BAD WRITING, BAD TASTE, STARTLING DISCLOSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

14,,4rsf-t 3
Bad Writing Bad Taste Startling Disclosures
0
0 VIA
z;
The Myth and the Madness
2 By Patrick J. McGarvey
Saturday Review. 240 pp. $6.95
?zr
o
By THOMAS B. ROSS
NOTHING WOULD better serve the
American people in their current stage
a cynicism, paranoia and fear of re-
pression than an honest book from in-
side the CIA. There have been a number
of competent books by outsiders and a
number of cover stories by insiders,
notably Allen Dulles's The Craft of In-
telligence and Lyman Kirkpatrick's The
-Real CIA. But no one yet has success-
;fully shed the cloak as he turned in his
agger. Victor Marchetti, who rose to the
top suite of the CIA only to quit in dis-
illusionment, is trying to publish a book
about his experiences. But the lower
courts have upheld the agency's demand
that it be suppressed and there is no
guarantee that the Supreme Court, which
ruled so narrowly in the case of The
New York Times and The Washington
THOMAS B. ROSS, Washington bureaui
chief of The Chicago Sun-Times, is co-
author of The Invisible Government.
Post will extend the First Amendment
to an ex-CIA operative.
Into the breach comes Patrick J. Mc-
Garvey, a former intelligence officer of ?2
14 years' service in the military, the CIA 2
and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 5
The fact that he has gotten into print (7,
_might suggest that the CIA feels it has 0
nothing to fear from him. And certain it
deletions in the advance-proofs indicate
a degree of censorship or at least self- o
censorship. (Hold the page to the light 9
and you can read through the inked 71,
crossovers?a familiar process recalling ti-
the Pentagon's decision to publish a LI'
censored version of the Pentagon Papers A.
after the full text was in print. Foreign
?agents come see what we really think is .?
? sensitive.) c")
But McGarvey's book, though flawed?E.:2
,almost fatally so?by bad writing, bad
taste and bad logic, contains several;:s
.startling disclosures, allegations and hor-
ror stories: how the Joint Chiefs of Staff C%1
recommended a retaliatory air strike :g
against the Israeli naval base that co
launched the attack on the U.S. intelli-2
gence ship Liberty in the 1967 Middlert)
Bad war; how CIA agents obtained a&_
, sample of King Farouk's urine from thq?
men's room of a gambling casino int)
- Monte Carlo; how an investigation of
the Pueblo fiasco turned up the facto
that the Air Force had been flying at
routine reconnaissance mission over A1,-0-
bania for 12 years, without purpose an
without authorization; how a leper col
(Continued on page 13)
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CIA: The Myth and the Madness
(Continued from page 6)
ony in North Vietnam was bombed on
the advice of the CIA that it was an
army headquarters; and how CIA psy-
chologists rewarded Vietcong defectors
by subjecting them to ghoulish experi-
ments in which they were exposed to
rapid changes in color, light and tem-
perature.
McGarvey also lodges serious allega-
tions against a number of important in-
dividuals and institutions. He contends
that Richard M. Helms made his way to
the top of the CIA by systematically de-
stroying his competitors: Ray Cline, for-
mer deputy director for intelligence and
now head of the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research;
Admiral Rufus Taylor, Helms's former
deputy; and Admiral William (Red) Ray-
born, his predecessor. "I thought for a
time when I was director of the CIA,"
McGarvey quotes Rayborn as telling
him, "that I might be assassinated by
my deputy."
McGarvey also accuses Helms of blunt-
ing the investigative spirit of the major
newspapers and magazines by taking
their correspondents to lunch and keep-
ing them happy with periodic leaks about
other matters and other agencies.
He alleges further that Congress has
given the CIA a veto over which senators
and representatives are to be seated on
the subcommittees that are supposed to
serve as watchdogs on the agency's activ-
ities.
Against the obvious implication of
many of his citations, McGarvey's thesis
is that the crucial problem with the CIA
is mismanagement, not an excess of
power and secrecy or a lack of account-
ability.
"CIA is not a ten-foot ogre," he writes.
"It is merely, a human institution badly
in need of change. CIA is not the invisi-
ble government. Rather, it is a tired old
whore that no one has the heart to take
off the street."
Too much intelligence is collected, Mc-
Garvey argues, and too little is properly
analyzed. There is less danger in the
CIA's excursions into sabotage and sub-
version, he contends, than in the insati-
able electronic search that put the U-2,
the Liberty and the Pueblo in extremis.
His recommendations for change are
rather forlorn. He concedes that Con-
gress has abdicated its responsibility, the
so-called oversight committees sitting
mute through Helms's annual "lantern
slide show," wilfully ignorant of how
much is being spent on intelligence and
where, never informed before or after
the fact about covert operations. Yet
McGarvey's cure is the weary old recom-
mendation: write your congressman ?
the one, perhaps, who is telling Helms
he'd rather not know what's going on
lest he have to assume responsibility.
I fear we must await a more compel-
ling book before the establishment is
moved to reform itself. The Supreme
Court willing, Marchetti may provide it
for us. It does not seem too much to
ask that he be able to use his CIA expe-
rience to inform the people, when the
three ex-CIA agents of the Watergate
bust-in (or were they, too, just on loan
for the campaign?) can apply their
agency-imparted expertise to subvert
the political process of a supposedly free
nation. cfs
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Friday; Dna. 29, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST
Chalmers M. Roberts
Helms, the Shah and the CIA
?
THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the
fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran
as the American ambassador 20 years
after the agency he now heads organ-
ized and directed the overthrow of the
regime then in power in Teheran. The
tale is worth recounting if only be-
cause of the changes in two decades
which have affected the Central Intel-
ligence Agency as well as American
"foreign policy.
Helms first went to work at the CIA
in 1947 and he came pp to his present
post as director through what is gener-
ally called the "department of dirty
tricks." However, there is nothing on
the public record to show that he per-
sonally had a hand in the .overthrow of
the Communist backed and/or
oii-
enteci regime of Premier Mohammed
Mossadegh in 1953, an action that re?
turned the Shah to his throne. One can
only guess at the wry smile that must
have come to the Shah's face when he
first heard that President Nixon was
proposing to send the CIA's top man
to be the American envoy.
The Iranian affair, and a similar
CIA action in Guatemala the following
year, are looked upon by old hands at
???-`4C.MM'A"AV,,..,..1?M;7`
1953: Teheran rioting that over-
threw the government left the Unit-
ed States Point Pour office with
gaping holes for windows and doors.
the agency as high points of a sort in
the Cold War years. David Wise and
Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian
story in their book, "The Invisible Gov-
ernment," and' the CIA boss at the
time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public
after he left the government that the
United States had had a hand in what
occurred.
IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet
Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who con-
fused Westerners with his habits of
weeping in public and running govern-
ment business from his bed, national-
ized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian
Oil 'Co. and seized the. Abadan refin-
ery. The West boycotted Iranian oil
and the country was thrown into crisis
Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and
Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Com-
munist party, to bolster his hand. The
British and Americans decided he had
to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi
to replace him. The man who stage-
managed the job on the spot was Ker-
mit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a
hand in some fancy goings-on in
Egypt), grandson of T.R. and. seventh
cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washing-
tonian in private business.
Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran
and set up underground headquarters.
A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New
Jersey state police, had become famous
during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping
case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the
Shah's, police force and he and Roose-
velt joined in the 1953 operation. The
Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named
Zaheldi as Premier but Mossadegh ar-
rested the officer who brought the bad
news. The Teheran streets filled with
rioters and a scared Shah fled first to
Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles
flew to Rome to confer with him. Roo.
sevelt ordered the Shah's backers into
tbe. streets, the leftists were arrested
by the army and the Shah returned in
triumph. Mossadegh went ? to jail. In
time a new international oil consor-
tium took over Anglo-Iranian which
operates to this day,though the Shah
has squeezed more and more revenue
from the Westerners. -
In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intel-
ligence," published after he left CIA,
Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran
and Guatemala it "became clear" that
a Communist state was in the making,
"support from outside was given to
loyal anti-Communist elements." In a
1965 NBC television documentary on
"The Science of Spying" Dulles said:
"The government. of Mossadegh, if you
recall history, was overthrown by the
action of the Shah. Now, that we en-
couraged the Shah to take that action
I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an
ex-CIA operative in the Middle East,
wrote in his book, "The Game of
Nations," that the Iranian derring-do
was called "Operation Ajax." He cred-
ited Roosevelt with "almost single-
handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces
on to the streets of Teheran" and su-
pervising "their riots so as to oust"
Mossadegh.
TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms
will go after he leaves the CIA is a sta-
ble, well armed and well oil-financed
regime under the Shah's command
which has mended its fences with Mos-
cow without hurting its close relation-
ship with Washington. The Shah has
-taken full advantage of the changes in
East-West relations from the Cold War
to today's milder climate. ?
While Iran and Guatemala were the
high points of covert CIA Cold War ac-
tivity, there were plenty of other suc-
cessful enterprises that fell short of
changing government regimes. Today
the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of..
Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has
withdrawn from such large scale af-
fairs as Iran, save for its continuing
major role in the no longer "secret
war in Laos." The climate of today
would not permit the United States to
repeat the Iranian operation, or so one ?
assumes with the reservation that
President Nixon (who was Vice Presi-
dent at the time of Iran) loves sur-
prises.
The climate of 3953, however, was
very different and must be taken into
account in any judgment. Moscow
then was fishing in a great many
troubled waters and among them was
Iran. It was probably true, as Allen
Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that
"at no time has the CIA engaged in
any political activity or any intelli-
gence that was not approved at the
highest level." It was all Part of a
deadly "game of nations." Richard Bis-
sell, who ran the U-2 program and the
Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV
show about the morality of CIA activi-
ties. "I think," he replied, that "the
morality of . . . shall we call it for
short, cold war .. . is so infinitely eas-
ier than the morality of almost any
kind of hot war that I never encoun-
tered this as a serious problem."
PERHAPS the philosophy of the
Cold War years and the CIA role were
best put by Dulles in a letter that he
wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his
then forthcoming book had appeared
in Harper's and I had suggested to him
some further revelations he might in-
clude in the book. He wrote about ad-
ditions he was making: "This includes
more on Iran and Guatemala and the
problems of policy in action when
there begins to be evidence that a-
country is slipping and Communist
take-over is threatened. We can't wait
for an engraved invitation to come and
give aid."
There is a story, too, that Winston
Churchill was so pleased by the opera-
tion in Iran that he proferred the
George ?Cross to Kim, Roosevelt. But
the CIA wouldn't let him accept the
decoration. So Churchill commented to
Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have
served under you" in such an opera-
tion. That remark, Roosevelt is said to
have replied, was better than the deco-
.
ration.
Helms doubtless would be the last to
say so out loud but I can imagine his
reflecting that, if it hadn't been for
what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the
others did in 1953, he would not-have
the chance to present his credentials
to a Shah still on the peacock throne
in 1973.
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Oun
PLd by
NORTHERN eseU:7ANIA SUN, INC.
An Independent Daily Newspaper
1=7 N. Ivy St. Arlington, V. 22214
HERMAN J. C3ERMAYE.', Editor & holistic:ft
p.OnceS24-300J
CircA.fion L".:4-65043
Page 1 Thursday i/et... 28, 1972
Demes Use, of Small
1 r
a v atd eary
WILLIAMSBURG (UPI )?
'.1itral Intelligence Agency
..esman denied Wednesday
ations that mini-nuclear
.,ions were used in CIA
ting programs at Camp
. near here or in any
agency training
1h-lig:am.
The CIA spokesman's
comment came after a story
pu(tisheci by the Virginia
Gazette, a weekly newspaper,
here, about operations at
Camp Peary, a secrecy-
clouded Department of
I)efense installation. The
Gazette said the base is ac-
tually a CIA training camp
and has been for' years.
-The GaZette said its report
,vas based on about four weeks
at investigation by two staff
members. The base was
acquired 21 years ago by the
Defense Department and
labeled "an Armed Forces
Experimental Training
Activity" base.
--c-15-0
-
Much of the newspaper's
story was based on an in-
terview with Joe Maggio, who
said he was a former CIA
operative widi the Agency's
Covert Special Operations
Division. Maggio has written a
novel about 1,-,e CIA, entitled
"Company Man." In the book
he mentionec: activities at a
"Camp Perry " He told the
newspaper . ..? section on
"Camp Perry" actually
referred to the "Camp Peary"
in York County.
The Gazette said its in-
formation from Maggio
"indicates that the training
methods aad echniques
covered by the CIA at Camp
Peary include assassination
training, demolition training,
parachute training, courses in
wiretapping and intelligence
gathering and experiments
with special weapons for use
in the _field, including what
Maggio labeled as 'mini-
nuclear bombs."
The CIA Spokesman
"unequivocally" denied that
the agency trained for or
engaged in an assassination
operations.
"The allegation abott mini-
nuclear weapons in any CIA
training program or use by the
Agency is utterly untrue." the
spokesman added.
. The 'spokesman also said
Maggio had been "fire. ;c,r
cause from a Ce-Ttral
Intelligence Trainig
Program,"
Maggio, 34, told the Gazette
he was fired from the CIA in
1967 because he was doing
some free lance writing while
employed by the agency. He
said his dismissal had nothing
to do with performance of his
('IA duties.
Maggio also told the Gazette
he was "never in a position of
responsibility" with the CIA,
hut spent a total of six months
in training with tl-e Agency at
Camp Peary.
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The Freo Lance-Star, FredericksburtVirginia
Wednesday, December 27,7972
r, ?
cjeD convvans
3 i/delc3tr
WILLIAMSBURG, Va. (AP)?Is
Camp Peary, a hush-hush Department
of Defense installation in York County,
Va., actually a training camp for the
Central Intelligence Agency?
The Virginia Gazette, a weekly
newspaper published in this restored
colonial capital not far from the camp,
says h. is. busing its claim principally on
an interview with an ex-CIA agent
turned novell.-it .
? ?
SC:7170./ i?Tfin)(77
Two reporters for the Gazette-news
editor W. C. O'Donovan ad Ed
Offley?say in an article for the veekly
that the CIA uses Peary to train toms of
assassins, guerrillas, flreign
mercenaries and special rfare
agents, and to test exotic new weaions.
O'Donovan and Offley wrote tht they
were not permitted to enter thc camp
property and received ens; "no
comments" when they posed qu?stions
Peary included "assassination
training, demolition training,
parachute training, courses in
wiretapping and intelligence-
gathering, and experiments
with special weapons for use in
the field, including what Mag-
gio labeled as 'mini'nuclear
bombs."
The Gazette quoted Maggio
as saying, "I'm sure if you had
a blue ribbon committee go in
there, they'd find a whole new
world?a Disneyland of war."
Maggio told the Gazette his
recently published book was la-
beled fiction because "it never
could have been published as
nonfiction.".
But the Gazette quoted him
as saying "the information con-
tained on Camp Peary is fac-
tual."
In "Company Man," Maggio
writes that at "Camp Perry"
rows of "old cars, tanks and
AMTRACKS (amphibious per-
sonnel carriers) line up on a
pulley to prove what the deputy
director of science and
technology can do with TNT,
tetrachloride, C4 (plastic ex-
plosive), dynamite and highly
classified. CIA-used Appnotsied For
ar bombs."
to
Nearly ..1 their information
,,pparentiy 'rne from former CIA .man
M.7!ggio, who wrote a
novel? company Man"?which
:nontion:A a "Can-ip Perry". at which
weapons were tested.
said Maggio confirmed
s niaal in Coral Gables, Fla., that
-Camp .,-)erry- his novel in
actaalay was Virginia's Camp Peary,
The Gazette allele si-?
description of an ord
testing area h "Cor aly
Man" matches a) aerial iJhoto-
graph taken this month by the
Gazette of Camp Peary's east-
ern corner.
Among other weapons the
Gazette quoted Miggio as say-
ing are being teeied at Camp
. Peary were a law- beam wea-
pon used to calls( bodily dete-
rioration within 24 hours, ex-
perimental formuas of drugs
, such as LSD, and a variety of
chemical warfare ..-naterials.
? "Some day, somcwhere," the
Gazette said it was told by
Maggio in a taped lelephone in- ?
. ?terview, "that base is going to ?
have a catastrophe?some Dr.
Strangelove explosion that real-
? ly is going to rock that area."
When Camp Peary was ac-
quired by the Department of
Defense in 1951, it ails called
an "armed forces e:imental
training activity." it still Is
called that.:
,
I.
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taken over by the Department of
Defense 21 years ago.
The newspaper said it was told by
Maggio that he was at Camp Peary for
three months in 1966. enrolled in a
"special intelligence tradecraft course"
given CIA recruits.
It . said its interview with Maggio
indicated the "training methods and
techniques covered by the CIA" at Camp
See CAMP PEARY, Page 27
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17 DEC 1972
14 CITY POLICEMEN
GOT C.I.A. TRAINING
Learned How to Analyze
and Handle Information
By DAVID BlURNHAM
Fourteen New York Police-
men?including First Deputy
Police Commissioner William
H. T. Smith and the com-
mander of the department's
Intelligence Division?received
training from the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in September.
A spokesman for the C.I.A.,
Angus Thuermer, confirmed
that the 14 New Yorkers had
been given training but denied
*hat the agency had regular in-
struction programs for local
police officials.
Mr. Thuermer acknowledged,
however, that "there have been
a number of occasions when
similar courtesies have been
? extended to police officers
from different cities around
the country."
In response to an inquiry,
Mr, Thuermer said he was not
able to determine haw many
? police officials or how many
departments had come to the
Washington area to receive
agency training.
"I doubt very much that they
keep that kind of information,"
he added.
Mr. Thuerrner scoffed when
asked whether the agency's
training of policemen?some of
whom are responsible for col-
lecting information about po-
litical activists?violated the
Congressional legislation that
created the C.I.A. to correlate
and evaluate intelligence relat-
ing to national security, "pro-
vided that the agency shall
have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers or internal
security functions."
Twelve of the New York
policemen?one captain, three
? lieutenants, five sergeants and
three detectives?received four
days of training from the C.I.A.
in a facility in Arlington, Va.,
beginning last Sept. 11, accord-
ing to the Police Department.
Commissioner Smith and?
Deputy Chief Hugo J. Masini,
commander of the Intelligence
Division, attended one day's
training, on Sept. 13.
Commissioner Smith said dur-
ing an interview that in con-
neetion with the reorganization
of the department's intelligence
work, "we decided we needed
some training in the analysis
and handling of large amounts I
of-information." - - -
Mr. Smith said the depart-
ment had decided that the
CL A. would be the best place
for such training. "They pretty
much set this up for us," he
explained. "The training was
done gratis, only costing us
about $2,500 in transportation
and lodging."
Both the International Asso-
ciation of Chiefs of Police, a
professional organization that
does police efficiency studies
and runs training seminars on
a variety of law-enforcement
subjects, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation said
they were not equipped to pro-
vide instruction on the storage,
retrieval and analysis of intelli-
gence information.
One branch of the Police
Department's Intelligence Divi-
sion, the security investigation
section, is the subject of a
pending suit in Federal court
here. The suit, filed by a group
of political activists, charges
that the surveillance and infil-
tration activities of the secur-
ity section violate "the rights
of privacy, free speech and as-
sociation granted and guaran-
teed" the plaintiffs "by the
United States Constitution."
The present reorganization of
the security section?and the
part of the Intelligence Division
that collects information on
organized crime?is being fi-
nanced by a $166,630 grant
from the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration, a
branch of the Justice Depart-
ment. As of Oct. 13, a police
roster indicated that there were
365 policemen assigned to the
Intelligence Division.
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eds Shell
CIA's HQ at
Long Cheng
" VIENTIANE (UPI) ?
The ,headquarters .of the
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy-fh Laos .at Long Cheng
has come under .Gommu-
'nist artillery fire for the
'first _time since early Sep-
tember, American officials
'said. Thursday. . '
ThO North Vietnamese
'shelling took place Tues-
day .night,' the officials
aaid. They said 'about 30
irounds.bf long-range 130-
,mm, 'a rtillery and 10
round s 'of shorter-range
857mrn.z.. artillery hit the
western end of the airstrip
and damaged several hous-
'es at the mountain base.
No casualties were re-
ported.
Lopg Cheng,.. about 80
MileS .north: of ' Vientiane,
isheadquarters. for the
CIA: sponsored "s ecret
'army" led by the -,kleo hill
tribesmen's Maj. Gen.
yang- Pao.' In addition to
yang Pao and his soldiers,
a. number of ?CIA advisers
.stay overnight at the base.
?
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13 DEC 1972
Cuts
? By LARRY GREEN
Chicago Daly News Service
SAIGON ? The United
States has curtailed operations
of its multibillion dollar super-
secret electronic battlefield
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in
southern Laos, it was learned
today.
The cutback involves a re-
duction in the number of Or-
wellian "Big Brother" sensors
costing up to $1,000 each that
measure supply traffic and
fresh troops moving from
North Vietnam to Communist
forces in the South.
The information is Used, in
part, to pinpoint targets for
U.S. bombing attacks.
As a result of the cutback,
military intelligence has less
data to gauge potential North
Vietnamese capabilities and
intentions. At the same time,
Ithe North Vietnamese have
more freedom of mOvement
along, the network of roads
than they've had since 1968.
Two Reasons for Cut
Military sources said the
cutback was ordered both be-
cause of the prospects of an
Indochina cease-fire and the
enormous cost of the program. -
One source called the reduc-
tion "significant," but refused
to indicate its scope.
There is also a possibility
that this year's Communist of-
fensive, which took more than
a year to prepare for, and in-
volved moving hundreds of
tanks and heavy artillery
pieces down the trail, proved
the sensor system to be less
. effective than enthuastic Air
Force officials had claimed.
Both the United States and
Smith Vietnam moved into
place for the offensive, and
were totally unprepared for
ack Sensors on
massive artillery and armor-
led attacks that hit some parts
of South Vietnam, including
the An Loc region 60 miles
north of Saigon.
The reduction in sensors,
one source said, was "a ques-
tion of priorities."
The United States. he ex-
plained, believes a cease-fire
is near, and at that time inter-
national inspection teams will
be able to observe, North Viet-
namese supply and troop
movements, making the mas-
sive seeding of sensors now
impractical.
They are camouflaged to fit
among tropical plants, and are ?
programmed to self-destruct if
tampered with, or when their
batteries become weak, after
about 99 days.
The Air Force command
here refused to comment on
the reported sensor reduction.
Thousands Were Strewn
Beginning in 1963, thousands
were strewn along hundreds of
miles of jungle :oads in the
Laotian panhandle used by the
North Vietnamese to push sup-
plies southward.
They were designed to de-
tect everything from the sound
of a moving truck to the odor
of urine, and were an impor- '
tant part of a U.S. program
that tried to make the trail
uninhabitable.
It was believed in military
circles that the war in the
South could be forced to grad-
ually die out if supplies and
men from the North could be
choked off.
? Information from the se-
sors was fed to computers at
the semisecret U.S. Air Force
base at Nakhon Phanom, in
northeastern Thailand. From ?
there, bombers were assigned
targets.
Trail Still Busy
This year, the Air Force has
concentrated on hitting sup-
plies in North Vietnam before
they reach the trail. Hundreds
of B52s have attacked storage
areas around North Vietnam's
key logistics city Of Vinh and
near passes leading through
mountains from North Viet-
nam to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Still, military sources say,
the trail is in full operation
now with truck convoys mov-
ing regularly, and with dozens
of fresh tanks heading south.
There are also at least 10,000
fresh troops heading for Com-
munist base camps in Laos
and Cambodia, military
sources say. ?
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Tr
Approved Fitolkelease 2003/M1 MCIP84-004e9R001000100001-4
12 Dec 1972
McGarvey, Patrick I.?
C.I.A.: The Myth and the Madness
New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 240 pp.,1
$6.95, LC 72-82770
Publication Date: October 25, 1972
It is one of the delightful ironies of Ameri-
can life that there is now a sizable literature
on the U.S. intelligence community and
particularly on the Central Intelligence
Agency. This latest contribution by Patrick
McGarvey is more revealing than many
other books in the literature, probably be-
cause the author is a former intelligence
officer who served both in the CIA and in
the Defense Intelligence Agency of the De-
partment of Defense. It is a difficult book
to review because on the one hand it offers
much interesting and valuable material
(never, to this reviewer's knowledge, pre-
viously printed),. while on the other it is
marred by serious flaws which damage
its overall value.
McGarvey is a believer in the need for
U.S. intelligence and of a CIA in particular.
His main purpose in writing his book is to
stied some light on what he terms a damag-
ing myth that CIA is efficient, well run,
and capable of almost any act of trickery
and intrigue. He attempts, through a broad
examination of what intelligence is all
about, to portray CIA as really a bureau-
cratic mess with little or no central direc-
tion, and in sore need of drastic change.
? He .attempts this through pulling together
his own personal experiences in intelligence.
He stresses that the U.S. intelligence scene
is in bad state and that no one in govern-
ment seems willing or able to effect
necessary changes.
The author approaches his subject in
two ways. He points out that an apprecia-
tion of intelligence and its effectiveness
is not gained solely by a study of the or-
ganizational structure of the intelligence
community, since this reveals little of the
conflicts and contradictions which plague
intelligence. The necessary second avenue
of examination is on the personal human
side since, above all in intelligence, people
make the Machinery run. McGarvey
stresses that the intangibles count so
much?the attitudes, moods, politics of
particular points of view, the feuds, the
horse trades, and the incredible acts of
omission.
However, it is precisely when McGarvey
pursues the human side, and especially
his own experiences, that the reader begins
to entertain serious reservations. The de-
scriptive portions of the book on how the
system is configured and how it operates
are accurate enough. In his opening chap-
ter, for example, he draws a picture of the
presumably average intelligence officer
which simply cannot be termed average.
He attempts to generalize far too broadly
on these human aspects and this repeated-
ly weakens the'case he tries to make.
The book is made sprightly by his many
amusing anecdotes, providing a very
personal flavor in his descriptions of the
organization and operation of intelligence.
However, his points are often so bizarre
and so overdrawn that the reader begins
to wonder how many of these adventures
were really the author's own and how many
were apocryphal.
As a general critique of CIA, it is not the
equal of Lyman Fitzpatrick's The Real CIA,
but this work of 1966 did not give as much
detail of operations as does McGarvey.
It is, nevertheless, superior to Harry Ran-
some's The Intelligence Establishment,
another recent book on the subject (1970).
The former is by a very senior ex-CIA
officer, the latter by an academic. Mc-
Garvey's book is a view by a junior and
middle grade officer.
LEONARD WAINSTEIN
Institute for Defense Analyses
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Spiv
By LEWIS GULICK
A,56Axiated Pres
The era of attempted eaves-
dropping on U.S, diplomats
abroad through- cumbersome
wire-connected microphones is
over. Hostile agents are trying
more advanced devices, small
enough to be dropped into a
martini or planted in a shoe.
So reports the State Depart-
ment's deputy assistant secre-
tary for security, G. Marvin
Gentile, who is respensiblc for
safeguarding U.S. missions
overseas.
, The deputy assistant secre-
tary, while crediting modern
safeguards with being able to
pretty well protect against un-
? invited listening at U.S. em-
bassies, stressed that continu-
ing vigilance is needed.
"You can never be sure,"
Gentile said.
2 Attempts Cited
In an unusual interview
dealing with the continuing un-
dercover-intelligence struggle.
Gentile disclosed that in the
last year or so his sleuths have
uncovered at U.S. embassies
in Communist East European
countries:
A tiny radio hidden in a
heel of a shoe of a senior U.S.
diplomat. It had good sound
pickup and could transmit 300
yards to listening points out-
side the embassy.
- The hug was secretly placed
in the heel when the diplo-
mat's -maid took the shoes out
for "repair." A U.S. security
Latest'Devkes
U.S. Embassges
office r, presumably using
modern detection gear, soon
discovered his colleague was a
walking broadcasting station.
e A miniature transmitter
tucked into an innocent-
looking binder holding curtain
samples.
Gentile said this spy device,
which turned out to have a
broadcasting range of 400
yards, was spotted before it
got into any embassy room
where secret information was
discussed.
Both deviees fit Gentile's
definition of "drop transmit-
ters" -- tiny radio transmit-
ters, usually battery-powered,
which can he easily hidden
and quickly implanted in an
office or on a person.
A Popular Tactic
-- A popular spy tactic used to
,be to hide microphones in U.S.
embassies and link them by
wire to outside listening posts.
This reached a high point in
1964 with the removal of 52
microphones from the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow and 55
from the Embassy in Warsaw.
Gentile said such eavesdrop-
ping installations were possi-
ble in the first years after
World War II, when U.S. diplo-
mats moved into 'buildings
-which had not been under U.S.
guard.
"The technological advances
of electronics and miniaturiza-
tion have made these wired
systems obsolete" and
"round-the-clock guarding of.
U.S. embassies_. prevents hos-
tile agents from maintainihg:,
them, he said. '
Under a recently completed ,
U.S.-Soviet agreement for nevi
embassies in each other's
cap-
ital, U.S. negotiators insisted;
on control. over constructing
the interior of the new building
in Moscow and on guarding
the premises during construe-_,
tion.
"Over the years since the..
second World War," Gentile,
said, "technical espionage has
become an increasing hazard
to. the security of our diPlo.7.
matic missions overseas."
He said the spying attempts
continue regardless of changes:,
in the international political
climate and that espionage de-'
vices "are uncovered with.
alarming regularity."
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CiirC'AGO
? . Apprv1f rtopOIRepase 2003/12//013 QFECA IkUP 8 4 - 0 0 alieR 0 0 1000100001-4
Ei.tcken Dugs ?
WASHINGTON, Dee. 10 [AP]
? State Department security
officers, in the last year or so,
have found a tiny eavealroping
,r a dio transmitter secretly
placed in the heel of shoe worn
by 'a senior United States diplo-
mat in a Communist East Eu-
ropean country.
At another American em-
bassy in East Europe, they
located a miniature spy radio
hidden in a seemingly innocent
binder holding curtain samples.
The head of the State Depart-
ment's security force, deputy
.assistant secretary G. Marvin
Gentile, reported these sample
discoveries of new, sophisti-
cated spy devices in a continu-
ing undercover intellig en cc
struggle abroad.
These are the first -public
I disclosures of such bugging of
U. S. missions overseas in re-
cent years. ? ,
Gentile said in an interview,
however, that the spying goes
on 'regardless of changes in the
international climate and that
"much of this espionage is un-
covered with alarming regu-
larity."
"Over the years since the
second World War," he said,
"technical espionage has be-
come .an increasing hazard to
the security of our diplomatic
missions overseas."
Gentile, whose Months seek
to protect U. S. embassies from
hostile intelligence penetration,
said defenses against electronic
spying have improved.
He figures today's safeguards
take care of uninvited listening
gadgets at the U. S. embassies,
tho there is need for vigilance.
"You never can be absolutely
sure," he said.
The heel radio?said tA; work
well up to 300 feet away when
the wearer isn't walking?re-
flects the long strides in elec-
tronic espionage techni goes
over the inimediate postwar
era when U. S. diplomats were
moving back into buildings left
unguarded during the war.
? Popular Spy Tactic
A popular spy tactic then Was
to hide microphones in walls
and fixtures and hook them to
listening posts by wires. Dis-
coveries of wired microphones
climaxed in 1964 with the re-
movel of 52 from the American
embassy in Moscow and 55
from the embasSy in Warsaw.
Under the just completed
U. S.-Soviet agreement for new
embassies in each other's capi-
tal, U. S. negotiators insisted
on control over constructing the
interior of. the new U. S. build-
ing in Moscow and on guarding
the premises around the clock
during construction. .
Gentile said that wired eaves-
dropping on U. S. diplomats
has become obsolete now with
technological advances, with
miniaturization and with 24-
hour guarding of 'U. S. em-
bassies keeping out hostile
security agents.
Resorting to "Drop"
Gentile said eavesdropping
devices are found from time to
time in American installations
in noncommunist countries too. ?
But he believes they are im-
planted by Communist intelli-
gence services. ,
The reason for this conclu-
sion, he said, is, that "we have
been very successful in identi-
fying the local employes
; I [caught in the espionage] and
whom they are working for."
He said no Americans have
been implicated.
Instead, he said, hostile intel-
ligence is resorting to tiny bat-
tery-run radios known as "drop
transmitters" which can be hid-
den easily and quickly slipped i
into an office' or on a person.
The State Department secur-
ity executive declined to say
just where or how the heel and
carpet bugs were spotted, or
what U. S. diplomats were their
targets. '
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US., Moscow
seek uglree
embassies
By Charlotte Saikowski
. Staff correspondent of
'The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
Bugs? -
For years Russians in Washington, and
Americans in Moscow, have assumed these
devices were a fact of diplomatic life.
Now both sides have a chance to minimize
electronic eavesdropping, since each is to
build a brand-new embassy in the other's
Capital.
Americans know it will be difficult to
exterminate bugs completely.
"The U.S. knows it's working in a bugged
building (in Moscow)," says one State De-
partment official, and to think you can keep
a building free of bugging in this day of
sophistication is nonsense."
? Nonetheless, one can assume the United
States and the Soviet Union will do their
utmost to keep out electronic listening de-
vices when they build the new embassies.
Agreement on interior work ,
.Under a recently signed agreement on
construction; each side has the right to do all ?
the interior work and to have unrestricted
access to its building site ? provisions that
Washington, which wants to use American or
West European laborers. insisted upon.
Both sides, if they -choose, also-can do the
exterior facing and the final roofing work.
No one is fooling anyone, though. It is
virtually impossible to eliminate eavesdrop-
ping by the "other side." Americans in
Moscow ? and no doubt Russians in Wash-
ington ? have always worked on the assump-
tion that no building is "safe" and therefore
keep alert about what they say inside. '
U.S. security officials are mum about the
latest wiretapping techniques. But these days
there are highly developed devices to monitor
conversation, some so miniaturized that
"drops and pickups" are a constant hazard.
A Russian or East European visitor to the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow, for instance, can
drop a small object in some hard-to-find nook
and pick it up unobtrusively (he hopes) at
some later date..
In any event, both sides are pleased that
after years of wrangling an accord was
signed ? it is the 101st Soviet agreement
since 1933 and the 43rd in the Nixon adminis-
tration?and plans for the embassies can
now take wing. The United States has hired
the firms of Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill of
San Francisco and Gruzen and Partners of
New York to design the building. Their
overall mandate is to come up with some-
thing that reflects American architectural
trends and values. ?
This gives the United States an unusual
opportunity to project the American image in
a .Communist society. Moscow watchers are
hoping the building will turn out to be more of -
an eye-catcher than, say, the U.S. Embassy
in Warsaw, which many critcs term "un-
imaginative."
It is expected to be at least two years before
ground is broken for the embassy. Besides
the architectural plans, which must be
cleared by the Russians to make sure they
meet local building codes, Congress must
appropriate the money..
Occupancy of the rwo embassies is to be
simultaneous ? bugs and all.
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NEW YORK, N.Y.
NEWS Approvel,
? 2,129,909
.2 ? 2,949,786
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DEC 10 1972
Mtn'? Really Happens
Sy Fact
By-PRANK VAN RIPER
Of THE NEWS Washingfon Bureau
THE SIGN Outside the entrance to
the heavily wooded compound in
suburban Langley, Va., says, "Bu-
feau of Public Roads," but it's an open
secret that what goes on beyond those
gates has little to do with roads and even
less to do with the public.
. Behind . the electronically monitored
fences and constantly manned guard
shacks is the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. In recent months, the secrecy, size
and capabilities of the nation's chief
spy shop have been questioned by men
who have been there, former agents
themselves.
One of them, Patrick J. MeGarvey,
a 14-year veteran of the CIA, the Na-
tional Security Agency. will -the Defense
Intelligence Agency," contends that the
amorphous "intelligence community" has
greivn so unwieldly, so redundant, in the
last 10 years that the U.S. is now get-
ting an intelligence product that is ac-
tually infevior to wN it goc a Aecad&
ago with fewer men and fewer machines.
And all this with the benign neglect
of Congress which, McGarvey says, has
approved the CIA's big annual budget
request behind closed doors, with little
inclination or desire to question the
spending estimates of the agency's lead-
ers, including CIA Director Richard M.
Helms. Helms' planned departure from
the CIA after six years, first revealed
by THE NEWS last month, was seen
in some quarters as an indication of
White House concern over the size of
the intelligence bureaucracy.
In an interview, McGarvey, a 37-year-
old father of four who spends his spare
time writing poetry and fiction and
dreaming of one day owning an oyster
boat in Chesapeake-Bay, maintained that
in the area of U.S. intelligence, "we're '
being deluged with much more informa-
tion than we actually need."
The author of the recently published
: book "CIA: The Myth and the 3,1ad?
kkeps,','?XeGarvey,!4retit,that "back, in
?
cr;
Ezt There -cif
?
ry?
the U-2 days, just before the satellites
came into being, we were getting a good-
ly amount of solid intelligence from the
biggies?the Soviets and the Chinese? justification for it." _
enough that we could digest it properly, Several lawmakers, among them Sen.
enough that it received the kind of eriti- Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), ranking
cal acclaim within the intelligence corn- Democrat on the Senate Armed Services
munity that it deserved. . - Committee, have been skeptical. of U.S.
' "But today, for example, we have
intelligence-gathering,- especially in light7
of such glaring . failures as the 1968
so many satellites pumping pictures back Pueblo affair ? which McGarvey -says
to us on a daily basis that- nobody pays was unnecessary and could have been
a damn bit of attention to them." avoided?the -abortive Son Tay prison.
"Seventy to eighty per cent of the camp raid in November, 1970-, when U.S.
money now spent on intelligence is spent forces wound up raiding an empty North
in technical collection, satellites and such, Vietnamese barracks in search of Ameri-
and it's ridiculously expensive and ludi- can PWs and the 1969 shootdown of.
crously redundant," -McGarvey said. "The a Navy. EC-121 reconnaissance plane off:
Army overflies all of Latin America tak- the coast of North Korea. .
ing pictures, and doesn't show them to - "One can almost predict," McGarvey
the Air Force. The - Army is interested said, "an increasing number of intelli,
in roads and ports and the whole sehmier, genee failures on the scale of the Pueb16.
while -the , Air Force is only interested incident?and perhaps another -Warbe,
.? in radar sites, missile sites-and air fields, - cause of the present dry rot that InfeetS
larbor0;k.,ancki.that's .abut it. -.Eadh.-, of" bi.,11.nationallptelligene:gtriiet4e:
L, - ...., ,-,..,. 112; r act-P. '!tx flat,1 . lalri5-1,11,..4,47 - 1.'1( IM 4 01-/- t '-"Ii.' - ' f'"' 1 ''''
these guys isdoing-the same dannahing,
and each individual budget has got a
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THE VILLAGE VOICE
7 Dec 1.912 NINO
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Debriefing the press:
memory: "I'm one step ahead of
you, Bill. President Sukarno and
'Exclusive to the CIV ,all about this, and they are partic-
ularly incensed at having a man
of color sent to spy in their
by William Worthy
In April 1961, a few days after
the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at
that time the director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, met in
off-the-record session with the
American Society of Newspaper
? Editors at their annual conven-
_don.
, Given the Cuba intelligence, by
then obviously faulty, that had en-
tered into Washington's rosy ad-
vance calculations, he inevitably
was pressed to tell: "Just what
are the sources of the CIA's infor-
mation about other countries?"
One source, Dulles replied, was
U. S. foreign correspondents who
are "debriefed" by the CIA on
their return home. The usual
:practice is to hole up in a hotel
room for several days of intense
interrogation.
Much of the debriefing, I've
learned over the years, is agreed petty cash drawer..
to freely and willingly by individu-
My first awareness of the CIA's
al newsmen untroubled by the
special use of minority-group
world's image of them as spies. In I
newsmen abroad came at the
' time of the 1955 Afro-Asian
summit conference at Bandung,
Indonesia. Through Washington
sources (including Marquis
Childs of the St. Louis Post
Dispatch), Cliff Mackay, then edi-
tor of the Baliimore Afro-
American, discovered?and told
me?that the government was
planning to send at least one
black correspondent to 'cover"
the historic gathering.
The "conduit" for the expense
money and "fee" was the director
of a "moderate" New York-based
national organization, supported
by many big corporations, that
has long worked against employ-
ment discrimination. The CIA
cash was passed to the organiza-
tion's direetor by a highly placed
Eisenhower administration of-
ficial overseeing Latin-American
affairs who later became gover-
nor of a populous Middle Atlantic
state, and whose brothers and
family foundation have long been
heavy contributors to the job op-
portunity organization.
Because of the serious implica-
tions for a press supposedly free
of governmental ties, I relayed, 1
this information to the American
Civil Liberties Union. I also told
Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip
Randolph's union associates in
the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's re-
Approved OgrkeOgAw2lir63Yfg01:Iti
gatherer, differed with brother country."
Foster Dulles, the Calvinist cliplo- Cold-war readiness to "cooper-
mat about the wisdom of the self--I ate" with spy agencies, whether ,
defeating travel bans. motivated by quick and easy
Years later, I learned that the II money (I've often wondered if
U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest under-the-counter CIA payments
who twice came to my hotel to have to be reported on income tax
demand (unsuccessfully) my returns!) or spurred by a miscon-
passport as I transited Hungary ceived patriotism, had its pre-
en route home from China in 1957 cedent in World War I and in the
was, in fact, a CIA agent revolutionary-counterrevolu-
operating under a Foreign Ser- . tionary aftermath. In the summer
vice cover. During a subsequent of 1920 Walter Lippmann, his
lecture tour, I met socially in wife, and Charles Merz published
Kansas City a man who had in the New Republic an exhaus--
served his Army tour of duty in tive survey of how the New York
mufti, on detached service in Times had reported the first two
North Africa and elsewhere with years of the Russian revolution.
the National Security Agency. Out They found that on 91 occasions?
of curiosity I asked him what ' an average of twice a week?
would be the "premium" price for Times dispatches out of Riga,
a newsman's debriefing on out-of- Latvia, buttressed by editorials,
bounds China. He thought for a had "informed" readers that the.
moment and then replied: "Oh, revolution had 'either collapsed or
about $10,000." Out of the CIA's was about to collapse, while at the
same time Constituting a "mortal
menace" to non-Communist
Europe. Lipprnann and his as-
sociates attributed the misleading
coverage to a number of factors.
Especially cited in the survey
were the transcending win-the-
war and anti-Bolshevik passions
of Times personnel, as well as
"undue intimacy" with Western
intelligence agencies.
After 1959, when Fidel Castro
came to power after having,
ousted the corrupt pro-American ,
Batista regime, Miami became a
modern-day Riga: a wild rumor
factory from where Castro's
"death" and imminent overthrow
were repeatedly reported for sev-
eral years. Both in that city of ex-
patriates and also in Havana,
"undue intimacy" with the CIA
caused most North American re-
porters covering the Cuban revo-
lution to echo and to parrot of-
ficial U. S. optimism about the
Bay of Pigs invasion.
In the summer of 1961, on my
fourth visit to that revolutionary
island, a Ministry of Telecom-
munications official told me of a
not untypical incident shortly
before the invasion. Through mer-
cenaries and through thoroughly
discredited Batistianos, the CIA
was masterminding extensive
sabotage inside Cuba?a policy
doomed to failure not only
because anti-Castro endeavors
lacked a popular base, but also
because kindergartens, depart-
ment stores during shopping
hours, and similar public places i
I
!at least one case, as admitted to me by the Latin-American spe-
cialist on one of our mass-circula-
tion weekly newsmagazines, the
debriefing took. place very reluc-
tantly after his initial refusal to
cooperate was vetoed by his supe-
riors. But depending on the par-
ticular foreign crises or obses-
sions at the moment, some of the
eager sessions with the CIA
debriefers bring handsome re-
muneration. Anyone recently re-
turned from the erupted Philip-
pines can probably name his
price.
Despite its great power and its
general unaccountability, the CIA
dreads exposes. Perhaps because
of a "prickly rebel" family repu-
tation stretching over three gen-
erations, the CIA has never
approached me about any of the
48 countries I have visited,
including four (China, Hungary,
Cuba, and North Vietnam) that
had been placed off-limits by the
State Department. But the secret
agency showed intense interest in
my travels to those "verboten"
lands. In fact in those dark days,
Eric Sevareid once told me that
Allen Dulles,_ the intelligence
children in their classrooms_ and
women where they shop.
On one such occasion a bomb
went off at 9.08 p. m. Five minutes
earlier, at 9.03 p. m., an ambitious
U. S. wire-service correspondent
filed an ;`urgent press" dispatch
from the Western Union , tele-
printer in his bureau ? office, re-
porting the explosion that, awk-
wardly for him, came five min-
utes after the CIA's scheduled'
time.
time. When that correspondent
and most of his U. S. colleagues
were locked up for a week or two
during the CIA-directed Bay of
Pigs invasion and were then ex-
pelled, many U. S. editorial writ-
ers were predictably indignant.
Except perhaps in Washington
itself and in the United Nations
delegates' lounge, the CIA's
department on journalism is
probably busier abroad than w,th
newsmen at hoine. In 1961, during
a televised interview, Walter
Lippmann referred casually to
the CIA's bribing of foreign
newsmen (editors as well as the
working press), especially at the
time of critical elections. All over
the world governments and politi-
cal leaders, in power and in op-
position, can usually name their
journalistic compatriots who are
known to be or strongly suspected
of being on the CIA's bountiful
payroll. I believe it was Leon
Trotsky who once observed that
anyone ? who engages in in-
telligence work is always in-
covered sooner or later.
'? Even neutralist countri
learned to become distrustful o
U. S. newsmen. In early 1967,
Prince Norodom Sihanouk ex-
pelled a black reporter after just
24 hours. In an official statement
the Ministry of Information al-
leged that he "is known to be not
only a journalist but also an agent
of the CIA." In a number of Afro-
Asian countries, entry visas for U.
S. correspondents, particularly if
on a first visit, can be approved
only by the prime minister or
other high official.
As recently as a generation ago,
? it would have been unthinkable
for most U. S. editors, publishers,
newscasters, and reporters to ac-
quiesce in intelligence de-
briefings,' not to mention less
"passive" operations. What Ed
Murroix denounced as the cold-
war concept of press and universi-
ty as instruments of foreign policy
had not yet spread over the land.
?In the years before the Second
World War, if any government
agent had dared to solicit the co-
, operation of a William Allen
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omb . n no counc ry oe on
Mobilize mass support by killing
4011N.
Wrhite at the EmporiAa RaPzrepiteeodrf or ReJease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004994114000100001-4
a Robert Maynard Hutchins at the
University of Chicago, the rebuff
would have been as explosive as
the retort to the CIA five or six
years ago by the president of the
New Mexico School of .Mines.
Describing himself as a "fun-
damentalist" on fidelity to intel-
lectual freedom and on adherence
to professional codes, he told me
of his having been asked by the
CIA to alert the agency whenever
any of his faculty members were
about to travel abroad "so that we
can ask them to keep their eyes
open." "You people ought to be
put in jail," he spat at the agent,.
"You have no right to involve aca-
demics and innocent people in
your dirty business." To his disap-
pointment, however, not everyone
on his teaching staff saw it his
way. At the next faculty meeting,
when he related the conversation,
some of the professors missed the
uuderlying principle by asking:
"Well, what's wrong with the
CIA's proposition?"
At Harvard, during our 1956-7 -
Nieman Fellowship year, New
York Times correspondent Tony
Lewis and I were told by an an-
thropologist that during her years
'at the State Department at the
height of the cold war, she had
? been horrified to find herself
reading CIA transcripts of the
debriefing of academics upon
their retury ,,tne from foreign
"scholarly- trips. She had corn-
' plained to the Social ? Science
Research Council, but at that
time was unable to get that pres-
tigious body to denounce the prac-
tice.
But now the times--and the all-
important intellectual climate=
have changed, thanks in large
part to a new image of the govern-
ment after its eye-opening crimes
and disasters in Indochina and
elsewhere. Today, to at least
some degree, a goodly number of
the most respectable spokesmen
for establishment journalism are
fighting the government's insis-
tence on turning newsmen into ex-
tensions of the police and prosecu-
tion apparatus.
Under the sobering impact of
dismaying troubles ahead, the
- older. tradition of this country is
re-asserting itself. Far fewer of us
are still living in the fool's para-
dise of the Eisenhower-Kennedy
years. In the mass media and on
the campuses the "fun-
damentalists" may never become
a majority. They don't have to.
They are again "raising a stan-
dard to which all honorable men
may repair."
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100001-4
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RADIO -TV MONRI 3I NG SERVIR64- , y
. . 000j . 4
3408 WISe&darffn AIM3;:VIt3gPWU3 WA- II I ' IP?111981g .: 244-8682
PROGRAM:
TEN O'CLOCK NEWS
fl
-
?
DATE: ,
DECEMBER 70 1972
STATION OR NETWORK:
WTTG-TV, METROMEDIA
,
TIME: ,
10:00 PM, EST
. .
__.
ANDERSON SAYS, CIA REPORT SAYS SYRIA. WILL FIGHT ISPAEL
..,,?