EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE DCI TO THE DIRECTOR, DIA RE: STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 30, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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DCl/IC 74-2367
30 October 1974
DIA DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
LETTER TO GENERAL GRAHAM
Dear Danny:
I have reviewed carefully DIA's views on revision of the Watch
mechanism which General Tighe forwarded to me in your absence.
In general outline, they coincide very closely with my own -- in fact,
my only serious reservation concerning them is the propriety of my
delegating to any one element of the community a responsibility that
is clearly national in scope and of such critical importance. There
is also the practical difficulty of my being able to provide' strategic
warning to WASG WSAG effectively if I am at one remove the mechanism
designed to support me in this function.
At the same time, I fully agree with the proposition that the
strategic warning mechanism should be intimately tied to the warning
mechanisms and procedures of the Department of Defense.
It seems to me that both these requirements can be satisfied by
my appointment of one of your deputies, and I have in mind specifically
General Faurer, as Chairman of a small USIB Committee to act as the
dgh level overview group referred to in General Tighe's letter: The
Committee would i-n-turn-6e-sHperted-by monitor the activities of a
small, highly qualified analytic staff headed by a CIA representative,
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who would alse-serve-en-the-eamm4ttee-as-i-ts-v4ee-enai-rfflanT report
directly to General Faurer. The DCI would, in addition, nominate a
senior CIA officer to serve as General Faurer's vice-Chairman. The
staff, composed of senior analysts representatives from DIA, CIA, NSA
and the State Department, would be co-located with the WIC, on which
it would rely for communications and other support, including the
24-hour "watch" function currently being conducted within the NIC.
I think we are fully agreed that the mission of this big "W"
warning mechanism should have a relatively narrow focus. The language
I favor, and which I understand has been substantially agreed to by
your representatives, is that the Strategic Warning Committee and
staff "will be responsible for providing the earliest possible warning
of military action against the U.S. or its allies, particularly by
the USSR or the PRC. It will also be responsible for providing warning
of military action 4,n-develeOn?-eri.si-s-Ottlati.ens by a major adversary,
in any area which eel d would involve U.S. forces." Warning of all
other critical developments which should be brought to the attention
of the WASG WSAG -- whether military technological, political or economic
-- would be provided by Alert Memoranda produced under the direction of
the NIOs and by normal current intelligence reporting.
Sincerely,
. E. Colby
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LTO Samuel V. Wilsan
Deputy to Director of Central:
Intelligeme for the
IntelligA!nee Corr:7un1ty
Central Intelligence Agency
. Washington, D. C. 23505
Dear Sam:
I have read the draft on Watch Committee reVitalization
which you furnished on 25 October anti wish o advise you
of the p3ttton my repreeentativee will take when Mr.
working group continues to.reconc le agency
views on ursday the 31st.
We have found significant comm,)n ground for agreement,
aufficient, intact, for me to anticipate e1 rly. resolution.
On the broad tissues - refocuaing upon the S vlet and
Chineei threat, the elimination or the comm ttee approach'
a daily temperature reading vice weekly eta us report,
MIMIC support to the analysts preparing this daily product'
and the reliance upon agency current intelligence staffs
to warn of small "w- crises - / perceive th t the DCI and
Director, DIA, are thinking the same.
We remain In disagreement with the proposal that a !sepa-
rate analytic ;staff need be organized under the DCI to
prepare the dally 'temperature reading of the posture or
the military forces of our major adversaried, and the
indication that these forces may be bent upon hoatile
action. To further explain our position, 14t me refer
to the second draft paper you furnished Friday, a memo-
randum for the Chairman, NSCIC, entitled "Iritelligence
Warnine. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of this draft outline
the proposed changes to the Watch Committee Itild NIC *true,-
ture,-mting the substitution of -an oversight committee
and "small".aupporting staff. Paragraph 12 lonclulas,
however, with the observation that this star will con-
nn such expertise that It would be unique o the com-
mlinity an overshadow any competition when a sessIrg
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,taviat r41.Winess posture, mbillzation lawi, war gArts atilt '
other sirtlar subjects. f do not believebat any wsmAlln
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staff could possibly compete with eithr tli e brindth or ?
depth or coverage or these areas that now exists in the
? co=!%4n1t:y, pgrt.loulrirly with1:1 thg: Sovlet 1:vls1o:4 of the
PIA. Our position was and remains based 09 this perception,
and our cowept:of the staff required to ptt,pare the "daily
temperature reading" Is one which taps and iquestions the
existing cot:Amity assets, rather than overtJhadows them,
We believe that such a staff could truly be small aril could
?fuhetion on behalf of the DC/ while integrated into theDIA ?
organization. I am sure that Danny Graham kill wish to '
pursue this question.
VThe resolution or this question, however, should not delay
i our advance towards.effectinr the major ch es, because
the adminlatrative and NNW watch team support to this
group will be essentially the same no matte how they are
organized. The DIA will be prepared by Thursday to outline
? both an interli support arrangement and the Considerably '
more advanced arrangements available In a mhdernieedliMIC
in the late 1976 time Frame.
f..c.jOn the small "we portion or your draft, I 11 only reit-
erate our support of your position; it is a function which
we each pursue constantly, Supporting our 1 dividusl su-
periors and the Nb O structure ,in the provis on of timely-
warning.
. I
'Finally,/ would suggest that the words.whith attempt to
define the large "We func.tIon need more stuOy. The sen-
tence, "It will also be responsible for prol'idintwarning
of military Action in developing crisis sitilstions, in
any area, .which involve U.S. forces," Is aniimprovement
over the past. It is sufficiently broad thtt time end
differing interpretations might lead to the!same situation
in which we find the current,Watch CommIttef. We must pre-
clude the loss of focus on the 142.5f and Pnithreat. Par- -
haps it would be better to say l\ "It will also be
Tesponsible for providing warning or milltart action by a
major adversary, in. any area, which would Involve U.S. '
forces.")
?
? Again, let me say that / perceive fundament 1 agreement and
we are ready to engage in implementation plinning.
Sincere1y,
Ira=
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