EVACUATION OF KMT IRREGULARS FROM BURMA: PROPOSED USE OF RESIDUAL FUNDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 14, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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) IONS COORDINATING BOARD
shington 25, D. C.
SUBJECT: Evacuation of KMP Irregulars from Burma: Proposed Use
of Residual Funds. ~,,. .... t.
Attached is a memorandum from the 0CB Working Group on NSC 146/2
and NSC 1664, submitted by Mr. E. W. Martin, Acting Chairman, dated
September 9., 1954. T understand that Embassy Bangkok which originated
the proposal is desirous of receiving an early reply in order to
inform the interested parties of U.S. intentions. The Department
of State has therefore requested that this matter be taken up as
early as possible.
It is suggested that this matter receive at least preliminary
discussion on Friday, September 17, at the meeting of the Board
Assistants and that, if possible, the Board Assistants be in a
position to act for their principals on the working group recommer-
dation,
1-t4 /' J ,
mar B. Staats
Memo for EO, OCB, from the Acting
Chairman, OCB WorkiGroup on NSC 146/2
and 1664, dated 979/54.,-same subject
as above, with attachment.
NSC review(s) completed.
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5ERV
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SECRET
September 9, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OPERATIONS COCRDINATING BOARD
SUBJECT: Evacuation of KMT Irregulars from Burma: Proposed Use of
Residual Funds
The NSC 146/2 Working Group met on September 8 and as directed by
the Operations Coordinating Board took under consideration the problem
of whether U.S. funds remaining after the official termination of Phase
III of the Evacuation program should be used for the evacuation and re-
settlement of subsequent stragglers. Embassy Bangkok, which originated
the proposal that residual funds be so used, points out that nearly
$75,000 still remain in the fund available for transportation. This would
be more than sufficient to transport 600 stragglers to Formosa, where the
resettlement expenses for this number of persons would be well within the
unused portion of the FO commitment.
The Working Group recommends that authorization be granted for
continuing use of residual funds (both FO& counterpart and special funds)
as required for the evacuation and resettlement of up to 600 persons,
without fixed time limit. The CIA member of the Working Group, however,
reserves the right to withdraw or qualify his support for this reooaend-
tion if his Agency perceives some objection to the recommended course of
action.
A memorandum discussing the problem in greater detail in attsched.
/s/
E. W. MARTIN
E. W. MARTIN
Acting Chairman
OCB Working Group on
NSC 146/2 and 166/1
Attachment:
Memorandum for OCB Working Group,
NSC..146/2, Subj: Burma-China
Evacuation: Proposed Use of
Residual Funds - with Tab A
attached. (Secret)
SE'f
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M1ORANDUI4 FOR GOB WORKING GROUP r NSC6/2
SUBJECT; Burma-China Evacuation: Pr nosed Use of
Residual Funds
Problem:
To determine whether U. S. funds remaining after the official termirs
tion of Phase III may be used for the evacuation and resettlement of subse-
quent stragglers.
Background:
On June 16, 1954, the OCB agreed that, while the regular program of
evacuating Chinese irregulars from Burma to Formosa had been successfully
ended, it would be permitted to take care of such stragglers as might pre
sent themselves in a reasonable period, in order to terminate the task set
by the U.N. in an orderly manner to the satisfaction of all concerned. TY
out-off date for the activity of the Joint Military Committee was to de nc
later than September 1, 1954; and without specifying an exact cut-off in
numbers the general scope of further U. S. support was to be limited to the
remainder of the 1500 evacuees planned on for Phase III, of which only 83~
had been already evacuated. Full transportation costs were to be pail froik
the unobligated dollar balance available for that purpose; resettlement
costs on Taiwan were to be met from FOA counterpart which had been set as.c g
for a total of 1500 evacuees; Thai costs were to be met from the unexpendf-c
FOA counterpart balance also available for handling a comparable number.
On August 30, 1954, Embassy Bangkok recommended that after the ter-
mination of the Joint Military Committee on September 1 the Embassy be
authorized to use the remaining available funds to provide transportation
for stragglers and arms to Formosa, provided the persons and weapons were
certified by the appropriate Chinese and Thai authorities. It was pointed
out that after the close-out 45 foreign forces would already remain in
Thai custody, of whom about one-half were willing to evacuate; that the
Thai were concerned about the disposition of these persons, and others
who might subsequently come into their custody; and that only 51 straggler
had been actually evacuated during the May-September close-out period,
although some ti?5,000 had been allocated for transportation.
Dicussion:
Immediate U. S. responsibility in the Burma-China evacuation, as re-
presented by participation in the Joint Military Committee, ended as of
September 1 with the evacuation of 5731 troops and 874 dependents. This
achievement may be considered a success: the back of the "KVIT problem"
has been broken and the Burmese Government has formally thanled the U. S. "or
its contribution toward "easing a situation beset with tensions and diffi-
culty."
In a more general political context, however, the U. S. is comrittei
to continued interest in the problem. While we have made it clear to Burma
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and Thailand that there are limitations to what might be achieved through
Joint Committee activity, we have stated in the U.N. and have assured the
Burmese Government that our interest will not cease with the end of formal
evacuation. Selected excerpts to this effect are cited in Appendix A.
And not only do our own pronouncements point to continued help, but the De-
partment of State believes that it is in the U. S. interest in Southeast Asia
to effect--and to receive credit for effecting--as lasting a solution of
the "KMT problem" as possible. Our complete withdrawal at this stage would
probably be construed by both Burma and Thailand as a failure, at least in
part, to live up to our promises of continued interest.
While the Thai accepted the OOB decision of June 16 with good grace
they had already made it clear that they would have preferred the Committee
to continue seeking out evacuees--rather than passively receiving those who
presented themselves--and thus to dispose of 2-3000 more foreign forces.
The Burmese, who estimate that some 5000 irregulars still remain on their
soil, recognize that the basic problem is now Burma's; and they are confident
they can handle it provided no more supplies or reinforcements are received
by the irregulars from outside. The Burmese and the Thai are in the process
of setting up a joint border commission to handle problems arising fro* the
presence of the irregulars and from other causes. But while policing problems
can undoubtedly now be taken care of by these two nations, the problem of
disposal will remain. In the view of the Department of State there is at
present no better way of fulfilling our commitment to continued helpfulness
than by contributing our residual resources to the evacuation of such stragglers
as may be rounded up by the Burmese and the Thai-provided these are willing
to evacuate and are acceptable to the Chinese Government. It would, moreover,
be helpful to our position in the U.N. to be able once more to assure the
General Assembly of our continued willingness to cooperate.
According to Embassy Bangkok a little less than 75,000 remains In heard
for transportation. This would represent 664 potential evacuees at the re-
duced C.A.T. rate of '110.70 a head, but would bring the all-over totel for
Phase III to 1551. FDA's commitment for resettlement in Phase III was
limited to 1500. It is therefore suggested that we agree to transport and
resettle up to 600 stragglers, which arrangement would not only fall well
within the FOA commitment but would leave a safe margin in transportation
funds for the relatively inexpensive shipment to Taiwan of such arms as may-
be turned in. At the: time of the OOB decision there remained sufficient
FOA/Thailand counterpart to care for some 2000 evacuees. Sufficient of thR.s
money should also be held available to cover Thai expenses, as was done dm fag
the regular evacuation.
As recommended by Embassy Bangkok no evacuees would be accepted who
were not certified by the appropriate Thai and Chinese authorities.
In view of the termination of formal U. S. participation there would
appear to be no need to set a time limit on the use of the funds in question.
By not setting such a limit we should be enabled to show continuing tangib '
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GRET
evidence of our willingness to help. On the other handy if we now with-
draw our limited financial support entirely, and the Burmese and the Thai
come to us with the problem of what to do with the foreign forces in their
custody;--as they almost certainly will-- we should be confronted with the
alternatives of (a) refusing further help, or (b) going through a whsle
new procedure for obtaining funds to help. Since it now appears doubtful
that more than 50 evacuees a month will be rounded up# it would appear tha
the most economical course would be to use up the money still available in
furtherance of the political ends for which it was originally allocated.
Recommendation=
T 'nation be granted for continuing use of the various fun
t
hor
hat ai}
,under discusgion, within the limitations and in the manner described above,
as a tangib a demonstration of continued U. S,'interest in the problem it
question.
FE:PSA tas
September 3, 1954
Clearances:
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SELECTED EXCERPTS. U. S. STATEMENTS IN U.N. AND TO
BURMESE GOVERNMENT OF CONTINUED INTEREST IN
PROBLEM OF CHINESE NATIONALIST IRREGULARS
Excerpt. DEPTEL 255, October 3, 1953, to Ran-coon:
nstructions_ to Ambassador Seba
r osa for Phase I to the Burmese Goverment. Sebald d on
October 5 that he had included these 12oints his
"In your talks with Burmese authorities you should point out ao-
postd.'. action is stage (repeat stage) in final solution. Make clear con-
tinued understanding and sympathy of U. S. Government and its desire con-
tinue exploration further useful steps following presently contemplated
movement and also of any assistance U. S. might be able tender GUB toward
restoring its authority over its own territory ... Also indicate that if this
first stage can be completed, U. S. Government would be glad study means
continuing its good offices to continue provide facilities further evacueea
if any present themselves and to observe ad'tivities and possible outside
ties of remaining Chinese irregulars."
Excernt. Statement of the U. S Representative in the U. N., Npvember_ 19
"Before closing, I should like once again to state that the interest
of my country in this problem will not cease with the evacuation of the
2,000 troops and their dependents. After they have left Burmese soil, we
would hope to be able again to consult with the interested parties regarding
what further action might usefully be taken and I can assure the members c.:"
this Committee that as long as the countries directly concerned continue t=l
find our efforts helpful, the Government of the United States stands ready
and willing to be of use."
Excerpt from President Eisenhower's Renlis to Letters on the Subiedt, P!
Burmese Prime Nii ister:
January 7. 195L: "You may rest assured of my appreciation of the
seriousness of the difficulties which this problem has created for Parma
and of my continued interest in a solution.'"
Agril 6, 195h.: "In closing I assure you of my continued interest in
the problem ..."
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