PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 170/1, 'U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000140005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 26, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005IO 2 RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3-
DATE: March 26, 1954
COPY NO.
0PER1TIONS C00RDIN~ TING B0iI.RD
Washington, D.C.
PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 170/1,
'?U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSE OF ACTION IN KORL,-,419,"
REFERENCE: NSC Acti.op 972d.
OCB FILE NO: 26
NSC review(s) completed.
Approved For Release ;;209?kAlA-RDP80R01731R003000140,0O -3,
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
This document contains information effecting the National.
Defense of the United Stete within the yreaning of the
Espionage Laws, Ti 11.e 1Fs, U.S.C., Suctions 793 and 794, as
amended. Its transmission or the reve1ation of its contents
in any man ier to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
 Approved For Release 2005/002q011ft80R01731 R0030001ffi56.
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. Co
April 16, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR TEE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
SUBJECT: Progress Report on NSC 170/1
The Operations Coordinating Board. Progress Report on NSC
170/1, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," dated
March 26, 1954, was noted and approved by the National Security
Council on April 6, 1954, Action No. 1087.
The attention of the Board is invited to NSC Action No.
1087-b, which provides for a continuous review by the OCB of
Annex A to NSC 170/1.
Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer
Progress Report on NSC 170/1, "U.S. Objectives
and Courses of Action in Korea," March 26, 1954,
with Appendix A, February 9, 1954; Appendix B,
March 23, 1954.
OCB File No. 26 TOP SECRET 1
of 1 page
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
 TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
March 26, 1951;
PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 170/1,
"U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES CF ACTION IN KCREA"
1. SUMMARY
A. Actions in Execution of Policy
In implementing NSC 170/1 the following major actions have been takers:
1. The United States has continued to observe the armistice, am has
endeavored unsuccessf.L11J t'irough the Military Armistice Commission to get
Communist compliance with ?tha armistice terms.
2. President Rhee has been formally notified of the UNC and US reaction
to a unilateral initiation of military operations by the ROK (see _:pprrdii ti.
3. The U.S. has developed plans and taken appropriate actions to permit
maximum flexibility ih *ret Li.if; any likely eventuality in respect to preventing
or countering resumption of fighting by the ROK.
4. A political conference to crosider the Korean question will m*et at
Geneva on April 26. Political and economic pressures on Communist China are
being maintained pending the outcome of the conference.
5. The United States and the Republic of Korea.have ratified the Mutza1
Defense Treaty. It can be brought into effect at any time by an exchange )f
ratifications. The United Sates is delaying this action pending further
assurance of continued ROK cooperation.
6. Redeployment of two U.S. divisions from Korea (of. NSC Actioh No. 972d.)
has been announced and a phased withdrawal of these units is taking pL ce.
Further action to withdraw U.S. forces will await developments at the xene-1?1
Conference.
7. The policy in NNSC 170/1 to allow new construction in Korea and tho
conclusion of an economic aid agreement on December 14 have cleared the wa-r for
more rapid progress in the Korean reconstruction program.
8. A separate report on covert operations will be made to the Board.
B. Evaluation of Policy
1. The working group considers that NSC 170/1 continues to be e?fec-~-,__ve
timely and applicable, with the following exceptions:
Para. 6. (Annex A to NSC 170/1, separately distributed) has not
been fully implemented due to changed circumstances, including di=aini;,1he1
likelihood of unilateral action by the ROK since the adoption of the
policy statement. However, ROK capability for unilateral action must 1*1
recognized and plans therefor kept current and coordinated.
OCB File No. 26 - 1 - TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP80R01731 ROd`5-3
Para. 10c. providing for a vigorous campaign to secure additional.
armed forces from other LO members has not been practical in view of
the armistice, the withdrawal of the French battalion and the South
African Air Force squadron, and the announcement of U.S. intention to
withdraw two U.S. divisions,
It is recommended that the above paragraphs of NSC 170/1 be re-exami:-i d in
due course in the light of the station current at that time.
C. Malor Problems
A number of develo;nnents, both political and economic, in US-ROK rely,-ions
(e.g.1 The Korean Po:t.tt._cai. Conference, review of the dollar?hwan converaiea '
rate, slooer than expected progresa in economic progra c) arc likely to converge
ie3 al a or, June,, in which case there may woU be a period of very difticull:
II. DETAII8D REPORT
A. Statement of Actions by Paragraphs aphs of NSC 170/1
Preventing or Countering the_Resumption of Fighting by the RO
Para. 5a. The United States has continued to observe the armis+P.e.
However, despite continuing efforts through the Military Armistice Cenasis-
sion, and the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission, Communist non-cooperation has made it :Im-
possible to enforce Communist compliance with the armistice term or to
carry out effectively the inspection provisions of the armistice ag cricnt.
Para. 5b.(1) See Appendix A.
Para. 5b.(2) See Appendix B.
Para. 5b,(3) As a portion of the overall detailed military planr:..ng
required by NSC 170/1, provisions were made for UNC troop dispos{tions in
Korea to permit the maximum flexibility in meeting likely eventunlitier
and in so far as possible to demonstrate U.S. determination to carry ~L:t
its policies in respect to resumption of hostilities. There is furthei
reference to this operational planning in the following paragraphs.
Paras. 6, 7, and 8. The contingencies of unilateral action by the
ROIL (paras, 6 and 7) and resumption of hostilities by the Communists
(para. 8) did not materialize during the reporting period. Coordinatl2!
military planning was nonetheless required and accomplished, and in
respect to para. 6 (Annex A to NSC 170/1, separately distributed) cer. Sin
capabilities had to be created even though it was determined that the
courses of action should not be fully implemented because of charged
circumstances. Revision of para. 6 in the light of these changes, i=-fud-
ing the diminished likelihood of unilateral action by the ROK, is these--
fore desirable. Despite the :Letter of March 6 from President Rhee to
President Eisenhower giving notification that the ROK may take unilatcr l
action, the present estimate is that the courses of action followed b-,
the United States since the armistice, and the changed circumstances
arising from the armistice have materially lessened the likelihood of
unilateral action by the ROK.
.. 2 - TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R%J098 05-3
Seeking to Obtain Satisfactc-ry Agreements from the Communists
Para. 9a. Negotiations to arrange for a political conference to
consider the Korean question were initiated on October 26 at Parnunjccr
by Ambassador Dean and were indefinitely recessed on December 12.
Liaison negotiations were reopened January 14. However, these w?rere
abandoned when the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Berlin agree to
arrangements for a Korean Political Conference to convene at Geneva
on April 26 on terms substantially better than those which had been
rejected by the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom.
Para. b The United States has continued to exert political arc`
economic pressures against Communist China. This subject is treated ?::--i
greater detail in other NSC papers.
Achieving a Position of Strength in Korea
Para. lOa. The United States and the Republic of Korea hav.-_e rats-.
fled the Mutual Defense Treaty. It can therefore be brought into of of
at any time by means of an exchange of ratifications in Washington. ~:.s a
result of President Rhee's letter of March 6 to President Eisenhower
ing notification that the ROI( may take unilateral action, the exchan/;c of
ratifications is being delayed pending further assurance of continued.
ROK cooperation.
Para, lOb. The United States has continued to build up and mai0rin
the security position of the ROK consistent with the armistice terms, iao
announced its intent to redeploy from I'orea two U.S. divisions in FY 1151+,
and has commenced their phased withdrawal. Plans are being made for r ijor
phased withdrawals in U.S. Fiscal Year 1955, but no further overt act.:on
wall be taken pending developments at the Geneva Conference.
Para, lOc. In view of the armistice and the redeployment of tw{, )f
our own divisions, it has not been practical to carry on a vigorous
campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for
service in Korea, and the only augmentation of Allied forces has beer, z
hospital unit from West Germany. The U.S. has given its approval to :Ae
withdrawal of a French battalion to fight in Indochina, and has relurt-
antly assented to the withdrawal of the South African Air Force squaar gin,
the India ambulance unit, and two New Zealand frigates. The Depirtmer
of State, however, has been endeavoring to persuade other countr_es to
maintain the present level of their forces in Korea.
Para. lOd. The United 'States has continued to work in and thrcxzx-r
the organs of the United Nations where feasible and in this connection'
has supported the continuance of i.UCURK and its movement to Seoul vhcrit may better observe developments in Korea, and similarly has s,ipp .sd.
the continuance of UNKRA and has taken steps to ensure that UPkas'e
program is integrated with the United States bilateral aid progr7un.
Para, i0e. The United States is making use of UNC facilities in
Korea to provide assistance to the Korean people. In this conne,tion
.a supplemental armed forces assistance program ($15 million in materic.Ls
has been made available in FY' 195+) is in full-scale operation and hr:c:
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 - CIA-RDP80R01731 0 05-3
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP80R01731 RRP0,Vd 05-3
alresdy made significant contributions, which have been given wide
publicity in Korea, to the rehabilitation of schools, churches, roes,
etc. Military units are giving technical assistance in various L3.reaL
of the Korean economy and took very effective measures for the relief
and reconstruction of Pusan after the disastrous fire in November l9!-: ,
Para. 10f. On December 14, 1953, an agreement between Mr. 'Mood, .1c;
CINCUNC's Economic Coordinator, and Prime Minister Palk Too Chin furthar
specified the basic terms for operation of the Combined Economic Boar*;. in
order to facilitate large-scale augmentation of the program of U.S.
economic assistance to the ROK. This agreement was executed pursuant
the US-ROK Economic Coordination Agreement of 24 May 1952 and to the
US-Korean Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1948. Implementation of
the economic program proceeded slowly in the first half of FY 1954 oc
to problems in planning and in reaching accord with the Republic of
Korea on internal stabilization measures. Until late November 1753,
Economic Coordinator in Korea, Mr. C. Tyler Wood, was restrained frog-
underta ing new construction in connection with the Korean Aid FrogrEr.
by Para,, l0f, 4) of NBC 170. In order to give the Economic Coonlinatc-:?
greater latitude in determining projects for. Korean reconstruction, the
NSC ru)..ng was modi'?'ied,. Of the $200 million available to FOA for the
economic progr.-am, fj..rm requests were received for approximately $50 Llit-
lion in the first half of FY 1951+. Implementation proceeded at a much
faster rate in January, but it is probable that not more than $150 mi.!-'Lion
of the T.1200 m:'. liion will be committed by the end of June 1-9511.. Unlei s
saleables can be increased and absorbed, with a proportionate de'rea:c
in the investment component, and other appropriate measures initiated,
increased buci scary expenditures and a marked increase of money ..3upp ;,:
will create serious danger of a new inflationary spurt between raw art.
June. T''Y s situation could lead to serious differences with the Gove...r.i--
ment of the ROK.
Para. ].Oh. The Department of State has constantly in its contact3
with oix--, All-.es carried on a campaign to persuade them to accept U.S.
courses of aci;ion and contribute to their support. Specifically,
Department of State officers have met frequently with our sixteen Al gees
in order to reach agreement on the issues and positions involved in the
POW problem and in the political conference. In addition, the U.S.
delegation at the UN has constantly worked with our .allies in an effor-
to gain their support for U.S. policies, and our Embassies abroad ha?-c
acted similarly with the Foreign Offices of the Governments to which
they are accredited.
Para. 101. Covert operations will be reported on separatel,,.
USIA support of above mentioned actions. USIA prepared information
policy guidances on those subjects for which special efforts were deemed
advisable to develop understanding and support abroad of the U.S. positior.,.
Continuous news policy guidance was provided to USIA press and radio office;3
in the U.S. and major items were treated in information guidances tra;ismittod
to overseas posts. The latter were made available to the Department of Dc:f.3nse
for transmission, in its discretion, to overseas commands.
Approved For Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP80R01731 F4080 ab' 05-3
I r
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
TOP SECRET
With respect to the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, USIA output include-
Secretary Dulles' letter to the President and the President's message to t_'ie
Senate requesting early ratification of the treaty, Senate discussions of ?he
treaty, and the Senate's approval of it. All progress was immediately comLuni
cated to Korea through press and radio channels. Guidance and output com_rn-
ing the withdrawal of the two U.S.. divisions from Korea was designed to assure
the ROK that the withdrawal would not result in a diminution of the overa17
strength that would be available to turn back renewed aggression. MsanwhL.e
output both in and to Korea continues to portray progress in the build.--up ,#f
ROIL defense forces. All available material on progress in the relief and
reconstruction programs, including about one story a day on the .Armed. For 'es
Assistance Program, was communicated to Korean audiences. Twelve MSA./Maruhsll
Plan motion pictures, emphasizing self-help in the U.S. aid program to Ew,-r'>pean
countries, were used in Korea. The ROIL-US economic agreement was reportel
globally and output stressed the magnitude of the problem, and the amount
aid to be delivered by the end of the current fiscal year, and, particula' y
to Korea, the need for and examples of cooperation in achieving the goals of
the aid program. The US-UN position in the efforts of Ambassador Dean and is
staff to reach an agreement with the Communists on arrangements for a pol__-:ical
conference was supporter. globally through USIA channels which used materix3.
supplied by Agency correspondents covering the negotiations at Panmunjom.
B. Assessment of the Current Situation in Korea in Relation to U.S.
Objectives
1. The likelihood of unilateral action disrupting the armistice by i~?;.
Government of the republic of Iicrea has diminished but still remains a posyt--
bility that must be reckoned with. The letter delivered by the Vice Pres1d-.nt,
the fact of the existence of the armistice, the measures taken by the military
to protect their position in case of unilateral action, and the release to
civilian status of the prisoners held by the UNC all contributed.
2. The relatively small possibility that in a political conference
agreement might be reached to unify Korea seems even less now in the igh ? ,f
the economic and military assistance being provided to North Korea by the
Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union. However, if agreement can be read
with the ROIL on a proposal for unification of Korea which will appeal to the.
free world as reasonable, the political conference may provide a foru:i in
which the Communists could be dealt a severe propaganda defeat.
C. Current Estimate of the Possibility of Attaining U.S. Objectives
1. Since the long-range objective is not likely to be attained, the
United States should concentrate -uTon the achievement of the current objec,
tive stated in paragraph 2 of NSC 170/1, through measures designed to strvr;-
then the economy and the defense forces of the Republic of Korea, and to
improve its relations with other free world governments.
2. It is doubtful that it is possible to achieve the objective of
economic stability simultaneously with the maintenance of a 20-division
army and the carrying out of a major investment program. The importation
a quantity of saleable commodities sufficient to balance even a reduced
?- 5 - TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003000140005-3
TOP SECRET
investment program, together with the ROK defense expenditures, might ra :3a
the standard of living beyond the goal of the 1949-1950 level set forth :
NSC 170/1. acme continuing inflation will accordingly have to be acceptea;
the investment program will probably proceed more slowly than is desirable;
and the period necessary to achieve self support (with some continuing
defense support) may have to be extended.
III. MAJOR ROBL PENDING IN US.?ROK RELATIONS
A. The joint statement by the Secretary of State and President RheE on
August 8 committed us to negotiate an administrative agreement cr agre~t:nts
with the Republic cf Korea which would provide for the privileges and imta.ii-
ties of the United States and other United Nations forces stationed in Kc'_r?.3a.
Until this arragement is negotiated it is expected that present informal
arrangements w:.:il stay in effect. It has not been decided whether to nef-c,iate
one agreement covering both United States and United Nations forces or sepir-
ate agreements, However, in any event the United States will negotiate on
behalf of all forces concurrently, consulting with the other United NaticnJ
Governments in advance as it may prove necessary.
B. The PO" has Presented a series of requests for strengthenin; itr
military establishment. Specifically, the ROK has asked for increasing fl-
armor and fire power of the present forces and an increase of the prosen'
ground forces to a total of 35 to 40 divisions with simultaneous in=east .n
the ROK navy a"_id air f_+rce, These requests are being carefully considered
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and. have been placed on the agenda of the P==~.
C. The various efforts to improve relations between Japan and the ECK
and to reopen.negotiat'.ons between them on pending issues have prove; un :ua.-
cessful, although President Rhee and Prime Minister Yoshida recently made
separate statements expressing willingness to meet. The Department c.f Store
is now trying to encourage both Governments to follow up on these expres?i.}ns.
This effort and any other which would be likely to prove effective in brim;-
ing about a rapprochement between, the two governments should be vigorously
and promptly pursued.
D. Economic relations are likely to produce the following friction
oints: (1) rate of construction of new plants and facilities (investmert
(2) proportion of aid funds devoted to anti-inflation imports as distinguiAled
from investment; (3) use of ROK foreign exchange; (4) control of prorurexi tt
with aid funds, in particular procurement in Japan; and (5) the dollar-hwarn
conversion rate. These problems taken together may present a period of v-z7
difficult U.S.-ROK relations by May or June of this year. Every posFible
effort must be made to accelerate the aid program and to secure adequate
publicity for its accomplishments within Korea. The U.S. should not com-
promise, however, by agreeing to measures which are clearly not in the ir.t-r-
est of the Korean economy.
E. It will be difficult, but important, to secure Republic of korea
cooperation before and during the Korean Political Conference at Geneva in
order to develop a coordinated pcsition consistent with U,S. objectives anci
interests,
- 6 - TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003000140005-3
 C Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
TOP SECRET
APPEIJDIX A
T H E W H I T E H O U S E
Washington
February 9, 1951+
IM MO1WIDtJM FOR TIM, CHAmIMT, OPERATIONS COORDIIIATIUG D0t^ D
SUBJECT: HSC 170/1
In connection with the preparation of the Progress
Report with respect to the above-mentioned policy paper
(U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, November 20,
1953), the course of action stated in Paragraph 5 b (1) has
been accomplished in so far as President Phee is concerned
in the course of rseetinGs between Vice President Nixon and
President Rhee during ITovember 1953, as subsequently reported
to the Stational Security Council by the Secretary of State
and Vice President Nixon, and by correspondence between
President Eisenhower and President Rhee.
Until further direction from higher authority, no further
action need be taken to iwpleraent this course of action.
ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President
Reproduction authorized by:
Mr. T. D. Koons, 2/4/54
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX B
March 23, 1954
Further Exchange of Letters Between
President Eisenhower and President Rhee (NSC 170/1)
On March 6, President Rhee wrote to President Eisenhower giving
notification that he might take unilateral action to unify Korea. In
addition, he said that the ROIL; would attend the Korean Political Oonfer
ence at Geneva if the United States would either (a) agree to assist
the ROIL in military efforts to unify Korea or (b) strengthen the iIOK
forces in accordance with ROK requests.
As a result of this letter, the Secretary of State directed
that the exchange of ratifications of the Mutual Defense Treaty,
which will bring the Treaty into effect and which had been scheduled
for March 18, should be postponed. No. reason was given the iorea.ns
for the postponement.
The answer, dated March 20, recapitulates the position on unilattr;0.
ROIC action expresser in the President's letter of November 6, whi.-h wut
delivered by Vice-President Nixon. It also rejects President Rhee:'s
alternative proposals, although it suggests the possibility of develor-
ing a mobilizable reserve in the ROK. The answer was delivered to
President Rhee on March 22. Re received it with little comment. He
has not yet said whether the ROK will or will not attend the Korean
Political Conference.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R00300014000573
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003000140005-3