ESTABLISHMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, SPECIAL STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100057-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: May 22, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

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WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITART INTELLIGENCE
0-2
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
'MID 912 22 May 1946
DUN FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:
8 J Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division,
Special Staff
DISCUSSION
1. Psychological warfare problems of interest to the War Depart-
ment have been the responsibility of the Propaganda Branch, 0-2, WDGS,
acting under the direct control of the A. C, of S., 0-2, in accordanda
with instruction's of the Deputy Chief of Staff. (Tab A) -Under the
provisions of JCS, 224 Series, the Chief, Propaganda Branch also acts
a* the Army Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison with the Over-
seas Planning Board, Office of International Information and Cultural
Affairs, Department of State. The Propaganda Branch also provides for
AAirinterest in psychological ?airfare in accordance with the decision
of the D. C. of S. abolishing the AAP Psychological Warfare Service
and transferring its personnel to the Propaganda Branch. (Tab B)
2. Prior to the establishment of the Propaganda Branch, psycholo-
gical warfare problems were the responsibility of the following staff
agencies:
World War I . Psychologic SubsectionM.I.2# Military
Intelligence Division
1919.1941 . None
1941 - Special Studies Group OASW and A. C. of S., 0-2
1942 Psychological Warfare Branch, MIS
1943 - OPD Policy Section, Strategy and Policy Group
A brief summary of War Department participation in psychological warfare
is attached as Tab C.
3. Although propaganda leaflets were employed by the Continental
Forces in action against British troops at the Battle of Bunker Hill
in 1775, and, in more modern times, an extensive propaganda effort
was developed in World War I, yet no firm doctrine or determination of
the proper role of psychological warfare in the military establishment
had been developed by the War Department at the outbreak of World War II.
As a result, civilian agencies were to a large extent relied upon to
plan, develop and execute psychological warfare missions for the armed
forces. tinder Executive Order 9312, the Office of War Information was
assigned responsibility for planning, development and execution of all
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John F. Inlea
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phases of the federal program of radio, press, pubkications, and related
foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information,
exoept in Latin Amerida, Which was assigned to the Office of Coordinater
of Inter-Americaa Affairs. Programa of foreign propaganda in the
theatera of operations were subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, while those parts exeeuted in theaters of military operations
were subject to the control of the theater commander*
4. As a result, psychological warfare operations in the various
eters were to a large extent concerned with the integration and
ilization of civIllans iho had been hastily trained and seledted for
work by the am In the absence of War Department doctrine or
various arrangements and agreements were made by the. theater
daders concerning the degree of such utilization, In sCO4
theaters, notably SPA, very little use was made of OWI civilians in
the field, While in other areas, particularly those under SHAEF Control,
extensive use was made in all operations, both strategic and tactical*
5 By military order of the Commander in Chief, dated 13 June 1942,
as amended by Presidential Executive Order of 9 March 1943, the Office
of Strategic Service (OSS) was established as an operating agency of the
Government Under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It was assigned the mission of conducting secret operations
within enemy countries and enemy-occupied or controlled countries for
the purpose of executing morale subversion by means of covert-or "black"
propaganda, including false rumors, "freedom stationt", false leaflets
and false documents for undermining theParW or the enemy.. Although
WS, was organized aa_a military structure it did not have recogalaad
=itia4a, as an agency of the War Department, with a result thliT71eitir
commanders were often relactant to utilize its services. As a result,
OSS OPerated only to a very limited extent in the Cincpac-Cinepoa area,
and not at all in the SIPA.
6. Should this nation ever have to face another world war, the
greater totality which will undoubtedly characterize it will apply to
the psychological as well as to the material 4 sans with which it is
Ought. In a contest in Which the material forces were cloaely belanced-
vietery might well hinge upon our capacity to shake the determination
of our enemps,and to win the support of people very different from
ourselves. Therefore, the War Department cannot afford to neglect the
implementation of may means which would assist in the accooplialpment of
such objectives, and with the reorganization of the War Department, it
appears pertinent to re-examine the status of psychological warfare with-
in the Genrral Staff.
7. Psychological Warfare cannot be improvised. Rather it required
a continuous accumulation of pertinent facts, many of them of a techni-
cal nature, and a discerning evaluation of such facts by trained specialists,
capable of following intently all developmental in the field of maze
education and mass information, as well as political and psychological
techniques. Such studies, While relying to a certain extent on intellia
genes sources, are not properly within the role of military intelligence,
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Which is devoted principally to an estimate of the war,making capabil
ties of other nations. The need for such a group within the war Department
has been recognized by the Army member of the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee, who in a letter dated 22 December 1945, to the A. C. of S.,
OPD, stressed the importance of consolidating the lessons learned in World
Wax II and establieing a email Apchelogical Varfare Branch in the lir
Department. (Tab D) This same need has also been recognized in the offi,
eel reports of psydhologies1 warfare activities in all theaters of
operations..
8. Field experience during World War /I demonstrated that While
psychological warfare was originally assigned to the various 0,2 staff
sections for development and implementation, the diverse chatacter of
the operations were such that the establihsment of special staff
sections was necessitated. As a result, in ETC, MTO, SIPA, And eventu,
ally in POA, Psychological Warfare Divisions or Branches were estab-
lished and psychological warfare was recognized as an auxiliary opera-
tional Weapon.
9. To insure complete exploitation of the potentials of psycholo-
gical warfare, studies of a highly technical character must be vigorously
pursued. These studies should include the development and utilization
of airborne, rocket, and artillery propaganda-dispensing devices, public
address systems, both air and ground types, and specialized morale
deterioration devices. In addition, all technical improvements insdch
diverse fields as radio and television, printing and publishing, and
motion pictures will require, cppetant study and review. Furthermore,
there must be sufficient experimentation in and develOpment of such'
items to enable standardization and the establishment of approved tables
of equipment and channels of supply.
10. Analysis of the responsibilities of the Intelligence Division
indicates that it is particularly concerned with the collection, evalua-
tion and dissemination of intelligence and With security of information.
Although relying on intelligence for propaganda purposes during wartime,
psychological warfare is an operational function involving not only
military intelligence, but strategic developments, political forces
historic and ethnic backgrounds of people, and diplomacy on the hidses
level. However, the diverse and technical character of its operations
and responsibilities does not appear to be a logical responsibility of
the Operations Division,
11. In the event of a future emergency, Alia overall political
and psychological warfare policies will stem from the White House
and the State Department, the existence of a nuclear organization with,
In the War Department possessing a complete plan for military psycholo-
gical warfare and the technical means of implementation, would avoid
the situation of World lar II *herein theater commanders had thrust
upon them civilian agencies to conduct military psychological warfaref
within their theaters, with resultant conflict of authority and lack
of control over trai4eg, standards and performance. Furthermore, a
psychological warfare organiiition on the Special Staff level would
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also be capable of planning, executing and implementing subversive morale
opera ono, time providing a unified structure within the War Department
for the conduct of all phases of psychological warfare.
ACTION =MENDED
.It is recomended that the Psychological Warfare Divis o
Department Special Staff, be established with responsibilities end
functions substantially as outlined in APPENDIX A.
CONCIIRMICES
D of I (
CAD
OPD
0-3
5 Inas
2. Appendix A
2. Tab A. MID Memo No. 78
is: Tab B. Memo for the D. C. of S.
4- Tab C. Brief of ID participation in P
5, Tab D. Letter from Maj. Can. Lemnitzer
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