VIEWS OF(Sanitized)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00353R000100070008-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 18, 2002
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 18, 1974
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP85T00353R000100070008-1.pdf | 147.99 KB |
Body:
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OCI-1022-74
18 July 1974
SUBJECT: Views of Glafkos Clerides
Inside Cyprus
1. The political credentials of Glafkos Clerides
within the Greek Cypriot community are impressive. As
president of the House of Deputies, he was the constitu-
tional successor to Makarios. He is co-leader of the
center-right Unified Party which has the largest number
of seats in the House and is widely considered to be the
"establishment" party because of its close ties to the
business community. He has also served as negotiator for
the Greek Cypriot side in the intercommunal talks since
their commencement in 1968.
2. A lawyer educated in Britain, Clerides was a
prominent participant in the first enosis campaign of the
1950's against the British. He became a close associate
of Makarios and soon assumed the role of "heir apparent."
Clerides' relationship with Makarios began showing signs
of strain in 1969 following the President's suspicion of
,Clerides' political ambition. When, in February 1969,
Clerides formed the Unified Party in cooperation with former
Minister of Interior Polykarpos Georkatzis, Makarios, who
disapproved of Clerides' association with Georkatzis, en-
couraged the formation of other parties in order to counter
Clerides' party. This angered Clerides and contributed to
the deterioration of relations between him and Makarios.
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3. Clerides was reelected President of the House in
July'1970. Members of his party urged him to run against
Makarios in the presidential elections of February 1973
but he demurred.
4. Politically, Clerides sought to appeal to the
moderate elements of the center, castigating on occasion
both the left and right and questioning the efficacy of
government policies. He has favored a more flexible posi-
tion in the intercommunal talks, condemned both the violence
of pro-enosis terrorists and that of government forces, and
sought to play a moderating role in the 1972 dispute between
Athens and Nicosia as well as in the most recent one which
led to Makarios' overthrow. His penchant for moderation
and compromise have earned him the distrust of both extreme
left and extreme right who consider his motives as opportun-
istic.
5. Clerides has little support among the pro-enosis
elements on the island. He and Sampson have been political
rivals since at least 1969. It is unlikely that the present
rulers of the island would distinguish much between Makarios
and Clerides. They would therefore be likely to resist any
effort to impose Clerides, though they might be receptive to
the appointment of a more respectable rightist with pro-enosis
and anti-communist credentials.
In Athens
6. It is unlikely that Clerides would be acceptable
to Ioannides as leader of the Greek Cypriots despite his
attempt to play a moderating role in the confrontation between
Athens and Makarios over the control of the National Guard
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7. The extent of Ioannides' commitment to Sampson is
not known.
It may well be that Ioannidis
considers him expend a and may be willing to bargain with
Ankara over his fate. This may account for the choice of
such a controversial figure to head the new regime. On the
other hand, the Athens regime's insecurity may have led it
to choose Sampson because of his presumed malleability rather
than his notoriety. In that case Ioannidis would likely re-
sist dumping him, unless he is confronted with the possibility
of a Turkish invasion and/or the complete diplomatic isola-
tion of Athens and non-recognition of the Sampson regime.
In Ankara
8. Of all prominent members of the Greek Cypriot polit-
ical elite, Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots would probably be
most comfortable with Clerides. More than the others, he is
a known quantity since he is the only Greek Cypriot repre-
sentative with whom they have had frequent if irregular con-
tact through the intercommuncal talks. Clerides enjoys good
personal relations with Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot
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leader and negotiator. The Turks doubtlessly assume him
to be sensitive to Turkish Cypriot concerns. Moreover, he
is a moderate and an advocate of the "feasible" policy of
independence rather than the "desirable" policy of enosis.
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