PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003100050011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 23, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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23 June 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . Psychological Warfare against the USSR; Proposed
Presidential Statement.
REFERENCE . State Department Cable 2044 of June 19, from
Ambassador Kennan.
1. Attached hereto is a copy of the reference telegram, the con-
tents of which are of particular interest and the concluding recommenda-
tions of which may raise some serious problems and policy questions for
us.
2. The net of the recommendation is that there should be no
major American statements attacking the Soviet Union during the immedi-
ate future -- in order that an opportunity may be given to observe
whether the Russians will begin to modify their propaganda attacks
against the United States. This recommendation, of course, has a
bearing upon the proposed Presidential statement which has suffered
so many delays and misfortunes from the time it was originally pro-
posed. The Kennan recommendation may be automatically taken care of
by the length of time which will probably ensue during the further
study and consideration of our draft by Admiral Souers and others. At
the same time I am anxious for you to have the Kennan recommendation in
mind, in the event that the President or Admiral Souers should speak to
you about this matter.
3. It may develop as speculated by Mr. Kennan that, in return
for a modification of our psychological warfare attacks against the
Soviet Union, they would be willing to reduce to some extent their
attacks on us. This is a very uncertain prospect at best, and it
should be borne in mind that this country suffered endless provoca-
tion and vilification at the hands of the Russians before we decided
to take up the cudgels and return some of the blows that we had been
receiving for so long. I do not believe that we should accept
Vishinsky's analysis and rationale -- namely that they are attacking
us in response to our attacks on them. The whole record since the war
simply does not bear this out. One other thought -- this is one of the
best testimonials that we have yet received of the efficacy of Our
psychological warfare attacks against the Soviet Union. We are
obviously hitting them where it hurts. It seems to me that the
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FRANK G. WtSN: .
Deputy Director (Plans)
Kerman proposal, if pushed to its logical extreme, would be a
putting of the cart before the horse. TrJhy should we back down
first in the hope that the Russians will reciprocate? Since they
started the fracas, threw the first dead cats, and are well aware
of the fact that they did so -- why should they not be the ones to
begin the moderation and not ourselves?
Encl (1)
Ref. cable.
cc: DDCI
C/PY via ADPC
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?NLIODiPt DRAICI
SEuaET z-B-1-URITY INFORMATION
Act too
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FROM: Moscow
TO: Seoretary of State
NO: 2044, June 19, 8 p.m.
PRIORITY
S I
I called on Vishinsky as scheduled and had conversation with
him which, to my mind was extremely interesting and somewhat
encouraging. It was my first discussion of any political
subject with any Sov official since my arrival here, and I
think my long silence and restraint lent a desirable emphasis
to it in Sov eyes. He received me courteously but quite seri-
ously, there was no banter or small talk. Since he did not
bring up the question of our relations I did so myself, re-
ferred to the Secretary's talk with Panyushkin, said I. would
not repeat the Secretary's remarks but could say that they re-
flected such reports as I had been obliged to my great regret
to render about the violent anti-American propaganda with which
I had been greeted on my arrival. I emphasized to him how pain-
ful this had been to me and how difficult it had been for me to
discover any reasons for all this which could, conceivably be
compatible with a desire on the Sov inside to improve Sov-Amer
relations. I said that I had worked hard up to this time and
had done all in my power to bring about an improvement in the
atmosphere surrounding the relations between the two governments,
that I was notapecsimist and would be glad to continue to use my
influence in tois direction, but what I had seen here since my
arrival really caused me to question whether there was any point
in such effort, since it could not be entirely. one-way street.
I was less surprised by the content of Vishinsky's reply than
by its terms and tone of utterance. He spoke quietly and rFa-
sonably, with no trace of vehemence or unfriendliness, and in
manner quite differe:it from that which he uses when he is
reiterating propaganda formulas designed for the public record,
or when he feels under any pressure from higher authority to be
aggressive and ur.pleasant. He referred immediately to statements
made on our side of the water, some of them, he said, by
high-placed persons, and also to the Grow diary, the press attacks,
etc. He made particular reference, in what seemed to me to be
really plaintive terms, to the Gubichev case. He did ro specif-
ically mention Katyn, but I am certain that it was this h:_~ had
most prominently in mind. He dwelt at some lengths on these
matters and ?eft no doubt about their being the Soy Govt's official
.reason
REPR DUCTIAN FIHON TH I S
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IIt
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Coetv,i: 9278
14c' d: June 19, 1952
4:34 p.m.
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.t __... r n d(i1VU111, vl
n may
a -A ex ma r? t e This does r meant
press will
oy
think ere is R ssibilit that
s~ortly become en us. I merely think t posss
a re u o e Qcretary`s helpful statements to Panyushkin
and in the light of this talk with Vishinsky, that the abnormal
pitch,of anti-Ameri.anism may now wane fairly rapidly, if no new
factor appears to exacerbate the situation. Its possibilities
must. have been- fairs,, vie*l exhausted by this time, in any case,
SECRET SECURITY INFC)RMATION
-2- 42044, June 19, 8 p.m., from Moscow
re.ason0for the propaganda.
I did not wish to be drawn into an argument with him about
propaganda exchanges and incidents of the past, and terminated
the conversation by saying to him that I deeply hoped that the
anti-Amer propaganda might cease at once and that so far as
such things as the Grow diary were concerned, I would ask that
we be judged by the present and not by the past. In parting
he took occasion, to my surprise, to indicate that the Sov Govt
had high regard for my person and that none of the unpleasant-
ness had any reference to myself.
By way of comment on the above I would only say this. The
past has taught us the need for greatest wariness in dealing
with the Sovs precisely in their better moments. Eager optimism
is the enemy of all progress at such junctures. We know that '
when we run across reactions and motives on their part which are
at least understandable in normal human terms, they are usually
intermingled with other impulses of which this cannot be said.
'What Vishinsky said to me of the background of the anti-Amer
campaign is only part of the story, and the misunderstandings
to which his statement points are extremely serious ones, since
they have roots in the stubborn Sov refusal to understand the
nature of Amer public opinion and its channels of expression.
Nevertheless, I have the feeling that this talk was useful and
encouraging. It indicated a certain concern for my opinion, and
represented at least something like an effort on his part to
present an explanation for the campaign--and that in itself
was not something to be taken for granted. If nothing occurs
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in London next week. For what I feel to be good reason, I have
rrrt r -'? 6EWI- pre - ss about this rneetiarg with Vishinsky and hcpe
that news of it may be closely held in Washington.
MOTE: Mr. t?arhr.~ notified 5:45 p.m. 6/l /5 i
SEC?.ET SECURITY INFORMATION
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REMARKS:
N
oted by DCI.
RET
CON I T T C I
Ap
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FOR M. / IP O3794-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
SEP. 1947 w~~!