FOOD RELIEF FOR MAINLAND CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000010011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 1, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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IU, dORAI?DUM TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OCB
Subject: Food Relief for Mainland China
References: IISC 1462 and IISC 1661
The OCB Working Group on IISC 1462 and IISC 166/1, at the direction
of the OCB, held a special meeting on August 19 to consider the question
of possible offers of food relief for Mainland China flood victims. The
Working Group recommends to the OCB that (1) the United States take
immediate steps to assist the Government of the Republic of China in
financing a food offer to be made by and in the name of the Government of
the Republic of China in accordance with the proposition outlined in
Taipei's TOUSFO 232 of August 13 (attached) and that (2) other plans
which involve overt United States participation in food relief offers,
should not be pursued at this time.
Taipei's proposal presents an opportunity to enhance the prestige
of the Government of the Republic of China, while discrediting the Chinese
Communist regime. The prospects of the Chinese Communists' accepting a
food offer from the Chinese Ilationalists are extremely remote. In any
event, a serious offer would improve the international position of the
Government of the Republic of China. Whether the offer is accepted or
rejected, the Chinese Communists would be placed in a difficult position,
which could be exploited by overt and covert media, stressing (1) the
inability of the Chinese Communist regime to manage its problems, despite
its much-vaunted water conservancy and flood control projects, and (2)
the inevitability that the policies of the regime (expropriation even of
peasants' emergency supplies of grain and export of this "political rice"
to buy war supplies from the Soviets, failure to make proper repairs of
the dikes, faulty engineering in the largely Soviet-directed water conser-
ancy and flood control projects, concentration on a few "show piece"
projects to impress foreign visitors, etc.) would lead to compounded distress
among the Chinese people in time of natural disaster,
It is essential that the hand of the United States should not appear
in the offer of the Chinese Government. Special arrangements will therefore
be required for financing the project,
The consensus of opinion of the Working Group was that the United
States should not participate in any plan of food relief which would
substantially solve the communists' problem for them, This would be
inconsistent with and might seriously undermine our policies of economic
pressures against the regime. Sizeable portions of any large-scale aid
might well be diverted as barter for war supplies or for the needs of
workers in the heavy industrial development program. In view of the fact
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OPERATIONS COORDIITATEIG BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
August 23, 195+
NSC REVIEWED 6/13/07 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND
I' MORAITDUM TO TIM OPERATIOITS COORDIITATIiTG BOARD
SUBJECT: Flood Relief for Mainland China
REFFRI;IICE: UTSC 146/2 and 17SC 166/1 (China)
BACI.GROUITD
The Board at its meeting of August 18 discussed possibilities for
US action in respect to the flood disaster in Communist China, and directe-.
the OCB working group to explore the matter further. The attached workin
group memorandum on the subject is summarized below.
DISCUSSION
The working group notes that direct US food offers to Communist Chins
are contrary to US policy, but that indirect US support of an offer bar the
Government of the Republic of China (GRC) presents advantages consistent
with policy, in enhancing the prestige of the GRC and discrediting the com-
munist regime.
Support of the GRC offer is proposed by Embassy-USOM/Taipei. (See
attached Taipei, TOUSFO 232, August 13.) The Taipei proposal is to purchse
and ship 20,000 tons of surplus rice owned by GRC to mainland ports In GB;,-.
or neutral ships under a safe conduct guarantee. Above tonnage represents
one month's rice requirement of 1,680,000 persons at Taiwan consumption rage,
perhaps 2 million at mainland rate. The total cost to the US is estimate-1 at
$3,100,000 to $3,600,000.
Embassy Tokyo feels that such a course would not remain concealed as
far as the Japanese are concerned, though it would be better than a strai.?
US offer. (See attached Tokyo 370, August 16.) The views of General Hull
were sought but were not available at time of writing.
Discussion has affirmed that acceptance by the communist regime is
highly improbable, and in this connection their refusals of the US offer
1950 and the current offers of the Red Cross are pertinent.
RECOMC9EITDATIOITS
It is recommended that the Board approve the following courses of
action:
OCB File ITo. 27 SECRET
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1. The US take immediate steps to assist the GRC in financing a
food offer to be made by and in the name of the GRC in accord-
ance with the proposition outlined in Taipei's TOUSFO 232 of
August 13;
2. Other plans should not be pursued at this time, though considera-
tion might be given the
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er;
S&eeial financing arrangements should be made to assure conceal-
ment of US participation;
41. Origination of propaganda exploitation should be through the WC,
Eli F S: Staa
Executive Officer
Attachments:
COPY - Memorandum to the Executive Officer, OCB, Subject: Food
Relief for Mainland China, from Walter P, McConaughy.
COPY - Telegram from Taipei ITO. TOUSFO 232, August 13, 1954.
COPY - Telegram from Tokyo ITo, 370 August
16, 1954. (Limited
distribution of t1 is attachment,)
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that serious epidemics are almost certain to follow the current devastat ci,
the fear was expressed that any exclusively United States delivered food
would prompt accusations of germ warfare, in the attempt to explaincommurist
inability to cope with the epidemics.
It was recognized, however, that it is characteristic of the Americar:
people to desire to help any people in time of great suffering, and that
considerable public opinion might be marshaled in favor of food relief for
the Chinese. The difficulties of ensuring that relief actually reaches th
sufferers might not be evident to the average American. Consideration
might appropriately be given at a later date, as the effects of the food
shortage become more evident, of an offer of food through the TAT ands/'or it
conjunction with several food-surplus Asian countries, in the light of cir-
cumstances obtaining then, including such factors as the developing clims.t:!
of world opinion, the likelihood of communist acceptance or rejection, and
the effect which the magnitude of the regime's difficulties might have on
its willingness to accept a mechanism of delivery which would clearly reva--l
the source of the aid, actually reach the people and otherwise satisfy the
legitimate expectations of a genuinely humanitarian project. These pre-
requisites do not now appear possible of attainment.
If the time should come when it appeared appropriate to entertain the
considerations of the preceding paragraph, the decision should be very
carefully weighed in the light of the highly important considerations
mentioned in the paragraph which precedes it.
The Working Group believes that at all times our attention should be
directed to the character and degree of possible internal political never ir-
ations arising from the food crisis and subject to exploitation not only tr:
the interest of the United States and the Free World but ultimately perhaps
to the emancipation of the mainland Chinese themselves. "A people do not
starve quietly."
/8/
Walter P. McConaughy
Chairman, OCB Working Group
on IISC 146/2 and 166/1
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