SR-39- SOME SUGGESTIONS CAUTIOUSLY ADVANCED BY G/SI (G/SJ)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030042-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: NOTES

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SR-39 CUBA --- Some suggestions cautiously advanced by G/SI WSJ)
I think the heart of the difficulty if any is best found in and
Illustrated by Section V4 The thesis is that the Cuban Ccssmuniete, who
pan the United States by direction, and the Cuban.Nationalists, who pan
the US primarily to kid themselves, Qg get together in time of war,
stress, or whenever it might embarrass the US, sad thus make trouble vwc-
etious to the US government and dangerous to US security.
The first trouble one would run into with this theory, I an inclined
to suspect, would be with the Agencies--not that one gives a darn what
the Agencies think, but here they might have a point. The case, in other
words, is somewhat similar to that brought on by ORE 9-48 where OIR'S dis-
sent was basically a complaint that we had overrated the bearing of Cuban
politics on US security. I know, or suspect, that the authors of SR 39
merely mean to say that a strong alliance of anti-US Cubans could embarrass
our government, presumably in a diplomatic rather then a military "me.
I'a not sure, though, that everybody would read it that way and fear that
consequently we'd get the:;ssame old complaint that Cuba is no Caribbean
USSR. I think the matter ought to be explained further and better.
I also think the analysis of the Cuban Nationalist position is less
then convincing. On the surface it would appear to me that these people
are victims of a very human psychological condition, related to normal uon-
psychopathic inferiaity reactions, which often cause a little man to pmt
on an abnormally big front to show a big man that he isn't a little man. If
so, I couldn't take the Cubans too seriously in this regard. The paper
itself says they know-perfectly well they're about as likely to get loose
from US? supervision as the moon is from the earth and that even if they dill,
'thtiy' d be nothing but a small island with a large pile of worthless sugar.
So why in the world should they (a) ally "themselves against the US with the
Communists whom they naturally and logically don't like, or (b) conspire to
embarrass the United States in a senseless exhibition of chewing off the hand
that is feeding you? In short,, until I an convinced to the contrary, I shall
continue to suspect that Cuban nationalism to related to US security conforms
to Macbeth's description of a tali) told by an idiot.
Certainly I an not being so rash, in the above, as to attempt to deny any
part of the conclusions. I only suspect that others will react similarly
and that therefore a strengthening of the argument is needed..
An pretty well satisfied with the Political part except for the history.
The economics cmin be brushed ups I thought some parts confusing. Foreign
Relations is virtually confined to a discussion of attitude toward the US
and says, about the same thing that's said frequently elsewhere. I wouldn't
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know, but should think one might be told acre about these curious
Caribbean relations that are always resulting in accusations that
everybody is invading everybody else. The military is covered all
right? but in parts, the writing Leaves something to be desired. I
think Isd do some more to Section V, as above, and where, by the way,
is the usual Section VI "on what's going to happen in the future? The
present SectionVI ought to be scrapped and either permanently omitted
or recast on the basic of some real evidence. I forgot to mention the
Summary. It ought to be a simple job of including a reference to all
important elements in the paper rather than just the strategic ones.
R. Nallrett will handle questions, if there are any, regarding the
appendixes.. I glanced at the biographical sketches, by the way, and
thought them excel7aent-but where was the picture of the fat general
on the this horse?
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Seriatim (See also marginal comments).
pp. 1-2 - This isn't the history of Cuba; it's the-history of the Platt
amendment. By mere chance, I happened to glance at Appendix C and read
the sketch on Batiste,p-if I hadn't done so, I''d never have realised what
he means in the Cuban scheme of things. All at, and that sort of thing,
ought to be noted in this Genesis portion so that readers would be
impressed right off with the important factors in the background of Cuban
thinking. Please do not mistake. ' as and think I wait a long, rambling
account of everything that has happened in Cuba since Columbus; $test
specify, without any narrative, what facts and events in the past have
bearing now on Cuban life. Similarly, by the way, the matter of Machado
who pops up abruptly on page 2, quite unintrodueed. We can't ass m+e that
readers--particularly the riffraff who read Situation Roports??will know
all or anything about the Machado affair.
P. 1-9 - Better make sure that Parts 4 and 5 got properly reversed in
the eventual typing.
Section n- see marginal notes.
Section TII - see General. above.
Section XV - In my opinion ought to be pretty thoroughly- overhauled. To
me, at least, coming to it fresh and ignorant, theme were parts that were
very confusing.
Section V -- p. 1. What's this Routs to India thin? Assuming you start
on this round-the-world jaunt from sow part in the United States, you
would presumably pane Cuba on your way out to seta; then Cuban-based craft
would protect you for a few miles, and then you'd get into the middle of
the South Atlantic and got sunk.. Wouldn't it be better to moie Cuba a
couple thousand miles east?.
P. 1 -- These crucial problems don't sound very crucial to me. It might
make a difference if the Cuban government couldn't keep order, because then
we'd probably have to send in a couple of Earines to take-care of the riot.
The other three crucial, problems leave me quite unimpressed,
P. 2 - This matter of Nationalists needs straightening out. For example,
it says hero that the Nationalists are capable of filling the gear box ful?.
of wrenches at the time of our greatest vulnerability. Agreed. They are
capable of it; so am I; so are you. The only question worth bothering
about is whether or not we are gotn to do it. Before Ira going to take up
my valuable time observing Cuban nationalists and being solicitous about them,
I want to know -- not what they can do, but what they will do,
AIL
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Section VI - is a total lose. This is like saying that since we know
nothing whatever about the subject we'll just use our imagination. Or
something like the time Groucho Marx couldn't find the missing diamonds
and proceeded to draw the plans from which he could build a house in
which they might be hidden.
I think the section ought to be written, and have a feeling that it
would be better to make it Section II rather than VI. Reasons for think-
ing so is that most people seem to have the Idea, right or wrong, that
Cuba is the center of LA Communism and would like to know sore about it.
I do not, however, no any sense in all this conjecture. I should simply
either (a) get some reliable information about the inn4r. working of the
Cuban OF; or (b) admit right off that I did not have any reliable informa-
tion on the subject and then detail what is'known about the overt side of
the pictures number of members, connections with OTAL at cetera.
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