RELEASE OF POW'S IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000140011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 18, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONS COORDINATING-BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
Janur..lry 18, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE OPERATIONS INATING BOARD:
SUBJECT: Release of POWs in Korea
On January 15th, 1954, the Board Assistants.,
acting in behalf of their principals, approved the
attached paper entitled, "Probable Action Regarding
Release of 22,000 Non-repatriated POWs and Preliminary
Checklist of Measures to Exploit this Situation," together
with its Annex "A", entitled, "Preliminary Checklist of
Contingencies Regarding Release of 22,000 Non repatriated
POWs Prepared by the OCB Staff in Consultation with the
Worl]ing Group;"
"-E:mer B. Staats
Executive Officer
Attachment:
1. Probable Action Regarding Release of
22,000 Non-repatriated POWs and Pre-
liminary Checklist of Measures to
Exploit this Situation dtd 1/15/54
w/Annex "A"
NSC review(s) completed. CONFIDENTIAL
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C FI DENTIAL
OPERATIONS C OORDINi TING HOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 15, 1954
PROBABLE ACTION REGARDING
RELEASE OF 22,000 NON-REPATRIATED POWs
and
PRILININARY CHECKLIST OF MEASURES
TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION
1. Probable Action by the NNRC
On the basis of unofficial reports, the Indian Custodial Forcef
(ICF) will return the 22,000 non-repatriated POWs to allied an(communist captors beginning January 20, three days before their
scheduled release as civilians. They will be returned as
prisoners-of-war and not as "civilians". The disposition )f
ninety-six North Koreans and Chinese who requested the opp?ar.
tunity to go to neutral nations is so far undecided. The re-
turned PO?Js will have the further choice of whether they w..sh
to take up civilian life or enlist in the ROK or Chinese
Nationalist armies.
b. General Thimayya has warned both Commands that if they change
the status of the POWs they will "not be in conforriity" with
the Armistice. The General interprets the Armistice agreement
to mean that the two Commands can not free the prisoners uitil
all have received explanations and a Korean Peace Conference
has discussed the future of the POs.
2. Probable Action by the UN Command
a.
b. The probable US-UN position in this situation is that we do
not concur in General ThimayyaTa interpretation of his re-
sponsibility or of the Armistice Agreement. In our view, ac-
cording to the Armistice Agreement, the POO'is become civi]3anrm
aft 12:01 A,M,, January 23d. The NNRC and the CFI have an
obligation to interpret the Armistice Agreement and neithur
side can change this obligation. Furthermore, the NNRC must
interpret the Agreement on their own responsibility; we are
not in a position to acquiesce in such an interpretation.
General Taylor will accept the Pads as they are released aid
will carry out plans for their disposition as outlined in
Paragraph 3.b.(1) of the OCR memorandum entitled flPreliminary
Checklist of Contingencies Regarding Release og 22,000 Non-
Repatriated PO1.4s Prepared by the OCB Staff in Consultation
With The ?-Iorking Group" of January 13, 1954.
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Ca FIDENTIAL
c, Psychological and military planning for handling the relea-3e
of the POWs is taking into account the strong possibility of
violence occurring among the POWs during the process,
3. Exploitation Measures Taken to Date
a,
b.
C.
d,
e,
f.
The W Command has briefed all news media representatives on
the plans and projected operations of the 8th Army regarding
the release, reception, and evacuation from the Demilitarized
Zone of all non-repatriate prisoners-of-war,
Arrangements have been made to give media all possible access
to activities dealing with the evacuation and transfer of the
PWs from NNRC custody.
Public statements by top UN Command officials, enunciating
the firm intent of the UN Command to facilitate the release
and evacuation of the PWs, have been made in support of the
US national policy on the matter.
USIA has made arrangements for sending two additional inf or:.Ia-
tion specialists to Korea to ensure that the release of the
prisoners and any other developments are given full coverage.
Material obtained by the USIS staff in Korea will be sent to
the Press, Radio and Motion Picture Service for world-wide
exploitation.
Advance information policy guidance on the general Korean
situation, with particular reference to upcoming events has
been airmailed to all USIS posts,
A briefer telegraphic information policy guidance has been
sent to selected posts and all military commands (USITO 194,
13 Jan.195Li.). Policy lines have been coordinated with the
Departments of State and Defense.
Exploitation Measures Being Considered for the Future
a. USIA
(1) Additional information policy guidance will be issued
as required by substantive developments, such as those
listed as contingencies in the OCB POU Working Group
paper of January :th.
(2) Statements, speeches or releases of U.S. military or
other government officials, concerning the prisoner
release or of related developments will be exploited
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(3)
(L)
(5)
through USIA Press and Radio Services. Similar treat:-ient
will be given to appropriate statements, etc. of foreign
government spokesmen.
Appropriate US and foreign press comment will be repeated
by USIA information media.
In the belief that this event can be exploited with maxi-
mum effectiveness through sustained follow-up after the
release, USIA will seek to insure that the former
prisoners' individual stories of why they chose freedom
are told fully in the world press in the months following
their release. A special effort will be made to demon-
strate that those POWs who chose the Army as a way cf
life did so voluntarily.
A special effort will be made to appropriately oresen t
this event to the peoples of Asia.
b. The Department of State, will !
(1) Prepare and forward to OCB for appropriate dissemination
a list of guidances previously issued on this subject;
(2) Consider issuing, before January 20th, a statement clari?
fying the US-UN position in answer to the Thimayya letter
and probable NNRC action, especially warning of possible
disruptive action by communist-directed agents included
in the non-repatriated returned PO' 7s.
(3) Probably have the Under Secretary of State issue a state-
ment on January 23rd;
(4) Attempt to have Ambassador Lodge issue a statement;
(5) Encourage Department speakers on foreign policy to in-
clude the subject of non-forcible repatriation in their
remarks;
(6) Include appropriate discussion of this issue in the up-
coming UNC Report to the reconvened General Assembly,
probably in February;
(7) ti:"ithin the Exchange of Persons program, exrlore the
possibility of allocating an educational fellowship
grant to one Chinese and one Korean POW,
The Central Intelligence Agency wills
(1) Support this program as they are able.
CONF'IDENTIA .
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CONFTD L
The OCB Staff will:
(1) Inquire into the desirability and appropriate way
of exploiting the POW petitions "signed in blood"
and sent to President Eisenhower, Lester Pearson
and General Mark Clark,
ENCLOSURE: (1)
CONFIDENTIAL - ANNEX "A" January 13, 1954 "Preliminary Checklist
of Contingencies Regarding Release of 22,000 Non-Repatriated
POWs Prepared by the OCB Staff in Consultation with The :,corking
Group"
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Annex
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON 2S , D. C.
January 13, 1954
PhELTl3INARY CHFCCKLIST CF CONTINGENCIES REGARDING
RELEASE OF 22,000 NON-REPATRIATED POWs PREPARED
BY THE OCR STAFF IN CONSULTATION 11TH THE WCUING
GROUP
1. The Problem
To explore the most likely contingencies regarding the release
in Korea of 22,000 non-repatriated POlds together with probable
U.S. courses of action in the event of each ccntingency.
2. The Situation
a, The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission now has custody of
some 22,000 North Korean and Chinese Communist non-repatriated
POWs. 'Paragraph 11 of the Annex of the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment~provides fcr "the relief from the prisoner-of-war status to
civilian status of any Prisoners-of-war who have not exercised
the right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition
has been agreed to by the political conference within 120 days
after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed
their custody." Accordingly, as of the end of the 22nd day of
January non-repatriated POi.:s will become entitled to their free-
dom as. civilians.
b. Pursuant to an agreement reached with General Thimayya, on Decem-
ber 22nd General Hull, UN Commander, issued a statement announcin
that on January 22nd non-repatriate. prisoners would become
entitled to their freedom as civilians and that they uvuld be
enabled to go to any available country of their choice, The J.S.
has repeatedly stated since then that we insist upon the release
of the POWs on January 22nd.
c. The Communist Command, on the other hand, has demanded that the
prisoners remain in neutral custody until a political conference
on Korean problems has been convened and has discussed the
prisoner-of-war issue for thirty days.
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The NNRC is considering these opposing views but has as yet not
clearly made known its official position.
3. Contingencies and Probable US-UN Courses of Action
2'
All contingencies listed 'below are not co-equal. As of January
13th we are advised by the Department of State that the Government
is proceeding on the assumption that there will be a peaceful
release of the POWs on January 23rd. However, the possibility
cannot be excluded that, contrary to this assumption, one of the
other contingencies listed below may eventuate.
The NNRC releases the POG7s at midnight January 72nd pursuant to
Par, 11 o the Annex of the Korean Armistice Agreement:
(1) The 14,400 Chinese prisoners and the 7,700 North Korean POWs
now in Indian custody will leave the demilitarized zone
shortly. after midnight at two separate points along the
south border of the zone. The Koreans will board waiting
trains and travel south at the Ma f 1,000. per hour to
reception centers at the East coast port of Pohang and the
?Jest coast port of Kunsan, There they will have tie choice
of enlisting in the 1.OK army or taking up civilian life in
the Korean republic, The trains wilipause briefly in Seoul
for a mass welcoming by Korean men, women and children,
The Chinese will travel by truck over guarded highways to a
processing center near Inchon, where they will be received
by representatives of Nationalist China, A few hours later
the P0!^7s will board I..000-,passenger LSTs and proceed to
Formosa, The American LSTs are under contract to Japanese
crews, Each will carry about one platoon of U.S. security
troops. About 100 Nationalist Chinese will be on hand at
the border of the-demilitarized zone to greet the Chinese
POtias and accompany them to Inchon and Formosa, The Eighth
Army will provide food and any necessary clothing to the
former POWs at the Inchon center, Hospitalized Chinese
will be flown to Formosa via U.S, military aircraft.
The NNRC releases the POWs prior to January 22nd
(1) This may occur in order to avoid a determination by the
NNRC that the POWs have become "civilians"*
(2) General Taylor will immediately move to corral the POWs
and continue the orderly transfer as in 3,b,(l) supra,
2
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d.
The NNRC refuses or fails to act and:
(1)
the POWs effect their own physical release'
(a) This may occur if the NNRC, for any reason, does not
take positive action to release the POTS.
(b) See 3,0.(2).
(2)
the POT4s,remain passive resulting in. maintenance of the
status quo:
(a) The possibility of this contingency occurring is re-
garded as extremely remote.
e. The ROK.Government intervenes with force to release the
(1)
(2)
The ROK Government has threatened this possibility,
General Taylor has said that the U. S. Eighth Army would
resist such a move,
f; The Communists, attempt. to halt the release of the PO?is
(1) This has not been threatened but is a contingent possibility.
(2) General Taylor has said that such action would "most likely
start the Korean War over again", that the Eighth Army is
"alerted for any contingency" and that the Army is fully
prepared for "orderly or emergency situations" that might
arise from the release of the POWs,
j: The General Assembly is called into session and becomes seized
of thPI .prob em
(1) It is highly probable that the Indians will have returned
the POWs to the two sides on or about January 23 (before
the General Assembly meets)6 However, the possibility that
India may decide to hold the POWs until the General Asser,zbly
meets can not be entirely excluded. Both General ram Il,i
North Korea's Foreign i'tinister, and Chou En Lai, Chinese
Communist Premier and Foreign Ministers have urged that a
General Assembly session be seized of the POW question.
(2) The United States believes that the General Assembly has no
legal authority under the Armistice Agreement to make any
decision regarding the treatment of PD.-Js: The United States
is i therefore, strongly opposed to any attempt to have the
General Assembly decide whether or in what manner the PCis
are to be released.
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Comments on OCB paper
We agree in general that US-ROK economic relationships
are likely to become increasingly strained, but we know no reason
for anticipating a crisis at any specified time, such as May or
June. Although the ROK government is making strenuous efforts to
achieve a rapid rate of economic development, the greatest
frictions between the US and South Korea will probably not develop
directly out of the implementation of this program. Because of
the extreme nationalism and touchiness of the Rhee government,
friction is more likely to arise over US control of ROK expenditm'e
of funds, i.e., procurement financed by US aid funds, procurement
in Japan, and the utilization of ROK foreign exchange resources.
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16 March 1954
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