EVACUATION OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS FROM BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000010003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 9, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
June 9, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD ASSISTANTS
SUBJECT: Evacuation of Chinese Nationalists from Burma.
The Department of State has prepared the attached memorandum
supplementing its paper transmitted under cover of its memorandum
of May 6, for consideration by the Board Assistants far use in
seeking OCB authorization for contingency funds to evacuate
possible further Chinese Nationalist stragglers from Burma. It
will be recalled that at the Board Assistants' meeting of May IL
it was decided to suspend action on the proposed contingency fund
pending receipt of data on the cost of resettling the evacuees on
Taiwan. The requested figures are now available, and -law and
means have been explored with respect to possible sources of funds.
These data, together with a summary of current political develon-
ments connected with evacuation, are included in the attached memo-
randum.
This item has been placed on the agenda for the Board Assistantr
for the June 11 meeting. Attention is urgently invited to the
request that the COB accept or reject at an early date the principle
of further limited U.S. participation, as all plans for evacuatt.on
remain in suspense pending this decision.
if? 6
Eimer B. Staats
Executive Officer
Attachment
Memo re current political developments
connected with evacuation from Burma, 6/8/54,
with enclosures as listed.
NSC review(s) completed.
OSD & DOS review(s) completed.
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Subjects CURRENT DEVELOPYINTS1 Contingency Fund to Evacuate Possible
Chinese Nationalist Stragglers from Burma Following Phare III
of Regular Evacuation.
Background:
On May 14 the Board Assistants of the OCB withheld action on the
above subject pending receipt of information on the costs of resettling
the evacuees on Taiwan, which costs could no longer be met out of FOA
counterpart. The requested figures have been obtained, and efforts
made through FOA to obtain a part of the resettlement funds from the
Escapee Program. These and other political and financial factors are
discussed below.
Discussion:
I. POLITICAL FACTCRS AND DEVELOPMENTS
An estimate from Bangkok dated June 1 seta the probable minimum
figure of Chinese irregulars remaining in Burma at about 3200, with
the maximum about 4350. The large majority are in the area of the
northern Thai-Burma border. It is not now possible to say how many
of the forces may be disposed to evacuate, but planning on a minimum
of 2,000 appears indicated. Attachment 1 sets forth what is known
to date on the strength and disposition of the irregulars.
Political Position of the Governments Concerned
Both the Thai and Burmese Prime Ministers have assured us of their
desire to cooperate in a clean-up evacuation; they have indicated
their willingness to work both with the U.S. and with each other, as
well as with the Chinese representatives in the area. Both Thai and
Burmese are disturbed at the prospect of bands of irregulars remaining
in the border area, marauding, engaging in illicit activities and,
especially, creating border tensions. In talking with the Burmese
and Thai our representatives have made the point that if they worked
together against this common danger the result would not only instre
amity but would facilitate U.S. cooperation: we desired to continue
helping but were reluctant to make a further financial commitment
pending the formulation of concrete plans. Embasey Bangkok, in comment:3
to the Department, has stressed the value of continued U.S.-Thai-eurme3
cooperation as an exercise in "united action" which could be a useful
factor in future Southeast Asian developments.
The Thai, in particular, desire to retain the Joint Committee and
evacuation facilities for a reasonable period: Thailand "wishes to
leave no one an unfortunate victim of circumstances," and is anxious to
forestall possible U.N. criticism that the job was left unfinished
because there was no one to finish it.
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At the Department's request, and pursuant to discussion at the
May 14 Board Assistants' meeting, Ambassador Donovan was also asked to
explore with the Thai their willingness to absorb some evacuees. The
Thai said they saw no reason wIly they should absorb such alien dissident
elements, and considered evacuation the best solution.
In Bangkok, the Joint Committee is attempting to make contact with
such guerrilla leadership as remains. There is also a plan afoot for
the Burmese to airdrop leaflets, prepared by the Chinese, explaining
the situation to the rank and files
On May 29 General Li Ni issued a statement on Taiwan, formally
announcing completion of the evacuation and liquidation of his orgunized
forces. Asked for a clarification of the Chinese Government position,
Foreign Minister !eh again assured us on June 4 that China will continte
to cooperate fully in efforts to remove all possible forces from Burma;
Yeh explained that Li Mi's statement had been intended to make it clear
to the remaining guerrillas that their organization was liquidated and
that they could expect no further support from the Chinese Government.
The Foreign Minister did, however, express his ?bat that additional
irregulars would choose evacuation, and he hoped explorations would not
drag on interminably.
The Department of State agrees with the last view, but considers
it well worth while to stage a final effort which will insure the 3atis-
faction of everyone concerned that all has been done that can be done.
In order that the Department may work effectively toward this objective,
minimum authorization should be given for funds to care for 2,000
evacuees. It is hoped that a larger amount may be made available,
against the contingency, admittedly remote, that more than 2,000 may
come out.
It has now become urgent, regardless of the amounts authorized,
that the Department of State be in a position to inform the other
interested parties of its willingness to provide some further financial
assistance. Until such assurance can be given nothing can be organize'
beyond the present preliminary explorations. /t is therefore urged
that the OCB give priority to a decision in principle that the U.S.
Government may continue to provide limited financial support for the
evacuation.
II. FINANCIAL FACTORS AND DBVELOPMENTS
Cost of Resettlement on Taiwan
According to the estimate of MUG/Fah the cost of resettlement on
Taiwan, on a strict economy basis, is NT$ 2.4 million (US$ 153,355 at
15.65) per thousand evacuees, or approximately US$ 153 a head. A break-
down of the items involved in resettlement, and a statement of Ne W Taiwzn
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rate of expenditure. Thai costs should therefore present no probleM,
although it is hoped that if funds to handle more than 2,000 are alrthori
sufficient flexibility in administration will be permitted to take care
of any small Thai deficit which might arise.
Possible Use of Escapee Program Funds for Resettlement
Following receipt of the data on resettlement costs an approach war
made through FOA to representatives of the Escapee Program to ascertain
whether, in view of FOAls inability to furnish further NT$ counterpart
for resettlement, it would be possible to obtain Escapee Program funds
for the purpose, Following an investigation the representatives of the
Program reported that up to $197,500 might be diverted for resettlement,
provided: (1) assurances were given that all feasible approaches had
been made to other sources of funds, and that sufficient funds were not
available from such sources; (2) that clearance could be obtained from
the Department of Defense for the use of Escapee Program funds for the
stated purpose.
On the basis of this possibility a budget was prepared to care for
up to 2,682 evacuees: see the following section, alternative A.
On June 7, however, word was received that the Department of Defense
opposed the use of Escapee funds as inconsistent with the concept of the
program as laid dpwn by the NSC. Defense moreover questioned whether,
if funds were so diverted, FOA would be able to meet its full require..
ments under the Escapee Program for the coming year. The Department of
Defense further took the position that if sufficient funds were not
available from special reserves, it would prefer to seek a finding under
Section 513 of the Mutual Security Act for the use of funds diverted
from end item.
It is requested that the Board Assistants discuss the question of
Escapee Funds at an early date, and that on the basis of their conclusions
they recommend action on one of the alternatives set forth in the follosemg
section.
Suggested Budgeting Alternatives
In presenting the alternatives which follow the Department of State
again invites attention to the urgency of an agreement by the OCB that
the U.S. Government shall participate financially to some degree in furtier
evacuation. Thus, if the first discussion should be inconclusive as tie
alternatives, or a decision reached which would require further staff week
to obtain a part of the funds, it is hoped that agreement may be reachec
on the principle of U.S. financial support for the evacuation of some
irregulars, the details of funding to be worked out subsequently.
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ALTERNATIVE at
Although its acceptance is now doubtful this plan is presented as
worked out on the basis of a possible $197,500 from Escapee Funds. That
amount is matched by Special Funds in the resettlement categoryp'and
further amount allocated from Special Funds for transportation:
Resettlement:
From Escapee Program $197,500
From Special Funds , $197,500
Subtotal $395,000
(2,575 evacuees at $153.36)
Transportations
From Special Funds $250,000
Savings, Phase III (approximate) saolow
Subtotal $354000
131812 evacuees at $12.5.1
Total; Resettlement and Transportation:
Resettlement
Transportation
$395,000
051,0010
Total $746,000
average of 2,682 evacuees at $278)
New Funds Needed for Above:
From Escapee Program $197,500
From Special Funds taa,500
Total $645,000
It will be noted that the nuMbers of evacuees potentially cared for
by the above categories are by nature disparate. If the amounts reques-,(-I
should be authorized it is hoped that sufficient flexibility in adminis-v,ra-
tion would be permitted to allow the maximum advantage to be obtained.
_ 5 .
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ALTERNATIVES
On the same lines as l'AP, with Escapee Program funds replaced by
ifend item!, money obtained through a finding under Section 513 of the
Mutual Security Act. If this were contemplated, a minimum advance guariAltee
of Special Funds should be provided so that plans for evacuation could
proceed while negotiations under Section 513 were going on.
ALTERNATIVE C
?
Failing the availability of either Escapee Program or Section ,j13
funds, a flat sum of $455,000 to be authorized in new money from Spociaa
Funds, Together with the 0101,000 savings from Phase III, this would male
a total of $5560000 available, or enough for the resettlement and transper-
tation of 2,000 evacuees at $278 a bead.
ALTERNAT1Vb D
If none of the above alternatives is acceptable it is requested that
at least the $250,000 originally asked for--and if possible, more--be
authorized from new Special Funds, to be added to the 0101,000 Phase III
savings for handling the transportation and resettlement of as many
evacuees as possible.
CONNENT
1. As noted in Attachment 3 Embassy Bangkok is making every effort
to obtain Thai agreement to the principle of at least a partial sealift,
with no results reported at the time of writing. A further instruction
was sent Bangkok on June 8. If a sealift should be possible the numbers
potentially handled would be greater in all the above cases, or the cost
would be somewhat less. It would, however, probably be necessary to make
a further financial concession to the Thai, who would be put to considerilly
more expense in housing and other maintenance costs; the evacuees could
not be moved on to Taiwan immediately, as is the case with an airlift.
At the last minute on June 8 a message was received from Embassy
Bangkok giving comparative costs for an airlift and a sealift. While an
attempt will not be made at this time to analyze the figures thoroughly,
it should be noted that whereas an airlift is estimated at only about
$142 a head including ground expenses, a sealift comes to approximately
$105 a head. The sea passage itself is quoted at only $8.00 a head but
there are many other expenses: for example, some $32 for tentage, $23 for
construction, and other items such as motor and rail transportation, food,
troop payments, et cetera, all in far greater proportion than in the
airlift.
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2. /t should be pointed out that if a flat sum were authorized
from Special Funds it mould have to be on the understanding that division
might be made as necessary between transportation and resettlement?in
the event that funds for the latter were not available elsewhere (aDterta-
tives C and D). If such latitude were not permitted, no evacuation could
take place at all as resettlement is considered an integral part of the
project.
Recommendations:
1. That the CCB concur at an early date in the principle thaf, the
Department of State shall provide further limited financial assistance
the evacuation of Chinese irregulars from Burma, with the understanding
that it will be made clear to all governments concerned that U.S. support
for the project will be terminated with the present effort.
2. That the CCB indicate, on the basis of the alternatives presented,
the degree and nature of U.S. support which it will authorize; and that
it take steps necessary for the release of funds authorized.
Attachments:
1. Strength Data, June 3, 1954.
2. New Taiwan Dollar Counterpart Costs, June 6, 1954.
34, Direct U.S. Dollar Costs, June 6, 1954.
4. Thai Counterpart Costs, June 3, 1954.
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dollar counterpart expenditures to date, are included as Attachment 2.
It should be noted that the figure of NT$ 2.4 million is for re-
settlement only, full transportation being included in the separate item
discussed under "Transportation Costs," below. (Previously a one-third
share of the airlift was also paid out of counterpart.)
Transportation Costs
A total of $918,000 was authorized for the "U.S. share" of expenses
in Phases 13 II and III. The majority of this was for a 0 share of
the airlift; the rest was for bonuses and "inducements." With the esti-
mated saving of some $101,000 in Phase III, about $817,000 has been
spent in direct dollar allotments for evacuating 6,749 persons. Miore
detailed data are furnished in Attachment 3, which also gives information
on airlift costs and comments at some length on AMbassador Donovan's
efforts to obtain Thai agreement to the principle of a sealift if this
shcad be required,
As noted in the first paper on this subject, circulated May 100
Embassy Bangkok requested a contingency fund of $250,000 for the airlift
of up to 2,000 stragglers at the round figure of $125 a head, for full
transportation with no extras (bonuses, et cetera). This request woule
be for transportation only, and in addition to funds needed for mettlement on Taiwan.
Since it now appears not impossible that more than 2,000 might
desire evacuation, it is hoped that not only will the $250,000 in new
funds be granted but that the savings from Phase III (approximately
$101,000) may also be held available against the contingency that more
than 2,000 may come out. At $125 a head this total would care for
the transportation of 2,812 evacuees.
Thai Counterpart Costs
Early in evacuation planning it was agreed that Thailand's share
of expenses should comprise all "ground expenses" in Thailand--housing,
security, maintenances et cetera (see Attachment 4 for sample breakdowr
The Thai share was to be met out of FCA counterpart, and a total of
5 million baht (a little over US$ 243,000) was released for the purpose.
Embassy and FOA/Bangkok have furnished the following accounting of Thai
counterpart expenditures:
Spent, Phases I, II, III US$ 190,039.73
Available for Phase TV US$ 53,862.71
While FCA/Thailand is not sanguine as to the prospects of generattrl
further counterpart without dislocating other projects, the Embassy
believes the funds available should accommodate 2,000 evacuees at the pc3t
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Attachment No. 1
BURMA-CHINA EVACUATION: =TENON! DATA
NUMBERS EVACUATED TO DATE
Troops,
Dependents
Totals
Phase Ili 040.4 .
1923
335
2253
Phase 11
2g2
513
3473
Phase III
25
836
POW's Repatriated from Burma
---
---
177
5699
_-__
873
6749
Totals represent those whose passage and expenses were shared by the
U.S. There were also 186 "civilian internees" from Burma, turned over
the Burmese, who were airlifted at the sole expense of the Chinese Government.
ESTIMRIED NUMBERS REMAINING
On May 22 the U.S. representative on the Joint Committee set forth the
estimates of strengths and locations of the irregulars then available to the
Committee (see below), and requested China and Thailand to verify these
figures; the U.S. member also ashed for views as to how contact might be made
with the forces and how much time would be necessary for this. China enc.
Thailand promised to study the matter and China has Given an estiwte (see
below). Burma, meanwhile, is also investigating the situation of the
irregulars.
Estimates reported by Embassy Bangkok on May 11 (presumably those used
by the U.S. member on May 22), Gave: 3200 along the northern Thai-Burma
border, plus 400 reported near Mae Sariang en route from the south to Scri.n
them; 600-700 in the area of the "Death Railway" (ASIS-Taunczun area, elout
80 miles SW of Mk Sawt where Phase III was carried out); and some 50 ir
Thailand near Me Sawt. Total: 4250-4350.
(EMbassy Bangkok also had rumors of 3,000 Chinese irregulars in the
Papun area of upper Tenasserim, but there has been no confirmation of this
and the figure seems highly improbable. Embassy Bangkok believes the greup
to comprise Karen and Mon insurgents, with possibly a few Chinese anions
them. There are also residual Guerrillas in the northern part of the Jhan
State, in numbers not determined excepting for the claim of the Chinese
representative, below.)
On June 1 the Chinese representative gave the following estimates -4
YUnnanese(*) guerrilla strength, based on talks with evacuees: 400 ne
Mae Sariang (**); 300 in Doi Done, a border area of Burma near Taehilat;
(*) The use of "Yunnanese" was not explained, but is presumably to
distinguish the Chinese Guerrillas from the indigenous "allies":
Shans Nachins, et cetera.
(**) Airicneilligi02600691?f. aicifrT
ile
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1500 north of Mong Hang, near the northern Thai-Burma border; and 3.000
north of 1:engtung (northern Shan State). Total: '3200. The Chinese relict-
sentative said be had no information on the groups reported near tbe Death
Railway, and donbted the veracity of this report. He made no mention oi
the 50 allegedly in Thailand. He did, however, give it as his opinion that
3.800 was the proper figure for those north of Mona Hang, rather than 150(,.
This would set his maximum at 3500, including 1000 in the northern Shan Efate
not enumerated. elsewhere.
TABULATIOU OF Tuh, ABOVE
Committee Figures, May 11 Chinese Representative, June 1
3200 Thai-Burma border area 2100
(including Doi Dong)
400 Mae Sariang 400
50 In Thailand
700 (max,).. Death Railway
unknown Northern Shan State 200
4350 TOTALS 3500
The forces reported in the Papun area have been ignored in the above,
as the basis of the report is too flimsy. It should be noted that :if the
Chinese representative's figure of 1000 is accepted for the northern Shan
State, the Committee total would rise to a maximum of 5350. This pus thp
5688 operational troops evacuated would give a maximum total strength of
11,038, plus such troops as might be in the Papun area.
Embassy Bangkok has not reported the Committee's reaction to the
figures given by the Chinese representative on June 1.
LQ$XB1E NTJMBR WIlLING TO EVACUATE
As already mentioned there is as yet no way of knowing how many of
the troops estimated above may wish to evacuate.
Of the 4350 first estimated the 700 near the Death Railway are
improbable candidates for evacuation, while a group of 200 on the northerr
border near Doi Dong is reportedly running an "opium headquarters." The
remaining 3450 would appear to be the nucleus from which evacuees might
come.
Of the 3500 estimated by the Chinese representative, 300 of the borisr
group are placed at Doi Dong. These and the 1000 in the northern Shan State
would probably be counted out, leaving a nucleus of 2200 from which evacuees
might come.
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For general planning purposes, therefore, it can only be said that
from ,2000 to 3000 may come out. The figure might possibly exceed 3000,
but it appears from present indications that it would probably be 2000
or less.
June 3, 1954 PPCRET
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AttaglIment No. i
ON: NEW IWt DO
COUNTERPART COSTS
I. ITENS ImvotwED TN RESETTLEMENT
According to estimates made in Taipei in October, 1953, the fol1ow1r4:
categories of expenses were involved in resettlement. The costs are give,'
in NT millions and the basis of calculation is for 2400 troops and 600
dependents.
0.756 - Rations for 2400 troops, 45 days
3.600 - Barracks for one regimental area
0.180 - Equipment (wash pans, cups, sleeping mats, etc.)
0.360 - Rations, clothing, utensils, cooking oils for
600 dependents
1.500 - Housing for 300 families
0.150 - Processing expenses, medical and miscellaneotis
TOTAL NT$ 6.546 For 2400 troops and 600 dependents (ca. US$ 418.274).
The above figures were, of course, advance estimates for planning
. purposes and show a cost rate of NT 5 2.18 million per thousand evacuees.
This compares very well with the present figure of NT$ 2.4, especially when
it is considered that in the actual evacuation a greater proportion of troops
to dependents was handled (87% troops instead of the 80% of the above
estimate).
I/. C0UNTEPPART COSTS FOR PHASES I. II AND III
At present writing exact figures on counterpart expenditures are
available for only a major part of the evacuation, complete vouchers not
having been submitted for the remainder. The final rate of expenditure
furnished by Embassy Taipei was NT$ 3.3 million, of which NT1 2.4 mdllior
was for resettlement, the rest for a 1/3 share of transportation.
Figures for the first 5,680 evacuees came to NT$ 17 million (a little
over US$ 1 million). Since a total of 6749(*) evacuees were handled in the
three phases, the remaining 1069 would have cost approximately NT$ 3.53 !Ba-
li= at the rate of 3.3 per thousand. The Taiwan counterpart expenoiture3
for Phases I, II and III, for resettlement and a share of transportotior,
were thus in the neighborhood of NT$ 20.53 million, or a little over USt
million.
(*) Includes 177 prisoners of war.
June 6, 1954 SECRET
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BURMA-CHINA EVACU4TIONI DIRECT_LS. DOLLAR COSTS
gosTs TO DATE
The figures which follow represent the "U.S. share" of evacuation
costs for Phases I, II and direct dollar expenditures paid out
of special funds, as distinct from the Chinese and Thai shares which were
paid out of PIA counterparts
Obligations
Transportation, arms shipment, miso
3569,053.04
Bonuses
66,630.00
Debts and operational expenses of irregulars..
?
?
180.704.00
(*)
Total
;816,387.04
Allocated, Phases I, II and. III *
I.
'Y918,0004,00
Obligations, Phases I, 11 and III
?
816.387.04
Estimated (*) Savings. ? ?
?.
401,612.96
The savings on Phase III owe to the fact that only. 836 persons were
evacuated instead of the maximum 1,500 on which planning had to be besed.
Direct U.S. dollar expenditures came under the three categories listed above
in "Obligations":: (1) 2/3 share of the airlift of men and arms, plus mini:
incidentals.; (2) bonuses at 315 a head in Phases II and III only; (3) "iniuce.
ments" to the guerrilla leadership, in the form of funds to settle debts and
obligations in Burma, plus money for the "operational expenses" of evacuation
--iee? food: and other subsistence expenses between the time of gathering
for evacuation and the time of actual surrender. The items of bonuses and
inducements had been Provided for in the original allocation of June, 1953.
AIRLIFT COSTS
To date Civil Air Transport has charged roughly 425 a head for the
Thailand-Taiwan airlift. This varied according to the locus of operation,
which in turn depended on the weather. Phase I cost 0123, from Lampang;
Phase II cost .426, from hiengrai; Phase III cost ;123 from Lampang,
plus 011 from Mae Sod to tampang.
Embassy Bangkok has been asked to negotiate with C.A.T. for a reductima
in the per capita charge for future airlifts. While it is hoped that some
concession
(a) 0169,000 for Phases I and II plus ;11,704 estimated operational
expenses for Phase III (food, etc., for 836 evacuees at ,44 a
head).
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2 - Attachment No
concession will be made, no word has been received on the subject at pres,Ait
writing.
POSSIBILITIES FOR A SEALIFT
The question of transporting evacuees by sea from a Thai port has been
raised from time to time since evacuation planning began, but on each
occasion has had to be dropped because of extreme Thai reluctance to permit
overland transit of foreign troops through That territory. The general
grounds for objection were problems of security and logistics: at one time
Thailand virtually made air transportation its price for participating in
any evacuation at all.
On May 27 the Department of State once more asked Ambassador Donovan
thoroughly to explore with the Thai the question of a sealift. It was
hoped the Thai Government would accept the principle that such a course
might become necessary, at least for a part of the operation, in view of
financial limitations and present uncertainty as to the number of evaoueal
involvedt The Ambassador was to stress the point that U.S. funds, if
authorized for further operations, would not be unlimited, and the D.S.
could net underwrite an unlimited operation: a limited number of evacuel3
might be airlifted, but if large numbers presented themselves some might
have to be routed by ship. Donovan was to point out further that while
our withdrawal from the operation was not necessarily contemplated at
present, if we did withdraw it would be Thailand who would be faced with
disposal of border-crossers. No reply has been received from Embassy. Bangkek
on this subject at the time of writing.
At the same time Embassy Rangoon was asked to comment on the poeeibility
that some irregulars who surrendered to the Burmese might be evacuated by
sea from a Burmese port. Rangoon replied that based on previous experience
it believed that any irregulars captured by or surrendering to the Burmsr(1
Army would be treated as prisoners of war, and that when a sufficient
number had been accumulated the Burmese would probably accept the principLa
of a sealift providing the carrier were not a ship flying the Chinese
Nationalist flag. The Embassy added, however, that there was little
likelihood of many surrenders to the Burmese: the monsoon, now on, wouk
prevent large scale operations till next November,,and in any event the
Chinese who wished to give up would in all probability prefer entering
Thailand to surrendering to the Burmese. This last factor was also
mentioned by Embassy Bangkok before Phase III: the irregulars prefer to
give up to the Committee, as a matter of "face" if nothing else.
As to what ships might carry troops, recent explorations at Taipei
show that the most likely carrier is fully contracted for Thailand-Japan
rice shipments until August. There are other lines, of course, but it
appears that nothing immediate could be arranged. Any long delay would
present a logistic problem to the Thai, who would have to quarter the
evacuees at some expense for months. This is one major basis for Thai
Objections
SZCRET
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003000010003-9
SECRET,
- 3 - Atachment No. 3
objections to a sealift. It should be borne in mind that a sealift,
more economical in respect to fare, would entail much greater expense
in housing and maintenance. A principal advantage of the airlift has been
the fact that the evacuees can be rapidly passed out of Thailand to
Taiwan.
In the early stages of planning it was ascertained that the fuel costs
for Chinese LW's?which would have been paid out of counterpart?amounted
to approximately US$ 8.30 per evacuee, with 1,000 men recommended ad the
load for one LSI'. China was willing at the time to use 1ST/a, but the
matter was dropped when Thailand insisted on an airlift as the price of
Thai cooperation.
June 6, 1954 SECRET
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003000010003-9
SECRM
Atta92nment N. 4
IN V CU I T CO t OSTS
On February 5 EMbassy Bangkok reported the Thai share of evacuation
expenses for Phase I, and estimated the costs for Phase II, as follous
(in U.S. dollars):
Phase I.
Construction housing. ? ? ? , 0000000
. ?
?
. ?
$20,731
Electric wiring, et cetera
3,731
Bedding
POL (troops)
,4
'Pay Thai army troops.
18,106
Food costs, evacuees. ? . . 0
1,420
Transportation, escorts and evacuees
6,600
Housekeeping service expenses
?
7,093
Rail transportation
5,840
Expenses camp guards
3.883
Total
05,000
Phase II (Estimate)
(A) Standing Expenses:
Housing repairs, staging area
600
Housing repairs, reception point
250
Airfield improvements (2 fields)
4,000
RR transport, troops and equipment
(Bangkok to Lempang and return)
?
5,845
POL and trucking troops to Lempang
..?
and Mae Chan and return
?
1,500
POL Thai liaison plane and Committee
vehicles
2,480
Subtotal
.
a4,675
(3) Total Daily Ekpenses (22 working days);
Food . ? 00000 0 0 4 0 0 1 ? 0 ? ****
-0,
**
$
2,464
Water ? ? V ? ? ************* ? ?
*
? ?
1,650
Pay Thai Airforce
9,196
Housekeeping
6,600
Housekeeping and moving evacuees
(Mae Sai-Mae Chan-Chiengrai)
2,684
POL, evacuees
2,464
Subtotal ? ? 4 ? 'I ? 0 . $250058
(C) Cost
SECRET
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SECRET Attachment No. i
2
(C) Cost of 15 Idle Days (*)
Water 3 '535
Pay Thai Airforce ? 6,270
Housekeeping 4.50o
Subtotal 311,325
2rAnd Total 51.058
In addition to the above there were certain unreported expenditures
for maintaining the facilities open on a skeleton basis between phases.
(*) Estimate was based on 22 working days and 15 idle days, as evacuees
were moved generally every other day.
June 3, 1954 SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED
Approved rorRe
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
on" 0003-9
E MET
INS7ROCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be dt twn ac s sheet
an each comment numbered to correspond with the number in thr; "TO" column. Each officer should initial (t heck lark ir f Int)
before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.
FROM:
TO
ROOM
NO.
1
DATE
REC'D
FWID'D
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
NO.
DATE
1.0 JUN
Se: A
COMNENrs
_
te)kr,
2.
de(
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM NO. 51-10
NOV 53
LI
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MAY BE USED SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNC )
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FIED
(o)