PART I INDO-CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000070002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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. THE PROBLEM
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To set forth a program of action without resort to overt combat
operations by U.S. forces, designed to: (a) secure the military defeat of
Communist forces in Indo-China, and (b) establish a western oriented
in Southeast Asia incorporating Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya,
Indonesia, and the Philippines,
II -.MAJOR CONSIalATIONS
(A) Indo.Ohina is considered the keystone of the arch of southeast
Asia, and the Indo.-Chinese peninsula must not be permitted to fall under
Communist domination. This requires the defeat in Indo-China of military
and quasi.-military Communist forces and the development of conditions
conducive to successful resistance to any Communist actions to dominpte
the area. Measures taken in Indo.China, however, must be in consonance
with U.S. and allied action taken in the Far East and Southeast lade to
defeat Communist efforts to extend their control of the area.
(B) Feasible actions to provide for the immediate U.S. assistance
requested by the French for operations in the Dien Bien Phu-Central Laos
sector have been taken. The measures recommended herein will hardly affect
the immediate tactical situation in those areas (which, while seriour,
is not as critical as public pronouncements suggest). They are designed
to effect a general improvement in the over.-all situation in Indo-China,
NSC review(s) completed.
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which is such that all actions must be considered a matter of urgency to tfl
implemented without delay. They are also designed to achieve the desired
results in Indo-China without overt involvement by U.S. combat forces.
(C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency have
developed a program of support for the Navarre Plan in Indo-China. This alan
considers certain basic immediate requirements for continued U.S. support for
Franco?Vietnamese operations and some of these recommendations hpve been ir-
plemented. The remaining actions have been incorporated hereunder in pars,
graph III (A). However, there is implicit in many of these proposals a
requirement for a stronger French political and military effort as well as
more effective support for Vietnamese participation. The alternative to
more precise and extensive action by the French and Vietnamese, as proposed
ty the U.S., appears to be a continued stalemate or debacle in Indoi-China.
(A) It would appear that France cannot withdraw her forces from Ind*.
china without serious deterioration of her position as a world power.
(E) The key to the success of military operations continues to be the
generation of well-trained, properly led indigenous forces effectively em-
ployed in combat operations against the Communist forces in Viet Minh. The
eventual goal must be the development of homogenous indigenous units with a
native officer corps. In this the French have had, for whatever reasoh,
insufficient success. Such success will ultimately be dependent upon the
inspiration of the local population to fight for their own freedom fram
Communist domination and the willingness of the French both to take the
measures to stimulate that inspiration and to mote, fully utilize the netive
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potential. At the same time, French sensitivities with respect to their
sacrifices, responsibilities, and capabilities must be respected, as we
persuade and assist them to correct existing deficiencies.
(r) The U.S. objectee In /rado.China should be centralized U.S.
control and coordination of all U.S. military, military aid, and "unconven...
tional warfare" (which includes psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare,
and certain aspects of pacification operations) mechanisms in Indo.China.
(G) There is in Indo4hina, or programmed for Indo-China (and enact*.
patine. continued U.S. assistance) a sufficient amount of equipment and
supplies and a potential manpower pool sufficIent eventually te defeat the
Communists decisively if properly utilized and maintained and lr the eiteat.os
continues to permit this manpower to be converted into military effeotivensis.
In their own report the French have acknowledged that U.S. aid in many are
has exceeded French capacity to absorb it.
(H) Measures advocated by the U.S. must be so characterized by deter-
miration, strength, confidence, and justice that they serve to enhance the
support of all Asians who seek freedom, both from Communist domination and
western colonization. Asians must be convinced that they will have a far
better future with the Free World than under Communism and that there Is no./
to be reinstitution of colonialism.
(I) The Communists in IndowChina, Southeast Asia, China, and Moscow
must be made aware that the United States, France, and the free government&
of the Far East are united, steadfast, and capable of accomplishing their aims.
(3) The U.S. must take the initiative in persuading the French and
Vietnamese to overcome these deficiencies. Such initiative must, however,
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avoid French exploitation in its unilateral interest and must avoid actiona
which will lead to involuntary U.S. combat participation.
III ..AmoNs gopiRp
(A) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Central InteIli.
gence Agency, have recommended certain courses of action which are suacept4le
of immediate implementation. Of those not already undertaken, the follow5n4
should be completed as a matter of urgency:
1. The French air forces in Indo.China should be augmented,
particularly with respect to air and ground.crew personnel from
military and/or civilian resources within the framework of the
French Vietnamese armed forces. Steps should be taken through
existing .eontacto with the French Government to satisfy these
requirements; to explore the possibilities of establishing a
volunteer air group; and to make the necessary arrangements to
replace the uniformed U.S. military personnel being temporarily
assigned to assist the French in maintenance functions.
Aga= Defense
2. The present arrangements for the assignment of U.S.
officials to Indo.China should be altered to include the assignment
of additional representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency
to an appropriate U.S. activity in the area.
Actiop: Defense, CIA
3. A source of funds in the amount of $124 millions to meet
additional urgent requirements for Indo-China for all services must
be determined. Currently for FY 1954 there has been provided to the
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French effort in Indo
Xhina a total of $1,115 millions in military
assistance, defense support, and military support projects. Unisys
a source of funds other than MDAP is made available to meet there
additional requirements, the materiel action and training support for
Indo-China will have to come at the expense of the world.-wide FY 1954
MDA program.
Agtiol Defense
(13) The present situation in Indo-China, however, indicates that it
addition to the immediate actions outlined above, the following steps must
be taken as a matter of priority:
Lawiti2a3.3E
1. As a result of events which have occurred during recent weeks,
and particularly in the light of the forthcoming Geneva Convention,
certain actions which might have been susceptible of direct negotia?
tion with the French Government now require more circumspect negotietion.
Nonetheless, it should remain the U.S. objective to obtain French
active acceptance formally or informally of the following:
16, Modification of the mission of the U.S. MAAG,
China, to provide for expanded strength, including a planning
staff (composed initially of up to 10 highly selected officer
personnel); authority to conduct liaison with senior training
and planning staff sections; and authority to make recommeria..
tions concerning the conduct of operations. This relationship
may be justified entirely within the framework of the present
agreement with the French Government that "the French Government
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will continue to facilitate exchanges of information and
views on a continuing basis between French and U.S. military
authorities and will take into account the views expressed by
the latter with respect to the development and carrying out
of the French strategic plans without in any way, of course.
detracting from exclusive French responsibility for adoption
and execution thereof." It should be presented that the U.S.
has complete confidence that France can win the struggle agains
the Communists in Indo-China and that expanded U.S. representatoa
at the French Headquarters is designed to provide the maximum
and most effective assistance in aiding the French to achieve
common free world objectives in Indo-China.
Gradual aesignment of additional U.S. personnel up to a
level of 50 specially qualified personnel in Indo-China as such
assignments become feasible. These individuals should have the
mission of acting as instructors, principally with the Vietnamel
forces and in non-combat areas as recommended by the Chief, HAAG.
and concurred in by the local Commander.
Expanded utilization of U.S. covert assets, particularljr
in the unconventional warfare field and particularly in bilateral
US-Associated States unconventional warfare operations.
Aatima State, Defense, CIA
2. It should also be a U.S. objective to seek (both with the
active French and other appropriate governments as well as with the
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necessary U.S. authorities) the methods of attaining the followings
A. Modification of present Foreign Legion enlistment
requirements with reduced enlistment period for service
in Indo4hina and expansion of the Foreign Legion to include
the formation of air units.
14, Recruitment in certain foreign countries, especially
Germany, Italy, and possibly Asia, of non-French personnel with
appropriate technical qualifications for service in Indo?China
with the Foreign Legion,,
at Provision of certain U.S. personnel, on a voluntary
basis, for service in the French forces without sacrifice of
their U.S. citizenship.
Aallau Defense, State
3. In addition to the urgent actions outlined above, the follow?
ing additional actions are suggested as contributing to the advance?
ment of U.S. interests with respect to Indo-China:
The U.S. should continue to stress and emphasize in
every way our purpose in helping the peoples of Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos through the French is to maintain their
independence, and should reiterate our position regarding
that independence.
Altagat_ Operations Coordinating Board
Li. A vigorous U.S. effort might be made to restore Bao
Dal's health and to persuade him and possibly the King of
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Cambodia to take a more active part in the struggle against the
Viet Minh. This effort should include action designed to
encourage Bao Dai to withdraw from his semi-isolation to visit
his troops, to reside in his capital and otherwise to comport
himself like a dynamic Chief of State. This effort might be
correlated with measures designed to have some U. 5, military
assistance delivered directly to the Associated States instead
of through the French. Such action might appropriately be
taken upon the conclusion of or during the latter phases of the
Geneva conference.
A012ul Operations Coordinating Board
Zsti614124-ZY
1. A general officer of two-otar rank, as designated by the
Department of Defense, should be appointed Chief, MAW, Indo-China,
upon relief of the present Chief in February 1954. He will be sub-
ject to the coordination of the U. S. Ambassador to Indo-China, but
will be under the military command of U.S. Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific. He will command all U.S. military personnel and covert
assets in Indo-China relative to his mission and will be personally
responsible for preventing the involvement of uniformed U.S. personnel
in combat.
2. Subsequent to the receipt of French governmental approval
(and desirably at their invitation), but at the earliest possible
time, the Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, should be provided with necessary
staff sections, and assigned additional duties involving expanded
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liaison with the French and Vietnam forces. He should be directed
and authorized to advise and assist the Franco..Vietnamese command
in training and planning, and to make recammendations concerning
the conduct of operations. In this connection he should urgently
seek the following:
Development and implementation of a sound concept and
operational plan for the conduct of operations in Indo.China.
14, Intensive and aggressive operations with a view to
winning a victory of consequence at the earliest time, and
exploitation of this success politically and psychologically.
2.8. Effective pacification of French-Vietnamese held areas,
emphasizing security of individuals and property through proper
utilization of defense groups and guards and institution of
adequate local civil administration.
la. Training and properly-equipping Vietnam units with
emphasis upon the institution of adequate officer, NCO, and
technical training courses.
gA Improvement in intelligence and security agencies.
ga. Expansion of unconventional warfare operations.
Actio; t Defense, CIA, FOE
3, Concurrently with the tasks assigned above, arrangements
should be made to develop an over-all concept designed to achieve
the subjugation of Communist forces in Indo-China and the pacificatioh
of the area. This concept should be provided the Chief, HAAG,
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Indo-China, as guidance in seeking the accomplishment of the task
assigned in paragraph 2 above.
ktipp: Defense, CIA
I, T. : ? P oho
1. Concurrently with the political and military actions outlinp3
above, and under the coordination of the Operations Coordinstinp; BoErd,
a specific domestic and foreign information campaign should be
developed and maintained, particularly for the period leading up to
the Geneva conference, to de-emphasize "hysteria" publicity, and to
bring about widespread recognition of and appropriate attention to
the following themes:
/146 France, in supporting the fight of the Associated State
of Indo-China against Communist domination, is the principal
nation now shedding its blood for the freedom of others.
118. The French Government has made major sacrifices in tern
of its young military manpower, its economic resources, and its
political position in order to defend the cause of liberty and
freedom from Communism in Indo-China.
The French Government has accepted the principle of
self government and sovereignty for the Associated States of
Indo-China and has in fact more than satisfied the initial
demands of Ho Chi Minhp thus providing evidence that the Viet
Minh are fighting not for freedom but for the Communist cause.
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ga The cause of the Associated States of Indo-China
is the cause of all countries in Sotth Asia who desire freedom
from Communist domination and self determination with respect tc
their political and economic objectives.
The cause of Viet Minh as with all Communists is the
cause of colonization and subservience to Kremlin rule as was
the cause in China, in North Korea and in the European sate flit.
Aptign; State, Defense, CIA, USIA
2. A specific U.S. psychological warfare program for Itdoo4hina
should be developed immediately, including overt and covert projects.
under Operations Coordinating Board coordination, with paramount
emphasis on the establishment of a climate of opinion which associates
all outside support with the achievement of Indo-Chinese national
aspirations. Benefit will accrue frain U.S. courses of action it
direct proportion to the degree they are implemented through itdigenTis
peoples rather than through direct support of the French. The D.S.
psychological warfare program should therefore provide for the
followings
As The establishment under the U.S. Ambassador to
Indo-China of an operations advisory group, including representa-,
tives of the U.S. Military Mission in Indo
-.China, the Department
of State, the Foreign Operations Administration and the Central
Intelligence Agency as appropriate to coordinate the nonseilitar,::
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aspects of U.S. psychological operations within Indo-China. Thr
Chief, HAAG, Indo-China, should be responsible for coordinating
all psychological warfare activities directly relative to his
expanded mission with this group.
A419n: State, Defense, CIA, FOA, USIA
14. Appropriate psychological warfare equipment and sup,)liee
should be assigned to the French and Vietnam forces, and key
technical personnel should be assigned to the HAAG for such
use as the Chief, MUG, may desire.
Aaasm Defense, Ca, FOA
A& A specific mechanism should be established within the U
to provide for the orientation of all official U.S. personnel
assigned to duty or visiting Indo-China so that maximum favorable
psychological effect is derived from all their activities and
contacts.
Actpn: Operations Coordinating Board
is Development of indigenous leadership which will be trulT
representative and symbolic of Indo-Chinese national aspiration-3
and win the loyalty and support of the people.
lict4on; State, Defense, CIA
94, Subsidization of indigenous newspapers and public inform-
tion media, including provision of equipment and supplies as well
as air transport to renote population centers.
Asa= CIA, USIA
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Upon establishment of necessary agreements with the
French Government as prescribed above, augmentation of the
US.Vietnam guerrilla warfare potential in IndoZhina.
ARtiow Defense, CIA
IV . coricLyqTcys AND.RCOMkENDATIONS
(A) If the above actions can be completed at an early date with full
French support (and on the assumption that the Chinese Communists do not
intervene overtly in Indo.China), it is considered that this program will
have the effect of reversing the present situation and give promise of
leading to an ultimate victory in Indo-China without overt use of U.G.
military forces.
(B) However, should the immediate situation in Indo-China deterioreto
drastically or should French intransigence make the substantial accoMplith-
ment of the program outlined herein impossible, the U.S. may wish to contiAer
direct military action in Southeast Asia to ensure the maintenance of our
vital interests in the area. Under such circumstances, an area concept
including Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, ar well
as Indo-China, would appear essential. These ramifications are to be
considered in Part II of this study as assigned to the Special Commifrtee.
(C) le recommende4 that this program be approved by the Operations
Coordinating Board and submitted to the President for immediate implementa-
tion.
(D) jritegmeztesi that the Department of Defense develop, for
the immediate attention of the Special Committee, a concept of operations cnd
considerations involved in the use of U.S. armed forces in Indo-China, sholld
etch involvement be determined upon.
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