O/NE COMMENTS ON 'AN ESSAY ON GLOBAL STRATEGY' BY AN UNIDENTIFIED DUTCH STRATEGIST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003100060035-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 23, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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23 November 1951
0/NE Comments on "An Essay on Global Strategy" by an
Unidentified Dutch Strategist
1. In general, the author of this paper appears to have a
fairly sound knowledge of Soviet strategy and current world
conditions. His factual information, however, is sometimes
spotty. For example, he has very good detailed knowledge of
Southeast Asia, but in discussing internal developments in the
USSR he seems to draw about equally on fact and fantasy. One
might infer that he has used sources varying in reliability from
The Economist and the New York Times to Kenneth DeCourcyls In-
telligence Digest and the Hearst Sunday supplements. His Dutch
loyalties are reflected in the final pages of the paper, where
he goes to considerable pains to emphasize the strategic impor-
tance of Indonesia.
2. Comments on specific paragraphs follow:
I. Russian Military Doctrine
Paragraphs 1-6 represent a logical analysis of Kremlin
thinking.
Paragraph 7, which states that "in February 1947 Stalin and
the Politburo of the USSR were convinced that the objective
conditions of world revolution really did exist," appears highly
speculative. At that time the Kremlin no doubt saw local revo-
lutionary conditions developing in certain parts of Asia and
the Near East, but hardly viewed them as part of a worldwide pattern.
In paragraph 16, the statement that "the USSR believes itself
to be superior to all of its potential opponents" seems open to
grave doubt. As recently as November 6 Beria, delivering the
major Revolution Anniiversary address, referred to some of the
postwar industrial objectives laid down by Stalin several years
ago. At that time Stalin described a number of production tar-
gets, including 60,000,000 tons of steel and 60,000,000 tons of
oil per year, which were to be achieved by 1960. Such production
would, said Stalin, be essential to ensure the invulnerability of
the USSR. Beria, in his November speech, predicted that these goals
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would be attained
/ahead of schedule, but his figures indicated that they were
still some years away. In view of this and other evidence,
it seems doubtful that the Kremlin is yet confident that
the USSR's power potential exceeds that of "all of its poten-
tial opponents."
II. The Industrial Framework of Russian Military Power
In paragraphs 1-6, the discussion of the Kremlin's interest
in the strategic and industrial importance of Siberia and
Central Asia appears quite sound. '
In paragraphs 7 and 9, however, are references to the indus-
trial centers of "Singkiang." Although Sinkiang contains
important oil and metal deposits, it seems highly unlikely
that any major industrial centers have been developed there.
In paragraph 12, and in several later passages, the author
speaks of a Soviet desire to avoid a "two-front war." How-
ever, he fails to explain how the Kremlin might hope, in
the event of a war with the US, to limit hostilities to either
Europe or Asia.
In paragraph 13, the author implies that strategic air opera-
tions from Korean bases south of the 38th Parallel would be
of limited effectiveness against Soviet industrial targets
in the Kuzbas, Karaganda, and Lake Baikal districts, but from
bases in North Korea we might deal these areas a "shattering"
blow. The geography and geometry of the situation, however,
do not appear to support this conclusion.
In the same paragraph he speaks of atomic stockpiles and
major industrial installations in the "Anggarau Valley (west
of Lake Baikal). Before the war Soviet propagandists spoke
glowingly of plans for a great hydroelectric, and industrial
program in the Angara Valley. It was even claimed that one
of the dams was to be "larger than Hoover and Grand Coulee
combined." However, available evidence indicates that very?
little actual progress has been made in this development,
and it seems highly doubtful that either the author of this
paper or any other Westerner knows whether the Angara Valley
is the site of a major Soviet atomic stockpile.
III. The Manpower Problem of the USSR
The author's discussion here appears logical.
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IV. Western Front
This discussion also appears reasonable. Considerable emphasis
is given to the importance of the Mediterranean and the main-
tenance of Allied strength in Spain and Gibraltar.
In paragraph 15, the author seems to be on firm ground when
he says that by the spring of 1952 the USSR will have enough
A-bombs to retaliate against the US should the US use A-bombs
against the USSR.
V. Defense Problems and the Importance of Oil Fields of the
Middle East
No quarrel is found with the general discussion here.
In paragraph 7, however, the statement that only 7 to 9 per-
cent kerosene can be recovered from crude appears erroneous --
in general, the figure would be nearer 20 percent. The statement
that 10 to 12 percent aviation gasoline can be recovered from
crude is also misleading. The proportion of avgas output to
crude input depends almost entirely on the type of refinery
equipment available, which varies widely in different plants.
In paragraph 8, the author estimates Soviet 1950 oil production
at 36 million tons. The ORB estimate is about 37.5 million
tons.
In paragraph 9, the author says that oil production at Grozny
and Baku is "rapidly" diminishing. While these fields have -
probably passed their peak, there is no evidence that their
production is yet diminishing "rapidly."
VI. The Communist Offensive in the Orient )
VII. India and Pakistan
VIII. Southeast Asia
IX. Indonesia
These sections reflect
accurate factual
information and reason-
ably sound analysis.
In this section the author apparently has dedicated himself
to demonstrating the vital strategic importance of Indonesia.
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He charges (paragraph 10) that the President of the Indonesian
Republic has confessed to being a ',Moscow Communist". This
section also describes elaborate Soviet plans for using Indonesian
bases in World War III for attacks on US communications lines
and bases in the Philippines areas. The author concludes
(paragraph 12) that Indonesia is one of the principle cold war
objectives of the USSR.
X. Far East
The discussion of the Korean war seems generally logical.
The author again shows his motional concern over Indonesia, -
however, by warning that one of the most serious consequences
of the abandonment of Korea by the UN would be an invasion of
Indonesia by Chinese "volunteers."
In paragraph 9, he says that both tracks of the Trans-Siberian
have been completed since World War II and that 4-track con-
struction is now under way. Actually, the double tracking
of the Trans-Siberian was completed before World War II, and
there is no evidence of a present 4-track program.
In paragraph 10, he estimates the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
at 400,000 tons monthly. The present ORB estimate is about
700,000 tons.
In paragraph 16, he concludes by warning that the USSR can
be restrained from waging a world war by (a) fear of atomic
bombs and (b) maintenance of the UN bridgehead in Korea until
Western Europe is strong enough to repel Soviet invasion.
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Y Off GLOBAL STRATEGY
Russian military doctrine,
I. communist parties -41 over the world are pretending that they
are flitting for this maintenance of world peace. They point out,
that war is a prodtiVaf class society. As long as the capitalist
system exists therein" be var.
Thlrefore Camluniem *Perms defensive vire for repelling attack
of capitalist stater, or a war-of liberation to sae workers and
Peasants from slaver:.', or a war to free colonial people from the
yoke of imperialism.
Aocordihg to Sovjet doctrines all liberated peoples must be
United in the Croat Commuhist Fatherland, based on multi4sationalistic
laralties and the Marxist ideals of world-revolution. All them
Ifherated people mosteeknowledge the leadership of the U.S.S.R.
whieh is coercing all its adherents, irrespective of nationalitY,
colour or race, to fight for the complete annihilation of the 'bite
capitalist states.
Following this way of thinkire; of orthodox communiam,it 'amid be
unrealistio to opine, that the Chinese communist state wouLl be
more Chinese than communist. For thou71i VOSCOW Ion aware of
the importance of nationalism, multi-nationalism and loyalty to the
Oommunist Fatherland is paramount.
In this respect Titoism is considered to be a deadly alma
because it clashes with the principle of multi-nationalism and the
Oommunist Fatherland, the ultimate aim of world revolution.
Stalin has proclaimed many times, that the agonising life and
death struggle between Communism and Capitalism is inevitabla
Nevertheless he has hesitated a long time before he changed Russia's
policy of defense against the bourgeois states for a more dynamic
and offensive one.
S. As a matter of fact the crucial point in the deep-Tooted controversy
between Stalin en Trotalq was, whether "objective conditions" as
prerequisites for a successful world-revolution really existed.
As a consequence of careful scientific, but partly theoretical
ilalysis, Stalin is convinced that we are living in the epoch of
world revolution. On the other hard, in October 1938, Trotsky put
the Auestion as followes "Hnve we really entered an epoch or social
revolution and should we not raioo tho question of re-examination of
our concept of the present epoch?"
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1."
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6.
It is obvious, that it will be an everlasting probIee Of the
Mlopeow leadere, how to keew whether "the Objective cenditiena
ofeeorld revolution "really exist and ellether the beur :or a
revolutionary crisis has really struck. That ill, in the communist
Wee, thin is the crucial facterefor the outbreak e s rell pre-
pared revolution and will be deeisive for the outteek of
world war III.
7. It MOWSIS ttat in February 1947 Stalin and the Politburo of the
were convinced that the objective oondltions oreferld-
revolution eeally dil exist, As a consequence of this leniicit convic-
tion an important chanee toek place in the .High Coemsna cf.' the .
Arly of the U.S.S.R.
8. AL thr the war the career generals Thekov, relinovske, '-eacOSSovs117,
Kemper and others who had aimed r-ues4a from diaster prOcieded to
create a eostewar amyl, according to eeeir own professional ocl'esPt?'
Thee obviously paid little aLeentioe to political and
coeziderations. ereveletionnary
9. however, .:11e-se concepts claehee wft the deeanio and revolutionary
ideas of world revolution, in eh:chAhe arey onie one of iseveral
Leutruments nor revolution. in 'brary 1947, accordSg to :t.11in's
decision the tase of the Army in the Sevlet order of things
outlined anew. To Amy of the U.C).S.7i. Nicene aboviesil the Insrument
of liberation of the wc-kers and the peaealts of thsewerld. This
Arley is an arey of brotherhood, Mot unly of the peonles of the
but of all the workers Of the world, the Lf-,r or world, .
revolution imbued with the sei-eJet of communist enOei-nationalise
of the Great Communist Fatherland.
10. The basic tent of Stalin's doctrine is that.wars must be
conducted by the leaders of the state and can not be doeeeeted
by strategical demends or profespional eflitary leaderee in
the etrule for liberation of the workers and peasaniti of the
world alternately or jointly, politics and cold rar or a Mhooting
war must be used as circumetancea demand.
War has a total and p.rmsnent character as lohg as the caeitallet
states and classes in the world are not yet wiped out and wr-,rkera and
peasants are not liberated from slavery: Consequently every ear
with the Anglo-Saxon caeitilist nations le justified.
U. The major theme ef this communlst thinking is, in the new eeleting
state of total war between the U.S.S.R. and the eaelealint tate, that
l'Awr Sovjet Army has to he comeleeele integratee and co-ordinated'
with political ar7a. Thorefore a succeeful world peace carviviliv
a new big steelplat somewhere in eiberia, a geeral etrlice in Feanee,
a local victory of Ho Chi ny in 'el? China or of the Tukbon7s in
Lhe Mbalippince etc., are ,.ecarded 411 tactical movne en the eermaeeet
war with the ca lealist states.
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12. In this respect i4 should be keptln min that a wedden and
enigmatic retr6at or Chinese troop n Korea, the suroriae bid
or !'alik for a cease-fire and an arra tics in Korea, ean no
len ?er be explained by tactical or strategical factors only.
'ouch decisions may also have been taken for polWeal reasons.
13. Ie this way of thinlOng, oold liar or a shooting war must no longnr
be .omducted by military leaders, but by the rolitburo. And to
Query out directives io harmony 114.th ohs inkentions of the TDelltburo,
tlo femoral Staff of the Ar; and the Naval Staff and Aie!orce Staff
muet be iohued vi,h co unit ,loctrines. Since Fe77.116M, 1947, ihen
Comoandor on ale: Varehal Zhukaw vies dismissed becaose hie cencepts
of ierene.Ixe strotelo eloshed with the dynamic prirnirles or Stalin's
new etrateoo and was 'rlaced by- flarehal Vassilewskr, all otaff officers
above the rank of oa-,tain in tlarshal Vassilewsky's teneral Staff,
have to be peety members.
14. According to leisoian military thinking, O,o'ld war Malin otart
with mass-at,acke Cron the air in w lob all kind of wes-ono,
4-bombs included, will le used. Phis win lead to a oenoorary
paoal*,sis of the attacked etaielbut not to comrlote :.estouction
Ln: the economic :review rk of its nili'cAro nowor. No oeeion can
13e expected in this : rst phase or the ear and the Runsian leaders
believe that the etamina of their own peo-le will he -uch reater than
that a heir ooponents, oven In case Lhe capiLaliat states shoeld
uee oter entire stock of A-bombs.
15. Thereafter a protected period of a war of attention will follow
on a far more terrible scale than in world war II, waood.leith
corrtentiortal weapons such as jet-planes, 'rocket guns, oatded
missiles etc. In this loosiod all newoeapons will be effectively used
and all o:fensive action will be based upon vastly increesed
mobility arid firepower.
18. Then cooes the decisive phose in which either one of the oppononts.
will mount an oLensive aiming complete annihilation of the eohausted
enemy and ending with operational pursuit on a strategical scale.
The U.S,S.R. believes itself to be superior to all its
potentialopponents not only because of her defence forces, which
are superior in nutners aod equal to those of the capitalist states
in quality of armeeent, but also throwthits ability to foment
revolutions behind the enemy's lines.
17. Though this last swoostion is open to doubt as far as various
countries are concerned, it can not 'he denied, that deeing the
last elections in Orence 5 million people, one quarter of the
electorate, voted for the communist party and for the tips being
there are no ounsLantial indications that since 1948 the Italian
communists hew, lost maroo of their adherents any sympathizers.
Defence planainG in 7ies5orn Lurope will have to find an
eOeluate selution for keopine under control the laeoe fifth columns
in France and Italy.
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II. The industrial irsmework of Russian 434,--tar7 power.
1.
Li world war I the Taaristio iserire had met disaster brcuase the
Pisani= heart industries could not provide the er-y with badly, needed
arrement, munitions ani eqpi,,ment. In that war the nussian arir was
saved from col to annihilation by the awful oondition of the
Ialasian roads and the railvaysystim. Once more On Claneewitzen
theory, that geography was Russia's invincible ally, was conf!,rmed.
2. Vihen the Bolshevist rage eame into paacr it decided that, at
the cost of the Russian farmer, largo industrial centres should be
established in the tonna :),ri sonn us possible. Soon after the communist
refolution it was also ',.'ecided to eatablish large industrial ocatres in
the Uralos Siberia and Central Asia. stalin and To-avevenov
worked out plans for these remote re7iona? arrording sefety n}7ainst
sir-attack.
3.. On October 27, 1924 they presented their plans tm the Konintern.
They were accepted and carried est. When range and .7,ovibloads
of modern boMbers raAdly increased, Yolotov declared in 1939 that the
construction of new ;,lants in Moaoew, Leningradi the coal- ,
been of Donbas-district in Southern ramie and other big cities
vas istriatly forbidden. The European part of the ii
now raridly losing its pre -dominance in output of heavy tndestries,
particularly rolled steel, to the tlrals, Kutzbas and Karal.anda.
(see map).
World war III has speeded up this shirt to the East of the
iron and steel industries of Doebae-Krivoiree to the Urals and beyond.
4. The main coalb,sins in Siberia, Kutzbas and Kare,7anda have ,Ievelloped
with enormoua strides. Since 1940 coal output of Kutzbas has mre than
doubled and amounts now to 40 million tons yearly, while the
production of Karalanda is now nearing 17 million tons.
While in the fourties Kutsbas provided Magnitoeersk in
the Urals with coal, Karaganda coal is now increasingly raed
for smelting in the Urals, while Kut a5 coal is new uaed or srnelting
ore of local deposits.
S. It should be bortle in mind, that the Stalin-Teraveaaenov-plan for
industrialisation of Russian Territory East of the Urals was not ?
only inspired by von 019usawitzes concepts of Ruasiala defensive strategy.
Already in 1923 Stalin states 1:. accordance with Lenin's thaats
"that Russia must turn her :ace to the East, tai:ing int'.-J accourt. the
enormous reserves Which are still slumbering thore. The rastern
peoples of Siberia aril .'.4prttral. Asia linked with China and India are
particularZy important for worldrevaution....and the awakening of the
east should become our prir:ary teak."
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-5-
Stalin has never been an advocate of defensive Etratel7 ui
the communist struggle for werldrevolution. He only- 41dopted a
defensive strathct aa lon7 as the U.O.SR. did not e__-___117_11-
posal a large armyi,navy, an d airforce and .racticall,Y invulneraaae
industries to ewply them w',th weapons, munition and oil etia.
6. The industries of the Veils and beeoni are i7;tdely dispersed in
LTheria and rAntral Asia. Even within these indestriAl cr711tr"
acceculAions of factoriei4sd mines have been avoieed and they
cannot be wholly destro.ycil by & small nulber of A..boile?
7. .As is clearly shown on the nap the indestrial centres of Siberia
And Central Asia are the economic frammoork for an offensive action
against China and India and are also ,'esighed to keep China and
India under control in the future. 11.1rkisar, Kutehas,71/ra.7,Anda,
Lake naikal Astrict and irj*liwostok are all connected b7 men car van
roa.is and railways with Chia'. All these 11m7s of colnunieetien
converge on the coast or rorthern China above the Ymng Tss rje
between Shanghai and the Southern tip of Korea.
6. This coastal region is now ltwgely controlled by American jet_
fiehters, based on the eirfield of 1-,:.1,7reo near Seoul, which cepa
newi be, 4ve efficient support ia) any offensive amphibian7operation
by Chian Kai Shekts i-xoops on the coast of the Yellow Sas betWeen
%alchow and Deiren.
Cr the other hand this large r1eg of 'aussian industrial
centres may serve for the defense of the Siberian Heartland.
9. A the same time the imtuatrial centres of Trans-Caucnnia, Taschkent
wel Siegkiang are Jesijnoi as :rtz.atogic offensive Ileses against Iran,
! Iraq, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.
A possible sol04on of the problem of the Russian rieneral 5taff,
namely how to conquer 1;outhern Asia in case these countries mitht nide
with the Cemocracies in 'erldear ILL, has 1A)en Indicaterl on the map.
10. Using the well known reograr:tical Methods or Napolsontt; s%rategioal
planning only roads, which can be used for strategic rurposes are marked
on this map.
btt
224 Hy studying this map it is clear, that there are only two ways to carry
out a successful attempt to destroy the Hsatland of the U.S.S..
On the one hani it could be oltstroyed by a.strateeic operation
through Iran and Arghani3tan against Taschkent? Ketabas and
Karaganda, The 115.S.R. can obviate this operation by. oecllpying
Iran and Afghanistan in cEae tdhse countries should not remain neutral.
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On the other hand the Allies coed launch an attack thrOMEb
NanchUkuo and Northern China against the vital indwell**
centres of Kutabas, Karaganda and Lake Baikal distriet4 It 28
highly probable that, in order to prevent such offenedve Allied
operation in Noeldwar the communists have tri to throw
the Allies out of Korea.
In this respect, the Japanese visit, %kat communist aggression
in South Korea is a preliminary action to an invasion of Japan
proper, is probWM17 correct. Above all the Moscow leaders *XI
try to avoid.* two-front war with a distance of some 10,000 wiles
between the European and the Asiatic front.
13. Meanwhile the successful onslaught of the Alliedtiroops in Korea
has put the communists in a dangerous predicament. Effective
bombing by B 29's operating from airfields south of the 38th
of the 4ital industrial centres of Kutsbas, Karagam&S
and Lake Baikal district in case of Worldwar III, is questionable.
The routine range of these bombers is only 1,500 miles. But
a Shattering blow might be dealt to the key indestriesof the
U.S.S.R. in Lake Baikal district by B 29's based *airfields
North of the line Pyongyang-Wonsan. As a result Ole atomic, stock-
piles and the hardsteel.alloys factories, vital to the production
of cutting tools and machinetools, electronice equipment, jet
-
engines, armor-piercing shells, atomic-energy work etc., of the
Anggsca valley (Nest of Lake Baikal), could be wiped out.
24. Supported by her industrial centres beyond the Urals, the U.S.S.R.
hold a strong, practically invulnerable position in Asia as long
as the Chinese troops of Mao The Tung can hold their awn. But in
the event of Worldwar III the Chimes communists might acme into
a very difficult position, if Manchukuo should be occupied by Chiang
Kai Shek's troops, supported by Allied forces. Then communications
between China and the U.S.S.R. would be cut off, "hits the
industries of Manchukuo would be destroyed or fall into the hands
of the Allied troops. This would be a heavy blow to the Communist
cause in Asia. for the capacity of the industries of China proper
in too small to supply Mao Tee Tungla armies. Moreover theme
industries, which are concentrated in four or five big towns,
could easily be destroyed by air-attacks.
IS. If we take a clear view of the industrial framework of Russia's
military power, it is obvious, that the economic bulwark of the
Urals and beyond will play a rola of primary importance in
defensive and offensive strategical planning of the U.S.S.R.
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1334 The manpower problem of the U.S.S.R.
lt may be expected, thet in worldwar III all the
Western Europe, except perhaps Britain, Spain and Per
will soon be occupied by the %seism armies.
2. Thereafter however, in the second phase of Worldwar III the
Russians will have to face the same fateful manpoww-Problm
as Hitler in Worldwar II, but on a much larger scale.
Eltlerfe strategy on the inner lines failed, because he coad
not defeat the Russians in the East before the invasion of the
Anglo Americans startled An the West. But the main reason 1/117
be suffered defeat in Runlets was, that at the cost of his
striking force in Russia he had to lay strong garrisons in all
the conquered territories to maintain law and order and to guard
the extended coastline of Europe.
Today the strength of the armiee of the U.S.S.R. largeir dePonds
on her industrial potential. Stee-production of the U.s.SA?
and her Europeen satellites amounts to approximately 35 million
tone, about as much as the steel roductioit of Ge
territories
S prod
was suffic t or at supp iso of about 8 minion
german soldiers. Though presently the U.S.1;.1. has thett l5
million men available for enlistment in the Russian:igrOdess
irrespective of the divisions which can be raised from fifth
columns in occupied territories and satellite states, it is
reasonable to expect, that the u.n.s.R. and her satellites can
only provive the armament for about 8 million men.
5. If however they could seise the steelplante of Western Europe
with a production of about 38 million tons (British steel-.
production of 17 million tone not included), the Russians could
mobilise 15 million troops. Then little hope would be left for
the free world to win Worldwar XII.
6. Therefore the main object of the defence of Western Etropo most
be to prevent that the heavy industries and armament pis& of
Europe should fall into the hands of the Cnmmunist conquerors.
7. However, voluntary destruction of their heavy industries will be
V017 unpopular among the peoples of Western Europe, though complete
destruction of steelplants will not be necessary in moat cases,
provided destruction of vital parts be carefully and acientificalIY
prepared.
Moreover it should be borne in mind, that if in the thi-d
phase of the morldwar the Russians should be forced to retreat
by a counteroffensive of Allied forces, the former will carry
out an all-cut scorched earth plan to Europe tn order to prevent,
that the free world forces might use the valuable war potential
or Western Europe.
Therefore it. is futile to try to save the heavy industries of
Western Europe, if the Communiets would overrun the couhtries of the
West.
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leas the total streegth of every modern army large3or depends
oil the industrial freepwork of the state, in =darn warfare yet
another manpower-problem =O b. solved. Adecision must be
taken Concerning the strength Of territorial troops and.
operational troops.
The task of these Allied teeettorial troops will be to fjght
fifth columns and airborne troops, to maintain law and:order, to
guarantee the carrying out of destructions of plant., communications
etc.
On the other hand the strength of the Russian operational
striking force large4 depends on the strength of the garrisone
which are needed in oce*Oetterritories. Though theitemberof
communists and their sympathisers is impressive in ream, and Itaiy,
the U.S.S.R.. expects that she will have to cope with Strong
resistant)* movements in several of the occupied. territories in
Europe.
Moreover large bodies of territorial troops will be needed te-
guard the extended coastlines of the Atlantic and the Medi-
Mean in case the Russians should not succeed in occeTring both
entrances to the latter, vist Sues and Gibraltar.
10. Little more than a delaying action ambit expected re* the
35,000 British troops in the Suez Canal sons, even in supported
by the troops of the Arab League. But Gibraltar can only fall
Into the hands of the U.S.S.R. if the Western peelers, Spain and
Portugal included would suffer defeat.
Therefore Gibraltar is one of the key-points of "astern
defensive strategy.
U. If the Straits of Gibraltar are kept open, the U.S.S.R. willsuf er
a serious loas in striking power of her operational troops, because
a large body or territorial troops, will be needed to guard the
Mediterranean coastline.
nr. The ';;estern Front.
1. In a strategic offensive against the Western front it might be
expected, that the Russians w113 apply their favourite pattern
of assault, vis. massed frontal assault with thrusts of encirclements
to cut off rear communications, all maneuvres being carefully timed.
2. In this way of military thinking the frontal attack might be
launched somewhere to the North of Switzerland against the central
sector of the Nato front in France and the Low Countries. Thereupon
the Allied High Command might be forced to plug an eventual gap in
this front with troops held in reserve.
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Then the Russians might shift the might of their 'UM* to the
Northern wing of the central sector, trying to captor. /5s-?t65(2r*
the only continental port mithout la* in the SentillenPar .1
the North Sea. Driving down their attack to the math, parallel
to the coast, they will try to prevent4 necond Oninkerkew".."Pe
of defeated allied troops or the forming of a Wendy*/ bridgehead
soremhere on the Atlantic coast.
At the same time Russian *rotes night invade Ingollawria and
following the Savo.valley, they sight try to break throughlIT?,
Italian Isonso front. Advancin7 through the Po-valurko they 7;44
reach southern France and the 4erimes. If they shooid succeed
in cutting off the defeated Nato troupe from SpidadiAhdre 11/_.
little hops that general France can hold the nottitainpassee Of
the Pyrenees, and as a consequence of a Spanish defeat Gibraltar
would fall in Russian hands.
Should the U.S.S.R. seise bath entrances of the Metittairanean,
then she would be able to save a large body of territorial troops,
no longer needed to defend the enormous -coastline of this 111114
If, however, Gibraltar mull remain in allied hands, the Us
will retain the initiative for an offenaime operation end eight
strike in the soft underbelly, sminwhere in the Balkiest Or the
Middle East,
6. From a purely strategic point of view it seems preferable to
rearm Spain and to keep the Iberian Peninsula as a bridgeheakfer
combined land and amphibian operettas's. This decision heeedir,
will meet with strong political oppodition Prom France and Great
Britain.
7. If on the other hand the Allies should soased in maintaining a
bridgehead of about 500 square miles sortewhers on the Atlantic. 'Oast,
this bridgehead woult be a very vulnerable target for A-bombs spid ?
atomic artillery and for concentrated Russian masseattaake by,leed
and from the air. Moreover control over the greater part of the
Atlantic coast would give the Ruesion submarines the port-facilities
needed for operations against the limes of communication between
Europe and America.
t. From this analysis of a hypothetical Russian offensive strategy
it becomes clear, that even if the optimists should be right and
the operational forces of the Nato might muster 40 divisions in
the spring of 1953, they not be able to resist the onslaught
of 100 to 150 Russian divisions,
9. Therefore the objectives of Allied defensestrategy in Western
Europe should hes
a. to prevent a Russian attack on the Western front by apes
buMing up an operational defense force of at least 80
divisions,
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b. If this policy of military 000Stianent of the
Can not be carried out effectively in the new future,
maintenance of the Karean hilt is of vital imperlease
for the security of Europe. For fighting on teetronts
10,000 miles Billet will raise 90 imam problems*
logistics, thattO
venture a third Itueleisali 'eight hesitate
c Should the n e Plaunch an attack against Western
. e
Europe, irrespective of these considerations, the main
Objectives or defeesive Allied strategr should be
1. to uecure demolition of the heavy- armaseati. and
equipment industries of western Europe ?Ty delaying
actions of the aIlied operational forcesvfeeParree?.
by territoriel troops, protecting the deillition
squads against attacks of fifth oelnens and airborne
enemy troops;
2. to seems the Iberian bridgehead until tr
supplies are rushed in for starting an of
operation against the nusaiana.
In the renewable future demolition of the European war
potential can be the only objective of Allied defense strategy.
Therefore orgallsation training anU alinement of territorial
bataljons is of primer; impertance. This will not &ler the
formation of operational divisions. As soon as sufficient heavy
armament and eqpipment is at hand, these infanterrlestaljons,
trained an oommandols, will form the core of new infantery dteisions.
(For the organisation of territorial bataljons see Appendix I.)
Moreover arming guerillas with small area is less 00647
while their training costs less time.
These territorial troops should never surrender and should fora
the core of guerilla units. Maw men and women will be willine
to join these guerillas and to fight for their lives and their
country. For Air= soon be clear that in case the %widens
should occupy Europe they woad not ?pare their class enemies.
Mass deportation to Oulag camps meld take place mmivelliene weed
never return.
12. The Moscow leaders are well aware of the dangers of he so-called
"small war", which might cripple their striking force of Tnfantery-
and armed divisions. A special bureau of the Russian Osnorel
Staff has been set ep under General lova, the military expert on
"small ware operations and has specialised in guerilla warfare.
The importance of enemy guerillas is no longer disregarded by the
adherents of the new military doctrines of eeneral Shaposnikov,
Stalins former brainernet.
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13. Though the Russians are cone &nit that they oan over-OW
'Europe in a Blitz, they are well aware that in the lonit run
they cannot resist a general Allied counter-offentive. Not
only their war potential is much smaller, but they will also
have to,cope with IMMO:to problems of logistics.
14. They expect that in this counter-offensive Allied land faros,'
supported by amehibian operations will force the Russian armies
to retreat through the endless plains of Europe and Russia.
Communist rearguard actions ?113. be supported by their fifth
Aolumns guerillas and Europe idal be devestated by aeon planned
wombed earth policy.
T. Russians expect that the Allied armies will penetrate
far into European Russia until their offensive is completely linen
out. Then the Allied forces will be routed and utterly defeated
by a strong Russian counten-offensive.
15. llse Russia be retained from invading Europe by the deterrent
alliance of the Nato? /t is impossible for Western mrope to
build up impressive joint armed forces at short notioe, to **event
a Russian invasion. For not much time is left. There is evert
chance that in the spring of 1952 the U.S.S.R. will have sufficient
Ac-bomba to retaliate in CAM the U.S.A. Should use these bombs
;against the Russians in Worldwar III. From that date on nothing
'could prevent the Russians from invading Europe, except perhaps,
the Korean bridgehead on the Continent of Asia.
V. Defense problems and the ispertanos of the oilfields Of the )ii44
34 Neither Iran, nor Iraqi Saudi Arabia, Syria or the Lebanon
able to offer strong resistance to a Russian invasion in force.
Jordan and Israel have the best armies, but could also be overrun
esaily by mechaaised divisions of the U.S.S.R.
2. Turkey's position in delicate. le the event of a third Vorldwar
-she will have to defend her 120 miles long Bulgarian border and
her Russian frontier of 300 miles with her army of about 1 million
troops, iris. 25 operational divisions, auxilliary forces and
territorial troops.
Turkey wants guarantees of effective support by the United
States and &sat Britain in case she could be attacked :07 Russia
and her satellites. With Persia cruebling and some oontinental
Nato-nations opposing her membership of the Atlantic Papt,, she would
not lack excuses for remaining neutral. Nor does she reliefs the
ideas of a Biddle East Pact with the uestable Arab States, which
could involve her in a war with Russia, wherein she would have to
face the main weight of the Russian onslaught.
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TUrkish neutrality Would be a disaster. As a consegempee the
Sues Canal sone will have to bear thebrunt of figh404. This
is the anly African defense line of the British Empire. It is
defended by 35,000 British troops. Moreover there are 8 native
bataajons with,Eurapean cadres, which are widely scattered over
the British African colonies.
4. The states of the Arab league are not strong enough to resist a
Russian attack and they probably will be forced to adopt the same
ambiguous attitude as Siam ana Indo-.China in Warldwir II, vben
those states were invaded by the Japanese. Moreover it is doubt.
ful whether there will be a joint ccOmand of British and Egyptian
forces in case of a Russian Rata* or any active support from
Egyptian forces for a common defense of the Sues Canal sone.
Under them conditions it is dbvioUs that the British forces
can only fight a delaying action, but can not resist a Russian
attack of overwhelming forces. The United Kingdom hag OM asked
her white dominions to support her in her defense effort in the
Sues Canal cone with men and materials.
In case or emergency air-attacks can be launched against the
invading Russians from the airfields of Turkey, if she does not
remain neutral, Cypress, Cairo, Hibbania (west of Bagdad),?
Dhahran, Marfak (Jordan) and from aircraft carriers. Mem
airattaeks may hamper and delay the Russian onslaught in the Middle
East, but cannot prevent the fall of the Sues Canal sone. Then
the way to Africa will be open for the Russians.
6. The loss of the oilfields of the Middle East would be a severe
blow to the oileupplies of the Allied armed forces. As in werldwar
II the Allies will largely depend on the oil supplies of Central
and South America, where drilling in Venesuela is speeded up to
attain a production of 100 millidh tons yearly. But the quantities
of oil needed in worldwar III will be much larger than in the last
war, for turbo-jets use 4 to 5 times as =oh fuel as reciprocating
engines.
Standard jet-fuel for turbo jets is krrosine. In the U.S.A.
however, the trend is away from kerosine and towards a peroleum
product beteeen kerosine and gasoline.
This will raise many problems of fuel supply. For only 7 to 9
per cent kerosine and 10 to 12 per cent avaiation spirit can be
recovered from the world's crude oil production. Though efficiency
of aircraft also largely depends on successful gasturbine design,
factors of economics and availability of suitable fuel grades will
be vital for determining air superiority. In this respect the loss
of the oilfields of the Middle East in case of a Russian invasion
in worIdwar III, will hamper the establishment of Allied air-
superiority.
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8. (On the other hand the estimated oil production of the TAA?841?
In 1950 amounted te out 36 million tons. Large quantities
of kerosine are needed for tractorstations of Russian:collective
farms irrespective of the large kerosine consumptie4 by turbo-
jets of the Russian airforce. Production of dieseltractors is nee
Invaded up to save kerosine fee turbo-jets. Moreover the Russians
are short of lubricating oil.
9. /
Production of the oilfields of Orosany and Baku is rapid-1r
dishing, while drilling and prospecting in Central Asia and
elsewhere has been rather unsuccessful.
Though production mt the new Ishimbai oilfield is important,
it is now clear, that I&1Ph1 will not become a second Baku.
'Iroduction of the relatively hew Emba oilfield on the Caspian
Sea is already diminishing. In this reapeot some oil experts even
think that the Kremlin is several million barrels daily Nagy from
touching off a worldwar.
10. It the Russians should ooeupy the oilfields of the tiddls East
they can not in the foreseeable future transport large quantities
of oil by the one track lranian mountain railroad to Russia. It
is theoretically possible to construct a pipeline across the 10,000
foot mountains to the Caspian nea ar to Tiflis. But any such
project must be dismissed as a practical proposition.
11. Nevertheless the Russians might resort to the exploitation of
the Middle East oilfields and refineries to solve their supply -
problems of petroleum products needed for an operation in Africa.
12. Moreover the loss of the oilfields .of the Middle East will make
Allied forces, operating in the South and South-West Pacific,
largely dependent on the oilfields in Indonesia and British Borneo.
These oilfields will soon have an approximate production of 10
million tons yearly.
Should these oilfields fall in oommuniat hands, then the Allies
would have to cope with the difficult problem of oil supplies in
this part of the world. On the other hand Russian subnerinea and
aircraft operating in thu South and South-West Pacific could be
easily supplied with fuel.
VI. The Communist Offensive in the Orient.
1. Communist cold war propaganda does its utmost to incite the main
controversies between the peoples of the Orient and their white
rulers by stirring up class-struggle, class-hatred and movements
for national revolt.
2. Moscow has known better than the western democracies that premature
liberation of the peoples of the Orient, and Africa would create
political, economic and social chaos in these territories. As a
reoult Western private capital would no longer be invested in these
liberated countries, having become politically unsafe. Living
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standards of the poor would rapidly decline end as a ocfl...
sequence these countries would soon be transformed into
hotbeds of coessunists.
3. In some of these newly liberated countries a large leading
class and a prosperous middle oloSs Could hold the balance
against the masses of the people:. Coed and 'table gavernmonts
could be established in countries such as India, Pakistan,
and Ceylon, where no chaotic conditions prevail.
4. But in the Philippines there is only a relatively smell leadimg
class of intellectuals awl capitalists, a largely Chinese middle
class and masses of extremely poor farmers.
These people, living in asthma misery and poverty have
provided the core of the revolutionary Hukbahalap guerillas. It
is highly probable that within some years these cammunist forces
will become a serious threat to the 'illustradoes" or better
classes.
The Hukbahalap movement has now spread from Luzon to the
Isle of Panay.
54 In Burma the leading classes are much smaller than in the
Philippines and until now the political leaders have been
unable to establish law and ardor in this unhappy country. Since
Britain granted freedom to Burma Uwe has been constant civil war.
There exists in Burma a strong middle-class of Indians and.
most of the managers of Burmese trades _are foreigners. Burma's
social structure is unstable and soon the objective conditions
for a communist revolution will prevail.
6. In Indonesia the leading class is extremely small. Mot more
than 0.035 per cent of the population are graduates or under-
graduates of a university or have had high school education.
This leading class of Intellectuals is too small to maintain an
efficient garernment. Moreover about 95 per cent of the managers
and owners of factories, workshops and estates are foreigners mostly
Europeans, Chinese and Arabs.
7. To date the econamic, political and social situation in Indonesia
is rapidly becoming chaotle. The big oommunist-controlled trade
unions do all that is in their power to keep down production and to
stir up strikes. They obediently follow the pattern of action
laid down by the ambassador of eommunist China in Djakarta, aiming
at inflation and skyrocketing of4rices and wages. Intimidation
of workers who refuse to strike has even been sanctioned by one of
the Ministers of Labour. But sore time this year or next the
wages must go down, if prices in the world market deteriorate, while
costs are going up. Then the fat will to in the fire and the danger
to Indonesia frasztonsunism will be greatly increased. (The Economist,
23-6-1951, p.1512)4
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in Indonesia as well as in Burma emd the Philippines Oars
e dangerous social tensions which already have remitted
in revolt and bloodshed. Social, economic and politieel
conditions in these countries are favourable for osimunist
class-struggle and class-hatred-propagenda.
It might perhaps be possible to combat communist class struggle
propaganda in the Orient, by point fOur plans, social refaces
and better standards of living. But is there apy way out for a
*elution of the problem of race-hatred leach arises from an
inferiority complex of coloured people?
IO. Russian propaganda is teaghing the coloured people that race-
hatred is incompatible with the principle of fraternising with
all the proletarians of the world. This communist line of
propaganda seems t? be effective.
But is there any effective meana for the white free world
nations to appease race-hatred? Europe's relations with the
Orient are riddled with distrust. For instance too mash lood
will and friendliness is felt as humiliation by the coloured men.
U. The levelheaded schemers of Moscow know that it is very diffieult
to combat race-hatred and distrust. And to dissipate distrust,
everywhere in the Orient Russian communist tactics enter the
patriotic road. National phrases are used by cowsunist propaganda
rather than clasesar formulas and an appeal is made to national
unity. Everywhere United Poples Front Parties are establiehed
with a strong national tendency.
Moscow carefully avoids any frustation of national feelings
in Asia and stigmatisee,the Western imperialist states with
suppression and exploitation of the coloured nations of Alia and
Africa.
This is also the main reason why they abstsin from Siy direct
attack on a coloured nation and have resorted to attack by proxy
in Korea and Indo China.
12. Nevertheless Moscow knows, that race-hatred does not only exist
between white and coloured races. Severe clashes have occurred
between Indians and Africans in South Africa and between Indonemians
and Chinese in Java. Those, who have studied the photographs of
the horrible mass-graves of Chinese men, women and children,
slaughtered by the soviet-orientated republicans of Ilocja, must
admit that the problem of race-hatred has a much wider scope and
that in future these terrible clashes may be repeated in Indonesia.
13. It is necessary, that the Allied farces should adopt a common line
of policy in the Orient. Never a direct attack should be launched
against one of the nations of the Orient. Their line of policy
should be to give active support to on. or more rival groups.
Therefore an attack in Worldwer III on China proper should be
launched by Chiang Kai Shek's troops supported by the Allies who
must provide him with the weapons and supplies he needs, specifically
modern aircraft, flown by white *volunteers".
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14. The balance of raciel teuling1l tip in I:avow of the likite
man, if either actively or merely =wally he coolie toll* aid
of a coloured nation of South or South Best Asia, ieSeded by
Chinese "volunteer". In this respect a notable ?Wings in
India's attitude against China has taken place since the Chinese
oecupation of Tibet,
15. In countries whore the Chinese middle-class is accused of the
exploitation of the poor classes, as is the case in
Indonesia, anti Chinese raee.feelings, if skilfully handed by
allied propaganda, may Meek into an internecine straggle with
Chinese volunteers.
16. As a consequence of this line of policy, the EDER-generals should
play an active part in the negotiations of an armistice in Korea
With their opponents.
In worldwsr III every move in Asia Should be based on the
principle, that it supports the rightful cause of anti-Communist
groups.
VII. India and Pakistan.
1. Since 1940 Pundit Nehru aimed at e federation of all the nations
of Southern and South East Asia and China, Be expected that after
Worldsar II the Western World would he divided in federated
groups of states and he argued, that Indians and Africans should
refuse to become just hangers-on of these may eetablished
groups. ',For a federated Europe, or Europe and America taken
together, will exploit the Eastern nations and delay their
freedom. Therefore we must look forward...to an Eastern
federation of nations".
It vas Obvious that in 19h0 'oandit Nehru was sizing at
united front of coloured people against political and .conrnic
aggression of Europe and America.
2. After the war Pandit Nehru changed his line of policy and tried
to establish a Southern Asiatic Federation comprising India,
Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Malaya. This federation
with a strong anti-comeunist tendency Should be instrumental to
exert pressure on every white nation in the East, the Middle East
and in the near future also in Africa.
3. China did not belong to this Southern Asiatic Federation. Never-
theless in 1950 Pandit Nehru has given political support to the
communist Chinese agressors in Korea. Is he Still hoping, as he
suggested in 1940, that China in the long run would line up with
the coloured races of Asia against the white nations of Europe
and America, Russia included?
4. It is obvious that his policy of an United Asian Federation is
purely opportunistic and definitely pro-Asiatic. Therefore the
value of this federation for the struggle of Western demeeraoies
against the Communists is questionable.
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Moreover the joint armies of India andPakistan are nOt
stronger than 150,000 man, while the &mem,* indusses
O f India can not supply even this relatively small forte
with arnmment and equipment.
Moreover the Kashmir dispute will obviate ce-operation
in a common cause even againstRussian invaders.
As has been indicated on the nap it may be expected that a
Russian operation to conquer these states, in 0A0O they
Should side with the Allies in Worldwar III, will probably be
-amapleted in a campaign of less than six months. It is
queitionable whether the free democracies will be able to give
them much effective support against the Russian onslaught in the
first phase of Worldwar III. Thus these nations unavoidably
will feel themselves betrayed by their Allies.
Therefore it would be wise to avoid any military commitments
in these countries and to advise them to remain nemtral,
VIII. South East Asia.
1. The prerequisite of every stable,gtwernment in Asia is to
promote production and welfare and to prevent chaos by main-
taining law and order. Liberation from colonial rule, however,
has been detrimental to economic, political and social eenditiens
In Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines.
It is open to disuussion whether the liberation of these
countries was. premature or materialised too quickly. It cannot
be denied though, that misery and poverty now prevail among the
large majority of these nations and that rapidly they will be
transformed into communist hotbeds where "objective conditions
of revolution" are ripening.
2. The nations of South-and South-East Asia are now convinced, that
the white man is on his way out. But they are not yet aware,
that the Chinese communist imperialists who will replace them,
might be worse than their former colonial masters. Fer the time
being some of them seem willing to acoopt the help of these
Chine communists.
On the other hand no responsible section of Western public
opinion now wishes to restore the colonial system.
3. Even in this cold war phase it is doubtful whether the regular
armies of Burma, Siam, Indo China and Malaya might resist an
attack in form of Chinese *volunteers" supported by communist
rebel guerillas,
4. To date the French army has defeated Ho Chi MIMI', troops, whirh
were trained and armed in China. If, however, the 300,000 well
trained Chinese troops in Kwangsi and Yunnan would be on the move
to invade indo China as volunteers, the French probably could not
resist them.
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In this respect it mai be eta/Nested, that preen:viably not
Indo China but Burma will have to bear the brunt of an *Sack
of Chinese volunteers. It can reseesSably be expected#Ahat
Chinese volunteers might support the4iebel Burmese vierillas
of Nang Saw, their leader in Kachen Northam Burma,' wh? have
been armed and trained in China. If the 10,000 rebel Burmese
guerilla' elsewhere in Northern Burma should side with these
Kitchen guerillas and Chinese volunteers, Wesel's justifiSto
*Mime that the regular*lWrmese army of 30,000 mon will be
defeated.
6. It is moreover an ominous sign, that Head Quarterivof the
nPeoplete Liberation Army" wildohuill operate in the whole of
Louth East Asia has now been established in Mon Lin in Northern
Burma as a mall point for South East Alia. Burma is the
powder keg of South Bast Asia.
7. If the communist succeed in conquering the rich rise:fields or
the Irraweddy_deIta, they will have sufficient food-supplies for
: their operations in the rest of South Bast Asia, in C880 ftrldwer
III should break out.
8. Then they could overrun easily Siam and the laths= of Ira,
cutting off the railroad communication between Singapore EX
Bangkok.. Then the way into Indo China and Malaya would be open
to them. It is not to be expected that Siam will offer much
resistance to a Chinese attack. Apart from the perennial struggle
for supremacy between the army, airforce and navy Pibul Sangria's
regime is opposed by the leftist sympathisers of Pridi Penamying,
who is now in Canton. If supported by strong Chinese forces and
red fifth columns he can set-up a red puppet-government.
9. If, however, in worldmar III Siam should be conquered by the
communists the French army now repelling the violent attacks of
Bo Chi Minh in the Tonkin delta of Northern Indo China, would be
taken by surprise in the rear.
10. Moreover in the strategic pattern of South East Asia the Isthmus
of Kra, belonging to Siamese and Burmese territory, 300 miles to
the North of the Malayan border is the key-point of defence of the
Malayan peninsula. A British effort to keep the 30 miles wide
isthmus might be successful. But the British forces in Malaya
are not strong enough to hold the 150 miles long border of Wale
and to prevent large infiltrations of communists, who will be
supported by Chinese guerillas, operating in their rear in Malaya.
Using the same infiltration tactics as the Japanese, a Chinese
force receiving support from the large Chineee community in Melva,
will soon be able to overrun the Whole peninsula and Singapore.
?
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1.
Akimmunist armies with heavy armament and equipment will not
be Able to cross the 120 miles wide Straits of Malacca because
they do not dispose of sufficient amphibian material and ships
to carry out big landing operations and island-hopping maneuvres.
However, large scale Infiltrations of communist infantery units
and coranandols from Maley* into the provimos Eastmain of Sumatra
in native promise, can, not to prevented by the small garissons
at the poorly armed Indonesian National Army. Moreover it is to
be expected, that the invaders will be eupported by local eommuni t
Ctmrill* 'a,
3. After having conquered the airfields of Sumatra supplies could
be flown into Sumatra and in their southern drive the communists
will soon control the oilfields of Southern Sumatra.
46 From this Southern part of Sumatra and by infiltrations crossing
the Straits Sunda, they'll]. soon gain :control over Java. This
island wiLl not offer ammeiresistance. It is even expected, that
in the foreseeable future communist government will be in
power in the republic of Indonesia, as a result of years of
communist burro-wings.
5. zit is now a well established fact, that in August 1945 the
Indonesian Republic was not proclaimed by the Japanese, but by
the Communist Students Committee, which after having kidnapped
Hatta md Sukarno forced them to-establish the Indonesian Republic
and provided them with instructions from Moscow.
6. These instructions have been laid down in the so-called last will
of Sukarno and Hatta while at the same time four smcceasore of the
two leaders, vies comrades Tan Malakka, Na Kusuma Sumantrie,
Sukarni and the well-known Buten Sjahrir were nominated in case
Sukarno and Hatta shouLl not be able to carry out the directives
of Moscow.
7., In February 1949 the Netherlands Government published a pamphlet
to warn the Security Council and the United Nations for the
dangerous burrowing of the Communists in the Netherlands Indies. 1)
1) 1114y political negotiations between the Netherlands and the
Indonesian republic failed. p.1I-15.
No heed, however, was ever paid to these warnings.
Since sovereignity has been transferred to the Indonesian Republic,
the communista of the Students Committee supported by the communist
batalions of the Siliwangi division of the regular Indonesian Army,
have liquidated by farce the federal states East Java, Madura and
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itast Indonesia. They met, howeverwith fierce resieWanos in
the Republic of the South Moluccas and though the capital on
the Island of Ambon with its strategically important harbour
and airfields has fallen, iresistanoe is still offered in the
island of Ceram against the Ommsunist bataljons who now control
the larger part of the territary of the Republic of the South
Moluccas.
9. Nearly all the instructions reveilles:low, laid down in the legit
will of Sukarno and Hatta now have been carried out amt for "13
point, Western New Guinea, the springboard for an ollensive action
against Australia is still under control of the Netherlands.
10. As soon as the Republieof Indonesia will have been proolaimed the
Indonesian communists Will centact with the Hukbehalaps of the
islands of Pansy and Ws* in the Philippines and the Chinese
ccemuniste of Malaya. In this respect it should be mentioned,
that president's Sukarno's speedh on July 15, 1951 at $sndung,
was an open avowal of the principles of "marheinimmell, Indonesian
for "communist multinationalise".-
Since the end of the war this is theliteLLIEILIAIELtt!
president onhelnaonesian Bepublic_has aCilfaiiied in ecumenist,
Jargon thai-he is a Moscow communist.
U. In cats of worldwar III, Russian submarines, now already sighted
on the North coast of Now Guinea in the neighbourheod of the
oilharbour Sarong, will attack the lines of communications of the
American bases in the Philippines, using Indonesian port facilities.
Attacks from the air by aircraft operating from airfields of
North Celebes and North Borneo on these American bases also are to
be expected. Communist guerillas, supplied by airdropptngs, may
even attack American bases by land once they would have succeeded
in defeating the regular Philippine army.
12. Warldwar Mita]. be a war of attrition, in which economic factors
and transport will be of primary importance. While the U. %.R.
will have to cope with difficult problems of logistics, the
Allies will by their seepower control the sea lanes and will be
able to bny raw materials from non-communist overseas countries,
rubber, palmoil, petroleum products etc, from Indonesia.
Keeping open the tea lanes and controlling the main sources
of strategic war-materials is a prerequisite to win the war. If
Indonesia should come under communist domination, the Allies mould
lose control of important communications between the Pacific and
the Indian ocean, and between the Philippines and Australia.
Indonesia is not only a strategic key-point to play an important
role in worldwar III, it is also one of the main sources of strategic
war materials in the world.
There is no doubt that Indonesia is one of the principal cold-
war objectives of the U.S.S.R.
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1. Cold imr is only a preparatory phase of What war". This
communist principle implies that the main objective of cold-
war is to jockey into tbe most favourable position for waging
full-blooded war, However, precautions suet be taken to prevent,
that cold war doeireot flash into hot vier before Ruse's has
outmaneuvred her 40panents.
2. It is one of the guiding principles of Moscow, to resort to
eapertment before taking an important decision or launching a
large seals revolutionary offensive in any country.
The egression by comunist troops in North Korea must be
seen as In experiment of the Moscow leaders to test hOw far the
bourgeois states could be cowed by a bold cold ear move.
It is a seripeagetback for the U.S.S.R. when their experiment
in Korea backfired. Their effort to throw the United Nations
troops out at Korea failed and as a result there is no doubt,
that. Malik,* proposal for a clean fire and armistice is detri n
to Chin*' military prestige in Asia.
On the other hand the Ruasians hope that this now oemmunist
peace offensive will bring about a relax:tion of the Allied
rearroment.Wert. This might be dangerous for the cause of the
free world.
When the North Korean', launched their offensive across the 38th
parallel, the U.S.S.R. expected thillits in Korea to be over in
Ler 3 months. Using conquered Japanese war material and the
armament captured from the defeated troops of Chiang Kai Shek,
they expected that the Korean Blitz 'mid not impede their con
war-effort. But when the Blitz failed they had to provide the
greater part at the supplies needed by the Chinese and North
Korean forces.
Worst of ail, Korea has become a dangerous bridgehead on the
Continent of Asia for offensive operations against the communist
forces In case of Worldwar III.
Moreover in Worldwar III Chiang Kai Sheltie armies, trained en
equipped by the U.S.A., would almost certainly cross the Tau river
and supported by the United Nations troops and airforce might out
off the main lines of communication of the Sovjet Union with China
by mowing Manchukuo. At the same time the armement industries
of Manchukuo mould come under control of Chiang Kai Shigeo whoee
guerillas will also foment counter-revolution IA Southern China.
This would bring the Red Poking government into an sekeard position.
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W1w1' lost the industrial backbone for her armies, ememmnist-
China would probably no lorver be able to resist an oailsvitt
of Chiang's troops in lorthern China. Then the main industrial.
centres of the Russian Siberian bulwark, vim Karaganda Kutsbas
and Lake Baikal district would be exposed to heavy bcmar attacks
of B 29's operating from airfields in Northern China and Manchukuo.
8. As a result Russia would have to fight in worldwar III a two-front
var. This would be a dangerous drain of her war potential.
Moreover experience in lead:war II has taught her, that she could
support the Chinese to a tild.ted extent only.
9. At the end of Worldwar II the Russian General otaff planned
Manchurian Blitz of about two months against the Japanese Kwantung
Army, with an operational fords of 60 divisions of 9,000 men
supported by an airforce of 5,000 aeroplanes, 75,000 motorvehieles,
auxilliary forces etc. This fere. needed 400,000 to 500,000 tons
of !supplies monthly.
At the end of the war the capacity of the Trans Siberian
railroad, largely a two-track railway, amounted to about 36 trains
daily, carrying about 200,-000 tons of supplies -monthly, irrespeotive
of transport for civilian needs.
Since the war both tracks of the Transsib have been completed,
while plans are being carried out for the construction of four
tracks. There are, however, no trustworthy data on how far this
plan has been carried out thus far.
10. It seems a fair estimate, that to date the-ospacity of the Transsib
allows the Russians to maintain an operational army of 40 to 50
divisions in the Far East, needing 350.- to 400,000 tons of supplies
monthly.
This is a serious drain oh the Russian war effort.
U. History has taught the Russians that their European front is
practically invulnerable, becauee geography is Russia's strongest
Ally. But geography may become the direst enemy of the U.S.S.R. if
she would have to wage a war on two fronts. Therefore she will try
to avoid this at all wets. The only means to prevent a two-front
war is to remove the United Nations troops from Korea, by beating
them decisively, or by skilful political and diplomatic maneuvring.
12. Latest intelligence reports now estimate that the strength of the
Chinese airforce in Manchukuo is rapidly rising, while at the same
time 2 to 3 Chinese Field armies are moving from China into
Manchuria.
Moreover in China an intensive campaign has been hunched for
speeding up the production of warmaterial and collecting gifts for
a !sustained war effort in Korea. Ccemunist propaganda in China is
assuring the Chinese that the American &greasers will be thrown out
of Korea in January 1952.
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13. Uost notable of all is, that notwithstanding the heartless of
face, the Chinese have accepted te,negotiate an armistice, pro-
viding for a mutual withdrawal or11.1 non-Korean troops from the
parallel as had been proposed by the U.S.A, on December 15, 1950.
In case this proposition should be accepted and complete
evacuation of Korea should be carried out by all non-Korean
-troops, the Chinese troops concentrated in Sanchukuo, 'veld be
able to cross the Yalu at saraoment and could conquer the wbele
of Korea by a Blits, before the United Nations mull come to the
aid of the South Koreans.
Us,
But if, as a result of peace-negotiations, peace has been
restored in Korea and China would declare itself neutral in the
first phase of worldwar III, an invasion by United Nations troops
In Korea or soranidiere in China would stigmatise the free world
states as agressors. This would have its repercussions throughout
the whole Asian continent.
As a result the Allies might be forced to abstain from ally
Interference in China and Russia wouli have the advantage of
having to wage a war on one front only.
15. On the other hand, nothing could retain the Chinese volunteerl
from invading South-East Asia, Indonesia and even the Philippines
and staging new cold war offensives as soon as the Korean war s
over.
16. There can be no doubt that Korea is at the moment the main defense-
line not only of the countries of South East Asia and the South-Nest
%ciao, but also of Western Europe against communistegressors.
Presumably the #381130 of worldpesee has not yet been defeated and
there is hope that it will not be defeated, provided the United
Nations forces do not evacuate Korea. This is the only effective
means of containment of the U.S.S.R.
At present we can only withhold her from waging a worldwars
a. by fear of a bombardment with A-bombs;
b. by occupying Korea as an offensive bridgehead in Asia,
until Western Europe is strong enough to repel a Russian
onslaught.
July 19, 1951.
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P'ept)11(
.ast . OF ,TiTliTeiti`L rZ LIME'
. 14 The territorial unit iv tic bataljon of 4 companies, operntinj in
a torritry of L.-lout 100 to 150 square ni1ea4
2.Tx the re of ,:1,-2ry-wartime 1.1at43ri, a pe_oo-time territcri,1 0071-)any
should be carrison6d4 Every company hns six platoons, viz.
3 1i3htorp1atoona of about 35 men, no organized that they can crrry
out ppecial miosions. 1 siznal-i 1 r-;--,otaco. End 1 tr-nsport plztoon
of :::tiout 20 rr,ans which c,4*b iv..:2.cd to Ulree Eroup v to up ort
o-ver2,- fighter 7)14toon.
Zhesc ic.hterplatoons are provided with bazodcat f513!MD chine k,,unos
tormr win, quir,7kfiring 1c rv haudrrenadae. lioreover every
batr.:ajon and vrqry comp:iny L.7:45 its own idtollizenoe sLf to eliminate
fifth e4111uniste in ex,so of war.
The territorial pe;-cet'onsc xpn, All form the centre for xrm:.Exio
for t orritrri;a evripanie. Together they will form the
-rz..rtirac territorial bz.teijOrt.
,) ? These territorial iuJ.j ;i uiU for' if possible, the core of
guerille?betajc,nr in 111a-tine. They c n accept new rer,7,rtits? in
rti.flte if their adnittance is sup -orted by three nano alre::dy donin
to the bataljon and if it has been approved by the intellivence ot f.
eve three ?;,:uorillas reru,,in responsible for the nolitieel beilaviour of
the new recruits.
? Thout;h infiltmtionr7 of unwanted elements can never be, cortplctely
prevented, it is not unreasonable to expect thst there i8 fair
chance to alin:intte ? ifth 4410.111S111 ..s:rents.
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