THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE IN THE NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100200001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1962
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET
Copy No. 6' )U
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR GM 62-10
November 1962
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
IN THE NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SECRET
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
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The border dispute between Communist China and India entered a new phase in October
1962 when heavy fighting broke out at several points along the Sino-Indian frontier. In
the period between September 1959 (when the border quarrel first became publicized) and
the spring of 1962, China and India exchanged many diplomatic notes about border issues
and incidents along the border, but the incidents themselves were few and relatively
minor. Nevertheless, during this period both countries greatly increased their military
preparedness along the frontier by increasing the strength of their border troops, by
establishing a number of new outposts, and by constructing roads to supply their frontier
forces.
Military activity increased in the spring of 1962. At first it was confined to the
Ladakh sector* and involved only small units and little actual fighting. Early in Sep-
tember, however, the focus shifted to the east where increasingly sharp patrol clashes
occurred along the McMahon Line near the Indian post of Dhola, located a few miles north-
west of Towang (see accompanying map). From this area on 20 October the Chinese launched
an offensive that quickly overran Indian posts and resulted in the capture of Towang late
in October.
The dispute along the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontier, which extends from
Bhutan to Burma and is about 700 miles long, concerns an area of about 26,000 square miles
that includes most of India's North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).** The NEFA area is dif-
ferentiated from other sectors of the disputed border territory by its larger size; by the
somewhat lower but, in many places, extremely difficult and rugged terrain; by heavy stands
of forest; and by the existence of an indigenous population numbering several hundred thou-
sand in the disputed territory. These characteristics are in sharp contrast to the high,
barren, and largely uninhabited mountain and plateau country that is in dispute in Ladakh.
Complicating political factors in the NEFA dispute include questions relating to the valid-
ity of the McMahon Line and the past international status of Tibet. Questions also have
arisen about the exact location of the McMahon Line.
Physical Aspects
The physical environment of NEFA is very different from that of contiguous areas to
the north and south. The NEFA area consists of a belt of steep hill-and-mountain terrain
50 to almost 100 miles wide rising sharply from the Brahmaputra Valley*** to the crest of
the Great Himalayas. The mountainous terrain of NEFA is deeply cut by numerous streams
whose valleys, particularly those in the hills adjacent to the plains, are choked with
heavy vegetation. In places -- generally between the outer hills to the south and the
high ranges along the border to the north -- more open valleys and rolling hills permit
agriculture and tribal settlement. The combination of rugged terrain and dense vegetation
has made NEFA hard to penetrate from the plains and has hindered internal communications.
These factors have contributed significantly to the lack of administration in this isolated
area. They also have contributed to the isolation and fragmentation of the numerous tribal
peoples of NEFA.
The part of Tibet north of the McMahon Line has two contrasting types of physical
environment. West of a line drawn roughly north-south from Gyatsa Dzong to Chayul, the
typical Tibetan landscape is one of high, barren plains and mountains and relatively open
valleys at elevations of 11,000 to 13,000 feet. Natural vegetation is scanty, confined
mainly to drought-resistant shrubs. To the east, however, the Tsangpo and its tributaries
have cut deeply into the plateau surface, dissecting the landscape into a complex pattern
of steep-sided ridges and narrow valleys in which many streams and rivers flow through
narrow gorges. The Tsangpo is one such river. At Tsela Dzong, just south of Lin-chih,
the Tsangpo flows at an elevation of 9,700 feet; farther downstream and beyond the gigantic
hairpin bend around the peak of Namcha Barwa (25,453 feet), the river flows at an elevation
of only 2,000 feet where it crosses the border claimed by India. At the somewhat lower
elevations of the eastern area, heavier precipitation permits extensive forests, mainly
coniferous. A variety of crops, including rice, can be grown in the comparatively low and
humid valleys.
* For basic information on the border disputes between India and China as well as Pakistan
and China in Kashmir, see CIA/RR GM 62-9, The Disputed Frontiers of Kashmir, November 1962, S.
** Chinese Communist claims to NEFA include nearly all of the Kameng and Subansiri frontier
divisions and most of the Siang and Luhit divisions; the fifth division of NEFA, Tirap, is
not contiguous to the border. In this report, discussions of NEFA are confined to the first
four divisions named.
*** The Brahmaputra River of India is known as the Tsangpo in Tibet and as the Dihang River
in NEFA.
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SKETCH
MAP
36780 1
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1
).6h ktsen
\ 0 2 4
MILES
SECRET
South of NEFA is the flat country of the Assam Valley, which averages about 50 miles
in width. The main feature of this broad valley is the wide, braided Brahmaputra River.
The river is in flood stage from June through October every year, and much of the plain is
inundated to a depth of 4 or 5 feet. Transport routes often are blocked by flooding.
The climate of NEFA is dominated by the summer monsoon that dumps 70 inches to well
over 100 inches of rainfall on the plains from June through September, although significant
amounts of rainfall also occur in April and May from premonsoonal storms. In the mountains,
precipitation varies greatly according to local terrain, but generally rainfall decreases
toward the north. It appears that the driest part of NEFA is in the northwest where the
ridges, apparently because of their alignment, block some of the summer rainfall; neverthe-
less, even here rainfall is sufficient to support a fairly heavy vegetative cover. In
Tibet the openings provided by the north-south-aligned valley of the Brahmaputra and, simi-
larly, by the valley of the Luhit River to the east, permit monsoonal rains to penetrate
southeastern Tibet during the summer. Most of NEFA is at such relatively low elevations
that cold temperatures and snow are not problems. Snow appears to be a problem only in the
higher passes along the Tibetan border on the north. Although heavy snowfalls may block a
pass and also the higher portions of supply routes for a few days, even these stretches
probably can be kept open with sufficient maintenance. Lower valley routes, such as those
along the upper Subansiri tributaries and the Nyamjang River, can be used when the passes
are blocked. Late in March 1959 the Dalai Lama entered NEFA via the Nyamjang Valley route.
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CHINA
McMahon Line as described
Le
T 9
pry\C9 /
K'a-lung 'i `I"o
0 \e Thag La /
Dhola \L 14500
(Chedong) Bride insemafle0~ ZANGLUNG~~ aro
1-~
McMahon Line as shown
on the Simla map and on
Indian maps untill96O. 1=
!'~diya - i
g %choa Ghal_
International boundary as shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
Internal administrative boundaries
Railroad
Motorable road
Track or trail
a Airfield, runway 6000' or more
? Airfield, runway 2000' to 6000'
Pass
23260 Spot height (in feet)
0 50
0~ 50 100 Kilometers
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International boundary, demarcated or delimited
International boundary, indefinite
International boundary as shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
-North East Frontier Agency boundary
Motorable road
"!"
Airfield
----
Track or trail
Pass
-~-+
Railroad
.19431
Spot height (in feet)
0 10 20 30 Miles
0 10 20 30 Kilometers
INSET e
In Tibet on the open plains south from Tsethang, strong winds during winter and spring
usually prevent any significant general accumulation of snow below the high peaks. In the
part of Tibet nearest Towang, however, winter temperatures may reach 0?F and locally may
create problems for military actions. In general, winter weather does not appear to be
severe enough to halt or deter military operations for long periods. In most of NEFA below
the high passes and ridges the winter season is the best for such operations because the
streams are low and fordable then and the ground is dry.
Transportation
The construction and maintenance of roads in the frontier area of NEFA by both China and
India have been hampered by rugged terrain and heavy rainfall. The most highly developed
network in the vicinity of the frontier is in Tibet, across the border from the Kameng fron-
tier division and the western section of Subansiri. In 1957, a road from Lhasa, the main
Chinese supply base in Tibet and the terminus of the strategic Tsinghai-Tibet road, was com-
pleted as far as Tsethang -- an important town in an agricultural area south of the Tsangpo.
As an aftermath of the flight of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan guerrilla activities at that
time, the Chinese rapidly extended their road network to the south and eventually linked the
frontier towns of Lhakhang Dzong, Tsona Dzong, and Chayul with major Chinese roads to the
north. Much of the terrain along the route is high (over 12,000 feet) but relatively open,
and road construction probably has been hampered only locally. It appears that at least
one Tibetan pass higher than 16,000 feet must be crossed before the frontier towns are
reached; consequently, snow and ice are very likely to be problems during winter. It is
considered probable, however, that the Chinese can move supplies to Tsona Dzong and forward
areas with only brief delays even during the winter. The relatively good logistical system
supporting the western sector of the NEFA frontier is reflected in the larger number of
Chinese troops that have been deployed there. To the east the roads are less well developed,
although motorable routes lead to Chayul and probably to Migyitdn, across the border from
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Longju. East of MigyitUn there appear to be no motorable routes leading to the McMahon
Line, but some construction has been reported near the border on a road running from Lin-
chih along the south bank of the Tsangpo. A motorable road to Li-ma (Rima) that was used
by the Chinese in their attacks against Walong, in the Luhit Valley south of the border,
is connected with the main Szechwan-Tibet road to the north and with a parallel road from
Szechwan to the east. All of these roads, however, are subject to seasonal blockage by
landslides and rockfalls that are induced by the heavy summer precipitation. The roads
farther east and north in Tibet, over which supplies to the frontier must move, not only
are susceptible to slides but they also cross high passes where winter precipitation is a
serious problem.
The Tibetan airfield nearest to NEFA is at Tang-hsiung, north of Lhasa, some 200 miles
north of the Towang area. The Tang-hsiung airfield can be used by jet fighters and light
bombers. In some areas that are closer to Towang, the terrain is suitable for landing
strips, which probably could be constructed fairly quickly.
In general, the more formidable terrain and the heavier rainfall in the NEFA hills have
handicapped Indian efforts to construct roads north to the Indian outposts along the McMahon
Line. Except for the road to Towang, which was completed only recently, motorable routes
extend northward from the plains only 30 to 40 miles (see the accompanying map), and border
posts have to be supplied over mule trails or by airdrop. Some of the trails shown on the
map may be jeepable. Air supply has been important to Indian activities in NEFA. Advanced
posts long have been supplied by airdrop, and numerous small airfields have been carved
from the valleys during the past 10 years. A few of them are mere strips suitable only for
landing single-engine liaison planes and as drop zones, but most of the new airfields are
usable by twin-engine planes.
Heavy summer rains periodically disrupt Indian road communications in NEFA. Although
the lack of roads and trails and the fast-flowing streams that hinder local movement are
important military obstacles, an ameliorating factor is the widespread availability of
trees, which would provide material for constructing makeshift and temporary bridges during
a tactical situation.
Basis for Border Claims
In 1960, officials from India and China met to discuss and document their respective
border claims. Neither China nor India, however, could muster convincing evidence to prove
that all of NEFA had incontestably been under its control. What emerged from the talks was
the fact that there had been little interest in or administration of NEFA until recent times.
Tibet had had some influence in the northwest in and near Towang because of the predominance
of Tibetan Buddhism in that area. The British also had had some influence, but it was con-
fined largely to the tribal areas of the hills that were adjacent to the plains and did not
extend to the higher and inaccessible areas of the north. In 19+3, however, the British
initiated a program for integrating NEFA into the administrative fabric of India. This
policy of integration was pursued by India after its independence, with marked acceleration
in recent years as tensions along the border increased. Basically, the rival claims to
NEFA revolve about the central question as to whether or not the McMahon Line is a legal
boundary.
Chinese Claims: In most places the Chinese claim in NEFA extends to the foothills
overlooking the Brahmaputra Valley and includes an area extending from 15 to about 80 miles
south of the border claimed by India. Aside from citing maps to support their claim, the
Chinese in 1960 presented evidence consisting principally of documents that purportedly
showed Tibetan jurisdiction in the northwestern part of the Kamen; frontier division, the
part referred to as the Monba area. This area (centered on Towang) is named after the
Monbas, a tribal group having more than 40,000 members who are closely akin to the Tibetans
in appearance and culture. What is more important, in relation to the border question, is
the fact that the Monbas are Buddhists of the Lamaist or Tibetan Buddhist faith and that
many Buddhist monasteries are located in this area. The Chinese contend that in the past
Tibetan administration prevailed in the Monba area and that taxes were paid to Tibet. India
contends that the money that was collected was for religious purposes only and that the
administrative machinery was in fact merely that of the Lamaist hierarchy, which was con-
cerned solely with ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Additional Chinese claims include appar-
ently small but somewhat vague areas in Luhit. The Indians refute these claims and cite
an official Chinese paper on the limits of Tibet, dated 1914, which did not include these
areas.
Indian Claims: Although at the 1960 conference India presented numerous docu-
ments as evidence of administration over NEFA, the real basis of the Indian claim is the
validity of the McMahon Line. In turn, the validity of the line depends upon whether or
not Tibet was an independent state at the time that the McMahon Line was defined and,
therefore, whether it was capable of incurring international obligations and entering into
treaty relations.
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Background on the McMahon Line
The modern history of Tibet, particularly its status as an independent state, is be-
clouded by the various relationships that have existed between China and Tibet since the
17th century. At first these relationships were primarily religious, but during the 18th
century three Manchu military interventions in Tibetan internal affairs placed Tibet under
some degree of Chinese control. Whatever the extent and effect of Chinese control during
the 18th century, it is undeniable that during the closing decades of the 19th century
China's influence over Tibet was merely nominal. Chinese military efforts of the early
20th century to reassert Chinese control in Tibet collapsed after the fall of the Manchu
dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1912. In an effort to clarify
and define the status of Tibet and its relationship with both China and India, the Simla
Conference was convened in 1913 through British initiative. Plenipotentiaries of Tibet,
China, and Great Britain attended the Simla Conference. During the negotiations a pro-
posal was made to establish an autonomous Tibet, referred to as Outer Tibet, that would
be under a shadowy Chinese suzerainty and an Inner Tibet in which Tibetan religious
authority would be recognized but secular power would be left in Chinese hands, thereby
necessitating the drawing of a border between the two parts of Tibet. At the same time
the Indian-Tibetan boundary east from Bhutan to the territory that now is northern Burma
also was defined. This eastern boundary was drawn on the map prepared at the Simla
Conference and became known as the McMahon Line, named after the British plenipotentiary.
There is no record that the Chinese representative at Simla contested the delineation of
this boundary. Nevertheless, the Chinese were displeased. Although the Chinese repre-
sentative initialed the draft convention, his government did not permit him to sign the
final version. Consequently, in July 1914, only Great Britain and Tibet signed the Simla
Convention, which included as an appendix the map that showed the now famed McMahon Line.
India maintains that the McMahon Line as delineated on this map is defined by a treaty
signed by two independent countries and therefore is a legal boundary.
The Chinese position is that Tibet has been and is an integral part of China and that
because China failed to sign the Simla Convention it is not binding and that consequently
the McMahon Line has no validity. A number of legal authorities convened in 1959-60 as a
Legal Inquiry Committee to investigate the Tibetan question under the aegis of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists, a body with consultative status to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council. Both the Commission and its Legal Inquiry Committee con-
cluded that during the period 1912 to 1950 the status of Tibet was "at the very least one
of de facto independence." Recently, American Ambassador Galbraith stated officially that
the McMahon Line is the international border that is accepted and sanctioned by modern
usage and that, accordingly, the United States regards it as the northern border of NEFA.
The increasingly sharp patrol clashes that occurred in the vicinity of the Indian
outpost of Dhola early in September 1962 had at issue the exact location of the Dhola
outpost with respect to the McMahon Line. China contended that the post was north of the
McMahon Line as drawn on the map used at Simla; India replied that in relation to the tra-
ditional boundary and the watershed in this area, the Dhola post was south of the McMahon
Line.
The guiding principle used in defining the McMahon Line was that it should follow the
main watershed, or water divide, along the crests of the Great Himalayas. Strictly applied,
however, a boundary following the water divide would place some parts of the McMahon Line
as much as 50 miles north of its presently accepted location, because several streams have
their sources north of the crests of the main ranges. This is the situation in the Dhola
area where the Nyamjang (or Manas) River extends well north into Tibet. In determining the
alignment of the border in these areas, the British at Simla relied on the southward extent
of Tibetan jurisdiction.
The map used at Simla to delineate the McMahon Line was at the scale of one inch to
eight miles -- an unusually small scale for boundary delineation. Furthermore, the map
was a provisional edition based on rough compilation, and in many areas along the frontier
the terrain features were merely sketched in. Until recently, India probably had no better
information about the terrain of the frontier than that provided by this and other outdated
maps. During the past 3 years, however, India has made ground and aerial surveys that pro-
vide accurate information about the location of terrain features. Although Survey of India
maps published through 1959 showed the western extremity of the McMahon Line, where it joins
the Bhutan border, at latitude 27?45 N and thus conformed to the Simla map, the Indian de-
scription of the McMahon Line that was given to Chinese officials in 1960 did not corre-
spond with the location of the line as shown on the Simla map. Instead, the description
placed the western extremity of the McMahon Line at 27?48'N, about 3 miles north of the
earlier version, with an alignment trending northwest-southeast and rejoining the line
according to the old version of the border about 10 miles to the east (see accompanying
map). The discrepancy appears to be explained by the fact that the Indians had acquired
a more accurate knowledge of the terrain from their recent surveys. Using the watershed
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and highest ridges as guiding principles, India in 1960 described the McMahon Line accord-
ing to the actual terrain in this area, following the Thagla ridge from the Bhutanese
border to the Nyamjang River. Although Chinese notes have made much of this particular
difference, recently published Indian maps also have portrayed slight differences from the
original Simla map at other places along the McMahon Line without arousing Chinese charges
of inconsistency.
The Chinese attack southward on 20 October
1962
quickly
overran the
Indian post at
Dhola and supporting posts with the result that
on 26
October
the Chinese
captured the
key town of Towang. At the same time, the Chinese launched a lesser attack in the east
down the Luhit Valley, an attack which threatened the important Indian post at Walong,
about 15 miles from the border. Apparent diversionary feints were made along the remote
frontiers of the Subansiri and Siang divisions. In the Towang area the Chinese moved
south from the high plateau -- their key base at Tsona Dzong is at 14,500 feet -- into
the valley in which Towang itself is located at an elevation of 10,000 feet. In contrast
to the earlier situation around Dhola, the Indians now possess high ground on the Sela
Range (10,000 to 16,000 feet in elevation) overlooking the Towang Valley. In the east
the Indian forces at Walong are located in the narrow Luhit Valley (elevation about 4,000
feet) around which surrounding hills rise very sharply to 10,000-foot ridges. In both
the Towang and Walong areas but particularly in the latter, most of the valley sides and
ridges below 13,000 feet are forested.
The current Chinese military position in the Towang Valley is handicapped by the
lack of motorable Chinese roads to Towang and by the fact that the Indians have superior
defensive terrain. Although there are roads from Tsona Dzong to Le in the Nyamjang Valley
and, apparently, to Bum La -- the pass located due north of Towang -- Chinese forces there
now must rely on animal transport and porters. Extensions to these roads probably will be
made if Chinese planning calls for additional advances in NEFA. A road south from Le along
the Nyamjang Valley would be roughly 45 miles in length and probably would require some
cutting into the sides of the mountains, judging from the alignment of the existing trail.
A much shorter route of about 15 miles might be built down from the 14,500-foot pass
(Bum La) to Towang at 10,200 feet.
Chinese alternatives to frontal attacks against the Indian positions guarding the
pass of Se La, which protects the Indian bases to the south at Dirang Dzong and Bomdila,
include a possible flanking maneuver to the east by moving up the Towang Valley. To cross
the high Sela Range to the east, however, the Tse La (a pass at 15,600 feet) would have to
be used, and from this pass the trails south to Dirang Dzong are difficult. Another alter-
native would be to move down the Towang and Maness Valleys to the southwest into Bhutan,
thus outflanking the Indian forces. At Tashi Gang Dzong, a few miles southwest of the
Bhutanese-Indian border, a jeepable road leads south to the plains. Part of eastern Bhutan
is claimed by China, and this claim could be used as justification for entering Bhutanese
territory.
Possible negotiations to settle the border question in NEFA undoubtedly would involve
the complex problems of the Ladakh sector as well. Although since 1959 China and India
have engaged in a voluminous correspondence about creating the proper conditions for
negotiations, the basic positions of 1959 apparently remain irreconcilable.
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5EC
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Title of Report
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPTJPE
IN THE NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
Date of Novb2
Report -
25X1A
Report Series No. GM 62-10 PN 61.2074 Control
Requester
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_
STATSPEC
STATINTL
request to M
STATINTL ~`t a following are sent to 7vu
e notes an select. re:
were used in briefing the I others
last year and the following p1e reports t
0p 61.I Part XI, copy 591
OF 62-3 tL, Copy 12
ox 62-10o copy 334
62- , Copy 375
?3P 63-+,L,, Copy 32
62-8, Copy 493
copy 50
STATINTL
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REPORTS TO RN USED IN BRIEFING THE DCI: (Briefing hid on 24 July 1963)
(24 59-3; November 1959
Cat 62-9? November 1962
'
62-10 November 1962
The China-India Border Dispute1 The Disputed Fronti_ers_
of Kali; and The Sino-Indian Border Dispute in the
NortEast Frontier Agency
When the Chinese last fall launched major attacks
on India in Iadakh and in M m,9 there vas an immediate
need by the white House and the Intelligence Coos unity
for background information on these poorly known areas,
packaged in a vay convenient for briefings, conferences,
and reference use. ORR bad previously prepared an over-
all study of the border dispute. To this study it now
added GM's on those specific sectors where the Chinese
attack was centered. SECRET
GR L-62-1 May 1962
Geographic Factors Affecting Clandestine Und
Nuclear Tests in the USSR
This report, prepared at the request of 061 in
connection with Geneva test-boo negotiations, vas a
pioneer research effort and continues to.be a basic
intelligence reference document in the field.
.CONFICEN1IAU
GP 62-31T >' October 1962
Data cards on Cuban Caves
The possibility that Cuba's thousands of caves
might provide suitable hiding places for guided missilee
and other important hardware has stimulated intensive
effort by ORR's geographers to locate and describe those
potentially suitable for clandestine use. To date, eoa
480 such caves have been inventoried on data cards and
disseminated throughout the Intelligence Cocaunity.
CI;z I Ej 1T! U
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BAST COPY
A VAILABLE
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