SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES (C)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 5, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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IC 78-5244
5 SEP 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Secretary of the Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Director?of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
")irector, De"ense Intelligence Agency
25X1 A FROM:
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives (C)
1. (C) An issue paper on this subject is forwarded for your review
and comment (see Attachment 1). It will be the basis for discussion at a
special Space PRC meeting on 13 September.
2. (C) We have participated in: the preparation of this paper . and
have submitted staff level comments on two previous drafts. However,
some of our significant comments have not`been incorporated. The comments
we submitted were coordinated with your representative on the Intelli-
gence Community Civil Space Policy Working Group (see Attachment 2).
25X1A 3. (C) I would appreciate it if you would provide me with your
formal comments on this issue by COB Friday, 8 September 1978. Please
25X1A forward these comments to 0
Attachments:
1. Satellite Reconnaissance Security
Policy Alternatives
2. Intelligence Community Civil
Space Policy Working Group
Representatives
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WASHINGTON, D.C. Z05D6
Aucust 31, 1978
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
Space Policy Review Committee Meeting
The attached document was extracted from the ongoing civilian space policy`
review. Because of its national security elements, declassification of the
"fact of" photoreconnaissance satellites will be discussed separately during
a Space Policy Review Committee meeting on September 13, 1978.
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
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SAT=LL- RBC0'7,.k7SSANCE SECURITY -POLICY ALTERNATIVES*
~.. PC-- IC: SETTING
When the United States started its space reconnaissance program in the late
1950's and early 1960's, there was considerable uncertainty as to foreign
reaction. The Powers U-2 incident in 1960 emphasized the high potential for a
major confrontation and embarrassm.n-t_, Yet the need for strategic intelligence
was overpowering. The US strategy was to be as unobtrusive as possible,
keeping the.. existence of the-program covert and avoiding the necessity for
foreign acknowledgment. In concert, the civil space program and benign appli-
cations were,emphasized.in public and led, over the years, to impl.ici.c general
acceptance of remote earth sensing for a variety of purposes..
It is common knowledge that the US and the USSR use satellite reconnaissance
monitoring techniques. For example, a recent-book by former DC1 William
Colby---cleared.by.t:he CIA prior:to publication--discusses the use of overhead
photography for arras-.control.verif.ication purposes. Secretary of State William
Rogers stated in 1972 that. surveillance.satellites were one of the means used
to monitor SALT I. Back in the mid-1960's President Johnson in a speech in
Tennessee extemporaneously stated that the US used satellite photography to.
observe Soviet I.CBN deployment. He added that this'activity alone justified:
the expenditures. on our space program. Furthermore, President Carter stated
during a March, 1977:radio call-in program:that."as you probably know, v-ith
space satellite:ph.otogra.phy we . guarantee the security of our
country . . . ."
PD/NSC-37 revised the security policy for space intelligence activities by
downgrading the fact thatthe US conducts satellite reconnaissance for intelli-
gence purposes--without disclosing the generic type--to CONFIDENTIAL .(NGDS)..
PD/NSC-37 specifies that the special product controls (over imagery and other
space-derived data) is-to be used sparingly by the DCI.
This section examines two possible revisions to the current policy:
First, a..simple declarative declassif ieation only of the fact that satel-
lite photoreconnaissance is one of the national technical means used. by
the US for verification of compliance with SALT and other arms control
agreements.
~On the recent Kampil.e.s espionage case--involving alleged sale of sensitive
reconnaissance satellite documentation to the Soviets--there is present y no
decision or. what must be presented during the trial as evidence. Presently, it
is planned to enter evidence on the satellite document in question under pro-,
tective seal. What must be divulged openly in court will be determined over
time. It may be required not only to admit-the "fact of" photoreconnaiss.anee
but also facts about the capabilities of US systems in order to prosecute
Kampiles.
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Second, a possible extension of this declassification to selectiveli-
declassify and release photoreconnaissance intelligence imager *or~
furthering economic, social, foreign: policy, defense, and political
objectives of the US.
3. DECLASSIFICATION OF THE "FACT OF"
Benefits and Risks. Claim is made in public forums that the SALT II agreement
no;; being negotiated is unsound, in part because of public perceptions that the
Soviets cannot be trusted to comply with its terms. Opponents of a SALT agree-
ment charge that the Soviets have cheated on SALT I and that the US has an
inadequate ability to verify compliance with SALT II. In answering these -
charges, government spokesmen are prohibited from "officially" stating that the
US conducts satellite photography to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT. They
are restricted to using the euphemism National Technical Means (NTM) when
describing those elements of our verification capability. Members of Congress
have been briefed on US monitoring techniques, however, and the fact that NTM
includes satellite photography is widely recognized and accepted by the press.
and much of the informed foreign affairs community. The term NTM, however, may
be lost on less-aware segments of the lay public. Direct referral to satellite
photoreconaaissance can alleviate any feeling in the public mind that. the '
Administration is being evasive and is trying to cover up an inherently weak
case for SALT. This, however, may be inadequate and it may also be necessary
to discuss facts about these capabilities to help allay public concern that we
can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Declassifying the "fact of" photo-satellite reconnaissance might enable govern-
ment spokesmen to make a more effective case for a SALT II agreement. The
ability to refer to credible intelligence capabilities might help allay public
concern that we can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the
agreement.
There are, however, risks associated with the declassification of the "fact
of." They are:
The classification of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance has served as
the first line of defense for the security of overhead intelligence
programs. After declassification, US agencies and officials could be
under pressure, both legal [Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)] and other-
wise, to provide ever increasing information about the reconnaissance
programs, as well as imagery itself. Acknowledgment of imagery could lead
to further probing and speculation about even more sensitive satellites.
Some agencies believe this pressure may be virtually irresistible and
irreversible. Other agencies believe that the line can be drawn in this
case as in others (e.g., nuclear weapons deployments), especially since
the "fact of" is already widely known, even if not officially acknowledged.
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Even though declassification of the "`act of" carries the strong impli-
cations that the Soviets have a similar capability, there ma' be adverse
Soviet reaction to a public statement to the effect that we use photo-
reconnaissance satellites. Subsequent harmful, consequences in various
arms control discussions (e.g., ASAT, CTE.) and other outer-space issues
also could result. At a high level we would need to inform or consult
with the Soviets on the scope of and reasons for any change in US policy
prior to any announcement that" might ensue.
There 'may be adverse, reaction in the UN Outer Space Committee to official
US acknowledgment of its photoreconnaissance activities, particularly on
the part. of the developing countries. Some have already expressed concern
that civil remote sensing acti.vities:pose a. threat to their military, and
economic. security. Such acknowledgment.could result in increased. pressures
for controls on remote sensing from satellites and possibly demands that
"military" satellites be banned. On the other hand, the fact is already
widely known, and increased demand.for access could likewise result.
Acknowledgment..in..rhe context of SALT. verification, howrever, wasted likely
be.applauded by developing countries.
C. ISSUE FO?.TECISION ON "FACT OF" . .
Some believe that, with. appropriate preparation, the "fact of'.' can be declassi-
fied now with real. but acceptable risks to intelligence security and to US
foreign..and domestic policy. According.to:this view, we could proceed to
public ly.acknosa.ie,dge,that photo-satellite reconnaissance programs are, among the
means used'by'the..US to verify Soviet compliance with.. SALT and other arms
control agreements. They believe there is an obvious, commonsense value to the
forthright.admis:sion,of what is already widely known. Furthermore, they
believe that implementation plans should :be developed, prior to public announce-
ments on this matter. Such plans could be prepared within a few.weeks and
would include:
A Presidential directive that. (1) declassification of "fact of" is limited
to photo reconnaissance for verification of SALT and other...arw control
agreements and that (2) all data derived. from overhead reconnaissance
remain classified and compartmented in accordance with existing guidelines.
A security plan to maintain intelligence discipline.
A plan of action'for informing Congress, our allies, and tha Soviets prior
to a public announcement'.
Contingency planning to deal with reactions of other countries and, a
thorough set of Q's and A's.
Others believe that the "fact of" can be declassified but that not enough is
presently known about the near-and long-term impacts on US satellite reconnais-
sance and suggest that a study of a few months is required. to make the best
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possible decision in this matter. They further believe that benefits from
acknowledgement of the "-act of," without some public use of information or
imager} from space reconnaissance, is of limited value. Further, they believe
that prior to a decision on implementation more study is needed over the next
few months This studs would evaluate the ramifications of declassifying the
"fact of" and develop a full and detailed execution plan that would include: a
security plan to maintain intelligence discipline; a detailed consultation
strategy with the Congress, our allies, the Soviet Union, and members of the L'N
Outer Space Committee; and contingency strategies by responsible agencies. They
also believe that the implementation considerations outlined in the discussion
on declassification of photographic imagery should be taken into account in any
decision on the "fact of" as well. Essentially, under this approach the
decision on declassification of the "fact of" in the context of SALT verifica-
tion would be deferred for the few months necessary to complete the more
detailed review.
D. DECLASSIFICATION OF PHOTORECONNAISSANCE IMAGERY
Any decision to go beyond declassification of the "fact of." and to additionally
include a selective and phased public release of photoreconnaissance imagery or
information from space reconnaissance increases both risks and benefits. Any
steps taken in this area either measured or decisive would represent a sigxiifi-
cant Administration initiative in space that would have worldwide impact.
Unlike other major space initiatives--Apollo or solar power satellites--
declassification would not have a budget impact. It is believed that the risks
and the potential long-term benefits of such a policy. revision warrant a care-
ful assessment of this possibility before acceptance or rejection. But, of
course, such-an assessment would be pursued only if the "fact of" were
declassified.
Potential Benefits and Risks. The broader use of presently-classified data
could well be an efficient means of meeting certain domestic needs for an
authoritative data base supplementing (or in some cases replacing) imagery
sources currently available to the private and public sector. For example,
stereoscopic imagery of cartographic quality has already been collected over
much of the world. Its exploitation has been largely limited to government
intelligence and mapping functions. Its value to mineral and petroleum
exploration--either in raw image form or as analyzed thematic geological map
products--is likely to be high, representing a quantum increase in the explora-
tion data base.
Other potential economic applications of such data include: land use, disaster
assessment and relief, environmental monitoring, forestry inventories, and crop
productivity. Some of these applications require the repetitive coverage being
offered by civil systems and not envisaged for intelligence systems which might
be available to the civil community. Some civil uses would benefit from the
availability of a high-quality imagery data base in many instances even if it
were quite old. If a decision were made to do so, much stored imager., could be
made available today from lower performance reconnaissance systems no longer in
operation as well as currently collected imagery.
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~v^ila aeclas.sifying .salel the "fact of" may enhance public confi.aance. in
flexibilit,- could be provided in the US in international: af?a:;.rs by
less-co., strained use of remote sensing da=a. Verifiability and. Jer~-fication
could be more credibly demonstrated with the release of imagery or information
derived therefrom. Peacekeeping possibilities might include private or public
release of visual evidence or information and analysis of impending crisis,
hostile actions, or:threatening situations (weapons shipments, border viola-
tions, nuclear capabilities) ; ?econoitic development informatcould be pro-
vided without subterfuge as to. d..ata sources:
The risks associated with limited declassification of satellite imagery can. be
categorized .as ;follows:
-- Imagery from intelligence systems provides information on militarily
significant targets such as airfields, missile deployments,. es.c... With
frequent monitoring, military:, deployment and levels, of military production
can be determined. As these-capabilities are appreciated--more directly
relevant-to the national.interests`of the non-major powers---we could
.expect resistance and. pressure for restrictions by other countries.
-- Such disclosure could, be expected.to lead to questions as to the le.giti.-
mz.c.y.of :military.uses of outer spate systems.' The Outer Space Tr.eary
reserves, the use..of space for "peaceful purposes." Some states, such as
Japan, have already called fore demilitarization of space. The release of
imagery could exacerbate these demands.
-- The Soviets have:.maintained the basis for flexibly distinguishing between.
legitimate::and' illegitimate remote earth sensing. They recognize a
sanctuary. only for "NTM's. Use of. cameras in space for. other purposes
than arms.control monitoring they consider espionage. Disclosure of the
imagery surely would stimulate discussion throughout the international.
community--not just the communist bloc,. but. the. non-allignedcountries
as.well as our'allies--of limitations on remote sensing. The. Soviets may
also use the release of imagery to attempt to ' justify their ASAT activities.
-- Disclosure of selected imagery provides, some information on. the design and
capabilities of the imaging system. for.film return systems, this may be
more acceptable, although the implications could cause adversary nations:
to increase concealment measures.
The security risk in unclassified use of the products of the latest.
operational systems would be high. A policy of unclassified release of
the most current imagery could not be readily reversed. Thus, the extent
to which the decision to declassify satellite imagery would impact on a.
later option to provide special security protection for new systems must.
be carefully weighed.
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~'LT?CTnTIO*: CO?\SIDERkTIONS
Sno'.:l: the additional decision be taken to selectively release imagery,, a
nu=ber of additional factors would have to be taken into account in formulating
an implementation plan. Certain of the factors are su-narized below.
The USSR. The USSR is sensitive to world opinion about the relative techno-
logical capabilities of the US and the Soviet Union. Comparisons between
Soviet and US imagery capabilities produced by US release of imagery, would
tend to cast the USSR in an unfavorable light. Second, the Soviets could view
a public policy change as casting doubt on their ability to prevent "espionage."
from outer space. For internal and international prestige reasons, they might
choose to take a hard line, including a more negative posture in ASAT negoti-
ations, augmented development of their ASAT systems, and renewed efforts in the
UN to establish stringent limitations on the conduct of remote sensing activi-
ties. Last, declassification could be viewed as a form of international "one-
upsmanship" by the US, especially in light of current US-USSR tensions. If
imagery release were contemplated, any assessment would have to examine whether
to inform the Soviets beforehand of the scope, purposes, and timing of any
release. The Soviets would react more strongly to a US decision to release
imagery than to-declassification of the "fact of." High level prior consulta-
tion with the USSR may be necessary in view of our tacit agreement with them. on
photoreconnaissance use. As such, a risk-benefit analysis of declassifying
imagery must take Soviet reactions into account.
Intelligence Security. The classification of the "fact of" satellite recon-
naissance has served as the first line of defense for the security of overhead
space intelligence programs. After declassification, US agencies and officials
would be under considerable pressure to provide more information. More
importantly, however, information obtained from photography alone is often
ambiguous; intelligence judgments are derived from analysis of data from a
variety of sources. We should not compromise other intelligence sources and
methods as a result of releasing photography. Well-thought-out strategies of
information release and management of requests are necessary preconditions to
even take steps toward declassification of imagery.
Impact on Other Issues. Decisions on the future organization of the US remote
sensing program would be impacted by decisions to release previously classified
imagery. If the US sets up a new organization structure for remote. sensing
from space, for example, this could raise issues concerning the future manage-
ment of satellite reconnaissance, particularly if the imagery presently classi-
fied were declassified for wider civil application. Selective release of
imagery would also blur the line between civilian and military-intelligence
remote sensing. Our heretofore highly touted international policy of open
dissemination of remote sensing data (based on acknowledgment only of NASA
data) would lose credibility, and new policies would have to be examined.
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There is no ouesticn t.a data on .space intelligence would' be sought under the
FCIA and that. in ail trobability legal proceedings- could force. disclosures
inimical to the intelligence discipline and national security. Lven if i aec-
cable guidelines were established and maintained as to what is classified and
why, the courts would not be bound to adhere to them in deciding FOI?_ cases.
Such guidelines could be established by Presidential Directive.
Allies. Given that US friends and alliesare.either.,dixe.ct or indirect bene-
ficiaries of the US intelligence programs, their interest, in preserving unim-
peded access to valid. intelligence.infoimation would have-to be assured through.
consultations. that outlined the limits and extent of planned disclosure. and the
political assessment of external (i.e., Soviet, and other) reactions. Particu-
lar care would have to be given to the question of possible imageryrelease by
the US of data taken over Allied countries. Much of the foreign intelligence
supplied to NATO about Warsaw Pact countries comes from US.overhead.sources.
As such, diplomatic repercussions. might arise when it became. kn,oi that some.
allies in the past had received, satellite-derived data and others had not.,
International:Reactions.. With the release of imagery, countries previously
quiescent about overhead reconnaissance might decide to take a stronger
position on the basic questions concerning sovereignty and exploitation by izDra
powerful states. Many "developing countries .(LDC's) increasingly recognize that
they:can benefit from remote sensing: However, the LDC's generally have in the
past. argued for a restrictive. legal regime governing these activities. The
ef.fe:Mt of a US release of imagery could be to stiffen their resolve toward a
restrictive regime. One might expect that the obvious international benefits
of strategic arms control would',soften. such arguments. Many,, indeed, recognize
that satellites are essential for arms control. The record of the LDC's in the
United. Nations may?.not be an accurate measure of real LDC responses. In fact.,
some.LDC'.s may.in the long run see, it in their interest to gain access. to
better quality imagery.
US Public Reactions. The announcement. of the "fact of'.' would serve to affirm
.the commitment of .the Administration to greater openness in government and the
promotion of space operations :for. keeping the peace. Without, public examples.
of data quality, however, there will be many questions as to the degree of
public confidence in verifiability.
F. RECOTML*SENDED: -ACTION ON DECLASSIFICATION OF ...IPIAGERY
Preliminary review suggests the need to study a new national policy in the use
of remotely-sensed imaged data for a spectrum of US interests, both domestic
and foreign. This cannot be decided now without a thorough review.. The focus
will be on the use of remotely-sensed data and the information that can be
derived therefrom, not on the management of the collection systems which
acquire such data. Further study is necessary that would include full and
detailed execution and. contingency plans developed well in advance of policy
revision to release photoreconnaiss'ance imagery. Analyzing the concept. of a,
space intelligence policy which looks beyond the. "'fact of" will fall into four
phases:
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An intensive analysis of the paints and possibilities noted i this paper
by selected individuals from the Departments of Defense and State, the
Intelligence Community, the Executive Office of the President, and others
as appropriate under the direction of the Space Policy Review Co;ttee.
This will be accomplished in 3 months.
Presidential review and decision or. desirability of change and appropriate
3. Detailed development and setting in place of the implementation elements--
consultation strategies, security planning, contingency plans--by the
responsible agencies over a period of at least 3 months.
4. Execution after final Presidential review and approval.
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CIVIL SPACE PD.LILCY IC WORKING GROUP
ORGANIZATION NAME
SAFSS Capt. David A. Messner
NSA
State/INR Joseph, E. Hayes
DIA Cdr. R. L. Seger
NFAC Robert A. Johnson
DDA
.DD/S&T
D/DCI/CT
D/DCI/RM
COMIREX
D/DCI/RM
D/DCI/RM
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25X1A
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