in.-
';titutions using structures in the LSSR and Eastern
.urope as his models, he created tne "organizations
:if the masses" to give every segmerm of the population
the opportunity to be Incorporated Lnto the Revolu-
!Aon and to intimidate anyone who cLose to remain
uutside. he gradually molded an enirely new admin-
stracive framework for running the country and mer-
ed three political groups--the pre revolutionary
C:ommunist party, his own July 26 Mo.ement, and the
liffuential Revolutionary Directoraie--into a single
party that monopolized all politica. activity. The
:scope of the reorganization he broult about was 5o
uroad and its impact so pervasive .L.-ut it constituted
1 true social revolution and not meFeLy a typical
! tin American changing of the guarh.
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The most significant organizational change was
the creation of the mass organizations. Prior to
the Revolution, there were areas in rural Cuba where
the population had little or no sense of nationality.
Some pockets were so remote that they could be reached
only on foot or by boat or beast of burden. The in-
habitants, without electricity or means of communica-
tion, were largely out of touch with any facet of
national or local government and lived almost entirely
outside the national economy. Castro's Revolution
made them accessible through the construction of roads,
exposed them to the communications media through net-
works of radio and television stations, and brought
them government services through the establishment of
schools and medical facilities. It gave them--as it
did to the poor in urban areas and the lower class
in general--a sense of participation in government
and political life through incorporation into the mass
organizations. These were special groups formed on
a nationwide basis for women, students, peasants,
laborers, and the public in general. Isolation or
poverty were no bars to membership and all sectors
of the population were urged through propaganda cam-
paigns and social pressure to join at least one of the
groups. Membership became a sign of revolutionary
commitment and a requirement for political, social,
or financial advancement.
Membership in the mass organizations had an
important psychological side effect. It meant that,
rather than waiting for some exterior force to turn
the clock back and return Cuba to the pre-revolutionary
era, the individual had made a conscious decision to
participate in the revolutionary process, and that
the first step had been taken toward acceptance of
the changes that have so drastically reshaped Cuban
society. It indicated the member had acknowledged--
at least to himself--that conditions were such that
cooperation had more advantages, or at least fewer
disadvantages, than either opposition or neutral
ground. The mass organizations, therefore, in addi-
tion to performing valuable substantive services
for the Revolution, also functioned as a subtle means
of preparing the people mentally for acceptance of
the dramatic political and socio-economic shifts that
Castro was bent on carrying out.
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The new institutions, particularly the mass or-
ganizations, were clearly designed to complement Castro's
dictatorial style of government. In general, they were
loosely organized, monolithic in structure, and passive
Ln nature. They concentrated authority and initiative
at the uppermost level and placed only nominal restric-
tions on the man at the top. They had an inherent
weakness in that they tended to curb independence and
innovation and to reward bureaucratic inertia at the
very time when initiative at lower levels and adapt-
ability were critical to the success of the widespread
changes being made. bureaucrats from the provincial
level on down judged it safer to implement directives
trom Havana without deviation rather than accept re-
sponsibility for modifying the directives to suit local
conditions. The most minute decisions were often left
to Castro himself, partly because he demanded it and
partly because the system favored it.
When Castro in his Messianic wisdom chose to
challenge on technical grounds the considered judgment
of foreign agricultural experts who had spent years
of research before reaching their conclusions, his
opinion automatically prevailed in spite of whatever
damage might occur in Cuban agriculture as a result.
'de could without fear of opposition commandeer large
amounts of scarce resources for utopian schemes that
looked good on paper but proved highly impractical in
the Cuban environment. Through vibrant oratory, he
could mobilize massive moral and physical support for
pie-in-the-sky projects that betrayed the best inter-
ests of the population that gave so willingly and gen-
erously of its time and muscle. There arose a mam-
moth gap between practicality and theory, and economic
pragmatism invariably fell victim to political exped-
iency. Thus, the goal set in 1963 of producing ten
million tons of sugar in 1970 was kept as a political
target--Castro claimed that the "honer of the Revolu-
tion" rested on its achievement--in the face of mounting
evidence that it would be economically counter-produc-
tive.
That such whims at the highest level of leadership
could continue for so long is a tribute not only to the
resilience of the long-suffering Cuban people and the
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strength of Castro's popular appeal but also to the
patience of Moscow, which continued to pour untold
millions down the Cuban rathole. Although the failure
of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 unquestionably
sparked serious introspection and some policy realign-
ment by the Castro regime, the breaking point appears
to have finally been reached in 1970 when Castro An-
nounced that the long-sought production goal would
not be met. Popular disenchantment, criticism from
pro-Castro technical experts abroad, and calamitous
production statistics from other segments of the
economy, backed up undoubtedly by stern pressure from
Moscow, forced Castro to make a broad assessment not
only of his policies but also of his manner of wield-
ing the virtually unlimited power he possessed. He
and his institutions were obviously not up to the task
of achieving his goals.
The major changes growing out of this reappraisal
included a reduction in Castro's personal intervention
in the application of economic policy, greater emphasis
on joint leadership at the policy-making level, a
strengthening of institutional frameworks, a greater
delegation of authority, and increased pragmatism in
problem-solving. In public appearances, particularly
those involving the handling of substantive matters,
Castro flanked himself increasingly with other members
of the Political Bureau, the highest decision-making
body in the country, to undercut charges that he was
perpetuating a personality cult. He withdrew some-
what from domestic economic matters and devoted much
more of his time to foreign affairs. He spent lengthy
periods abroad, visiting 20 countries--several of them
twice--between November 1971 and October 1973. He
paid much more attention to Soviet advice and permitted
a significant increase in the influx of Soviet and
East European technical experts and advisers.
He called for a revitalization and democratiza-
tion of the mass organizations and this precipitated
a frenzy of activity aimed at providing channels
through which the masses could communicate with the
leadership and allegedly could have more of a say in
determining policies and regulations that directly
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tected them. A process was begun wnich in November
1972 resulted in the restructuring of the entire gov-
ernmental apparatus, bringing all ministries, offices,
and agencies--many of which had been totally aertonomous?
under the jurisdiction of the Executive
Committee of
the Council of Ministers with Fidel at
its
head
anc
Paul Castro as its second-in-command.
The
most
impor-
tant reorganization involved the party
and
this
process
I 5 still in progress. It will continue until next
year when the party's first congress Is to be held
ahd could represent the greatest challenge to Castro's
authority since the abortive attempt In 1962 by sev-
eral members of the pre-Castro Communist party to
wrest control of tne party from him enc. his Sierra
Maestra guerrilla elite.
As It is currently structured, the party is
auverned by a 91-member Central Committee which is
itself directed by an eight-man Political Bureau.
Castro and the guerrilla elite have an overwhelming
majority on the Central Committee anc?with the single
exception of President Dorticos, who was hand-picked
by Castro himself?ali members of the Political Bureau
belong to the guerrilla elite. It was through this
strong majority of unquestioning loyalty that Castro
ruled supreme for so iong, and it is this majority that
may be reduced significantly in favor of the "old"
Communists at the party congress in
The party has already undergone major changes in
that the Secretariat?formerly concerned only with
:arty housekeeping functions--has nos: become the organ
responsible for monitoring the government's execution
of all party directives. The emergence of the Sec-
retariat as a ma7or force in policy implementation
may have been an attempt by the Central Committee
minority, basically the 'old" Communists, to undercut
Lie supremacy of the Political Bureau, i.e., the
supremacy of Castro himself. It so, the attempt
seems to have failed, because the guerrilla elite
succeeded in maintaining its origina majority by
claiming four of the live new seats cn the expanded
'ecretariat.
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Nevertheless, much remains to be resolved in the
party and the outcome of the party congress will have
an imposing effect on Cuban politics for years to come.
The congress will elect a new Political Bureau and a
new Central Committee and the makeup of these bodies
will determine who is calling the shots in Havana.
The higher the representation of "old" Communists,
the more hard-pressed Castro will be to shape Cuban
policies without being drawn totally into the Soviet
orbit. Although his extremely heavy dependence on
Soviet economic support has reduced considerably his
room for maneuver, he prefers to keep the leash from
Moscow taut. If he had a viable alternative, he
would opt for greater independence from the USSR--
total independence, if possible--and it is the real-
ization of this possibility and preference that rein-
forces the "old" Communists in their efforts to gain
the balance of power.
This does not mean that Castro would change his
form of government if Soviet economic leverage were
eliminated. He has gone far beyond the point where
a return to pre-revolutionary capitalism would have
been possible, and his brand of socialism will remain
at least as long as he and his guerrillas retain power.
Even if independent, he would maintain warm relations
with Moscow just to keep his options open, but he would
be much less amenable to Soviet direction and manipula-
tion. It is primarily this Soviet influence that is
compelling him to hold the congress in the first place;
he has long been against it because his guerrilla elite
has the most to lose and the least to gain, but Soviet
insistence apparently left him no choice but to set a
date.
If Castro retains his strong majority at the
congress or even increases it, he will most likely
continue to govern as he does now, making few ad-
ditional fundamental changes unless forced to do so
by the demands of the economy. The frenzy of re-
organization that began in late 1970 will then have
run its course. If, however, he perceives the pos-
sibility of a significant loss of representation by
his guerrilla elite, he may be tempted to conduct
another purge of "old" Communists as he did in 1962
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and 1968, and his relations with Moscow will suffer
accordingly. Such a purge would be feasible because,
he still enjoys the staunch loyalty of the armed
torces and state security apparatus. With his main
opponents thus cowed, he could controL completely
the congress actions.
A reading of the situation at present indicates
Lhat, because he dominates the body that presumably
will be responsible for organizing the congress
.e., the Secretariat), Castrb will have little
hrouble retaining his grip on the party reins even
if the "old" Communists do achieve a modest increase
in representation_ As the congress approaches, how-
ever, the pressures from Moscow and the maneuverings
of the "old" Communists are bound to Increase with
Lhe expectation that significant gains can be engine-
ered at the expense of the guerrilla elite. Until
the congress actually convenes, therefore, Castro
may be much more willing than he has Leen in the past
Lie take advantage of opportunities to decrease his
reliance on Soviet support and expand his contacts
with the West. He has given no sign that he would
willingly pass the baton of leadership, on to someone
else, and it is safe to assume that if he believed his
position to be threatened he would seize an opportunity
to strengthen it. The Soviet-sponsored process of
institutionalization that is gradually building limits
ail around Castro may already have convinced him that
such a threat indeed exists.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Government, Castro Style
In a democracy, domestic politics is basically
a matter of give and take, whether it be the "ins"
striving to remain in, or the "outs" endeavoring to
unseat the incumbents. Both the incumbents and the
opposition are subject to pressures from a multitude
of sources that must be obliged to some extent if
valuable support is to be preserved. In many countries
of Latin America, for example, the Roman Catholic
Church is a key element in political life. Student
and youth organizations, labor unions, the press,
cultural and consumer organizations, the military
establishment, large industrial corporations, chambers
of commerce, political parties, the legislature, and
the judiciary are other examples of institutions that
must be taken into consideration by political leaders
responsible for the complex process of government. In
a democratic system, these institutions and pressure
groups theoretically are given the widest opportunity,
within reason, to express their desires and make their
opinions known so that the conduct of government can
reflect as much as possible the will of the people.
In Cuba, however, the "de facto" chief executive,
Prime Minister Fidel Castro, over the past 15 years
has systematically destroyed, emasculated, or forced
under his control all domestic pressure groups. As
a result, his dictatorship is one of the "purest" in
a hemisphere long known for its totalitarian govern-
ments. Although Castro has wisely recognized that
the will of the masses, now that they have been poli-
ticized, cannot be totally or perpetually ignored, he
has removed the give-and-take from his country's
domestic politics and up until recent years indulged
in the luxury of government by whim. With the country
suffering from an extremely serious housing shortage,
for example, Castro spent millions on prize cattle
flown in from Canada and housed them and their off-
spring in expensive "show-case" barns equipped with
air conditioning and piped-in music. For years, he
frittered away other millions on schemes to subvert
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screign governments, while his own peeple were sub-
cted to stringent rationing of consumer goods and
comestibles. He squandered untold misSions more on
spur-of-the-moment experimental agricustural projects
that provided meager returns in spite or the large
investments and the high priority accerded them.
That Castro was aple to do this :or so long with-
out serious damage to his political position is a
tribute to his ability to deflect popular dissatis-
_action away from his own stewardship to such scape-
goats as militant exile groups, counterrevolutionary
worms," the "microfaction," streetcorner vendors
=d other remnants of privately-owned Pusinesses, afd,
course, that old standby and most cependable of
oi.1 bugbears--the "imperialist" Unitec States. Those
Cubans who might have validly questioned his actions
or decisions on technical grounds--or on any grounds,
for that matter--for tne most part kept their own
counsei--and thus their heads--much te the detriment
oL the national economy. Castro does not take kindiy
criticism even when it is constructive and offered
with the best of intentions. His dis:avor is apparent
Ci the arbitrary treatment of those woo have dared to
speak up. Major Huber Matos, who had shared the hard-
shtps and dangers of guerrilla warfare with Castro in
the Sierra Maestra in 1958, was denounced as a coward,
traitor, and counterrevolutionary and was given a
A-year prison sentence in 1959 for resigning as mili-
tary commander of Camaguey Province to protest in-
creasing Communist influence in the government. For-
mer Sugar Industry Minister Orlando Borrego, one of
eeveral top government figures who have been relegated
to obscurity in the past decade, allehedly owed his
demotion in 1969 to his temerity in saggesting, cor-
rectly as it turned out, that the 197) sugar harvest
target of ten million tons would not ae met. Even
the French journalist K. S. Karol and toe internation-
ally respected agricultural planner and economist Rene
Dumont, despite their admitted pro-Castro bias, were
publicly denounced as 'agents of the CI after they
had published painstaking analyses of Castro's economic
policies. Punitive reactions like these discouraged
constructive criticism at all levels of government.
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Safety Valves
To guard against a backlash to the repression
of freedom, Castro introduced several safety valves.
In September 1965 he promised that anyone who so
desired could leave Cuba. This purged from the popula-
tion, in a much more humane fashion than was employed
in the Soviet Union and Communist China, those elements
most likely to develop into significant opposition;
provided the government with a gratuitous income (all
real and personal property of emigres was confiscated);
and forced those waiting to depart to conduct themselves
in an exemplary manner in order to protect their
status as prospective emigres. The refugee exodus,
consisting of ten flights a week to Miami with from
70 to 80 passengers on each flight, continued for
over six years. Many more Cubans departed than Castro
had estimated, but at least he was relieved of many
potential trouble makers.
Aware that people are inclined to shoulder greater
burdens during times of national stress, Castro worked
unceasingly to create an aura of siege, to depict
Cuba as a beleaguered bastion fighting desperately
to keep one step ahead of the voracious imperialist
monster. In speech after speech, year after year,
he laid the blame for Cuba's economic problems on the
"imperialist blockade," despite the fact that the
nations of Western Europe made a shambles of US efforts
to restrict their Cuban trade. Many Latin American
countries honored the trade restrictions placed on
Cuba by the Organization of American States at US
urging, but, with the notable exceptions of Argentina
and Venezuela, they are trade competitors of Havana.
They do not produce what Cuba needs and had no signi-
ficant trade with Havana even prior to Castro's rule.
The so-called "US blockade" unquestionably impaired
the Cuban economy years ago when the economic denial
program was initiated, but its effectiveness has waned
over the years as US technology in Cuba has been re-
placed by that of the Soviet Union, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, and other countries.
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The average Cuban, oi course, is either unaware
or unimpressed by any objective assessment of the
Impact of the "blockade;" he believes only that it is
an aggressive policy designed specifically to destroy
his economy and his government. It is quite natural
that he views the policy as an affront to his country's
sovereignty and a threat to him persoLaily. In enter-
taining such sentiments he is extremely vulnerable to
Castro's "beleaguered bastion" thesis and to claims
that "imperialism" is responsible for whatever goes
wrong in his life.
More dramatic than the blockade ste the terrorist
raids and bombings carried out by military exile groups
against the island itself and against Cuban diplomatic
and commercial offices abroad. These attacks, which
sometimes result in the killing or maiming of innocent
people, contribute absolutely nothing to Castro's demise;
on the contrary, they give him further evidence to
support his "beleaguered bastion" theme. As is to
be expected, these foolhardy ventures are invariably
blamed on the US.
When small bands or exiles infiltrate in the naive
hope of initiating another guerrilla war, Castro ex-
ploits the propaganda potential to the maximum by
deliberately mobilizing military reserves far beyond
those actually needed to combat the exiles. The
reservist is hastily summoned from home, factory,
field, or mill to join his unit. Then, amid under-
standable tension and excitement, he is rushed off to
the general area of the incursion. Wien the opera-
tion is over, usually within ten days Or two weeks,
the reservist, even though he may never have seen a
single one of the enemy, has become convinced of the
threat of imperialist aggressions. Le returns feeling
that he has made an important contribution to the
defense of his country, that he is needed and important,
and no longer a faceless nonentity existing outside
the political and social life of the nation. More-
over, the field experience is valuabe military train-
jing for reservists and keeps the mobilization system
itself in good running order.
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Although the activation of reserve units--even
for short periods--probably reduces local productivity,
the benefits to the armed forces more than compensate.
Counterproductive Exile Actions
The primary and immediate beneficiary of the
incursions is Castro himself. He is able to divert
attention from his economic troubles, to embellish
on his "beleaguered bastion" melodrama, and to siphon
off potentially dangerous frustrations. Perhaps the
most outstanding example of his exploitation of the
exiles' antics occurred in April and May 1970, when
the politically crucial sugar harvest was entering
its final stages embarrassingly short of its goal.
When a team of 13 heavily armed exiles was discovered
minutes after landing on a beach in eastern Cuba near
midnight on April 16, units of the army, reserve
militia, Border Guard, and Frontier Brigade were rushed
to the northeastern area of Oriente Province and de-
ployed in concentric defense rings around the point
of infiltration. By April 26, all the members of the
infiltration team had been killed or captured. Blanket
press coverage was devoted to the incident, and Fidel
himself presided at the memorial service held for five
members of the defense forces who had been killed in
the fighting.
To secure the release of the captured infiltra-
tors, an action unit of Alpha 66 (an exile organiza-
tion which has claimed authorship of numerous attacks
on Cuban facilities) captured and sank two Cuban fish-
ing boats on May 10 and held the 11 crewmembers hostage
in expectation of negotiating an exchange. Reaction
in Cuba was carefully orchestrated by the government.
On May 15 hostile crowds, which at one time reportedly
numbered 200,000, began gathering around the US
Embassy building in Havana, then held in caretaker
status by the Swiss Embassy. They remained there
until May 19, when Castro arrived to host a reception
for the returning hostages who had, in the meantime,
been abandoned on a small island in the Bahamas by
Alpha 66, and had returned to Havana via Nassau.
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iti the huge building serving as a giqantic, visible,
]:1Aci tangible symbol of US "imperialisr," Castro de-
Livered a bombastic adcress vilifying the US, prais-
hq the courage of the fishermen and ocngratulating
f Cuban people on their "great victory' over "im-
perialism.' Almost as an afterthought, he announced
Jot the sugar harvest target, on which he had staked
"honor of the Revoaution," would rot be met.
The timing of the exile incidents was so bene-
l;.2ial to Castro?allowing him to blunt the keen
popular disappointment he knew would fcllow the public
,i,jmission that the harvest would not r-ach the coveted
-en million ton mark?that it is difficult to avoid
hpeculating that his intelligence agents, who seem
-a; have penetratea thoroughly all important exile
(rganizations, may have suggested the cperations to
exile leaders and assisted in the planning and execu-
:ion. Although there as no evidence ta support this
conspiracy" theory, it is clear that fastro de-
herately overreacted to shift the focus away from
:he harvest shortfall. Had the ten million tons been
within reach, he would have done nothing that would
Live jeopardized the harvest.
The hfiltration-kianaping arfaii served Castro
but it did not completely negate the impact
F the failure to achieve the harvest Over-
)ed though they were at the sate return of the
hermen, the Cuban people found the harvest pro-
tion totals a bitter pill to swallo,,; after their
long, almost superhuman efforts in the oanefields.
aL-itro was aware of the state or public morale and
Dr1 July 26, durina the traditional speech on the an-
niversary of the outbreak of his revolution, he hinted
in an oblique fashion Lhat he might step down if the
ople so desired. This probably marked the nadir
uh his popularity since he came to power in 1959.
'raying uba's Pulse
Castro monitors has popularity tr-s. his direct
aantacts with the people and by public opinion polls
acnducted by an olfice at the Revolutionary Orientation
A** 4*tv
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Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban
Communist Party. Scorning the "representative
democracy" of the Western nations with their congresses,
house of parliament, etc., Castro claims to be operat-
ing a "true democracy" which, in his view, is ex-
emplified by the conversations he conducts with all
strata of the Cuban people. He not only frequently
visits the University of Havana to engage in spon-
taneous "bull" sessions with the students, but often
chats at great length with kitchen workers at the
Habana Libre Hotel or at other places where he might
be dining. When he tires of the monotony of the
day-to-day business of governing, he visits factories
and mills to talk with the workers or he leaves
Havana for the rural areas, visiting with people in
small towns and state farms. Many a surprised peasant
has found himself in his home discussing local problems
with Castro over a hospitable cup of coffee.
Castro may need direct contact with the masses
for psychological reasons, but in any case, these
conversations perform a valuable public relations
function. They are the only bridge between the masses
and the top level of government. By personal contacts,
Castro learns how government proposals will be re-
ceived, what proposals should be reshaped or shelved
and what segments of the population need attention
in terms of political education and indoctrination.
If he tried to assay public opinion through formal
channels, such as the Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution (CDRs), he probably would be told not
what the masses are thinking, but what the municipal
and provincial CDR leaders think he wants to hear.
Guessing Wrong
This system is not infallible, however. When
on September 28, 1965 he offered to permit unrestricted
emigration to the US, he miscalculated grievously.
The thousands upon thousands of Cubans who "voted
with their feet" by applying for permission to leave
their homeland became such an embarrassment that the
government stopped accepting applications on May 31,
1966. By that time so many people had registered to
emigrate that the exodus continued for over six years
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a rate of about 4,0uO per month. his outpouring
refugees did contain certain benefits for Castro,
but it gave the regime a political black eye and more
Lmuortant, led to a "brain drain" that cost Cuba, al-
ready weakened by the toss of upwards ot half a mil-
lion upper and middle class citizens in exile, many
cL the people it needed most: professionals, ex-
perienced management personnel, and skilled technicians
Another miscalculation occurred n November 1965
when the Military Units for Aid to Production (UMAP)
was established. UMAP was advertised as a system to
uend the unemployed to work in the fitlds under military
supervision, but in reality it createe a network of
forced labor camps populated by common criminals,
homosexuals, school dropouts, clergymen, persecuted
religious lay leaders, and anyone who nappened to be
without visible proof of employment when stopped in
ihe street by "recruiters." Life in the camps was
difficult enough what with the strenueus physical
labor that had to be performed, but the criminals and
sex perverts made it tnat much harder for those un-
used to a prison-like existence. Thaae whose religious
beliefs forbade the wearing of uniforms had a part-
icularly difficult time. Within six ronths, UMAP
had aroused so much public antipathy that "recruit-
ment" was halted and the system was permitted to die
Li natural death. By mLd-1968, those who had not al-
ready been released were transferred to regular mili-
eary units to finish their three-year military obligation.
Castro had apparently believed that most of the
pcople would be willin4 to accept some -iorm of com-
pulsory labor service )or those laggards who, in
spite of a scarcity of labor, steadfaatly avoided
work. Guido Garcia Inclan, a radio commentator who
ometimes acts as a kind of government-sanctioned
ombudsman by airing general complaint from the public
denounced in his broadcasts those who dressed like
cane-cutters, carried a machete, bragged of fictional
exploits in the harvest, but never actually cut. a
..angle stalk of cane. The same commer_tator also
complained of ion-haired youths in tight-fitting
pants who lolled about the streetcorners of Havana
at the height of the harvest when therr presence in
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the canefields was needed. The public was unprepared,
however, for the harsh treatment, strict regimentation,
unsanitary conditions, and degenerate environment that
the UMAP quickly came to represent. The highly un-
favorable reaction from the families and friends of
the luckless UMAP "recruits" resulted in prompt re-
forms and, eventually, elimination of the system al-
together.
In spite of popular disapproval, there is no
question that Castro could have continued the UMAP
if he had so desired, but he was not prepared to
accept the price of greater repression, particularly
in view of the UMAP's minimum effectiveness. In-
stead, he sought to achieve the same ends by different
means. As the UMAP was being phased out in 1968, the
youth arm of the Cuban Communist Party was forming
an agricultural labor force of some 50,000 young
people (UMAP strength probably never exceeded 45,000)
called the Centennial Youth Column. This organiza-
tion also met with some popular resistance because
of strong-arm recruiting tactics in its initial stages,
but in general the Column was accepted by the people.
In fact, it served as a model for similar but smaller
groups such as the Youth Column of the Sea, the
Textile Youth Column, and the Steel Youth Column and
others which were organized to channel young people
into those expanding economic sectors in need of
labor. In August 1973, the Centennial Youth Column
and its adjunct units were merged with the Permanent
Infantry Division, military units in which armed
forces personnel were used as common laborers in
agriculture and industry, to form the Youth Labor
Army, a militarized work force of about 100,000 people.
Key Historical Factors
The ease with which Castro has been able to
minimize the give and take in domestic politics is
in large part a result of Cuban history. The high
incidence of violence in Cuba's political affairs,
the absence of a strong democratic tradition, the
acceptance of corruption as a way of life by those
political leaders who preceded Castro, the weakness
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both governmental and non-governmeutai institutions
i. the time of Castro's accession to Rower, and many
'ears of frustrated revolutionary amhLtions all con-
Cributed to a politico-economic situacion that was
ripe for exploitation. Castro was merely continuing
Cuba's traditional means of seeking political change
when he attacked the Moncada barracks in July 1953
jud when he took to the Sierra Maestri mountains in
eastern Cuba at the head of a guerriiia column in
December 1956. His guerrilla force, as well as many
others that appeared in eastern Cuba during the first
alf of this century, was patterned arter the roving
oands of irregulars that had waged thc War of Inde-
pendence in 1895-98 and that were reoarded as heroic
ymbols of Cuban nationalism. The violence and
selective terrorism to which Castro's urban resistance
apparatus resorted in 1957-58 drew little popular
criticism not only because the kidnaprngs, bombings,
and assassinations were directed against hated in-
dividuals and institutions but also Lecause violence
per se was considered neither evil nor improper.
(The indiscriminate counterterrorism co which the
atista government resorted, however, redounded to
astro's advantage and served to dri a wedge be-
tween the government and the people L(acause it was
applied against the population as a vnole rather
than against specific resistance leaoers.) in tact,
the high incidence of violence that permeated Cuban
politics ever since the Ten Years War a century ago
Las so conditioned the population that its use as a
political tool was looked upon not wlth disfavor but
with a degree of hope. Atter ail, ir was violence
that had gained Cuba Its freedom in _898, violence
that had ousted the hated Machado from the presidency
hi 1933, and violence that had eventually brought
about the collapse of the detested Batista dictator-
:ehip on January i, 1959.
Iioience an Accepted Way ot i e
Much of the Western press severly criticized
(stro in early i959, labeling his w]despread use
the execution wall a 'bloodbath." But very few
(ulbans, even those who later turned against Castro
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and went into exile, sided with the critics. Such
outstanding public figures as Auxiliary Archbishop
of Havana Eduardo Boza Masvidal, later expelled by
Castro, and Roberto Agramonte, former Orthodox Party
presidential candidate whose integrity was acclaimed
by US Ambassador Phillip Bonsal, spoke out in defense
of the executions. The Cuban people found it dif-
ficult to understand why foreign observers, particularly
those in the US, failed to muster much enthusiasm
for the elimination of what they considered heinous
criminals. Likewise, Castro's use of strong-arm
methods to purge the University of Havana of "un-
reliable" professors and teachers created little stir.
Some public outcry was heard when teams of young thugs
invaded churches and disrupted services in a deliber-
ate program of harassment of religious institutions,
but the population in general was unimpressed. These
and similar actions were carried out in the name of
the Revolution and thus were automatically justified.
In these early days, the emotional pitch of the
population was so high that it was enough for Castro
to accuse some group of opposition to his policies
to bring out howling mobs bent on violence in his
defense.
Even in more recent times, after it was no
longer a necessary tool for the consolidation of
his power, Castro has used violence or the threat
of violence as a basic political weapon. In 1968,
for example, he had all the means to take over peace-
fully shops, stores, and other remnants of private
enterprise that still existed. He chose, instead,
to unleash the "Revolutionary Offensive." Not only
were 58,000 small businesses confiscated, but those
people who were becoming disillusioned with the
regime's inability to satisfy basic needs were
thoroughly intimidated. Later the same year, he
claimed that "counterrevolutionaries" were conduct-
ing a campaign of "economic sabotage" to undermine
the government, and, to the prolonged applause of
his audience, he warned:
...Revolutionary laws are severe. But if
they are not severe enough yet, the Revolution
can enact still more severe ones. Let them
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the counterrevolutionaries) not say later
that they had not been forewarned nor that
they did not know, because if we know any-
Laing, this revolution is a hare struggle, a
death struggle aaainst the powerful imperialist
enemy which encourages and will always encour-
age these acts (of sabotage). This is a strug-
gle to the death. The people ir their wisdom
and instinct reaiize this. This is a struggle
for survival of the Revolution er the counter-
revolution, and when things stack. up thusly,
halfway terms are ruled out and the measures
must be extreme... Before this revolution
can cease to exist, no head of a single re-
volutionary will remain on his shoulders in
this country. Before they can destroy this
revolution, the heads of all whc: may want to
destroy it will roil.
As if to emphasize Castro's threat, shortly after
his speech a "saboteur" who allegedly had burned
down a clothing warehouse was executed.
Ln May 1970, at the time of the incident of
the kidnaped fishermen, two members ot the Swiss
diplomatic mission were physically restrained by
a mob of demonstrators organized by the government
from leaving the former US Embassy building and were
without food for three and a half days. A year
later the Cuban intellectual community was shocked
by what came to be known as the Padilla affair.
The well known poet Herberto Padilla, who had in-
curred the enmity of old guard Communists as early
as 1961, had permitted some veiled criticism of
the Revolution to infiltrate his works, a lapse for
which he had already been called to account twice.
Padilla and his wife, Belkis Cuza Male, were taken
into custody by officials of the Interior Ministry
on March 20, 1971. His wife was released after a
few days of questioning, but Padilla was kept in-
communicado for over live weeks. During his de-
tention he signed a 4,000 word "confession" admit-
mg to involvement in counter-revolutionary activities.
He was released some three weeks after the date of
his "confession," and a day later, in front of his
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colleagues assembled at the Union of Writers and
Artists in Havana, he delivered a lengthy and debas-
ing self-criticism. Following his lead, several
others, including his wife, abjectly admitted counter-
revolutionary shortcomings of their own. Although
Padilla denied that his "confession" was the result
of torture, the manner in which his case was handled
arouses strong suspicion.
Less fortunate than Padilla was a French press
photographer, Pierre Golondorf, who allegedly was
caught trying to smuggle a manuscript of Padilla's
to a publisher in Spain. Golondorf received a long
prison sentence after being held incommunicado several
months, and authorities in Havana let it be known that
"other intellectuals could be arrested on charges of
counterrevolutionary activities." The message was
not lost on Cuba's intellectuals. Unfavorable domestic
reaction, as far as can be determined, was nil, al-
though a fierce battle of words raged between Castro
and European and Latin American intellectuals.
Democracy a Stranger
Violence was a traditional phenomenon in Cuba;
practical democracy was not. Except for Panama, Cuba
was the last of the Latin American republics to gain
its freedom; at the time of Batista's overthrow in
1959 it had been independent from Spain for barely
60 years. In that relatively brief period, violence
and corruption became stronger institutions
than did democratic ideals. The first years of in-
dependence from Spain, 1898 to 1902, were spent under
US occupation which, according to Secretary of War
Elihu Root, "should not be, and of course will not
be, continued any longer than is necessary to enable
the people to establish a suitable government to
which control shall be transferred, a government which
shall really represent the people of Cuba, maintain
order, and comply with international obligations."
General John R. Brooks (January 1, 1899 - December
20, 1899) and General Leonard Wood (December 20, 1899-
May 20, 1902) were appointed by the President of the
US as Cuba's first and second governors.
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tne general elections held on December 31,
1901 under General Wood's supervision, Cuban democracy
tarted off on the wrong foot and never fully re-
overed. General Bartolome Maso, piqued because
he board supervising the elections tncluded none
of his representatives, withdrew from the race in
ts final stages and the Moderate Party's Tomas
,strada Palma won unopposed. There was no improve-
went in the offing. the first election in a free
Puba, held in February 1904 to select members of
Longress, became a farce when the Liperal Party re-
used to concede the Republican Party's victory.
Hy boycotting the opening session of Congress in
April, it denied a quorum to the legislature, thus
ureventing the Congress from?conveninq.
The next presidential election, on December 1,
905, was a repetition of the first. Tomas Estrada
Palma again won without opposition; this time the
Liberal Party decided to withdraw after one of its
popular leaders was murdered during a brawl with
Lae Santa Clara chief of police. As it turned out,
it's abstention made no difference. ine Moderate
Party had contrived to win in any eventuality by
erpetrating gross fraud in voter reaistrations.
is not really surprising that the 17,1bera1s turned
Lo violence to redress the wrongs they had suffered.
Their armed uprising brought back the US marines
n October 1906, and President Theodore Roosevelt
named Charles E. Magoon provisional aovernor of Cuba.
Under Magoon, reasonably honest elections were
and General Jose Miguel Gomez of the Liberal
arty was the victor. In 1912, howeuer, Gomez's
iywn party spurned him and tapped Vice President
Alfredo Zayas as its presidential candidate. Gomez
nnd his followers, who controlled the ballot boxes
Li Havana and Oriente (the two provinces with the
'Ireatest population), proceeded to throw the election
L() General Mario Garcia Menocal of the Conservative
Party. Four years later. Menocal sought to reverse
'die election results by declaring himself re-elected
in spite of a disclaimer--supported later by the
,upreme Court--from the Central Election Board.
A4ain the cheated Liberals took up arms, and again the
[J3 sent marines to the scene.
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Amid the usual violence and fraud, Alfredo Zayas
was elected on November 1, 1920 to succeed Menocal,
his former opponent but now his mentor. Although
still another US intervention brought about the in-
validation of the results in 20 percent of the electoral
districts and led to supplemental elections in March
1921, further sporadic violence caused the Liberals
to avoid the polls and Zayas officially gained the
presidency.
In 1924, Zayas, the former Liberal now turned
Conservative, found it opportune to change his party
once more. In return for the promise of lucrative
spoils, he gave his support--mostly armed muscle at
the polling places--to the Liberal Party candidate
Gerardo Machado. Machado won handily and, when his
four-year term was drawing to a close, he contrived
through blatantly illegal means to gain a second term
of six years. This was too much even for Cubans to
bear. Resistance developed, and finally, in August
1933, Machado resigned and flew to Nassau, allegedly
taking with him seven bags of gold.
In the extended period of chaos that followed
Machado's departure, the presidency was filled in
rapid succession by General Alberto Herrera, Carlos
Manuel de Cespedes, a pentarchy, Dr. Ramon Grau San
Martin, Carlos Hevia, Manuel Marques Sterling, Colonel
Carlos Mendieta, Jose Antonio Barnet, Miguel Mariano
Gomez, and Federico Laredo Bru. Some were president
for a day; some did not even have time to take the
oath of office before they were overtaken by events.
The only man to gain the presidency through elections,
Miguel Mariano Gomez, was impeached and ousted after
barely seven months in office for vetoing a bill that
was designed to enrich Fulgencio Batista.
Batista, a former army sergeant, had succeeded
in seizing control of the army in 1933, and as army
chief of staff quickly emerged as the most powerful
man in Cuban politics. He made presidents and, as
in the case of Miguel Mariano Gomez, he broke them.
He finally decided to come out from behind the scenes
and rule in public. He ran for president in 1940
and, in what was probably one of the cleanest elections
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Cuban history, won. When his car didate was de-
..eated by Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin n the election
--once against honest?in 1944, he turned the gov-
ernment over to his successor peacefully. Grau step-
ped down in 1948 for his own hand-picked candidate,
Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras. When it Yecame clear, how-
ever, that Dr. Roberto Agramonte of the Orthodox
Party (a splinter from Grau's and Prio's Autentico
Party) would win in 1992, Batista staged a coup d'
etat, ruling first as prime minister and then as
president until he was able to hold 9 controlled
election that would give him the appaarance of legi-
timacy. To run legally in the race, he yielded the
presidency to his minister of state, Dr. Andres
Domingo. His only opponent, Dr. Grau, withdrew a
Few days before the votes were cast, and the way was
clear for Batista to rule for another four years.
The elections of 1958 were as much a. farce as those
tri 1954, with Batista's candidate, Dr. Andres River?
Aguero, claiming 62 percent of the ballots. Castro's
revolt prevented River() from ever taing office.
currupllion a Friend
Widespread corruption, as well as the unsavory
methods employed in elections during Cuba's republican
era, tarnished the democratic ideals that were, in
theory at least, supposed to be the guiding lines
cf the country's political life. HiFtorian Hubert
Herring described the first president, Tomas Estrada
Palma, as "incorruptible and devoted," hut his suc-
cessors were a different matter. Of the second presi-
dent, Herring wrote: "With a smile, Pomez emptied
the treasury and allowed Cuban and Argrican cronies
Lu fatten on concessions." President. Mario Garcia
Menocal "succumbed to the infection of easy money
tor himself and his friends," and the next (Alfredo,
Zayas) "president's rule by plunder offered no hope
for the citizens." Then came Machado who "rewarded
his inner circle with handsome incomes from concessions
and contracts." Batista. "grew rich from commissions
on contracts, kickbacks on customs, and percentages
of the National Lottery. When he retired in favor
ofi Gran. in 1944 and went to live in Forida, he was
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able to settle a fortune upon his divorced wife.
Cautious observers said that he had other millions
invested in Florida apartment houses and like ventures."
Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin "could not control the
grafters who surrounded him... There was a steady
deterioration in public services and increased cor-
ruption in high places and in low." Things were to
get even worse. Under Grau's successor, Dr. Carlos
Prio Socarras, "thievery reached new heights, and
the President himself was able to build a remarkable
house in nearby La Chata at a cost of some two or
three million dollars--on his salary of $25,000."
Thus, when Castro took over in 1959 and ignored
his pledge of free elections within a year, there
was no strong outcry (other than from the exile
community) from a population long denied the right
to choose its own leaders. The democratic tradition
was far too weak to withstand the pressure of cau-
dillismo that Castro represented.
Revolutionary Aspirations Denied
Another historical factor also helped pave the
way for the people's acceptance of Castro as their
20th century Moses. Cuban revolutionary aspirations
had been frustrated for many years. Even when victory
seemed tantalizingly close, revolutionary aims were
thwarted. The tragic and inhuman Ten Years War
(1868-78), for example, ended on a hopeful note with
the signing of the Pact of Zanjon. This treaty, which
had been purchased at great cost in blood and human
misery, appeared to grant important concessions to
the rebellious island. The pact, however, was honored
only partially, temporarily, and half-heartedly by
Spain, and before long Cubans again took up arms in
search of freedom.
Then, during the War of Independence (1895-98),
the United States intervened just when--according
to contemporary and present day Cuban historians--
the revolutionaries had Spain "on the ropes."
Whether this nationalistic interpretation is true
is academic; the important point is that many poli-
tically conscious Cubans believed it and believed
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lhaL the Cuban people were thus deniel the fruits
ut victory after 30 long years of bitter struggle.
This group looked upon the US intervention as a mere
change of tutelage, with the US replacing Spain as
master of Cuba's fate.
life in the republican era seemea to bring the
country no closer to tie achievement of revolutionary
goals. US influence, embodied in steadily increasing
economic involvement, frequent military interventions,
And the hated Platt Amendment, pervaded all important
aspects of national life until the mid-30s and made
A mockery of the nation's alleged independence. At
the same time, the so-called democrati.c institutions
pressed upon Cuba by a paternalistic JS functioned
la such a manner as to perpetuate corruption and poli-
tical intrigue and to confound any effort by the mass-
ea to improve their lot.
A ray of hope gleamed briefly following the fall
4)); Gerardo Machado, but it was quickly extinguished
when the US, fearful of the "red menace" and appalled
by the continuing chaos., refused to recognize the
revolutionary government of Ramon Grau San Martin.
(His power base was relatively narrow and he did not
enjoy support across tne political spectrum or
throughout the country at large.) Washington waited
for the emergence of a leader (Fulgencio Batista)
who could restore order before granting the recogni-
tion so vital to any Cuban government wishing to
remain in power.
While Batista charted a course in close con-
junction with US interests over the next ten years,
Grau retained leadership of the revolutionary ele-
ments and organized his followers into the Cuban
Revolutionary (Autentico) Party, which succeeded
gaining wide appeal among the masses. Grau had
to wait until 1944 before gaining the presidency,
however, and by then the seeds of corruption had
taken firm root in his political organization. Op-
portunism replaced whatever revolutionary ideals
remained from the previous decade. Although Grau's
hand-picked successor, Carlos Prio Socarras, won
Lhe presidency in the elections in 1948, the Autenticos
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had to face the electorate without the support of
many party members who, disillusioned by the unbridled
graft and other forms of corruption that permeated all
levels of government, had broken away in 1947 to form
a splinter group called the Cuban People's (Ortodoxo)
Party. This party, to which Fidel Castro and many of
his followers belonged, became the repository of revolu-
tionary ideals and "the refuge of yet another rootless
younger generation."
Batista reappeared in 1952 to thwart the nation's
revolutionary ambitions once again by conducting a
coup just prior to the elections that would have
vaulted the Ortodoxos into power. With peaceful means
denied them, the revolutionaries looked to the rifle
as their only salvation. Many unsuccessful attempts
were made to depose Batista; the Moncada barracks
assault in July 1953, Colonel Ramon Barquin's mili-
tary conspiracy in April 1956, the Goicuria barracks
assault later in the same month, the attack on the
Presidential Palace in March 1957, and the Cienfuegos
naval conspiracy in September 1957 were the most
important. Victory came to the man who captured the
imagination of the people by literally retracing the
steps of such national heroes as Jose Marti, General
Maximo Gomez, and General Antonio Maceo. Whereas
most revolutionary efforts to overthrow Batista were
short-lived coup attempts, Castro's guerrilla campaign
was long and drawn out (December 1956 to January 1959).
This gave him the time to develop an image the public
could accept, support, and cherish, and Batista did
much to make Castro's task an easy one.
On January 1, 1959 most Cubans viewed Castro as
the best opportunity since at least the mid-30s to
achieve the political, social, and economic goals
they had fruitlessly sought for so long. His revolu-
tion had ended its military phase and was about to
enter its social phase, with promises of a clean break
with the past and an honest government subject to the
will of the people. He and his insurgent band seemed
almost a reincarnation of the legendary heroes of the
War of Independence, and his guerrilla campaign against
Batista was similar in many ways to the irregular war
which the revolutionaries of the most dramatic period
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ii Cuban history waged against Spain. It was almost
is if the nation were reliving the glorious moment
at its independence, and it was Castro who was re-
sponsible for the miraculous rebirth. Such was the
euphoria of the people that they gave Castro a free
hand to reshape the country's institutions as he saw
Fit. The Cuban people, except for those with vested
rlterests, were ready to try anything new so long as
this new-found messiah led the way. Tney did not
have long to wait.
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CHAPTER TWO: OLD INSTITUTIONS SCORNED
Weaknesses Exploited
When Castro and his victorious guerrillas entered
Havana in January 1959, the country's fundamental
institutions were already seriously weakened. It is
impossible to determine just when in his drive to un-
seat Batista Castro convinced himself that the whole
structure of Cuban society would have to be demolished
and rebuilt from the ground up. It seems most likely,
however, that the decision was a gradual one, based
on a series of reactions to specific problems that
confronted the revolutionaries over a long period
of time.
Castro's "No Election Decree" of October 10, 1958,
for example, was a response to Batista's announcement
that national elections would be held on November 3
of the same year. The rebels had to take a public
stand before elections were held if they were to avoid
the possibility that the Revolution might find itself
opposing a new government that to all appearances
had been honestly chosen and that was at least nomi-
nally free from the illegality, corruption, and brutual
repression that had characterized the Batista admin-
istration since 1952. Although some candidates
abstained or withdrew, many were obliged--by pressure
or connection--to participate in the race. Thus,
because the rebels' decree barred from public office
for 30 years anyone taking part in the elections,
many politicians and their parties were effectively
excluded from post-revolution political activity.
Another example was the elimination--despite
earlier disclaimers of any such action--of foreign-
owned (and ultimately all) private enterprise in
Cuba. Batista's hurried departure early on New
Year's Day 1959 left Fidel without a windmill to
fight. He needed a threat so that he could defend
the Cuban people, a threat that would unite the
masses behind him while he introduced the radical
measures necessary to consolidate his position. The
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enmity of the US, with its distastefut reputation of
naked intervention in Latin American Politics, would
serve this purpose and would--based on Previous Cuban
experience--be relatively easy to pro7e, the US
being the'iargest investor in Cuba. Thstro set out
on a course of deliberate provocation, forcing a
series of reactions from the US, which he countered
by confiscating and expropriating Ameuican property.
,nus driving ever deeper the wedge beuween the two
countries. Although Cuba unquestionably paid the
greater price economically, the cost was calculated
Lo be bearable in view of the political gains. The
casualty in this process of planned alienation was
private enterprise. Private business nad provided
much of the money that had financed Costro's guerrilla
,ar, but Castro realized that it could now contribute
the same manner to nis overthrow. he was, there-
fore, quite willing to do away with the private sector
despite the serious economic problems that could in-
evitably result.
J,c isiature
Other institutions, rather than JeLng system-
ically destroyed, collapsed of their own weight.
The legislature, dissolved permanentiv shortly after
the rebels entered the capital, had rarely in its
57-year history served as an effective counter-
balance to the executive branch of government. The
bnly time the Congress successfully cl.allenged the
presidency was in 1936 when, at the direction of the
army chief of staff, Fulgencio Batista at the time
Cuba's de facto chief executive), Prestdent Miguel
Mariano Gomez was impeached for refusing to sign into
Ualw a bill-legalizing craft for Batista,
Corruption had been a trademark cf the legisla-
t:.ure ever since it was formed in 1902. According tc
Hugh Thomas, Cuba's first-Congress:
?.embarked upon democracy with a scandal fit
to discredit it. Having first passed a bill
Jiving lavish salaries to public office holders,
another was introduced to give extra payments
...twoo***AaRasavoaloa.arowaimpopaa a
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to the army of liberation: one dollar was prom-
ised to privates for each day of service, and
lavish sums to officers. This opened the way
to a sensational speculation on the part of a
number of politicians, who let it be understood
that the delays in settling this question would
be endless, and persuaded half the soldiers with
claims to sell these at half their proper price.
Afterwards, when the bill had been in the event
quickly passed, the new politicians.. .drew in
the profit without shame."
Involvement of high-ranking Congressmen such as
Orestes Ferrara, president of the House of Representa-
tives, in the multi-million dollar scandals of the
Gomez administration (1909-1913) further tarnished
the reputation of the Congress. During the Gomez
administration the national lottery (outlawed in 1898)
was restored, providing a source of wealth that con-
tinued to corrupt the legislature up until the time
of Batista's fall in 1959. The president of the
Senate in 1909, who 18 years earlier had found it
politically expedient to denounce the system of bet-
ting as "social gangrene," offered a bill to reinsti-
tute the lottery and met with no opposition. The
law provided that the lottery tickets would be sold
by widows and families of veterans of the War of
Independence and that these people could retain a per-
centage of the face value of the tickets. In practice,
however, the lucrative ticket distributorships were
apportioned among congressmen and political cronies,
who proceeded to multiply their take simply by in-
creasing the sale price of the tickets to as much as
five times their face value. Thomas claims that
"within a few years of Gomez' law, the lottery was
known to be the most efficient method of illegal en-
richment, and above all for buying the silence or
support of the legislature or press."
Over the years, the legislature either permitted
itself to be corrupted into supporting the president
or, at the least sign of recalcitrance, was suspended.
The period of Batista's second administration (1952-
1959) is typical. Following his coup d'etat on March
10, 1952, Batista ruled without a legislature until
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anuarv i955, wnen, flfter a carefull- -ontrelled
..iection in which he ran unchallengr L, he was assured
docile and compliant Congress. Altl-ough members
the opposition in the House and S-rate--some pre-
:iimaoly driven by self-interest and ethers by the
ope that by working within the syst-m (albeit a
-orrupt one) they could act as a kin of legislative
Tonscience and possibly influence fa-mrably some of
__e Legislation brought up for discussion--their
-resence served only to give the appearance of lecal-
Ly to a body that functioned as a rihPer stamp for
he presidency.
curing the 34 months in which Congress under
Ratista was suspended, legislative ,--)7Y4ers were in-
vested in the Council of Ministers. Pis is the
%/stem in use today under Castro. AThing through
7esident Manuel Urrutia Lleo ( Janur..7 1 - july 17,
959), Castro dissolved Batista's lecjalature in.
jonaury 1.959 and a month later promulgated the Funda-
mental Law which, in Article 119, granted all legis-
aLive powers to the Council of Mlnistors. In this
shion, Cuba's Congress was permanert-y laid to rest
./en betbre Castro 'became prime minister. Its pass-
q went unnoticed and unregretted tri the masses it
was supposed to represent.
etc Military
;01.lowing his accession to power. Castro handled
zitista's military establishment in n-:ch the same
manner as he had handled the legislature; he simply
iiguidated it. Its duties were transferred to the
ebel Army. Some of the officers and men who had
enved honorably and who were willing to submit to
Llie discipline were incorporated (as individuals
rnther than as whole units) into the Pebel Army, but
most were released outright. The military had had
oil the men and equipment necessary tn iestroy
Castro's guerrillas in combat durinq the war in the
flLenra. Maestra, but it was devoid of fighting spirit
and lacked a sense of nurpose. Piddled with corrup-
tion and burdened with a venal hierar-717 incapable
oh effective leadership, it collapsed aa much from
own internal decay as from military pressures in
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Rear-echelon officers sold guns and ammunition
to the rebels' intermediaries, front-line commanders,
unable to nail down their elusive adversaries, rounded
up groups of local peasants, slaughtered them, and
reported the bodies to headquarters as "rebel casual-
ties." The treatment frequently accorded captured
rebels was enough to alienate any decent military man,
and the indiscriminate bombing of peasant villages
in the Sierra Maestra so sickened air force pilots
and bomber crews that they sometimes jettisoned their
ordnance out over the ocean. A few were so appalled
by the bestiality that they deserted and went into
exile. Field commanders came to realize that if the
fortunes of combat turned against them, they could
not count on reinforcements. Still worse, it was
not unusual for units to be ordered into combat with-
out being forewarned of ambushes that the General
Staff knew had been set up by the rebels. Under
these conditions, it is no wonder that over 400 army
soldiers had surrendered to the rebels by mid-1957
and that many more had deserted to join the rebel
ranks.
This is not to imply that the rebels inflicted
no defeats on Batista's forces. The guerrillas won
far more encounters than they lost, and their skill
in overcoming platoon and company-sized units in
isolated outposts in Oriente Province finally com-
pelled the army to evacuate these positions and with-
draw its troops to larger garrisons in the cities.
Although many of the battles--particularly those in
1957 and the first half of 1958--involved fewer than
a hundred men on either side, the guerrillas' ability
to come out consistently on top helped keep rebel
morale as high as army morale was low.
The seeds of the disease that brought about the
collapse of the Cuban military establishment had been
sown many years before Fidel Castro ever became inter-
ested in politics. The foundation for the army was
laid in 1907 during the second US military intervention
(the Army of Liberation having been disbanded in 1899
during the first intervention). Although the army had
dabbled in politics from time to time in its early years
it had not played a major role until the early 1930s.
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was President Machado who pcliticized the
Jrmy. He promoted to choice positicns those officers
open to corruption and assigned to 1-arious military
Hmtboes those whose Integrity interfered with his
4mbitions. To sao the influence of the younger and
Loss tractable officers, he saw to it that they were
overruled whenever they attempted tc, censure enlisted
ilen for breaches of discipline. This latter actio
backfired. During the hectic summer of 1933, these
officers, shocked by the chaos that the general strike
iuhd widespread terrorism had brought, forced Machado
Lc leave the country. In the turmoil following his
departure, however, army enlisted mer., led by Sergeant
Fulgencio Batista and other non-commissioned officers,
mutinied throughout the entire country and seized
power. About 300 of the young professional officers
Look over the National Hotel in Havana, apparently
hoping that a show of unity and possible US backina
could restore their control over the army. Their
ITailure to act decisively, however, ioomed their ef-
rts almost from the start. After more than three
weeks of tense waiting, the soldiers attacked the
hotel with everything from rifles to naval and field
drtillery. Following a furious battle, the surviving
ntficers were sent off to jail. Thus, the Cuban of-
icer corps lost most of its dedicated and well-trained
professionals; their olaces were takhn by corporals
;Ind sergeants quickly elevated to lieutenants, cap-
iains, majors, and colonels.
The new armed forces dominated :'Llinan domestic
politics from 1933 until late 1944, when newly elected
Bresident Grau began an extensive shnke-uP that was
,o rid the military of most of the officers who sub-
ported Batista. But again the tide was reversed.
Batista staged a successful coup on March 10, 1952,
Jamiediately purged those officers not personally d6-,-
voted to him, and restored his old c-onies to top-
Lwel positions. By these actions, he removed the
very individuals who might have destroyed Castro's
querrillas and replaced them with incompetents more
tnterested in amassine great fortunes. than in fight-
_1.(a rebels. In effect, Batista underwrote hs own
downfall.
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Political Parties
Just as discredited as the military in the eyes
of the Cuban people were the political parties. None
had evolved as a consistently strong contender in
national or local elections, and none had developed
a clear ideology of its own. Conservatives of one
day would run on the ticket of the Liberals the fol-
lowing day. Democrats were not always democrats, and
the Cuban Revolutionary Party did not represent the
revolutionary ideals that gave the party its name.
After Eddy Chibas' suicide in August 1951, even the
Ortodoxo Party split wide open. Without Chibas'
demagogic voice and impetuous leadership, the
Ortodoxos broke up into factions, some favoring the
radical path that Castro chose and others seeking a
more conventional, less militant means of solving
Cuba's problems.
Opportunism was the trademark of Cuban politics.
Batista was just as willing to work with the Communists
as to work against them; and the Communists, in turn,
could do a quick about-face when they realized that
Castro's rebel forces were gaining the upper hand in
the fight against Batista. Parties were not tied
rigidly to a narrow ideology, and therefore new parties
could be created and old ones discarded without damage
to the politicians or the political system. It was
a candidate's personal charm and rhetorical skill, not
the party he represented, that were important factors
in an election. The people attached their loyalties
at the ballot box to the individuals of their choice
rather than to a particular party. In the elections
in 1944, for example, Grau won the presidency in a
landslide but his party was unable to gain a majority
in either the House or the Senate.
Cuba's political parties proved useful for half
a century, but were never vital. In 1959, Castro
did not have to destroy them; they quietly disinte-
grated from lack of interest.
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The .Judiciary
The judiciary suffered a somewh t different fate.
Atter initial purges removed persons who might prove
independent or otherwise embarrassing to Castro's
Revolutionary Government, the judiciary was largely
l4nored. This was possible because A system of courts
was instituted to handle actions that ander the new
.revolutionary ethics were considered to be crimes.
i-ae "old" judiciary inherited from Batista was quite
unused to neglect. Previous administrations had
.reated the judiciary in cavalier fasaion, accepting
_nose juridical decisions that were nonvenient and
-aypassing or disregarding altogether those that were
disliked. In addition, judges were -requently bribed,
and in many cases they owed their apoointments to
political rather than juridical skil - These factors,
cilus the fact that in the more remote areas justice
s dispensed from the mouth of a pistol by a member
the Rural Guard, did little to foster a tradition
respect for tne courts. Justice ?-las often looked
upon as a luxury that only the rich sould afford.
Some improvements in the judiciA system were
qade after the Constit_ution of 1940 was adopted, but,
as in the case of the legislature, tAe judiciary never
evolved to the point that it could roresent a seri-
ous challenge to the presidency. Law was still con-
ndered a tool of convenience, a wea non to be employed
only when one's opponent broke it ane not a code of
,nduct for one's self. Even in the 'period from 1940
1952, when Cuba made its closest upproach to democ-
racy, contempt for the courts was evIdent in the
highest places. Thus, in 1952 Presdent Prio, ap-
parently in exchange :or several valeiable tracts of
land outside Havana, granted a full eardon to a
wealthy Cuban who seven years earlie- had been tried
and convicted of chill molestation, -enat who, because
or numerous appeals, nad never serve e any portion cf
is six-year prison sentence.
The fortunes of the judiciary fEL1 to new laws
alter Batista's ouster of Prin. Altiough the Court
or Constitutional Guarantees--bresumdbly in a sage
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spirit of self-preservation--ruled that Batista's
government was not unconstitutional because "revolu-
tion is the source of the law," many honest magis-
trates found themselves torn between their duty to
uphold the law and the increasing lawlessness of the
government they represented. Havana Criminal Court
Judge Jose Francisco Alabau Trelles, appointed as
magistrate and special judge to investigate six mur-
ders and several other crimes, felt such pangs of
conscience that he decided he had to act. On March
11, 1958, he indicted Lieutenant Colonel Esteban
Ventura, chief of the police department's Division
of Subversive Activities, and Lieutenant Julio Laurent,
chief of Naval Intelligence--both notorious killers
--for two of the murders and ordered them held with-
out bail. Within 24 hours, President Batista had out-
maneuvered Alabau by suspending civil rights and re-
moving the indictments from civilian courts to mili-
tary tribunals, where they were immediately quashed.
The enraged Ventura, accompanied by two police ser-
geants, went with gun drawn to the courthouse in an
effort to find and kill Judge Alabau. The judge had
fortunately gone into hiding and later made his way
safely into exile.
Thirteen other judges--two of them presidents of
divisions of the Havana Court of Appeals--took a more
cautious approach. On March 6, just a week before
Alabau's indictments, they addressed an appeal for
relief to the Chamber of Administration of the Havana
Court of Appeals, stating:
The administration of justice in Cuba has
never been so mocked, ridiculed, and abused as
it has been recently. Upon reviewing our hazard-
ous past history, we cannot find any record of
two sons of a judge having been killed by a
soldier, or the homes of two magistrates having
been bombed, or of a magistrate acting as an
electoral inspector having been arrested by a
member of the armed forces, and his having been
kept incommunicado and deprived of food. Nor
can we find any record of judicial procedure
having been prevented by national police patrol
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cars, or the traditional institution of habeas
corpus mocked and Ignored after toe criminal
division of the Supreme Court ordered prisoners
Lo be freed, prisoners who were later found shot
to death, or after the Court of 1oueals of this
district had ordered that they be presented be-
fore the court under the appeals procedure.
h the otner hand, it is notorious that
.des like gambling and prostitution are exploit-
c.d by those called upon to prosecute them and that
the list of deaths and murders anong prisoners
grows daily, even including younc people and women,
without the authors of such crimes being discovered,
owing to the lack of police cooperation.
There hardly remains any Court of Appeals
where, for lack or proper vigilance, a fire has
not broken out or a bomb has not exploded. A
few steps from the Supreme Court puilding a man
has been found shot to death, ane the police have
neither been able to prevent it nor to trace the
assassins.
judge, aopointed as special_ prosecutor to
Laves-tic:fate the facts, is publicly subjected to
threats and insults with complete impunity.
J.nally, in the municipalities of Santiago,
de Cuba, Guantanamo, Palma Soriano, Bayamo, El
Cobre, Manzanillo. and Niguero, ft is a notorious
fact that cases of violent death by gunshot,
torture, and hanging) are daily events, while the
judges are prevented by officers of the armed
forces from doing their duty and are deprived of
the indispensable means to do it.
Tilis state 01 affairs makes ::he judiciary of
J'ac Republic appear as a weak and oppressed body
in the eyes of the nation...
As could only be expected, nothing came of the
lidges' appeal, and the situation they described so
accurately continued without change for another nine
,ind a halt months.
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If the judges themselves were so distressed as
to acknowledge publicly that their inability to
function was due to government lawlessness, it is
hardly surprising that the people whom the courts
were supposed to serve found no solace or refuge in
their judicial system. The judges' description of
the situation existing during most of Batista's
second administration goes far toward explaining why
the people were so willing to accept the revolution-
ary tribunals, established by Castro in early 1959
to handle major crimes, and the people's courts, set
up in later years for minor offenses. The new courts,
despite their many shortcomings, did much in the early
stages of the Revolution to assuage the people's thirst
for justice that the old system had failed to quench.
Much of the old judicial system remained in ex-
istence until 1973 but was rarely used. The revolu-
tionary tribunals and the people's courts handled
the great volume of juridical business. This dual
system of courts was replaced in 1973 by a new judi-
cial structure patterned on the court systems of the
countries of East Europe, and the laws by which it
operates are based on "socialist legality," rather
than the Napoleonic code which heretofore had been
the foundation of Cuba's legal procedures.
The Church
The judiciary could be bypassed by creating a
new court system, but to subjugate Cuba's major reli-
gious institution, the Roman Catholic Church, required
different tactics. Castro had one big advantage. Ever
since the country's independence, the influence of the
Church in Cuba had been only moderate. In the colonial
period, relations between the Church and the mother
country, Spain, were very close. Not only was all of
the Church hierarchy Spanish, but favored Spain when
the revolutionaries were struggling for Cuban inde-
pendence. There were notable exceptions to the pro-
Spanish sentiments among most of the clergy, of course,
but they were viewed as just that--exceptions.
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Although most Cubans were nomina_ Catholics,
they identified the Church--both durit4 and after
Lie rebellion--with colonialism- Thus, when Spain
was forced to withdraw in 1899, the Caurch not only
Lost much of the property that it had acquired but
also experienced considerable difficulty in recruit
Lag native clergy. The result was a refatively weak
religious institution that remained under a cloud of
suspicion and sufferea from a chronic shortage of
priests, especially in the rural area .
The Church tried to establish it5elf as a posi-
tive social force, particularly after the 1930s, but
Lt was unable to recover what influence and prestige
IL had enjoyed before Cuba's independtnce. In addition,
the conservative bent of its largely Spanish (and pro-
Franco) clergy acted as a restraint a4ainst those in
the religious life who pressed for a more liberal
posture_ Far from taking the lead in the fight for
social justice, the Church was frequently on the de-
tensive in the '40s and '50s, fendinc off attempts by
the Popular Socialist (Communist) Party to pass laws
that would have emasculated the parochial school system
and explaining politically embarrassiag incidents, such
as the friendly welcome accorded Fulciencio Batista by
Archbishop of Havana Cardinal Arteaga in 1952 following
Batista's successful coup d'etat.
The Church's inability to compet with the radical
elements in answering the critical need of the masses
For leadership championing their cause eventually re-
sulted once again in the identification of the Church
with the status quo. Despite the willingness of priests
like Father Guillermo Sardinas to join Castro's guer-
rilla band in the Sierra Maestra, the Church's denun-
ciation of government atrocities, anc its attempts to
settle the nation's political'problens through negotia-
tion, the notion that the hierarchy was insensitive to
the plight of the masses prevailed. The very fact that
Lie Church was singularly ineffective in its attempts
to change the status cuo and was unsuccessful in its
confrontations with the government served to discredit
Li as an institution too weak to bencfit the oppressed.
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The activist priests provided Castro with a con-
venient political tool which he submitted as "proof"
that the rebels were not the radicals they were rumored
to be, but there is no evidence that any of the clergy-
men, Father Sardinas included, exerted significant in-
fluence over him or over other members of the rebel
leadership. Castro was willing to use them as long as
they were willing to be used. They functioned primarily
as chaplains, as confessors to people executed by the
rebels, and as dispensers of the sacraments to
peasants living in areas "liberated" by the Rebel
Army. The few priests who cheerfully suffered the
rigors of guerrilla life could not, however, counter
the popular belief that the Church, dominated as it was
by Spanish clergy, was allied with the upper class,
which was also made up largely of families with strong
personal and political ties to Spain, and even that it
was an agent of foreign interests. Also damaging to
the Church's position was the permanent departure from
Cuba, in gradually increasing numbers, of hordes of its
most faithful financial supporters, once the radical
nature of the Castro regime became apparent. The Roman
Catholic Church, without substantial economic resources,
widespread popular support, or influence among rebel
leaders, could do little to change the course of events
once Castro had assumed power.
For the Church, the post-Batista period opened
auspiciously enough. Archbishop of Santiago Enrique
Perez Serantes was one of those who entered Havana
with Fidel on January 8, 1959. He had presumably
earned this honor in 1957 when, in several pastoral
letters, he denounced the crimes of the government and
pleaded for peace. The summary executions of former
government officials drew criticism from abroad, but
representatives of the Church defended the new admin-
istration's right to eliminate those guilty of heinous
crimes. Perez Serantes, however, in an action reminis-
cent of his plea in 1953 for the lives of those who had
attacked Moncada, asked Castro to reduce the sanctions
as much as possible "because the new tree of liberty
and justice does not need to be watered with more blood."
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The close relationship between 'the Church and
regime was short-lived. The Churqa's power was
Tradually reduced until finally it disappeared entirely.
Oritial friction appeared in late Jaanary 1959 when all
academic credits and degrees awarded bv Catholic and
other private advanced educational institutions after
November 30, 1956 were declared null and void. Al-
though this measure seems to have been intended pri-
marily as a sop to students at the Uriversities of
Havana and Santiago (which had been closed since
November 30, 1956 by government order and not as an
opening salvo against the Church, tor Church officials
requested clarification, of the status of private
education in mid-February. Perez Serantes, perhaps
because he knew the Revolution's leaCers better than
ethers in the Church hierarchy, was particularly wor-
ried. He asked: 'Could it be said that to be a student
of a Catholic school is a danger for society? Perhaps
there is fear that our youth, for having passed through
a Catholic school, will be less cultured or less manly?
?Lt Dr, Fidel Castro, alumnus of Dolores (a Jesuit high
school in Santiago attended briefly by -Fidel) and of
)3elen (a Jesuit high school in Havana which Fidel at-
bended from 1942 to 1949), answer for us."
Perez Serantes was more skeptical than his fellow
prelates about the impact of the radi7.al Agrarian Reform
Law which Castro promulgated in May 1)59. Some of the
clergy welcomed the law as an importalt and necessary
facet of social austice, but, after originally endorsing
the measure, Perez Serantes reversed ni-riself and warned
of increasing Communist influence at the highest levels
of the government. As the Revolution ground on, des-
iroying the free Press, private entercrise, independent
Labor unions, and any other potential threat to unfet-
tered executive power, the rest of the Church hierarchy
)oined Perez Serantes in opposing the regime.
The increasing contacts of the new government with
the Soviet Union confirmed the clergy's fears. A pastoral
letter from Perez Serantes in May 1961 warned that "the
enemy is within the gates;" three months later, the
opiscopate released a Pastoral condemring "the
qrowing advances of Communism in our cnnntry" and
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declaring that the Cuban people "could only be led
to a Communist regime by deception." Castro respond-
ed on August 11, 1960. He accused the Church of
"systematic provocations" and charged that as a re-
sult of prodding from the US Embassy and Franco's
Spain, the Church had mobilized "as many Fascist priests
as can be found to fight against the Revolution."
The final stages of the Church-State conflict had
arrived. Church services were disrupted by government-
organized mobs of young toughs, Church property was
confiscated under various pretexts, religious proces-
sions were broken up and finally banned altogether,
priests found it impossible to obtain supplies with
which to repair their churches and other buildings,
Church-sponsored programs on radio and television were
silenced, and the government-controlled press conducted
a campaign of slander and denigration of the clergy
which could not be refuted for want of a vehicle though
which to reply. Following a speech in which Castro
threatened the Catholic school system, the Church fired
one last barrage before falling silent. In an open
letter directed to Castro, on December 4, 1960, Church
leaders vigorously protested the constant harassment to
which it had been subjected by the regime. Castro
replied by making another speech in which he bitterly
denounced the Church and linked it once again to the
enemies of the Revolution.
The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 provided
the setting for the rounding up of some 300 members of
the clergy (mostly non-Cuban priests) who, along with
many thousands of suspected or potential "counter-
revolutionaries," were then herded into Havana's base-
ball stadium, the moat at Cabana fortress, and other
make-shift prisons by Castro's security forces. When
the priests were eventually released, their residency
permits were revoked by the government and many left
the island. In June, the Church's schools were nation-
alized, "eliminating the discrimination and privileges
that fostered the division of social classes and clashed
with the cardinal principles of socialism." In August,
two priests and the nephew of a bishop were sentenced
to 20 years in prison for "activities against the power
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ot the State." The following month, _36 priests, in-
cLuding Auxiliary Archbishop of Havana Monsignor
Fduardo Boza Masvidal, were arrested and deported after
the Interior Ministry had made a gen(,ral denunciation
the Church.
With its schools gone, its staff of nuns decimated,
its priests reduced to a quarter of their original
aumber, much of its property confiscEted, its services
banned outdoors and tightly controlle indoors, and
most of its active members and financal supporters in
exile, the Church was shorn of its prier and influence.
J a tacit admission of its impotence. the Church in
recent years has chosen the path of ae!commodation.
Members of the clergy have voluntarily assisted in cane-
cutting at harvest time and have supported the government
and Castro specifically) in the press and on the radio.
r)f'. key importance in establishing the new relationship
was a pastoral letter dated April 10, 1969. In the
Letter the eight bishops, acting on tr_e experiences of
he Second Vatican Council, the pasto-al constitution
on The Church in the Modern World," ri.d the papal
encyclical "Populorum Progressio," ur7ed a halt to the
US "economic blockade" of Cuba. Altheligh one of the
bishops had serious reservations abou- signing the
fetter and many parish priests refuse to read it to
their congregations, cooperation is clearly the main
theme in the Church's present policy -oward the govern-
ment.
The government remains unimpressed by the Church's
turn-around. It permits the Church te continue to
exist only because its total destruction would scuttle
Lhe myth of freedom of religion that Castro finds so
attractive and undercut. Castro's relations with the
many Church officials in Latin Americ, who have adopted
radical politico-economic positions ir the past decade.
faving challenged the Church, and won Castro can af-
I:ord to deal with it from a position of olympian supe-
riority.
Other religious groups in Cuba, ling far weaker
than the Roman Catholic Church, escape.t a similar con-
rontation with the regime. With few exceptions, they
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also reacted more flexibly and were thus able to re-
bound more quickly after the initial years of the
Revolution when any organization having connections
abroad (as most of these groups did) was suspect.
For the most part, they are now coexisting with the
government in much the same fashion as the Catholic
Church. Some evangelical sects such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses, however, have drawn down upon themselves
the government's full wrath for resisting service in
the armed forces, insistence on maintaining the sab-
bath, and vigorous proselytizing. Their adamant at-
titude has brought them persistent persecution. In
the Jewish community, (which in pre-Castro days
numbered about 10,000), nine out of every ten members
have chosen exile rather than accommodation. Despite
this massive emigration, all five of the congregations
existing in 1958 are still functioning, and the re-
lations of the Jewish community with the government
are considered satisfactory by both sides.
The Press
The subjugation of the Church occurred at the
same time the free press was being liquidated. The
term "free press," of course, must be qualified.
Under Batista, and in fact even as far back as the
mid-thirties, most newspapers were able to survive
only because of government "subsidies" which took the
form of outright bribes, government advertising, gen-
erous payments for publication of official notices,
and direct financial support to under-paid reporters.
In spite of these subsidies, so many newspapers dared
to exhibit a degree of independence that Batista felt
compelled to resort to frequent censorship. The subsidies
which for so long had constituted the very life's blood
of a large segment of the press, may have served Batista
poorly, but they proved extremely useful to his suc-
cessor; they gave Castro the ammunition he needed to
embarrass and discredit key figures in the news media
and to throw open to serious question the ethics and
credibility of the entire pre-revolutionary institution
of journalism.
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Castro's suppression of the free press was ac-
omplished in several stages over a two-year period.
In early January 1959, the Batista-owned daily Pueblo
dnd the weekly Gente were confiscate. Also confis-
ated were Batista's Circuito Nacionul Cuban? (CNC)
?a chain of radio broadcasting stations that spanned
he island?another Eatista-owned radio station (La
/oz del Indio), the pro-Batista daily Alerta, the
uantiago de Cuba dailies Prensa Universal and Diana
Nacional, and three other Havana dai7_ies Ataja, Mariana,
and Tiempo en Cuba, A second nationwide radio network,
Union Radio, which belonged to the pro-Batista national
uonfederation of trade unions, was taken over by members
of the July 26 Movement.
In addition to tie confiscations, which many Cubans
believed were justified in light of the involvement of
Iiatista and other hated officials of h*s administration,
more than 50 newsmen were purged fron the College of
Journalists because of alleged connections with the
previous administration. Moreover, the July 26 Movement's
oficial newspaper Re'ciolucion, ceased its clandestine
operation and took over the plant and presses of the de-
funct Alerta. In its January 29, 1959 edition, it pub-
li_shed.i-a-full list of the most prominent journalists
and the amount of the bribes they had regularly received
from the Batista government.
That Revolucion was speaking for Fidel rather than
s.ome disgruntled jourraJists intent on settling old
3,2ores could not be mistaken. Castro kept in close
::ouch with the newspaper's operation and appointed as
,dlitor an old Communist Party drop-out and comrade-in-
arms from the Cayo Corfites expedition of 1947, Carlos
rangui Mesa. Frangui, a former typesetter for the
Communist Party's daily Hoy and one-tine editor of the
Party's weekly newsletter Carta Semanal, had joined the
July 26 Movement in mi1-1955 shortly after it was
stablished. At that time, he had founded Revolucion
weekly spokesman for the Movement. Later, he joined
Cstro in the Sierra Muestra and was &ssistant to Luis
uriando Rodriguez, chief of the Rebel Army's press and
bropaganda section.
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Castro assured himself a second friendly repre-
sentative in the press by giving another of the con-
fiscated dailies to Rodriguez, whose daily La Calle,
had been closed down as "incendiary" by Batista in
June 1955. Rodriguez took over the plant formerly
used by Pueblo and resumed publication of La Calle;
he later re-christened a confiscated radio station
in Havana as Radioperiodico La Calle (La Calle Radio
Newspaper). Another of the confiscated newspapers
went to a group of Comiuunists who proceeded to re-
surrect the old Party daily Noticias de Hoy, more
commonly known as Hoy, which had been proscribed by
Batista in July 1953. A fourth went to the Revolu-
tionary Directorate, a student-based group that main-
tained a guerrilla column in Las Villas Province
through most of 1958, presumably as spoils of war: the
Directorate used the facilities to publish Combate.
The fifth confiscated newspaper became the pro-Castro
Diario Libre, a daily of so little consequence that
it was donated to the Marques Sterling School of
Journalism as a workshop in March 1960.
Not satisfied with a predominance in the press,
Castro did not hesitate to condemn publicly any jour-
nalist or newspaper that did not give him wholehearted
support. In February 1959, barely a month after Batista's
ouster, Castro threatened to suppress the well-known
weekly humor magazine ZigZag for printing a cartoon
that mildly poked fun at him. The following month, a
series of editorials in the Havana daily Prensa Libre
calling for elections and warning of Communist infil-
tration led Castro to accuse its publisher of "under-
mining the prestige of the Revolution," a charge that
moved his audience to call for the publisher's execu-
tion. In the same month, Castro's fulminations against
another Havana daily, El Crisol, persuaded its owner
to adopt a neutral policy regarding the Revolutionary
Government.
Castro's verbal attacks were supplemented by both
official and unofficial pressures to keep the independ-
ent press in line. Government advertising was denied
those newspapers that were not spokesmen for the regime,
and private advertisers were intimidated into following
suit. To block circulation of these papers, distributors
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and dealers were threatened, delivery :rucks were
srned, and mobs were Incited to sack newspaper of-
fices, Favored newspapers, such as Revolucion and
itoy, were given exclusive access to key news stories
and were permitted to send newsmen to cabinet meetings
closed to the rest of the press. The favored few were
,aso allowed to distribute their papers in the prov?
inces and provided military aircraft to make deliveries.
ine competition was to) much for most independent papers
The Havana daily Diario,Nacional susp nded Publication
La June 1959 and was taken over by the government.
Publication under government control ns continued until
March 1960 when this newspaper's facisities, also, were
given to the Imprenta Nacional.
To counter tfte influence of US newsreels, films,
arid press agencies in Cuba, Castro crated the Cuban
.11stitute of Motion Picture Art and Industry (ICAIC
March 1959 and the Prensa Latina press agency in May
the same year. Alfredo Guevara, a Communist Parry
member of long standing who had trave_ed to Venezuela,
Panama, and Colombia with Fidel in 1948 to represent
i:fte students of the University of Havana at the Latin
American Students Congress in Bogota, was aPPointea
head of ICAIC. He was given an initiJ1 budget of
$5,000,000 to get the Institute on its feet. In ad-
dition to making documentaries, feature-length
arid newsreels with suitable propaganda for domestic
)udiences, ICAIC was tasked with reviewing and class-
ifying all imported films. It performed its censorship
function with vigor. By the end of 16.0 it had Panned
LCO foreign films from Cuba, 87 of them US. The in-
creasing censorship, lack of access tni first-run theaters,
increased import duties, and foreign currency reguiations
that prevented US distributors from removing profits from
Cuba finally, in September 1960, brought a complete halt
L3 the supply of US films. The folloing May the US
motion picture distributing companies were nationalized.
1 4,0,0FOWAO. 110010WWW,WW:
To direct Prensa Latina, Castro ..Jhose Jorge
kicardo Masetti, an Argentine nationai whose previous
ournalistic experience included a tw.-year stint with
Agencia Latina, Argentine ex-President. Juan Peron's
press agency. As a reporter for the Luenos Aires daily
Mundt), and a radio station of the sime name, Masetti
Crid made two trips to the Sierra Maestra in the
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spring-summer of 1958. During these visits, he spent
time in both Fidel's and Che Guevara's camps, and
late that year he published an account of his experi-
ences highly favorable to Castro. Although Prensa
Latina was originally envisaged as primarily a vehicle
to channel Cuban propaganda and Havana's version of
the news to the press, radio, and television of other
Latin American countries, it eventually became the
primary source of news for all Cuban radio and tele-
vision stations, newspapers, and magazines.
Despite these strong moves by the government to
control the field of public information, there were
still a few opposing voices in the press as 1959 drew
to a close. Castro acted again. In union elections
late in 1959, at Castro's behest, old-time Communist
Dagoberto Ponce became secretary general of the
Graphic Arts Union to which the newspaper printers be-
longed. On January 11, 1960, Castro in effect author-
ized this union to censor newspaper content by order-
ing the union to "classify" press material not reflect-
ing the "truth" about the Revolution. All editorials
and articles that placed Castro or his administration
in a bad light were to be accompanied by "explanatory"
notes provided by the union. Thus were born the
"coletillas," or "little tails," that were added to
news items that criticized or embarrassed the govern-
ment. A week later Jorge Zayas, editor of the Havana
daily Avance, was confronted by his printers who re-
fused to set an editorial he had sent them. Zayas had
been harassed by the government since the previous
November when he, along with 14 other Latin American
journalists, had visited the US State Department while
he was in the United States to attend a seminar on
journalism. In December, the head of the national
federation of unions, David Salvador, had demanded that
he be shot and his newspaper confiscated- Castro him-
self denounced Zayas as a counterrevolutionary and
labelled Avance "dangerous." The confrontation with
the printers on January 18 was the final shot!
Dagoberto Ponce, leading a gang of union toughs, took
over the plant, and Zayas prudently sought asylum in
the Ecuadorean Embassy. The government continued to
publish the newspaper under the name Avance
Revolucionario until December 1960, when it disappeared.
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Four days after the seizure of Avance, the gov-
ernment confiscated the holdings of Amadeo Barletta,
an Italian national and a multimillionaire whose ex-
tensive holdings included Ambar Motors (a General
Motors distributorship), the Havana daily El Mundo,
Radio El Mundo, the Tele-Mundo television network,
and numerous other businesses. The government said
it had taken this action because Barletta had done
business with Batista, but did not explain why it
had waited over a year before making the move. El
Mundo continued to appear, first under Levi Marrero
Artiles as editor, and then, after October 1960, under
Luis Gomez Wanguemert; it was finally turned over to
the University of Havana School of Journalism as a
workshop and ceased publication in the late 1960s.
Barletta found safety in the Italian Embassy.
Next to be swallowed up were El Pais and
Excelsior; they were confiscated in March 1960. The
editor of both papers, Dr. Guillermo Martinez Marques,
had resigned in February after refusing to print a
coletilla in El Pais, and the joint owners of the
two had long since fled the island. All equipment
and personnel of the two newspapers were transferred
to the Imprenta Nacional.
Also in March, a running feud between the Com-
munists and Luis Conte Aguero, popular radio and tele-
vision commentator and long-time friend of Fidel,
finally came to a head. A government-organized mob
physically prevented Conte Aguero from making his
usual broadcast on the CMQ-TV network on Friday,
March 25, and that week-end Fidel and Raul Castro
denounced him publicly. At that point, Conte Aguero
fled to the Argentine Embassy. When Goar and Abel
Mestre, the brothers who owned Radio Reloj and the
CMQ radio and television networks, attempted to de-
fend Conte Aguero and his anti-Communist stand, the
government confiscated their properties, thus ac-
quiring what were probably the most respected and
technically efficient radio and television chains
in Cuba.
On May 11, 1960, the prestigious, conservative,
Catholic-oriented Havana daily Diario de la Marina,
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founded in 1832, went the way of Avance. Dagoberto
Ponce of the printers union and another Communist,
Tirso Martinez from the journalists guild, led a
gang of armed men who seized the plant and smashed
the plates that were to be used to print an open
letter from 300 of the newspaper's 450 employees sup-
porting the publisher in his running battle with the
government. The publisher, Jorge Ignacio Rivera, fled
to the Peruvian Embassy on May 13. The take-over by
armed force was vigorously denounced in Prensa Libre,
and on May 16 this paper suffered the same fate. An
armed mob seized control, and publisher Sergio Carbo
went into exile via the Panamanian Embassy. Of the
passing of Diario de la Marina and Prensa Libre, US
Ambassador Philip Bonsai wrote: "The owners, editors,
and top people of the papers in question behaved as
bravely as one could ask. The reader reaction to this
deprivation of unofficial news and comment was practi-
cally nil. So far as one could judge from the attitude
of the public they had served, Diario de la Marina
and Prensa Libre sank amid only the gentlest of rip-
ples." Revolucion took advantage of the opportunity
to secure better technical facilities and moved into
the Prensa Libre plant. Revolucion's old presses
were turned over the Communists' Hoy.
And still the seizures continued. The popular
weekly magazine Bohemia, which had a significant
circulation outside as well as inside Cuba and had
been Castro's ardent and consistent supporter even
during the years of Batista's rule, was seized after
its owner, Miguel Angel Quevedo, requested asylum in
the Venezuelan Embassy on July 18, 1960. Carteles,
a weekly magazine resembling Bohemia and also owned
by Quevedo, was likewise confiscated and turned over
to Raul Castro's weekly military journal Verde Olivo.
Carteles ceased publication but Bohemia, under govern-
ment auspices, continued to appear, first under the
editorship of Enrique de la Osa and later under Angel
Guerra, its present editor. The English-language
daily Havana Post discontinued publication on September
8, 1960, and the independent Times of Havana, published
thrice weekly, was taken over by its workers on
November 10 of the same year and ceased publication.
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he conservative Havana daily Inforlacion managed to
avoid confiscation, but could not s-irvive financially.
ft went out of business on December 23, 1960,
January 1961, Castro had co-oleted his take-
ewer ot all Cuban public information 'media. All of
Lhe press, radio, television, and f lm industry was
Ander his control. The number of (Lities throughout
Lhe entire country was eventually reduced to seven:
officiat organ of the Cuban Communist Party
central Committee (wnich was formed in late 1965 by
the merger of Pevolucion and Hoy): Thventud Pebelde,
official organ of thi, Communist Par-v's youth arm!
and one newspaper in each of the fiee provinces out-
-5ide Havana. The number of radio s-ations has been
eut to about 100, but the transmitter power of many
has been increased and transmission frequencies have
been shifted to ensure that the regme's propaganda
:an be heard throughout the island and that the
people's access to foreign radio stations has been
made much more difficult. Although the number of
rational television networks has been cut from three
to two, facilities have been expandcH so that thi
media of government propaganda is reaching more of
the people. For example, a provincial network based
on Santiago de Cuba is now operatinc in populous and
previously neglected Oriente Province, The basic
source of news, whether it be disseTnated by news-
paper, magazine, radio, television, or film, is pro-
vided by Prensa Latina, the governmeat's Press agency.
How could so many fundamental ilstitutions be
Lotally destroyed in such a short pe-iod of time?
;,rie answer is the uncanny ability of Fidel Castro to
!inape public opinion and to apply a earefullv measured
amount of force with precise timing. 3ut just as
important is the attitude of the peonle.
By late 1958, tho Cuban masses od been subject-
el to so much terror and had been so g-osslv abused
La so many ways for so long that the were ready to
make a clean break with the past. rr'-e sterile
"democratic" system of elections, tAT unbelievably
corrupt executive officials, the suloe,-vient legis-
J3ture, the inefficient and powerles' iudiciary, the
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self-seeking business community, the aloof Church
directed by foreigners, the opportunistic political
parties, the venal military establishment, and the
puppet press had all failed them. They did not de-
mand radical changes in their system of government:
indeed, Castro had led them to believe that the new
governmental apparatus would be directed by honest,
elected officials whose authority and tenure would
be limited by the resurrected Constitution of 1940.
On the other hand, they did not insist that their
new leaders honor their earlier promises. They did
not mourn the destruction or emasculation of the old
institutions that had served them so poorly. Instead,
they looked to the future with an emotional faith in
their new messiah, willing to experiment, willing to be
led, willing to follow the only force that had not
yet discredited itself in their eyes--Fidel Castro
and his Rebel Army. In effect, they permitted Castro
to write his own ticket, and he did so with enthusiasm.
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C.0APTER THREE: New lnstituti( as Molded
rh the process of denouncing, ntscreditinq,
id destroying Cuba's old institutions, Castro did
not forget that he had to establish nis own power
base. He proceeded cautiously to create new,
..00seiy organized institutions rooted in the
masses that were so vulnerable to hls manipulation.
0e rejected rigid structures, apparently because
he feared they might eventually be converted into
,:enters of opposition. He was supremely confident
f his ability to sway the Cuban pecoie so long as
He nad access to the mass media, but he was sus-
idcious of any forma organization tnat could
Possibly switch its allegiance to someone else.
Yhese rnisqrvinqs explain why it took Castro
x years to create a political part,: and why,
After L years of his rule, the first party congress
has yet to be held (one is scheduled for 1975). It
nlso explains wny he refused to honor his promise
ho relnstate the Constitution of 1940 and why the
rountry's basic lega_L document is the hastily
boncocted and much-amended Fundamental Law of
,ebruary 7, 1959, a set of statutes that was
lever intended to be permanent and that, in any
,-ase, is frequently ignored.
Nevertheless, Castro recognizeo Chat some
nstitutions were needed to cnannel the energy of
he masses and to give them a sense of participa-
bion--and thus a degree of responsaility (or even
!ialpability)--in the revolutionary process. Aore-
over, by involving the Cuban people in the revolu-
bionary struggle, Castro would be ahle to cast an
lura of democratic authenticity ovei his rigid
personal dictatorship. He, therefore, established
wide range of organizations that could embrace
the entire population. For the peasants, there
was the National Small Farmers Assoclation (ANAP):
Lor women, the Federation of Cuban Vomen (FMC); for
l'he youth, the Rebel Youth Association (AJR) and
_Later the Young Communists League (L:c!), the
e.deration of University Students (FEU), the High
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School Students Union (UES), and the Pioneers (UPC);
workers had the Cuban Workers Central Organization
(CTU); and adults had the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDR). All of these
were created by the Castro regime except for the
FEU and the CTC, which were inherited from pre-
revolutionary days and were reshaped to serve the
new administration.
Cuban Workers Central
Organization
Although it had earlier origins, organized
labor in Cuba made its most significant strides
toward maturity and power in the late 1930s.
This was due largely to the coincidence of several
key economic and political factors. Over the
years, Cuban farmers and rural workers had grad-
ually developed a sense of class consciousness
and were able to identify with each other because
from year to year the fate of each had become much
more closely related to the mercurial fluctuations
of the sugar economy. With both groups in the same
economic boat, and given the great size of the
sugar industry, there existed a large mass of
people extremely vulnerable to exploitation by
union organizers during times of financial stress.
Into this atmosphere were thrust hundreds of
urban revolutionaries and political activists who,
as a result of the depression, had joined the ranks
of the professional organizers in the budding labor
union movement. Their organizational work was
made easier by a ban on immigration from Haiti and
Jamaica that had stabilized the labor force and
by a concentration of capital in cane farming that
tended to centralize labor in large units. The
chaotic political situation in the years following
the overthrow of President Machado in 1933 also
stimulated organizational work. Labor leaders who
could deliver the support of a large bloc of
people to any of the vying political factions
enjoyed a good deal of bargaining power.
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The most powerful single labor group at this
time--and the only national confederation in the
country--was the Communist-led Cuban National Labor
Confederation (CNOC). Conflicts wit. the govern-
ment led to the dissolution of the CNOC in 1935,
but three years later Batista. Cuba's de facto
chief executive, negotiated an understanding with
Communist leaders. Tn return for giving them a
free hand to reorganize the labor movement, the
Communists promised their political support. In
January 1939, a new national labor organization,
the Cuban Workers Confederation (CTC',, was estab-
lished, with Communist Lazar() Pena Gonzalez as its
secretary general.
So agreeable was the working relationship be-
tween the Communists and Batista than- much of Cuba's
social legislation was written into the Constitution
of 1940 at the Communists' suggestion (with the
support, of course, of the Autenticos and other
political parties and groups). The rew constitu-
tion recognized the state's obligation to provide
work for all who desired it, the rignt of workers
to organize, and the right of unions to strike and
boycott. It also provided for written collective
contracts, enforceable by law; minimum wages, an
eight-hour work day and a 48-hour work week; social
security; and abolition of child. labor. This co-
operation also brought two top Communists, Juan
Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez into
Batista 's cabinet as ministers without portfolio
after Batista was elected to the presidency in
1940.
1?ena and the Communists continued to dominate
she labor movement until 1947, when President Grau's
Labor minister (and successor) Carlos Prio Socarras
granted official recognition not to Penn's CTC, but
to a new CTC organized by Grau's and '3rio's
utentico Party. Gradually, most of the member
unions of Pena's CTC, pressured by the legal right
of the Labor Ministry to grant or withhold recogni-
tion and registration of unions, defefied to the
now CTC headed by ex-Communist Angel ,Lofino. In
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an internal power struggle, politically independent
Cofino was replaced by Autentico Eusebio Mujal (also
an ex-Communist) in April 1949. When Batista oust-
ed Prio in 1952, Mujal tried to support Prio
with a general strike. When this failed, he una-
bashedly transferred his loyalties to the new chief
of state, and he remained at the head of the CTC
until Batista was routed by Castro in 1959. During
Batista's corrupt and repressive reigns, union
leaders abandoned their ideological goals and be-
came isolated from the workers. Not only the CTC,
but some unaffilliated Communist-led unions reached
working agreements with Batista. When Fidel Castro,
from his guerrilla bastion in the Sierra Maestra,
called for a general strike to topple Batista in
April 1958, both Mujal and the Communists refused
to cooperate. For Castro, this was a serious
political defeat.
In October 1958, however, the Communist union
leadership, hoping to be in a position to assist
in the take-over of the CTC by July 26 Movement
officials, joined Castro's underground labor front,
the National Worker Front (FON). But the labor
leaders of the July 26 Movement could see little
reason for sharing the victor's spoils with a group
so late in climbing aboard the revolutionary band-
wagon. As a result, the Communists suffered a
crushing defeat in late May 1959 at the congress
of the largest trade union federation in the CTC,
the National Federation of Sugar Workers. In
elections in the other 32 federations, the Commun-
ists were left in full control of only three feder-
ations and in partial control of only another three.
To all appearances, they had little chance of
regaining control of the CTC when that body held
its tenth congress in mid-November 1959.
Some time in the summer of 1959, however,
Castro reached a working agreement with the Commu-
nists and three of the 13 Executive Committee
nominees placed before the congress for its con-
sideration were Communist Party members. The July
26 Movement labor leaders were furious, and the
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congress degenerated into a brawl. Al though
Castro intervened personally to restore order, the
delegates ignored him and CTC Secretary General
David Salvador, who also supported the Communists,
cod voted overwhelmingly to reject the trio.
Castro then ignored the results of the election and
had Salvador offer a new slate that excluded both
known Communists and anti-Communists. This group
was composed of individuals who could pe easily
controlled by the regime, and, under strong
pressure from Castro, the delegates approved the
List in the name of "unity."
The congress also approved the witndrawal of
the CTC from the interamerican Regional Organiza-
ion Workers and, more important, the creation
a CTC purge committee ostensibly to weed out
'3atistianos from union leadership. Many of
3atista's supporters had, in fact, fled the island
Ln the last days of 1938, and almost none of those
remaining held union offices. Thus, from the
cinning the purge committee was aimed at
ellminating the anti-Communists who, at the congress,
had given Castro his first defeat since coming to
power. The committee accomplished its mission
iXL the last two months of 1959 and the early
months of the following year. Even David Salvador,
Lice secretary general who had presideG over the
suicide of the free CTC, was sacked and later
thrown into jail, where he apparently remains
Loday.
Although resistance to the new gcvernment con-
nued within some of the individual union federa-
Lions, notably the electrical workers, the CTC--
declawed and defanged--never again was a real or
even a potential threat to the government. Instead
of functioning as a medium for the workers to convey
their grievances to the government, the CTC quickly
became a government tool to press for greater
Productivity, longer working hours, and "voluntary"
Tcontributions to finance industrialization. It.
succeeded in the latter two tasks in varying de-
t_jrces but has never been able to promote the pro-
ductivity increase that the governmenc . nas sought.
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In his search for the magic organizational
formula that would raise productivity as well
as ensure that the CTC could not become a power
base for opposition to the government, Castro
has conducted periodic shake-ups of the entire
CTC structure. At its 11th Congress in November
1960, the CTC's 33 federations were replaced by
25 national unions, and at the 12th Congress in
August 1966 the number of national unions was
reduced from 25 to 14.
Still another reorganization began in late
1970 as a result of Castro's call on July 26 of
that year for a campaign to revitalize all of the
country's mass organizations, The process was
still in progress in November 1973 when the CTC--
with a total of 22 unions--held its 13th Congress.
Additional unions will probably be formed as more
of the work force is brought under union juris-
diction.
The call to revitalize the mass organizations
stemmed from the politico-economic situation re-
sulting from the failure to meet the sugar harvest
goal of 10 million tons, and also from critics
abroad such as Karol and Dumont, who complained
that the Cuban people had no say in decisions
directly affecting their lives. In response,
the union hierarchy, along with the leaders of the
other mass organizations, quickly developed a
fiery passion for popular elections within their
respective structures. It is doubtful, however,
that anyone was fooled by the election gambit.
Cuban Communist Party officials were in control
of the candidate selection process, and the new
union officials--at least those in the upper levels
--were bound to be, as in the past, representatives
of the government, not the workers.
But there were some positive results. At the
lower levels, the unions undoubtedly received an
infusion of new blood if for no other reason than
that the larger number of unions required a cor-
responding increase in the number of officials.
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Moreover, one facet of the reorganizaion involved
the, initiation of a trend away from professional
cadres, which caused a reduction in tne number of
permanent officials, and an increase in part-time
anion leaders. The presence of these newcomers--
who must fulfill their union responsibilities
in addition to holding down a full-time lob--
may to a degree resolve Castro's complaint that the
old union structure had failed to serve as a
channel for informing the national leadership of
the problems of the masses. But it iT difficult
to believe that the revised union offcialdom will
be more willing than its predecessors to pass bad
news up the organizational ladder. The Cubans
have demonstrated a decided predilectfon for bur-
eaucracy?revolution or no revolution?and bureau-
crats seem to have an aversion to passing potent-
ially unpleasant news to their superiors?presum-
ably out of fear that it will be interpreted as
an admission of an inability to handle problems.
The Carrot and the Stick
The departure in Late 1970 from a strict adher-
ence to the principle of moral incentjyes, and the
enactment in early 1971 of the so-called Vagrancy
.1:aw were acknowledgements that organized labor had
tailed in one of its most important missions--
the elimination of absenteeism. To strengthen
the unions hand in enforcing worker discipline,
Castro allowed them to distribute consumer goods
no the workers. Only those who maintained good
job attendance records and who met or exceeded pro-
duction goals could expect the privilege of pur-
chasing whatever goods were available. This novel
method of dispensing goods may give the unions a
small amount of leverage over the workers, but it
is unlikely to improve labor discipline signifi-
cantly until the supply of goods is considerably
creased. A worker can be forgiven fsr not put-
ting forth his best effort if he is competing with
300 other workers at his factory for permission to
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purchase from a stock of goods that includes, for
example, only one refrigerator, two bicycles, and
ten alarm clocks. A further drawback to this
method of distribution is that "exemplary" workers
may become a privileged class whose access to much
sought after consumer goods may act, not as a
stimulant to increase production, but as a divisive
force that convinces the average worker that there
is no use putting great effort into his job because
the stiff competition places the so-called fruits of
labor beyond his reach.
To offset the inherent structural weaknesses
which arise from the staffing of the majority of
positions in the new union system with non-pro-
fessional, part-time personnel, the unions have
been organized as much as possible along lines
parallel to the government's own administrative
framework rather than on a functional basis. Thus,
the Ministry of Education has a corresponding
National Union of Workers in Education and the
Sciences; the Ministry of Light Industry has a
National Union of Light Industry Workers; the
Ministry of Basic Industry, a National Union of
Basic Industry Workers; and so on through the
governmental bureaucracy. Even Raul Castro's
Armed Forces Ministry got in step and formed the
National Union of Revolutionary Armed Forces
Civilian Workers.
After all this revamping, the CTC is little
more than a paper organization. Its only re-
maining function is to serve as a channel for
communications between the leadership and the
workers, but then this is apparently all the
Castro regime expects of it. As Raul Castro said:
"In socialism, a principal function of the unions
is to serve as a vehicle for the guidelines, dir-
ections, and goals which the revolutionary admin-
istration, the administration of the working class
must take to the heart of the working masses to
convert these masses into the physical force that
will carry out and further these goals at every
moment. The Party is the vanguard that exists,
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'hides, and fulfi]is it_s real role tee the same
ex:tent that it is projected into the masses. The
uions are the most powerful link between the
Surty and the working masses. This is one of the
iain functions they fulfill within the socialist
senciety... The unions are essential elements
the construction of socialism, not only because
rouah them the Party guidelines reach all the
working masses, but because through them the
2elings, concerns, and initiatives of all the
aiasses must reach the Party." He said that "union
sections must pay attention to livinc and working
cenditions," but identified productivity and labor
i.scipline as the "main tasks confronting the
?turking class of our ':-Iountry."
auk specified that the sections, the lowest
_evel in the union structure, were tc be the
quardians of the workers. He said the sections
were responsible for "gathering the workers' con-
cerns, problems and needs, analyzing them with
the heads of the units and contributina in that
y, to the extent of our possibilities, toward
3oiving them." Thus, workers' grievances go
hat through the union structure, but through the
,f=iministrative apparatus of the government ministry
ci agency in charge ot their particular work center.
The labor movement in Cuba has indeed come upon
rd times,
'ommLttees for the Defense
- Revolution
ri September 1960, Castro went tee the United
Nations in New York to denounce the United States
Hr preparing to invade Cuba. On returning home,
he delivered an address in which he expanded on
Lhe invasion theme and called for the organiza-
in of a vast, nationwide network of neighborhood
eimmittees for the Defense of the Reolution"
DRs) to buttress the country's weak security
upparatus and combat an alien-inspired fifth
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column. His speech, before hundreds of thousands
of Cubans gathered in front of the Presidential
Palace in Havana, was frequently punctuated by
the sound of exploding noise bombs, presumably
set off by the government to underscore the sub-
versive threat to the regime.
CDR units were immediately organized in almost
every block and in almost all work centers in the
cities and towns throughout Cuba. By the end of
1960, a total of 5,581 committees had been formed.
Their prime task was to uncover spies and counter-
revolutionaries by notifying the police at the
first sign of unusual activities or the unexplained
appearance of new people in the neighborhood.
This mandate was often very broadly interpreted
by CDR members. A broad range of activity, from
grumbling about the government to making purchases
on the black market, constituted sufficient grounds
for denunciation, depending on the revolutionary
fervor or personal bias of the CDR observer.
At the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion in
April 1961, the CDRs were instrumental in rounding
up in quick order tens of thousands of suspected
counterrevolutionaries, most of whom were not
released until after weeks or months of incarcera-
tion under the most primitive conditions. After
the invaders had been defeated, the CDR National
Directorate was ordered to expand the organization
to 100,000 committees, and by the end of the year
it had enrolled 798,703 members in 107,000 com-
mittees, handily surpassing the goal. Moreover,
the CDRs no longer centered their organizational
efforts in urban areas. In response to increasing
counterrevolutionary activity in the rural areas
of Oriente, Camaguey, Las Villas, and Pinar del
Rio provinces, they advanced into the countryside
(by 1963, 38,718 of the organization's 104,425
base committees were located in rural areas:
25,943 in peasant areas, 8,949 in People's Farms,
and 3,826 in mountainous regions).
At the same time, the role of the CDRs
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panded. The organisation was tasked with the
utter Census"--qathering statistics on the
amounts of edible fats and oils on hend as a
0elude to rationing. The CDRs quid: .v provided
ne government with tee data and thus assisted
Lhe regulation of consumer commod3ties in
the face of growing srortages and price speculation.
This success opened un a whole new feid of nos-
eibilities and converted an organizaeion that was
essentially political into one that ceuld also
erform valuable administrative and economic tasks.
The government Was Quick to exp_olt this
ca ability and in 196i gave the CDRs the resconsi-
aT.1.ity for distributira ration cards to the 'copula-
Dn. The organizatien also performed valuable
services in the field of public heals. It con-
acted the country's first vaccinatien campaian,
eollected over 8,000 donations in a htood drive,
d held more than 100,000 meetings to educate the
Jilic in basic sanitation measures. Its primary
oission, however, was still politica_ It
established and operated Study Circice and Revolu-
eonary instruction Circles to discuss revolution-
aiy theory and the writings and speecees of the
eIntry's political leaders. To keep these "cir-
eies" supplied with study materials, she CDR
National Directorate heaan publishine a monthly
magazine Con Ia Guardia en Alto (with the Guard Up)
in October 1961 and periodically prireed and
stributed political tracts, such as Elas Poca's
One Fundamentals of Secialism in Cuba and collec-
ons of shorter political works by verious authors.
the CDRs also served as government cliaues by
:ending telegrams of support to the eemmunica-
Lions media when a new government pree:ram or
_icy was announced, and if a receptIve audience
were needed for Fidel or some other t-)r official,
One CDRs could always be counted on ti provide on
short notice a sea of faces that cheered and
whistled at all the right places.
La succeeding years, however, th- increasing
isoability of the regular security forces to detect
-,?mirmwmompla,.
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and suppress counterrevolutionary guerrilla
bands in the countryside and to infiltrate and
liquidate groups of anti-Castro plotters in the
cities permitted the CDRs to devote more attention
to less pressing matters, and the government,
anxious to exploit the CDRs' ability to act
quickly in situations requiring a mass response,
gradually assigned more and more administrative
duties to the "cederistas." Its monolithic
structure and extremely broad base made the CDR
organization ideal for such tasks as supervising
the operation of local grocery stores and butcher
shops to guard against black market sales and
ration card abuses, organizing scrap drives to
recover metals to be melted down and reused,
repairing washouts and potholes in roads, collect-
ing books to start or improve local libraries,
constructing thatched-roof schoolhouses in rural
areas, distributing doses of anti-polio vaccine
to children, organizing campaigns for conducting
cytological tests for women, collecting used jars
and bottles to ease the country's glass shortage,
enrolling poorly educated workers in educational
improvement classes, conducting campaigns to
improve the appearance of public places, assisting
in registration of young men for the draft, and
managing blood donor drives among its members.
Any problem that required rapid mobilization of
the masses or that involved contact with the en-
tire population was passed on to the CDRs. Event-
ually, the CDRs became so involved in these admin-
istrative tasks that they assumed many of the
responsibilities of local government in cities and
towns across the country. In the fall of 1967,
CDR members were elected to virtually all local
government posts in Cuba's urban areas.
By 1967, membership was reported to be
2,237,652, but many members were apparently counted
more than once. Some seem to have demonstrated
their revolutionary commitment by joining the local
CDR where they lived and another CDR where they
worked. After the committees in the work centers
had been abolished later in the year, the organi-
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ation's membership dropped to 1,704,,J89. By 1968,
-cwever, over halt a nillion new memla2rs were
enrolled, and in the spring of that year the CDRs
received one of their most important economic
assignments?the operation of the 58,000 small
businesses that had been confiscated ey the govern-
ment in March, April and May. In 1969, they
also were charged with assisting in tJe rehabili-
Lation of ex-convicts and juvenile delinquents.
n7,,r this purpose, the 'Social Prevention Front"
was formed. Members of the new front visited
aarents of juvenile delinquents and problem
children and urged them to guarantee that the
offending child would mend his ways ana attend
school regularly. People recently released from
orison were also visited and counselleu on how
they could return smoothly into society. The
families of recently convicted criminals also
.not attention to ensure that the loss of a bread-
winner would not create insurmountable problems
'sr those at home.
The following year the CDRs received another
assignment; to build a bridge between tne people
and the military. Again a -front was formed, this
Lime the CDR-FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) Front.
Young men waiting to he drafted were oriefed on
what to expect in the service and were given send-
- ceremonies by the local CDR, whion then publicized
whatever honors the draftees might earn during
their military careers. The aim, presumably, was
to reduce the number of young men who tailed to
register tor the draft, failed to report when
rafted, or deserted after being inducted.
The CDRs participated in many Leavy con-
struction projects in 1971 and 1972. They mobil-
-ized large numbers of 'cederistas' to serve as
laborers in constructing an addition to the Latin
merican Sports Stadium in Havana, if expanding
the power plant at Regla in the outskirts of
Unvana, and in many other construction projects
across the country. -othing seems to be too diffi-
cult, too complex, or too big for the CDRs.
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CDR Organization and Philosophy
The fundamental unit of the CDR organization
is the base or block committee, which is called
a Committee for the Defense of the Revolution.
Most have from ten to fifty members, although
some are larger. Each committee is responsible
for a specific territory, such as an apartment
house, a portion of a city block, or a section of
a small town, and is staffed by a president, an
organizer, an officer for vigilance, another for
public health, and others for whatever types of
work the committee may be performing such as the
Social Prevention and CDR-FAR Fronts. All are
volunteers. The next organizational unit is the
zone, which is made up of a number of base com-
mittees, also staffed by volunteers. Ten to
fifteen zones make up a sectional or municipal
committee; several sectional or municipal com-
mittees, a region; and a number of regions, a pro-
vince. The highest level is the national direct-
orate, which oversees the six provincial direct-
orates.
The professional staffing of the CDRs begins
at the sectional municipal level, the section
being the urban equivalent of the municipality.
The chief of a sectional directorate is called
the coordinator, and he (or she) and the direct-
orate's organizer are full-time, paid officials.
If the directorate is a particularly large one,
it may have an additional one or two professionals.
Officers at the base level are elected by the
members of the local CDR and any member can be
put up as a candidate; at the zone level, however,
a slate of acceptable candidates is drawn up by
the sectional or municipal directorate and sub-
mitted to the members of the CDRs of the zone.
Similarly, the regional directorate selects a
slate of candidates for the sectional or municipal
level. Officers at higher levels are sent to the
National School of Vigilance, which was established
to train CDR cadres. Special courses are also
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rod to CDR members by various government
nizations, particularly the Intertor Ministry.
The present chief of the organization, CDR
National Coordinator ,:lorcre Lezcano Perez, replaced
Lads Gonzalez Marturelos on October 2b, 1973.
(,,unzalez Marturelos had held the posi:ion since
July 27, 1966. He succeeded the firs: CDR National
Coordinator, Jose Matar, a member of :he "old'
e!emmunist Party, who was caught up in the "micro?
e?ction purge in January 1968 and ousted from his
seat on the pxesent Cuoan Communist Party Central
(ommittee. According to Gonzalez Marturelos,
2,re were 67,000 CDRs with a total membership
3,222,147 in September 1970, but a: that tine
he expressed disappointment with the auality of
many of the cederistas. Undoubtedly reflecting
he soul-searching, self critical moci that Castro
[ad displayed in previous months, Gonalez Marture-
Les admitted that not all members parcicipated
actively in the tasks assigned the CEs and lam-
ented that at times we have not been able to turn
aver responsibilities to a majority c: the members
the organization. Nevertheless, rIly two years
later, Castro claimed that the CDRs hug some
4,236,000 members, or about 70 percent of the
entire adult population.
cm the intervening biennium, lit :le had been
done to change the CIDEs, despite Castro's call
fer a revitalization cf the mass organizations. A
CDR National Assembly in December 1971. had made
minor changes in the structure of the provincial
directorates and an attempt had been made to
L11 some of the vacant positions by shifting
personnel, but no action had been taken to purge
1:ne committees of the nordes of opportunists
who enjoyed the benefits of membershiP but
shouldered few of the CDRs' burdens. Indeed, no
ouch action is likely. To reduce the membership
by including only activists would transform the
ODRs into an elitist rather than a mass organiza-
on and would deny the very reason tar their
existence--the incorporation of the misses into
one Revolution.
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In establishing the CDRs, Castro created a
political mechanism by which he could control the
extremism that he encouraged in his speeches.
The original CDRs by their very nature constituted
a negative organization that appealed primarily to
proponents, rather than opponents, of change, and
to individuals that tended toward radicalism
rather than moderation. Conservatives and moder-
ates might join the base CDR to prove their
patriotism and forestall criticism of their rev-
olutionary fervor, but they could hardly expect
to assume leadership positions higher up in the
organization. These positions were reserved for
those whose basic qualification for leadership
was an exemplary revolutionary attitude, i.e., a
total commitment to Castro and to whatever policies
he might promote. The nature of the organization
and the character of its leadership led inevitably
to an oversimplification of political definitions
and to a polarization in which issues were cast
in terms of black and white with no middle ground.
Those not indiscriminately for the Revolution were
judged to be against it and only two categories
of political persuasion existed: revolutionary
and counterrevolutionary. Castro, of course,
deliberately fostered this situation, not so much
to uncover 'imperialist' spies as to intimidate
those among his own people who might oppose his
methods of remaking the country's social structure.
As Castro became firmly entrenched and the need
for intimidation diminished, the role of the CDRs
changed. Although the primary mission has remained
the same, i.e., vigilance against the counter-
revolution, its orientation has shifted from' nega-
tive to positive and celebrations of CDR anniver-
saries in recent years have emphasized the con-
structive contributions the organization has made
in addition to its successes in vigilance. CDR
members still fill many positions in local govern-
ment, and membership in the CDRs is a key pre-
requisite to any form of personal advancement
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.;ause iu indicates that the individuau, rather
than observing the Revolution as an uncommitted
bystander, has deliberately chosen to become
involved and to take an active part in helping
o achieve the Revolution's goals. Although
he motivation behind this choice on rrequent
occasion may be _less than ideal, the individual
-Is nevertheless made a conscious decision to
participate in the revolutionary process and has
rejected both non-participation and outright
opposition. This is important psychologically be-
cause it indicates that the individual, despite
a possible reluctance to cooperate fully, has
acknowledged that conditions are such that cooper-
ation has more advantages, or at least fewer
,..cept for the previously mentioned reduction
the membership of the Central CO= ttee, the first
anae in the personnel of the Central Committee or
Ls attendant bodies--as established En October 1965--
was announced in Havana on February 7 1973, when
;7eur new members were added to the Seeretariat- Labor
Minister Jorge Risquet, Armed Forces Vice Minister
ehr Political Work Major Antonio Pere-. Herrera, dep
aty director of the National Fishing -nstitute Isidorn
Malmierca Peoli, and Ambassador to Moecow Raul Garcia
'elaez. All are Central Committee menbers. Both
'1.squet and Perez Herrero served unde- Raul Castro
Lhe war against Batista! Malmierca Penli was a
:itember of the pre-Castro Communist party: and Garcia
P-alaez fought in Fidel's guerrilla co'umn during
L:le revolution. Still another additi-n to the
';ecretariat--Vice Prima Minister for flaeic Industry
Miret Prieto--was announced in -anuary 1974,
')ringing its membershio to 11, its present total.
MIret, a member of the Central Commit'ee, has been
:i'osely associated wita Castro ever sihde their
;a.dent days at Havana University.
The expansion of he Secretariat was orohablv
quired by the increased workload the n)arty reor-
Ization placed on ins original memLers. President
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Dorticos and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, for example
had been given major duties in the Executive Com-
mittee of the Council of Ministers in November 1972.
Faure Chomon moved on to political tasks deep in
eastern Cuba some time ago, and Bias Roca has been
preoccupied for more than three years with the re-
organization of Cuba's legal system. Furthermore,
the party's first congress has been scheduled for
1975 and the Secretariat, as the party's housekeeping
body, must bear much of the responsibility of pre-
paring for it.
Of the five new Secretariat appointees, only one
was a member of the pre-Castro Communist party. Castro
undoubtedly had the congress in mind when making the
selections. He had no intention of letting the "old"
Communists gain significant strength in any branch
of the party that might have major influence during
the critical period of political maneuvering prior
to the congress. The Secretariat is now made up of
Fidel, Raul, and four men loyal to them; three "old"
Communists; one former member of the Revolutionary
Directorate; and one--President Dorticos--who held
membership in both the pre-Castro Communist party and
the pro-Castro 26-JM. Castro, therefore, has as much
of an edge in the Secretariat as he has in the Central
Committee itself.
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HAPTER FIVE: THE SECURITY POPCES
Ori gins
The Cuban Revolutionary Armed F-res of today
-e the outgrowth of the Rebel Army that was formed
the mountains of Oriente Province ..from December
1959. The nucleus of this army censisted of the
22 men of the Granma Fxpedition which after the dis-
astrous ambush by Batista's forces at Alegria de Pio
an December 5, 1956?only three days after the force
returned secretly to Cuba--was almost destroyed.
Those of the 82 not killed or captured during the
ambush, or summarily executed after captured, dis-
persed in a dozen or more small parties of three or
tour men. They wandered through the mountains until
chance brought some of them together aaain. In the
regrouped force were about 15 or 20 ren, although
Castro likes to say there were only 12.
The ragged group took the "offensive" on January
1957, descending from the mountal7is to attack a.
small military most at the isolated village of La
elata on Oriente's southern coast. Despite stubborn
resistance, the guerrillas managed tc overrun the
-ost. Following this modest victory, the nascent
Rebel Army continued its hit-and-run tactics, grad-
ually growing in strength by recruitina peasants
and assimilating groups of youths from the cities.
July 1957, the Rebel Army had grown to some
20 to 100 men, a large enough group far Castro to
create a second guerrilla unit, dubbel Column Number
our to confuse the enemy. He placed the new unit
under the command of Che Guevara. The Rebel Army
continued to grow. By February 1958, it numbered
about 350, or enough for Castro to establish two
acre units, Column NumPer Six "Frank eats" and
Column Number Three "Mario Munoz." The latter was
3ent to operate near El Cobre west of Santiago de
Cuba under the command of Major Juan lmeida. The
former, under Raul's cpmmand, was disatched to the
lortheast to open up a second front and carry the
war to the eastern half of the provin-e
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Once on his own, Raul demonstrated a remarkable
ability to organize; despite his youthful appearance,
he was able to earn the respect and close cooperation
of other guerrilla groups which had been operating
independently in the area. By the time Batista fled
ten months later, Raul was commanding six rebel col-
umns and an air force of 12 aircraft, and was in
control of approximately 12,000 square kilometers of
territory. His forces inflicted 1,979 casualties on
the Batista forces, while suffering only a little
more than 160 dead of its own, captured 1,216 weapons,
shot down three planes, and destroyed or captured 31
posts and garrisons.
During the same period, Raul had created a civil
administration that included Departments of Education
(under Asela de los Santos), Propaganda (Jorge Serguera
Riveri), Public Works (Oriente Fernandez), Public
Health (Jose Ramon Machado Ventura), Justice (Augusto
Martinez Sanchez), Personnel (Senen Casas Regueiro),
Supplies (Julio Casas Regueiro), a Central Treasury,
a public force, an Agrarian Bureau (Antonio Perez
Herrero), and an organization of over 100 Peasants'
Associations (with "old" Communist Jose "Pepe" Ramirez
Cruz as secretary general). Haul's Department of
Propaganda published 12 issues of a semi-monthly news-
paper, Surco, and maintained two mobile and 12 fixed
radios for broadcasting and for point-to-point contact
with Fidel in the Sierra Maestra and with Miami, Mexico,
and Venezuela. More than 200 schools and 40 hospitals
were established in the ten months of the Second
Front's existence. A bomb factory was set up to ser-
vice the guerrilla air force, and arms plants, tailor
shops for making uniforms, and shoe factories were
created. When the war ended, Raul was operating a
veritable state within a state and was providing more
services to the people of the area than Batista ever
had.
In the Sierra Maestra, following the departure
of Raul and Almeida, Fidel called for a general
strike throughout the nation, but because of poor
coordination, lack of popular support, and barbaric
counter-measures by the Batista regime, it was a
disastrous failure. Batista countered with a massive
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:illensive against Castro's mountain hnadquarters, but
_ government troops lacked the will to fight and
Lne operation failed. By mid-summer _938, Castro was
on the offensive himself, sending two Taerrilla col-
umns led by Camilo Cienfuegos and Che Guevara across
Camaguey and into Las Villas Province where, joined
by local forces, they out the coup de grace to the
iatista era at year's and by capturinn Santa Clara
and an armored train tnat the President had sent to
relieve the city. Two columns left the Sierra Maestra
set up a fourth front in northwest Oriente, and by
Ida time Batista fled from Cuba early on New Year's
Day 1959, almost all of Oriente and Las Villas Proy-
f_nces was in rebel hands. In addition, a small quer-
La force under Major Dermedio EscaLona was operating
Pinar del Rio Province in the name of the 26-JM.
iter The Victory
Tho January victory was followed by land reform
in May, and many of the Rebel Army's nfficers cuickly
ound themselves in charge of large sn._41ments of agri-
cfulture or cattle raising acreage witnout the slightest
knowledge of how to use it. A number of other offi-
eers of the Rebel Army disappeared frnm the scene
one way or another. Major Paco Cabrera lived
nnrough the guerrilla war only to die in an accident
while accompanying Fidel on a brief trio to Venezuela
Lu late January 19597 Major Felix Penn, a guerrilla
noMbatant for 22 months who had presided on the court
which tried and acquitted 22 Batista nirmen in early
1959, committed suicide shortly after Fidel overturned
the court's verdict, retried the airmen, and gave them
long prison sentences7 Major Dello GOreZ Ochoa, who
irose in the guerrilla ranks to head tne rebels' fourth
ont in the final days of the struggle, fell into
disfavor and as punishment was ordered to accompany
t_ mixed Cuban-Dominican guerrilla fdrce on its in-
vasion of the Dominican Republic, where he was captured
Lii June 19597 Major Pedro Diaz Lanz, 7aief of the Rebel
Air Force, quickly became disenchanted with the new
regime and went into exile in mid-1959: Major Huber
Matos, as upset as Diaz Lanz with the direction the
devolution was taking, tendered his resignation but,
'thong with his entire staff, was tried and convicted
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of counterrevolutionary activity; one of Matos' sub-
ordinates, upon hearing of Matos' arrest, committed
suicide; Major Camilo Cienfuegos, the army chief of
staff who arrested Matos, disappeared on October 28,
1959, while returning to Havana by air from Matos'
headquarters in Camaguey.
These and other losses to a small army already
stretched dangerously thin moved the new regime to
enter more than 100 cadets in the military school
at Managua in June 1959 and a smaller number at the
Mariel Naval Academy three months later in an effort
to bolster its over-taxed officer corps through
the training of cadres untainted by service to Batista.
To institutionalize the regime's military, the National
Revolutionary Militia (MNR) was founded, and the De-
fense Ministry was replaced by the Revolutionary Armed
Forces Ministry (MINFAR) in October 1959. Raul Castro
was named to head the new ministry, and Rogelio Acevedo,
a young member of Che's guerrilla column during the
rebellion, was appointed chief of the MNR in January
1960. Later the same year, in September, a school was
set up in Matanzas to train militia cadres, and the
following month the class of cadets at Managua was
graduated early in expectation of an invasion by US
sponsored exiles.
The MNR was mobilized on December 31, 1960, to
await the invasion and remained in a state of alert
until January 20, inauguration day in the US. The
MNR was then directed against counterrevolutionary
bands that had taken to the mountains in southern
Las Villas Province and, under the command of Major
Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, conducted a counterin-
surgency campaign in the Escambray region. During
the invasion in April 1960, the MNR was sent to repulse
the landing at Playa Giron. The students at the
Matanzas militia cadre school was dispatched to the
scene of battle, and many were killed. The decisive
action of the minuscule Revolutionary Air Force in
sinking the invaders' supply and support ships isolated
the attacking force and permitted the militia to over-
whelm it within 72 hours of the disembarkation.
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The MNR returned to the strugal, against the
nelerrilla bands until it was replacer by new units,
called the Anti-Bandit Brigades (LCBf-') , that had been
,stablfshed on July 3 1962. While the T,C,Bs conduct-
Jd a mop-up of the stubborn guerrill; forces, the
teaular military units were expanded as rapidly as
[iew men could be trained, Large amonnts of military
-euipment and weapons arrived from Eastern Europe in
steady flow, and following the missile crisis of
tober 1962, much of the materiel nt-wided by the
,viet forces was turned over to the 'nbans as fast
they could assimilate the technolcay. Motor tor-
endo boats, submarine chasers, and fat, launches
11ring surface-to-surface missiles were turned over
ra the Cuban Revolutienary Navy on Aulust 3, 1963,
and by 1965 the Cubans had assumed responsibility for
all weapon systems left by the departed Soviet troops.
Also in 1963, several cadet schools were established
provide a steady flow of officers or service in
Lank, infantry, artillery, and communications units,
And the General Maximo Gomez Advanced Basic School
was founded to prepare armed forces c)mmand cadres
ar high-level assignments in a militirv establish-
'aunt rapidly become mere and more comPlex. In Nov-
Raul proposed a law of obligat)ry military
service and in December the work of c-eating party
cells in the armed forces was begun i unit in
::,stern Cuba,
7
)cie 7y Militarized
The first draft call came in Apr 1 1964, and as
Hcosult of the influx of recruits, new military units
were created. Three new units in the Havana area
were formed in the first half of 1965--the Armored
vision, the Independent Army Corps Gf the East,
-d the Independent Army Corps of the West--and
specialist schools were established bv the various
services to meet the need for trained technicians at
Lie enlisted level, Tr 1966, the Armered Division
:)ecame the Armored Corps and another row unit, the
,I,avana Defense Troops Group, was formed. Also in
966, the Military Technological Inst,t1,.t for train-
,g officers and technicians was open e;_ using
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facilities of the old Colegio Belen, Fidel's alma
mater; the Carlos Ulloa Aviation Cadets School was
founded at San Julian in western Pinar del Rio
Province; and the first of seven Camilo Cienfuegos
Military Schools was established at Playa Baracoa,
near Havana, to provide boys between the ages of
11 and 19 with an education at the junior and senior
high school levels. The Camilo Cienfuegos Military
Schools, which teach children who intend to make a
career of military service, are operated by the MINFAR
vice ministry for training and are the responsibility
of Captain Asela de los Santos, the same woman who
served as head of Raul Castro's Department of Education
in Oriente during the guerrilla war in 1958. The
schools are now co-educational; the first girls were
admitted in the fall of 1969. The schools are the
source of most of the students who enter the various
cadet schools and the Military Technological Institute.
As the years passed, the military's influence
began to be felt more and more throughout the country.
Military men appeared in increasing numbers in the
sugar harvest management, in industry, in education,
in autonomous agencies, in the Council of Ministers,
and in top party positions. In 1968, for example,
the Political Bureau delegate system appeared. It
apparently was designed to be a supermanagement system
in which delegates named by the Political Bureau as-
sumed supreme authority in a geographical area or, in
one case, a particular industry. In all, seven
Political Bureau delegates were appointed--for Oriente,
Camaguey, Matanzas, and Pinar del Rio provinces, for
the Isle of Pines and the Holguin regions, and for
the Construction Industry. All seven posts were
filled by majors.
Eight of the ten changes that took place in the
Council of Ministers between 1967 and mid-1972 in-
volved military men. In five cases, a military man
replaced a civilian: in one, a military man replaced
another military man; and in two, a civilian was re-
placed by another civilian. In no case was a mili-
tary man replaced by a civilian. The trend was the
same in autonomous agencies. The director of the
Cuban Broadcasting Institute, Aurelio Martinez, who
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s in charge of all radio and teievis.:on broadcast-
ing in Cuba, was replaced in May 1967 uy Major Jorge
Serguera Riveri, who 'headed Raul Castrs Department
of Propaganda in Oriente in 1958. UnUpl the govern-
ment reorganization announced in Novemoer 1972, the
heads of all five of the new economic .rectors dis-
cussed earlier were also majors. The :he Guevara
,nd Clearing Brigade, formed in late i967, was led
hy army personnel and had a military structure, with
rigid military discipline. When the 1tional Agri-
cultural and Livestock Development Agency (DAP) was
Formed In mid-1968, it was patterned giong the same
lines as the Che Guevara Brigade, whidu it later
albsorbed. Chief of DAP is another officer, Major
Mario Oliva Perez. Militarization also hit the sugar
industry and hit it hard. The jMAP units already
discussed were a product of MINFAR's effort to ex-
pand its role in the national economy, and when the
UMAP system tell Into disrepute and hal to be re-
)aced during the early stages of the 1968 sugar
rvest, it was MiNFAR that filled in with thousands
,)F troops In what was called Operatiap Mambi. Operu-
U ion lasted from early 1968 until August of
he same year, when the first units ot the newly
formed Centennial Youtn Column (CJC) ,rrived in
Camaguey Province to relieve the solders. in keep-
ing with the trend of the times, this -.aew organiza-
Limn too was formed along military lites; it in-
cluded military training in its activities, was
staffed in part by officers, and depended heavily on
military discipline. CJC members who served in the
column for a full three years were cr dited with
Culfillment of their military draft r guirement.
The entire narvest in Oriente Province was turned
over to military management in 1968 io what was
announced as a test plan. it the military establish-
ment could succeed in Oriente, the pian was to be
adopted in Oriente, Camaguey, and Las Villas provinces
i:or the 1969 harvest and in all six pefovinces for
e 1970 harvest. There were many mtdifications
following the 1968 harvest and the plan was not fully
Implemented throughout Cuba, but many of its features,
such as complex 'agricultural command posts" and
Large-scale participacion by tne
0--
trocps, were continued
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in the later harvests. Much of the harvest remains
in military hands today, with primary responsibility
resting with the chief of the Sugar Harvest Sector,
Major Diocles Torralba Gonzalez. Massive military
participation became so necessary for the harvests
that to avoid any further impairment of combat readi-
ness, new military units, called Permanent Infantry
Divisions (DIP), were established in 1971 to serve
as a permanent agricultural labor force. The men of
these units received basic infantry training, but
spent most of their time in agricultural work 7 most
were involved in the sugar harvest, but many worked
with rice, coffee, viands, or in construction. The
DIP system was so large that its chief, Major Oscar
Fernandez Mell, ranked as a vice minister of MINFAR.
The men under his control doubled in August 1973 when
the CJC and DIP merged and became the Youth Labor
Army.
Education too was a major target to militari-
zation. All technological institutes and senior
high schools were taken over by a new MINFAR office
(first made public in late 1968), called the Vice
Ministry for Military Technological Education. At
its head was Major Belarmino Castilla Mas, the former
MINFAR vice minister and chief of the General Staff,
who had served as chief of one of Raul's six guer-
rilla columns in 1958. Apparently as a result of
considerable international criticism by K.S. Karol
and Rene Dumont, among others, Castro tried to dis-
guise the growing influence of the military by shift-
ing Castilla Mas from MINFAR to the Education Ministry,
appointing him to replace Education Minister Jose
Llanusa in July 1970. Far from reducing military in-
fluence, the move completed the militarization of the
Education Ministry. Castilla Mas brought with him
his MINFAR staff and installed MINFAR's vice minister
for training, Major Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez, as
first deputy education minister, replacing Eduardo
Muzio. Furthermore, he removed Muzio from his second
responsibility, that of chief of the Education Minis-
try's adjunct body, the National Cultural Council,
and replaced him with another officer, First Lieutenant
Luis Pavon Tamayo, who had been editor of the mili-
tary weekly Verde Olivo when that magazine had engaged
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a iengtny and biter denunciatic of certain Cuban
etellectuals whose literary works centained veiled
:riticism of the regime, This move inded ill for
"Htbals intellectaal community and indeed the next Year
ehe of those whc had been attacked b- verde Oliva,
aberto Padilla, was arrested and sueaected to stremg
essures until ne made an agonizing and debasing self-
criticism admitting hs 'counterrevo'utionary" faults
,a front of an assembly of the natio-al professional
erganization for writers and artists
'dot surPrisingiy. orinqing the tlitarv into the
ducatIon Ministry resulted in furth - stress on milt-
-try training within the educational system. All
eenior high school and technological institute students,
th male and female, received milit-lev trainind at
eehool in addition to their academic subjects and there-
fulfilted theer three-year militaeer service ()loll-
eetion Wine in schoo], So that the addition of mill-
_ -y subjects to the senior high schcol and technologi-
eet institute curricula would not be detrimental to
students' academic education, an additional year
aJs added to junior high school. The students who re-
ceived miiitary trainina were formed orimarilv into
Anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillerv dun crews and
fere destined to serve in that capac]tv in the evert
cF a military alert.
lImphasis on the Reserve-F-
One of the aims of this student ready-reserve
was to enable the regime to reduce the size of its
regular force anc permit the release df manpower
badly needed in the labor force. Thie suggests that
Lee size of the military establishmen has peaked
and that military manpower has been cit to a much
Tore reasonable tigure. Some of the .egative effects
the reduction are being offset by amproved tech-
eology, which can be assimilated because of the good
etuality of the technical education system established
within MINFAR. over the years. Severa Years ago,
aeiul Castro complained that in the redime's early
lys the average Rebel Army officer bad only three
veers of formal education, but he claamed that this
storm* *mew tow
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had since been raised to about six years. The edu-
cational level has risen higher since then, and, as
the Camilo Cienfuegos Military Schools feed more and
better trained students into the cadet schools, thus
enabling them to raise their standards, it is bound
to go higher yet.
One indication that the armed forces have fewer
permanent personnel appeared in May 1971, when the
General Ignacio Agramonte Officers School in Matanzas
closed. The closure, it was announced, was made be-
cause the armed forces were now better organized, re-
sulting in an increased capability for modern combat
that "has provided us with the chance to reduce the use of
human and material resources which are so needed to
support the country's economic plans." Shortly there-
after, MINFAR's Osvaldo Sanchez Cabrera School for
Political Instructors was also closed. The responsi-
bilities of both institutions were shifted to the
General Antonio Maceo Interservice Cadets School at
Ceiba del Agua.
Some idea of the size of the reduction in the
military that the Cubans had in mind can be gained
from figures given by then-deputy chief of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces General Staff Major Oscar
Fernandez Mell in early 1970. He claimed that one to
two percent of the total population is the proper
range for the size of a peacetime army, and that 30
to 35 percent of that army should consist of regular
forces with the rest reserves. Using the 1970 census
figure of 8.5 million as Cuba's total population,
Fernandez Mell's lower estimates would mean that Cuba's
regular armed forces strength could be as low as
25,500 of a total force, regular and reserve, of
85,000. Fernandez Mell's high estimates would bring
the strength of the regular army to as high as 59,500
with a total force of 170,000. Even the higher--and
probably more accurate--figures are a reduction of
somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 percent, if there
is truth to Castro's claim that 100,000 Military men
could be used in the 1970 sugar harvest with enough
left over to maintain the nation's defenses. This
explains, of course, why the militarization of
education was necessary. If the country's 15,700
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or nigh school students, using .19 1 statistics,
added to the 29,700 students in technological
titutes and to the 30,000 university students
ho are formed ineo reserve units, the total eligible
student population is /5,400. If those engagea in
ocher training are included, as was most likely
- case, the number ct potential student reservists
ses to 102,700.
The militarization was even extended to the
ithfor high schools. In April 19J2, some 465 stu-
dents, male and female, at the Ana Beancourt Junior
gh School in Camaguey were organized into six
companies of student militia under the auspices of
the MINFAR, MININT, and Civil Defense. Plans called
hr members to spend one session a week plus one
h;nday per month In tiaining. This co-ed teenagers'
ie.litia was established in March 1971 and apparently
IIS expected to spreau spontaneously to other junior
(11-1 schools.
Military reserve in Cuba are ncenIng new. The
LdB units used against the counterrevDlutionary bands
from mid-1962 until the total elimination of the anti-
hstro guerrillas three years lacer evbived into a
hNAT irregular-type unit, called the Mountain Troops.
These were kept in a .eserve status until enemy
filtrations or otner threats required their mobifi-
tion. The Mountain Troops Enen evcd.ved into the
--sent 'territorial" (i.e., reserve) units--ready
reserves that can be called up on ve)y short notice
'7.ey are Invariably tile ones activated for the en-
circlement or infiltration teams or focal counter-
volutionaries, and are an importanL segment of
he Cuban defense establishment.
le Rcrular Forces
rhe major eiemenes of Cuba's arned forces are
, Revolutionary Navy (MGR), the Air and Air De-
fense Force (DAAFAR), and the ground torces. The
''1::(41., commanded by Major Aldo Sahtamaria, in early
073 received two OSA-class guided-mrssile fast
atroi boats from tne USSR to supplenent the 18
A
-iatpprervethforRefeas fteregymme
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KOMAR-class guided missile fast patrol boats, 12 SO-1
class submarine chasers, 6 Kronstadt-class submarine
chasers, 12 P-6 class fast patrol boats, and 12 P-4
class fast patrol boats that make up the MGR's surface
fleet. The DAAFAR, commanded by Major Francisco
Cabrera, is made up of the Revolutionary Air Force
and the Air Defense. The former, which is equipped
primarily with MIG-21 jet aircraft, operates out of
three main airfields: San Antonio de los Banos Air
Base south of Havana; Camilo Cienfuegos Air Base
near Santa Clara in central Cuba; and Frank Pais Air
Base at Holguin in eastern Cuba. The Air Defense is
composed of the previously mentioned surface-to-air
missile units and an unspecified number of anti-air-
craft artillery pieces.
The ground forces are made up of three armies
(Eastern, Central, and Havana); two independent army
corps (Camaguey and Pinar del Rio); two subordinated
army corps (the Central Army's Las Villas Army Corps
of ready reservists and the Eastern Army's Holguin
Army Corps); and many smaller units. Although the
Youth Labor Army discussed earlier is alleged to be
on a par with the other three armies, it apparently
has no matching combat capability and is primarily
a labor force.
A considerable amount of information on the
Cuban Armed Forces can be gleaned from overt publi-
cations, such as the armed forces weekly journal
Verde Olivo and the party daily newspaper Granma,
but corresponding data on the forces at the dis-
posal of the Interior Ministry are almost non-existent.
It is known that these forces include the border
guards responsible for protecting Cuba's coastline,
the National Revolutionary Police, which handles
normal police functions such as traffic control and
apprehension of criminals; the State Security troops
used mainly in a counterespionage capacity; an
Intelligence Directorate for collecting foreign
intelligence and carrying out clandestine operations:
and other units reponsible for such matters as im-
migration and population control. Although details
are lacking, it is clear that the Interior Ministry
and its hierarchy have much in common with the Armed
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worces Ministry and its staff, and here appear tc
oe no major polItical differences bctween the two
)rganizations. MINIT, of course, is much the
'unior nt MTNFAR and would be no mach for the lat--
_er if ever there were a confrontat-nn. The like---
1hnod of such a cnn-lict is even lcss likely since
,c.tui Castro, as chairman of the Central Committee's
''alned Forces and State Security Comrission, is the
,verridinq influence in both ministries.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE SCENE TODAY
Of Cuba's pre-revolutionary institutions, the
legislature is dead; the last stale remnants of the
judiciary have been swept away; private industry has
been reduced to a few privately owned fishing boats
and a steadily diminishing number of small farms;
the old military establishment and the political
parties have passed into oblivion; the national fed-
eration of labor unions, the unions themselves, and
the few professional organizations that have managed
to survive are obedient tools of the regime; the
press is completely subservient to the government;
and the Church, its clergy decimated and its members
cowed, has chosen the path of accommodation as the
only means of self-preservation. Those few pre-
revolutionary institutions still in existence are
barely able to keep alive, let alone oppose the regime.
Of the institutions created since 1959, only
the security establishment, headed by Fidel and Raul
Castro, and the PCC, of which Raul is second secre-
tary, have the organizational strength to exert
pressure on the Revolution's "maximum leader," Fidel
Castro. Neither has given evidence that it has of-
fered anything but unquestioning and wholehearted
support to Fidel, even when his fortunes were at
their lowest. The extended trips Fidel has made
since his last serious domestic crisis, the harvest
of 1970, are a tribute to his confidence in these
two institutions as well as a testimonial to the
faith he places in Raul.
If formal institutions either lack the capa-
city to influence Castro, or are unwilling to ex-
ercise power they possess, what about the informal
institutions? It would appear that here too the
potential for opposition is minimal. First let us
examine the masses. Most of those people who wanted
to leave the island have done so or, failing in that,
have reconciled themselves to their plight. When
the Varadero-Miami "freedom" flights came to an end,
there was no great hue and cry; neither was there
any great upsurge in illegal departures. In earlier
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,Jiys, such was the passion for escape that would-be
-efugees frequently plunged into Cuha's coastal waters
nothing more than a flimsy raft of timbers and
irpty oil drums or a few inner tubes sandwiched in
piece of canvas folded over and sewn together.
Ly their actions, these people gave :.1:astro a dramatic
vote of no confidence. But that era is over and when
ended Castro reached an important milestone. The
;hiban people, with few exceptions, had finally gotten
rown to the business of making the bast of the situa-
tion. The exile invasion had failed; guerrilla up-
risings had failed; and the security forces seem
cimnipotent. Passive resistance still is a probler
tor the regime, but there is no indication that more
ihan a handful of Cubans are working against the goy-
irnment. Most are apathetic, despite the regime's
iitforts to motivate the workers to "daily heroism"
at their place of work.
.sfen the few exceptions who had refused to
iocept the Revolution have come around. Some were
triteliectuais who found the atmosphere suffocating
ond oppressive, but they now seem tc have submitted
Ho the lesson of the Padilla affair in 1971. With
Che surrender of Padilla, there appear to be no new
igures in the Cuban intellectual world with either
the stature or the inclination to spark significant
(Jdposition to Castro. Neither are there any who
night substantially influence policy other than that
Hirectly affecting the intellectual community. In
act, Castro has succeeded in capturing as his own
he intellectual greats of Cuban history and has
dentified his regime with them so completely that
iLlestioning Fidel or his policies is tantamount to
itlestioning Cuban history and tradition. To his
Laithful, Castro's Cuba is the Cuba of Jose Marti,
-intonio Maceo, Maximo Gomez, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes,
ftnd other heroes of the wars against Spain. Even
the Indian chief Hatuey, who died at the inquisitor's
itake early in the sixteenth century rather than
!iubmit to the Spanish "imperialists, is hailed as
precursor of today's revolutionaries, notwithstand-
ing the fact that he invaded Cuba from Santo Domingo
ihaly a step ahead of the Spaniards. The importance
r Castro's success in linking his Pevolution to
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Cuba's historical greats and to the Cuban historical
process is difficult to overemphasize. He has suc-
ceeded in creating an awareness of Cuban nationality
that will be almost an insurmountable obstacle to
anyone, Cuban or foreigner, who comes to the island
with the idea of "saving" the people from Castro or
of trying to turn back the clock.
Students in the pre-Castro days were a privileged
class with no real responsibilities. They were members
of an elite group to whom the leadership of the country
would be eventually entrusted. Now the prospects for
joining an economically privileged class upon graduat-
ing have been diluted or have evaporated altogether.
Students can no longer get away with political "hell
raising" as they did prior to the Castro era--and as
Castro himself did at the University of Havana. In
the early days of the Revolution, students were given
special privileges: they did not suffer as severely
as did the rest of the population from shortages of
food, clothing, medical and dental care, or housing;
they were exempted from military service; they were
given modest sums of spending money; and they were
granted recreational facilities and other amenities
unheard of elsewhere in the country. But now the
life of students has become much more onerous and
has lost much of its glamour. All political activity
is barred unless it is in support of the government,
and political reliability has become the determining
factor in admission to centers of advanced education.
Work and study are being integrated, and classes are
no excuse for failing to help with the harvest or
planting or weeding or whatever other agricultural
task needs doing. Soon all junior high schools will
be boardingschools in the countryside, and half of
the student's time will be spent cultivating the
acreage given to the school for raising its own food.
In senior high schools a student can look forward to
three years of military discipline, hardly a pleasing
prospect, and after graduation he may have to go to
some remote corner of the island, away from the ameni-
ties of life, to place his knowledge at the service
of the Revolution.
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As bleak ar,, this may seem, the students have
iot crystallized their frustrations and resentments
?nto activity against_ the regime. individual acts
').f vandalism may occar and even with some frequency,
todav's students have been raised in an atmosphere
,lifferent from that existing prior to the Revolution.
They do not look upon serious plotting and political
,Activity as an inherent right; they are too young to
-La.ve remembered pre-revolutionary times and, since
their first day of school, they have been subjected
TAD political indoctrination that has developed a way
thinking far removed from that oi their parents.
They may make formal protests, but the protests are
[made in harmony with the Revolution, not against it.
he Revolution's leaders complain semetimes that the
;tudents are more revolutionary than the Revolutionaries,
)1it this is not the type of situation that represents
genuine opposition to the government. Although the
students, like the rest of the popueation, may not
be entirely happy with their lot, ti ey do not want
risk worsening their positions. in addition, they
hecognize that the Revolution has brought some genuine
Lmprovements to the masses and instead of wanting to
reverse or halt this process they wculd rather speed
up.
If there is opposition to Casteo in Cuba today,
Lt is not voiced openly nor is it likely to be dan-
4erous. The security forces have snown themselves
'[to be effective in descouraging the traditional forms
uf plotting, and no tales of assassination attempts
nave been heard for 4uite some time. Castro's
,4reatest threat seems to come from the slow but
steady institutionalization that is taking place.
idel is instinctively wary of anytning such as a
constitution or a rigid party or governmental structure
that might tend to inhibit his freedom of action.
,de much prefers to govern by communicating directly
with the people. Economic reality has made this more
and more a luxury that Cuba can ill afford, however,
and Fidel has had to weigh his distrust of institu-
tionalization against his country's need for it.
He was able to control the process for over a decade
but the trend of events, particulariy in the past
three years, is clearly against him. He has learned
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that although old and discredited institutions can
easily be destroyed by a torrent of rhetoric from
the mouth of a gifted and appealing demagogue, the
complex business of government requires that the
consequent vacuum be filled with new institutions
capable of satisfying a people awakened to greater
possibilities and characterized by increased ex-
pectations. Moreover, he seems to have come to
realize that the flamboyant and freewheeling style
of rule that so endeared him to the masses in the
early years of his social revolution and enabled him
to bury the remnants of the previous government in
a morass of words became outdated long ago and, as
a result, he has acquiesced in a de-emphasis of his
personalistic manner of government in favor of the
trappings of a collective leadership.
Since 1970, in particular, Fidel has opted for
a more sober definition of his role in Cuban politics.
He learned through bitter experience that he cannot
master all facets of economic life, that the advice
of technical experts must be heeded, and that the
business of running a government cannot be left to
one man, especially one who often lets whim or wish-
ful thinking determine his actions. He seems to have
reconciled himself to less active participation in
domestic economic matters and to greater concentra-
tion on strengthening and expanding contacts abroad.
He has chosen to stifle his ingrained antipathy to-
ward the Soviets as the price of the economic under-
pinning vital to the preservation of his regime, and
he has tailored some of the more abrasive of his
domestic and foreign policies so as to reduce friction
with Moscow to an acceptable minimum.
He continues to depend heavily on his "guerrilla
elite" as the basis for his control over the political
apparatus, and this is likely to be a constant factor
throughout the life of his regime. He has enough con-
fidence in his ability to command the loyalty of this
group that he perceives no threat from one of its key
members, his younger brother. Thus he has permitted
Raul to accumulate an inordinate amount of power and
to assume an ever-expanding leadership role in the
hierarchy. While Fidel's impact on Cuban affairs
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as diminished?albeit ever so slightiv?Raul's has
Increased markedly. Fidel unquestionably maintains
his position as the Revolution's "maximum leader,"
hut Raul is becoming more and more tae individual to
watch when analyzing Cuban developments.
was Raul who was the archite_t of the mili-
tarization of Cuban society, and it was through this
militarization that Raul's influence spread so per-
vasively. With the militarization came the elevation
of many of Raul's friends and former comrades-in-arms
La key positions throughout the government and the
party. In the top level of the Armed Forces Ministry,
tor example, First Vice Minister and chief of the
General Staff Senen Casas Regueiro and his brother,
Vice Minister for Services Julio Cass Requeiro,
huld corresponding positions--chief of the personnel
,iepartment and chief of supplies, reepectively?on Raul's
taff on the Second Eastern Front in 1958, and two
other MINFAR Vice Ministers, Abelardo Colome ibarra
and Rogelio Acevedo Gonzalez, have been linked closely
with Raul for years.
Also fighting under Raul's command in 1958 were:
Vice Prime Minister for the Sugar Harvest Sector
Diocles Torralba Gonzalez; Vice Prime Minister for the
,:lucation, Culture, and Sciences Sector Belarmino
stilla Mas, who headed one of Raul's six guerrilla
columns; Minister of Transport Antonio Lusson Bathe,
Another of Raul's guerrilla column ciefs; Eastern
Army chief Raul Menendez Tomassevich. vet another
juerrilia column commander; Artemisa Territorial
Division commander Filiberto Olivera Maya, chief of a
Tierrilla company; former Armed Forces Vice Minister
r Political Work Antonio Perez Herrero, assigned
the Party Secretariat; Labor Minister Jorge Risauet,
appointed to the Secretariat with Perez Herrero;
First Vice Minister of the Interior Ministry Manuel
Pineiro Losada; Interior Ministry General Staff officer
Joaquin Mendez Cominches; and Havana Provincial Party
Iirst Secretary Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, who
aeaded Raul's old Department of Public Health.
Moreover, "old" Communist and long-time ANAP
!resident Jose Ramirez Cruz served if 1958 as secretary
4.1 11111.01010,014011,9**.14401.0tWallik0.111,P,M
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general of Raul's Peasant Associations and acted as
Raul's liaison with the pre-Revolutionary Communist
party, and another "old" Communist, Vice Prime Min-
ister for Consumption and Services Major Flavio Bravo
Pardo, has had a close association with Raul ever
since their student days together at Havana University.
In addition, several pre-revolutionary professional
military men have risen quickly in the post-revolu-
tionary Armed Forces Ministry and owe their rapid
advancement and successful careers to Raul--Education
Minister Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez is a good ex-
ample. Raul himself, of course, is Armed Forces Min-
ister, First Vice Prime Minister, Party Second Secre-
tary, and second ranking member (behind Fidel) on
the Political Bureau and the Secretariat.
In sum, Raul seems to be creating a "guerrilla
elite" of his own, possibly in preparation for the
day when the reins of power slip from Fidel's hands
into his own. Association with Raul in the guerrilla
war, of course, does not necessarily mean that an
individual is automatically a "Raulista." Neither
is there any evidence that Raul is involved in a
"power struggle" in any sense of that term. It is,
after all, reasonable to assume that in a developing
country short of skilled personnel in all categories,
Raul should seek out and promote those people who
he personally knows are capable. Nevertheless, the
trend toward greater authority for Raul deserves
watching.
Should this trend continue unchecked until the
first party congress is held next year, Raul, and--
by association--Fidel, will be assured of the back-
ing necessary to weather the congress without sur-
rendering significant control of Cuba's political
apparatus to those among the leadership--the "old"
Communists--who prefer a closer association with
Moscow. Because of its Soviet ties, this group has
enjoyed a degree of influence out of all proportion
to its size. Its fortunes have risen and fallen in
unison with the fluctuations in Cuban-Soviet rela-
tions. It has never been satisfied, however, with
only minority participation in the elements of power
and has consistently sought to improve its position--
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as in the Escalante aitair in 1962?and reduce Fidel
tu a figurehead. The congress, therefore, gives the
"old" Communists a unique opportunity to reverse the
pro-Castro bias in the composition ot the Central
Committee and other top organs of the party and thus
open the way to the assumption of conpiete control of
1:10. government.
Prior to the convening of the congress, there is
sure to be considerable activity as the competing
groups jockey for a position of advantage in hopes
or entering the congress with as much leverage as
possible. For example, the recent removal of Jorge
Serguera Riven, who headed Raul's old Propaganda
Dpartment in the guerrilla days, from his post as
czar of all radio and television broadcasting in Cuba
raises the suspicion that behind-the-scenes maneuver-
Hg by the "old" Communists may have been responsible
for his ouster and that others of Raui's entourage
may soon suffer the same fate. This is an unlikely
scenario, however, and it is highly improbable that
such a key personnel change would have been accom-
plished without the approval of both Raul and Fidel.
still controls the Political Bureau--the en-
tity responsible for top personnel appointments?and
he would not make changes against his better judg-
ment unless unusual pressure were brought to bear,
ahd the only source on the Cuban scene capable of
,exerting that amount of pressure at present is Moscow.
The affinity between Moscow and the 'old" Communists
notwithstanding, the Soviets would hardly go to such
extremes for what are relatively low stakes. It
would take far more than the elimination of a radio
and television czar to give the "old" Communists--and
Moscow--a leg up on the guerrilla elite when the
congress convenes.
The ability of the "old" Communists to exploit
any decline in Fidel's popularity among the masses
aver the past four years, and the success they have
in undermining the influence of the guerrilla elite
-in the party Secretariat?which presumably will be
He office responsible for organizing the congress--
will determine to a large degree their ability to
Golate the Castro clique and, with the support of
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technocrats and opportunists, to emerge as the dominant
factor or at least with a much improved standing in
the new party structure. There is no strong evidence,
however, that Fidel has suffered a dangerous drop in
popularity that could be exploited profitably by the
"old" Communists. Neither are there indications that
any member of the guerrilla elite on the Secretariat
is willing to change his political affiliation, so from
all appearances it will be largely up to the Soviets
to earn for them whatever gains the "old" Communists
achieve. Castro, thus, is presently the figure on
the domestic scene who will enter the congress in the
strongest position.
If Castro retains his strong majority at the
congress or even increases it, he will most likely
continue to govern as he does now, making few addi-
tional fundamental changes unless forced to do so
by the demands of the economy. The frenzy of re-
organization that began in late 1970 will then have
run its course, and Castro, who never wanted the
congress in the first place--he has little to gain
from it and everything to lose--will presumably have
satisfied the demands of his Soviet mentors to place
his crown on the line. If, however, Castro perceives
the possibility of a significant loss of representa-
tion by his guerrilla elite, he may be tempted to
conduct another purge of "old" Communists as he did
in 1962 and 1968, and his relations with Moscow will
suffer accordingly. Such a purge would be feasible
because he still enjoys the staunch loyalty of the
armed forces and state security apparatus. With his
main opponents thus cowed, he could control completely
the congress' actions.
A reading of the situation at present indicates
that Castro will have little trouble retaining his
grip on the reins even if the "old" Communists do
make modest gains. As the congress approaches, how-
ever, the pressures from Moscow and the maneuverings
of the "old" Communists are bound to increase with
the expectation that significant gains can be engi-
neered at the expense of the guerrilla elite. Until
the congress actually takes place, therefore, Castro
may be much more willing than he has been in the past
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o take advantage of opportunities tLJ decrease his
reliance on Soviet support and expand nis contacts
with the West. He has given no sign tnat he would
willingly pass the baton of leadership on to someone
else and it is safe to assume that it ne believed
his position to be threatened he wou_d seize the
opportunity to strengthen it. The Soviet-sponsored
process of institutionalization that is gradually
building limits all around Castro may already have
convinced him that such a threat indeed exists.
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