INDONESIA'S ARCHIPELAGO WATERS: RICH, STRATEGIC, AND IN DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000300060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
Indonesia's Archipelago Waters:
Rich, Strategic, and In Dispute
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Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74-2
August 1973
PON W DISSEM
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Classified by 019641. Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 "ex-
emption categoryt 56(1),(2),(3). Declassifica-
tion date impossible to determine:
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Page
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Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Factors in Formulation of the Archipelago Concept . 4
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Z. Petroleum . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Other Minerals . . . . . . . . 8
3. Sea Life . . . . . . . . . 9
Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . ZO
Shipping: Indonesia's Location . . . . . . . ZZ
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Z3
Maps . . . . . . . . . . . following text
Map A: Sovereign Waters Claim
Map B: Offshore Petroleum and Tin Producing Areas
Map C: Major Shipping Routes
CON
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1973
INDONESIA'S ARCHIPELAGO WATERS:
RICH, STRATEGIC, AND IN DISPUTE
The broad archipelago sea claim that Indonesia first
advanced in the 1950's will be considered by negotiators
at the upcoming Law of the Sea Conference. In brief,
Indonesia wants the right to deny use of the sea lanes
that cross her archipelago, and she wants uncontested
control over all of the sea and seabed resources of the
archipelago.
The Indonesian archipelago lies astride major world
maritime trade routes, and there is no way that the
archipelago can be bypassed economically by ships plying
these routes. Supertankers carrying oil from the Middle
East to Japan, for example, must go through waters claimed
as sovereign by Indonesia. Indonesia wants the right to
exercise control over this traffic, while the maritime
countries insist on freedom from all controls.
Dissidence, endemic in many outer-island areas in
the 1950's, was a key consideration in the formulation
of the archipelago concept. Although insurgency is not
now a serious threat to the country's security, fear of
rekindled activity remains. It is doubtful, however,
that even uncontested control of all archipelago sealanes
would ensure an effective curb on insurgency.
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligences Code
Z43, Extension 3057.
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Indonesia's seabeds are rich in petroleum and tin,
and there is a wealth of sea life, principally tuna and
shrimp. Known petroleum and tin deposits are on the
continental shelf*at depths much less than 200 meters
and, therefore, under uncontested Indonesian sovereignty.
Jurisdiction over all fishery resources, however, can be
guaranteed only by international recognition of either
the archipelago claim or of a special resources zone such
as the 200-mile zone that is currently being advanced in
the international community.
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Background
1. One of the thornier issues to confront negotiators
at the United Nations Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference in
Santiago, Chile, in April 1974 will be the claims of several
archipelago countries. Led by Indonesia, the Philippines,
Fiji, and Mauritius, these countries claim sovereignty over
all waters (and air space above) enclosed by baselines
drawn between points on the outermost islands of the archi-
pelago. Such claims have been totally unacceptable to
maritime countries because they impose restrictions on the
movement of merchant and military ships through waters that
have always been considered high seas. The archipelago
countries are unlikely, however, to rescind their claims
and accept narrow territorial sea zones around individual
islands. One possible compromise would be acceptance by
all nations of a proposed 200-mile exclusive resources zone
that would give the archipelago countries unchallenged
ownership of all sea and seabed resources within the
archipelago while permitting unimpeded movement of all
ships along traditional international trade routes through
their seas and straits.
2. Indonesia, the largest archipelago nation in the
world, is in the forefront of these countries in asserting
sovereignty over all seas within the archipelago.* It
claims all seas lying inside a perimeter formed by 8,168
nautical miles of baselines drawn between 194 points on the
outermost islands plus a 12-mile territorial sea zone outside
the baselines (Map A). By this concept, its sovereign
seas total about 765,000 square nautical miles or about 3.5
times the size of its territorial seas as defined by a zone
of 12 miles around each of its several thousand islands.
Using the 12-mile zone, most of the water area within the
archipelago is considered high seas.
Some of Indonesia's seas are hundreds of miles across.
The Java Sea, for example, measures more than 200 miles
from north to south, more than 800 miles from west to east.
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3. Indonesia originally inherited a territorial sea
of 3-mile zones around individual islands from the Nether-
lands East Indies colonial government. Claiming that such
a narrow and fragmented territorial sea was not in accordance
with the unity -- land and sea -- of the archipelago,
Indonesia first advanced its claim to sovereignty over all
the archipelago seas and superjacent airspace in December
1957. On 18 February 1960, the Government of Indonesia issued
Regulation Number 4, which ratified the 1957 announcement.
This unilateral declaration, transforming extensive areas
of strategically located and heavily trafficked high seas
into Indonesia's sovereign waters, is not recognized by
any major maritime nation. Regulation Number 8, issued on
25 July 1962, clarified Indonesia's position on the right
of innocent passage, according foreign ships that right
"so long as the security, general order, interest, and peace
of the country are not disturbed."
4. The reasons for Indonesia's pitch for uncontested
control over the archipelago waters are clear: (1) she
believes that unchallenged control of the shipping lanes
between her far flung islands is essential in order to
maintain political unity and economic viability; (2) the
seas form one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the
world, and their underseas petroleum reserves appear to be
large.
Factors in Formulation of the Archipelago Concept
Security
5. Dissidence plagued many of Indonesia's outer
islands when the archipelago concept was formulated in
the 1950's. Maintaining political unity in the face of
rebellions -- especially in northern and western Sumatra,
northern Celebes, and the Moluccas -- was a major consid-
eration in the advancement of the concept. Contention
with the Netherlands concerning jurisdiction over the
disputed territory of West New Guinea (now known as Irian
Jaya) was another factor; Indonesia hoped by the archipelago
concept to enhance its efforts to curb Dutch maritime
defenses in the territory.
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6. Indonesia today is free of major insurgencies and
Irian Jaya is, after years of hassling, a full-fledged
Indonesian province. Small bands of rebels operate only
in isolated border regions of western Kalimantan and in
Irian Jaya. Even if there were foreign support of dissidence,
it would not necessarily violate the seas claimed as sover-
eign under the archipelago concept; if it did, the small
Indonesian Navy (109 vessels of assorted types, mostly
small) has limited capacity to deter illicit maritime
intrusions. Despite these facts, Indonesian linkage of
internal security and sealane jurisdiction remains.
7. Outer-island dissidence in the past has been
provoked in large part by the Java-oriented political and
economic policies of the Jakarta-based Government. The
Government feels that control of its seas must be asserted
to ensure efficient supply of the outer islands and curb
economic discontent that could lead to rebellion. The
small size (only 156 ships larger than 1,000 gross register
tons) and decrepit condition of Indonesia's merchant fleet,
however, is a far more important limiting factor than is
lack of uncontested control over all sealanes.
8. Indonesian officials also insist that unchallenged
sovereignty over its seas is needed to effectively enforce
immigration, customs, and quarantine regulations. It is
doubtful, however, that the extension of sovereignty would
significantly improve enforcement. Although the Government
claims that large numbers of Chinese enter the country
illegally, the number of illegal aliens entering the country
by sea is not great.
Economic
Resources
9. Recognition of the potential wealth of petroleum,
tin, fish, and other resources in and under the seas of the
archipelago was a major consideration in the formulation of
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Indonesia's archipelago claim in the 1950's. Today, in
view of its greater knowledge of its underseas wealth
together with the diminution of outer-island dissidence,
economic considerations undoubtedly are as important as
security considerations in Indonesia's continued push for
international recognition of sovereignty over her
archipelago seas.
10. According to the 1958 LOS Convention on the
Continental Shelf, the coastal state has jurisdiction
over all resources on and under the adjacent seabed to
a depth of 200 meters and to greater depths where
exploitation is possible.* About half of Indonesia's
seas are on the continental shelf with depths nowhere
exceeding 200 meters, and Indonesia therefore has
exclusive resource rights on these seabeds even if
its archipelago claim is rejected. Only the waters of
eastern Indonesia, which are nearly everywhere deeper
than 200 meters, cover seabed resources not, by the 1958
Convention, under Indonesia's unquestioned jurisdiction.
Depths here plunge to more than 7,000 meters (Map B).
Petroleum
11. Petroleum is the key to Indonesia's economic
growth, accounting in 1972 for 52.9 percent of its gross
foreign exchange earnings. While most oil production to
date has been from wells on Sumatra, exploration since
the late 1960's has been predominantly offshore. About
15 international companies are now drilling in the shallow
seas of the archipelago. Offshore production for export
began in 1971 from fields in the southwestern Java Sea and
in the Makassar Strait off the coast of eastern Kalimantan
(Map B). Production in 1972 from these fields was about
24 million barrels, about 6 percent of the total Indonesian
* Officials from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Fiji,
meeting in May 2972, proposed in a joint position paper
that ocean resources within the recognized territorial
limits of a state belong to the state regardless of the
depth of water.
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production of 395,552,322 barrels.* Indonesia has 10
billion barrels of proven recoverable reserves, about
2 percent of the world's total, and at least 300,000,000
barrels of these are offshore. Geologic conditions on
the extensive continental shelves indicate a considerable
potential, and further exploration is certain to increase
the offshore figure.
12. Both Indonesia's present offshore production
and its proven offshore reserves are on its adjacent
continental shelf, under unchallenged Indonesian sovereignty
according to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Oil
company concession blocks include only relatively small
water areas deeper than 200 meters (Map B). If neither
the Indonesian version of its sovereign waters nor a 200-
mile exclusive resources zone (which would encompass all
of the seas of the archipelago) are internationally accepted,
deep sea areas of the archipelago will fall outside the
country's economic control. These are too deep for present
drilling methods, but, as improved drilling technology makes
the exploitation of deep sea petroleum deposits profitable
(oil companies are drilling in waters of depths greater than
200 meters in other parts of the world), exploration may be
extended into these deeper waters.
13. In keeping with its policy of developing its
petroleum resources as quickly as possible while avoiding
boundary hassles with its neighbors, Indonesia has made a
concerted effort to reach agreements on its offshore
boundaries. During the past 3 years Indonesia has signed
agreements delimiting its seabed boundaries with Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. Of the offshore
boundaries yet to be delimited, the one on the continental
shelf between Indonesia and South Vietnam will probably
be the most difficult to resolve. The shelf of the South
China Sea between the two countries promises to be oil-rich,
and haggling over the alignment of the boundary may be
drawn out.
* Indonesia produces about 70 percent of the crude oil in
the Far East but less than 2 percent of the world total.
Most of Indonesia's oil is shipped to Japan.
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Other Minerals
14. Indonesia is believed to be rich in mineral
resources in addition to petroleum although only a small
percentage of potential mineral-bearing areas has been
surveyed. Tin, nickel, and bauxite are the only minerals
currently produced in significant quantities. Of these,
only tin is mined from the seabed. There are no prospects
for the mining of tin at depths greater than 200 meters
and little likelihood that manganese nodules or other
mineral deposits will be found in comnercial quantities
at such depths. Indonesia's claim to all known underseas
minerals, therefore, is uncontested regardless of the
outcome of negotiations at the LOS Conference.
15. Indonesia is the world's fourth leading producer
of tin among non-Communist countries. It accounts for
two-thirds of the value of Indonesian mineral production
and about 5 percent of total export earnings. While
production waned in the 1950's and 1960's, it has had a
resurgence in recent years. Production in 1972 was
21,734 metric tons of concentrate, the highest yield
since 1960. Tin is mined from an ore-bearing structure
that extends from Burma, through peninsular Thailand,
West Malaysia, and into the Java Sea. Most of the
Indonesian part of the structure lies under water, with
depths to 60 meters. Production is either by hydraulic
methods on the islands of Bangka, Billiton, and Singkep
or by large dredges, which operate in nearshore waters
to depths of 30 meters (Map B). Exploration for tin
and associated detrital heavy minerals was undertaken in
the early 1970's in offshore waters at depths to 50 meters.
Newly discovered tin deposits are at depths, however, that
exceed the capability of existing Indonesian dredging
equipment.
16. Production of nickel, currently mined only in
southeastern Celebes, has increased markedly in recent
years. Crude ore production in 1972 was 935,075 metric
tons. There are no prospects for mining nickel from the
seabed. Bauxite is mined on Bintan Island, south of
Singapore; crude ore production amounted to 1,276,578
metric tons in 1972. It is not likely to be mined from
the seabed.
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Sea Life
17. Although the seas of the Indonesian archipelago
have an abundance of sea life, the domestic fishing
fleet -- comprising mostly small sailing craft with
archaic equipment -- has limited capability to tap this
resource. The official 1971 fish catch by the domestic
maritime fishing fleet was 1,226,800 metric tons, only
a small part of the potential catch. Official
statistics, however, do not reflect the total catch from
the seas of the archipelago. Smuggling to neighboring
countries and poaching by fishermen from those countries
account for a significant take, and large legal catches
are made by foreign fleets. A large quantity of tuna, for
example, is taken annually from the Banda and Ceram Seas
by Japanese trawlers.
18. Indonesia's waters consist of two zones on the
basis of depth, types of sea life, intensity of fishing,
and extent of foreign commercial fishing operations:
(1) the South China and Java Seas, nowhere more than 100
meters deep, are unusually rich in a variety of fish and
crustaceans; they supply most of the domestic maritime fish
yield but are exploited relatively little by foreign fleets
except for shrimp; (2) the deep seas, nearly everywhere
exceeding 200 meters, east of Kalimantan and Java and ex-
tending through the Molucca Islands to Irian Jaya are
teeming with tuna; they are relatively lightly fished by
local fishermen and divided into concession blocks for
Japanese and other foreign fishing fleets.
19. Should the Law of the Sea Conference fail to
recognize Indonesia's archipelago claim or to grant a
200-mile exclusive resource zone or a broad coastal state
fisheries zone, Indonesia will have no legitimate claim
to fisheries outside a 12-mile zone. Loss of revenue
earned from foreign tuna-fishing concessions in the deep
seas of the east and from shrimping operations in the South
China and Java Seas would be substantial. Shrimp are the
country's major seafood export by value.
20. Under its archipelago claim, Indonesia moved
early to control foreign fishing in its archipelago seas.
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Charging that foreign fishermen were violating Indonesia's
boundaries and exhausting her resources, the Indonesian
Navy confiscated a number of foreign vessels fishing in the
eastern archipelago waters (mostly in the Banda Sea) during
the 1960's. Tuna trawlers of Japan and the Ryukyu Islands
(now a prefecture within Japan but then a dependency of the
United States) had long fished there and were the most
frequent intruders into the newly defined sovereign waters.
The conflict was clear: Indonesia claimed that vessels
fishing anywhere within the archipelago were violating
her international boundaries, while the foreign fishermen
recognized only 3-mile territorial sea zones around
individual islands.
21. To put an end to the seizures, bilateral agree-
ments were signed in the late 1960's with several countries,
including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore,
Norway, and Kuwait. Fishing concession blocks were parceled
out in much the same way that petroleum concessions are
granted to international oil companies. The foreign fleets
pay annual license fees and limit fleet sizes and annual
catch. The fleets are not permitted to fish within 3 miles
of any island. This stipulation protects the fishing
grounds of local fishermen, few of whom stray more than a
few miles from the coast. The agreements, which also
provide foreign financial and technical aid to local fishing
fleets, allow Indonesia to relax its guard over its maritime
resources and bring revenue from resources that its own
fishermen are currently incapable of exploiting.
22. The fishing agreements are, in effect, payoffs to
stop Indonesian harassment of the fleets since none of the
signatory countries recognize Indonesia's claim to sovereignty
over the seas in which their fleets are fishing. It can be
argued, however, that the agreements are a de facto recog-
nition of Indonesian jurisdiction over the concession waters.
Smuggling
23. Smuggling of rubber, copra, and other commodities
from Indonesia's outer islands to foreign ports has created
a substantial drain on government revenues. Officials
maintain that uncontested sovereignty over its seas is
essential to curb this illicit trade. Most smuggling
routes, however, traverse either Indonesia's internationally
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recognized and unchallenged territorial seas (e.g.,
through the maze of islands along Sumatra's eastern
seaboard) or the high seas beyond its archipelago claim
(e.g., across the Celebes Sea from Celebes to either
the Philippines or Sabah). Arguments that sovereignty
over all archipelago waters is essential to curtail
illicit trade, therefore, may be challenged.
Shipping: Indonesia's Strategic Location
24. Indonesia is located athwart all trade routes
linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia
with Southeast Asia and the Far East as well as those
linking Australia with Southeast Asia and the Far East.
(Major international and domestic maritime routes are
shown on Map C.) No viable alternatives for any of the
international routes bypass the archipelago. Freedom of
movement through Indonesian waters, therefore, is essential
for all merchant ships using these routes as well as for
the ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet operating in Asian
waters.
25. Most of the international merchant ships that
sail through the archipelago, including Japan-bound oil
tankers, go through the heavily trafficked Strait of
Malacca. While there are no accurate measures of traffic
through the Strait (or through any other passage in the
archipelago), officials of the U.S. Coast Guard estimated
in an unofficial paper presented at the 1973 conference of
the Law of the Sea Institute that some 50,000 vessels sail
through the Strait yearly. The southeastern part of the
Strait is encumbered with shoals and reefs and has a minimum
depth of 61 feet; supertankers carrying more than 200,000
deadweight tons of cargo usually use a deepwater route
to the southeast -- through the Lombok Strait between Bali
and Lombok, northward through the Strait of Makassar, and
into the Pacific Ocean south of the Philippines. This
route adds 1,000 miles and 3 days to the voyage from the
Middle East to Japan. Some merchant traffic also goes
through the Sunda Strait, between Sumatra and Java. Al-
though it is deep, none of the supertankers use it
because of the presence of shoals in the Java Sea and in
the southern part of the South China Sea, between
Kalimantan and Sumatra.
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26. Indonesia maintains the right to deny passage
through the archipelago to any ship that she deems a
threat to her security. While not interfering with
merchant shipping, she requires (but does not always
receive) formal notification by all warships prior to
their entry into any of these seas. Indonesia also
wants jurisdiction over the straits and seas of the
archipelago so she can take measures to combat pollution
from transiting ships. The US and other maritime
countries, while agreeing to international standards
on navigational safety and pollution control, want no
unilateral restrictions placed on the movement of any
ships through the archipelago. They cannot accept
transit based on the right of innocent passage because
it accords Indonesia the power of deciding whether or
not passage is innocent.
27. Three British warships sailed through the
Sunda Strait without prior notification in 1964 as a
show of Commonwealth strength during the Indonesian
"confrontation" with Malaysia. Great Britain recognized
neither Indonesia's sovereignty over a 12-mile territorial
sea nor over all archipelago waters. The outgunned
Indonesian Navy, which threatened to attack if the ships
entered the Strait without permission, was. forced to back
down, and the ships continued unmolested. Similar
passages of foreign warships through the archipelago
without prior notification could spark more serious
incidents if an international understanding of the status
of Indonesia's seas is not reached.
28. The major trouble spot between Indonesia and
the U.S. in the differing interpretations of the
sovereignty of the seas of the archipelago concerns
freedom of navigation. While Indonesia wants the right
to exercise some control over maritime traffic, the
United States seeks an agreement to permit free transit.
Differences have been tempered by the current friendly
relations between the two nations, by Indonesia's will-
ingness to accept an informal notification of the passage
of U.S. warships through the archipelago, sometimes after
the fact, and by the inability of the Indonesian Navy to
effectively patrol the sealanes through the archipelago.
There is, however, no assurance that these moderating
factors will continue.
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Outl ook
29. Indonesia will continue to bargain hard for
acceptance of her broad archipelago claim even though
her economic interests will likely be satisfied whether
or not the claim is accepted at the 1974 LOS Conference.
Accords in the offing will probably give all coastal
states control of their sea resources to a distance of
at least 200 miles from their coasts -- a zone that will
blanket all of Indonesia's seas. Indonesia therefore
will almost certainly emphasize the security issue rather
than the resources issue in negotiating for international
acceptance of her archipelago claim. She will continue
to see her sprawled-out island nation vulnerable to
foreign intrusion and, consequently, threatened by the
presence of foreign vessels sailing unimpeded across her
archipelago seas.
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Indonesia's Archipelago Waters:
Rich, Strategic, and In Dispute
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74-2
August 1973
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C 0 N TENT S
Page
Z
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Factors in Formulation of the Archipelago Concept . 4
Security . .
4
Economic . 5
Resources . .
1. Petroleum . . . . . . 6
2. Other Minerals . . . . . . . . 8
3. Sea Life . . . . . . . . . 9
Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Shipping: Indonesia's Location . . . . . . . lZ
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Z3
Maps . . . . . . . . . . . following text
Map A: Sovereign Waters Claim
Map B: Offshore Petroleum and Tin Producing Areas
Map C: Major Shipping Routes
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1973
INDONESIA'S ARCHIPELAGO WATERS:
RICH, STRATEGIC, AND IN DISPUTE
The broad archipelago sea claim that Indonesia first
advanced in the 1950's will be considered by negotiators
at the upcoming Law of the Sea Conference. In brief,
Indonesia wants the right to deny use of the sea lanes
that cross her archipelago, and she wants uncontested
control over all of the sea and seabed resources of the
archipelago.
The Indonesian archipelago lies astride major world
maritime trade routes, and there is no way that the
archipelago can be bypassed economically by ships plying
these routes. Supertankers carrying oil from the Middle
East to Japan, for example, must go through waters claimed
as sovereign by Indonesia. Indonesia wants the right to
exercise control over this traffic, while the maritime
countries insist on freedom from all controls.
Dissidence, endemic in many outer-island areas in
the 1950's, was a key consideration in the formulation
of the archipelago concept. Although insurgency is not
now a serious threat to the country's security, fear of
rekindled activity remains. It is doubtful, however,
that even uncontested control of all archipelago sealanes
would ensure an effective curb on insurgency.
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic InteZZigence, Code
143, Extension 3057.
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Indonesia's seabeds are rich in petroleum and tin,
and there is a wealth of sea life, principally tuna and
shrimp. Known petroleum and tin deposits are on the
continental shelf at depths much less than 200 meters
and, therdfore, under uncontested Indonesian sovereignty.
Jurisdiction over all fishery resources, however, can be
guaranteed only by international recognition of either
the archipelago claim or of a special resources zone such
as the 200-mile zone that is currently being advanced in
the international community.
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Background
1. One of the thornier issues to confront negotiators
at the United Nations Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference in
Santiago, Chile, in April 1974 will be the claims of several
archipelago countries. Led by Indonesia, the Philippines,
Fiji, and Mauritius, these countries claim sovereignty over
all waters (and air space above) enclosed by baselines
drawn between points on the outermost islands of the archi-
pelago. Such claims have been totally unacceptable to
maritime countries because they impose restrictions on the
movement of merchant and military ships through waters that
have always been considered high seas. The archipelago
countries are unlikely, however, to rescind their claims
and accept narrow territorial sea zones around individual
islands. One possible compromise would be acceptance by
all nations of a proposed 200-mile exclusive resources zone
that would give the archipelago countries unchallenged
ownership of all sea and seabed resources within the
archipelago while permitting unimpeded movement of all
ships along traditional international trade routes through
their seas and straits.
2. Indonesia, the largest archipelago nation in the
world, is in the forefront of these countries in asserting
sovereignty over all seas within the archipelago.* It
claims all seas lying inside a perimeter formed by 8,168
nautical miles of baselines drawn between 194 points on the
outermost islands plus a 12-mile territorial sea zone outside
the baselines (Map A). By this concept, its sovereign
seas total about 765,000 square nautical miles or about 3.5
times the size of its territorial seas as defined by a zone
of 12 miles around each of its several thousand islands.
Using the 12-mile zone, most of the water area within the
archipelago is considered high seas.
Some of Indonesia's seas are hundreds of mites across.
The Java Sea, for example, measures more than 200 miles
from north to south, more than 800 miles from west to east.
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3. Indonesia originally inherited a territorial sea
of 3-mile zones around individual islands from the Nether-
lands East Indies colonial government. Claiming that such
a narrow and fragmented territorial sea was not in accordance
with the unity -- land and sea -- of the archipelago,
Indonesia first advanced its claim to sovereignty over all
the archipelago seas and superjacent airspace in December
1957. On 18 February 1960, the Government of Indonesia issued
Regulation Number 4, which ratified the 1957 announcement.
This unilateral declaration, transforming extensive areas
of strategically located and heavily trafficked high seas
into Indonesia's sovereign waters, is not recognized by
any major maritime nation. Regulation Number 8, issued on
25 July 1962, clarified Indonesia's position on the right
of innocent passage, according foreign ships that right
"so long as the security, general order, interest, and peace
of the country are not disturbed."
4. The reasons for Indonesia's pitch for uncontested
control over the archipelago waters are clear: (1) she
believes that unchallenged control of the shipping lanes
between her far flung islands is essential in order to
maintain political unity and economic viability; (2) the
seas form one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the
world, and their underseas petroleum reserves appear to be
large.
Factors in Formulation of the Archipelago Concept
Security
5. Dissidence plagued many of Indonesia's outer
islands when the archipelago concept was formulated in
the 1950's. Maintaining political unity in the face of
rebellions -- especially in northern and western Sumatra,
northern Celebes, and the Moluccas -- was a major consid-
eration in the advancement of the concept. Contention
with the Netherlands concerning jurisdiction over the
disputed territory of West New Guinea (now known as Irian
Jaya) was another factor; Indonesia hoped by the archipelago
concept to enhance its efforts to curb Dutch maritime
defenses in the territory.
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6. Indonesia today is free of major insurgencies and
Irian Jaya is, after years of hassling, a full-fledged
Indonesian province. Small bands of rebels operate only
in isolated border regions of western Kalimantan and in
Irian Jaya. Even if there were foreign support of dissidence
it would not necessarily violate the seas claimed as sover-
eign under the archipelago concept; if it did, the small
Indonesian Navy (109 vessels of assorted types, mostly
small) has limited capacity to deter illicit maritime
intrusions. Despite these facts, Indonesian linkage of
internal security and sealane jurisdiction remains.
7. Outer-island dissidence in the past has been
provoked in large part by the Java-oriented political and
economic policies of the Jakarta-based Government. The
Government feels that control of its seas must be asserted
to ensure efficient supply of the outer islands and curb
economic discontent that could lead to rebellion. The
small size (only 156 ships larger than 1,000 gross register
tons) and decrepit condition of Indonesia's merchant fleet,
however, is a far more important limiting factor than is
lack of uncontested control over all sealanes.
8. Indonesian officials also insist that unchallenged
sovereignty over its seas is needed to effectively enforce
immigration, customs, and quarantine regulations. It is
doubtful, however, that the extension of sovereignty would
significantly improve enforcement. Although the Government
claims that large numbers of Chinese enter the country
illegally, the number of illegal aliens entering the country
by sea is not great.
Economic
Resources
9. Recognition of the potential wealth of petroleum,
tin, fish, and other resources in and under the seas of the
archipelago was a major consideration in the formulation of
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Indonesia's archipelago claim in the 1950's. Today, in
view of its greater knowledge of its underseas wealth
together with the diminution of outer-island dissidence,
economic considerations undoubtedly are as important as
security considerations in Indonesia's continued push for
international recognition of sovereignty over her
archipelago seas.
10. According to the 1958 LOS Convention on the
Continental Shelf, the coastal state has jurisdiction
over all resources on and under the adjacent seabed to
a depth of 200 meters and to greater depths where
exploitation is possible.* About half of Indonesia's
seas are on the continental shelf with depths nowhere
exceeding 200 meters, and Indonesia therefore has
exclusive resource rights on these seabeds even if
its archipelago claim is rejected. Only the waters of
eastern Indonesia, which are nearly everywhere deeper
than 200 meters, cover seabed resources not, by the 1958
Convention, under Indonesia's unquestioned jurisdiction.
Depths here plunge to more than 7,000 meters (Map B).
Petroleum
11. Petroleum is the key to Indonesia's economic
growth, accounting in 1972 for 52.9 percent of its gross
foreign exchange earnings. While most oil production to
date has been from wells on Sumatra, exploration since
the late 1960's has been predominantly offshore. About
15 international companies are now drilling in the shallow
seas of the archipelago. Offshore production for export
began in 1971 from fields in the southwestern Java Sea and
in the Makassar Strait off the coast of eastern Kalimantan
(Map B). Production in 1972 from these fields was about
24 million barrels, about 6 percent of the total Indonesian
Officials from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Piii,
meeting in May Z972, proposed in a joint position paper
that ocean resources within the recognized territorial
limits of a state belong to the state regardless of the
depth of water.
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production of 395,552,322 barrels.* Indonesia has 10
billion barrels of proven recoverable reserves, about
2 percent of the world's total, and at least 300,000,000
barrels of these are offshore. Geologic conditions on
the extensive continental shelves indicate a considerable
potential, and further exploration is certain to increase
the offshore figure.
12. Both Indonesia's present offshore production
and its proven offshore reserves are on its adjacent
continental shelf, under unchallenged Indonesian sovereignty
according to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Oil
company concession blocks include only relatively small
water areas deeper than 200 meters (Map B). If neither
the Indonesian version of its sovereign waters nor a 200-
mile exclusive resources zone (which would encompass all
of the seas of the archipelago) are internationally accepted,
deep sea areas of the archipelago will fall outside the
country's economic control. These are too deep for present
drilling methods, but, as improved drilling technology makes
the exploitation of deep sea petroleum deposits profitable
(oil
meters companies
otare herdpartsnofltheaworld), explorationtmaytben
200 00
extended into these deeper waters.
13. In keeping with its policy of developing its
petroleum resources as quickly as possible while avoiding
boundary hassles with its neighbors, Indonesia has made a
concerted effort to reach agreements on its offshore
boundaries. During the past 3 years Indonesia has signed
agreements delimiting its seabed boundaries with Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. Of the offshore
boundaries yet to be delimited, the one on the continental
shelf between Indonesia and South Vietnam will probably
be the most difficult to resolve. The shelf of the South
nha$ggt the promises to be
may be
haggling over
and
drawn out.
* Indonesia produces about 70 percent of the crude oil in
the Far East but less than 2 percent of the world total.
Most of Indonesia's oil is shipped to Japan.
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Other Minerals
14. Indonesia is believed to be rich in mineral
resources in addition to petroleum although only a small
percentage of potential mineral-bearing areas has been
surveyed. Tin, nickel, and bauxite are the only minerals
currently produced in significant quantities. Of these,
only tin is mined from the seabed. There are no prospects
for the mining of tin at depths greater than 200 meters
and little likelihood that manganese nodules or other
mineral deposits will be found in commercial quantities
at such depths. Indonesia's claim to all known underseas
minerals, therefore, is uncontested regardless of the
outcome of negotiations at the LOS Conference.
15. Indonesia is the world's fourth leading producer
of tin among non-Communist countries. It accounts for
two-thirds of the value of Indonesian mineral production
and about 5 percent of total export earnings. While
production waned in the 1950's and 1960's, it has had a
resurgence in recent years. Production in 1972 was
21,734 metric tons of concentrate, the highest yield
since 1960. Tin is mined from an ore-bearing structure
that extends from Burma, through peninsular Thailand,
West Malaysia, and into the Java Sea. Most of the
Indonesian part of the structure lies under water, with
depths to 60 meters. Production is either by hydraulic
methods on the islands of Bangka, Billiton, and Singkep
or by large dredges, which operate in nearshore waters
to depths of 30 meters (Map B). Exploration for tin
and associated detrital heavy minerals was undertaken in
the early 1970's in off,hore waters at depths to 50 meters.
Newly discovered tin deposits are at depths, however, that
exceed the capability of existing Indonesian dredging
equipment.
16. Production of nickel, currently mined only in
southeastern Celebes, has increased markedly in recent
years. Crude ore production in 1972 was 935,075 metric
tons. There are no prospects for mining nickel from the
seabed. Bauxite is mined on Bintan Island, south of
Singapore; crude ore production amounted to 1,276,578
metric tons in 1972. It is not likely to be mined from
the seabed.
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Sea Life
17. Although the seas of the Indonesian archipelago
have an abundance of sea life, the domestic fishing
fleet -- comprising mostly small sailing craft with
archaic equipment -- has limited capability to tap this
resource. The official 1971 fish catch by the domestic
maritime fishing fleet was 1,226,800 metric tons, only
a small part of the potential catch. Official
statistics, however, do not reflect the total catch from
the seas of the archipelago. Smuggling to neighboring
countries and poaching by fishermen from those countries
account for a significant take, and large legal catches
are made by foreign fleets. A large quantity of tuna, for
example, is taken annually from the Banda and Ceram Seas
by Japanese trawlers.
18. Indonesia's waters consist of two zones on the
basis of depth, types of sea life, intensity of fishing,
and extent of foreign commercial fishing operations:
(1) the South China and Java Seas, nowhere more than 100
meters deep, are unusually rich in a variety of fish and
crustaceans; they supply most of the domestic maritime fish
yield but are exploited relatively little by foreign fleets
except for shrimp; (2) the deep seas, nearly everywhere
exceeding 200 meters, east of Kalimantan and Java and ex-
tending through the Molucca Islands to Irian Jaya are
teeming with tuna; they are relatively lightly fished by
local fishermen and divided into concession blocks for
Japanese and other foreign fishing fleets.
19. Should the Law of the Sea Conference fail to
recognize Indonesia's archipelago claim or to grant a
200-mile exclusive resource zone or a broad coastal state
fisheries zone, Indonesia will have no legitimate claim
to fisheries outside a 12-mile zone. Loss of revenue
earned from foreign tuna-fishing concessions in the deep
seas of the east and from shrimping operations in the South
China and Java Seas would be substantial. Shrimp are the
country's major seafood export by value.
20. Under its archipelago claim, Indonesia moved
early to control foreign fishing in its archipelago seas.
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Charging that foreign fishermen were violating Indonesia's
boundaries and exhausting her resources, the Indonesian
Navy confiscated a number of foreign vessels fishing in the
eastern archipelago waters (mostly in the Banda Sea) during
the 1960's. Tuna trawlers of Japan and the Ryukyu Islands
(now a prefecture within Japan but then a dependency of the
United States) had long fished there and were the most
frequent intruders into the newly defined sovereign waters.
The conflict was clear: Indonesia claimed that vessels
fishing anywhere within the archipelago were violating
her international boundaries, while the foreign fishermen
recognized only 3-mile territorial sea zones around
individual islands.
21. To put an end to the seizures, bilateral agree-
ments were signed in the late 1960's with several countries,
including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore,
Norway, and Kuwait. Fishing concession blocks were parceled
out in much the same way that petroleum concessions are
granted to international oil companies. The foreign fleets
pay annual license fees and limit fleet sizes and annual
catch. The fleets are not permitted to fish within 3 miles
of any island. This stipulation protects the fishing
grounds of local fishermen, few of whom stray more than a
few miles from the coast. The agreements, which also
provide foreign financial and technical aid to local fishing
fleets, allow Indonesia to relax its guard over its maritime
resources and bring revenue from resources that its own
fishermen are currently incapable of exploiting.
22. The fishing agreements are, in effect, payoffs to
stop Indonesian harassment of the fleets since none of the
signatory countries recognize Indonesia's claim to sovereignty
over the seas in which their fleets are fishing. It can be
argued, however, that the agreements are a de facto recog-
nition of Indonesian jurisdiction over the concession waters.
Smuggling
23. Smuggling of rubber, copra, and other commodities
from Indonesia's outer islands to foreign ports has created
a substantial drain on government revenues. Officials
maintain that uncontested sovereignty over its seas is
essential to curb this illicit trade. Most smuggling
routes, however, traverse either Indonesia's internationally
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recognized and unchallenged territorial seas (e.g.,
through the maze of islands along Sumatra's eastern
seaboard) or the high seas beyond its archipelago claim
(e.g., across the Celebes Sea from Celebes to either
the Philippines or Sabah). Arguments that sovereignty
over all archipelago waters is essential to curtail
illicit trade, therefore, may be challenged.
Shipping: Indonesia's Strategic Location
24. Indonesia is located athwart all trade routes
linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia
with Southeast Asia and the Far East as well as those
linking Australia with Southeast Asia and the Far East.
(Major international and domestic maritime routes are
shown on Map C.) No viable alternatives for any of the
international routes bypass the archipelago. Freedom of
movement through Indonesian waters, therefore, is essential
for all merchant ships using these routes as well as for
the ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet operating in Asian
waters.
25. Most of the international merchant ships that
sail through the archipelago, including Japan-bound oil
tankers, go through the heavily trafficked Strait of
Malacca. While there are no accurate measures of traffic
through the Strait (or through any other passage in the
archipelago), officials of the U.S. Coast Guard estimated
in an unofficial paper presented at the 1973 conference of
the Law of the Sea Institute that some 50,000 vessels sail
through the Strait yearly. The southeastern part of the
Strait is encumbered with shoals and reefs and has a minimum
depth of 61 feet; supertankers carrying more than 200,000
deadweight tons of cargo usually use a deepwater route
to the southeast -- through the Lombok Strait between Bali
and Lombok, northward through the Strait of Makassar, and
into the Pacific Ocean south of the Philippines. This
route adds 1,000 miles and 3 days to the voyage from the
Middle East to Japan. Some merchant traffic also goes
through the Sunda Strait, between Sumatra and Java. Al-
though it is deep, none of the supertankers use it
because of the presence of shoals in the Java Sea and in
the southern part of the South China Sea, between
Kalimantan and Sumatra.
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26. Indonesia maintains the right to deny passage
through the archipelago to any ship that she deems a
threat to her security. While not interfering with
merchant shipping, she requires (but does not always
receive) formal notification by all warships prior to
their entry into any of these seas. Indonesia also
wants jurisdiction over the straits and seas of the
archipelago so she can take measures to combat pollution
from transiting ships. The US and other maritime
countries, while agreeing to international standards
on navigational safety and pollution control, want no
unilateral restrictions placed on the movement of any
ships through the archipelago. They cannot accept
transit based on the right of innocent passage because
it accords Indonesia the power of deciding whether or
not passage is innocent.
27. Three British warships sailed through the
Sunda Strait without prior notification in 1964 as a
show of Commonwealth strength during the Indonesian
"confrontation" with Malaysia. Great Britain recognized
neither Indonesia's sovereignty over a 12-mile territorial
sea nor over all archipelago waters. The outgunned
Indonesian Navy, which threatened to attack if the ships
entered the Strait without permission, was forced to back
down, and the ships continued unmolested. Similar
passages of foreign warships through the archipelago
without prior notification could spark more serious
incidents if an international understanding of the status
of Indonesia's seas is not reached.
28. The major trouble spot between Indonesia and
the U.S. in the differing interpretations of the
sovereignty of the seas of the archipelago concerns
freedom of navigation. While Indonesia wants the right
to exercise some control over maritime traffic, the
United States seeks an agreement to permit free transit.
Differences have been tempered by the current friendly
relations between the two nations, by Indonesia's will-
ingness to accept an informal notification of the passage
of U.S. warships through the archipelago, sometimes after
the fact, and by the inability of the Indonesian Navy to
effectively patrol the sealanes through the archipelago.
There is, however, no assurance that these moderating
factors will continue.
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Outlook
29. Indonesia will continue to bargain hard for
acceptance of her broad archipelago claim even though
her economic interests will likely be satisfied whether
or not the claim is accepted at the 1974 LOS Conference.
Accords in the offing will probably give all coastal
states control of their sea resources to a distance of
at least 200 miles from their coasts -- a zone that will
blanket all of Indonesia's seas. Indonesia therefore
will almost certainly emphasize the security issue rather
than the resources issue in negotiating for international
acceptance of her archipelago claim. She will continue
to see her sprawled-out island nation vulnerable to
foreign intrusion and, consequently, threatened by the
presence of foreign vessels sailing unimpeded across her
archipelago seas.
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Confidential
Confidential
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CIA/BGI RP 74-2
Disseminated 13 Sept 73
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4 F 38 Headquarters
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4 F 38 Headquarters
25X1A
Developing Nations Division, OER
Japan/Pac:i fi.c Branch
4 G 24 headquarters
Developing Nations Division, O ER
Petroleum Branch
6 G 17 Headquarters
5 G 23 headquarters
DDCI
7E,12 Headquarter!;
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5 E 35 Headquarters
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Rtoh. i t. Hodgson
INR/I)1 N/RGIi
Dcpart.nuent of State
8742 New State
Ilugh D. Camitta
L/OA
Department of State
6420 New State
Ot]io F. Eskin
IO/UNP
Department of State
6332 New State
Burdick Brittin
S/ I1ti'- COA
3214 New State
DIA/D14A
MB 937 Pentagon
Commander Charles Ake, USN
Office of Joint: Chiefs of Staff
Department of Defense
1 E 935 Pentagon
Stuart French
Department of Defense
DASD/ISA
4 E 810 Pentagon
Captain Paul Yost
Spcecial Assistant for Law of the Sea
Office of the Chief Counsel
U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, D.C., 20590
Leigh Ratiner
Director, Office of Ocean Resources
Department of Interior
19th and C Streets, NW
Washington, D.C.
Room 6547
Howard 11. Pollock
Deputy Admini strator
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrati(-
14th and Constitution Streets, NWV
Washington, D.C.
Room 5802
Ms. Freida Falatlco
Naval Ocean Survc_illanc.c InF-01matioln Center
4301 Suitland Road
1Vasl~ington, D.C. 20390
1 David Lam )crtson
LA/RA
Pc1)a rtmcnt o 1 State
4312 Now State.
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,97C
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MOM
M
.BC
O S
GEOGRAPHY DIVISION Record of Classification Decision
14 September 1973
Date
1.
Title of report, study, or map:
Indonesia's Archipelago Waters: Rich, Strategic, and In Dispute
2.
Project N'o. and Report No. or Map No.:
CIA/BGI RP 74-2
3.
Classification, control, and exempt category:
CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, 5B 1, 2, and 3
4.
Name of classifier:
5.
Rationale for classification and exempt
Discusses Indonesia's economic and pol
sovereign seas claim. Indonesia's arc
international issue. Disputed by most
it will be negotiated at the 1974 Law
ion:
itical reasons for its
hipelago claim is a delicate
countires including the US,
of the Sea conference
6.
Sources used in report, study or map wh
classification and exemption:
ich have a bearing on
NOTE: Prepare in triplicate -- one copy
for Branch Project File and two copies
for Division Front Office.
CONTROL or CLASSIFY, according to
content of entries.
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L
A-RDP84-00825 ~003GO060001- 7 g ,
4.,12 I1, DET ' PX G._ ~s3 1
 For Official Use Only
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R - ENTIAL
PROJECT PROPOSAL
RESEARCH ACTIVITY
NOTICE
XX
SUBJECT
PROJECT NUMBER
Research Paper on Indonesia for Law of the Sea Negotiation
61.2674
SUBJECT CODE
REQUESTER
REQUESTING OFFICE
Self-initiated
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
TARGET DATE
Based on a 30 May 1973 conference with State Department
July 1973
officers Hodgson (INR/RGE) and Nordquest (Legal) on the kind
ANALYST/BRANCH
of geographic intelligence support most useful to the U.S.
GD/F
representatives at forthcoming LOS meetings, we propose to
prepare a paper on the archipelago of Indonesia with emphasis
EST. ANALYST MANHOURS
on seabed resources. Other subjects, treated lightly, will
'
100
s waters and
include maritime traffic through Indonesia
aspects of Indonesia's territorial claims which differ from
25X1A
those of other archipelago countries. To be sure we are on
the right track in the selection of relevant subject matter
on this complex field, we plan to send Mr. Nordquest a
detailed outline of the proposed report.
uest
Nord
ith Mr
i
,
q
.
on w
In a subsequent conversat
25X1A
was assured that such a policy-support paper
would in act be useful in State's preparation for the
Summer 1973 UN Seabed Committee Preparatory Sessions and
the 1973-74 LOS meetings in New York and Santiago.
25X1A
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : Modification of several maps
OTHER CIA: none 25X1A 25X1A
NON-CIA. : State
AMIN X73
DATE CHIEF, Geography Division, A May73
REPORT RECORD
TITLE
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
AREA CODE
SUBJECT CODE
PUBLICATION DATE
ANALYST/BRANCH
INITIAL NO. OF COPIES
MANHOURS EXPENDED
CLASSIFICATION
DISTRIBUTION
EDITOR
TYPIST
C
TS
STANDARD
ANALYST
Approv
d For Release 200
/04/18: CIA-RDP -
LIMITED
2_66M 2594 For Official Use Only ^ CONFIDENTIAL
^ SECRET
 Approved For Re1ea%0001Q4/18 .~QIA-RDl 84?00825R000300Q60001-4
`1'IIi' 1.973 - 7l+ LOG COJ*" 3ENCL: TL;ItRITORTAL CLAIMS BY A.RCHIPEIAGO COU11T.11,IRS
I. Introduction
A. LOS Meeting in 1973-74. One of critical problems to be resolved is that of
broad sea claims of several archipelago countries.
B. What are these claims,. flow d.mm do they differ from traditional concepts
of archipelago concepts of archipelago areas by maritime countries? ghat
countries are making tihese claims'.' (:lndone si.a, Philippines, Fiji, Bahamas)
How do the claims differ from one another? What other countries could also
make archipelago mm claims? Formulas for defining archipelagos.
C. i;rImmttatmm Histmrical background of the archipelago concept. Problem has never
been resolved at any international conference, including the 1958 Geneva
Conference. But with increasing exploitation of the sea resources and with
continuing conflicts between maritime countries and the archipelago countries
over navigation rights through architplago waters, the question can't be
shelved much longer.
II. Individual 1 mm'omih Countries
A. Indonesia. In the forefront of the archipelago countries in asserting its
cls;. m. Has by far tle most extensive claim and, probably, the most difficult
one to substantiate. With strategically located straits and seas and a urm2iathh
wealth of resources in its seas and seabeds, it has the most to gain if its
claim is recognized and the most to lose if it is not.
1) History of claim. Dutch East Indies Government claimed only 3 miles of
territorial waters around individual islands. Indonesia introduced its
archipelago concept in 1957 - 60.
2) Technical aspects of claim, including points with which Indonesia differs
with other archipelago countries. Loopholes in claim. Indonesia is NOT
pushing for a quantitative/objective formula to define archipelago waters
because it realizes that any reasonable formula would negate much of the
claim; rather, it wants a definition that would recognize an archipelao,
land and sea, as a geographic unit. Thus is her pitch.
3) Physical Geography of the Indonesian ARchipelago
a) The Islands -- number, range ci' sizes, distribution (distance between
them) pCl