DANGERS SEEN IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 157
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

READVIG, PA.
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NOV 2 Approved Fosawlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004941W01000090001-6
1 1971
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S - 85,704
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By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Ret.) intuit in the intellie'ence community
? b are and make intelligence less responsive to the
? ? .A release from the White Home Nov. Richard Helms and Henry Icissin i I h decision make.rs.
5 announced a drastic reorganization of the former wears three hats in the ncw setup Rather than streamlining theaP-
and ' the hitter two hats plus. the all- in 'tug the new organizeition, further frag-
whole U.S. intelligence community. important responsibility of per sonall
The reasons given determining what the President sees. ments the intelligence community by add-
71 for the big shake-up No defense! leader, civilian or military, ing- the four additional advisory or ad
-
were "to improve the active -or retired, so far as I know, ques-
mi
efficiency he- and effective- nistrative. echelons.
ness of t U.S. foreign The new system also increases the.
tions the ability or loyalty of either Helms
intelligence c m u - or Kissinger, but sound organization should -possibility that intelligence estimates and
,! ? , not be based on personalities since they are foreign zissessinents can be doctored to
nity. Etde rath
ilways transient and sometimes fallible.
Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff th
, who. support decisions previously Iller
T h e reorganizttion
by law are designated as the nrincipal an the other way around.
boards or committees
.A provides ,four new
tary advisers to the President, are elim- It would be safer and soimder for
central intelligence. 'file inated, for all practical purposes, from times, the daily intelligence summaries
presidents to get, ? as they did in earlier
including a direCtOr of ;
Centr a I Intelligence intelligence evaluation. from the defense department, the state
?-? Agency ? "rector, Rich- The 'Whole purpose of foreign in- department and the ClA uncensored by any
Gen. Eaket ard Helms, takes on tins telligence is ? to observe adequately zind intermediary. The President's principal
job in addition to his assess accurately the military strength of national security adviser might well digest
duties as CIA director. these estimates arid assessments but he
There is a National Security Council other nations and thus evaluate the hazards never should delay their presentation net
Department, including trill:le e-1 Joint Chiefs
Defensechiefsof alter their .
meaning
to our own security.
intelligence committee with Henry Kis-
singer, the President's principal national
Staff and the intelligence agencies of the
security advise'r, as, chairman. -There is a armed services are best qualified by
net assessment group within the National education and experience for sound advice
Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an in these areas.
intelligence resources advisory board which The intelligence apparatus Ins not been
Helms also heads. streamlined and reduced in size and cost.
The U.S. intelligence board is ,,re_ Instead, all the new layers', boards and
constituted," according to the White House committees now will have to be manned. A.
release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is ? minimum .of 500 top-level intelligence pea-
chairman. ? pie eventually will be. found in or serving
It is generally believed that the White these new echelons, considerably increasing
House was unhappy with the ? sometimes the overall cost of intelligence. These. new
-conflicting estimates of enemy Military agencies. if used. also will .create delays
strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence.
community. There were also charges that
the military deliberately overestimated
enemy strength to get increased' defense
appropriations, and that intelligence was -
costing too much, about $5 to $6 billion an-
nually. The intelligence apparatus needed
.therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size.
and cost and military influence curtailed,
according to this view.
There is no doubt but that the
reorganization does greatly reduce military
influence jn the- intelligence apparatus. Of
the 30-odd members of the four new layers,
boards or committees at the -highest levels
on the .intelligence totem, pole, only three
are military men. Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6
The two men who now are clearly dom-
THE ECONOMIST
Approved FolklaeleasgCka61411081-9NA-RDP84-00494iilik001000090001-6
Spies get together
There is one secret that the intelligence
fraternity in Washington has not been
able to keep under cover : its own lines
of communication have become badly
scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of
the worst discrepancies and overlaps
President Nixon . has announced a
reorganisation of the, multiple branches
of the secret service under the direction
of Mr Richard Helms, the present and
very -able head of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Mr Helms will now
head the new United States Intelligence
-Board and will co-ordinate the activi-
ties and the budgets of the various
? intelligence networks?the first time
that anyone has had power. to do this.
The board will, be directly responsible
to ? the National Security Council. At
the same time two new panels will
be set up within the NSC. One, under
the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger,
the chief of the council, will analyse
all the intelligence reports. (In the rush
to collect raw facts their interpretation
has often been, neglected.) The other
will compare ?the strength of the Soviet
forces as a whole with those of the
United States. . .
The tangles within the intelligence
world go back beyond the crisis over
missiles in Cuba. On numerous Occa-
sions the many military spies?the three
services have their own intelligence net-
works and then the Department of
Defence has still another?have Come
UI) with assessments that differ from
those .of the civilian agencies such as
the CIA and the intelligence division
of the State Department. Although the
CIA has a hawkish image in foreign
eyes, it is generally the military men
who have over-estimated the resources
available to the other side, partly in
an effort to boost support in Congress
for their own defence budget. Further-
more, relations have been strained
recently between the CIA, which
gathers information from abroad, and
4he Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which manages surveillance at home?
This year the confusion has been
more noticeable, than most. The abbr..
tive commando raid a year ago to free
prisoners of war from the deserted
camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam
caused acute embarrassment. Then the
Pentagon papers revealed that there
had earlier been some. serious discrepan-'
cies between ?military and civilian
Richard Helms: master-spy
information on the war .in Vietnam.
And now there is a struggle brewing
over the extent of the reported '
build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union
at a time when the negotiations on
the limitation , of strategic arms are.
reaching a crucial stage.
Congress, which has always been
suspicious of the secrecy surrounding
the intelligence world, has also been
prodding the President. The conserva-
tives in -the Senate, led, rather surpris-
,ingly, by Senator Ellender, Who used
Ito be the spies' best friend, want_ to
cut the money that goes on military
intelligence ; in the age of expensive
satellite spies about $5 billion a year
is spent on this out of an annual intel-
ligence -budget of around $6 .billion.
The liberals, on the other hand, claim
that Congress has too little .control over
the intelligence networks in particular
they feel that the CIA has too great an
influence on foreign policy. What, they
ask, is ihe CIA doing in Laos? It will
be no consolation to these critics that
Mr Kissinger will now have greater
authority over spying. As a presidential
aide he is not responsible to Congress.
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r'
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THE tram halm
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HONOLULU 7-- (AP) ?
,Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird said Saturday that. the;
Pentagon is 'ready to carry
but quickly President Nixon's
new orders to consolidate
federal intelligence-gathering
operations. ? . .
"I believe the Department
of Defense will be able ulti-
rnate4y to reduce costs be-
cause of these actions," Laird
said in Honolulu for a stop-
over while he was flying
from Saigon to Washington
after surveying the Vietnam
situation for Nixon.
D1F,FEN.SE officials said
the consolidations should
save millions of dollars
through elimination of dupli-
cations and reductions in
staff .but they said it is too
early to estimate accurately
how much costs will be cut.
? The full extent o defense
intelligence operations in
their various forms never has
been disclosed publicly, but a
hint of their magnitude can
be gleaned from an estimate
that they involve about 150,-
000 people and about $3 mil-
lion a year. ? ? -? -
Laird's ? statement- came a
day after the White House
announced a reorganization
of .the wide-ranging intelli-
gence apparatus of the gov-
ernment, giving Central In-
telligence A ge a cy Director
Richard Helms "an enhanced
leadership role" and coordi-
nating authority.
IN HIS statement, Laird
appeared to be backing up
the generals' and admirals'
view that each armed force
must have its own intelii-
1 11
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(fence arms.
Recalling streamlining pro-".
posals by his own blue-rib-
bon defense panel, Laird said
"we have paid particular at-
tention to intelligence,
eluding the need to maintain
the intelligence capabilities
.of the four armed services."
Even befOre the White
House acted, Laird had creat-
ed a new assistant secretary.
of defense slot which he said
"will increase civilian super-
vision of intelligence matters
in my office."
The new post is held by
Dr. Albert C. Hall, until re-
cently a vice president of an
aerospace company.
? ?
. BUT LAIRD never has fol,?
lowed through on a recom-.
mendation by the blue-ribbon
panel that would have strip-
ped command of foreign in-
telligence from the Joint?
Chiefs of Staff.
Pentagon authorities said
that Lt. Gen.. Donald V. Ben-
nett, head of the Defense In-
telligence ,Agency; and Hall
rank as co-equals. -
- The Defense chief said that
establishment of a National
Cryptologic Command, to
handle all code-cracking and
communications intelligence,
"will proceed in an orderly
_ .
manner." Ai-id he said .his
staff is working on
estailish-
nient of a Defense Map
Agency and an OffiCe of De-
fense Investigation:
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CARBONDALI' Thtflproved ForViefetse 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-00499Q(411,000090001-6
SO ILLINOISAN
E 20c4-63 4 1971
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uld to kPea
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[i
By Rtk meWethy
Con:,-,,liss$rial. Quarterly
Since Congress created the
ultra-matt Central Intelligence
Agency in e47, a growing
number of members have beau. -
Itching to find out more about
what their creation does.
The. push is On agaii this year,
with impetus being providod. by -
disclosures that the United
States is involved in a clan-
destine war hi Loos that
Cmraess didn't .know alxot.
Mtore than a dozen bills have
bneui intivduced this *ring mad.
pummetr aimed at removing
-some of tho legal blinders
Congress put on it,..7E.11 with
respect to the CIA. Some would
slim the legislative branch to
share more fully in the agency's .
hitellignee information,
. In the last ti:'49 decades, nearly
Me bills have been introduced
aimed at easing the tension
between an uninformed
Congress and an .uninformative ?
CIA. Not ens bill has passed and
only two have been - put to..
vete. As a' result, the CIA re-
mains a mystery 'even to the
body that voted it into ex,' ---
istenoe.
- The agency is so 'secret that
some members of Congress who
are EaippoSed to know .AIINA, CIA
activities ? nuembam of the
four highly select ? intelligence
oversight subcommittees ? did
not know 'how deeply the CIA
figures in the coutinued ex-
istence of the 'Royal Lao
goveniment. CIA oversight is
auPposed to be conducted ? by
subcommittees of the Senate
and HouSe Armed Services, and
Appropriations Corernitte,o5. ?
.Much to the irritation of some
member, the CIA oversight
subcommittee of the House Ap-
propriations Committee not only
Veeps - its business with the
agency a. secret, .1n:4 also keeps
the subcommittee's membership
a secret from other members of
Congress. .. .
lixplenation of P.,tracy
.raul Wilma, staff director of
he Ticuse cormnittes, told
Congressional Quarterly the
t
The late Allen Dulles, former CIA qireclor
.Missouri Democrat Stuart
Symington, a member of the
G?Mr4.t.e. Aimed Services CIA
'oversight subcornanittEo and
chairman of the Foreign Rola-
tiOns sul_lcommittee on U.S.
oonainitmerits abroad, had to
send to staff members to the,
jungles of Laos to find out haw
extensive the CIA program was
in .that cuppoly nellttal
country.
"In ell ray committee's there
is no real knowle$ge of what
going, on in Laos," Symington
told, a closed ;.-..e!,,sloa of the
Calrte June 7.
NiT11 senators, including
Symington, nit on on,..t of the two
Senate subcommittees designed
to provide legislative oversight
tleinhership was a r....vrd of the CIA.
occeim. that's the? Wiel. -1"1311e TA bild-q,'.1
mf-/Pluvel9e9E IW-gez iirbf/Mfo
`alwajts hma."
by Congress," said T. Edward
kPraswell chief couri?e1 foi- the
Senate Armed' Services Com-
mittee.
.
Desvite Symington's claims to
the contrary, Braswell told
Congressional Quarterly; "The
budget is gone into more
thoroughly than people (on the
committee) would admit. It's
just reviewed in a different way
than, ? say, ?? the - - St a to
Department's budget .
Braswell said the budget
review was at times conducted?
by a "very select group ,
More, f,elect than the five-1114P
mhcornmittee."
CfAc Ni41410 AVVieTily ?
Although the cf.A was
cateblished in 1947, it was miot-
for ? another two years that
C..engres1 ? granted the agency
carte blanche to operate without
: fitierADP84400499$001000
The ic,.59 law exempted the
?from R-dcral statutes
. .
... ...
requiring - disclosure - of ? the
"functions, names, official titles,
salaries or numbers of p..rson-
nel" employed by the agency.
To the CIA edrector, the law
granted the authority to spend
Money "without regard to the
..
pro ions of - law and mills-
' ,tions relating to the.- evpolditm- -,e-
t-:of government funds,'
Senate Appropriations
.. - Committee hali a five-man sub..
.- CoMmittee ? with the Winery
. .responsibility of reviewing ? the
' .CIA. budget, a figure which later
is ? hidden in the accounts of
'other government egenci&a.
According to William W.
;Woodruff, the one-man staff of
.: . . the Appropietions oversight
subcommittee, the senators
' - discuss more than just the CIA'
' when . its director, Richard
Helms, Uatifi-M
"We lo-A- to the CIA for the;
-. best intelligence on the Defense
Department budget that you can
.. get," -Woodruff said. He said
Helms also . provided the ant).
committee with budget
- estimates for all .government
,lintelligence P,parotion3, in-
' eluding those not specifically
'. under the jurizdiction or. the
, While . the ..}Totr;?z! . Arin
, propriatians Committee veils-its
- oversight operation in secrecy,
' the House Armed Services
Committee just formed a now
. subcommittee to deal with nit
,
aspects of intellizznee,
E For the last seven - months
. Rep. F. L'fiward liebE;rt, D-La.,1
. r, chairman of ? Armed. Services,
,used the full com.raitte. to
Voight CIA testimony.
"To pay the committee Was '
performing any real aversig,ht
- function was a fiction," raid
freshman committee member
Michael Harrington, a-
M. assachusetts. Democrats. The
new subcommittee will be under .
the direction of -Rep. Lucien N.
Nedzi, D-Mich;
No Quilling Solely - ?
"I find it very difficult to
believe the oversight coin-
inittees could not obtain some
pretty' accurate information on
-bow much Of that CIA money
was going into Laos," com-
mented Sen. Jack Miller, R
Iowa, during the Senate's June: 7 .
closed session.
Sen. J. W. Fulbright D Ark.,
chairman of the Foram Rola-
09041,committee, retorted: "It
as be said that we, all know
_ . ,., _ .
?eoit intio 6
Approved Fdonntease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499001000090001-6
about what the CIA is doing. I
have been on the CIA oversight
committee and I have never
s7en ariy &tailed figures (en
Laos) whatever." '
. Even Sen, John C. Stennis (D.
Miss.), chairman of the Armed
?Sm.-vices Committee - and its
omrsight subcommittet,? ad.
witted during the closed F.aa&im
that tome of the information-
? contained in Symington' 3
'Classified staff vaport 14,,as new
to him. .
. Stennis added, however: ' ? "If ?
we are going to have a CIA, and
we have to have a CIA, we ea-
not run it as a quilting society or
something like that."
_? .
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ST. LOUIS, tieftpproved Forease 2001/11/08: CIA-RDP84-0049941,1101000090001-6
POST-DISPATN
- 326,376
S - 511,863
8FPG
57 0
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d ..
By RTCHARD DUDNIAN Met- Secrettiry of the TreasurY. been used to finance in part
-
..
? Chief Washington - Doi.eslas Dillon was ?cheilernan. I, certativinternational laloor pro- Bissell Wa's reported to have.
Correspondent of the s, ilse.,..'iliociernent, re.porting. Bis- ? graMS.)-iTindled through .?. . the suggested that the? : CIA could-
:? ?
Post Dispatch ' 51 ii revieW and apprMsal of I AFT_,700.-
. t e 'I use foreign nationals increas-
e tnie CIA's covert operations .0.,
, i?e ..-.. ?
WASIIING'FON, Sept. 25 ? A e '. ? .,,member of the ins i ingly as '''career agents," with
-T. said: If the agency is to .be , panel, ?snot identified but ap-
As a result?MD funds have -
'confidential report being i a status midway between a
cir- :is effective, it will have to majte - ?
patently. Bernstein, the Steel-
ciliated in Washington and Bos- ' ?rkers -oficer,
I , was quoted as use of private institutions on an Di classical' agent in a: single op-
ef '
,ton urges that the Central In- 'expanding scale, though those eration and that of a staff
saying that it . was common ?
, member involved through his '
relations which, ' knowledge even before the ex-
cannot be resurrected. .? poseS'7 of la67 that there had
"We need to operate under . labor:Programs.
deeper cover, with increased ' - Persons in international labor
attention to the use of 'cut-outs.' ! affairs were dismayed, he said,
CIA's interface with the rest of over public disclosure of this
the world needs to be better : ClA mport. He said that ."cer.
protected." . tam n ?It e w a p a p e mien chin-
Bissells presentation, as re- ' pounded , their difficulties by
ported in the summary, referred , confusing AID with CIA."
The report is a summary of ? .
frequently to exposes in tie, - -I di- eein i n inte'li- , The -summary continued,
itelligence Agency improve its
secrecy M. peneterating private
institutions at home and abroad.
The document proposes also
that the CIA direct its covert
operations particularly at Af-
rica, Asia and Latin America
and make wide use of agents
other than Americans.
: - mus year of the CIA's pene-
- g,enee and -foreign policy con n? e- , - r , ? , f quoting] the same speaker.? , with good reason," the sum-,.
tration and financing of .t.lie,s
- ducted by the Council on For- ",Since i these disclosures, the mary said: .
National - Student Association i
- eign Relatiores in New York - -- s turn ,01,i, ' events has been unex-
"If these- OVerfliPhts had
, , and other p1 is org,anizations,,
1.. including trade union organiza-? pectecia ferst, there hasn't been ?; ,
. ,eaited' to the,- American press,'
Ja.n. 8. 196S.
, clans ove,.eeas, any real trouble with interne.-
the USSR would have been
Copies of the 'document are e s? - ?-? ?
being 'elm-Elated in this country' - -. 'IC various groups hadn't ? della) ilabor programs. Indeed,
forced to take action.
... . ,. -. - -
. and Europe by a group of rant- - -.:been-,:a.ware of the source of there i has. been an increase , in ?
On a less severe level, the
7.theix.I. 'funding, the damage sub-
... detn4ndei for U.S. -labor pro- same problem applies to satel-
cal schola?rs in Cambridge, ..
Mass, as "a still-relevant prim- et% . - . . k,ian-1- and the strain on our
caree.r in many operations.
At another point, the account.
of Bissell's presentation asked ?
the question "From whom is a
covert operaticin to be kept.
secret?"
'After five days, for exemple,
the U-2 flights were not secret I
from the Russians, hut these ;
operations remained highly se-
cret in the United States and
.. .., . , . .ins, m., i
or .on the theory and practice 'efiave.;;have been far less tfian capacity' has been embarras-
ef .the C e n t r al ITII?elliUnce ?-'iii....eeon.rred," the summary said. s sing.Forrnerly these common
Agency" and "a fair warning e....,,,,,e. -.7. . labor unions knew we were
ine tel..). interface with vari-
es to the direction of the agen-
eottstepriyate groups, including short of funds, but now they
cy's interests and efforts." b. groups,
all assnme we have secret CIA
Leader usiness and student of the 1965 discussion,'money, and they ask for more
..: "
. was Richard lvi. B must be. remedied.
Bissell Jr., a help."
former CIA deputy director Who
was in charge of the U-2 spy
plane program in the late 19.50s
' and the abortive invasion of
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in
1911. Ile left the Government in
1912 and is a vice president at
United Aircraft Corp.
. Others in the group were the ,
late Allen W. Dulles', who had
been the CIA director; Robert.
Amory Jr., who had been ,the
deputy CTA director for hitt:Hie
if genre.; Thomas L. Hughes, then
director of intelligence and re-
search at the Department of
- State and now president of the
Carnegie Endowment for finer.:
national Peace, and Meyer
Bernstein, director of interna-
tional affair S for, the United
Steel Workers of Am erica. For-;
-Approved
Other documents, obtained in
early Itki9 by the PostsDispatch Citing: labor union in British , of private organizations over-
showed that the U.S.
Guiana as an example, he said I seas, Bissell said that such pro-
Agency,
for International Developme.nt they were "supported through .-
had picked up the tab for cer- CIA conduits, but now they ask
tam n overseas programs that - for more assistance than be-
had been financed secretly by fore'
the CIA. These became known .. Ine-thsumma,ry of Bissell's
as "CIA orphans" after the Presentation, the report said the
secret finaacing, was disclosed. ,United ?States should make in-
The change apparently grew ! ici:eaeitsge use persons Other
out of a 1967 order by President : than American citizens who
Lyndon B. Johnson prohibiting "should be -encouraged to de-
any ,further hidden subsidies to .- velop a second loyalty, more
private 'volu.ntary organizations. : or less :comparable to that of
He promised to consider a pro- the I eaerican staff, ,
posal; that the -Federal Govern- . "TI.,, desirability of more ef-
ment establi,sh "a public-private -. fectiv,-.use of foreign nationals
mechanism to provide public inerca'S'es as we shift obr at-
funds openly for overseas activ- : tention to Latin America, Asia
itiefi:ioForganizations which arc i and :Africa, where the conduct
adjudged deserving, in the na- of United States nationals is
tional. interest, of . public sup easily subject to scrutiny and
FprRqjpase 2001/11/08 : CtAtiktfrE14E01q99tWX9
rim:Seri ,et 1 e s 1 090001-6
lite reconnaistianc.e. These are
examples of two hostile govern-
ments collaborating to keep.
operations secret from the gen-
oral public of both. sides. 'Un-
fortunately, there aren't enough
of these situations'."
- Returning to covert financing -
Oflnued
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2
grams as arranging visits by have been financed covertly by
CIA.
potential political leaders to the
In his toscussioa of covert op-
the United States were more ?
crations, Biss411 was quoted as
effective if carried on under
sawing that in some countries
private auspices than if sup-
the CIA representative "has
ported officially by the U.S.
served as a close counselor
Government.
(and in at least one case a
"They do not need to be drinking companion) of the
'-covert, 'but if legitimate pri- chief of state.
.vate entitles such as the faun- "These are ? .situations, of
dations do not initiate them, course, in which the tasks of in-
there mey be no way to get. telligence collection and politi-
them done except by covert cal action overlap to. the point
support to 'front' organizations, of being almost indistinguish-
"Many propaganda ()Pero- able," the account said.
tions are of declining cfective.-1-
ness. Some can be continued at
slight cost, but some of. the
larger ones (radio, etc.) arc
pretty well 'blown' and not in-
expensive, USIA (United States
Information Agency) doesn't
like them, although they did
have a real justification some
10 to 15 years ago as the voice
.of refugees and emigres, groups
which also have declined in
value and in the view of sonic
professionals are likely to con-'
thine declining in value."
Bissell told the Post-Dispatch
by telephone that he did not
recall details of the 196.8 panel
discussion but assumed that the
reference to radio propaganda ?
operations was to Radio Free
Europe and similar broadcast-
ing and other enterprises that
_
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THE 1.$NCHESTER GUARDIAN
lo Nov 1971
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The CIA and the
clumsy crainteman
New York, November 15
?
The weekly magazine "News-
week" claimed today that the
American Central Intelligence
Agency had played an
important part in bringing
about the downfall 10 years ago
of Antoine Gizenga's Stanley-
ville Government in the Congo
? now the Zaire Republic.
The CIA's role in the affair
involved the exposure of Soviet
smuggling of arms disguised as
Red Cross packages, and the
theft of Soviet funds destined
to pay Gizenga's army, the
magazine said.
The account which
"Newsweek" said was
previously unpublishe d,
recounted how Gizenga made a
bid for leadership of the former
Belgian Congo in 1961.
He had ,nttended the Prague
Institute tor African Affairs
and spent six weeks in Russia,
and was seen by Washington as
"Moscow's new man i in the
Congo," the magazine said. He
broke away from the Congolese
Government. which had the
backing of the United Nations,
set up a regime of his own in
Orientalc Province; armed 6,000
troops with smuggled Russian
guns and paid them with Soviet
funds. -
The White House authorised
covert operations to stop him,
and the CIA was informed by
friendly European agents that a
Czech ship was bound for Port
Sudan with a cargo of guns dis-
guised as Red Cross packages
for the relief of refugees in the
Congo..
"Newsweek" went on : "A
direct appeal to the port
authorities to inspect the crates
would never work, the CIA's
man in Khartum realised. The
Sudanese would have to be
faced with public exposure of
the contraband.
"Appropriate arrangements
were made on, the wharfs
before the Czech ship docked.
'If my memory serves me
right,' a former CIA man says,
it was the second crane load.
The clumsy winch operator let
the crates drop and the dock-
side was suddenly covered with
new Soviet Kalashnikov rifles.'"
On the incident involving the
soldiers' pay, "Newsweek"
recalled that by late in 1961
Gizenga's troops were growing
restive as their arrears
mounted. An appeal was made
to Moscow, and Soviet intel-
ligence delivered $1 million in
US currency to Gizenga's dele-
gation in Cairo.
The CIA learned that one
third of the, money was to be
delivered by a courier who
would take a commercial flight
to Khartum,. wait in the transit'
lounge to avoid a Customs
search, and then take another
plane to the Congolese border.
"When the Congolese courier
arrived in Khartum and settled.
into the transit lounge, his suit-
case between his knees, he was
startled to hear himself being
paged and ordered to proceed
immediately to the Customs
area," the magazine went on.
"After a moment of flus-
tered indecision, he took the
bag over to a courier and left it
unobtrusively near sonic
lockers before leaving for Cus-
toms: At that point a CIA man
sauntered out of the men's
room, picked up the suitcase,
and beaded out the back door
where two cars were waiting
with -motor's running."
" Newsweek " concluded: "Not
long afterward, Gizenga's
Government fell. It was said
that his troops suffered from
shortages of arms and were
upset because they hadn't been
paid." ? Reuter.
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MONESSEN, PA.
VALLEY IIIDEPENDENT
DEL 28 1971.
E ? 18,086
Review of
YEARS AGO, then Sen. Eugene Mc-
Carthy used to come down hard once
in awhile on what he viewed as ex-
cessive secrecy about the Central In-
telligence Agency's budget and oper-
ations:Though there was considerable
sentiment favoring closer surveillance
of the Cjilf.and a greater degree of
accountability to Congress, nothing
much came of McCarthy's efforts.
Despite his attempt to shed some
light on how much money the CIA
spends, and to force disclosure of such
Information as could be revealed with-
out hurting the national security, the
agency remained essentially hidden
from the public. The size of its budget
continued to be concealed in appro-
priations for other governmental func-
tions. Watchdog committees set up by
both House and Senate presumably
were privy to quite a bit of informa-
tion, but most of Congress as well as
the general public was kept in the
dark. -
? That period is recalled by the cur-
rent effort of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi,
Democrat of Michigan, to extract
more public information about the
CIA and other intelligence groups.
The situation is basically unchanged
today: no one who is telling seems to
have any clear notion of what the CIA
budget amounts to, though estimates
range from four to six billion dollars
annually.
. .
intelligence
The approximate size and extent,of
CIA operations remain hidden from
the public, which also gets only frag-
mentary (and often disquieting) hints
as to the CIA's role in foreign policy
decisions and implementation.
For the past several months Nedzi
has been chairman of a group set up
by the House Armed Services Com-
mittee to oversee intelligence opera-
tions. Inquiries thus far, he said the
other . day, have led him to conclude
that from the standpoint of national
security "more can be made public
than is being made public."
This is the heart of the matter. No
responsible person suggests that the
operations of the CIA or other intelli-
gence agencies ought to be made an
open book to the public ? and, by ex-
tension, to other governments. Intel-
ligence work is by its nature secret,
and would quickly be undermined by
excessive disclosures.
The public which is served by intel-
ligence agencies and which foots the
bill for them, however, has the right
to general information about how big
they are and how much they spend
? and above all, about how well they
stay within carefully defined limits of
their proper function.
Congressional review of the situa-
tion with this in mind would be a
sound step in the public interest.
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1300k .onW ?rid War Ii Spi;s Draws E?Iritishinquiry
. .
i
By HENRY BAYMONT wartime deputy chicf of;army ht et cave in the Thurin-
NLI.5 Britain's counterespiorigian forest.
One recent crisp fall morn- I He is known to have worked
inage ag,ency.
ing a. lean, youngish man with -,--- a, . closely with Sir John, who im-
an Oxford accent walked into He also knew that tli.e .r-rt- mediately after the war wrote
the offices of the David McKay ish authorities had been toId 1-n, exhaustive secret report
Thirdthat the British edition
would ar.alyzing the effectiveness of
Co., a publishing house at
Avenue and 47th Street, and be reproduced precisely ft-con M.1.5 in Opration Double-Cross.
asked to see the company s
to be published here next Jar? some material from this re- University Press publish the
president, Kenneth L. Lawson.
He was shown into Mr. Raw- "arY? port might have found its way full report.
I . _ .
son's office,. a spacious wood-
" understand your Govern-
paneled room with floor-to-
ment's position," Mr. Rawson
-
ceiling bokshelves and an told his caller. "But having
imposing grandfather's clock, read the manuscript I dont
and identified himself as the feel there are any real sacu-
deputy director general of the rity issues and, quite frankly, I
believe that 27 years after the
war the public is entitled to
get to read this fascinating
story."
The story referred to he
Mr. Rawson is how the British'
intelligence service " turmat
around" the top 12 Germ;: a.
agents in Britain in order to'
feed false information to the.
German. High Command, an c
fort that ended by leading the
Germans into assuming that
main thrust of the Allied in-
vasion of June, 1944, would
concentrate on Belgium rathc.r.
than Normandy.
Farago Names Agents
This deception, celebrated as
one of the most successful in-
telligence coups of the war hut.
never told in 'its full detail, bc-
came known as Operation
Double-Cross, or, as the intel-
ligence community prefers to
call it, XX.
Mr. Farago, a Hungarian-
born writer who became an ex-
, the original McKay edition, dne it was the assumption that
into "The Game of the Foxes"
that sent the British Govern-
ment seeking the 5- content of
the book. The ISSUC inside the
Government. was set off by a
decision of the former security.
chief, now a respected 80-year-
old Oxford don, to let the Yale
British Information Service.
"I am here at the instruction
of the Foreign Secretary," the
visitor told the publishing ex-
ecutive across a large mahog-
any desk stacked with manu-
scripts and papers. "We under-
stand that one of your
forthcoming boks may violate
Crown copyright. That is, we
feel it contains material that
is confidential and rightly be-
longs to Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment."
Mr. 'Rawson, a cheerful, gray-
ing man of 60, was unperr
turbed as he crushed a ciga-
rette in a heavy pewter ash-
tray. He had been expecting
the call.' Within the vistor's
reach, but concealed by an
overflow of paper, were the
galley profs of the book in
questi on?Ladislas Farago's
"The 'Game of the Foxes," a
detailed account of German es-
pionage. in Britain and the
United States during World
War IL
The veteran publisher ? he pert in .German and Japanese
has headed McKay for 21 years codes during the war when he
?knew that the Home Office was chief of research and plan.
had already asked the book's fling in the Office of Naval in-
English publisher whether it telligence, has reconstructed
contained any material from the the operation by cross-refer-
records of Sir John Master- ening British security informa-
man, the provost of Worcester tion with the Abwehr archives
College, Oxford, who was the found by the United States
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, 2 ,71
By W. W. ItCSTOW
AUSTIN, Tex.?What's wrong with
the United States?
If the possibilities of movement
toward stable peace are real, and the
risks of chaos and increased violence
also real, why is American political
life fixated not on these great hopes
and dangers but on just how rapidly
we can pull back or pull out from Asia
and Europe?
? I believe there are two major
reasons.
The first I call the Tocqueville
Oscillation, to recall his famous ex-
planation of why democracies have
such difficulty in conducting a steady
foreign policy. Historically, in this
century, we have only acted abroad
with unity and purpose in the face of
a clear and present danger to the
balance of power in Europe or Asia
or to the effort of a major power to
emplace itself to the south of us in.
this Hemisphere.
Between times we tended to lapse
into a moralistic isolationism. For a
half ?century we have first tempted a
sequence of ambitious aggressors, then,
when they had succumbed, we took
up arms, against them. We are in
danger of doing it again, as some
-American leaders are bowing their
heads to the neo-isolationist onslaught.
The grand question, then, is: Can
America for the first time make the
responsible, steady, and energetic pur-
suit of stable peace the focus of its
foreign policy rather than await situa-
tions of mortal danger before we react
convulsively, as in the past?
The answer is now inextricably
linked to how we handle our economic
policy at home and abroad.- Until
President Nixon's wage-price freeze,
we had been living with a corrosive
combination of inflation and unem-
ployment. It weakened every private
and public institution, undermined our
balance of payments position, and put
in question our capacity to Carry our
responsibilities in the world. The ac-
tions taken thus far merely recognize
the situation and buy a little time.
They have plunged our society and the
world community into a crisis from
which we must now extricate ourselves.
Most ecOnomists agree what we
ought to negotiate with our partners
as we reconstruct the international
monetary and trade system:
0 -An upward revaluation of the yen
and the Common Market currencies;
he Principal Question
117hz.!t's Wrong
With the U.S.A.?
? A definitive' shin: rrorn me costar as
a reserve currency to greater reliance
on the Special Drawing Rights, or,
"paper gold," created by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund;
e Greater flexibility in exchange rates,
over a narrow range, accompanied by,
more explicit international rules of the
game for deficit and surplus nations;
e, A sharp movement toward more.
liberal trade, including a revision of
agricultural policies in japan, the
Common Market, and the United States;
? A concerted effort by the rich na-
tions of the world to enlarge the flows
available for the development of Ash,
the Middle East, Africa and Latin
America.
This is the kind of result we ought
to seek in the international economic
conference that: must surely come.
But it is a pipe dream unless we
convert the wage-price freeze into
what I have called a social contract.
Unless we demonstrate a capacity to
organize ourselves for the long pull
to relate wage to productivity in-
creases, our negotiators will be met
with well - deserved skepticism. This
means that labor leaders must find
ways of assuring that the wage-
productivity link will not operate
inequitably. Then the labor leaders
require guarantees that labor restraint
will not be exploited to permit ex-
cessive profits. To make this kind of
social contract?and make it stick--
requires that we put aside conventional
political slogans and work together.
Our greatest asset is that, in his heart,
every serious labor leader and every
serious business leader knows this is
required to deal with the wage-price
problem; and that to deal with it is in
the interest of his constituency. But
the highest order of statesmanship will
also be required in Washington.
I do not believe we can come to this
kind of responsible consensus while
behaving irresponsibly abroad. I do
not believe we can act steadily and
responsibly abroad if we fail to recon-
cile steady growth and price stability.
We must find our way to common
cause in foreign as well as in domestic
The key to that reconciliation is the
perception that the great things to do
abroad; consist in working steadily,
patiently and actively toward a stable
peace men have not known since 1914.
That is the victory potentially within
our grasp. That is -the ..goal that could
and should reunite us. In a nuclear
age we have no right-to wait-for an-
other Pearl Harbor or a Cuba missile
crisis in reverse: irnan age of a trillion-
dollar gross national product we have
.no right to stumble about like a help-
less giant. I do not believe it is
America's destiny to collapse in a
heap, to drop by the wayside when the
nearly visible next sta.fe of the journey
could be so much more hopeful for us
and for all mankind.
.
This is the /ast of three article.s by
W. W. Rostow, adviser to President
Johnson.
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21 SEP 1071
By W. W. ROSTOV/
AUSTIN, Tex.---A great question
evidently still exists in Moscow which
we should understand and discuss
candidly:
Should the Soviet Union complete
the SALT negotiations and bring the
.strategic arms race in offensive as
well as defensive missiles to a formal
close on the ?basis of parity, somehow
acceptably defined to both parties?
Or should it go forward on the basis
of current momentum and. try to
achieve strategic superiority over the .
United States in some meaningful
sense?
There are, technically, two ways in
'Nvhich the Soviet Union might achieve
superiority. First, a sufficiently masa
sive build-up of strategic forces, cf-:
fensive and defensive, so that: a Soviet
first strike might be undertaken
against -the United States .so powerful
that we could only inflict in a second
strike a level of destruction which
the Soviet leaders judged acceptable;
that is, the United States would be
destroyed as a viable power, whereas
a viable Soviet State would survive.
Such. an insane enterprise is most un-
likely; but it is conceivable.'
The second sense in which Soviet
superiority might be achieved waild
be 'what might be called a reverse
Cuba missile crisis; that is, against
the background of a substantial Soviet
strategic advantage over the United
States, Moscow might try to force
Washington to back .down in a major
confrontation in a particular area; for
example, the Middle East.
The likelihood of such a dangerous
adventure is increased somewhat by
belief- that our statistical strategic ad.-
vantage played a large role in Presi-
dent Kennedy's stand at Berlin and in
.the Caribbean in 1961-62. I do not be-
lieve it did. It gave President Kennedy
small comfort, if any, to ?know that
more of America than Russia would
survive a nuclear exchange. He ac-
cepted some risk of nuclear conflict
because there Was a good chance that
MoscoW would not risk nuclear war
to expand its. power if it found the
United States redoubtable in defense
of a vital interest. Nevertheless, some
Soviet leaders May believe?and
some Americans do believe?that the
numbers mattered greatly in 1961-62.
But the critical question, in, my
view, is not merely the estimate in
Moscow of the strategic numbers, but
?
the image or American will: I know
what it took to bring about the
Test Ban Treaty, the Nonproliferation
Treaty, and the beginning of the SALT
talks. They happened because we com-
bined strength with a candid recog-
nition of legitimate Russian security
interests. ?
I believe the greatest danger to the
SALT talks lies in our projecting to
Moscow the image of a nation en-
gaged in unilateral disarmament,, or
a nation so confused about its role
and purposes that a reverse Cuba mis-
sile crisis might be-worth the try. .
Much the same kind of balance be-
tween hope and danger exists in the
Middle East.
After many years of frustration the
balance of feeling in the Arab world
has begun to shift marginally toward
moderation: the fcdoyeen made their
bid last year but were defeated in
Jordan; a new, more temperate Gov-
ernment emerged In Damascus; and
President Sadat of Egypt has talked
to his people about the primacy of
education and other tasks. And he is
apparently trying to assure that Egypt
can be truly independent, rather than
the pawn in the imperial game of a
great power. ?
But all these events, as we know,
were framed by a Massive expansion
in the Soviet navy and a kind of latter-
day Mahanist effort to expand Soviet
influence in the Mediterranean, East
Africa, and the Indian Ocean area as.
far to the East as Singapore.
There must be great temptation. in ,
Cairo and Moscow to try again, to
succeed against Israel in the 1970's
after the failures of the 1940's, 1950'a
and 1960's. The balance is close be-
tween another bloody crusade, on the
one hand, and, on the other, an ac-
ceptance of Israel and a turning to the
modernization of Arab societies.
And we are the critical margin. If
American military strength in the
Mediterranean (and capable of projec-
ti...)n into the Mediterranean) weakens
if American political life projects an
'image of hasty, irresponsibb with-
drawal from responsibility iii Europe
and Asia?the balance "could tip, in
.Moscow and Cairo,- away from pur-
suit of a firm Middle East settlement
toward another desperate try to re-
verse the course or history.
The policy and posture of America
bear also on policy in Jerusalem. Any
likely Middle East settlement will in-
volve much more explicit American
guarantees and a larger American role
in the Middle East ? than the fragile
settlement of 1957. Israel must clearly
withdraw, in such a settlement, from
the bulk of the territory it now ?eerie.
pies. Its willingness- and ability to do
so depends greatly on. the credibility!
of American strength and will. It is
not surprising, therefore, that Israelis
follow with great attention the Ameri-
can performance in Asia and Europe
?and the temper of our political life--
aa they study the peace proposals laid
before them by the American Gov-
ernment.
There are, then, three great possi-
bilities before ns, none certain, all
endangered by the isolationist slide in
American political life: a settlement
in Asia; a SALT agreement: and a
settlement in the Middle East,.
This is the second of three articles by,
W. W. Rostow, - adviser to President
Johnson. ?
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FOR
PROGRAM
DATE.
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. NAV., WASHINGTON, O. C. 20016, 244-3540
PUBLIC AFFAIRS- STAFF
Today Show
September 21, 1971 7:00 AM
STATION WRC TV
NBC Network
CITY
AN INTERVIEW WITH PHILIP J. KLASS
Washington, D.C.
HUGH DOWNS: In May of 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, then
head of Russia, was discussing United States photo-reconnaissance
flights over Cuba with former Senator William Benton. Khrushchev
offered to trade scret pictures with the United States, saying,
"I can show you photos of your military bases taken from outersp-
ace. I'll show them to President Johnson, if he wishes.? And
then he added, "Why don't we exchange such photos?"
The Soviet leader's remarks about aerial observation
by the Soviet Union and the United States is reported now in.
a book called "Secret Sentries In Space," which is the first
detailed report on the extent and sophistication of such spies
in the skies as they are called.
It author is Philip J. Klass who's Senior Aviatics
Editor for Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine. We
want to Welcome Mr. Klass to "Today".
\ PHILIP J. KLASS,: Thank you.
DOWNS: I've mentioned that Cuban overflights there,
because this was one of the two incidents that you suggested
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aerial observation may have prevented a war in these cases.
KLASS: Yes.
DOWNS: Could you tell us a little bit about the two?
KLASS: May I begin a year earlier -- actually just
ten years ago this month? There was a very severe war crisis
over Berlin, because Khrushchev had issued an ultimatum that
he would sign a peace treaty with the East Germans by the end
of 1961. At that point in June of '61, when we met with President
Kennedy in Vienna, or prior to that time -- there had been the
feeling in the highest councils of government that there was
a severe missile gap, that the Russians might have up to 400
ICBM's, which would be capable of striking and devastating the
US.
Fortunately, on January 31st of 1961, just after PreSi-
dent Kennedy had taken office, we launched the first of our
"search and find" reconnaissance satellites. This is a satellite
that's designed to make a complete survey of the Soviet Union,
taking photographs from an altitude of about 100 miles and trans-
mitting those pictures down by radio so that we can quickly
recover them and analyze them.
And so, by the summer of 1961, as the Berlin crisis
grew hotter and as Khrushchev thought that he could threaten
the US, President Kennedy began to get intelligence from these
satellite photos that the Russians instead of having several
hundred ICBM's, actually had -- well, at that; time in the summer
of '61, we thought they had maybe as many as 50. And by September,
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just ten years ago, by September of '61, President Kennedy knew
that the Russians only had 14 ballistic missiles -- 14 ballistic
missles, and so he was able to stand firm.
And in fact, I believe that in early October, President
Kennedy in a meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet
Union Gromyko -- that he actually showed Gromyko photographs
taken by our satellites and said, "We not only know how few
missiles you have, but we know whore they are located in case
war breaks out and we have to destroy them."
And so, I believe that just ten years ago, theses satel-
litesplayed a very influential role.
DOWNS: I ,wonder why Khrushchev was anxious or willing
to trade such photos?
KLASS: Well, this happened several years later, and
as we know, Khru.shchev was a very curious and interesting man.
He had a great sense of humor.
And by 1963, the Soviets themselves had developed the
same sort of capability as the US had. And for example, in
the first, oh, starting about 1961, the Russians opposed what
they called the American spies in the sky. But by 1963 they
had begun to develop -- they had launched their satellites --
reconnaissance satellites. They'd recover the whole satellite
to get the film.
DOWNS: Oh, now in your opinion, is their system of
doing the same thing, watching things by surveillance, by satel-
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lite as sophisticated as ours?
KLASS: I don't believe that it is. It's hard to
know, but the US was more advanced in terms of high altitude
reconnaissance for aircraft., so we had a head start on them.
I don't mean to suggest the Russians are not as smart as we
are.
DOWNS: Is this phot.ographically or in the aerospace...
KLASS: Well, I would say photographically that we
are probably ahead of them. So they rely primarily on satellites
that stay up for eight to twelve days and take photographs;
and then they return the whole satellite. We have two types.
We have the radio type -- which I called the search and find --
which takes pictures, transmits them down by radio. They are
not high resolution, they are sufficiently good, we can sort
out the...
DOWNS: By the number of lines in it...
KLASS: We can see objects, perhaps a foot or two
feet or three feet. We can resolve that small. And then when
we find something that arouses our curiousity, we send up another
type of satellite.
DOWNS: What -- to get more detail on it?
. KLASS: To get with a longer focal-length lens that
takes photographs and actually returns the 'film via capsule.
And in fact -- may I use this model here?
DOWNS: Sure.
KLASS: This is a model of the Agana spacecraft, built
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by Lockheed, which is used for both types of satellite functions
that is, the radio transmission and the recoverable type.
DOWNS: What the size of that, approximately?
KLASS: Well, this is roughly 30 to 40 feel long.
DOWNS: I see.
KLASS: Now, a new generation was just launched on
June 15th, which is called "Big Bird" -- is actually 50 feet
long. But in the recoverable version, this capsule, after it
has taken -- used up its film, photographed all of the curious
sights that have been discovered earlier, this capsule is in
effect kicked out of orbit and comes down with its own parachute,
which I don't have here in the model -- parachutes down and
is recovered near Hawaii by aircraft as they -- as it's parachut-
ing down, the aircraft fly by and snag the capsule and haul .
it in. Or if they fail to do that and it falls in the ocean,
then it has some flashing lights and radio beacons and then
they drop frognet. But the record is very good. They're now
catching and have for some years caught most of them.
DOWNS: Right. Arc these solar energy cells or something
like that?
KLASS: indeed, you are correct. That's exactly
the spacecraft carries its own batteries, but these are used
to recharge it. And this is one of the things that limits the
life -- the consumable; that is, how much film it can carry
and how much electric power.
DOWNS: All .right. Now, it is your belief, and ,of
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course, the thesis of your book, that the great powers being
able to do this surveillance, that it reduces the kind of suspicion
that you think might trigger a big war?
KLASS: Indeed. I think that these are the most stabi-
lizing -- one of the most hopeful developments on the horizon.
I think that they have indeed stahilized relations between the
US and the Soviet Union because it enables each to know what
the other is doing in strategic weapons.
DOWNS: Now, obviously, this technique can't photograph
the surface of the earth in great detail over...
KLASS: Yes.
DOWNS: ...'any country. Wouldn't that stimulate the
development of techniques for hiding things? I am thinking
now of the underground silos and things of that sort. Will
its usefulness be limited eventually, or is it impossible to
mount a large missile campaign that won't show from the surface?
KLASS: Well, the fact of the matter is, Hugh, that
to dig -- while a missile solo could be camouflaged, as you
suggest, once it was dug, still the digging and construction
of it is something that takes many weeks and months, and so
what you first detect is roads being built in the wilderness
of Siberia, let's say.
DOWNS: Oh,.yes.
KLASS: And then construction crews and...
DOWNS: So the work going on would be...
KLASS: So the work going on gives it away. It's
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7
really much more difficult, though, to discover submarines.
Again, we can see them as they are being built, as they are
being launched. Where they are after they take off with their
load of missiles and they are submerged that we cannot detect
at the present time.
DOWNS: Yes, yes. Yes. What do you see as the future
of it, now with China gaining in the sophistication of these
techniques? And in effect, three powers of major size, all
with surveillance of each other. Do you think that large-scale
war. can be staved off?
KLASS: Indeed I do, and although.-- China, as you
know, has launched two small satellites, neither one of them
large enough to do the reconnaissance job. But in my book,
I predict that by 1c.;75, and certainly, by the end of the decade,
that China will have the same sort of reconnaissance capability.
DOWNS: It's a fascinating idea. "Secret Sentries
In Space." That's the name of this by Philip Klass. The story
of satellites that have been and that are being deployed and
that will be in the future, and it details it very well.
Thank you so much, Mr. Klass.
KLASS: Thank you, Hugh.
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21 SEP 1971
A 17?
;?1
t
'r5f Ti
I) '7 '72.1
-
;--ie Personally V./..v,ict.111;-Ans of Missions
and ,S,,inctioncd
? NEW YORK (UP1)----
President. Dwight D.
Eisenhower personally re--
viewed the flight: plan of
all U-2 spy missions over
the _Soviet Union and it'.
was he who decided .the
ill-fated flight of Frailcis
Gary Powers was "worth
the risk," Daniel Ellsberg
said Monday.
Ellsberg, the former De-
fense Department analyst
who leaked the Pentagon
papers ? on the 'Vietnam
war to the press, said in an
interview in Look maga-
zine that he learned of
Con. Eisenhower's person-
al involvement in the U-2
flights when preparing an
early study of the deci-
sion- making process in
crises.
The shooting down of
Powers' U - 2 reconnais-
sance 'plane by the Rus-
slang in :19C0 shortly be.
fore a planned. summit
conference between Gen.
Eisenhower and then So-.
?viet Premier Nikita 5,
Khrushchev strained U.S.--
Soviet relations and
prompted Mr. IThrushchev
to cancel. the conference,
"M o s t Americans qs-
sinned that Eisenhower
had not known of tho
fliE.,,ht, certainly in detail,"
-Ellsberg said.
Ent, Ellsberg said, in the
course of his study ha
learned differently from
"the man who was in
charge of the U-2 program
from beginning to end,
who had left the CIA at
that point."
"lie said that Pres:ident
Eisenhower went over the
flight plan Of every U-2
flight over Russia in the
greatest detail, which
usually occupied no less
than four or five hours. '
"He said the questions
that 'President. Eisenhow-
er asked forced him to jus-
tify every reconnaissanee
objective assigned to the
flight and to weigh it
T-Q.Thill;f: the precise ma N.
ginal risks on each leg of
the flight.
"In fact, he said that on
the specific flight where
Powers was shot down,
they were well aware that
there were SAMs (surface-
to-air missiles) in that
area that were becoming
operational.
"-There was already a
risk, and. they had to ba?
lance that leg of the flight
against, the desirability of
covering those objectives,"
Nllsberg said. 'President
Eisenhower made. the de-
cision that it was worth
the risk."
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20 SEP 1971
Toward a:Stable Peace: I
By W. W. ROSTOW ?
AUSTIN, Tex. ? The only victory
worth seeking is a stable peace root-
ed in the principles of the United Na-
tions Charter. In the name of peace,
the questions posed in the current
debate on foreign policy are: How
fast and how much should the United
States pull back from responsibility
in the world? How many troops can
we pull out of Asia or Europe? How
far can we cut the military budget,
or the foreign aid budget?
I believe we are debating the
wrong questions. The right question
is: What must America do to play its
part in moving from where we are to
reasonably stable peace?
I believe this is the right question,
because underlying forces offer more
chance than at any time since 1945
? and, perhaps, since 1914 ? for
the attainment of reasonably stable
peace. ,But the movement is not cer-
tain. There are also powerful forces
at work making for disruption and
violence, of which the most danger-
ous are those pushing the United
'States toward excessive withdrawal
. from responsibility.
What, then, are the bases for hope?
First, there is the diffusion of
pewer away from Moscow and Wash-
ington.
This diffusion has continued over
the 'past generation, gathering mo-
.mentum, in particular, after the Cuba
missile .crisis.
That crisis persuaded men in many.
Parts of the world that the Soviet
Union was not as dangerous as it
had been over the previous fifteen
years and, therefore, they could act
with greater independence of Wash-
ington, as well as of Moscow. The
missile crisis also brought Moscow's
split with Peking into eie open and
intensified it.
American policy did not oppose.the
diffusion of power. We Vied to help
organize it in constructive ways. Since
the Marshall Plan, we threw our po-
litical influence, as well as our eco-
nomic resources, behind the desire of
nations to fashion their own destinies.
And, we have moVed in recent years
-- under President Johnson's leader-
ship and now President Nixon's
to the active support of .regionalism
In Latin America, Africl., .Asia, and
Western Europe.
For Moscow the diffusion of power
has meant that the Communist vision
of a world led by the Soviet Union
has receded. Along its Chinese frontier
and in Eastern Europe grandiose hopes
have changed to anxieties. In the de,
veloping continent5, naVorls_inEkgsn
ingly march to thefARIPAiet1,SMe
policy has moved in the direction of
a conventional concern for Russian
American policy did not oppose the
diffusion of power. We tried to help
organize it in constructive ways. Since
the Marshall Plan, we threw our
political influence, as well as our
economic resources, behind the desire
of nations to fashion their own destinies.
security. That is what the -nonpro-
liferation treaty Is about. But other
events raise warning flags: the Middle
East'since 1967 and the Soviet failure
to honor its commitment to the Laos
accords of 1962 should remind us that
this doctrine has not been accepted
fully.
A second major force which could
lead us in the direction of stable peace
is the decline of the aggressive revo-
lutionary romantics. In Asia this ros-
ter included Mao, Ho; Kim, Sukarno;
in the Middle East, Nasser; in Africa,
Nkrilmah and Ben Bella; in Latin
America, Castro.
Some of these are gone and the fate
of others ? and their policies ? is
still to be determined. In general, how-
ever, they encountered three forces
which have tended to frustrate them.
First, they encountered that nemesis
of all expansionists: other people's
nationalism. ?
Second, they encountered the resist-
ance of those 'who have not wished to
see the regional balances of power
upset.
Third, their relative neglect of do-
mestic welfare gradually reduced po-
litical support at home for policies of
expansion. ,
The most dramatic example is the
trend of events and p6licy in Peking.
We have ,observed a truly extraor-
dinary passage of history since Mao,
a few weeks after the first Sputnik
was launched in the autumn of 1957,
proclaimed in Moscow that the East
Wind was prevailing over the West
and that the Communist party of the
Soviet Union should lead the Com-
munist world in a great offensive.
Since.that moment of euphoria, we
have seen the failure of the Great
Leap Forward; the emergence of the
Sino-Soviet split and the build-up on
both sides' of the Russian-Chinese
border; the failure of the Peking-
Jakarta movement against Southeast
Asia of 1965, and the failure of the
Cultural Revolution.
e I Pr#keeM ittPlaccq&
tide began to turn in Peking
more rational domestic and
?
?
policies. Behind Ping-Pong diplomacy
and the Nixon visit lay several years
of slow economic recovery, the grad-
ual political triumph of the Chinese
military and technocrats, and the quiet
resumption of normal diplomacy with
other nations in the non-Communist
world.
As Peking now looks at the world
around it, including the Soviet divi-
sions on its frontiers and the economic
momentum of Japan and much of
non-Communist Asia, it is inclined to
regard the United States less RS a
mortal enemy than a force capable
of ?maintaining a livable balance in
its region, as it turns to its long-
neglected tasks of economic and social
development.
Taken all together, then, it is not
beyond the range of possibility that
we might see in the years ahead:
o A Soviet Union which has ac-
cepted its role as a great nation state
among many and is prepared, while
advancing its interests, to work to-
ward stabilizing a world environment
as potentially dangerous to Russians
as to others.
O A transition to moderation in
Pyongyang, Hanoi, Cairo, and Havana
equivalent to that which has already
occurred in Jakarta, Algiers, and
Accra.
O The emergence of a Peking on
the Asian and world scenes prepared
to concentrate China's energies on
modernization, while leaving its
neighbors alone.
Under those circumstances, the
world community would still be a
lively place, for the forces at work on
the planet are inherently volatile; but
it might begin to approximate the rel-
ative order and balance envisaged
when the United Nations Charter was
drafted.
' This is the hopeful possibility which
the performance of American society
will either help bring to pass or des-
troy in the time ahead.
E00.4'?p V
OiNfietf(11jlia6 articles by
#
t . . ostow, ute House adviser
toward to President Johnson, and author of
foreign "Politics and Stages of Growth."
INTERNATIOITAL AFFAIRS
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. VLADIMIROV
Imperialist? Intelligence
and Propaganda
IN OUR DAYS, the role of ? propaganda and in-
telligence as major foreign policy instruments
of the imperialist states is growing all the time.
13. Murty, an American professor, emphasises
that the functions of camouflaged ideological
coercion and subversion of world law and order
are being carried out by means of propaganda.'
In effect, Murty recognises the close connection
between propaganda and intelligence.
The intelligence agencies do not, of course,
conduct their propaganda activity openly, but
they possess the necessary means to promote
ideological subversion abroad and render it
more effective. A network of secret agents and
paid informers, bribed newspaper and 'magazine
publishers, corrupt politicians and adventurers,
to whom the intelligence ,service assigns the role
of "charity workers" and "educationalists"?
all this makes it possible for the intelligence
service to exercise anonymous control in spread-
ing propaganda and disinformation.
Richard Helms, the head of the CIA, stated
in a memorandum to the government, that the
psychological warfare must be placed fully under
the control of the US intelligence service. Psy-
chological warfare, he 'stressed, is a sphere of
government activity which must be dealt with
only by professionals acting in secret. An. Ame-
rican professor, Ransom, who for a long time
took part in the military research programme of
? Harvard University, holds that the role of the
CIA in undertaking politica.' and psychological
subversive acts has increased so much that it
has become a major. instrument of political war,
and has far exceeded the functions determined
by the law,on the establishment of the ,CI.A.2
Some bourgeois scholars call this process
"politicising" the intelligence service. "The
? ? 3 See 13. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order.
.The Legal Regulation of Me Ideological Instrument of
Coercion, New 1-laven?London, 1968, p. 11.
2 See 14.? Ranporn, The Intelligence E?tablishment,
Cambridge (Mas.), .1970, pp. 94, 239.
agent influencing political affairs abroad is be-
coming a central figure," wrote Bergh, a West
German expert on intelligence.3
In this way, a kind Of an organisationally
independent sphere of so-called unofficial
propaganda is forming. In the. opinion of West-
ern specialists and politicians, this type of pro-
paganda has a number of advantages over the
official one. A report "The American Image
Abroad", submitted to the American Senate in
1968 by the Republican Coordinating Com-
mittee, stresses that the material being spread by
non-governmental agencies is accepted in
foreign countries with greater trust than that put
out by the government. In view of this, the com-
mittee recommended the government to en-
courage by every possible means the American
organisations issuing information and pro-
paganda material for foreign countries.
A vivid example of the kind of unofficial pro-
paganda directed against the 'USSR and other
socialist countries is the activity of Radio Free
Europe, officially an independent organisation,
but virtually controlled by the US authorities.
Speaking in the US Senate in January 1971,
Senator C. Case said that 1,642 employees .of
Free Europe and about 1,500 professional work-
ers of the Liberty radio station were maintain-
ed by the CIA. These subversive centres make
use of 49 transmitters bought with CIA money..
The American intelligence service expends an-
nually over $30 million on these radio saboteurs.
Hundreds of millions of dollars have travelled
from the .US state treasury to the accounts of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for over
20 years. As for the assertions that. they are
financed from "private .donations", it transpires
that these donations do not even cover advertis-
ing expenses on. appeals to the American public
for money. . .
The US intelligence agencies secretly subsi-
3 H. gergh, ABC der .Spione, Pfaffenhofen, 1965, p. 83.
cont I rue
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disc many newspapers, magazines and publish-
ers at home and in other capitalist countries.
The American press has reported that the CIA
finances the Frederick Praeger publishing eon-
cern, the. Newsgaper Guild, an association re-
presenting the American newspaper owners, the
Houston Post, Soviet Survey ? and also other
publishing groups arid publications.
To carry out acts of sabotage and. ideologi-
cal subversion, the US intelligence agencies are
trying to enlist the services of citizens from
other countries. The above-mentioned report to
the Senate recommends using them on a wider
scale in foreign policy propaganda in favour of
the USA .
The same? methods are also? applied by Is-
rael, Which widely employs, the services of Zio-
'nist organisations in many. countries for Ko-
pagandist undertakings: We can cite, as an ex-.
ample, the so-called centre on documentation in
Austria. The centre was officially registered as
an organisation for the collection and dissemi-
nation of information about Nazi crimes against
the Jews. But, in actual fact, as an instrument
in the hands of the Israeli and other imperialist
intelligence services, it has conducted propagan-
da against the USSR. and other socialist cowl-
-tries. It organised a provocative broadcast over
the West German TV netiVork; in which defec-
tors from Poland took part.
It is clear from the American press that the
CIA uses various charitable and scientific-funds
to secretly finance many national .and foreign
organisations and. to direct subversive activity
abroad, ? including anti-communist propaganda.
There were about 40 such 'mediatory funds in
1967 and 1968, including the Ford Foundation,
.which has enormous financial resources and
widespread international contacts. Moreover,
the CIA also sets up fictitious funds, some of
them having a semijegal status. When Amer-
,correspondents wanted to know for what
purpose these funds are used, it emerged that
some of them were never actually where they
were supposed .to be according te the official
documents. These fictitious funds were receiv-
ing money from the CIA and transferring it to
the accounts ofOther funds, which in their own.
name were -supplying certain organisations with
money Linder the guise of assistance. These ope.
:rations were frequently described by them as
subsidising charitable work.
The.American .intelligencp service finances a
number, of .cultural, youth and other public or-
ganisations of various political orientation, most
of which advertise themselves as politically
-rieutral. Their international contacts are useful
to the intelligence agencies for carrying out dis-
guised disruptive activities in international and
foreign progressive organiSations. The National
Student Association, with affiliations in 300
American universities, can be cited as one of
them. According to its president, Eugene Groves,
over 90 per cent of this organisation's bud-
get was supported by the CIA between 1952 and
February 1967. Groves stated that the CIA sent
its agents to educational establishments of the
socialist countries through this organisation.
Under the guise of probationers, they went to
youth forums and festivals where they carried
on anti-communist propaganda and committed
other subversive acts. On realising that the NSA
had been used as a screen for CIA activity for
13 years, the overwhelming majority of its mem-
ber condemned the NSA leadership and de-
manded an immediate break with the CIA.
? The CIA also .finances a number of trade-
union organisation S which are assigned to car-
ry On disruptive activity in the international
working-class movement.- The closest contacts
with the CIA are maintained by the leadership
of the AFL-CIO. Denouncing these contacts, an
American trade-union leader, V. Reuther, said
that Meany, Lovestone and certain other frade-
union bosses had been allowing the CIA to use
tbis organisation as a screen for its under-
ground operations. In his bOok CIA and American
Labor, published in New York in 1967, G. Mor-
ris shows that annual allocations to the Amer-
ican trade unions reach $100 million.4 A con-
siderable part of them goes to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions whose main
task is to exercise political influence in other
countries and 'carry on subversive activity
against the World Federation of Trade Unions.
The intelligence agencies supply funds to
some scientific establishments and information
centres dealing with the selection, preparation
and dissemination of propaganda materials.
They include above all the universities and col-
leges which study the USSR and other socialist
countries in Europe. For example, a number of
professional employees of the Russian Institute
at Columbia University in the USA are working
hand in hand with 'the CIA. The Institute on
Studying the USSR, set up in Munich in 1950
with the help of the CIA, is actively cooperating
with the intelligence service in working out pro-
paganda hostile to the USSR and European so-
cialist countries.
4 See George Morris, CIA and American Labor. The
Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy. New York,
1967, p. 158. '
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"Sovietologistr and "Kremlinologists" are
supplied by the intelligence service with espion-
age material and other special information for
, books and propaganda articles. Thus, in pre-
paring one such work, 20 employees of the Rus-
sian Research Centre. at Harvard University
went to Munich, where they spent a year in-
terviewing former Soviet citizens and trying to
wrest from them information of the .required
political character.
The exposure of certain Of the CIA's back-.
'stag O financial operations caused such a violent
reaction in the USA, that President Johnson had
to appoint in 1967, a special commission, headed
by N. Katzenbach, Under-Secretary of State, to
investigate the CIA's .ties with American public
organisations. Director of the CIA, R. Helms,
was also included in its membership. The com-
mission was forced to admit the existence of a
system involving American public organisations
in subversive ? activity on an unprecedented
scale. It confirmed that this system was built up
on US government instructions.
A great role in the activity of the imperialist
intelligence agencies is assigned to the ideolog-
ical infiltration of the socialist countries, the aim
being, as Western bourgeois specialists assert,
the gradual and imperceptible ousting of social-
ist ideology by the imposition and inculcation of
bourgeois views. In order to 'achieve this, the
Propaganda and intelligence services are trying,
:in addition to widespread radio broadcasts on
the socialist countries, to derive benefit from
personal contacts between foreigners and
citizens of the socialist countrieS. These tactics
were used by them during the events in Czecho-
slovakia in 1968. In particular, -special groups
for conducting propaganda during their trips .
across Czechoslovakia were formed out of stud-
ents from Heidelburg, Stuttgart and other uni-
versities. As admitted by the West German Wir-
schaftsmagazin,lourist groups visiting the so-
cialist countries include persons who have been
specially trained to carry out -subversive anti-
communist activities:
? For the purposes of propaganda and .ideol-
ogical subversion', the intelligence service
scrapes together and subsidises its own subver-
sive groups from those hostile to socialism.
These groups include such iemigre organisations
the People's Labour Union, and organisations
of Ukrainian, Baltic and other nationalists. In-
ternational anti-conmunist subversive centres
such as, the Assembly of the Ca'ptive Nations and
others are maintained by the CIA.
In 1968, the American, British and West Ger.
man intelligence services -sent their .agents to
Czechoslovakia,-including those who had been
earlier exposed in espionage activity. Radio Free
Europe alsb established direct contacts with
counter-revolutionary and revisionist elements
operating at that time in the mass media.
? The employment of revisionist and anti--So-
viet conceptions in order- to undermine the so-
cialist countries and the international commun-
ist and,working-class.thovements has become a
? major elernent in, the contemporary political
strategy of imperialism:?'The .bourgeois press
willingly -propagandises works by modern revi-
sionists. Moreover, Western ideological centres
put into circulation. a reat deal of their own
'stylised" products, -Which in form and ,content
are close to those of the Right and "Left" oppor-
tunists. '?
In this context, the recommendations given
as early as 1058. by.W. Daugherty and M. Ja-
nowitz, US experts on q0.,:stions of "psychologi-
cal warfare" are of interest. They believe that
"the propagandist must feel himself into the
mind of enemy our 'propaganda to Russia
should be done on the supposition that we are
talking to conimunists."6
Exposing the disruptive activity of foreign
centres engaged in ideological subversion and
espionage, Pravda, the organ of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia,
wrote in January 1970: "The commentators of
Radio Free Europe have replaced their anti-so-
cialist vocabulary with a terminology hitherto
employed only in communist propaganda. The
fact that they have begun to speak allegedly
from the positions of the communist parties and.
of patriotically-minded citizens cannot conceal
the real essence of their schemes?to do away
with the socialist system in this or that country
of Eastern Europe."
Intensive ideological penetration is also
being carried out by.imperialists in the develop-
ing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
A USIA employee in India, A. Goodfriend, wrote
that Americans do their best in the developing
countries to rear social strata, the representat-
ives of which would be indigenous "in blood and
colour, but American in taste, in opinion, in mo-
rals and intellect".6
Imperialist propagandists are trying to in-
fluence the army officer corps, state employees,
and the intelligentsia of the developing coun-
tries, since these strata -play an active part in
the political and ideological life of their coun-
.
5 See W. Daugherty, M. Janowitz, A Psychological
Warfare Casebook, Baltimore, 1958, p. 41. .
6 A. Gooclfriend, The Twisted Image, New York, 1963,
p. 94.
cont'i'nued
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tries. Such, in particular, is the. background of
the US programme of leaders. and programme
of specialists, envisaging a systematic impact on
political and public figures, the intelligentsia,'
and students in the developing countries.
The intelligence services do not confine them--
selves to "unofficial" propaganda. They directly
influence state propaganda agencies by supply-
ing them with provocative and .disinformational.
material for dissemination and publication. -
The elaboration of the concepts and prin-
ciples of foreign policy propaganda, the prepa-
ration of propaganda material; and the evalua-
tion of its effectiveness are also carried .out with
the help of the political intelligence service.
. In his book The Strategy of Persuasion, Ar-
thur Meyerhoff, an American specialist, writes
that in order to ,start a propaganda campaign,
one should possess a vast .quantity of informa-
tion, including that collected by the intelligence
service. He recommends thorough study of the
psychological and ideological requirements and
,inclinations of the population, and also of the
factors obstructing the West in its propaganda
?activities.7
Under .the pretext of carrying out sociologi-
cal research the American intelligence service
collects copious data on the political situation
in the Latin American, African and Asian coun-
tries. The materials obtained by the intelligence
agencies .are used to plan and wage a "psycho-
logical warfare" On these countries.' These were
the aims pursued by Project Camelot, which was
carried out by US intelligence service in the
?1960s for "studying the revolutionary potential"
in Chile. Similar operations (Simpatico and
Job-430) were ,also carried out in other Latin
American countries. The American intelligence
service planned to carry out mass polls among
different strata of the population in the Latin
American countries to estimate the strength of
anti-imperialist sentiments there. Acting on the ?
instructions of the intelligence service, sociolo-
gists, politicologists and other specialists who
had come from the USA to Latin American coun-
tries under the guise of rendering "aid", were
to distribute questionnaires ,and assess public
opinion.
In the Socialist countries, the intelligence and
propaganda services are trying to make 'secret
?
7 Sec A. MeyerholT, The SO-elegy of Persuasion, New
York, 1965, 'pp. 149-152. '
?8'Sce Congressional Record, Aug. 25, 1965, pp. 20921-
20927.
contacts with hostile elements ready, for a mis-
erable fee, to supply them with "raw material"
for ideological subversion. These people pick up
various kinds Of rumours and juggle with facts.
Sometimes they are themselves the authors of
malicious and slanderous lampoons on the so-
cialist 'system, and these are secretly forwarded
to the West and 'published in the bourgeois
press. ?
Very frequently the intelligence agencies of
the imperialist states applythe formula: "If the
facts .and events necessary for anti-coMmunist
propaganda .do not exist, they should be orga-
nised. For this 'purpose, fictitious tourists are
sent to the -socialist countries with an assign-
ment' to 'scatter instigating leaflets and shout
provocative slogans?with the aim of attracting
the attention of people :Irby and causing as
much of a -disturbance as possible. As a rule,
bourgeois newspaper, radio and ,TV correspon-
dents "happen" to be on the scene of the provo-
cation, taking notes, photographing and filming
-so that an' act of hooliganism can be presented
as a "move in defence of freedom and democra-
cy".
Sometimes, a private talk with a writer or a
public figure from a socialist country is set forth
as an "evidence" from communist countries.
Questions are put in such a way as to prompt
the 'interlocutor to utter views which suit the im-
perialists, and then, after being "slightly edited"
the talk is used for subversive propaganda pur-
poses. For instance, F. Hardy, an Australian
writer who visited the USSR in .1968, was en-
gaged in this kind of activity. The sequel to
his talks with some writers was the publication
of anti-Soviet articles in the Sunday Times
and other .newspapers.
Subversive propaganda, carried on with the
.active participation and often under the control
of the intelligence agencies, is in the service of
imperialism's aggressive foreign policy. The
merging of foreign policy propaganda with the
intelligence service and the spread of subversive
ideological activity by the imperialist states,
carried out with the application' of the means
...and methods of secret warfare, are instrumental
in aggravating-international tension.
However, the very fact that, in its propagan-
da campaign .against socialism and the national
liberation movement, imperialism is forced ever
more frequently to resort to the services of in-
telligence and its secret agents, is eloquent tes-
timony tb the weakening of its ideological posi-
tions.
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On the
Issues
CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, .SPL'iNDI.NG
Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given
authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative
oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un-
informed Congress and an uninformative CIA.
In the -last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at
making the CIA more accountable to the legislative
branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been
reported from committee. None has been adopted.
The push is on again. Some members of Congress
are insisting they should know more about the CIA and
about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military
operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this
year's impetus.
Sen. -Stuart Symington (I) Mo.), a member of the
Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee
and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee
dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the
Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the
CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his
briefing on ,a staff report. (Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660,
1268)
Ile told the Senate in that closeil session: "In all my
committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on
in Laos. We 'do not know the cost of the bombing. We do
not know about the people we maintain there. It is a
secret war."
As a member oftwo key subcommittees dealing with
the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to
more classified information about the agency than most
other members of Congress. But Symington told the Sen-
ate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to
Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing. -
If Symington does not know what the CIA has been
doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress
exercise over the super-secret organization? (Secrecy
fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785)
A Congressional Quarterly examination of the over-
sight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study
of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and
interviews with key staff members and members of Con-
gress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge
about. CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands
of four powerful committee chairmen and several key
memb.ers of their committees--Senate and House Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees.
The extent to which these men exerciso their power
in ferreting out the' details of what the CIA does with its
secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative
oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted
into existence 24 years ago.
The CIA Answers to...
As established by the National Security Act of 1917
(PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was ac-
countable to the President and the National Security
Council. In the original Act there was no language which
excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also
no provision which required such examination.
To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent
of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intel-
ligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all
federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names,
official titles, salaries or numbers o.f personnel" employed
by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to
spend money "without regard to the provisions of law
and regulations relating to the expenditure of govern-
ment funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organi-
zation in 1949, its budgeted funds .have been submerged
into the general accounts of other government agencies,
hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a se-
lect group of ranking members of Congress. (Congress
and the Nation Vol. I, p. 306, 249)
THE SENATE
In the Senate, the system by which committees
check on CIA activities and budget requests is straight-
forward. Nine men?on two committees?hold positions
of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular
annual legislative oversight function. Other committees
are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and
not on a regular basis.
Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel
for the Senate Appropriations Committee' and the only
staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that
, when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee,
more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.
"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the
Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff
told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director
Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his
estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence
operations.
Woodruff explained that although the oversight
subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA bud- ?
get, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency
would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not
Appropriations.
No tranScripts are kept when the CIA representative
(usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Wood-
ruff said the material. covered in the hearings was so
highly classified that any transcripts would have to be
kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does
take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are
held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he
said, "and they're on my desk in an hour.'
Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not
legally -require any review by Congress," said T. Edward
Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelli-
gence Operations Subcommittee.
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CIA Oversight Subcommittees
Four subcommittees have the official function of
monitoring Central intelligence Agency programs
and. passing judgment on the agency's budget before
the figures are submerged in the general budget.
Senate. Armed Services Committee, Central
intelligence Subcommittee (reviews CIA programs,
not the budget)?John C. Stennis (I) Miss.), *Stuart
Symington (D Mo.), Henry M. Jackson (I) Wash.),
Peter H. -Dominick (R Colo.) and Barry Goldwater
(R Ariz.); ?
Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Opera-
tions Subcommittee comprised of the five ranking
members on the Defense Subcommittee---Allen J.
Ellender (D Lai,* John L. McClellan (D Ark.), Sten-
nis, Milton R. Young (R N.D.), Margaret Chase
Smith (R Maine);
Foreign Relations Committee in 1.967 was invited'
by Stennis and Mender to send three members :to
any joint briefings of the Appropriations and Armed
Services oversight subcommittees. The three mem-
bers were J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.), George D. Aiken
(R Vt.) and Mike Mansfield (I) Mont.). There have
been no joint meetings in' at least the last year.
However, CIA Director Richard Helms did appear
once in March before a Foreign Relations subcom-
mittee. .
House. Armed Services Committee, Intel-
ligence Operations Subcommittee (created in July)----
Lucien N. Nedzi (D ich.),* G: Bray (R Id.),
Alvin E. O'Konski (R Wis.), 0. C. Fisher (D TCxas),
Melvin Price (D III.), with ex officio members F.
Edward Hebert (D La.) and Leslie C. Arends (R
Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Opera-
tions Subcommitt ee?Illembe.rship undisclosed.
Believed to be the five ranking members of the
Defense Subcommittee headed by committee chair-
man George Mahon (D Texas). Also would include
Robert L. F. Sikes (D Fla.), Jamie L. Whitten (D
Miss.), William E. Minshall (R Ohio), John J. Rhodes
(R. Ariz.). ? Indicates subcommittee chairman.
The role of the Armed Services Committee is not to
examine the CIA's budget, Braswell said, but rather to
review the programs for which the appropriated funds
pay.
"The budget is gone into more thoroughly than
people (on the committee) would admit," Braswell ex-
plained. "It's just reviewed in a different way than, say,
,the State Department's budget is." The committee's
chief counsel said the budget review was conducted by
a "very select group... more select than the five-man
subcommittee."
In the June 7 closed session of the Senate, Jack Miller
(R Iowa) said, "I find it very difficult to believe that the
oversight committee could not obtain some pretty ac-
curate information on how much of that CIA money was
going to Laos."
Symington's reply: "There is a war going on in Laos
and money is being spent in heavy quantities about
which the Senate knows nothing. I am a meiriber. of
literally all the committees involved. Each time we go
into Laos. and believe we have uncovered the last leaf of
what has been and is going on, we find later that it is
not true."
Foreign Relations. Since the CIA never has been
recognized officially as an agency involved in making
foreign policy, the operations of the agency have not
regularly been scrutinized by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. The Armed Services Committee reviews the
agency's program annually because threats to the United
States, against which the CIA guards, traditionally have
been military in nature. The Appropriations Committee
checks on the CIA's budget because the committee ex-
amines all money requests of government agencies; the
CIA provides valuable intelligence on Pentagon programs
about which the committee has an interest. The Foreign
Relations Committee was a newcomer into the circle of
CIA-knowledgeable committees. ?
In the spring of 1967, secret CIA aid for student activ-
ities became the cover story for Ramparts magazine. The
national press picked up the story and soon it became
widely. known that the CIA had been contributing money
to the National Student Association (NSA) and other
tax-exempt foundations and was playing more than a
casual role in jockeying CIA personnel into leadership
positions in the various organizations.
The response in Congress to the NSA story was the
introduction of seven bills in one month.?all aimed at
allowing Congress a closer look at the CIA. One pro-
posal, sponsored by former Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy
(D Minn. 1959-71), would have involved an investigation
of the CIA by a select committee armed with subpoena .
power. A proposal to set up a similar oversight and investi-
gating committee had been killed in: 1966 on a procedural
ruling regarding Committee jurisdiction. With the new
series of embarrassing CIA revelations, the McCarthy
proposal posed a threat to the long-standing oversight
system.
Don Henderson, a Foreign Relations Committee
staff member, said that in an effort to undermine support
for the McCarthy bill, the Foreign Relations Committee
was invited to send three members to all CIA joint
briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees. The original members were J. W. Fulbright
(D Ark.), Mike Mansfield (I) Mont.) and Bourke B.
Hickenlooper (R Iowa), who was replaced by George
Aiken (R Vt.) when Hickenlooper retired in 1968. ?
Woodruff, counsel for the Armed Services Committee,
said that the committee had not ?met jointly on CIA busi-
ness with the Appropriations Committee for at least one
year. "Maybe it's been two years," he said, "I'm not sure."
CIA Director Helms, however, appeared before the
Foreign Relations Committee for a special briefing on
Laos in March.
"I have known," Ful bright told the Senate during the
June 7 closed session, "and several (other) Senators have
known about this secret army (in Laos). Mr. Helms testi-
fied about it. He gave the impression of being more can-
did than most of the people we have had before the
committee in this whole operation. I did not know enough
to ask him everything I should have......
THE HOUSE
Two committees in the House acknowledge that
they participate in oversight of the CIA?Armed Services
and Appropriations. The Armed Services Committee has
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a five-man subcommittee reviewing the programs of all
intelligence organizations. The Appropriations Committee
refused to say who on the committee reviews the CIA
budget.
Armed Services. A new subcommittee formed in
July has filled a hole on the committee that has been
left since F. Edward Hebert (D La.) reorganized the
Armed Services Committee and abolished the CIA Over-
sight. Subcommittee that had been run by the late L.
Mendel Rivers, chairman of the committee until his
death Dee. 28, 1970. ?
Hebert's plan was to democratize the committee by
allowing all to hear what the CIA was doing instead of
just a select group of senior Members. Freshman commit-
tee member Michael Harrington (D Mass.) said that
'Hebert was making an honest attempt to spread the
authority, but the full committee CIA briefings were
still superficial. "To say that the committee was per-
forming any real: oversight futiction was a fiction,"
Harrington
When Helms came before the full committee, Har-
rington asked what the CIA budget was. Helms said that
, George Mahon (1) Texas), chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, had instructed him not to reveal any bud-
get figures unless Armed Services Chairman Hebert
requested the information. Hebert said "no" according to
Harrington and the budget figures remained a mystery.
As in the Senate, the House Armed Services Commit-
tee is responsible more for what the CIA does than how
much it spends, according to the committee's chief
counsel, John R. Blandford. The ii?rmed Services Com-
mittee does not meet jointly for CIA briefings with the
Appropriations Committee or with the Foreign Affairs
Committee; Bl andford
The new subcommittee, responsible for reviewing
all aspects of intelligence operations, was put under the
leadership of Lucien N. Nedzi Mich.)?a leading
House opponent of the Indochina war and critic of Penta-
gon spending. lieert said he chose Nedzi "because he's a
good man; even though we're opposed philosophically."
Hebert's predecessor as committee chairman, Mendel
Rivers, regarded the oversight subcommittee as so im-
portant he named himself as subcommittee chairman.
Nedzi said that Hebert had placed no restrictions on how
the subcommittee should be run or.what it should cover.
When Hebert took over as chairman of the full
committee and abolished the CIA Oversight Subcommit-
tee, there were 10 members of the subcommittee. One of
the original 10 left Congress in January, one died, Hebert
and Leslie. C. Arends (R Ill.) currently serve as ex
officio members, four have been renamed to the sub-
committee and two memb6rs have been bumped?Charles
E. Bennett (D Fla.) and Bob Wilson (R Calif.). Both
Blandford, the subcommittee's new staff roan, and
Earrington said that the new subcommittee was formed
because the full committee hearings were too unwieldy,
not because Hebert wanted Bennett and Wilson off the
subcommittee:
Appropriations. In interviews with two staff
members of the House Appropriations Committee, Con-
gressional Quarterly learned that the ?membership of the
committee's intelligence oversight subcommittee. was
confidential. When asked why the membership Was a
secret, Paul Wilson, staff director, said: "Because that's
Intelligence Reorganization
The Central Intelligence Agency was created as
the clearinghouse of intelligence information gather-
ed by the various government agencies responsible
for espionage, .code-cracking and other forms of
intelligence work. The CIA was intended to loosely
coordinate operations of all the different intelligence-
gathering groups.
The plan as originally conceived has not worked .
to total satisfaction. The Washington Post reported
.Aug. 16 that the White House, which ordered a study
of ways to consolidate the far-flung intelligence-
gathering operations of all branches of government,
was looking for ways to cut at least $500-million
and 50,000 employees from the: estimated $5-billion
and 200,000 employees currently representing what
is believed to be the total intelligence program.
The Post reported that Allen J. Ellender (D La.),
chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
has forced the Administration to look into budget-
cutting plans by threatening to slice a piece of the
appropriation from the White House request.
the way it's always been." Ralph Preston, a staff man
for the Defense Subcommittee, said the information was
a secret, but admitted that more members than just
Chairman Mahon were responsible for reviewing the
agency's budget.
Rep. Harrington said he has requested the compo-
sition of the subcOmmittee and has been refused the in-
formation. "I'm just sure the CIA committee consists of
the five ranking members of Mahon's subcommittee on
defense," Harrington said. Other sources indicated that
Harrington's conclusion was correct.
Quality of Congress' Oversight
Because most members of. Congress have not been
aware of what the CIA was planning until long after the
agency, had already acted, more than one. Senator or
House member has made embarrassing statements out of
line withlact.
Former Sen. Wayne Morse (D Ore. 1915-69), a
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, took the
Senate floor April 20, 1961--five clays after the Cuban
Bay of Pigs invasion--and said: "There is not a scintilla
of evidence that the U.S. government has intervened in
the sporadic rebellion which has occurred inside Cuba.
That rebellion has been aided from outside by Cuban
rebel refugees who have sought to overthrow the Castro
regime."
Four clays later Morse admitted: "We now know
that there has been a .covert program under way to be of
assistance to the Cuban exiles in an invasion of Cuba and
that assistance was given by the United States govern-
ment. We did not know at the legislative level, through
the responsible committees of the Senate, what the pro-
gram and the policies of the CIA really were."
The Morse speech, delivered nine days after the
Bay of Pigs invasion, was the first mention in either the
House or Senate of U.S. involvement in the invasion at-
tempt. (Congrm and the Nation Vol. 1, p. 127)
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Four Approaches to Change
Although more than a dozen bills and amend-
ments relating to greater legislative control of the
CIA were introduced in the Senate and House prior
to Aug. 6 (summer recess), four basic approaches to
altering the present system of oversight have emerged.
O In every Congress .since 1953, a resolution has
been introduced which sought ,to establish a joint
committee on intelligence operations and information
which Would include members of key committees from
both the Senate and House. From the 83rd to the
92nd Congress this type of resolution has been intro-
duced, referred to committee and killed by lack of
action.
O The approach adopted by Sen. George McGov-
ern (I) S.D.) in S 2231 was aimed at gaining a single-
sum disclosure of the CIA budget to be voted on by
the !Louse and Senate as a line-budget item annually.
O A proposal which sought to provide Congress
with more intelligence information without either
limiting CIA activities or disclosing the agency's ex-
penditures was introduced by Sen. John Sherman
Cooper (R Ky.). The bill (S 2224) requested that the
two Armed Services Committees. the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee be provided with regular and thorough CIA
briefings with information and details included in the
briefing which Would be similar to the data provided
the White House.
O The approach adopted by Senators Frank Church
(I) Idaho) and Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Rep.
Herman Badillo (H N.Y.), among others, has been to
sponsor proposals aimed not at learning more of what
the CIA knows, but at limiting the agency to informa-
tion gathering rather than military and para-military
operations. (Radio Free Europe, p. 1850)
While explaining the details of the Central Int elli-.
VIICO Act of 1919,- former. Sen. Millard E. Tydings (I) Md.
1927-51) said in a May 27, 1949, floor speech: "The bill
relates entirely to matters external to the United States;
it has nothing to do with internal America. It relates to
the gathering of facts and information beyond the borders
of the United States. It has no application to the domestic
scene in any manner, shape or form."
Committee investigations into tax-exempt founda-
tions in 1964 produced an informal report issued by Rep.
Wright Patman (D Texas) labeling the Kaplan Fund as
a conduit for CIA money. The fund described its purposes
in its. charter as to "strengthen democracy at home."
Patman later agreed to drop the committee investigation
saying, "No matter of interest to the subcommittee re-
lating to the CIA existed." (Congress and the Nation
Vol. 1, p. 1780)
In the spring of 1967, another example of domestic
CIA programming emerged as it became known that the
National Student Association was receiving money from
the CIA and that the agency had been involved in manip-
ulating the leadership of the student organization. -
Laos. The most recent case study of Congress
lacking knowledge about CIA activities has been in the
series of revelations which came from the June 7 closed
Senate session briefing on Laos requested by Symington.
(Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268)
Three times during the two-hour session, Symington,
a member of the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA
oversight, said that although he knew the CIA was con-
ducting operations in Laos, he did not know how exten-
sive the program was.
"Nobody knows,"" Symington said, "the amounts the
CIA is spending while under orders from the executive
branch to continue to supervise and direct this long and
ravaging war (in Laos)."
Minutes after Symington said that in all of Ids sub-
committees?which included the Armed Services Intel-
ligence Subcommittee under the chairmanship of John C.
Stennis (I) Miss.)?there was ".no real knowledge about
what is going on in Laos." Stennis took the floor and said:
"The CIA has justified its budget to our subcommittee
and as always they have come with expenditures right
in line with what they were authorized expressly to
do....They (CIA) have told us from time to time about
their activities in Laos."
"It has been said that we all know about what the ?
CIA is doing," Fulbright retorted. "I have been on the
CIA oversight committee and I have never seen any de-
tailed figures (on Laos) whatever. Often the briefings
are about how many missiles the Russians have. When
we ask about specific operations, they say they are too
secret; they Can only report to the ? National Security
Council, which means to the President. There is a lot I
did not know about, specifically in Laos."
Stennis said that the secret report on CIA activity
in Laos, compiled by Foreign Relations Committee staff
members, contained some information he was not familiar
with, information he had not been told in his capacity
as chairman of the Armed Services ? Intelligence Opera-
tions Subcommittee. - ?
"I think we all know," Stennis said, "that if we are
going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we
cannot run it as a quilting society or 'something like
that. But their money is in the clear .and their forthright-
ness, I think, is in the clear."
Sen. Miller criticized Symington for saying the
Congress was appropriating money blindly: "We should
not leave the impression that the Senate somehow or
other has been helpless in this matter. We are all mature
individuals and we know what we are doing. We have.
appropriated a lot of money for the CIA. If we have done
so, knowing the CIA is an executive privilege agency, I
think we have done so with ow eyes wide open. Maybe
we should change that. That is something else.
"But let us not say the Senate has been hoodwinked
or leave the impression we have been mislead and have
not known what is going on. I think we may have lacked
information on the specifics, and the Senator (Symington)
is pulling out information on specifics, but the Senators
who voted on these appropriations for the CIA voted for
them with our eyes wide open, knowing what we were
doing. Maybe we should change it. It is something for
future debate."
"I would be the last to say he (Miller) had been
hoodwinked," Symington commented, "or that any
other member .of the Senate had been hoodwinked. But
I have been hoodwinked, and I want the Senate to know
this afternoon that that is the case."
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Washington Couple
iriedman Ci.y]Dtotiog Collection Given
To:Virginia Research Library
Lexington, Va. ? An important and
extensive private collection of cryptolog-
ic material has been given to the George
C. Marshall Research Library in Lexing-
ton.
The gift was made by the late Lt. Col.
William F. Friedman, who died in 1969,
and Mrs. Friedman, of Washington.- Colo-
nel- Friedman and his wife have been
widely acclaimed in the field of cryptolo-
gy since World War I.
.The Friedman Collection "will be a
tremendous addition to the library's hold-
ings," said Lt. Gen, Marshall S. Carter,
foundation president and former director
of the National Security Agency from
1965 to 1969.
Dedicated in 1964, the Marshall Re-
search Library is closely associated with
nearby Washington and Lee University
and the Virginia Military Institute and
has become the national memorial to the
World War H. Army chief of staff and
author of the Marshall Plan of aid to
Postwar Europe. The library's museum
has been open to the public since the
dedication.
? One of the library's primary projects is
the -publication of a multivolume biogra-
phy of General Marshall being written by
the library's director, Dr. Forrest C.
Pogue.
3,000 lions
Approximately 3,000 items are in the
Friedman Collection now being prepared
for use by future researchers in the field.
The material ranges from Colonel Fried-
man's first publications on cryptography
in 1916 and research papers allied with
their assignments for the U.S. govern-
ment to books in various languages, pam-
phlets, technical papers, periodicals, mi-
crofilm, slides and newspaper clippings.
? For almost . half a century, Colonel
Friedman was regarded as this country's
most eminent cryptologist. In congres-
sional hearings on the Pearl Harbor at-
tack, he was identified as leader of the
group of U.S. Army cryptologists who
solved the Japanese diplomatic cipher
. and built a machine which automatically
deciphered these important communica-
tions. For his wartime work, he was
awarded the highest civilian honors given
by. the government.
In 1944, he received the War Depart-
ment's Commendation for Exceptional
Civilian Service; in 1946, the Medal for
Merit; and in 1955, the National Security
Medal for "distinguished achievements
in national intelligence work." In a rare
action, the U . Con,,..e?res,s i 195 woled
him $100,00 lilEliYaC'do REns Rke
the commercial rights of his inventions
held secret by the government.
Born in Kishinev, Russia, September,
24, 1893, William Frederick Friedman
was brought to Pittsburgh in 1893, where
lie became a naturalized citizen. After
graduating from Cornell University with
a degree in genetics, Colonel Friedman
served as director of genetics research at
Riverbank Laboratories in Geneva,
While there, he met Miss Elizabeth
Smith, who became Mrs. Friedman. Miss
Smith was at that time conducting re-
search on the claim that Sir Francis
Bacon had written the works of Shake-
speare. Mr. Friedman also became inter-
ested in this controversy and his talents
were diverted from genetics to cryptolo-
gY?
Before the war broke out in 1917, Riv-
erbank Laboratories volunteered the
services of its unique group of crypto-
graphic personnel, including Mr. and
Mrs. Friedman, who trained the first
class of Army cryptographers, to the
U.S. government. During World War I,
Lieutenant Friedman served in Army In-
telligence. In 1921, his long government
career began with the Signal Corps. He
was chief cryptanalyst with the War De-
partment from 1921 to 1947 when he be-
came chief cryptologist for the Depart-
ment of Defense.
In the 1930s, he was also a special
assistant to the director of the National
Security Agency and from 1955 until his
death in 1969, he served as a consultant
for the Defense Department.
While her husband was working for the
War Department, Mrs. Friedman was
employed by the Treasury Department
unscrambling the codes and ciphers used
by rum-runners during Prohibition. Her
skills led to the capture of smugglers and
the breakup of opium smuggling rings.
She was selected to establish crypto-
graphic communications for the Internae
tional Monetary Fund and served the
IMF as a consultant. From 1924 to 1942,
she was chief of the 'Treasury Depart-
ment's cryptographic section and a re-
search analyst with the Navy Depart-
ment from 1912 to 1946.
Shakespeare Questions
The Friedmans' interest were not limit-
ed to their government work. They con-
tinued their study of the Bacon-Shake-
speare question and after several years
concluded that there 'exists no proof that
the author was other than Shakespeare.
Their article, 'The Cryptologist Looks
at Shakespeare," Was awarded the
In their collection, the Friedmans have
included books and essays .of the other
major points of view on the Bacon-Shake-
speare controversy, as well as those who.
support Shakespeare.
Also of great interest to the Friedmans
was the science of archaeology. Many
aspects of this study are represented in
the collection. Among these are: the ru-
ins of Europe and Scandinavia. Linear
A and 13 of Crete, Stonehenge and Easter
Island. The development of Western civi-
lization is studied through the Aztecs,
Incas and some North American Indians;
however, the largest amount of material
is about Mayan culture. -
In the Friedman .Collection, there. are
several hundred items relating to cryp-
tography, cryptanalysis, secret writing
and signalling, radar, telephony and te-
legraphy. To supplement the technical
side of cryptography, the collection con-
tains dictional works whose plots involve
spies and codes, as well as popular books
on cryptographic games for children and
a set of the official publications of the
American Cryptogram Association.
The Friedmans also gave the library
valuable code books used in the Union
Army during the Civil War and rare
books on the subject of cryptography
dating from the 1500's. "
There is a large amount- of material
concerning Pearl Harbor and the contro-
versy over who was to blame for the
"Day of Infamy."
Roger Bacon
Of particular interest is a copy of the
Voynich Manuscript which has been the
subject of intense research for some
years. Thought by some to be the work of
Roger Bacon, the medieval monk and
scientist, the manuscript has never been
deciphered. Colonel Friedman and many
others have attempted solution, including
the late Rev. Theodore C. Petersen of.
-Catholic University, Washington. Father
Petersen bequeathed to the Friedman
Collection his workbooks and color copies
? of the manuscript.
The third section of the collection is.
devoted to literature, particularly the
works of James 'Joyce and Gertrude
Stein. Colonel Friedman believed that the
works of the authors composing the "cult.
of unintelligibility," were really of a
cryptographic nature, since the authorss,
deliberately attempted to conceal their
true meanings.
-4' 1 er Shakespeare Library award Once the material has been integrated
'agAbIREIR84-00499R004OOO9EMOSA3 Library's holdings, it
bridge University Press as "The Shakes- will become an important addition to the
pearean Ciphers Examined" in pig. Lexington research facility.
NEWSWEEK
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2 uG'
HOAXES:
The Buckley Papers
They read like a conservative's an-
swer to the Pentagon papers?fourteen
pages of top-secret government docu-
ments urging, among other propositions,
a bellicose "sharp knock" strategy for
winning the Vietnam war fast and an
'exemplary nuclear drop Off Haiphong
harbor. Enticingly labeled "The Secret
Papers They Didn't Publish," this latest
glimpse into the Washington policymak-
ing process was served up last week in
William F. Buckley Jr.'s National Review,
accepted as fact?at least briefly?at the
highest levels of government and repub-
lished by newspapers and wire services
all across the country. The only trouble
was it wasn't so. The day after the pa-
pers appeared, Buckley himself pro-
claimed the whole thing an .elaborate
hoax that he and his jolly staffers had
fashioned "ex nillilo"--!out of absolutely
.lielcar proposal was the biggest
'- Buckley papers, but not the
. he "documents," variously at-
tributed to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and re-
tired Adm. Arthur Radford, among oth-
ers, also proposed closing Haiphong and
Sihanoukville harbors, destroying North
Vietnam's dikes, thermal power plants
and rail links to China and "neutralizing".
' China's Hainan Island. All of which,
Buckley insisted, was kidding on the
square?a hoax designed to show "that
the Pentagon and the CIA are not com-
posed of incompetents . . . [and] that
forged documents would be widely ac-
cepted as genuine provided their con-
tent was inherently plausible." Blandly
Buckley added: "We admit that we
Proceeded in something of an ethical
vacuum."
Denial: What not even Buckley reck-
oned on was the credulity of his audi-
ence?including principal characters in
his "papers." Of the authors named in
the series; only Daniel J. Boorstin, now
director of Washington's National Muse-
um of History and Technology, flatly
denied he had authored the paper attrib-
uted to him. "I can't verify that I wrote
L.
WILLIAM F.
(3U(KLEYJR
Gag: The mileage was considerable
for a gag batched only two weeks be-
fore, at a Review dinner at Buckley's el-
egant New York apartment. Accordin
to his sister Priscilla, National Review's
? managing editor, Buckley broke into a
discussion of the Pentagon papers with a
puckish, "Hey, gang, what if ..." Within
24 hours the project was under way.
Five staffers, including Buckley, did the
writing. A decoy cover went to press;
the real cover, bannering the papers,
was substituted only at the last moment.
'Buckley himself did the final pencil edit-
ing, and, after letters of warning had
been sent out to 6,000 friends of the
magazine, flew off to California to wait
for the fun to begin. He chanced to be
on the telephone to his office when The
New York Times's managing editor, A.M.
Rosenthal, called him to .ask about the
. National Review pseudo-secrets. "Tell
Mr. Rosenthal that I'm hiding with Dan-
iel Ellsberg," Buckley instructed his
secretary gleefully. "I'm sure he knows
where to find me."
To be sure, not everyone: was laugh-
ing. A number of critics sharply ques-
tioned the propriety of telling the world
that the U.S. had contemplated the use
of nuclear weapons in Vietnam?or, for
that matter, of joking about nuclear
weapons at all. But Buckley, as usual,
had a ready .answer. "Any intelligent
person who reads this," he told NEWS-
WEEK'S Tom Mathews, "is going to say
to himself, 'II Dean Rusk didn't disavow
these papers, if Admiral Radford didn't,
and if the Defense Department didn't,
there must be something in them that's
serious'."
Conrad ? 1071, Los Ar400e5 Times
'We admit that we proceeded in
something of an ethical vacuum'
any such memorandum," Rusk told
newsmen. "It's entirely possible that I
did." Fumbled former U.S. Ambassador
to Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow: "All I
can say is that the memo expresses -my
views. I don't know for sure if and when
I wrote it."
The authenticity of the papers was
hardly questioned?by the government
or the press. Forewarned by Boorstin's
denial, The New York Times ran a cau-
tiously worded report on page 4. But
several newspapers front-paged the sto-
ry, the TV networks played it straight,
the Voice of America broadcast it over-
seas and both United Press international
and Associated Press moved it nation-
wide?with AP later finding itself forced
to break in on its own straight-faced
follow-up story on the papers to move a
bulletin on Buckley's confession. The
Justice Department, battle-weary after
its vain attempt to suppress the first
batches of Pentagon papers, said it
would investigate this set, too. But at
least one high-ranking Pentagon official
declared the documents authentic
("There must be some counter-leak-
ors"), another conscientiously wrote the
comment "Good!" beside the nuclear
"drop" proposal. The gist of Buckley's
"secret" even reached all the way to the
President, as part of his daily White
House news digest.
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A7 liar? ? -
Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired
for his good common sense, has offered a good common-
sense proposal to the Congress, namely, that the National
Security Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central
Intelligence-Agency to keep the "germane" committees of
the Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of
"analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the
intelligence gathered by that agency.
The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Con-
gress is entitled to the same information that the executive
receives in order to pass considered judgments on matters
pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surpris-
ingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dis-
semination of CIA-gathered intelligence to Congress, but
neither does it require that Congress be informed. So, by
a familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of
using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Con-
gress out in the cold to scrounge around and get what
intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of
the exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to
start wars and when to end them. Of course it retains the
power of the purse, but few members of either House are
courageous enough to stop a war by withholding .funds--
it leaves them open to the accusation that they are letting
down "our boys," which can prove fatal at election time.
Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would
have limited Congressional circulation, It would be made
available to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and
Armed Services Committees, whose members could pass
along pertinent portions to other legislators and staff mem-
bers working on national security matters, subject to the
normal security requirements.
Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under
the present arrangoinent. The President, for his purposen
leaks a CIA report to, say, The New York Times on, say,
the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government.
'Does the Presider' ea:1 in the reporters and tell them
candidly that here -rA report of general interest which
I am divulging to at on? He does nothing of the kind
,--he would rather the leaking game. That is one
reason why the ekecattve prefers to hoard the information
and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able
to leak it when it serves his purpose to do so.
The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The
Congress and the public are denied information on which
vital decisions are based. The denial appLes not only to
military information but substantially to all data except
what the executive chooses to share, which is always what
will benefit him politically by enhancing his image and
making him look, if not infallible, at least pretty close to
it. The effect is to multiply errors as well as to hide them.
The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from
the public and the press.
Senator Cooper has taken an important first steo- to limit
the secrecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations.
His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy alai'
.save us, from involvement in another Indochina mess.
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ir1
Li ,*-in
re3s"
1 61- rq 51 CIA C
CIA officials are very concerned about. a DM
Senate_ move to require their secretive agency to
give detailed global intelligence to congressional
committees on a regular_ basis.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
scheduled hearings this :September on a con-
troversial measure that would greatly expand the
number of senators who have access to classified
CIA evabiations.and information.
The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman
Cooper, would require the CIA to brief the
full Senate and House Foreign Relations and
Armed Services Committees on a routine
schedule, similar to the system under which the
agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the
executive branch.
ALAR:)IED CIA OPFICIALS view the proposal
potentially jeopardizing their clandestine
operations around the world. There are 110 con-
gressmen on those four committees, and that's a
lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the
CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying
quietly to have the measure killed,
- The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its
influence over Presidential foreign policy-making,
and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that
goal. The measure already has considerable sup-
porters, including Majority Leader Mike Mans-
field, Foreign Relations Committee Chairriiiin J.
William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the
only senator on both the Foreign Relations and
Armed Services Committees.
The CIA now reports only to five special sub-
committees of the I louse and Senate, composed of
senior members of the Armed Services and Ap-
propriations Committees. Those groups are con-
'corned-primarily with the CIA budget and opera-
tions. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright
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birilellTPLYS
Or other congressmen whose major interest is in
the field of foreign policy.
SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are
askedlo authorize and fund Presidential decisions
that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat
but are told little more than the generill public
about the information and analyses that prompted
those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of
the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the
wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to.
discover from the papers that the CIA had warned :
President Johnson full-scale bombing of North .
Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up.
CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to
intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the
temptation of. leaking ? and perhaps misinter-
preting ? snatches of information that serve
their own political purposes or can get them
publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee in particular has long had a reputation for
being a sieve.
. But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no
worse at keeping secrets than the \t'hile house
itself. it is common practice for White House and
State Department officials to-leak classified docty
meals and secret foreign intelligence when it: suits
their purpose. Fon instance, the administration
recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new
Soviet missile sites to help generate support for
military budget items.
Even so, the administration keeps 'reasonably
tight control over the number of officials who have
access to CIA intelligence and who have per-
Mission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate
moments. Congress has no such control Oyer its
members, and the odds that an individual con-
gressman might make a grievous error hi judg-
ment about what is safe to make public are not
inconsiderable,
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The is sing DAfemor anti a
19624966
II I.C rIkri
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?LLIQPI.ogi.1:1Egl
Strategy and counterstrategy from highly classified
documents not published by the New York Times
and the Washington Post, leaked to NATIONAL REVIEW
c (6 /nri'C i1!1
3E-pfc3 A r)
In early September, 1964, President Johnson appointed a special inter-departmen-
tal, inter-agency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of
US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (the date of US recogni-
tion of Boo Dal, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The com-
mittee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the
end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion
and due for decision in the first week of October. "(was the normal practice of
such committees, special or standing, as it was of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach
final agreement on a single report through discussion and, when. necessary, com-
promise of. any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however,
tWo members----not named, but 'identified as from the Air Force and-CIA?de-
clined to endorse the report, and insisted on submitting a "minority" document,
not so much disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is
not clear whether this -appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen
by the President.
.1. As in numerous other reports, mem-
oranda and recommendations drawn up
since 1951 for.JCS, NSC, SD, the:Pres-
ident, various ad hoc committees, etc.,
.the report of OVERLOOK fails to ac-
cept the implications of its own data
and analysis, and therefore cannot servo
as a correct guide for policy and plans.
2. From 1950 on, the nature and sig-
nificance of US interest in Southeast
Asia have been repeatedly stated, with..
out essential dispute. E.g.:
illemorcaulum from Secretary of De-
fense McNamara to President Ken-
nedy, 8 Nov 1961: ". . . The Joint
Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatrick and 1 . . . are
inclined to recommend that we do com-
mit the United States to the clear ob-
jective of preventing the fall of South
Vietnam to Communism and that we
support this commitment by the neces-
sary military action. . . . If we act in
-this way, the ultimate possible extent?
of our military -commitment must be
faced. . . ."-
Memorandum from Secretary of
State Rusk and Secretary of Defense
McNamara to .President Kennedy, 11
Nov 1961:
a) UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTER?
ESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
The loss of South Vietnam to
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Communism would iN3tve?tne trans er ? an harass the Administration. . A memorandum from Secretary of f
of a nation of 20 million people from
the. free world to the Communist bloc.
The loss of South Vietnam would make
pointless any further disafssion about
the importance of Southeast Asia to the
free world; we would: have to face the
near certainty that the remainder- of
Southeast Asia. and Indonesia would
move to a complete accommodation
with Communism, if not formal incor-
poration with the Communist bloc. The
United States, as a member of SEATO,
has commitments with respect to South
October 1964: "The US ac-
cepted the commitment to
prevent a Communist takeover
of South Vietnam. To make
good on that commitment, the
JCS (and other, relevant agen-
cies) have periodically pro-
posed military, pa-ea-military,
political, psychological, etc..
measures.
"Invariably the measures ac-
tually approved have been
drastically sealed down, in both
quantity and quality, from
those proposed. In every case
the reduced measures have
failed to achieve the assigned
objectives. This failure was
predictable, and was in fact in
a number of instances pre-
dicted, but no conclusion was
ever drawn for future opera-
tions. On the contrary, the
failures were rationalized, and
the same process repeated at
the next stage."
Vietnam under the Protocol to the
SEATO Treaty. . . .
The loss of South Vietnam would
not only destroy SEATO but would
undermine the credibility of American
commitments elsewhere. Further, loss
of South Vietnam would stimulate bit-
ter domestic controversies in the United
States and would be seized upon by ex-
treme elements to divide the country
b) TIM UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN
sourti VIETNAM.
The United States should commit it-
self to the clear objective of preventing
the fall of South Vietnam to Communist
[sic].
? Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs
-
of Stall to Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara, 13 Jan. 1962; transmitted to Pres-
ident Kennedy 27 Jan without endorse-
. . . MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.
a. Early Eventualities?Loss of. the
Southeast Asian mainland would have
an adverse impact on our military strat-
egy and would markedly reduce our
ability in limited war by denying us air,
land and sea bases, by forcing greater
intelligence effort With lesser results, by
complicating' military lines of commu-
nications and by the introduction of
more formidable enemy forces in the
area. Air access and access to 5,300
miles of mainland coastline would be
outflanked, the last significant United
Kingdom Military strength in Asia
would be eliminated with the loss of
Singapore and Malaya and United
States military influence in that, area,
short of war, would be difficult to exert.
b. Possible Eventualities?Of equal
importance to the immediate losses are
the eventualities which could follow the
loss of the Southeast Asian mainland.
All of the Indonesian archipelago could
come under the domination and control
of the USSR. and would become a
Communist base posing a threat to
Australia and New Zealand. The Sino-
Soviet bloc would have control of the
eastern access to the Indian Ocean. The
Philippines and Japan could be pres-
sured to assume, at best, a neutralist
role, thus eliminating two of our major
bases in the Western Pacific. Our lines
of defense then would be pulled north
to Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan, result-
ing in the subsequent overtaking of our
lines of communications in a limited
war. India's ability to remain neutral
would be jeopardized and, as the bloc
meets success, its concurrent stepped-up
activities to move- into and control Af-
rica can be expected. . .
Defense McNamara to President John-
son on "South Vietnam," 16 Mar 1964,
and an NSC Action Memorandum
(22) on. "United. States Objectives in
South. Vietnam," 17 Mar 1964, restate_
the analysis- and objectives,. and- stress
the added. fact that the. United States
commitment .to date "accentuates the
impact of a Communist South Vietnam
"The enemy will be able to ad-
just and adapt to owf.i-oexe-
mental escalation, no matter
how high an absolute level it
reached, so long as the pressure
is increased only by slow and
gradual 'steps. ..."
-
not only in Asia but in the rest of the
world, where the South Vietnam con-
flict is regarded as a test case of United
States capacity to help a nation. to meet
the Communist `war of liberation.' "
3. Based on these premises, the US
accepted the commitment to prevent a.
Communist takeover of South Vietnam.
To make good on that commitment, the
JCS (and other relevant agencies) has
periodically proposed military, para?
military, political, psychological,. etc..
measures.
4. Invariably the measures actually
approved have been drastically scaled
down, in both quantity and quality,
from those proposed. In every case the
reduced measures have failed to achieve.
the assigned objectives. This failure was
predictable, and was in fact in a num-
ber of instances predicted; but no con-,
elusion was ever drawn for future op-
erations. On the. contrary,_ the failures
were rationalized, and the same process
.
repeated at the next stage.
5. What has been at issue here has ?
been, at bottom, a basic conflict be-
tween two strategic concepts: a) the
strategy of what the Secretary of De-
fense has termed "graduated response,"
or what might be designated "incre-
mental escalation"; b) the strategy of
CLOSSARY (3i: TERMS CIYI---Covernment of (North) Vietnam (in South Vietnam)
Cli.'N---Covernment of (South) Vietnam M.?Patrol 'Boat, Fast '
AFTI2--Technical Research Vessel JCS--Joint Chiefs- of Staff P3-A---Patrol Aircraft
!t'0--Army - of (South) Vic:foam IST?Landing Ship, Transport SO---Secretary of Defense
ellicorn---Communist China NSF?Mine-Sweeper, Fast SEA--South East Asia
ClfiC.IY,C---Commander in Chief, Pacific IiiIF?National Liberation Front'
55?Submarine
Cl-iC--Cornrnunist Party of China On Southl ii etn a rn) SO..?Soviet Union
.1..--- ...S tof,r FSC?National Se.ourity Council S'4:1--South Vietnam
W.1?Dernocranc Republic of (North) Vietnam BVI!--North Vietnam S2--Anti Subma rine
EIXIT---Electronic Interceptor001C-?
ef, West Pacific
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what. the JCS has termed "the sharp
knock," or what might be designated
"quantum escalation."
6. The strategy of graduated re-
spcmse has been folloWed, in practice,
to date. It has failed, at each stage to
achieve its immediate ,or promote its
longer-term objective, and is thus
.proved deficient by experience. Its in-
adequacy can readily be demonstrated
by general considerations. As the JCS
has pointed out, the slowly increasing
pressures of the "graduated response"
strategy deprive the US of the military
effects on the enemy of surprise and
.shock, and enable him to adjust to the
slow quantitative and qualitative in-
crease of pressure. There is no reason
to predictthat this situation could
-"The internal conflict cannot
be resolved without knocking
NVN out of the war."
change in the foreseeable future. The
enemy will be able to adjust and adapt
, to our incremental escalation, no mat-
ter how high an absolute level is
reached, so long as the pressure is in-
creased only by slow and gradual steps.
7. The liquidation of internal con-
flict in SVN, and the consolidation of
a -viable, self-sufficient non-Communist
regime able to . stand on its own feet
politically, militarily, and economically
is necessarily a long-term process (cf.
Malaya). it does not, however, require
a major American military presence.
I3ut the internal conflict cannot be re-
solved without knocking NVN out of
the war, since it is NVN (with the
backing and support of the USSR and
the Chicoms) that commands and con-
trols the internal SVN struggle, and
is the primary source of arms, supplies,
training; rcgroupment, and, to an in-
creasing -extent, personnel. To succeed
in the long-term task of the liquidation
of the internal subversion, NVN must
be compelled to stop, or reduce to a
minimum level, its intervention in the
south. This can be done only by a
"sharp knock'' or succession of knocks
delivered with a form and suddenness
to which NVN cannot adjust and adapt,
and which, will present the GNVN with
"Demonstration- drop of nuclear
device . . . followed by use of ?
nuclear bombs and devices
where militarily suitable."
a prospect in face of which it will
choose to give up its objective of taking
over SVN, in preference to risking its
Own destruction.
8. The conclusion follows that the
US must abandon the strategy of grad-
uated response and shift ,to the "sharp
knock" (quantum escalation) strategy
in relation to NVN. This will mean
adoption of one or more, as necessary
and in rapid succession, of the sharply
escalated measures that have been pro-
posed and studied, and for which con-
tingency plans have long existed. E.g.:
a) Closing- of Haiphong and Siha-
noukvil le harbors, and blockade of
NVN and Cambodian coast.
b) _Rapid destruction of all. NVN
thermal power installations.
c) Destruction .of rail lines linking
NVN and China.
d) Destruction of Red. River dikes
and irrigation systems, thus of primary
NVN food source.
e) Neutralization of Hainan.
f) Demonstration drop of nuclear
device, as projected (cf. memorandum
from Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
Chairman JCS, to Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Wilson, 26 May 1954, and
supporting exhibits), followed by use
of nuclear bombs and devices where
militarily suitable, if GNVN does not
respond. . . .
9. It is of the essence of the proposed
strategic shift that each operation
should be massive and concentrated, to
ensure a III aXi mum psychological as well
as physical effect.
10. The objective with respect to
NVN would be constantly and publicly
reiterated: that NVN end its interven-
tion in SVN. It would be made clear
that US operations against NVN (and
NVN personnel in SVN) 'would cease
as soon as the GNVN agreed to end the
intervention, or showed in action that
it was bringing the intervention to an
end. There is every reason to assume
that this objective so stated will present
US policy in the most favorable form
from the point of view.' of most other
nations.
11. The course and nature of the
conflict demonstrate that the - US can
achieve its declared objective only by
adoption of a strategic approach along
the lines herein proposed, which are
moreover in keeping with US combat
tradition. This has been recognized by
many for some while, especially within
"If, for whatever reason, it is
decided to be paramountly un-
desirable to adopt such a
strategy the US should renounce
its commitment in Southeast
Asia, and withdraw as rapidly
as is physically possible."
.Y1
the military and intelligence structures.
There remains to draw the final, and
logically inescapable, conclusion: that
if, for whatever reason, it is decided
to be,paramountly undesirable to adopt
such a strategy?and therefore as a
consequence impossible to achieve our
objective?the US should renounce its
commitment in Southeast Asia, and
withdraw as rapidly as is physically
possible.
. .1j3irirdroo.:1._g9(341,r, rrrii.c6 ? lin .r.30
O i ,..4::IligraF.A
N V.r/1111-{1 L:2c,;:jec:.'(.1:6:kiy(")?oa.niiilico-.,
This planning memorandum, originating in the office of the Assistant Secretary
for International Security, was circulated by the Secretary of Defense to a num-
ber of high-ranking officials in. rhe Pentagon, in the last week of December, 1964.
TO: OSI)
FROM: ISA
RE: International repercussions of pro-
jected overt armed intervention in SVN
1. The public meaning of US armed
intervention in VN can be established
only in a global rather than a merely
regional context. Whatever we say or
do will be interpreted by the world
either as a US betrayal of one of its
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'PA'rvt!ityrinA
allies, or as a US act of agg"ressm,4111,.
alternatively, as artVRIV'lki}si e
-APT4-1.1
:eae 2001/11/08 :
since .1.9o3
treaty obligations and a justified len-
tion to Communist aggression.
. 2. The global context is established
by two historical facts: the global na-
ture of the Communist threat, and the
global system of Free World defenses
against it. The Communist threat is
global because the Communists speak
and think_ of their ultimate goal in terms
of all mankind; also because each na-
tion falling victim to Communist ex-
pansion is seen by other nations not as
having been brought into this or that
sphere of regional influence but rather
as having been subjected. to totalitarian
dictatorship. This fate. is understood by
all other still free nations as one poten-
tially threatening them, too, so that any
particular Communist takeover is ex-
perienced by all free, nations as a bell
that tolls also for them.
3. In response to Communist aggres-
sion, the US and it allies have created
a system of treaties, both collective and
bilateral, of which SEATO is an in-
tegral part. While the treaties are not
made legally dependent on each other,
they are linked by the common factor
of political stamina that results from
the US commitment to the defense of
nations exposed to Communist invasion.
and subversion. The prospect of US
help enables each 61 these exposed
countries. to sustain its will to be free
rather than to hop on the Cornmunist
bandwagon "while there is still time."
If any of the exposed nations felt it
necessary to look on future Communist
rule as a foregone conclusion and re-
minded itself, either from observation
or past experience, how hopeless is any
internal opposition to an established
totalitarian regime, a rapidly increasing
number would hasten to join up today
rather than tomorrow. In this interde-
pendence of US commitment and the
political stamina of exposed nations,
the obligation of the US under the
various defense treaties is like an in-
ternational litmus paper: so long as the
US stands by its obligations, the ex-
posed countries will dare to feel secure;
once the US fails an ally, the coloring:
of the paper will change, and every one
of our allies will. come to feel exposed,
alone and ultimately doomed.
4. US global resistance to Communist
expansion stems not from an arrogant
desire to play policeman all over the
v-a-dd but from the simple caleul,
tnat not only our national security but
A-RDP84-00499153145009000110Thern tier of the
iollowed
a policy of
accommouaz.fort
with the Soviet Unio:9, aud
have in fae 1.-,a ejected a signifi-
cold disinetio,k bet\ ,Tee,1 Asian
Co,nnurisin p;td_ Russ;prt
COM:P11/14Sill. llf ye, Were to
COriiiITUe thiS 11110; We would
bcr ourselves from prescilling
the conriet in Vietnam as part
of a global env-at of Commu-
nism and our own action as
an integral element in a global
system of resistance to Con:-
munist expansion. To engage
in militaly action in what
would then appear as a purely
'Asian' war would mean to risk
not only the loss of the only
justification for our action, but
also the rise of a ho'Aile
`Asianisin' resenting our 'white
presence there."
also world peace are bound up with
the resistance of the exposed nations to
Communism. Each new nation to fall
under Communist rule swells the total
resources at the disposal of that
enterprise. Czechoslovakia is today So-
viet-occupied, which means ti ml its arms
and machines go wherever Moscow de-
sires them to go. 1.f Europe and South-
east Asia should fall under Communist
control, the Communist bloc's power
resources would so overbalance ours
that our hope for survival would come
to rest wholly in the potential use of our
nuclear weapons.
5. If SVN should be allowed to fall
to Communist insurgency while we are
present but merely looking on, the first
countries to draw obvious conclusions
for themselves would be the divided
ones, Germany and Korea. The effect
of that event in SEA has been desig-
nated the "domino theory." That term
suggests something like an automatic
or mechanical effect of the fall of SVN
on its neighbors. Actually, the effect
would consist of a radical re-assessment
of the world situation and of the chance
of anti-Communist resistance in areas
contiguous to Communist-dominated
territory, setting in motion strag psy-
chological and political forces favoring
a yielding to Communism as the "wave
of the ruffire." This effect would not be
confined to SEA but would also occur.
Ivlicklie East., and even in parts of LA.
One could expect NATO's seams to
loosen or even burst; all other parts of
our alliance system would be critically
examined by our allies, with a stront,
disposition to pull out and look for
alternative shelters.
6. If, on the other handl, we inter-
vene massively in Vietnam, given the
global context of our commitments,
repercussions may result from the geo-
political character of this particular
theater which might be looked upon as
the wrong place. One could expect that
some of our NATO allies, who rallied
strongly in view of the fall of Czecho-
slovakia, would not. consider the fell of
SVN as a.direct threat and would take
a dim view of our action there. They
might even conclude, that our commit-
ment in SEA takes away from the atten-
tion we can give to European security.
7. The same considerations would
have applied!. to Korea. In that case, we
obtained not only the consent but the
active participation of a goodly part of
our allies. We succeeded in this because
we based our intervention in Korea not
on regional strategic motivations but on
global ones: both the global threat of
Communism, and also the desire, with-
in the UN framework of collective se-
curity, to punish "aggression" in the
abstract. The Korean experience should
warn us not to present the conflict in
Vietnam in a mere regional context but
continuously to emphasize its global
significance. In a merely regional con-
text, our intervention there would also
look to many as if it were an act of
imperialism.
8. It follows that the most important
"In this interdependence of
US commitment and the politi-
cal stamina of 0,-posed nations,
the obligation of the US under
the various defense treaties is
like an international litmus
paper: so long as the US stands
by its obligations, the exposed
countries will dare to feel
Secure; once the US fails an
ally, the coloring of the paper
will change, and every one of
our allies will come to feel
exposed, alone and uliimately
,
Goomou.?
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.POit tailed
repercussion of' APPir9eYWo9ir
-Vietnam is bound to occur in our own
relations with the Soviet Union. Since
1963 we have followed a policy of ac-
commodation with the ?Soviet Union,
and have in fact projected a significant
. distinction between Asian Communism
lease 2001/11/A8 : CIA-RDP84-0049
ano misstan uommurnsm, it we were
?to Qontinue this line, we would bar
ourselves from presenting the conflict
in Vietnam as part of a global threat
of Communism and our Own action as
an integral element in a global system
of resistance to Communist expansion.
*01000090001,8 -
.o engage in military action in what,
would then appear as a purely "Asian"
war would mean to risk not only the
loss of the only justification for our
action, but also the rise of a hostile
"Asianism" resenting our "white". pres-
ence there.
?
[1:DC:7,?C:701.iiii;reCir 11,13
Veaur IF,VOL7 011 IYJ
Private Communication to the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, signed "DA" (Dean
Acheson?).
December 14, 1964
The honor of bring asked for my opin-
ion on an overt military intervention in
Vietnam with combat Units is highly
appreciated. I am returning the classi-
fied documents ? and other materials
which you so kindly put at my disposal.
You could not expect me. to pass on
the military aspects of the projected
policy. I shall confine my remarks to
a few ideas about the political aspects.
1. The military potential of the Viet
Cong and the North Vietnamese forces
is bound to remain small except for out-
side aid. The. Chicoms can supply light
weapons, food and some fuel. Most
substantial aid would come from the So-
viet Union. Without Soviet help our op-
erations could be kept in a very low key.
2. Soviet aid alone could raise the
level of warfare to the point where
both its scope and duration would turn
into a problem of first magnitude, both
internationally and on the homefront.
Our relations with the Soviet Union
and our chances of minimizing Soviet
aid to North Vietnam are therefore of
vital importance in the entire picture.
. 3. Since 1 963 we have been engaged
on a?course of accommodation with the
Soviet Union, to the point where we
have accorded quite differential treat-
ment to Communism' in Russia as dis-
tinct from Communism in China. We
have publicly stated that the Cold War
is ended and that we consider the So-
viet Union a power wholly committed
to the cause of peace.
4. If we were to engage our military
. forces in Vietnam and at the same time
to cling to this line of accommodation
With the SU, we would find ourselves in
an extremely weak diplomatic position
vis-a-vis Soviet aid to Vietnam. We
would be compelled practically to ig-
nore that aid and would be deprived
of diplomatic leverage for its reduction.
5. Even more serious consequences
could result on the homefront, and in
relations with our European and Asian
allies. If we make a significant distinc-
tion between Communism of Moscow
and Communism of Peiping, .and call
the first one our friend and the second
our enemy, the impression must result
"My considered opinion is that
as long as we are unwilling to
discontinue the policy of ac-
commodation with the Soviet
Union, we should not involve
our forces in overt fighting in
Vietnam... . We should put
the blame for a breal:down
of the pattern of agreements
and cooperation on the
shoulder of the Soviet Union
and hold out the prospect of
returning to that pattern hi the
same measure in which Soviet
aid to Vietnam will he
reduced."
that in Vietnam we are not fighting
Communism. but rather China, or, what
is even WOrSe, the Liberation forces of
Vietnam. It will be impossible :then to
make sense of this war, for we have
no urgent direct national interests that
would ,bid us go to war against Viet-
nam, or even China. Vietnam, like Ko-
)Tea, is a far-away place, and the only
way in which US armed intervention
there can be justified is in terms of the
global threat of Communism.
6. if we continue the Course of ac-
commodation with the Soviet Union,
we would also feel ourselves inhibited
from taking military steps that would
keep Soviet aid from reaching North
'Vietnamese forces, e.g. closing ports of
entry to Soviet ships.
7. My considered opinion is that as
long as we are unwilling to discontinue
the policy of accommodation with the
Soviet Union, we should not involve
our forces in overt fighting in -Vietnam.
8. If the decision, however, should
be made in favor of overt intervention
in Vietnam, I urge very strongly that we
make it clear to the Soviet Union that
we are doing so in response to a Com-
munist violation of the status quo in
SEA, that we would react with equal
determination to a violation of the sta-
tus quo in Europe, the Middle East and
elsewhere, and that wecannot have one
policy in Europe and another in Asia.
We should. put the blame for a break-
down of the pattern of agreements and
cooperation on the shoulder of the So-
viet Union and hold out the prospect
of returning to that pattern in the same.
measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam
will be reduced. As programs and pol-
icies adopted since 1962/3 are being
dismantled one after the other, we
should do this in close consultation
with our NATO allies and with flank-
ing operations in the
9. The overriding purpose of this
shift in our policy to the Soviet Union.
.should be a double one: a) to minimize
Soviet aid to Vietnam, and b) to keep
before the eyes of the world and of our
people the meaning of this war, which
is the containment of Communist Im-
perialism.
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e",1 71
1K17,)?
Excerpt from Confidential Memorandum .prepared by 'Douglas Pike and Frank
Trager at the request of Assistant Secretary of State William I'. Bundy, July, 1964.
1. The widespread- impression exists
that the conflict-process in Vietnam is
a civil war on the traditional model
among and/or between contending lo-
cal factions. This is an illusion. Unless
the fundamental novelty of the Viet-
namese situation is understood, no gen-.
cral support for the war on the. part of
the American public can be anticipated.
The authors of this memorandum
would like to put particular stress on
the factor of novelty,
2. The familiar term Viet Cong, a
contraction of Viet Nam Cong San,
ine.aning Vietnamese Communist, is im-
precise. In itself, the term Viet Cong is
a barrier to the understanding.
3. The so-called Viet Cong actually
consists of three interlocking but dis-
tinct elements: 1) the People's Revolu-
tionary Party, or Communist Party of
Vietnam, 2) the Liberation Army and
3) the National Liberation Front, corn-
prised of some twenty or more socio-
political entities.
4. One aspect of the `Inovelly factor"
concerns the history of the National
1 ilv.ration Front, or NLF. Unlike pre-
"fronts," such as the Popular
Front of the 1930s and '40s, the NUT?
structure came into being in 1960 be-
fore there were any entities for the
?"front" to, so to speak, front for. When
it was founded. on December 20, 1960
--incidentally, in Hanoi pursuant to a
decision taken at the 15th meeting of
the Lao Doug (Communist Party)
Central Committee in May, 1959?it
was correctly considered a phantom
entity, 'existing only on paper. Grad-
ually,, however, the paper design was
fleshed out.
5. A key fact& in the fleshing out of
the paper skeleton. of tile NLF was the
announcement, early in 1960, of Soviet
support for so-called "national wars of
liberation." 'Phis meant that dissident
factions within any underdeveloped na-
tion would have maximum Soviet sup-
port when they could mount an insur-
gency. In effect, the policy of support-
US, in the sense' that the Soviet Union
was saying that it would employ its full
military and political resources to upset
the balance of power in 'vitalsectors of
the world.
6. Returning to Vietnam, the military-
political thrust there must be fully un-
derstood. Let us take each of the tln-r -e
interlocking elements separately.
7. The Natibnal Liberation Front, or
NIX, consists of administrative and
functional elements.
a) The administrative st7ructure is in
essence an alternative government. It
is hierarchical in nature, with the. NIX
Central Committee at the apex. Lines
of command run down through inter-
vening administrative committees to ad-
ministrative groups operative at the vii-
"A key facor in the fleshing
out of the paper skeleton of the
NLF was the an.uounecinent,
early in 1930, of Soviet stipport
for so-called 'national wars of
liberation.' ... effect, the
policy of supporting 'D at i on al
wars of liberation' was a
Soviet declaration of war .
against the US."
lage level. This is the administrative
central nervous system of the National
Liberation Front.
b) The functional units comprise
such groups as the Workers' Liberation
Association, the Women's Liberation
Association, the Youth Liberation As-
sociation, the Student Liberation Asso-
ciation, the Cultural Liberation Associ-
lion (school teachers, librarians, etc.),
the Patriotic and Democratic .T.ournal-
ists' Association, as well as externally-
oriented groups such as the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Committee. This
structure is disciplined and subject to
tight control by the NLF Central Com-
mittee.
the Southern Branch of the Vietnam
Workers' Party (Hang, Lao Dong). At
that time it changed its name to the
People's Revolutionary Party of South
Vietnam, with tighter organizational
control by the DRV Communist hier-
archy in Hanoi. The PRP is not the
.only political clement in the NU:, but
it is the domir one. The PRP is de-
scribed as "ti. of the NL1.?, the
"engine of the ?.,lution," the "van-
guard." It ? has "fraternal ties" with
Communist parties elsewhere.:
9. The NLF, dominated by the PRP,
thus constitutes 'a partly indigenous '
southern structure, an alternative gOV-
ernment, with chain-of-command rela-
tions to the DRV hierarchy in the
North.
10. The Liberation Army of the Nil?
consists of two elements, a Full Mili-
tary Force and a Paramilitary Force.
The former is usually referred to as the
Main Force, sometimes as the "hard
hatsv (because of the fibre-board Viet
Minh helmets wor)), and consists of
some 75-80,000 regular troops. The
Paramilitary Force, or guerrillas, about
three times that number, is comprised
of both men and women. The Paramili-
tary Force itself consists of two types
of guerrilla: a) the .classic guerrilla
band, operating in a remote area, and
b) the Local Guerrilla, a part-time
fighter who may work by day and carry
out guerrilla actions at night.
11. The objective of all three elements
described above is political power. The
political goals are identical to those of
Communist parties elsewhere. The Nil?
is most accurately understood not as an
indigenous South Vietnamese phenome-
non but as an administrative arm of the
DRV extending itself South through
political-military pressure and organiza-
tion,
12. NLF popularity was at its pinnacle
in 1962-63, but since that time has
dropped precipitously. NLF village
cadres have increasingly exhibited para-
noiac behavior with regard to the pos-
sible prese.nce of "spies." Prisoners
freed by allied troops from NIX jails
have told harrowing stories of "jus-
ing "national wars erat
tice" in the villages. Villarrers can now
Soviet declaration c4hri9va0 " was a 8. Until January, 1962 the Commumst i,FRrigPlelaPPy2,40411tilaactiCtA4RDP844:10499RDOIDOD0910001Aacc?R-ling to 1\11:F
.a0;r1f. rrti
?directives. The, yil
"thought reform sessions," the increas-
ing tax levies and the conscripting of
young men into the Liberation Army.
Of local supporters of the NLF, :it is
certain that . a very high proportion.
should be classified ,as -unwilling sup-
porters. The secret of .continuing NLF
-strength in the countryside is efficient
organization, plus the poor communica-
tions with the central government char-
acteristic of Vietnamese society at its
present stage of -development.
13. No certainty exists as to how the
NIX would behave if it succeeded in
wresting power from the Saigon gov-
ernment. Based on its current adminis-
trative structure, it would be expected
to establish a totalitarian structure
closely linked with that of DRV. Based
on experience elsewhere, a struggle
might be anticipated within the emerg-
ing NEE regime- between guerrilla ele-
ments, or sonic of them, and the central
apparatus. Given the disposition of
power within the PRP, dissident guer-
woyx41Fc*Itelease200,14-11/Z8 CIA-RDP844104M1Vompppl-g plain. '1 lie CS 0.1)-
"NE;jr.i' cadres have in-
creasingly cAsthitcd paranoiac
behavior wila regard to the
possible prese!ce of `viies.'
Prisoners freed by allied troops
fron, PLC, jails Lave told
borrowing sta.ies of 'justice' in
the villages. Villagers can now
be shot on the spot according
to di,:ectives."
fLI
rillas and other dissident elements might
be expected to lose this struggle. The
central apparatus would have the poli-
tical and military backing of the DRV
government in Hanoi.
14. 'Hie -authors of this memorandum
would now like to move beyond the de-
scriptive into the projective.
a) Clearly, the first question must
be: What will be the fate of the non-
Communist government of South Viet-
nam if the United States does nothing?
lished NET organization, controlled by
the Communist North and backed by
the ?Soviet 'Union and Communist
China, will make the country ungov-
ernable. The techniques for accomplish-
ing this 'are well-known.
b) Suppose the United States pur
.sues the course of protracted conflict,
shoring up the Saigon regime, but at
the same time providing enough muscle
-for the Saigon regime to make -signifi-
cant progress against the NI-13?
it must be clear here that the DRV
can match US input in such a way as
to neutralize it. Diversionary attacks
will be carried out at various points to
tie down the US forces. Meanwhile,
the protracted conflict will be incon-
clusive.
15. From the above, One :conclusion
seems inescapable.- The _conflict in the
South cannot be successfully- concluded
unless the North is definitively pre-
vented from -sustaining its political and/
or military structure in the South.
? "
t II 11 i ik-D iJ 'C'_,;J r..:!"2 (3 11?0 L `-7]1?J-If S'El''-j:0 ?
cpr(E cAP N el] 11
Private letter from Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to "Vietnam 1957-
1961, to Secretary of State Dean Ru.s.k, dated August 10: 1966.
.Dear Mr.- Secretary,
Our presence in Vietnam and our
commitment to the objective of keeping
South Vietnam from falling to the Com-
munists are continuously assailed by the
charge that we are in fact preventing a
'people from achieving its unity and the
-National Liberation Front from carry-
ing out an essentially patriotic job. Is
there no way of making clear to the
? world that -national liberation is a cause
that Communists have exploited re-
peatedly to establish their rule?
You know that in Vietnam two
movements for gaining national liberty
? have existed since the early Thirties:
one Communist and the other national-
ist:You remember, of course, that dur-
ing the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia
there also emerged Mibailovich and
Tito, a genuinely nationalist and a Corn-
- mrmist liberation movement; in that
case, the British and we backed the
? wrong horse, as it turned out later. At
present, the Communists still maintain
sleeper liberation movements in Malay-
sia and the Philippines, after the nation-
alistic forces beat them in the struggles
of the Fifties, Incidentally, a specially
instructive case is Byelorussia, where
the Communists first created a national
liberation movement, then got into
.power with the help of it, and finally
crushed it with 'much bloodshed. It
seems that national liberation is a game
in which many players can participate,
.and with different motives. The actual
term "National Liberation Front" seems
to have been_ the exclusive property of
"A specially instructive case is
Byelorussia, where the Com-
munists first created a natiohal
liberation mOVCIlleilt, then got
into power with the help of it,
and finally crushed it with
much :bloodshed."
Communist' organizations in Greece,
Yemen, Venezuela and other places.
The Communists have long ago em-
braced the principle that there are cer-
tain "holy" causes to which people will
flock, and that these causes can and
must be put at the service of the Com-
munist strategy. Since _1949, they have
skillfully exploited the "peace" move-
ment. Even . earlier, they put the strong
_pulling power of "anti-fascism" before
their wagon, and "national liberation"
as well as the peasants' hunger for land
have been their special mounts ever
since Lenin's days.
A Communist-run National Libera-
tion Front is nothing but a special
branch of Cominunist military, para-
military and_ administrative machinery
that uses- and misuses the patriotism of
honest people for its ultimate partisan
purposes.
In this day of "accommodation" with
the Soviet Union, has it become diplo-
matically impossible to remind the
-world of these truths? .
Sincerely yours,
Elbridge Dnirbrow
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Cohttoned
Memorandum of Special CIA Task Force on Soviet Posture in the event. of US
Armed Intervention in Sfl.N.
(Requested by White House in May,
1964. DeliVered and. filed June 12.)
SUMMARY
Probable reaction of SU to open mili-
tary intervention by US armed forces
in SVN:
1. The Soviet Union presently oper-
ates under the strategy formulated by
various Party documents publishe,d in
November, 1957, December, 1960, and
November, 1961 (Tab. 0. These docu-
ments contain the Party's official ap-
praisal of the world situation and stra-
tegic directives for?the present. period.
They resemble similar documents pre-
viously adopted. in 1920, 1928, 1935,
each of which was held .binding until
the adoption of its successor.
2. The present strategy commits the
SU to avoiding an all-out nuclear con-
flict with the West, also to avoiding
"local wars" which might lead to a
general conflict, but on the other hand
to taking "a most positive attitude"
toward "national liberation, wars" and
"popular uprisings." (Khrushchev's
speech, Ian. 6, 1961, Tab. II.) This pat-
tern, called "peaceful cb-existencc," is
meant to be accompanied by sharply
intensified "ideological struggle." It en-
visages great internal tensions and pres-
sures occasioned in Western countries
ongoing "national liberation wars"
and looks on them as opportunities for
Communists to enter into coalitions
with Social Democrats, pacifists, pro-
gressive and liberal forces, and others
generally opposed to present Western
policies, and through such coalitions to
obtain control of this or that Western
government.
3. The strategy thus has a military
and a political dimension, the latter
being a design to help Communists
achieve what they call "peaceful transi-
tion from capitalism to socialism,"
which in turn, depends on. Communist
governmental control attained without
the cost of war. The takeover of
Czechoslovakia in 1948 has convinced
Soviet leadership that the way into
governmental power with 'die help of a
general leftist coalition is feasible and
in general the surest- way to a Com-
munist triumph. They arc not likely to
jeopardize their great expectations in
this regard for anything less than an
international emergency.
4. The Soviet Union mif,ht break
this entire policy pattern if it were
faced by a direct military or political
threat to its home base. Overt US inter-
vention in Vietnam, however, will rath-
er confirm the Soviet adherence to the
present strategy. Not even a US military
victory in SEA is likely to provoke the
Soviet Union to a direct nuclear threat
against the US, or to the introduction
of nuclear weapons into the Vietnam
theater.
5. The resort to serious diversions
(Berlin? Middle East? LA?) would lie
athwart the main line of the new stra-
tegy which aims to ill ak e Communists
acceptable to potential coalition part-
tiers. One may assume, -therefore, that.
even in the presence of overt. US mili-
tary action in VN, the Soviets will be.
disposed to play the game of "accom-
modation" as they have done since
1962/3.
6. One should assume that for rca-
sons of political exploitation Moscow
is interested in the longest possible dur-
ation cif a war in VN, The SU is likely
to furnish IL:, with substantial arms,
escalating its
Hartionately to the
:
rise of our n, -..1.11reS, and. en-
abling Hanoi to ly..yond guerrilla
warfare to "stage )ii"---conventional
warfare---which according to Maoist
principles is alone suitable for bringing
a war to a victorious conclusion.
7. Only a war of long duration will
enable Soviet propaganda to exploit
the situation fully with a view to the
eventual developments of domestic
politics mentioned under (2). The goal
of a Soviet propaganda campaign of
long duration would be to identify the
US government and its allies in SVN
with imperialism, racism, militarism,
fascism and aggression, and to alienate
the US government from the people.
8. The Sino-Soviet' conflict will con.-
tribute to keeping Soviet aid to the
DRV vigorous but inconclusive. A DRY
victory attributable mainly to Chinese
help can be as little in Moscow's in-
'crest as a DRV. defeat attributable to
insufficient Soviet aid. Moscow is pres-
ently in no position to deny Peiping
strong influence in the area and, for
ideological reasons, will not withhold a
certain amount. of practical cooperation
with China, in regard to the DRY.
nri,-.rdnilaini o UE.m4c, `ireLIc N,
Vravini Cora tcri' CC)
Me11701011C11/111 of Special CIA Task Force on Chicom Posture in event of US
Armed Intervention in SVN.
(Requested by White House in May,
1964. Delivered and filed June 7.)
S'UAIMA RY
J.. China intervened in the second phase
of the Korean war when the North
Korean army was on the point of being
annihilated; her intervention eventually
served to save North Korea and estab-
lish the cease-fire line near the 38th
parallel, it should be assumed that
China is likely to intervene directly in
the Vietnam war only if. and when the
forces of the DRV are on the point of
total defeat.
2. Even then, the situation HOW is
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not what it was in 1951. Internal events
in China have put severe limitations on
the regime's ability for external action:
a) The CPC is deeply split between
the adherents of Mao and the regular
Party apparatus; Mao, ' who still has
charismatic leadership, has nevertheless
been put OD a siding.
b) Widespread disaffection prevails
in the countryside as evidenced by the
29 issues of Kung-tso Tung hsiin (the
Red Army Bulletin) which recently fell
into our hands (Tab. I)
c) The Sino-Soviet split compels the
Peiping regime to count on the possibil-
ity of a military conflict with the Soviet
Union, which automatically puts a two-
:front prospect on any military venture
17'41. [ a'',; r 11
11 ri I
11 December ? 1963
TO: Secretary of Defense;
Pentagon
FROM: head,
Division of Psychological
Assessment
CIA
Psychological Evaluation of War-
fare Involvement in Southeast
Asia
BACKGROUND:
The US has a treaty obligation in Indo-
china. The wisdom of the commitment
rests on the belief that US security in-
terests, global and in the Pacific, will be
gravely threatened if the US does not
maintain a policy of containment. If the
.Administration holds this is no longer
true, we recommend all troops and ad-
visOrs be withdrawn from Vietnam?If
this belief is still held, we emphatically
recommend immediate massive cscala-
thin of the war effort. While it is not
our function to 'prepare the form this
will take militarily, it is our duty to ad-
vise on the psychological consequences
of war on both the Vietnamese people
as well as on the American public.
These we feel will, prove critical.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The psychological warfare division roe-
omniends Short Term 'Warfare (STV1)
in: the South.
d) Chinese production has been dis-.
torted and severely set back by the
"great leap forward."
e) Peiping has reflected its awareness
of -all of these limitations in a stance of
great. caution, as evidenced by her -reti-
cence in the Indian war, and Vis-h-vis
Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
3. The Chicoms are obviously inter-
ested in a protracted' duration of any
war in Vietnam in which the US would
be involved. China will seek_ to keep
this war going by a steady flow of sub-
stantial supplies, short of committing
her own forces to a potential clash with
US armed forces. China would draw
advantages from a long war not only as
she exploited the war in a propaganda
campaign against the US, but also in
the weakening of Hanoi and Hanoi's
increasing dependence on China. The
dependence could -not be greater if
Chinese. troops were dispatched to the
DRV 'since these troops would rather
awaken the Vietnamese memory of past
Chinese domination.
4. The likelihood of a Chinese com-
mitment of troops to the SVN theater
is further reduced because of the flank-
ing threat from Taiwan, to which Chi-
con's comrnuoieations and transport
lines would be exposed, especially when.
the US Seventh Fleet and Okinawa-
based aircraft and -installations are
taken into account.
cif,
2' I I Li ;+'4. t?L2' 10,22(.2, CJ riti 11
- A 111 I
d)e
the US, the. ARVN, the Viet Gong and
the North Vietnamese. long Term
Warfare (LTW) will yield a no-win
posture, thousands of deaths, and will
have serious effects on our, as well as
Saigon's, political institutions,
DISCUSSION: ?
A. Effects on Vietnamese
Long Term Warfare (1...TW): ? The
Vietnamese have already been subjected
to a prolonged conflict. Killing, pillage
and all the rest is already a common-
place occurrence. Yet, the conflicts to
date are small in size and specific in
damage. They have in a. sense adapted
to this continuing nuisance.
LTW with continual American troop
"Long Term Warr El ( TATW
will yield a no-win posture,
thousands of deaths, and will ?
have serious effects on our, as
well as Saigon's, political insti-
tutions.. . .Gradual, slow
escalation of the war over a
period of years does not create
in the Vietnamese people a
sense of purpose or destiny. it ?
will only create horror and
depression. . . The Administra-
tion should not start the Viet-
namese operations if they see
the war as an L'INV affair."
and armory movements, bombing,
search and destroy missions will have a
disastrous effect on the Vietnamese
population. At the present the alterna-
tives for allegiance for the Vietnamese
farmers are not compelling. The Viet
Conk demands are contrary to their
traditional values, and the Saigon gov-
ernment has not been convincing in its
agrarian programs. Tnr the long run
troop movements criss-crossing this
population will only find the Viet Cong
ahead, if not by assent then by terror.
Additionally, of course, there will be a
great toll on the landscape and environ-
mental resources of the country if LTW
takes place.
More specifically, the threat or pres-
ence of war has obvious ill effects on a
population. For those who understand
the ideological issues and are commit-
ted to them, the war is viewed as a
necessary evil and the concomitant
tragedies are endured with relatively
little psychological harm. Clearly, this
is a relatively small part of the Vietna-
mese population. The majority live with
a day-to-day philosophy and passively
accept and prefer peace and quiet as a
way of life over freedom, Prolonged
-war will alienate this population and
tend to make them incorrigible. Also
the ravages of war will tend to disrupt
this segment of the population more
than any other.
Short Term Warfare (12-24 months)
.The objective of war is to win and to
which will redupOtovidido so as wickly and with as little loss
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coat .tnue4
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of life, property and societal stability
as possible. This objective can only be
achieved by a quick "In and Out" move.
Gradual, -slow escalation of the war
over a period of years does not create
in the Vietnamese People a sense of
purpose or destiny. It will only create
horror and depression. With a quick
and purposeful strike involving bomb-
?ing and possible invasion of the North,
.the Vietnamese will respond with elm:-
ity and determination.
B. American Public Opinion
UM: It would be an error to as-
sume a protracted conflict in Southeast
Asia would be supported by the Ameri-
can people. Any move on the part of
the US will be criticized by a large
vocal minority. This minority will grow
with time, for it is in the nature of the
American people to wish not to be or
seem to- be belligerent: When it appears
there arc ambiguities in our purpose
(and this state of affairs wilt surely
emerge in -a war effort only abstractly
involving American interests), public
opinion will disengage their support
gradually and completely.
It is the attitude of those about to go
.into the armed forces or of normally
,liberally minded youth which will turn
aggressive. As their anxiety -about the
faceless war grows, their hostility
towards the American government and
its institutions will become more in-
tense. They will observe they are acting
aggressively towards their own govern-
ment and its policies --an attitude that
they are not historically comfortable
-0 (3 ir s) C,1.7.;
The following 111C117011111d1M1 ('Some ObSerVOliGliS Olt the Psycho-Political Dimen-
sion of the Vietnam Conflict: Enemy Operations and Internal Dissidence"), dated
12 Sep 1962 and routed pro forma to the Director, CIA, was presumably pre-
pared by a covert CIA consultant (not identified except through the designator
02./34
1. Communist dodrine understands
psycho-political operations to be a
major weapons system, and potentially,
-at least in certain instances, the decisive
weapons system. In the Vietnam con-
flict, the US has the capability of bring-
ing to bear in the local theater an over-
Nvhelining preponderance of conven-
tional?not to speak of nuclear----weap-
ons. This fact dictates, for the Com-
munists, a high priority for the psycho-
political system, since in this capability
the Communists possess superiority. In
terms of total strategy, psycho-political
operations offer the potential of out-
flanking the enemy, that is, the US.
2. It is with respect to psycho-politi-
cal operations that the essentially global
nature of the Conflict is most unmis-
takably apparent. In routine day-by-day
activities of the Communist-ruled na-
tions and Communist organizations,
there are divergences and disputes: cf.,
. most conspicuously, the Si no-Soviet
? disputes, as well as the factional and
ideological fissions between and in local
Communist parties and front organiza-
tions. But in a struggle defined as Within their global framework-, Judo- political initiatives.
against the leader4P6911401FACRPII,eaVI Q U080:rOARDP844)0499R004000139000V6
a united front of all Communist ele-
ments, governments as , well as non-
governmental organizations, automati-
cally tends to sharpen up. The psycho-
political campaign is, in sum, both
global and unified. (A tight command
structure and continuous liaisdn are not
required, since the shared ideological
foundations and historical goals assure,
for the most part, a sufficient coordina-
tion.) The psycho-political campaign is
carried forward by and from Moscow,
Peiping, Warsaw, Havana, Hanoi and
even Belgrade, together with all Com-
munist parties and satellite organiza-
tions, Moscow-oriented, Trotskyite,
Maoist, revisionist, adventurist, etc.
This has been demonstrated throughout
the past decade of comparatively low-
profile struggle in Indochina, and will
become more strikingly apparent when
?as has become probable--the strug-
gle is escalated.
3. Frorn the point of view of Com-
munist conflict management, psycho-
political operations constitute one .di-
mension or mode of their total war.
with-----and to explain these actions they
will conclude that all government policy
is bad and its officers corrupt and im.- ?
-moral. This kind of attitude develop-
ment process is well .understood, and
it works like clockwork:
. As a result the Administration should
not start the Vietnamese operations if
they see the war as an LTV,' affair.
STW: If the American public were
.prepared for the events in and around
an STW operation they would over-
whelmingly support the effort. Opinion
would have to be shaped as carefully
as it has been done in the past
(See TOP SECRET-Sens. 1987/139--
BOSEVLT--WW2). There would still
he seriouscriticism of the policy but it
would remain- minor if the entire event,
was over within 12 to 24 months.
active local theaters or fronts. The US
thus should consider itself engaged in a
two-front (in the larger and long-term
sense, global) war. It is probable that
the enemy regards territorial US as the
main front.
4. Among primary objectives of
Communist psycho-political operations
are, and will be, the following:
a) Global, long-term: Weakening of
the relative power position of the US;
promotion of discords between US and
other nations, especially allied nations;
promotion of anti-US attitude in less
developed nations; all as subordinate to
long-term objective of defeat of US and
thereby achievement, of Communist
global hegemony.
b) -Indochinese theater, specific: Pop-
ularization of image of US as invading
imperialist aggressor, anti-masses, anti-
Asian, white racist, fascist, protector of
local landlords, grafters and exploiters,
etc.; presentation of Saigon govern-
ment (so long as under.anti-Communist
leadership) as tool of US imperialism,
corrupt, murderous, etc. (cf. current
operation re President Diem); use of
all opportune means to drive wedge be-
tween Saigon government and US;
utilization of US personnel (civilian
and military) as carriers, conscibus or
unconscious, of Communist psycho-
long-teral:
10
)7?,PRTypd 4,011111981 ql.A-RDPg047-011A9
tion Indoaina conui uat o as
"in the present situation the
`alitiviar moveme,ae----as,orning
that tho Viet-,!a,n coPr_:CC is if)
be protracted and ex.panded?
extends potcrtially far beyond
the circles the COLO^
and/or fellow travelers
have in the past been able to
establish Peave contact. if the
congict is 1.org, prol,racted and
frustrating, it is safe to predict
that an i;Iliiwar moven:en::
formidable in size and in:eusity
will develop frrml. many sectors
of the population.... :Cf the
anii)vai moveinent reached a
surf/ CI), broad tnt-1 devel-
oped level--as it would prob-
ably do if the conffict is sufg-
ciontly drawn out?this would
mean that the Communists
would be in a position of
psycho-political leverage from
which they could exercise a
considerable degree of control
over the -US political process, at
least with respect to Ncioehina."
opportunity to advance in long-term
campaign to maximize potential fissions
Mid splits within US social structure,
and to promote division between gov-
ernment and people.
d) US theater, specfic: Maximum
exploitation of antiwar sentiment, spon-
taneously present under the prevailing
climate of opinion, in relation to a con-
flict of this nature (far-off, not ob-
viously related to direct national inter-
est, drawn-out and frustrating, etc.);
_ transformation of antiwar sentiment
into a dissident, to the extent possible a
subversive, movement against the US
government and social order; atrocity
propaganda; sympathetic stories and re-
ports of VC and NVN; continuous
anti-Saigon government propaganda.
5. Within the US theater (as global)
the. longtime fellow-travelers, sympa-
thizers and dupes of the Communists
--including those who have. remained
covert.----have automatically lined up in
a de facto united front. Some of them
are already finding their way to Hanoi,
.forming committees, etc., and ? establish-
ing active contact with their similars in
other countries---in many cases reviv-
ing old acquaintances from numer-
ous Communist-controlled conferences
sponsored by the World Peace Council
and other international fronts. How-
ever, in the present situation the "anti-
war movement"--assuming that the
Vietnam conflict is to be protracted and
expanded?extends potentially far be-
yond the circles with which the Com-
munists and/or fellow travelers have in
the past been able to establish active
contact. If the conflict is long, pro-
tracted and frustratinP:, it is safe to
predict that . 'an antiwar movement
formidable in size and intensity will de-
velop from many sectors of the popula-
tion: the youth (with the additional
motivation of fear_ or hatred of the
ri Co-.- L24P01-1
An early memorandum dated 26 May 1954 from Admiral Arthur W. Radford as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson,
entitled "Studies with Respect to Possible US Action Regarding Indochina," had
included the recommendation (3.a), "Employing atomic weapons, whenever ad-
vantageous. . . ." The text of the following cable from Admiral Ulysses S. Grant
Sharp,. then Commander. in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?though
carefully obscured iii spite of its ultra-secret designation?indicates that the pro-
posal to make one or another use of nuclear weapons remained alive within time
military as well as at least one section of the- intelligence communities.
12 Feb. 1965
?FROM: CINCPAC
TO: JCS
SUBJ: LIGHTNING
A. 'YOUR 210114Z
B. CINCPAC 211002Z (GENSER)
C.. OPPLAN 65-34K.
REF A REQUESTED STATUS OF CTNCPAC
COMMENTS ON REP C. REF B FURNISHED
t.j!gal?t19K0?-19.9Pclttils ; the clergy; the
media; the left wings of the major par-
ties; in due course, political figures
either influenced by ideological consid-
erations or feeling that antiwar is the?
wave of the electoral future.
6. This antiwar sentiment and the
mass antiwar movement into which it
has already begun to - develop. has his-
torical, psychological and moral roots
not overtly related to Communism or
the Communists. The Communists and
their allies, in the US and globally, will
not exercise direct control over its de-
velopment and all of its Itctivities,_
though they will over some. But, ob-
jectively considered, the antiwar move-
ment will constitute a receptor for the
Communist psycho-political operations;
it will be, in a general way,: in. reso-
nance. This means that Hanoi, the Com-
munist apparatus in the US, and global
Communism will be able to use the
antiwar movement as a transmitting
mechanism through which their ideas,
slogans and proposals of the moment
can reach and influence the broad US
public in a "denatured" form, stripped
of time taint of a too obviously Com-
munist or enemy (Hanoi) origin. If the
antiwar movement reached a suffi-
ciently broad and developed level?as
it would probably do if the conflict is;
sufficiently drawn out.--this would
mean that the Communists Would be in
a position of psycho-political leverage
from which they could exercise a con-
siderable degree of control over the US
political process, at least with respect
to Indochina.
COMMENTS ON . ALL ASPECTS OF REF C
WITH EXCEPTION OF ANNEX NOVEMBER
AND CINCPAC'S OVERALL ESTIMATE OF
EASMILITY ANT) IMPACT OF SUCCESS-
FUL COMPLETION OF REP C ON DRV.
THIS MESSAGE COMPLETES CINCP AC'S
VIEWS ON PROPOSED OPERATION.
CONCUR IN GENERAL APPROACH CON-
TAINED IN ANNEX NOVEMI3ER wind EX-
CEPTION OF POSTDROP AIRBORNE MONI-
TORING' ' REQUIREMENTS. GIVEN PROB-
ABLE PRESENCE OF GN UNITS OPERAT-
ING IN GULF NORTH 01' 17TH PARALLEL
AT DR01"11 ME, AND HIGHLY VARIABLE
UPPER ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS PRE-
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11
eont. .1.4,4
VATTING THIS flME
Approv,edyfo1'iffltease-20151/4.4108);IA-RDP844049908%400900001-6nic0ms AND USSI:
Al' LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL PLATFORMS
REQUIRED. PLATFORMS SHOULD HAVE CA-
PABILITY OF INITIATING COMMUNICA-
TIONS 'WITH GVN UNITS AFTER DI:or TO
ADVISE OF PREDICTED FALLOUT PAT-
TERNS, IF ANY. CURRENT -INTELLIGENCE
ON TWO PROPOSED SITES FOR DEMON-
STRATJON DROP SKETCHY AT BEST. HOW-
EVER, BELIEVE AU] ERNATIVE SITE A
PREFERABLE. WHILE VISUAL IMPACT OF
.DROP WILL BE SINGLE MOST - DRAMATIC
DIMENSION, SITE A OFFERS PROBABLE
SUBSTANTIAL AUDIO DIMENSION AS WEI,L,
GIVEN REDUCED DISTANCE FROM HAI-
)'HONG. TOTAL POPULATION AND CIVIL-
IAN/MILITARY RATIOS AT BOTH SITES
BELIEVED ROUGHLY EQUAL.
OINCPAC BELIEVES THAT REF C OFFERS
SINGLE BEST POSSIBLE SOLE) ION TO A
FAVORABLE, DIXIS1VE AND SPEEDY END
TO PRESENT CONFLICT. POLICY OF GRAD-
UATED MILITARY PRESSURE HAS NOT
YIELDED ANY DISCERNIBLE RESULTS TO
DATE, NOR . IS THERE GROUND FOR BE-
a=r,1
(t1'%L. Ve5' F c tcf, C,4
SINCE EACH US STEP IN PRoot;A?-1-. OF
GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE CAN BE
ANTICIPATED BY ENEMY, WHO CAN TAKE
ALL- NECESSARY MEASURES IN ADVANCE
TO MINIMIZE EFFECTS OF THESE .STEPS.
GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE SCE-
NARIO GUARANTEES DRY ABILITY '10 PRE-
PARE ITSELF MILITARILY, ECONOMICAL-
LY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FOR EACH
SU13SEQUENT STEP. BY ITS VERY NA-
TURE, THIS POLICY GIVES THE ENEMY
OUR WAR PLANS IN ADVANCE.
CINCPAC BELIEVES ENEMY STAYING POW-
ER IN VN CONFLICT CONSISTENTLY UN-
DERESTI MATED. GIVEN POLITICAL DICTA-
TORSHIP IN DRY, ENEMY STAYING POWER
PROBABLY SUN Ut.1032 TO US, A LONG
DRAWN OUT CONFLICT WILL Vv'OAR: TO
ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE, NOT OURS, AND
POLICY OR GRADUATED 1,1 ILITARY RE-
SPONSE PRACTICALLY GUARANTEES AN
EXTENDED CONFLICT.
CINCPAC CONCURS THAT INCREASED RISK
WILL RESULT FROM SUCCESSFUL COM-
PLETION OF DEMONSTRATION DROP.
HOWEVER, IF THIS IS PRIMARY ClIli ERI-
ON FOR DETERMINING SCOPE AND NA-
TURE OF 'MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SE
ASIA, IT IS CLEAR TO LIE THAT WITH-
DRAWAL IS PREFERRED COURSE OF AC-
TION, I BELIEVE OUR CURRENT STRATE-
GIC P05 LURE SUFFICJEN1"10 DETER ANY
RASH. ACT BY EITHER CIIICOMS OR USS
ALTHOUGH THIS MAY NOT BE CASE FIVE
YEARS FROM NOW.
TOTS). IMPACT or A SUCCESSFUL HIGH
ALTITUDE DROP OFF HAIPHONG HARBOR.
ON DRY LEADERSHIP IMPOSSIBLE 'TO ES-
TIM ATE DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, CINCTAC
FINDS IT DIE rucul.T TO 'VISUALIZE ANY
OTHER COURSE OP ACTION FOR US IN
PRESENT- -CONFLICT WHICH WOULD BE
MORE LIKELY '1'0 (A) BRING DRY TO
CONFERENCE, TABLE, (II) ENABLE US TO
SETTLE CONFLICT ON FAVORABLE TERMS
FOR OURSELVES AND CIVN, AND (C) SAVE
LIVES OF . AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN.
In the slimmer of 1966, apparently in response to a request by the Secretory of
Defense or Assistant .Secretary McNaughion, the joint Chiefs. of .S'tal1 analyzed
the requirements of a "full-blown" blockade of North Tiietnan7 and Cambodia. Up
to this point, only a blockade of the South Vietnamese coastline had been at-
tempted, nuclei' the fairly successful Market, Tillie program, and a ?blacklist of
-merchant ships which traded with North Vietnam had been established in order
to reduce the availability of transport to the North Vietnamese.
The joint Chiefs have reviewed the
force requirements, possible command
structures,' and probable impact and ef-
fectiveness of .alternative DRY block-
ade options. We find that, to be effec-
-live, any blockade will. have to. include
the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville
.and any ,other potential deep- or medi-
.urn-draft .Cambodian offioading points.
The following discussion is predicated
on the assumption that. Cambodia will
be included in any blockade effort.. .We
further assume that it will be desirable
to retain the option' in blockade of per-
'milting certain selected ships to pass
-through (for example, those carrying,
foodstuffs for domestic NVN consump-
lion). We wish to make clear that while
We believe a full-blown blockade to be
a necessary condition if DRY support
of forces in SYN is to be terminated,
a blockade, by itself, will not be Sul!--
dent to do the job alone.
Two basic options, or some combina-
tion, are open to blockade planners:
1. Passive blockade. A passive block-
ade would be confined .to measures
which avoid any face-to-face US/DRY
'No blockade will be 109%
effective in denying outside
intOrarial support to ene,ray
.forces in SVN.. . .-Road trans-
port of -material from China
through D1.-tv to SVP:T can
probably b2 reduced to 50 tqnS
a month, considering cx-pcted,
losses in fray-is:it.- Given .minimal
'Soviet ,and Cniconi..sustained
? airl:ft .capability, air leakage
.stould'he ineunsequential."
Li':u'iiV j CIA
or US/Communist bloc confrontation
on the high seas or in DRV territorial
waters. Measures to be taken in such a
blockade would include (but not be
limited to) aerial, surface and sub-
surface mining of all DRY and Cam-
bodian ports and approaches thereto,
placement of obstacles such as sunken
-concrete-laden barges and LSTs in har-
bors and approaches, utilizing SVIq
naval forces to intercept, board and in-
spect any ships which request permis-
sion to pass through blockade (or at-
tempt to run it), and a greatly expand-'
?ed U.S. intelligence effort to detec1 po-
tential blockade runners and discrim-
inate between ships carrying permissibk-,
(if any) cargos from those carrying
contraband.
2. Active blockade. An active block-
ade would -involve the overt participa-
tion df US -:naval and air forces in the
interception, boarding, inspection and
engagement (if necessary) of any ships
which attempted to run the blockade.
An active blockade would include most
of the elements of the passive blockade
option as well.
,Leakages.-No?blockade will be 100%
effective in denying outside material
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support to enemy
ages can be expected consisting- of Ma-
terial produced in DRV and shipped
overland to SVN as well as supplies
which enter into DRV overland from
Chinese border. However, sustained and
concentrated aerial bombardment of
Lao Kay and Lang Son rail links to
China can reduce rail leakage to mini-
mal amounts. Road transport of material.
from China through DRV to SVN can
probably be reduced to 50 tons a month,
considering expected losses in transit.
Given minimal Soviet and Chicom sus-
tained airlift capability, air leakage
should be inconsequential.
Force requirements
1. Passive blockade. Considerable re-
inforcement of mine warfare forces in
WESTPA.0 would be required: a) a
minimum of two additiOnal MSF divi-
sions; b) additional .surveillance capa-
bility; c) one squadron of P3-As or two
squadrons of S2s, with land-based. sup-
port requirements; d) augmentation of
intelligence assets, in..luding one addi-
tional AFTR and two airborne EL1NT
platforms, One on-station and One re-
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forces lit 1 eaK- serveS wothd ' eT/JISIC "rajle Yee y sunoroinate to c7INCPAC.
value. .MSFs will need surface com-
batant support when carrying out oper-
ations.in hostile environment. At least
one DD division will be necessary for
this mission. Further material and
logistic support will need to be fur-
nished to SVN navy units engaged in
intercept and inspection duties.
? 2. Active Blockade. In addition to
assets needed to support passive block-
ade, two additional divisions of DUs
and two divisions of PlFs would be re-
quired. Air cover of US intercept and
inspection operations can probably be
tasked to Yankee Team carrier.
COMMand Structure
Experience gained in Market Time
operations suggests the need for a sin-
gle over-all authority to exercise com-
mand and control of any full-blown
blockade effort. Given the potential
sensitive, political problems il'aising in the
carrying out of any blockale, and the
need for immediate, high-level response
to developing situations, it is suggested
that the command and control clement
in charge of blockade operations he di-
Potential Problenn
In addition to the international politi-
cal problems discussed elsewhere in this
rnernorandmn, certain operational prob-
lems arising out of any blockade, can be.
foreseen. These include: detonation of
mines by ships carrying permissible
cargo, with resulting international corn-
plication. . . . As we have discovered
from Market Time ops, Hainan Island
will play a crucial role in any attempts
to evade a blockade. Accordingly, any
blockade line and intelligence collection
program will have to be -designed to
insure maximum detection of tram-
shipments from Hainan. . . . Coastal
traffic between China and NVN will
probably be best countered via a pas-
sive barrier in the Mon Cay: vicinity
on the NV1N/Chicom border, .Active
operations in this area will be. difficult
to carry out and subject to substantial
risk of active interference from NVI,I
or Chic.om naval forces.
Probable impact of and international
repercussions from full-blown blockade
operation lie outside scope of request.
e,
? \ t72): :;`) ,17:'[.i71 I
"i (-2' d L. it
r _ ,
; C.; (...) CZ:-;1.1"k17);,LLi,?,C ?i? iq
?
Summary of draft memorandum "Protracted Conflict and American Historical
and Societal Chola. cter," from the Committee of Historians and Cultural Anthro-
pologi.sts, prepared by Professor Daniel Doorstin of tile Dept. of History, Univer-
sity of Chicago, to President John F. Kennedy, June 30, 1963.
In accordance with your request of
May 30, 1963 the full Committee met
June 7-12 in Chicago to review the
problem of protracted conflict in the
context of American historical expe-
rience and from the perspective of cur-
rent. societal values. These conferences
and a review of relevant data issued in
the following tentative conclusions.
1. In the abstract, a prolonged con-
flict in Vietnam, characterized, when
necessary, by increasing pressure upon
the enemy applied in. minimal incre-
ments, would appear both rational and
prudent. It would appear to. avoid the
extremes of both defeat and largescale,
possibly nuclear, warfare.
2. However, serious objections to
such a course exist on the grounds of
the American historical experience as
that has shaped the habits and expecta-
tions of Americans at the present time.
Some of the basic points are:
a) American sod ety is achievement-
oriented. The American expects his ef-
forts to issue in definite, even measur-
able results. When his efforts fail to pro-
duce such results he becomes embit-
tered and, often, irrational. (See Ap-
pendix A: Robert K. Merton, "Patterns
of Cultural Goals and Institutional
Norms"; also, Merton and Rossi, "Ref-
"AlT)CrieD31 soc=cty aci,leve-
Dlei).01`ee, 7 The f`kiDeriCt171
expects his e;ioyts to issue
definite, eve-.t measprabic re-
SEALS. When. his effoYts fail to
procilice such resulL:3 he be-
comes embitieved and, often,
irration L"
erence Group Theory and Social Mo-
bility.") 11 should be pointed out that
the expectation of definite and/of me.a-
surable results does not exist in societies
where a different conditioning has pre-
vailed. In such non-achievement ad-
opted societies, the individual is often
content to go from day to clay for long'
periods of time sustained by other kinds
of values built into the culture.
b) American society is "progressive"
in the sense that effort is expected to
produce not only tangible results but a
general improvement in the over-all
state of affairs. When such improve-
ment is not forthcoming, dysfunction-
lug, both individual and systemic, is
likely to result. (See Appendix B: John
A. Clausen, "The Sociology of Mental
Illness"; Albert K. Cohen, "The Study
of Social Disorganization and Deviant
Behavior.")
c) American society is individualistic
and .contractual in significant respects.
This means that the individual is less
content. to subordinate his own satisfac-
tions for the good of the larger social
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entity than he is in other. seccictics, and in other socio-cultural contexts, makes 1815, the PelOpOiiriCSTaIl War and many
this reluctance increases exponentially little provision for "stalemate"; and fur- other earlier conflicts, not to mention
in the absence of the ycwards noted in then that the mass American sporting the most pertinent of all, the war that
a and. b. (See Appendix C: William 3. heroes. are the. "Enock.--out" puncher, the has been waged by Vietnamese against
Goode, "The Sociology of the Family"; "home run" hitter, and the professional each other, the Japanese, the 1..)xlsch
Georg Shun:tel., "Conflict and the Struc- quarterback who "throws the long. and the Americans for IN: last half-
of the Group.") 'fhe failure of the bomb." IIe persuaded the other confer- century). The American wars have
gsoup to -produce such expected re- ces that these were important clues to been characterized by the concentrated
wards characteristically results in re- American cultural emotional patterns, application of power and the 'sudden
bellicms behavior directed at the group, c) In contrast to other cultures, "breakthrough." The American military
as well as the "de-legitimizing," of said Americans exhibit a very high boredom services arc a reflection of the larger
group. coefficient. This is related to tbe time American society and its ethos, and
d) The factor of time pervades factor discussed above. Several confer-- nothing in the historical experience of
American socio-cultural ,value systems ees felt that a "protracted conflict" either would 'seem to make it easily
to an. unprecedented degree. (See Ap-- would, among other effects, produce adaptable to protracted .conflict. (See
pendix D: II. Werner, et al., "Rhythmic widespread boredom, apathy etc. Pro- Appendix Ft R. A., Katzell, "Contrast-
Activity and the Perception of Time"; lessor McLuhan -made the point that ing Systems of Work Organization";
J. A. )T)yal and '1'. A. Holland, "Dis- television, even the televised news, is Robert M. Gagne, "Military Training
crimination Reaction Time as a Joint from oneperspective entertainment. No and Priimcpl cl Learning"; also Mil-
Function of Manifest Anxiety and In-
telligence"; and H. C. I. Duijker and
N. H. Frijda, "National Character and
National Stereotypes.") in all areas of
his daily life, Professor Mead noted, the
American is conditioned to an environ-
ment of speed, to a high degree of auto-
maticity and to efficiency in a wide va-
riety of social and economic relations.
This produces "impatience" when tinse
expectations are not satisfied.. (See Ap-
pendix E: P. E. Medd, "Schizotaxia,
Sehizotypy and Schizophrenia.") Pro-
fessor Cottrell observed the relationship
between time in American life generally
and time as a factor in mass American
entertainment, as in professional foot-
ball, hockey, boxing, etc., where the
clock is a key element in the total ex-
perience. Professor Cottrell pointed out
that American sport, relative to sports
audience, he. said, would tolerate the
same show night after night indefinitely.
f) American society is increasingly
technological. The American lives in an
environment where technological power
is characteristically brought to bear to
achieve specific results in a short period
of lime. 'This conditions his expecta-
tions generally. It is worth noting that
the young?I.e., those who would bear
most of thc burden of the war----are pre-
cisely the segment. of the population.
most conditioned by the post-World
War II environment of technological
efficiency.
3. The, wars fought by the United
States since 'the industrial revolution
have been relatively short (contrast the
Thirty Years War, the Hundred Years
War, the extended conflict between
England and France between 1688; and
a-D3zA [3,4
LeCs.d.`Mit,32.-; [di Eirco
ton Jensen,. "
iVe Reaction to
Air Force.")
4. The "Report of the Subcom-
mittee, on Southeast. Asia" emphasized
the contrast between the American and
Vietnamese socio-culthral context, viz.
whereas the prevailing value structure
in America is negative as regards pro-
tracted conflict, the prevailing value
structure in Southeast Asia is positive.
1, the case of each factor, a) through
I), the Vietnamese is better adapted to
this kind of warfare than the American.
5. Conclusion: It was the conclusion
of the Committee that on these -and
other grounds specified at length in the
Report that from a social-anthropologi-
cal-historical perspective the waging of
a protracted conflict in Vietnam is con--
tra:indicated.
_ l4on-Adpist-
'Ci ainiog in the
c:l:lh
-(--j%n (1.j) rf 'Orracc
(6' Li c,-; .!';')Eir.A C) tJc
Handwritten note by Secretary of State summarizing the results of a high-level
departmental meeting at which the advisability of seeking a decloration of war
had been discussed, dated Feb. 10, 1965.
The following reasons pro and con
were adduced during- the meeting:
a) Deel. of war against NLF (The
National Liberation Front created, by
Hanoi as time ostensibly South Vietnam-.
ese framework for the North Vietnam-
ese effort) is out of question; it would
elevate that entity to the dignity of a
state and would preclude any ultimate
political success of our action.
b) Dcel. of war on North Vietnam
unadvisable because of the mixture of
Southern subversive and Northern mili-
tary and paramilitary operations; also
because of consistent denial of Hanoi
that. its troops are operating in the
South.
c) Precedent of Korea as all 1111de--
dared war.
(1) For a short terns effort, "Ponkin
Rcs. is Sufficient, decl. of war would
become desirable only if war were to
last for years. In view of sharp actions
proposed by joint Chiefs, including ac-
tive blockade, cutting No Chi Minh
Trail, and exerting diplomatic and eco-
nomic pressures on SU, one must an-
ticipate rapid attrition of aggressive
potential of DRV by File 1966, and
conclusion of overt military operations.
After that only mopping up operations.
c) Commitment of US troops by
Pres. without declaration has ample
precedents (over 100 times?).
1) Dech conjures up prospect of use
of atomic weapons which we do not
want even to suggest.
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NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
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22 JUL 1971
The article that follows is part of The
.Planning of the Vietnam ? War, a study
by members of the Institute of Policy
Studies in Washington; including
Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and
Ralph Stavins.*. In: their introduction
to the study, the authors write:
"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin con-
ceived the. idea of a study that would
explain how the Vietnam disaster hap-
pened by analyzing the planning of the
War.. A group of investigators directed
by Ralph Stavins concentrated on
'finding out who did the actual plan-
ning that led to the decisions to bomb
North Vietnam, to introduce over a
trOops into South Viet- ,
nam, to defoliate and destroy vast
areas of Indochina, and to create
,millions of refugees in, the area.
"Ralph Stavins, assisted by (anta
Plan. John Berkowitz, George Pipkin,
?
and Brian Eden, conducted more than
300 interviews in the course of this
studY. A Mong those interviewed
were many .Presidential advisers to
Kennedy and Johnson, generals and
admirals, middle level bureaucrats who
occupied strategic positions in the
,national security bureaticracy, and offi-
cial, military and civilian, who carried:
out the policy in the field in Vietnam.
"A number of informants backed up
their oral statements with documents
in their possession, .including informal
lminutes of meetings, 'as well as por-
tions of the official documentary ree-
lord now known as the "Pentagon
Papers." Our information is drawn not,
only from the Department of Defense,.
but also from the White House, the
Department of State, .and the Central
Intelligence Agency."
The study is being,published in two?
The first, which includes the,
article below, will be published early in
August. The second will appear in'
.May, 1972. .?
? I
*The study is the responsibility of its
authors and does not necessarily reflect
the views of the Institute, its trustees,
or-fellows,
Ii L. Stavins
There has been an increasing dis-
position within official circles and
the army to question Diem's abili-
ty to lead in this period. Many
feel that he is unable to rally the
people in the fight against the
Communists because of? his .reli-
ance on virtual one-man rule, his
? tolerance of corruption extending
even to his immediate entourage,
and his refusal to relax a rigid
system of public controls.
At the end of March, '1961, the CIA
.circulated a National Intelligence Esti;
mate on the situation in South Viet-
nam. This paper advised Kennedy that'
Diem was a tyrant who was confronted
with two sources of disContent, the
non-Communist loyal opposition and
the Viet Cong. The two problems Were
closely connected. Of- the spreading
Viet Cong network the CIA noted: ?
Local recruits and sympathetic or,
intimidated villagers have enhanced
Viet Cong control and influence
over increasing areas of the coun-
tryside.. For example, more- than
one-half of the entire rural region
.south and .southwest of Saigon; as
well as some areas to the north,
are under considerable Communist
control. Some of these areas are in
effect denied to all government
authority not immediately backed,
by substantial armed force. The
Viet Cong's strength encircles Sai-
gon and has recently begun to
.move closer in the city.
The people were not opposing these
recent advances by the Viet Cong; if
anything, they seemed to be support-
ing them. The failure to rally the
people against the Viet Cong was laid
to Diem's dictatorial rule:
The CIA.referred to the attempted coup
.against Diem that had - been led by
, . .
General Thi in November, 1960, and
concluded that another coup was likely.
In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong,
they predicted that the next attempt to.
overthrow Diem would. originate with
the army and- the non-Communist
opposition.
The -Communists would like to
initiate and control a coup against
Diem, and their armed mid sub-
versive operations including united
front efforts are directed toward
this purpose. It is more 'likely,
however, that any coup attempt
which occurs over the next year or
so will originate among non-
Communist elements, perhaps a
combination of disgruntled civilian
officials an.d oPpositionists and
army elenients, broadq: than those
involved in the November attempt.
In view of the broadly based Opposi-
tion to Diem's regime and his virtual
-reliance. on one-man rule, it was unlike-
ly that he would initiate any reform
measures that would sap the strength
of the revolutionaries. Whether reform
Was conceived as widening the political .
base of the regime, which Diem would
not agree to,. or whether it was to
consist of an intensified counter-
insurgency program, something the
people would not support, it had.
become painfully clear to Washington
that reform . was not the .path to
victory. But victory was the goal, and
Kennedy palled upon Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw.
up the. victory plans. On April 20,
1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:
a) Appraise the current status and
future prospects of the Communist
drive to dominate South Vietnam..
b) Recommend a series of actions
(military, political, and/or econom-
ic, overt and/or covert) which will
prevent Communist domination of
that country.
?Ant nu ed
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va
Accords have placed inhibitions
upon free world action' while at
the same time placing no restric-
tions, upon the Communists, Am-
bassador Nolting should be in-
structed to enter into preliminary
discussions with Diem regarding
the possibility of a defensive secur-
ity alliance despite ?the ? inconsis-
tency of such actions with the
Geneva Accords.
This action would be- based on
the' premise that such an under-
taking is justified in international
law as representing a refusal to be
bound by the Accords in a degree
and .manner beyond that which
the other 'partyto the 'Accordshas
shown a ?willingness to honor.
Communist violations, therefore,
justify the establishment of the
security arrangement herein recom-
mended. Concurrently, Defense
should study the military advisa-
bility of _committing ? US forces in
Vietnam.
?
This was the explanation that would
be given to the American public:
Communist violations of the Accords
justified the bilateral treaty and the.
Gilpatric organized an Interdepart-
mental Task Force with representatives
from State,. Defense, CIA, the Inter-.
national Cooperation Agency, the US
I Information Agency, and the 'Office of
the President, with Brigadier General
Edward Lansdale as operations officer.
Their .report was to be completed in
one week.
The final version, "A Program of
,Action to Prevent Communist Domina-
tion of South Vietnam," was sub-
mitted to Kennedy on' May 6. The
'victory plans recommended by the
Gilpatric Task. Force called for the use
of 'US ground troops and a bilateral
treaty, between the US and the GVN.
Both proposals stood in direct viola-
tion of the Geneva Accords, but were
required because "it is essential that
President Diem's full confidence in and
communication with the Unita States
be restored promptly."
Diem suspected that . the United
.States was wavering ir4 its commitment
to ? the GVN on several grounds, some
rational, such as the negotiations fdr a
Laotian settlement, others irrational,
such as his belief that the U,S had'
played a role in the attempted coup of
November, 1960. But it was 'Diem's
.suspicions, not the justification for
them, that .compelled Washington to
give serious consideration to using
o old troops and to signing a treaty
the GVN, even though Diem's
e,....ies were demonstrably ? bankrupt
and the suggested remedies violated
international law. The feeling w'as be-
ginning to take hold. in Washington
that if the US took over the jdb,
Diem's policies would not matter. This
belief was to be reinforced during the
crisis in the fall -of 1961, when
Secretary of State Dean Rusk recom-
mended that the United States simply
.take over the machinery of government
in the South, should ground troops be
introduced into the combat theater..
Circumventing international law Was
viewed by the Kennedy Administration
as a problem far less significant than
that .of building support for a bankrupt
GVN. Nevertheless, the question ex-
ercised the minds of officials in Wash-
aington. In his report to Kennedy,
Gilpatric, for example, advanced the
following argument to meet the charge
that the United States was flouting the
law:
use of US 'ground forces. But would
this explanation also, convince official
Washington of the need to deploy
troops? Indeed not. In the same re-
port; Gilpatric informed Kennedy why
US troops were . needed in Vietnam.
"US forces are required," Gilpatric
wrote, "to provide, maximum psycho-
logical impact in deterrence of further
Communist aggression from North
Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union."
.They would alsO serve an additional
purpose: "to provide significant mili-
tary resistance to i)otential North Viet-
nam Communist and/or Chinese Com-
munist action" (italics added).
The US public was to be told that
Washington had a legal right to deploy
troops in response to actual Com-
munist transgressions, while privately
Washington would decide to act be-
cause of "potential" Communist ac-
tion. Of course, "further". aggressions
from .China or the Soviet Union could
hardly be equated with past violations,
especially since neither country had set
foot in South Vietnam. Indeed, Russia
had sponsored the two Vietnams for
'membership in the United Nations as
late as 1959. "Further" aggressions
.from the North', such as reactivating
the guerrilla apparatus in the South, an
apparatus manned by Southern cadres
and fed by Southern peasants, were
Hanoi's delayed response to the initial
-Approved For jos. w Ito g-IapEil44ri9ci494Reio1 moo 90tion*so n that he did
not want foreign troops on Vietnamese._
rcnntinued
collusion with Washington, had refused
to consult with the North or hold
elections in the South, as required by
the Geneva Accords.
Thus, Washington's
ploying combat troops
dicta the explanation that would be
given to the presk and' to Congress.
Washington had decided that the way
to manipulate international law was to
fool the American people.
On' May 11, President Kennedy,
after reviewing the findings of the
Gilpatric Task Force, issued:a National
Security Action Memorandum which
'contained several important decisions
on Vietnam. Such memoranda, written
by the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy, were -used to convey Presidential
orders to all the agencies that were to,
carry them out, or needed to know
about them. The NSAM of May 11
stated: -
reason for de-
directly contra-
1. The US objective is to prevent
Communist domination of South ,
Vietnam.
2. A further increase in GVN forces
frOm 170,600 to 206,000 is to be
assumed. ?
3. Defense Department is directed to
;of
the size and composition
.of US forces in the event that such
forces are committed to Vietnam.
4. The United States will . seek to
increase the confidence of Diem.
5. The Ambassador should begin nego-
tiations for a bilateral arrangement.
with Vietnam. .
6, The program for .covert action is
approved. ?
? Gilpatric asked the Joint Chiefs of
Staff their opinion on the desirability
of deploying ? US forces td Vietnam.
They recommended ? immediate de-
ployment of 'a sufficient number to
achieve the objectives set fdrth in
the Gilpatric report. To set the ma-
chinery in motion, the Joint Chiefs
added, Diem should."be encouraged to
request that the 'United States fulfill its.
SEATO obligations.... Upon receipt'
of this request, suitable forces could be
immediately deployed."
Vice President Johnson was dis-
patched to Vietnam to shore up
Diem's confidence in the US commit-
ment by. "encouraging" him to request
US ground troops. Referring to Diem.
as, "the Winston Churchill of the
'Orient," Johnson asked him to make
this request. But much to Washington's
'soil, except in the event of overt
- aggression. Moreover, he pointed outr'
the presence of UApprOyedaccoil
contravene and nullify the Geneva
Accords. The. semblance of legality
could be preserved, he added, if Ameri-
can troops were channeled, as "ad-
visers," through the Military Assistance
.Advisory Group (MAAG), which had
been in South Vietnam since the
- mid-Fifties. .
After Johnson's visit, Diem sent a
letter to President Kennedy expressing
., gratitude for Johnson's offer of assis-
tance. "I was most. deeply gratified by
this gracious gesture . by your dis-
tinguished Vice President,, particularly
as we have not. become accustomed to
being asked for our own views as to
our needs," he wrote, concluding with
the reminder that "we can count. on
the material support from your great
country which will be so essential to
achieving final victory." Material sup-
port, not US troops, would be fur-
nished by Washington; otherwise Diem
.would?make himself even more vulner-
able to the Communist charge' that he
was a colonialist. ?
During the summer Of 1961, When
:the situation in Indochina deteriorated,
Diem. changed his mind and requested
a treaty and troops from the United
..States. On October I,. the recently
appointed Ambassador Nolting .re-
ported that Diem wanted a bilateral
defense treaty with the US; on the
, thirteenth, Diem requested ground
_troops. These requests coincided With
the conclusion of Defense Departmen?t-
and JCS studies, both of which advised
the President to dispatch US troops tb.
Vietnam, as wolf as with the announce-
ment of . a forthcoming "fact-finding
mission" to Vietnam by two White
House advisers, General. Maxwell Tay-
lor and Walt W. Rostow.
Having determined that the Viet Chiefs, or the use of nuclear weapons, as
,
hewmovement was local in origin, a cola aaplated by Admiral Felt, the
ThefaNilbnigkiglAtIRPRMAP4a9MAN090?M76 of the Pacific,
that 11,000 .US combat troops and forces (CINCPAC), was left undecided.
11,800 support troops be deployed to
? Vietnam for the purpose of sealing the
border against any possible future
infiltration. from the North. But, the
Department added, these troops would
be insufficient to establish an anti-
Communist government in the. South.
"The ultimate force requirements [for
that purpose] cannot be estimated
with any precision," the Departinent
stated.. "Three divisions would be a
guess." ?
The Joints Chiefs of Staff, in their
reply to Gilpatric, reasoned that the
North would rely -still .further.? upon a_
policy of infiltration if SEATO and US
troops were deployed in the South.'
The Joint Chiefs speculated that it
would be uncharacteristic of the North
to respond with an overt invasion of
the South, but in the event that it did,
the US would have to send in three
divisions. If China . threw its weight
into .the struggle, then six US divisions,
or a total: of 205,000 men, would be
required, and the use of nuclear
weapons would become a distinct pos-
sibility.
?
The CIA took the Viet Cong threat
less seriously than the Defense Depart-
ment did, and identified the non-
Communist (perhaps, one should say
anti-Communist) South as. the im-
mediate danger to Diem. The agency
wrote:
?
The Defense Departnient's study of
the Viet Cong movement produced the
discovery that the men and material
originated in the South, not the North.
The Department found that although
the level of infiltration from the North
was increasing, the "vast majority of
Viet Cong troops are of local origin."
If Hanoi was not furnishing the troops,
Was it at least furnishing the supplies?
"There is little evidence of major
'supplies from . outside sources," the
Defense Department study found,
d"most arms being captured or stolen
from GVN forces or from the French .
during the Indochina war." The NOrth
had given moral support to the insur-
gents, but little else. Aprirdved1Ftdar
United States do?
Most immediate threat to Diem is
not ? a military takeover by the
Communists but the mounting
danger of an internal coup by
disgruntled military and civilian
. members of the government who
are critical of Diem's leadership.
These critics hold that. Diem's
? heavy hand in all operations of the
government is not only hampering
the anti-Communist military effort
but is steadily alienating the popu-
lace.
Should a SEATO task force be
dispatched to Vietnam as an alternative
to US troops?one of the contingency
plans circulating in Washington at the
time?the CIA, like the Joint Chiefs,
discounted the likelihood of a Northern
invasion. Hanoi's strategy, the CIA
believed, would be "to play upon,
possible SEATO weariness over main-
taining substantial forces." Once this
weariness became evident, "the Asian
members would soon become disen-
h td d 1 k
the US
c an e an oo to to
something to lessen the burden and to
solve theaproblem." Whether this some- discussed the Taylor-Rostow mis-
Rojwoo iguecimogipc?at7904919Rooti btionetrimil6 Vice President
Thuan, speaking for President Diem,
do
f the CIA -analysis was correct, the
US faced the possibility of a major war
on the Asian mainland for the purpose
of defending the narrow. base of the
Diem regime against its own people.
Even the anti-Communist opposition in
the South was rapidly being trans-
muted into part . of a Communist
monolith, located either in Moscow or
Peking.'
Nevertheless, some advisers began to
argue for war. William Bundy, ,who had'
recently changed positions from the
CIA's . Far East expert to Deputy
Assistant Secretary at the Defense
Department, echoed Walt Rostow's be- ,
lief that the fall of 1961 was the "now
or never" period for the US.. If
America acted promptly and aggressive-
ly, Bundy argued, there was a .70
percent chance that it would "clean up
the situation." There was a 30 percent
chance that "we would wind up like
the French in 1954; white men can't
win this kind of war." Having weighed
the options, Bundy .concluded that a
-pre-emptive strike was advisable, and
recommended "early. _and:. hard-hitting
operations." a t
The Taylor-Rostow Mission
On October 1 1 , 1 961 , President
Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow
mission to Vietnam. Its purpose was to
examine the feasibility of dispatching
US troops; Kennedy specifically recom-
mended that the mission look into the
question of trop requirements. One
option would be to send fewer US
combat troops than the 22,800 identi-
fied in the, Defense Department plan,
but enough to "establish a US presence
in Vietnam." A second dispensed with
US combat forces entirely, and envi-
sioned a stepped-up version of what is
now called the "Vietnarnizatiori" pro-
gram. According to this plan, the
United States woUld increase its train-
ing of Vietnamese units and furnish
more US equipment, "particularly heli-
copters. and other light aircraft, trucks,
and other ground support transport."
Two days after Kennedy announced
the Taylor-Rostow mission, Diem, who
had heretofore refused to "request"
US combat troops, met with Ambas-
sador Nolting and asked that the US
government provide South Vietnam
with the aid that had been secretly
when
s ground troops, as favored by the Joint
etlrutitUed
requested an additional squadron ^assumption that tactical nuclear weal)- ^eted to have great military signif-
AD-6 fighter bombAPPrg yediEl3t ReIRASCgOSO aim :rpAraoR444(149 WNW, oPtctoP 91911TP ran the risk, as
- contract pilots for ?helicopters, trans- we can anticipate requests being made
port planes to be used for non-cOmbat. for their use if action expands into a
operations, and US, combat units to. , Phase 4 situation." (Phase 4 involved a
be introduced into South Vietnam as North VietnameSe and Chinese invasion
combat-:trainer units. of the South.)
_ . .
D. Once in Vietnam, Taylor and Ros-
iem had changed his mind.. Orig- tow explored ways of introducing US
inally ashamed to be dependent upon a ground troops. They had decided that
US presence and 'afraid .to scuttle the Diem needed them to preserve his rule,
Geneva Accordsn. he set aside these but they also recognized that such a
considerations once it became - clear course would damage America's image
that a neutral Laos was about to as a peacekeeper. The general and the
- emerge from the negotiations then professor wondered how the United
under way. According to Diem, a States could go to war while appearing
'neutral Laos would be useful to .the to preserve the peace. While they were
Communists. They could then cross pondering this 'question, Vietnam was
the western border at will, infiltrate suddenly struck by a deluge. It was as
- into the South, and crush him. The if God had wrought a miracle. Amer-
terrain in Laos was more difficult to lean . soldiers, acting on humanitarian
defend, and the Communists were impulses, could be dispatched to save
. strong enough there to strike a final Vietnam not from the Viet Cong, but
blow. Laos, he argued, had been used to from the floods. McGarr, the Chief of
trap the Americans into conceding . iV1, ,
AAG, stated that Taylor favored
South Vietnam. - "moving in US military personnel for
Having enticed the Americans. into a humanitarian purposes with subscqnent
settlement that made it look as if the
. retention if desirable." He added,
Americans had lost nothing, the Com- "This is an excellent opportunity to
munists could concentrate all of their minimize adverse publicity." "
. energies on seizing South Vietnam.. To
counter this strategy, Diem wanted laylor himself viewed the. flood
some immediate assurance that the US relief task 'force more ambitiously: It
would remain committed to the South. would be the most efficient way to
Such assurance would require a bilateral deal -.With world opinion, assuage.
treaty- and the presence of US combat
troops. Only this 'would dissuade the
North from pursuing a militant. policy
and convince thoiie elements in the
that were still loyal to Diem that
i..aotian settlement was not the death
warrant for the GVN.
The Kennedy Administration had
discovered that it was impossible' to
avoid war. The 'only question was
where and when. If Laos was not
settled quickly, the US would have to
pour in troops, with small chance of
success. But to negotiate a neutral
Laos meant that US troops would have
to be deployed to South Vietnam, thus
increasing the likelihood of a direct
confrontation. Washington had painted
itself into a corner?either war it Laos
now or nwar in Vietnam in, the future.
-Kennedy chose the latter.
r-r1
he Taylor-Rostow mission stopped
at Hawaii on the way to Vietnam and
.discussions were held with Admiral
Felt, head of CINCPAC. Rostow asked
about contingency plans in the event
that open warfare broke out with the
North. One .question in particular con-
cerned the use of nuclear weapons.
Felt replied, "Plans AppitametiofiCtIlRe
Taylor ;put it, of "escalating into a
major war in Asia." Even if this danger
did not .materialize, the initial commit-
ment would make it "difficult to resist
the pressure to ? reinforce." Once the
bloodof a single American- soldier had'
been spilled the President would
assume the role of 'Commander-in-Chief
and would be obliged to discharge his
constitutional duty to protect -the
troops in the field. ?
This' obligation' ritad'e it ??likly" that
troops Would be removed and far more
likely that. additional troops would be
'sent over. The technical device of a
built-in 'exit might be suPc..rseded by
the political reality of a built-in escala-
tion. And with the DRV and the Viet.
Cong committed to a policy of attri-
tion, the United States would then be
locked into a long struggle at the edge
of the Communist world..
Such 'a struggle would take place,
unfortunately, at a time , when "the
strategic reserve of the US forces is
presently so weak that we can ill afford
any detachment of forces." Taylor, in
effect, told Kennedy to dispatch a few
thousand combat troops which could
not. turn the tide of 'Military battle,
,which invited a major war, provoked an.
indefinite and indecisive conflict, and
Diem's fears, . and- allay Kennedy's". depleted the US reserve. Why should
reservations. World opinion would be Kennedy do ? this? Because, as Taylor.
swayed by humanitarian . Considera--_ said, "I do not believe that our program
tions. The colonial stain would not
unduly tarnish Diem's image because without it."
the flood relief program clearly was - The symbolic- gestnte of stationing a
not intended to "take over the respon- few thousand US troops would save
sibility for the security of the. coun-' South Vietnam., Taylor argued, because
try." Finally, and perhaps most im-? it would inform the, Communists of
portant, Taylor's plan contained ? a the "seriousness of the US intent to
built-in_excuse to withdraw--:a feature resist" and would raise the "national
?
intended to overcome. Kennedy's objec- morale" of the South. Taylor predicted
tions. The President, it was well that the North would back down if the
known, .believed that 'it was far more United States exhibited a fixed resolve
difficult to remove troops. than to to defend the South. That resolve had
introduce them. Taylor wrote to Ken- to be conveyed in the form of 'a clear
nedy, -"As the task is a specific one, message to Hanoi that the United
we can extricate our troops when it is States would take offensive action
done if we so desire. Alternatively, we 'against the North if it did not stop
can phase them into other activities if supporting the Viet Cong. A small task
we wish to remain longer." force, was a harbinger of greater devas-
Having invented a scheme that tation. The North would desist once it
'understood this message because, in
Taylor's 'word's, "North Vietnam is.
extremely vulnerable to conventional
bombing, a weakness which should be
exploited diplomatically in convincing
Hanoi' to lay off South Vietnam."
to save South- Vietnam will succeed
would enable the leaders in Saigon and
Washington -to placate their ? respective
constituencies, Taylol. then turned his
attention from his preoccupation' with
politics to the military consequences.
He recommended that the President
deploy 8,000 ground troops, and
acknowledged that most of them.,
.14AikIlk.kggio,;;;;9
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9R0010000909114
4
The small task force, along witl.
'other forms of? USAPPr6b16961rEctrn
not only would alarm Hanoi, but in
the South it would "reverse the pros-
ant downward trend, stimulate an
offensive spirit and build up. morale."
As Rostow commented to Diem at this
time, "That secret of turning point is
offensive4iction."
he purposes of_ discouraging the
North and encouraging the South be:
came the strategy that was to be relied
upon thfoughout the Vietnam war..
The same arguments that were ad-
vanced for .the first time in 1961 were
repeated in 1965 when Washington
made the decision to embark on
Operation Rolling Thunder. By the
summer of 1965, however, lifting
Southern.. morale was no longer viewed
as necessary to win the war. The
decision to send in the first 500,000
combat troops was justified solely by
the need to convince the Corninunists
that the United States was serious.
The strategy has remained surpris-
ingly constant, guiding American pol-
icy f?r The better part of a decade:
The sarchitects of the strategy, Taylor.
and Rostow, did not envision the small
task force of .8,000 men as the ."final
word." It was 'simply- the first lesson
they planned for the leadership in
Hanoi.
By its major premise?that Hanoi
wodld back down only if it knew the
United States was prepared to attack
North -Vietnam directly?the strategy
entailed a built-in escalation. Events
: had to follow in a monotonous but
"natural order: increase the, size. of US
support troops in the South;: institute
covert operations against the North;
threaten to bomb the North; bomb the
North; pour US combat troops into
the South as rapidly as possible; invade
Cambodia; invade Laos ... invade the
North? destroy the North? etc..
The strategy required not only that
the United States make it known that
it would ,attack the North dirbctly, but
also that the United States not oblit-
erate the North. To threaten to de-
stroy the Communist regime in Hanoi
would risk, a direct encounter .with
China or Russia, a risk that the
national security managers' wished to
avoid. They did not want to fight a
nuclear war. They wanted to fight a
safe war. The, strategy therefore de-
manded a combination- of escalation
and moderation.
I America would exercise its power in
a deliberate and calculated manner in
`Hanoi" here is to be taken literally: 4,
elaSere2OCklititOeriliclArBER841-00499NR010.6W090tRYicl6 mean that US
advisers would, in effect, become
Indochina, was to become a target. -
One could say that US strategy was to '
kill the people while preserving the.
Hanoi government. Once surrounded
by . devastation, isolated, 'and aban-
doned by her socialist allies, Russia
.and China, Hanoi would be left with
no choice but to submit to a "mod-
erate" but triumphant America.
Although the Creation of the task
force was its most far-reaching recom-
mendation, the Taylor-Rostow report
urged the President to adopt a number
of other measures. These were mainly
of a military and administrative. nature.
The report recommended that the
personnel in the Military Assistance
Advisory Group mission be. increased
from 1,103 to 2,612. Moreover, US
?aircraft, consisting of several helicopter
companies, and US crews for supporting
or operational miSsions were to be
.introduced no later than mid-November.
The combat troops, .the increase in
the size of MAAG, and the use of US
aircraft and crews were all violations of.
the limits on troops and armaments set
by the Geneva Accords. The Interna-
tional Security Agency, reviewing the
legality of these recommendations,
noted -that the additions to MAAG,
although a violation of international
law, could not easily be proved: discus-
sions between the International Control
Commission, which was charged with
enforcing the Geneva Accords, and the
Embassy could be extended for
months, during which time the value
of the increase in MAAG's size would
be realized.
The use of OS helicopters was of a.
more serious nature, requiring some.
groundwork to pacify Congress and the
press. But combat .troops could not so
easily be disguised. Their only justifica-
tion would be their subsequent success,
not prior propaganda, and the Interna-
tional Security .Agency viewed them
with deep. skepticism.- It predicted that
the North would respond by infil-
trating 15,000 men, which would in
turn require three US divisions to
offset them. Thus an indefinite war of
attrition would be ensured.
The "Limited Partnership"
The administrative recommendations
of Taylor and Rostow were designed
to place a number of Americans on
four specific levels of the South Viet-
. narnese bureaucracy. First Americans
cabinet officers in the Diem govern-
ment. Next, "a joint US-Vietnamese
Military Survey, down to the provincial
level, in each of three corps areas"
would engage in a number of ...tasks,
including . intelligence, command and
control, the build-up of reserves for
offensive purposes, and mediation
between the military commander and
the province chief. The other two.
functions ,would . be border control
operations and "intimate. liaison with
the Vietnamese- Central Intelligence
organizations."
The ostensible purpose of giving
Americans critical roles in government'
was that "Vietnamese performance in
every domain can be substantially
improved if Americans are prepared to
work side by side with the Viet-
namese." Taylor designated these
administrative changes as representing a
"shift from US advice to liinited
partnership." The concept of "limited
partnership," in fact, meant that the
.GVN had been negligent in reforming
itself in the past, and suggested that
the only, way to reform the GVN in
the future would be for the US to take-
it over. With US ground' troops in the
field, US aircraft controlling the skies,.
and US civilian personnel administering
the cities and provinces, Vietnam
would be reformed. Only Washington's
own people could fulfill Washington's
?wishes. ? ..
The administrative changes Meant
that the national security managers had
decided that the most effective mech-
.anism for processing reforms through
the GVN was for America to take over
the government. They were also begin-
ning to understand that the surest way
to take over a client state .was to
introduce ground troops who. would
ultimately become jesponsible for the
defense of the country. Under such
circumstances, the native leader. no
longer serves as a puppet but rather, in
,the manager's words,' as a "platform"
upon which the American military and
administrative personnel would be able
to operate. Reduced from a leader to a
0100- nu e d
order tohold Hanoippt 1000090001-6ove99R00
s o e o
number of Americans in key minis-
platform, the local ruit acticlibietease1200414114-,-;
0 v: CIAARDP38414004900120P09,00alt6came to mean
? state is robbed of the Tast. vestiges of Diem lacked the image that would ;, turning the reins of government over
his -.political 'life. His value to the qualify him to receive American : to the Americans. Once Americans .
mother country is no longer measured ground troops. In a discussion of "the , took ?Ver.,. they could manipulate the
by the speed and economy with which famous problem of Diem as an admin- concepts . of warfare and welfare
he is able to bring about the changes istrator and politician," ' Taylor sug- according to their own priorities. The
'suggested by Washington. (the core of gested three choices that were available battle between. these concepts would
..
his' bargaining power). , . to Washington. .
be waged within the American estab-
Since the local leader is no longer The first was to "remove him in lishment, with the pacifiers making
the source of change, he is not favor of. a military dictatorship which feeble attempts to reform the military.
expected to do anything; he is merely would 'give dominance to the military Reform ultimately came to moon less
expected not to undo anything. The chain of command." The second was indiscriminate 'killing instead of greater
mother country is less interested in to "remove him in favor of a figure of citizen participation. Finally, , the re-
gaining than in not losing. That desir- mote dilute power who would delegate port . defined the qualities of the ideal
able feature ? of leadership, charisma, authority to act in both military and leader that America would ...nccd .in
gives, way to banality. The worth of . 'civilian leaders." It was this option Vietnam after it I stationed its troops in
the leader is now measured by the that foreshadowed the need for a lodal the field and its bureaucrats in office?
number of followers he .does not lose, leader who could retain a . rapidly qualities that were to be found 'even-
the number of riots that do not occur, diminishing . constituency, so that the tually in the middling 'leadership of
the number. of battles that are not. largest number of US troops could be Thieu.
fought.
The leader's role in his own coun-
try is purely custodial. His task is to
hold things together. To the degree.
. that he performs this function, he has
built the platform upon which the
troops from the mother country may
enter. His obligation to the mother
country is to serve as.? the official
greeter of the foreign troops. He is a
janitor at home and a master . of
.ceremonies abroad.
The problem with Diem was that he
was unable to play a custodial role at
home or a ceremonial one abroad. By
-1961, he was beginning -to lose his
folloWers faster than the United States
could. increase its. personnel in Viet-
nam. Were this- inverse ratio to con-
tinue, the 'moment would come when
there would be no platform for Amer-
ican troops to walk on. But tlis was
not clearly 'perceived in Washington' in
1961. When it did 'become obvious in
1963, Diem was dispensed with.
Whereas Ambassador Durbrow had
toyed with . the idea of eliminating
Diem because he was not .a reformer,
the. Kennedy circle would remove him
because. he had been abandoned by the
last of the faithful. Diem's failure to
,reform 'would be the alibi for, not the
.- cause of, his downfall. ..
- What was obvious .in 1961 was that
. . _
, Kennedy was alarmed about Diem's
public image in America. From . the
.point of view .of the President of. the
United States, the local leader 'must. be
palatable to Ihe American people if
American troops are to be ordered to
Vietnam. One explanation for 'Ken-,
nedy's decision to veto the recom-
mendation of all of his senior advisers
sent. Once the need became apparent,
the second choice was axiomatic.
Washington would then require some-
one to perform custodial. services in
Vietnam and- act as an official greeter
for American troops, roles played by
General Khanh in 1964 and .General.
Thieu after 1965.
. In 1961, however, Taylor opted for
the third choice. Be wished to retain
Diem in. order "to bring about a series
of de faCto administrative changes via
persuasion at -high levels using the
US presence to force the Vietnamese
to get their house in order in one area
after another." In considering the first
two choices, Taylor raised the prospect
of a coup, but rejected it because "it
would be dangerous for us to engineer
a coup under present tense circum-
stances, since' it is by no means certain
that we could control its consequences
and . potentialities . for Communist
exploitation." In other words, the
United States had not yet taken over
enough of Vietnam to ?guarantee ?the
irrelevance of the new leader.
'he. Taylor-Rostow report had a
profound influence on Washington's
policy toward Vietnam. The report
fashioned the: strategy of combined
.escalation and moderation. By estab-
lishing the principle of "limited part-.
nership," a euphemism for American'
control, it resolved the conflict be-
tween the need for efficient prosecu-
tion of the war and the need for
administrativereform. The previous
aim of reform had been to broaden the
base of the government to include
elements of the loyal oppositiOn. The.
new focus was on the pace at which
The Recommendations of
McNamara and Rusk
While the Taylor-Rostow report was
circulating in, Washington, Secretaries
McNamara and Rusk were writing their
own recommendations for Vietnam
policy. McNamara picked . up the
?thread of Taylor's strategic analysis
and Rusk pondered the need for an
American seizure of the Vietnamese
bureaucracy.
Rusk believed the President should
carefully weigh the decision to send in
US troops against. Diem's unwillingness
to "give. us something worth support-
ing." Diem's failure to trust his own
commanders and his obstinate refusal
to broaden the base of government
made it unlikely' that a "handful of
American troops can have decisive
influence." Rusk . noted the vital im-
portance that US policy ,attached ? to
Southeast Asia, but he cautioned
against "committing American prestige
to a losing horse." Hks recommenda-
tions,. however, also presumed a seizure
of the internal bureaucracy, the process
described by Taylor as "limited part-
nership." Rusk directed the State
Department to. draw up a list of
m
expectations "fro Diem our assis-
tance forces us to assume de facto
'direction of South Vietnamese affairs "
While Rusk was elaborating on Tay-
lor's report from the civil side,
McNamara accelerated the recom-
mendations from the military side. He
accepted the strategy recommended by
Taylor, but criticized him for not
putting enough muscle. behind that
strategy. In -McNamara's -view; the
-8,000-man task force would help Diem
but would -not convince the other
1 i
Lt
. American troops entered the eld d e ? trooktis_ete Called from
Approved For Releaten20011114/211tsCIARDP8401100b0014
oscow, cipmg, or Hanoi) that we
_government.
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6
mean business. Moreover, it probablYStelic bFsts Ta_vlar _reap a
mpp?47 64blreettti
will not tip the scalAPPRVg191.W .soneelS, fh,
during dis-.
cussions wit t. resi ent-elect, Eisen-
would be almost ?certain to get increas- . to. be led to -accept a gradual involve- hewer told him, "It is imperative that
ingly mired down in an inconclusive ment. McNamara, on the other hand, Laos be defended. The United. States
believed that America would ? much should accept this task with. our allies,
more likely support a firm hand. if we could persuade them, and alone
Taylor either eschewed war alto- if we .could . not. Our unilateral. inter-
gether by projecting ,such logical ventioh would be our last desperate
incompatibilities as a bold strategy and hope in the event we were unable to
a quiescent task force, or equivocated prevail 'upon the Other signatories to
by never pulling out or pushing in.
McNamara, just recovering from his Kennedy's advisers wholeheartedly
personal revulsion at' the possibility of, supported .Eisenhower's position, but
'a nuclear holocaust over Berlin, seemed had to wait for Johnson to apply it "to
to be willing to prosecute a large Vietnam, not Laos. Kennedy himself,
Conventional war. In view of the in 1961, seemed to be more impressed
"advanced .state of US technology, such, with the arguments advanced by the
a war, if carried on for years, could British and French arnbassadOrs than
produce effects amounting to nuclear
devastation.
struggle."
Since the aim of' the strategy was to
make the enemy know that the United
States would attack directly if it did
not disengage itself from the Southern
struggle, McNamara concluded:
... the other side can be. con-
vinced we mean business only if
we accompany ?the initial force
introduction by a clear warning
commitment to the full objective
? stated above, accompanied by a
warning through some channel to
Hanoi that continued support of
the Viet Con will lead to punitive
retaliation against North Vietnam.
McNamara presumed that the other
side .would attack, not withdraw, in
spite of the presence of US troops and
a clear statement of intent. The US
would then reply with 205,000 men,
or six divisions. Public opinion in
America, McNamara. believed, "will
respond better to a firm initial position
than to courses of action that lead us
in only gradually."
Wnat is striking about the recom-
mendations by the Secretary of State
:and the Secretary of Defense is that
each, . within his particular domain,
weiit beyond the suggestions made by
'General Taylor. Whereas Taylor spoke
of a limited partnership between the
GVN .and the United States govern-
ment, Rusk operated ori the assump-
tion of a "de facto direction of South
Vietnamese affairs."
With respect to military policy,
boldly conceived a strategy that
could well lead to genocide, but he
was rather. timid in applying He
wanted to avoid the impression that
? the US would send its troops into
actual combat, and urged the flood
relief idea upon the President as a
cover to preserve a peaceful image.
McNamara, however, not only was
willing .to embrace the need for 8,600
combat troops, but seemed to be
devising a pre-emptive strategy by
calling on a second-strike capability of
six divisions as a response to the
. Northern invasion that would be
.touched off by the initial force. .
'While Taylor saw the flood relief
-task force as a humanitarian cover to
avoid
_as a
Kennedy's Decision
' In spite of the agreement among his
senior advisers that ground troops.
should be dispatched, Kennedy refused.
He could have cited many reasons to
support his decision. One was that the
introduction of US combat forces in
Vietnam would cripple the discussions
for a negotiated settlement in Laos.
Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador,
had told Rus'Ic on November 7 that "the
introduction of US troops would not
only complicate the situation, but make
it impossible to get anywhere on Laos."
A week later, Ambassador Alphand of
France told Rusk that further escalation
would undermine the Geneva negotia-
tions and compound the risk of "mass
intervention" by the Soviet Union.
Alphand also reminded the Secretary
of "difficulties for the West of fighting
.in Vietnam."
Rusk, however, took this to -mean
that Europe and America Might have
to part ways. Rusk explained that. it
"would be difficult for US opinion and
friendly countries to accept a repeti-
tion of Laos in Vietnam:'Southeast
Asia, he concluded, was "more impor-
tant to" the United States than to
Europe." Indeed, "if the loss of South-
east Asia was at stake, and Europeans
did not agree with our policies, there
might have to be a divergence."
usk's attitude demonstrates a fun-
damental shift in the direction of
American foreign policy. Hereafter the
national security managers, except for
a larger war, McNamara viewed it George Ball, were to reject the need
way to provoke the North into for a multilateral response and .affirm
that
tance .of a peaceful APPretlietd3FORRe lesset200f41 dik-F12615841W499R0010000900 -
counseled the President on the impor- first sign of this shift occurred on
larger war: Taylor, moreover, the will to proceed alone in Asia. The
.6cAt rued ?
with Eisenhower's position .or with
Rusk's acceptance of it. Kennedy, it
could be argued, was yet to be
persuaded that US foreign policy was
destined to go it alone in Asia. In
addition to shattering the Laotian
settlement, the dispatch of troops to
Vietnam at a time when the Berlin
crisis could again erupt increased Ken-
nedy's "expressed concern over a two-
front war." This- does not Mean,
however, that Kennedy was willing to
preside over the liquidation Of- the
fledgling American Empfte in South-
east Asia. The fear of.a two-front.war,
according to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
wOulcl have to be weighed against the
fear "that an American retreat in Asia
might upset the whole world balance."
Other factors must be considered to
explain Kennedy's veto of combat
troops. One way to understand the
President's motives is to recall the
decision he made and try to discover
what light they shed on decisions that
he did not make. We do know, for
example, that Kennedy sent .troops to
Vietnam, referring to them as support
troops, though their combat role was
extensive. Therefore, we can conclude
that Kennedy saw the need to disguise
their combat function. We also know
that the number sent during his admin-
istration ultimately doubled the initial:
figure .of 8,000 recommended by Tay-
lor and Rostow. Therefore, Kennedy
saw the need to introduce them into
. Vietnam gradually instead of at one
stroke. Finally, we know that Kennedy
began a campaign of covert activities
against North Vietnam-Ta campaign
that .marked the switch to ? direct
offensive actions but was disguised so
that Washington could publicly dis-
avow its own role.
2
7.7
IN,..ennedy's policyA towaset Vika
then, was to accelera pe c war wti
pTvea r
61.9"1509*Ptiit%
torate were the dispatch o' ,igorAr.ik
fi
e erlA9s2Ailti gA941:aRftE rf 97:Mas ,.orts o a. lie
c
denying that he was doing it. His
policy was to prosecute a private war.
He was willing to go it alone in Asia,
but not to admit it. He disregarded the
counsel of his advisers only. to the
extent that they preferred a public
war. ??
The President,. clearly, did not be-
lieve that the American people would
support him in his decision to eScalate
the level of combat. This does not
mean that Kennedy. thought the Amer-
ican, people would have been opposed
to a war in Indochina under any
circumstances. It simply means, that in
1961 the American public would not
support a war whose ostensible pur-
pose was to preserve the Diem regime.
The war would be repulsive because
the, leader was odious. In 1963, when
the ?self-iminolation of protesting Bud-
dhist monks became a daily event,
Diem's image abroad deteriorated and
became incompatible with the Amer-
ican. presence. ? The American people
could resign themselves to an indefinite
. war, but not when the character of the
regime, personified by Diem, Nhu, and
Madame Nhu, was so obnoxious. Wash-
ington concluded that Diem would'
have to be eliminated before the' war
could. be escalated.
While Dien was too repellent to be
?given 'American combat troops, he was
:'not pliable enough to accept American
bureaucrats. Rusk, as we have seen,
presumed that America would under-
take a ."de facto direction of South
, Vietnamese; affairs." The Taylor-
Rostow report had anticipated- -a
"limited .partnership" - between ? the
GVN and the United States .govern-
ment. Diem quickly dashed these
hopes.. Vice President Thuan told
Ambassador Nolting that Diem's "atti-.
tude seerred to be that the United
States was asking great concessions of
GVN in the realm of its sovereignty, in
exchange for little additional help."
When Notting pressed Diem directly on
the need for a close partnership, Diem
informed him that "Vietnam_ did, not
want to be a.protectorate."
By word and deed, Diem demon-
strated that.he would no more broaden
his decision-making councils to include
Americans than he would do so to
inclUde other Vietnamese. To turn over
the internal bureaucracy to the Amer-
icans, Diem had told Ambassador
Kenneth Young, would "give a mono-
poly on . nationalism to the Coin-
munists." The only conditions under dum, Kennedy cljAwnsteolo*AlleggAie.cd
rPVVIRRE- Re IgPsAc2M111
%;,?.w.fik-Fagro. y 499R0 woo.9ogg;!,-
which Diem would a
nu ecr
the .combined
non-Communist
certain that the Americans .would people of the GVN against a Com-
openly 'defend him, then he could munist takeover." Kennedy admon-
ished the.' ambassador: ?
afford to come out openly as their
puppet. But Washington would. not
openly defend Diem because he did
not seem worth defending in public.
In these circumstances Kennedy
made the decision ,not to send in
combat troops, or rather, to fight a
Private war. In a National Security
Council Action Memorandum on Viet-
nam, NSAM .111, Kennedy, observing
widespread- criticism of Diem's regime,
stated that US support would be
conditional upon whether real reforms
were instituted by.Diem. The President
said:
Rightly or wrongly his regime is
widely criticized abroad and in the
US, and if we are to give our
substantial support, we must be
able to point to real administra-
tive, political, and social reforms
and a real effort to 'widen it's base
that will give maximum confidence
to the American people, as well as
to world opinion that our efforts
are not directed towards the sup-
port of an unpopular or ineffective
regime, but rather towards sup-
porting the combined efforts of all
the non-Communist people of the
GVN against a Communist take-
over.
In the next clause
of the NSAM,
however, Kennedy made the decision
to send ..US troops and informed the
American ambassador that these troops
should be seen as the equivalent of
combat forces.
It is anticipated that one of the
. first questions President Diem will
? raise with you after your presenta-
tion of the above joint proposals
will be that. of introducing US
combat troops. You are authorized
to remind him that the actions we
already have in mind involve a
substantial number of US military
personnel for operatic:if-1dt duties in
Vietnam, and that we believe that
these forces. performing crucial
missions can greatly increase the
capacity of GVN forces to win
their war against the Viet Cong: .
US firepower and US troops would be
immediately sent to Vietnam without
the necessity for any "real administra-
tive, political, and social . reforms."
What was desirable was that Diem's
image be improved.
In the next clause of the memoran-
You should inform Diem that, in.
our minds, the concept of the'
joint undertaking envisages a much
closer relationship than the present,
',one of acting in an advisory
capacity only. We would expect to
share in the decision-making pro-
cesses in the political, economic
and military' fields as they affected
the Security situation.
Reform, .to Kennedy, ultimately meant
that Diem. needed an attractive image
in America, and that Washington
needed to seize the bureaucratic
chinery in Vietnam. If neither
forthcoming, . Diem would be
mated, and a "genuine and
puppet put in his place.
II
ma-
was
dim-
real"
The private war required dispatching
US. ,combat troops to ? Vietnam to
perform "operational duties" and with-
holding that .fact from the American
public. The 'troops were put under the
jurisdiction of the newly 'organized
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV), but their. combat role was
disguised. The public was told that US
personnel would only "advise" ? the
South Vietnamese army. ,
Another component of the private:.
war was the initiation of covert activ-
ities. Begun 'in ? the spring of 1961, only
six weeks after John F. Kennedy had
assumed the Presidency, these con-
tinued without interruption up to the
launching of Operation Rolling Thun-
der in February, ? 1965, the beginning
of the overt war by Lyndon Johnson.
In March, 1961., Kennedy instructed.
the?national security agencies to "make
every possible effort to launch guerrilla
,operations in Viet-Minh territorY at the.
earliest possible time." He directed the
Secretary of. Defense and the Director
of the CIA to furnish plans for covert
programs
near-term
periods."
against the North both in the
and in the "longer future
Two months later, Kennedy
approved the program for covert ac-
tions that had been proposed by the
Vietnam Task Force, a group working
out of the State Department, then .
under the leadership of Sterling Cot-
trell. Cottrell had accompanied Taylor
and Rostow on their mission to Viet-
nam in the fall of 1961 and had urged
8
the President not to introduce combati-
? troops into the SoutlAftxpltbaiediftr
1961 he recommended that the Pres-
ident use South Vietnamese troops for
commando raids and sabotage in North'
Vietnam and Laos.'
. The President agreed. One hundred
days after he was elected President, he
ordered agents to be sent into North
Vietnam who were to be resupplied by-
Vietnamese civilian mercenary air
crews. Special GVN forces were mean-
- while to infiltrate into' Southeast Laos
to locate and attack Communist bases,
and other teams trained by the Special
Forces were to be used for sabotage
and light harassment inside North Viet-
nam. Finally, Kennedy ordered flights
over 'North Vietnam to drop leaflets.
' Two days after Kennedy authorized
the Taylor-Rostow mission and before
the mission arrived in Vietnam, th-t
President ordered guerrilla ground
action, "including the use of US
advisers if necessary against Communist.
, aerial resupply missions in the vicinity
. of Tchepone, Laos." In December,
immediately after he shelved Taylor's
proposal to deploy 8,000 combat
-troops in the South, Kennedy adopted
a CIA-sponsored program to recruit
South VietnEimese personnel for the
purpose of "forming an underwater
demolition team to operate in strategic
maritime areas of North Vietnam."
.
jy the end of 1961, the private war
consisted of covert operations directed
against North Vietnam and Laos, and
the concealed use of US air and
ground combat personnel against the
'Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Each
element of the private war increased in
tempo and .intensity 'throughout 1962
and 1963. By the time Kennedy was
assassinated, the United States had
16,500 troops in South Vietnam pm-
tending they were not fighting, and the
Special Forces were executing' a host
of covert programs in North Vietnam
and Laos.
, During its thirty-three months,. in
. office, ' the Kennedy Administration
managed and directed an illicit war. By
sending an additional :1,000 troops to
.Vietnam in '1961, Kennedy broke
through the MAAG ceiling and violated
the Geneva Accords. Speaking to Rusk
at a National Security Council meeting
November, .1961; Kennedy defined
the Presidential manner proper to
breaching international laws: "Why do
The Accords, of course, had been M(,rg,e Bundy. The chairman of the
alse2011111.1/08ut ClIA-RDINSA-00349114,90110NOROMe6rge Bundy,. who
. .
conceal violations?and the developing had been given his choice between
the
war?from the American public was chairing
new. That the Bay of Pigs, the U-2
flights over the Soviet Union, .and
attempted coups in various parts of the
world had also been covert enterprises
does not diminish the special
significance of the Vietnam under-
taking. Here, for the first time, covert
activity no longer crystallized into. a
,single event, as with the Bay. of Pigs.
In Vietnam, the "black stuff" became
_ the usual way of doing business;. the
war itself Was .covert. Nor does it
suffice to say that, the U-2 flights were
stretched Out through time. The pur-
pose of these flights was spying; they
were repetitions of a single act; and
they were placed under the jurisdiction
of the CIA, an agency restricted to
covert, acts. In. Vietnam, several covert
programs were put together to create a
pattern of warfare, not spying, and
these programs were instituted and
managed by the government.
Room 303 ,
In 1962 and 1563,. two agencies in
Washington managed the Vietnam
war?the 303 Committee and the
Special - Group Counter-Insurgency
(SGCI).
The 303 Committee, taking its name
,from the room number at the Execu-
tive Office Building where it met once
a week, came into being as a direct
'consequence of the egregious blunder-
ing at the _Bay of Pigs in the spring of
'1961. Kennedy, appalled by the mili-
tary incompetence shown by the fiasco
. and embarrassed by the public image it
'created, was determined to make sure
'that the covert activities of the CIA
did not contradict US foreign policy
? and that :they- were not . beyond the
capabilities of the military.
? . Thereafter, CIA programs had to be
cleared in advance. This was the task
of the 303 Committee, whose jurisdic-
tion came to inclimle every important
covert program conducted anywhere in
the world, including Vietnam. The
'membership of the committee in-- ished and exploited; ? that
eluded the Deputy Secretary of .De- tribes; rather than landed . peasants,
fense, the Deputy Undersecretary. of. could be made into warriors and be
State for Political Affairs, the Deputy moved ' more, easily from one assign-
ment to another. As warriors, the
Montagnards took their orders directly
from the CIA, in return for which they
were liberally paid and
autonomy from the GVN.
Special Group Counter-
Insurgency and the 303 'Committee.
To the extent that Vietnam was a
covert war in 1962 and 1963, the 303
Committee managed the war. It did
this by approving and revising the .
programs that defined American covert
participation in the war. At least four
major programs were authorized and
supervised by the 303 Committee,?
Operation Farmhand, the training of
the Montagnards, DeSoto patrols, and
34a operations.
Operation Farmhand was the first -
covert program approved by the .303 .
Committee for Vietnam. Under this
program, South Vietnamese personnel
were airlifted into North Vietnam in
the' spring of 1961, to "commit sabo-
tage, spy and harass the enemy."
Trained by the army's Special Forces,
who were themselves detached and put
under the control . of the CIA, the
commandos were invariably 'arrested as
soon as they landed in the North. In
many, instances, personnel would have
to be conscripted to accept an assign-
ment. Frequently, they would show up
drunk or fail to 'appear at all. In the
'field, the program was a total failure,
but, 'strategically, it informed the
North that direct measures would, be
taken against it..
ihe second major program author-
ized by the 303 Committee .was the
training of the Montagnards in South
Vietnam, who had managed to preserve
their ethnic identity over the centuries.
These local tribesmen, whose loyalty
never extended beyond their Own clan,
were as opposed to, the encroachments
of the GVN as they 'were to the
'solicitations of the Viet -Conga Because -
they inhabited an area that bordered
an infiltration route from North to
South, the CIA believed that they..
could be trained as a force of warriors .
to be used ,in attacks against the Viet
Cong.
The CIA felt that the bonds among
ethnic minorities could be easily nour-
nomadic
Director of Intelligence of the CIA, and
, the Special Assistant to . the President
-for National Security Affairs, During
we take onus, say we are going to the Kennedy years, these offices were
break the Geneva Accords? Why .not held, respectively, by Roswell Gilpatric,
remain silent? Don't say this our-
U. Alexis Johnson, Richard Helms, and neither' consented 'to nor
,selves!"
Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00111300090001-6
continued
promised
The GVN
complied
Approved Foftlease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-0049n01000090001-6
oping effective and loyal armies Within 1964.
CINCPAC plan 34a, drawn up in the
fall of 1953 as an annex to the entire
CINPAC plan for Southeast Asia, was
the covert plan directed against the
North. It consisted of two parts:
psychological operations and hit-and-
run attacks. The latter included amphib-
ious raids by the Vietnamese in areas
"south of the Tonkin Delta having
little or no security." This was subse-
quently expanded to include the use of
'Swift torpedo boats to shell the
Northern mainland and kidnap North-
ern personnel. Plan 34a, too, was
assigned by the 303 Committee
Joint Chiefs for implementation.
' The Special Group for
Counter-Insurgency
By the end of 1963, 30,000 local
tribesmen had been armed and trained.
The Special Forces carried out this
work for the CIA. Eventually, the
Montagnards were formed into units
known as the Civilian Irregular Defense
Groups (CIDG). They. were used for
. various types of operations, and were
noted primarily for their bravery, bru-
tality, and terrorism. CIDG., units were
, used to repress the Southern peasantry
as well as for armed incursions into the
North. As soon as the program showed
some success, the ,MACV, attempting
to break the autonomy of the Special
Forces, removed the program from the
CIA and placed it Under its own
jurisdiction. ?
CIA training of the Montagnards in
South Vietnam had its counterpart
among the Meo tribesmen in Laos. The
Meo, too, were a local clan whose
latent warrior tendencies and antipathy
toward central rule? were carefully
? nurtured by the CIA. By training and
:paying the Montagnards and Meo
'tribesmen, the CA, in effect, created a
feree of warriors directly under its
The conflict between the
.1oCal? tribesmen and the central govern-
ment, fostered by the CIA, ran parallel
to a larger conflict among American
officials?a conflict between the Special
Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Just as the local tribesmen were
promised their autonomy from the
,central government by the CIA, so the
Special Forces had been established as
an autonomous force, to take their
commancg directly from the President,.
circumventing the Joint Chiefs. As ?the
Indochina .war proceeded, the local
tribesmen Were eventually reduced to
subservience by the central govern-
ment, arid the Special Forces were
taken over by the Joint Chiefs. The
"guerrillas" within the client stqte and
the 'guerrillas" within the American
imperial state were broken and absorbed?
by the client and imperial government,
respectively.
But to develop a 'guerrilla force
within the imperial power, an idea
originated by the CIA, is a structural
-.change that may prefigure the imperial
1.111y of the future. For the conflict
between the Special Forces and the
Joint Chiefs, on the one hand, and the .
its client states. -Neither the Royal
Laotian Army nor the ARVN has been
able to hold its own against the people's
army, the Viet Cong, and the Pathet
Lao. It was as 'a direct result of this
difficulty that the CIA attempted to
build armies of local tribesmen.
These guerrilla armies were an aston-
ishing success when .compared to the
regular armies of South Vietnam and
Laos. When the Joint Chiefs set out to
break the autonomy .of the Special
Forces, they Were fortuitously putting
under. their command a guerrilla army.
of local tribesmen which they were
able to use as the new imperial army.
With this one stroke the Joint. Chiefs
resolved some of the difficulties of
relying both upon a client army and
upon troops conscripted in the US.
Neither American boys nor South
Vietnamese boys wished to fight in a
people's war. What could be better
cannon fodder to use against the
People . than a pre:People, that is,
clansmen? The courage of the local
tribes and the technology of the
imperial power were combined to do
battle with large numbers of Asian
'people and the guerrilla organizations
they were supporting.
rr
ihe third program begun by. the 303
Committee was the use 'of DeSoto
patrols. Originated in 1962 and
approved by the President, this pro-
gram authorized US destroyers to
operate along the border of mainland
China and the North Vietnamese main-
land, to listen to the "military and
civil activity of tile Asian Communist
bloc." In addition to -listening, the
patrols were ordered to stimulate the
radar of the enemy so that the position
. and type of radar could be identified.
After the DeSoto patrols were
approved by -Kennedy. and the detailed
policy for using them was formulated
by the 303_ Committee, the program
was submitted for implementation to
the Joint Chiefs, who tho'n put the. pro-
gram under the jurisdiction of the
Joint Center for Intelligence at their
headquarters in Washington. The Ops
Center, as it was called, dreW up the
tentative schedules and forwarded
them to C1NCPAC in Hawaii.
CINCPAC selected the precise 'dates for
tile DeSoto patrols and sent orders to
local tribesmen and the central govern7. the Seventh Fleet. Copies of these
ment, on the other, reflects a larger orders were also sent to MACV il
conflict between the client state and the- Saigon. The question of who selected
imperial power. The United States has and. kept track of the DeSioatrols ?
to the
The second agency in Washington
that managed the private war between
1961 and I963 was the Special Group
Counter-Insurgency (SOC). Organized
in response to Khrttshchev's speech on
wars of national liberation, the SGCI
was created by President Kennedy in
NSAM 1-24, issued in late 1961,? The
SG,CI, like the 303 Committee, met
once a week.. In fact,??? its members
included those on the 303 Committee,
or their delegates, and met in Room 303
at The Executive Office Building imme-
diately after the Committee adjourned
its meetings. Members of the 303
Committee would complete their 'dis-
cussions, sign the orders for the covert _
programs, and then call the SGC1 to
order, in additional deputies, and
turn their attention to the problems of
counterinsurgen0'.
1\ evertheless, there., were substantial
differences between the 303 Com-
mittee and the SGCI. The 303 Com-
mittee managed the covert operations
of the United ? States government in
every area of the world. The programs
themselves generally originated. with
the CIA, although other agencies of.
government, such. as the Defense
Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the
State Department, did submit proposals,
many of which were put into operation.
The only requirement for a 303 hearing
Was that the program be significant and
covert: When a program was put into
operation, it generally used the services
of the Special Forces.
The SGCI, on the contrary, never
managed 'covert operations,- had only a
limited relation to the CIA, and did
n84-P,049rOblitlIP0k9ti
s
encountered grave dAlitinzWeict-Skre.Pec,19P?R gc19114 11,4?,?fficiAp
'Oree.S. t deal exClusively with the
of the Special
the Gulf of Tonkin incident-of August,
10
overt programs of the 6proyAafntr RAktaw ?fACW13(041,; cl#APPA4-004
in any nation 'around . the ?globe that7'Fuilt the. hamlets in total disregard of RAPQM?A9APP04, since, they
show the information guiding official,
. was deemed to be threatened .. by the oil blot theory. Instead 'of seemingWashington during the private war as
insurgency. These programs were under .one hamlet before proceeding to the, l
well as the. reaction to that informa--
the special jurisdiction of the several next, -Nhu was interested in increasing' tion. . ? ' -
national security agencies, including ' the number of hamlets, with the result The Viet Cong
. the Defense Department, AID, the : that none was secure. When 'Diem was.'
State Department, USIA, and the CIA assassinated in 1963, thousands of The year ? 1962 has been referred
The purposes of SGCI were to . coor- strategic hamlets collapsed overnig,ht to as the optimistic period in Vietnam.
dinate . the overseas programs of. the 3): The ARVN was to be built into a The insurgency was. coming. under
national security 'agencies, ' eliminate powerful army that could take the control,- and McNamara' was persuaded
duplication of effort, and ensure that offensive against the Viet Cong and that the US had. turned the Corner in
those programs relating to counter- regain the territory then held by the Vietnam and . that AmeriCan boys
insurgency were completed. The SGCI Communists. The ARVN, trained by would be returning home. On May 3,
? supervised the overseas program's of MACV and working in conjunction 1962, Sterling Cottrell reported to the
each of the national security agencies. with . the strategic hamlet' program Special Group that ' .the . US had
A counterinsurgency doctrine ..tech- under the charismatic leadership. of "reached - the _bottom's in. Vietnam.
nically known as "The Overseas In- Diem, would, it was anticipated, ex- .Cottrell, it should be recalled, was the
lanai Defense Policy ? of the USA" tend the .national sovereignty of the' head of the Vietnam Task Force, had
- was. written in 1962. President Ken- GVN throughout South Vietnam. i ? accompanied Taylor and Rostow on,.
nedy adopted it as the official policy The national, security agencies of the their mission to Vietnam, . and had
i of the US government in NSAM 182. US government devoted, all their opposed their advice on the question .
The main premise of the docirine. was efforts to this strategic plan. ? Their of ground. troOps'. He supported a
, that the counterinsurgents should help programs were supervised by the SGCI low-keyed approach to Vietnam and.
themselves, but a saving clause was and their projects - were completed clearly had a stake in the continuation
added to the doctrine instructing: under the direction of a-- special of the current Vietnam policy. .
"Where necessary, _ introduce US agency, which ostensibly possessed a . General Lyman Lemnitier; the chair-
troops."' . blueprint of victory. : . man of the Joint Chiefs, reported ,on
Thus the 303 Committee was largely' The countries under the jurisdiction May 1'1, 1962, that the defense build-up
responsible for the unofficial policy of of the SGCI included Vietnam, Laos, was going well. The military seemed
the US government toward Vietnam, Thailand, ,Iran, and a ? half-dozen Latin unanimous in believing that US policies
during . the private war?the covert: American countries. Vietnam and Laos were having .benign effects. On May 31,
activities in North Vietnam and Laos,' were it the top. of the list. By, the end'. Cottrell informed the SGCI Group that
and the disguised .use of US combat of 1962, entire meetings were devoted the CNN was increasing the-number of
.troops within. South Vietnam. The to Vietnam alone. The SGCI mainly 'strategic hamlets at an ,`ambitious and
SGCI, on the other hand, was in uncontrolled rate."
reviewed weekly reports furnished by
Chargb of the Official policy?the policy
the :Vietnam Task Force. In time, On June 20, however, John McCone,
that was re. ported in the, press and
however, these reports, prepared . by director of the -CIA, warned that the
.otherwise made known to the Amer-
Sterling Cottrell and Ben, Wood, were Viet COng were beginning to fight in
;lean public.
. ? considered ' too meager: and other larger. units. They were using heavier
.. . ? . .
The, official . policy consisted of a national. security agencies, such as, the weapons, he, added,. to wipe out stra--
? Pentagon, AID, and the CIA, began to tegie hamlets before help could arrive.
strategic plan ,which, consistent with
suppI y supplementary reports on On. November 5., the Task Force told
the counterinsurgency doctrine, called
Vietnam. . . . the Group that Viet Cong forces Were.
upon the GVN to defend itself, to win?
The reports, 'whether from the Task as strong as ever. They were -able .to .
its own war, and to employ Americans
Force or the other national security recruit many new ..pet'sonnel, even ..
as teachers. There were three parts to
agencies, were discussed at the opening though, their morale had begun to slip. '
. the plan:
of each meeting. Then, e5(pert wit- Cottrell added that the "situation was
1) The US government officially
nesses who had just returned 'from Still in balance."
accepted Diem as the premier of South
Vietnam would . brief the Special In 1963,' ;the US tried again , to
Vietnam, and all aid was, channeled
Group. Some of._ the Witnesses who document its charge that the Viet
through him.,
regularly appeared before the SGCI. Cong were being aided by. heavy
2) The strategic hamlet program was
were John Richardson, the CIA station infiltration from. the 'North. 'One taI:
? devised. as the principal means Of
chief in Vietnam; General Victor Km- .confronting the Special Group was to
defending the South against further
lak; the Special Assistant for Counter- determine the accuracy of the charge,
-.encroachments by the Viet Cong.
Insurgency and Special Activities On January 17, 1963, the Task Force
Strategic hamlets were supposed to
(SACS-A); . William Jorden, a former decided -that infiltration was less seri-
help organize the rural peasants .into
New York Times reporter and the
larger territorial . units in order to
cora IC nu e d
author of the two white papers on
increase their capacity- to defend 'them-
-? Vietnam; Ted Sarong, the Australian
selves and .to weed out Viet Cong,.
- attach?Robert Thompson, the British
As envisioned by the planners, the
- - expat on counterinsurgency and mov-
?hamlets were to expand like an oil ?
ina force' behind the strategic. hamlet:
blot, dense in the center,' blurred at ''' -
doctrine; and one Walton, an ex-marine
the perimeter. Ideally, a second hamlet - ,
and-head of the police safety division in
-would not be built until the first was
Vietnam:.
, satisfactorily organizio30151.-na
1,-eLletelifiSeagnaiisliVatliCItUFIDR84-00-499R001000090001-6
defensible. Diem's brother, Nhu; was
-
11
ous than had
plained that in
'supplies were ished to the
Viet Cong in tin ; the, insurgents
had little need L., dependent upon
:the North for either. Taylor, com-
plying with "higher" orders, said it was
important , to get information on
Northern infiltration - and authorized
William Jorden to go to Vietnam ,to
study the question thoroughly. Wash-
ington was becoming embarrassed over
the fact- that it was increasingly- corn-
Mitting. itself to intervention in a civil
War.
, On April 5, 1963; a famous meeting
of .the Special, Group was ??held, in
which Jorden, after spending . three
'months in Vietnam, reported that "we
are unable to document and develop
.any hard evidence of infiltration 'after
October 1, 1962." Evidence prior to
that date strongly indicated the. ab-
se.= of infiltration, At the same
meeting, Robert Thompson attempted
to counter Jorden's pessimistic ap-
praisal of Viet Cong gctivity by fore-
casting that "US forces are adequate.
By the end of the year, troops can '
begin to be withdrawn."
AState Department representative
on the Special Group summed up in
one sentence the observations of the ;
US army officers who returned .from
Vietnam in 1962: "If free elections
were to be held in 'South Vietnam in
1962, lb o would get.70 percent or the
popular vote." Because of Ho's popu-
. ?
larity, he added, wholesale supplies in
the South and ready recruitment of
' personnel were available to the Viet
Cong. Only a trickle of supplies jn
addition to the original covert apparatus
had been furnished by the North.
The State Department official pointed
, out that all insurgents receive some
outside help. "There has never been a
ease of an isolated- insurgency. Not
even the US War of Independence was
an isolated insurgency."
This same official was one of the
authors of the counterinsurgency doc-
trine of the US government.- He
.contrasted the. doctrine of the Corn-
-munist Party with that of the US on
the question of the necessity of out-
side help for an insurgency, noting that,
- Communist doctrine
... emphasizes the fact that the
insurgency should be homegrown,
and that major communist powers,
especially China, do not pour in
that e Viet Gong -were actively
LAppxo.ved For-"ReleA?g 2g030,1t98
a'ss.PIARPf114-04. 0,000.09.00101p6pulation and
.ierit and local enables the insurgents, to retain
.their own 'independence so that
they can sustain themselves over
- ? the long haul.. Communist Party
doctrine stands in radical contrast
to the US doctrine of counter-
insurgency, :which demands Inas-
- sive support by us and which turns
, the counter-insurgents into our
dependents, sapping their morale
and capacity to fight.
He supported this comparison, with
evidence accumulated by the Spe-,
cial Group showing that all weapons
captured from the Viet Cong by the
US during the period of the private
war were either homemade or had
been previously captured. from the
GVN/USA. "Throughout this time," he
said, "no one had ever found one
Chinese rifle or one Soviet weapon
used by a VC." He concluded that the
weight of evidence and doctrine proved
that. "the massive aggression theory
was completely phony.".
?
Approved For
that they fought with dedicated spirit-
and great effectiveness. It should not
have been difficult for Forrestal and
, Kennedy to see that the rural popula-
tion cooperated "from conviction" be-
cause in fact it made up the Viet
Cong.
In 19'62, Michael Forrestal, a senior
member of the National Security
Council and a close friend of President
Kennedy, confirmed these charges. Re-
turning from a long viSit to Vietnam,
Forrestal and' Roger Hilsman wrote a
report to the President that ,stated that
the Viet Cong had ."increased their
regular forces from 18,000 to 23,000
over this past year." During this period
the government of Vietnam had
claimed that 20,000 Viet Cong were
killed in action and 4,000 wounded.
"No one really knows," Forrestal
wrote, "how many of the 20,000 'Viet
?Cong' killed last year were only inno-
cent, or at least 'persuadable,' vil-
lagers." ? ? ?
Forrestal told Kennedy that "the
vast bulk of both recruits and stqlplies
come: from' inside South Vietnam it-
Self." At the "very least," Forrestal
concluded,
De.foliatioi?
The 'Special Group devoted part of
its attention to some of the programs
conducted in the field. As early as
1961, the defoliation .program,
called Operation Hades and sub-
sequently accorded the euphemism
Operation Ranchhand-, was ? granted
Presidential approval. Limited at first
as an experimental measure, it soon
became an exercise in wholesale crop'
destruction. The expanded program
received strong financial and political
support. 'Discussions of Operation
? Ranchhand in Washington were instruc-
tive, especially since they showed the
bureaucrats' lack of 'any concern what-
ever for the consequences of their
decisions. Indeed, what was most strik-
ing about the discussions of the de-
foliation program at the Special Group
meetings - was the absence,:of inquiry
into the nature of the program.
No limits on the defoliation program
were ,,ever established; no results ex-
amined, no damage surveyed. ,Concern,
about the program focused on the
single question of whether the South
Vietnamese military had given their
consent. Apparently, if the GVN
recommended the program and the
ARVN consented , to it, bureaucratic
responsibility in Washington was be-
, lieyed to have ceased.
the figures on Viet Cong strength
imply a continuing flow of recruits
and supplies from these same vil-
lages and indicate that a substan-
tial proportion of the population
is still cooperating with the
enemy, although it is impossible to
tell how much of this cooperation
stems from fear and how much.
from conviction.
Still, Forrestal emphasized that "the
Viet Cong continue to' be aggressive
1
The program was the brain-child of
ARPA, the Pentagon's Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, and was placed
under the command of the US Chemical
Corps. It was approved by the highest
bureaucrats in Washington, including
Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson,
Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy,
Michael Forrestal, and Richard Helms,
along with a host of their deputies. But
.after they had approved the defoliation
program, these men ignored the forced
migration, sterility, and hunger that
followed in its wake. Such consequences
were left to the concern of the GVN.
The policymakers in Washington re-
moved-every vestige of personal respon-
sibility from their shoulders and laid it
and extremely effective." It would, at the door of the GVN officials.
seem that he had answered his own, Thus, Washington was able both to
uestion. Like many other officials and and evade
V-rgiNgligAlieCIAAPEgi
TuVr?rMil'AIM?? tioY 'Nem. Maxwell
the war at this time, he had discovered Taylor summed up the -coneerri for
Operation Ranchhand in these words:
12
"We used it for cropAPP2YPAIFsNI9r
i n2001/11/0p: CIPARRP81-e0049 41
140100
0000
esses were o ten ntunicate( by state apparatus irect?y- 6u nde- r President
foliage. It was only useful along the his ferocity: When William 'Jordn;
Kennedy i every
highways. It was not at all criminal. It the author of two white papers on n Washington, but
effort was made to duplicate ,this
was simply ineffective. The entire pro- Vietnam, testified about infiltration
pattern in the field. When Kennedy
gram was irrelevant." Defoliation was from . the North, for example, he was
assumed. the Presidency, one of the
indeed irrelevant to Washington, but it excused prematurely in order to avofd
problems plaguing American oreign
was not irrelevant to the peasants who further embarrassment at Robert Ken- f
policy was fact that each agency .in
had to migrate, the women who be- nedy's hands. Another witness, re- .
the field acted as if if were a self-
came. sterile, the children who were minded that .the President's brother ,
was simply trying to get ,the facts, contained system, staking a claim
made hungry.
against the Pentagon for its ?own
replied that Kennedy was "guilty of '
resources, moving from one part of the
Kennedy in Control over-kill," Kennedy's function, it
globe .t. next according to its
seems, was to instill some fear into the o. the ' ,
_ assessment of where th action was,
Although the bureaucracy in Wash- agencies?to persuade them that they e
,
insulating itself from above,
_ington was not concerned with the were being watched closely by the .
and extending its imperial writ. below.
fruits of its labor in Vietnam, the President and should act - accordingly.
President was ? greatly concerned with The armed services offered the prime
his capacity to command the bureauc-
racy in Washington. In his quest for 'Defenders of the Kennedy Admin- wild; but the civil agencies in the field,
.control, he introduced four structural istration contend that the purpose of including the CIA, State, USIA, and
others, also made their own rules and
changes in the office ? of the Presi- these exertions was to keep America
dency?the Special Group. Counter- .out of an unnecessary war in Southeast circumvented all attempts at direction
.Insurgency,. the 303 Committee.; the' ?:\sia. The .Kennedys, it is .suggested, from above.
:Country Team, and the . Green Berets.' believeil that the only way to avoid a The CIA, for 'example, was assigned
'Country
of these Were fashioned to . meet deepening and perhaps irreversible a ? percentage of all shipping to
specific defects in the execution of commitment to Vietnam was to expose nam, set up its Own network of
.
- foreign policy, and in this sense may ? the inflated statements offered., by ict so nol i?iv-1 1nm idirectca tion schannel fibackeld ' toa nN(V1 -ahs ha 11
'he viewed as ad hoc measures. But an officials who wished to draw the ington. , Laos . simply, became -. corn-
extraordinary pattern emerga when nation into a wider war. But these petitive turf for the several agencies.
the four are grouped together?an ex- rationalizations do 'hot hold up when it Each moved in with personnel and
.Pansion of the war-making powers of is recalled ,that the purpose of the material, then sought a 'program first
'the Executive to a degree neve i- before SGCI in general, and Robert Kennedy's to justify its presence and second. to
contemplated in the history - of the purpose in particular, was to centralize expand its domain. Aircraft stationed
Aepublic. For the first time, total in the hands of . the President control. In Korea were forwarded to Vietnam
command over the 'several ?national of a national state security machinery , on Air Force orders which had not
security agencies was concentrated in which was increasingly committed to been cleared at higher levels, and when .
, the office of the President:? war in Southeast Mia. such clearance became necessary,.
The SGCI was a special agency The CIA had displayed' its power to dummy committees were created at
'created .by "Kennedy to . supervise the make foreign policy at the Bay of Pigs, the Pentagon to clear automatically
programs of the national security, forcing the President to assume respon- any material requested. So far as the
agencies. Kennedy, seleCted Maxwell sibility for events he had not initiated. agencies in the. field were concerned, '
Taylor, then occupying a special office. . and could not control.. After. Cuba, questions of state were politically un-
in the White House 'as the PreSiderit's Kennedy fired Allen Dulles and real. The sole reality was the national
military adviser, to be chairman of the appointed John McCone as director ,of
...., economy, which was viewed as -an
'SGCI,and the President's brother, the CIA, perhaps because McCone was infinite source of supply.
Robert Kennedy, to be co-chairman. , considered more manageable: At the
The state apparatus was thus central-, same time, he created the ? 303 Corn- ,.....,
? ized by appointing a chairman and , a mittee to break the CIA's independent The origin of Operation kanchhand
- co-chairman whom the President -per-. nower and place the agency under.his under .the .expert guidance of William
sonally . trusted and who would report own management. From that time on, Codell offers -a classic example. ARPA
directly to him. the CIA had, to clear each of its appropriated surplus funds to' begin the .
?- Taylor acted as a broker among the programs in.. advance .and report defoliation program, and .then, in order
various power blocs to ensure that the directly to McGeorge Bundy, the chair-S to justify an .increased budget,..by?
agencies- responded to the President's man of the 303 Committee and the passed the original guidelines and ex-
bidding. Robert Kennedy was . con- Special Assistant to the President for Panded the program. Much ,as feudal'-
. sidered the moving force behind the National Security Affairs: Bundy, Max- warlords had waged w.ar against each,
SGCI. He attended every meeting and, well Taylor, and Robert Kennedy were other within fledgling nations, so the
by his personal tactics, 'managed to trusted lieutenants who todk their modern ' agencies looked upon each.
?transform them into courtroom spec- orders directly from the President and other as rivals and tried to grab power
.tacles. Officers of the agencies pre- were placed in charge- of special agencies and resources within the fledgling
-sented their findings from a 'witness to Centralize command in -the natidnal empire. ? ' -
chair, and Kennedy would zealously security apparatus on the' President's To cope with this problem, Ken-
and relentlessly cross-examine 'each''behalf. nedy, in 1961, gave US ambassadors
witness. .. Not only were the 303 Committee , . full power to control the . national
Approved For RekelaStee200011110eneCIA3RDP0401)499R001000090001-6
. ootrit 1 nu ect
1 3
security agencies in tAt) V6IdifoidAteratlit20-ilillOgis. 4' AiRDP84-100492ftiQ.Q0M99116the Chiefs. The
the agencies were
their programs with.and.be supervised is anticipating just rapidly
Special Forces,Sp such a counterinsurgency as a cover - to 'gain .
by the ambassadors -to the countries in challenge by. the Chiefs and is pre-. control over part of the plans for,
which they were operating. Together paring his own defense. The policies of covert 'operations, then expanded it to
they were called the "Country Team," the. Chiefs, -moreover, invariably extend include conventional warfare, which
with the ambassador as captain, who, the zone of combat until victory .is the military was organized to ptirsue.
received his anthority - directly from achieved The Chiefs also depart from In this ,respect, there was an implicit,
Kennedy and reported directly to him.. civilian leaders in being willing to wage accord between the military and civil,
Just as Kennedy had hoped. to bring nuclear' war, if that is considered ian leadership._
the national security agencies in _Wash- necessary to avoid defeat.-
ington under the command and control Every one of Secretary McNamara's
of the SGC1, so he relied upon' the .
famous visits to Vietnam was a guided
concept ' of the Country Team to But '.if a war can .be presented as a tour carefully 'stage-managed by the
',
achieve the same control in the field, police action, . or can proceed . under Joint Chiefs. McNamara would stop off
cover as a private matter, then the
at Hawaii and pick up a briefing book,
'.
The Joint Chiefs power of the Chiefs can be sharply prepared by Krulak, which contained
limited. Thus Kennedy had an obvious
? ? . stake brilliant charts and graphs displaying
,
But the Joint Chiefs of Staff?in in keeping the ? progress of the war. McNamara
ng the war private. But
contrast to the oiler national security he was not passive. During the period. would scan the book to obtain the
,agencies?have independent Support of the private war Kennedy set about, information he needed for press con-
both in Congress and in the country, building the elite corps of the Green ferences to be held in Saigon. After
Working through ..the chairmen ' of key Berets. In Kennedy, Sorenson wrote: the trip, the information would be
Congressional committees, the Chiefs converted into 'a hard-cover volume
have .automatic access to one branch of But the President's pride: was still containing references .to McNamara's
government to articulate the proposals the Armyrecent findings in Vietnam,. but again
growing to a level some five .or six times as large as when he took
. they deem ? important, -. regardless of written by Krulak. 'Phis book would
whether they have the support of the office, although still small. both in then be. handed to the President
President or his senior advisers. Once total numbers. and in relation to ?as the final report. The book had been
'these proposals are made public; the the need for more. The President written in advance of the trip just as
-Chiefs can count .on the right-wing directed?again over the opposition the trip itself had been planned in
-constituency in the country to support of 1.6p generals?that the Special advance.
. them. Since the Chiefs formulate, ex- Forces wear Green Berets as a
press, and then 'personify the national mark of distinction.
required to clear accord with those of the military or he military first employed the conCept of
With counterinsurgency - in their
'interest on any issue concerning Kennedy wanted to carry on the pockets, the management. of some of
national security, they rival the Presi- Vietnam war' exclusively through .the the covert operations well in hand, and
dent's claim to sovereignty. By virtue Special Forces, which would enable McNamara under close scrutiny and
of their support in Congress, their him to seize command of the national partly under their guidance, the Joint
political constituency, and their claim military apparatus. He seems to have Chiefs turned their attention to the
upon the flag, the Chiefs, unlike other had a vision of the Green Berets as a thorny problem of the Special :Forces.
government groups, can even charge Praetorian Guard, an elite army Under the supervision of the CIA, the
the President with treason. Because -of directly under the command and con- Special Forces had been successful in
their formidable power, the President trot of the President.. The Green Berets training the Montagnards. In 1964,
. must respond to any proposal they. put represented Kennedy's attempt to curb OperatiOn Switchback was approved in
"forward. ?
the power of the Chiefs and institu- Washington to break up the autOnomy
The President, of course, can coin- tiOnalize the military ?directly under of Special Forces, remove them from
mand his own resources to persuade
the Presidency. the CIA's direction, and plaCe them
the Chiefs to champion his causes. But 'Edward Lansdale., a devout believer under the command of MACV.
he must always bargain with them and in the Special Forces .and in the In one stroke, the Joint Chiefs
grant them- certain concessions if they'
concept of counterinsurgency, was picked up control of both the Special
oppose him Or if he needs their public quietly assigned an. -office under Forces and the local tribesmen. The
_ support. Once the state embarks on McNamara in 1961 and given the .state had spread its power over the
war, this uneasy balance between the power to keep Vietnam Under Presi- ancient tribes of Indochina and its own
President and the Chiefs gradually tips dential control. This was a mistake, elite warriors. The central state appa-
on the side of the. Chiefs. The Joint The Joint Chiefs immediately perceived ratus was concentrated in the hands of
Chiefs of Staff, -not the Commander- Lansdale as a potential threat and they the Chiefs and the, .President. The rest
in-Chief, are presumed to know how to set up their own counterinsurgency Of the national security machinery
manage a. war.' The President who agency by creating a Special Assistant received its orders from their combined
opposes their programs lays. himself for Counter-Insurgency and Special command. The question left open?and
open to the charge that he is playing Activities (SACSA). Victor Krulak, the Still unanswered?was whether the
with 'American lives.
. . first "SACSA," a former Marine Corps
war on the grounds that he is pro-
Thus, when the President expands a
general and an astute politician who
was -referred to as "the brute," under-
aorit i riu
tecting the lives of US troops in the cut Lansdale .at 'every turn until Lans-
9U
field he either has, in effect, borr2wed_ A 6A iv sttivii i ?
AcchYggutgryKel g /04.:'-i?eCIVRoP8400499R001000090001-6
the Chiefs' argument
t' , Once he gained control over
Krulak was able to restore ?
14
Approved FoSeelease 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-004AN601000090001-6
Chiefs and the Commander-in-Chief
would share that immense power
equally, or whether one would make a
claim against the Other:
Centralization Of the state bureauc-
racy?except for the Joint Chiefs?
directly .under the command and con-
trol of the President greatly enhanced
the power. of the President. The effects
? of this transfer of power were pro-
found. Through the .303 Committee
and the mobilization of the - Green
Berets, the President dould now make
?the decisions on matters of espionage
and military ?strategy. To. the extent
that: he has control over the CIA and
shares the power of the military, lie?is
in effect both a superspy and a field
marshal. Tlie time and energy he is
normally expected to devote to his
duties as Chief Executive are now
absorbed by these new offices. How
much time Kennedy actually devoted
to supervising covert activities and
:personally managing the activities of
the Special Forces remains unclear, but
it is certain they made large claims on
his working day.
? Though the' 303 Committee and the
Special Group successfully centralized
the powerful government agencies
under the Executive, the Green Berets
and. the Country Team-were much less
!effective in centralizing the field opera-
tions. Nevertheless, the concept of
centralizing the...state apparatus was
adVanced by Kennedy and the reality
almost measured up to that concept.
During the. thirty-three months Of his
Presidency, Kennedy was creating the
elements of a totalitarian state strucfure
which carried on a private war:
The fact that the ? war was private
meant that it was not the Main
preoccupation of the nation, but rather
the chief task of the Executive; that it
was conducted not in the interests of
the nation, but in the interests of the.
state. Indeed, one could now say that
it was conducted 'against the interests
, of the nation, because it destroyed' the.
orderly processes of government.,
Would Kennedy Have Withdrawn? -
American national security was never
4t. stake. Through the Special Group,
Kennedy knew well that there was no
serious infiltration from the North, not
any Chinese or Soviet support for thc
Southern struggle. Kennedy knew
therefore that the .war in South Viet-
nam was a civil war. How was Arner-'
ican national security threatened by
the outcome of their civil, war? The
likely impact of a Viet Cong victory
on the international interests of the
United States was never Systematically
studied during the Kennedy years,
notwithstanding the casual talk about
dominoes. .Whenever that issue was
raised; the CIA fudged its assesiment.
For example, if South Vietnam went
Communist, the CIA suggested, South-
east Asia ,would be demoralized and
this demoralization might even spread
to India. But what is demoralization?
How is it measured? How are its
consequences, determined for national
security? Does demoralization cause a
nation to switch sides or does it cause
it to attach. itself ever more closely to
the mother country? Would a Viet
Cong victory have created a revolution
in Thailand? In India? In Cambodia?
In Japan?
According to INR, the intelligence
branch of the State Department,
"there was no serious analysis of what
we could expect throughout Southeast
Asia if we failed to support South
Vietnam." The state was not in the
least interested in determining whether
?the national security was at stake. One
steady feature of US policy in South-
east Asia Was the failure to consider
why we should be there. Only in 1969
did the intelligence community
attenipt a detailed study of the conse-
quences if South Vietnam were to
become a Communist nation. Accord-
ing to INR, this estimate, prepared by
the CIA and only recently made public,
concluded: .
We would lose Laos immediately.
Sihanouk -would preserve Cam-
bodia by a straddling effort. All of
Southeast Asia would reniain just
as it is at least for another
.generation. Thailand, in particular,
would continue to maintain close
relations with the US and would
seek additional support. Simul-
taneously, Thailand would make
overtures and move toward China .
and the Soviet Union. It would
simply take aid from both sides to
preserve its independence. North
Vietnam would consume. itself in
Laos and South Vietnam. Only
Laos would definitely follow into. ?
the Communist orbit.
This estimate suggests that if the
United States were defeated in open
warfare by a "fourth rate 'nation,"
there would be no international con-
sequences to .US interests.. Is it not
then reasonable to assume that if the
United States had not fought andnhad
not been defeated; its stock of .good will'
might have risen? The principal effect of
American intervention is the carnage-'
and devastation of Southeast Asia.
? ihe events of the early .1960s
strongly suggest, however, that had
John F. Kennedy lived, he would not?
have pulled out of Southeast Asia. He
would more likely .have taken any
steps necessary to .avoid an ignomin-
ious .defeat at the hands of the Viet
Cong. In a nationwide interview. on
NBC television two months before his
assassination, when asked whether the
US was likely to reduce its aid to
Vietnam; Kennedy replied:
I don't think we think that would
?. be helpful at this time. If you
reduce your aid, it isopossible you
could have some effect upon the
government structure there. On
the other hand, you might have a
'situation which could bring about
a collapse. Strongly, in our mind is
what happened in the case of
China at the end of World, War II,
where- China, was lost?a weak
government became increasingly
unable .to control events. We don't
want that.
What. I am concerned about is
that Americans will get impatient
and say, beCause they don't like
events in Southeast Asia or they
don't like-the Government in Sai-
gon, that we should withdraw.
That only makes it easy for the
Communists. I think we should
stay. We should use our influence
in as effective a way as we can,
but we should not withdraw. .
A week earlier in another nationwide
interview with Walter Cronkite, Ken-
nedy said:
But I don't agree with those who
say we should withdraw. -That
would be a great mistake.... We
took all this7-made this effort to
defend Europe. Now Europe is
quite secure; We also have to
Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090904* nu el
participate?vie may not like it?in '
'To speak of air strike is to evoke preA.-"for wirw.ny type of war, at
the defense of Asia'Approved.For' e ' atseatial bt lt08dze,likiRDP44100,0?rw099chRyumilie6. Not only did
- Kennedy would not withdraw, but Hiroshima. Brush-fire?war, on the other the brush-:fire and conventional capa-
he was troubled by the prospect .bf hand, is described by the rhetoric of bilities make giant strides in a period
public disapproval of his decision. To limited hostilities, pacification of in- of peace, but the nation's strategic and
stay in Vietnam without arousing pub- -surgents, and nation building. To talk tactical nuclear capabilities were . shill- .
li'e- opposition, he waged the war as of a "surgical air strike," then, tends lady expanded. 'Strategic nuclear
Privately as possible. to blur the distinction between con- weapons were increased 100 percent,
ventional and brush-fire warfare. It and tactical. weapons ?60 percent. The
The "Brush-Fire Wart" . implies that friend can be distinguished capacity .to fight any type of war was
from foe when seen from the air and called the doctrine of "flexible re-
The counterargument to this inter- that conventional weapons can be used
pretation of Kennedy's Vietnam policy , selectively to wage. brush-fire war. It Not only was a conventional war
advances the premise that Vietnam.:was suggests a lower leVel of violence than anticipated and recommended within
,an . example of a new concept' Of conventional warfare, a means of pro- the state, but Kennedy hiniself authoi,-
carefully limited action in 'support of tecting our friends while destroying ized the first use or heavy firepower
local allies ,which was officially .and our enemies. . when he sent the newly armed heli-
publicly described as "brush-fire war.". When asked to comment on the copters to Vietnam in.. 1962. The
Congress openly debated this policy feasibility of using "surgical air strikes" MAAG mission', moreover, had trained
and appropriated'huge sums of money ? within the limits of brush-fire war, the ARVN to prosecute a conventional
in support of it. The war, then, was a McGeorge Bundy .called the question, war. Would the Americans, when need
public, not a private, matter. Under "naive." "Professors know that bombs :-beckoned and opportunity knocked,
Kennedy, American manpower in Viet-.. kill people," he said. Yet such naivete , renounce their own training, firepower,
pain never exceeded 16,000, a figure.
clearly within the bounds of. a brush- helped to preserve an appearance of ' and private urgings?
fire war. . innocence, permitting, the decision-. The United States proceeded one
? step at -a time, and Kennedy took the
- The problem with this argument is makers to believe that the.y had not
. first giant step. If the Viet Cong could
that there was only a handful 1 vl 1 o embarked on a course of systematic not be defeated at a lower level. of
seriously propounde6 the brush-fire deception.. . violence, why not proceed to the next ,
.war doctrine in the highest councils of The type of. ordnance financed dur-
*the state. Roger, Hilsman and Robert level? That was the precise purpose of
jug the Kennedy period also encour- ? flexible response. Kennedy, as we have
Thompson come to mind as official's aged the policy-makers to blur the ? seen, publicly stated that he would not
closely associated with . a counter- distinction between the two types of , 1
o
witnraw..His policy clearly was one
insurgency strategy. for Vietnam; .but war. Preparations for both conven- of gradual escalation which set the us
the dominant positions in the Kennedy tional warfare , and brush-fire war -on the course followed by Johnson,
Administration were held by exponents simultaneously made dramatic ad- and, in revised form, by Nixon. As
of conventional war, whose recOm- vances. -Within two years there was a Maxwell Taylor said when he was
mendations were withheld from 1 the 600 percent increase in counter- asked what Kennedy would have done
. public. Walt Rost9w, who publicly insurgency forces and a 45 percent in Vietnam had he lived: "Far be it from
enunciated the doctrine of brushl.fire increase in the number of combat- me to read the mind, of a dead man,
war in behalf of the Administration in ready Army . divisions. Hence .the but let me just say this, Kennedy was
1961, was privately recommending managers were equipping the state to0
"offensive action" and aerial strikes .
not a loser."
fight either kind of war. This produced
against 't he Northern mainland, an element of doubt and ambiguity
McNamara, also, called for _ 'public over which kind of war the US was
support of brush-fire wars and simul- fighting and would continue to fight.-
taneously .urged privatelY that the US 'Since a brush-fire war signified a lower ?
be .fully - prepared to use 260,000 level of involvement and could be
troops in a conventional war. The prosecuted without interfering with the
public statements of the Kennedy normal business of everyday, life, the
Administration invited public support security managers could point to the
for a brush-fire war, -but the private counterinsurgency. preparations as con- ,
recommendations presupposed the use sistent .with Kennedy's Vietnam' policy.:
of heavy firepower. The capability of carrying both kinds
of defense could be cited as justifier:-
This does- not necessarily mean that tion for both the public .rhetoric and
the officials were. deliberately deceiving the 'private recommendafions. ?
the public. To some extent, they were
also deceiving themselves. The ,con- v. s,
tradiction betWeen their public rhetoric What becomes -.clear when one
and their private 'recommendations was examines the over-all changes intro-
blurred, at the time, both by their duced by Kennedy's managers at the
language and by the kinds of military pentagon is that. they decided- to
technology available to them.
It became fashionable in the early
1960s, for example, tAfilAVerdirtir Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6
gical air strikes," a phrase coined by
Walt Rostow. Aerial warfare is, of
1 6
)16,1).121114434 51J1,1
Approved Fo*lease 2001/filibeVtlAVDP84-0049t114001000090001-6
(A-}r- RIP
kj" V j11(4,1.) ?,Z).?f2:1,1) described as radical consei.va-
live.
I. 4 ,. ? 6 6:1 . - ',..? r% ,_ 9 7.'F' Referring to the secret docu-
: ./.-. afing,i,8 oeereg., k.p-.(fia ;LUPUS nyelit h, Mi.. Buckley said:
I? "'Me idea arose at an editorial
meeting two weeks ago. We
were discussing the Pentagon
papers as released and the fact
they were ideologically tenden-
ficulty was not that the Penta- thus. ,
gon and the CIA gave LIU bad I, in fact, initiated the idea.
advice, but that J.,BJ didn't take I: said, 'Hey, team, what do you ;
Mr. Buckley said the don-
'' d ' .e." think about this--?' We were '
ments were composed by editors , - remarking on the point Maxwell
N... '? y i (1 -Taylor made that the papers
the hoax came after suspicion were fraf,,,mentary,
arose when several persons list- "Created- Them"
ed as authors of the printed; "We reasoned that others at
documents could not. recalll that time saw what was actually
writing them. One flatly denied; happening and gave appropriate
New York tilt,--With a broadpers, or something like them,!
grin, William F. Buckley, Jr., must have been written. There-
editor, revealed yesterday that
publication in his National Re-
view of so-called secret Vietnam
documents was a hoax.
fore, one concludes that the dif-
of the magazine "ex mhilo"?
out of nothing.
Intended Pm-pose Cited
The intended purpose, Mr.
Buckley told a news conference,
was to demonstrate in regard to
the earlier Pentagon -papers authorship credited to his name, advice to the government. We
"that the Pentagon and the CIA Not The First Put-On then created them. That step
.are not composed of incomp& , was easy for National .Review
? ,
It was not the first put-oneditors:
would be widely accepted as l ,
; tents . ... that, forged_ documents i
; staged by the 45-year-old Mr.! Mr. Buckley said he had a
:
;
genuine provided their content Buckley, brother of New Yor.k's; hand in composing the false -doe-
!
,was inherently plausible . . . conservative Senator James L luments, but would not say who
? i
1
that the 'challenge in Southeast, Buckley. In 1965, William Buck-!on the magazine's staff wrote
Asia was an aspect of the global ley ran unsuccessfully for mayor' what. ,
challenge to the West, not alef New York, stringing together On July 16, Mr. Buckley went
local affair." llong and little-known words, but on, the magazine mailed 6,000
Later, Mr. Buckley told a re-:slimming up by saying that if letters "to our closest friends
;elected he would "demand a re- and supporters of National Re-
porter at his Manhattan apart- view advising them of what we
meat: ' count.''
"Jf the advice given in the Mr. Buckley founded the Na- were doing." -
Several subscribers have been
magazine had ben followed,!tional Review in 1951 to further
his political outlook, which he contacted but Said they had not
we wouldn't be in Vietnam to- ? received such a letter.
day. The point is that the pa- "Invited Discovery"
"We mentioned a lot of people
we didn't have to mention," Mr.
Buckley said. -"In that sense, we
invited discovery. We couldn't
have been surprised if within
?-twO hours after it appeared it
had been called a hoax. We were
more surprised than anybody at
-reading . . . that not even Dean
Rusk had been able to deity what
was printed."
Asked if the magazine _planned
any future capers, .Mr; ? Buckley
replied: "Maybe we should re-
veal the -deliberations of the
? Central Committee of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China after
the meeting with Kissinger"
In his news conference, Mr.
Buckley said: "Co-operation
from government officials was
neither given- nor sought."
?"Those who will Want to ques-
tion the methods we used in
order to make our demonstration
may proceed to do so," Mr.
Buckley's news conference state-
Anent said. "We 'admit that we
proceeded in something of an
ethical vaccurn. .
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iiICTCI POCT
Appr9ved Forllidlease 2001/190 MIAMP84-0049014.01000090001-6
By Don Oberdorfer
WatThitigton Ptast Stair Writer
NEW 'YORK, July
Buckley would not say
ham F. Buckley Jr. said today whether he has any evidence
that the top secret" govern- that such a recommendation! --including former Secretary.
ment documents on the Viet- Was actually made by the Joint. of State Dean Rusk, former!
Chiefs of Staff or anyone else
nam war published in his ? Secretary of State Dean Ache-
magazine,a high position in the Amer-
National son, and Prof. Frank Trager--
Review, lean government.
? - -- ? - were unable to say Tuesday
were a hoax designed "to dem- "It inconc.civable to me night whether the documents
onstrate . . that forged docu- that there is nobody in the attributed to them were gen-
ii:tont:8 would be widely ac. Pentagon, CIA or White House nine, ?
, who has the same analytical
(Toted as genuine provided ? . Few if any of the officials
? powers as a. junior editor of
their centent wa.s inherently
National Review. We were pro- or agencies namedin the docul
ments had seen copies of the
plausible." posing these things seven
A subsidiary purpose, the years ago," he said. National Review, which could
not be found on newsstands ill
National. Review editor told a The conservative editor, col- Washington Tuesday.
news conference, was to prove umnist and television person- . When copies did become
that it was "Plausible" that ality was smiling, joking and available in government, of-
American officials had recom- obviously enjoying the lime- ficials began to say they could
mended massive escalation in light of an airport press con-
vict:11am, as favored by the ference to announce the hoax
conservative magazine, i.after flying in from the West
- Among other things, the ; Coast.
:false documents "showed" i Buckley said the documents,
that high-ranking U. S. offi-i which took up 14 pages of the
icials twice recommended use current issue of the National
of nuclear weapons in Victd Review, were composed last
I nam in 1964-5. Headlined "The week in the magazine's offices.
Secret Papers They Didn't Be said the idea for the hoax
!Publish," the documents had issue sprang "full-blown in my
;
been described by the maga, mind" and added dryly it was
,zine yesterday as "fragments" "an arduous challenge" to
I
from extensive files made emulate bureaucratic prose.
'
available to it by an unnamed Those who will want to
!informant. question the methods we used
Buckley was asked today if in order to make our ! demon-
stration may 'proceed to -do it served any useful purpose
so," said Buckley, facing three
for. American news cervices to
tell the public and the world camera crews and about 10
on the basis of false doeu-
reporters. "We admit that we
ments that the U. S. govern-
'
proceeded in somewhat of an
ment had seriously considered ethical vacuum.
using nuclear weapons in Viet-
i '"I'he New York Times has
nam. instructed us that it .is per-
"it seems to me quite dear miscible to traffic in stolen
that the fact we have ?lidera. documents. But they have not
yet instructed- us on whether
arms suggests that. they ought it is permissible to traffic in
to be used under certain cir- forged documents," he said.
cumstances," he replied. Buckley maintained that the
"If it could be demonstrated
of the -Smithsonian's National
Museum of History and Tech-
nology, told newsmen this
morning that he had n o
written the document ascribed
to him by the National Re.;
v I e w. Repeated efforts to
reach Boorstin Tuesday night,
before publication of news
articles on the magazine dis-
closures,. were unsuccessful..
But -several of those named
as authors of fake documents
failure of government agencies
that in 1965 a demonstration and former high officials to'
challenge the auth of
drop [of 'nuclear weapons] out-
enticity
the !National Review papers
side of Haiphong might save -was evidence of their "plans-
the lives of 43,000 Americans, ibility" as mere paraphrases
I would suggest that it Was a of documents which do exist.
reasonable suggestion for the There were denials before
Joint Chiefs to make." ? the Buckley news. conference.
Prof. Daniel Booratin, director.
not find such documents in
their files, but they indicated
they were planning extensive
searches.
The Washington Post got an
advance copy of the National
Review on Tuesday from the
office of the editor's brother,
Sen. James L. Buckley (C-
N.Y.). Attached was a calling
card from the senator's press
secretary, Leonard Saffir. He
had written on it, "A journa,-
. .
listi
- coup. Messrs. Buckley
and Rusher (National Review
publisher William A. Rusher)
deserve Pulitzer Prizes."
Yesterday, Saffir said that
he had thought the documents
were genuine and that his boss
did not know anything about it
since he was away- in Cali-
fornia. Asked what he thought
the hoax proved, Saffir
"Maybe it highlights the gullie
bility of the press. Maybe it
proves the press should be
more probing."
At the press conference
here, William Buckley ap-
peared unconcerned about the
potential impact of the hoax,
on the credibility of his jour-
nal, which claims 115,000 cir-
culation. He said the "plausi-
ble" hoax enhances. the Na-
tional Review's reputation for.
analysis.
!Buckley maintained his
magazine's "larger purposes"
excused its publication of cone
cocted documents at least as
much as the "larger purposes"
of major newspapers- excused
the publication of authentic
documents about decision-
in the Vietnam war.
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I3EW YOM REVIEW OF BOOKS
Approved FdlitRelease 2001/1&?8 )8i-A-146P84-0049411k001000090001-6
-Oanato Domitrigo: Ti.ha
Intervention and Negotiation:
The United States and the Dominican
Revolution
by Jerome Slater,
with a Foreword by
Hans J. Morgenthau.
Harper & Row, 254 pp., $7.95
Barrios in Arms:
Revolution in Santo Domingo
by Jose A. Moreno.
University of Pittsburgh,
226 pp., $8.95
Norman Gall
We know.that many who are now
in revolt do not seek a Communist
tyranny. We think it's tragic in-
deed that their high motives have
been misused by a small band of
conspirators, who receive ? their
directions from abroad. To those
who fight only for liberty and
justice and progress, I want to join,
in .... appealing to you tonight to '
abWel your arms 'ana tdacsure
you that there is nothing to fear.
Tlie' road is.o.pen tci 'You to shire ?
in building a Dominican Democ-
racy and' we 'irt America .are ready
and anxious and willing to help
y9u.
?
?Lyndon B. Johnson__
May 2, 1965
President -Johnson's military inter-
vention in the Dominican Republic in
1965 was as momentous as it was cruel
and politically mistaken. We can. see it,
along with our enlargement of the
Vietnam war in the same year, as part
of a disastrous expansion of the
powers of the American Presidency
and of its sense of "global responsi-
bilities." When a force of 23,000 US
troops landed in Santo Domingo in
May to reverse the course of the Santo
Domingo civil war they served to
rescue a repressive military establish-
ment from an apparently successful
'popular revolt thatwas trying to
restore constitutional r,ule. We can now
see that the high priority the US gave
to social progress in Latin America,
an idea implicit in the Alliance for
Pfogress, has been replaced by what
?appears to be an expanding and recur-
rent pattern of control by terror.
nta3s aft 91'onzooma ?
-Professor Jerome Slater's ? political
study of the 1965 intervention and the
eighteen-month US military occupation
that followed is derived from his use,
on a not-for-attribution basis, of "a
great number of papers, memoirs, and
documents which are not now in the
public domain," as well as off-the-
record interviews with US and 'OAS
officials. However, all this new material
adds little or no support to the official
rationale for-the intervention?that the
Dominican Republic was at the brink
of a possible Communist takeover.
Instead it provides further evidence of
double-dealing and cruelty after the US
troops were sent in.
Because he relies so much on classi-
fied official documents, and because of
his otherwise limited knowledge of
Dominican affairs, Slater tends at times
to bend over backward to give credence
and legitimacy to the official US view in
a number of, at best, highly doubtful
instances. Nevertheless, he concludes
that although "there was some risk
that out of an uncontrollable revolu-
tionary upheaval Castroite forces might
emerge victorious ... the risk was not
yet sufficiently great to justify the
predictably enormous political and
moral costs that the intervention en-
tailed."
The effect of the intervention was to
restore to power, in Santo Domingo the
political apparatchiks of the long and
brutal dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo (1930-61). Of the costs Slater
writes at the end of his book:
the steadily worsening political
terrorism ... has recently [19701
reached crisis proportions. Scarcely
a day goes by without a political
murder, a "suicide" of a jailed
political prisoner, the disappear-
ance of a political activist, or, at
the very least, a case of police
harassment of the political opposi-
tion. Most of the victims are
Communists or Castroitc radicals,
PRD activists [of ex-President
Juan Bosch's Partido Revolu-
cionario Dordnicano], or former
constitutionAtists, although re-
cently even anti-Balaguerists on
the right have been attacked:
While there has been a rise in
leftist counter-terror, with ma-
chine-gunnings of isolated police
and soldiers increasingly common,
the main culprits appear to be
unregenerates in the police and, to
a lesser extent, the armed forces.
It is not clear what [President
Joaquin] Balaguer's role is in this,
but although he has condemned
what he calls the "uncontrollable
forces" behind the violence and on
several occasions has shaken up
the police leadership, there is a
growing feeling among moderate
Dominicans that he is encouraging
the rightist terrorism or, at best,
has been inadequate in his re-
sponse to it.
In recent years there have been more
political murders in the Dominican
Republic than in any comparable
period during ?Trujillo's dictatorship,
with the sole exception of the reign of
terror that followed the swiftly
crushed invasion from Cuba in 1959,
organized by Fidel Castro.' The Santo ?
Domingo newspaper El Nacional last
December 30 filled a page and a half
of newsprint with the 'details of
186 political murders and thirty dis-
appearances during 1970.2 The Domin-
ican terror resembles the current wave
of political killings in Guatemala (see
my "Slaughter in Guatemala,' NYR,
May 20, 1971) in that the paramilitary
death squads are organized by the
armed forces and police, which in both
cases over the years have been given
heavy US material and advisory sup-
port. The death squads themselves are,
partly composed of defectors from
revolutionary political factions. .
The political terrorism in Santo'
Domingo, however, seems now to be
directed not so much against well-
known politicians, as is the case in
Guatemala. Rather it is used to control
the Santo Domingo ell M population.
which was the main force that 'de-
feated the Dominican military in the
1965 revolution. In the proliferating
ramshackle slums and squatter srttIe-
ments that spread nonhward from the
ancient churches and plazas of down-
town Santo Domingm, there is con-
tinual patrolling by uniformed military
and police units, as yell as b) p6;r\--
clothes agents on motor scooters. Each
barrio has been infiltnted by govern- '
ment intelligence orgalizations. (Mor-
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over, many N5.113401erd Fispae4ifse 2001/11/08 : CIPe-aipFg3f3NR
agents, like Haiti's. Ton-Ton Macoutes.) A
Since much of the killing seems to be
_ done almost capricipusly by these
patrols,3 the effect of' the terror has
been an undeclared, al-night curfew in
the slums. ?
On a recent visit to Santo Domingo
I found that, owing to the general fear
of assassination, heavily populated
slum areas of the old rebel zone,
whose intense street life in the past
resembled New York's Forty-second
Street or Tokyo's Yoshiwara district,
were virtually deserted after 8 PM.
Although these killings have aroused
little in the way of active popular
resistance,, a twenty-fonr-hour general
strike was called last November. The
outlying barrio of Los Minas--a heavily
PRD slum which was invaded by
squatters after the Trujillo assassination
in 1961 and which today has more
than 100,000 inhabitants?was shut
down after six residents of the barrio
were murdered within a week. Accord-
ing to one feeble old man in the barrio
who was questioned by a reporter at,
.the time, "The situation had gotten so
bad in Los Minas that the men felt
compelled to stay at home and send
the women out to find the .day's
sustenance, because their Jives were not
worth a piece of rotten'fruit.;'4
The night before Los Minas was shut
down, President Balaguer, a crafty and
tenacious political maneuverer who was
Trujillo's last puppet president, told a
press conference at the National Palace
that the strike at Los Minas
... is illogical and absurd because
what the citizenry should do
is associate itself with the
authorities to counteract the ter-
rorism. As I have said many times,
this is a fight in which all sectors
of society should participate. For
if an exact version of each deed
could reach me and the Govern-
ment, one could establish respon-
sibility more easily and the
Government could punish these
acts of terror.
I have denounced the irregu-
larities inside the police, and I
?have confided to many persons the
purification of the police.s So far
this has not been achieved and I
completely agree with the editorial
in today's [newspaper] / utin
Diario about this: the imperious
need to purify the police, so that
its services are efficient and to end
these criminal acts that6 are filling
the country with blood.
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RIMPBRA-80
2
According to secret Dominican government documents I obtained while
investigating the political terror in Santo Domingo, the intelligence and
security -apparatus of the Balaguer regime has been making use of Cuban exiles.
One typewritten memorandum under the letterhead of the National Police
says [see photocopy on opposite page]:
Very courteously, you are informed that you should have ready a group
of five men, since on the 25th of this month it was agreed to stage a
simulated attack 'on the Royal Bank of Canada to discredit the
movements of the left, which have been gaining strength in recent months.
J. I says that the personnel selected for this purpose should be Cubans.
The uniforms that will be used will be supplied by Lieutenant Cedano.
Another memorandum, written under the letterhead Presidencia. de. la
Republica and dated April 22, 1970, gave these instructions:
Very courteously, it is communicated that you should send Agent, M.10
to the Airport of the Americas at 6 a.m. to await the arrival of ',the
personnel of Cuban nationality that will carry out this service under your
supervision.
Another memorandum, indrked "Confidential" and dated July 29 1970 says:
Very respectfully I communicate that the mernhers ot t));.-, body -
(CUBANS) have instructions as well as the arms tly-Py v:ill tn.e ih their
work. At the same time 1 intorm you that P. 17 wished to eturri to
Miami as soon as he performs the service. This should be discussed with
J. 1 since it could bring. problems ,n that the peison mentioned ,,as
disagreements with the other men.
Political assassimwtiens continued same date Perez Aybar also wrote
' steadily for four years after ,1966,
when, with US occupation forces still
in the. country, Balaguer, was elected to
his first four-year term. In 1970,
during Balaguer's campaign for re-
election, the terror sharply increased.
A great many voters_ abstained from
this election after the Dominican con-
stitution had been changed to allow.
Balaguer to run for a second consecu-
tive term. Then, in the last six months
of 1970, after Balaguer had begun his
second term of office, new plans for
police action were circulated among
the intelligence and security agencies
of the Dominican government, which
are honeycombed .with officers of
Trujillo's old secret police, the SIM
(Servicio de Inteligencia Militar). These
plans were the basis for the most
sustained and enveloping system of
terror since the fall of the Trujillo
dictatorship.
The head of . the Department of
Intelligence at the National Palace is
Manuel A. Perez Sosa, former chief of
the SIM. On August 2, 1970, Perez
'Sosa received a letter of resignation
from one of his subordinates, Miguel
A. Perez Aybar, who explained that "I
have taken this step so as not to lend
myself to the events that I understand
will occur and will do great injury to
the Supreme Government." On the
?
Balaguer that "I have decided to resign
because I am your ..friend and because
the plans of the Department of Intel-
ligence are disastrous for your labor of
Government, and I do not wish to be
an accomplice to the murder of men
who are going to be assassinated
without any cause."
A. few months ago a new kind of
terrorist organization was organized by
the police.,Known as La Banda, it is
made up mainly of former members of
the Maoist Movindento Popular DOMill-
icano (MPD), the most militant party
of the Dominican left, which last year
tried to form a United Front of all
political factions?including dissidents
on the extreme right?to oppose Bala-
guer's re-election. The MPD is said to
have carried out the kidnapping, in
March, 1970, of Lt. Col. Donald J.
Crowley, the US air attach?n Santo
Domingo, by the "Unified Andre-
election Command." Crowley was
exchanged within sixty hours for
twenty Dominican political prisoners,
the most prominent of whom was the
MPD Secretary-General Maxhniliano
Gomez, who were flown into exile.
Since then most of the principal MPD
leaders have been gunned down by the
police, and Gomez himself died of gas
poisoning last month in Brussels under
mysterious circumstances.
Ap_proved F
Meanwhile, many MFD 7ouths have
been arrested and pressured into join-
ing the police terrorist bands. On April
20, 1971, six youths who said they
were members .of a terrorist organiza-
tion called Joventucl Dcmocratica
.Refoitnista Anticornunista were grant-
ed political asylum in the Mexican
embassy. in Santo Domingo. All but
one of them were age eighteen or
younger. Before taking refuge in the
embassy they issued a statement to the
' press saYing that they had been re-
cruited by the police after they were
arrested and accused of "a series of
deeds that we did not commit." They
identified the leader of the terrorist
bands as Police Lt. Oscar Nunez Pena,
who. they said was a bodyguard or
Gen. Perez y Perez, the police chief.
"In this way," the youths said, "they
(the police] want to get their hooks
into many revolutionary militants."
They said the police told them that
"this is a declared war against the
Communists. The bainis will be organ-
ized in all the barrios of the capital
and what has been done so far is an
experiment to acclimatize public because he had been ordered by Police
opinion." According to their state- Lt. Nunez pan to kill Felix Albur-
rnent, the group was given three querque, the PRD Secretary-General of
Thompson machine guns and a car to the taxi drivers' union UNACHOSIN,
carry out its assignment in the "April and Radhames Gomez, the managing
Plan" which was drafted by the
--- editor of El Nacional. Before obtaining
police.'
,asylum Sierra y Sierra had lived in a
On June 7, another member of La
squatter settlernent called Katanga,
next to Los Minas. One of his last acts
Banda, Fernando Aquino Mateo, also
as a member of La Banda, he said, was
known as Sierra y Sierra, obtained
to arrest Juan Almonte, the. PRD
asylum in the Mexican embassy. Before
leader of Los Minas, under orders of a
he entered he embassy Sierra y Sierra
police sergeant who said that' "if
said in an interview that he had been
- . nobody sees us take him prisoner, we
jailed several times after fighting on
should kill him."8
084-CIA-RDP-84-00468,1004-000090001-6
yirjr.'"N
k ? - ?
e
49-1-e--40
11.11113PI SCA 110111NICAN4
pouciA NACIONAL
SART? D011000, D. N.
Al r 00.?
Aounto s 'Plante relacionado al Banco The Roy.al Dark
Of. Canada.
Siuy tortensento, a* le infOima quo debe Rd. toner
lioto un personal do 5 boubron, yo quo on rouninn calobrada. en to-
ca 25 dol. present. Eta, co acord6 realitar VD siaulado atrao0 al
The Royal Bone% Of. canada, este, nodida so acordo para poder doss-
croditnr los sovisiontoa do itquieria, los cualea *sten tomando -
fuersaa en lois Ultimos mom.
. Dice J.1 tuo el personal seloccioando part+ cot&
fin deben aer Cubanos. Los unifnroes nue sorAn utilicados le oortin
suministrado por el Teniento Cedano.
the constitutionalist side in the 1965
revolution, and had been beaten up in
jail so many times that he finally
agreed to become a .trustee at La
Victoria prison, where, he said, he beat
and tortured other inmates. He also
said he witnessed the death by beating
of Oliver Daniel Mendez Guzman,
twenty, whom Police Chief Perez y
Perez said had escaped from jail on
May 5. The dead youth was taken
from jail in a sack by a police colonel,
Sierra y Sierra recalled, "I imagine that
they threw him into the sea, because I
have not read in the press that his
body appeared anywhere."
He explained that he had joined La
Banda after his release from jail, May
19, and had sought diplomatic asylum
Almonte had recently made a series
of accusations of corruption in the
operations of the national lottery, and
had won an election held by the union
of lottery ticket sellers?certified by
the Labor Ministry. He had, however,
been stopped at gunpoint by the old
union leadership from taking over the
union headquarters. In an interview
shortly before his arrest, Almonte told
me: "The violence in these barrios is
such that even police sergeants and
corporals have been killed for having
become too close to the PRD. We will
have a revolution soon more violent
than before. Last time [in 19651 we
routed the army' in twenty-four-hours,
and when it happens again' it will take
less time."
According to the testimony of the
, youths who obtained asylum in the
Mexican embassy, the police agents
who organized La Banda were also
involved in one of the most sordid
ipolitical crimes in recent Dominican
history, the kidnap-murder of Santiago
Manuel Hernandez, nineteen, a former
MPD member also known as Manga
who had been sought by the police for
several weeks. Young Hernandez was
shot and critically, wounded inside his
father's slum shack by two police
undercover .s&e.-qts on March 26. Two
weeks later; oic-Easter Sunday, the day
before he was to undergo surgery, he
was kidnapped from his hospital bed
by police agents and was found dead
the next morning in a roadside cane-
field near the town of San Pedro de
Macoris, some forty miles away. ?
? As described to me in interviews by
his mother and his parish priest, a
Cuban Jesuit named Tomas Marrero,
the convalescence of Manga was a lurid
nightmare that moved inexorably
toward death. His mother, Sra. Mer-
Cedes Hernandez de Frias, told me that
when her critically wounded son was
brought to the Hospital Padre Bellini
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Nt-NrT
el
in downtown SantoDoAi3prov:etiRdrNiiidiellSergee'l )411VO&Ifenkc-ftPt40049ffigetPtiegOioggf Thus the
could be found for a transfusion, since
the local blood banks said tney nan. no
bloc for a wounded man until they
got a police order to supply it. The
emergency operatiOn to prolong the
life of ? Mangi. was performed?with
police in, the- operating room?by re-
cycling the blood hemorrhaging from
the patients body into a bottle
and injecting it back into him. After
his recovery, police guards were sta-
tioned with machine guns inside the
'ward, and forbade the boy to speak
? with anyone.
According to his mother, Hernandez
was visited every day by two police
plainclOthesmen who stood at the foot
of the hospital bed and asked how he
was getting on; she said her son
whispered to her after one of these
visits that they were the two men who
shot him on March 26. Late each night
? the police would turn on all the lights
in the ward and search the boy's bed,
on one occasion disconnecting the
rubber tube through which noxious
fluids were being drained from his
body. Wheii Father Marrero, who was
taking turns with members of the
family in all-night bedside vigils, pro-
tested to the policemen, the priest was
? barred from the hospital from then on.
. A few days later the boy's mother
overheard the police guards say, "We're
going to lynch this dog."
At 7 PM, on April 11, four men
entered the hospital ward with stock-
ings over their heads and handkerchiefs
:covering their faces. They announced-
that "we are from the party and we
have come to liberate you," but the
boy said, "I have no party," and
pleaded with his mother not to let him
go. As the men were leaving the ward
with her son, the mother saw that
beneath their hospital smocks they
wore gray police trousers and black
police boots. A few days after the
boy's body was found, President Bala-
guer attributed the murder to "a
struggle between two organizations of
the extreme Left."9
The story of Manga's death was first
told to me by Father Marrero, whom I
have known since the 1965 revolution,
having slept in his church in the rebel
zone while interviewing some of the
people who fought on the constitution-
alist side. Ile was one of some twenty
Cuban and Spanish Jesuits who came
to the Dominican Republic from Cuba
in 1961?after nationalization that year
di Th ad originally
started as a means of self-protec-
tion and an expression of solidar7
ity among members of informal
groups, became the most powerful
instrument -in the hands of the
rebels. By the end of May there
were in the city 117 commando
posts in which 5,000 men lived,.
ate, and slept together....
On one hand, informal groups
of people from the barrio, groups
of friends and relatives from the
community, or gangs of "tigers"
[teen-age street gangs] evolved
.into commandos such as San
Miguel, Pedro Mena, Pichirilo, and
Barahona. On the other hand some
formal organizations [political
parties and labor unions] already.
operating ? in public life whose
leaders decided to combine their
memberships with other individ-
uals formed such commandos as
San Uizaro, Poasi, and Argentina.
Both kinds of groups Were numer-
ouS, and both were relevant to-the
revolution. The first kind relied
heavily on the organizational
abilities of the leader, particularly
on his charisma and machismo
[manliness' and bravery]. The
second kind relied heavily on the
organizational structure of the
parent organization.
This description, I think, should help
to place. the Santo Domingo revolt of
1965 'alongside the Paris Commune of
1871 in the world's revolutionary
traditions. Both were urban, popular
uprisings that were sustained by civil-
ian militia until they were crushed by
foreign troops. Both were involved in
the turbulent process of peasant migra-
tion to the cities that made Paris in
the nineteenth century and Santo
Domingo since Trujillo's assassination
in 1961 into centers of social revolu-
tion. Moreno writes very well of the
quarrels, ? the hunger, the demoraliza-
tion as the months of negotiation
dragged on: under the US military
occupation. But his book tends to'
lapse into sociological jargon toward
the end, and it?is regrettable that he
did not instead simply let the Domini-
cans speak for themselves. I can testify
that many of them not only can tell
what the revolution was about with
eloquence. and clarity, but can also do
justice to the incandescent inner life of
the Santo Domingo slums.
able work in leading the agglornamerzto
of the Dominican church, drafting the
principal church documents, organizing
cooperatives, literacy . campaigns,
peasant leagues, and the new Catholic
University Mater et Magistra in. Santi-
ago, and earning the enmity of right-
wing elements of Dominican society.
During the revolution I met another
Cuban Jesuit, Jose Moreno, author of
Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo
Domingo, who was working with
Father Marrero at the. San Miguel
Church, running an improvised medical
clinic and distributing surplus food.
The food was sent by the .Americans
across the cease-fire lines, while nego-
tiations were dragging on, but in barely
sufficient quantities to avoid panic and
starvation among what became essen-
tially a captive population.
Jose Moreno has since left the
priesthood and is now .teaching soci-
ology at the University. of Pittsburgh's
Center for Latin American Studies. His,
account -of life inside the rebel zone
during the 1965 civil war?he was
doing field research for his doctorate
in sociology at Cornell when the
revolution broke out?is written with
more intimate knowledge and greater
precision than any other study of the
insurrection I have seen. Moreno's is
the first, objective, detailed, and plau-
sible analysis-available anywhere of the
real Castroitc-Communist strength in
the constitutionalist camp. He shows
that their forces were limited to a few
well-armed and well-disciplined co-
mandos of resistance fighters con-
trolled by the Communist Party and
the Castroite June 14th Movement.
But these were only a few groups
among a great many others. As Moreno
describes the process:
A training school was set up in
which navy frogmen was,
the
civilians in urban guerrilla tactics.
To maintain the moraje of the
rebel organization, [Col. RarnOn]
Montes Arache [the frogmen's
commander and the rebel defense
minister] and other officers agreed
to let the civilians organize them-
selves into commando [neighbor-
hood militia] units. Montes
Arache realized that his job was to
coordinate these units scattered all
over the . city and to give them
leadership together with logistic
(fod
of the Jesuit Colegio Belen in Havana, 'ti rue
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' Professor Slater writes that ."the realk10,61 Jam.11
? explanation" for - theApprovicleEpgiRl!edsRlutimit /yo 1.11.,-.,, - 4 vitagritila tb.e terror is the
5
Jo 4?,p,1 o ileac ?7410 giii lei% ....6
was the [US] embassy's playing on --,:ein. ?tin? contra z ego aim at Yutting it out."
' Spanish that sounds, like a Mississippi One flaw 'of Professor Slater's book
the Communist theme, compounded
drawl. Life stops at midday when he is that he treats the 1965 intervention
by the almost universal disdain and
speaks on the radio, the slow, seduc- as an isolated episode with virtually no
distrust for . Bosch throughout the US tive indignation of his voice blasting reference to the history of pS involve-
Government." I think this is true but into the street from every shack. In a ment in Dominican affairs:- President
there are deeper explanations. that are recent radio speech Bosch asked: Grant's efforts to annex Santo
relevant ,both to the continuing polit-
'kat terror in Sant.? - Domingo and to Why do you think there are armed. Domingo, which were blocked by
social conditions throughout Latin bands punishing the poor barrios Congress; the US Marine occupation of
America. . ? . ' of the capital? Why are there so 1916-24; the US receivership of
'Sinn Domingo -is one of the ex- many political murders, so many Dominican customs ' duties from
spies, so many political prisoners, 1905-1940, when Trujillo .arranged for
.treme examples -of the creation of a so many abuses? It is for the same final payment of the foreign debt, one
huge sub-proletariat . overnight. Its reason that the country has had a of his proudest 'achievements. Nor does
population (now. 800,000) has . more, large commercial deficit in recent - he mention the CIA role in the
than . doubled .' in - the decade since years. It is because the country assassination of .Triijillo,14 and the US
Trujillo's death... It is -a particularly does not produce enough, for all military and -diplomatic-maneuvering to
, grave .case of the influx to the cities in Dominicans to live at least .with
dismantle the Trujillo political appa-
e-eontemporary? Latin America. And it enough food, and besides this
differs .frOm. ? European peasant migra- what is produced is badly distri- ratus (twice US warships were sent into
buted. A few have much, others Dominican coastal waters to block
tionsItt itli.e ,era ?lithe Paris Commune have enough to live on but the attempts to restore the dictatorship)
In ..04-* important- viays.' Fit-St, the great majority don't even have and to establish the provisional regime
European .urbanization process. pro- where to fall dead, that held the 1962 elections in which
Ce.eded at a somewhat slower pace than. Bosch won by a large majority.
in . Latin America today and was sus- The economic problems of these
A major. element of the US presence
?tamed by a much Iiigher degree - of people 'are immense, almost immeasur-
in Santo Domingo since the fall of
industrial ernploym-ent.10 Secondly, able. A survey of one marginal barrio
Trujillo has been the intimate relation-
there was in Europe nothing approach- by Santo Domingo's Urban Planning
ship of US advisers with the Domin-
ing Latin America's urban squatter Office found that only 16 percent of
jean military and police.15 After the
problem that tends to divide cities into employable family heads had regular
intervention of: 1965, these advisory
distinct 'asphalt and marginal .areas.11 work, 44 percent survived by' occa-
missions expanded enormously. In
If the demands, of those who are sional odd jobs, called chirripa, while
1967 and 1968 the Dominican Repub-
moving into the cities for food, jobs, r.:40 percent were totally unemployed, lie, with a population of only. four
.and housing are in no way satisfied, Of those working full.or part-time, 93 Million, had the largest AID Public
they become 'dangerous to the regime: :percent earned less than $100 Safety (sic) or poiice. assistance pro-
only terror and force will control 'monthly." Survival under these condi- gram of any country outside Vietnam. ?
them. ' ? ? !tions is partly in the cash economy, The, second and third largest programs
. The tattered country people who 'partly through barter, but probably were respectively in Brazil (with 90
I
came to Santo Domingo have built .most important, through elaborate and million people) and Guatemala, the
flimsy; 'clapboard shacks that sprawl :highly codified exchanges Of personal two. other Latin American nations
away from the city's center along both favors, like tribal or - communal ens- where, major outbreaks of right-wing
banks of the Ozama River and under tom ? in many rural subsistence ccon- terror, ,by paramilitary death squads
i
the Duarte Bridge. In 1965, thousands omies. have occurred in recent years.. .
of the slum dwellers, using Molotov 1 . ? -
?cocktails and small arms captured from 'Six years after the revolution, Santo One of the most interesting clocu-
the police, defeated elite tank and Domingo is still .divided into two ments to appear recently on the Amer-
infantry units at this bridge in one of enemy camps: the slums of the old lean presence in Santo Domingo was
the episodes that demoralized the rebel zone, and the comfortable resi-- the transcript of a taped interview with,
Dominican military and led to the US dential neighborhoods surrounding the . David Fairchild,: who served with AID
intervention.' 2 This humiliation has American embassy. I talked to an old : in the Dominican Republic for eight-
generated in the Dominican ? armed ?and - wise . Trujillista politician who ?-eon months in 1966-67. The interview
forces ,and police an obsessive hatred these days rocks on his porch a few deals mainly, with the frustrations and
and fear of the shack settlements and blocks from the embassy. "In the old complexities of administering the vast
the dense, fetid warrens, called patios, days, when a fire broke out in a sugar US aid program to stabilize the Bala-
of ardboard and palm-bark huts which 'cane field, the way to fight it was to .guer regime. Fairchild has this to say
are squeezed behind the facade of ,start another fire, called a counter-fire, about the AID .Public Safety program:
the pastel-colored wood-and-concrete ..' [contrafitego]. In 1965 a big fire
houses. in -the 'interior of each city ! called the' revolution broke out in
block in the parte alta of Santo
Domingo.
The people in these slums have kept
'a blind and stubborn faith in their
oomii nue8?
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There were six positions in the
Public Safety DivisAPPrgVeciEby
which were CIA officials. They
were CIA 'employees. They =reit'
paid by AID ? because there was no -
way of keeping.. the accounting
separate without exposing them.
Their location there was unknown
to other mernbers of Public
Safety. I had to become familiar -
with this because one of my jobs -
was getting the positions and the
budgets straightened out. They
worked with .the police. There
were only six of them out of
20 ... they were in intelligence,
communications, management
-training here are the figures: in
fiscal '67, there were IS [AID
Public Safety officers]; in fiscal.
'68, there were 18, of which six,_
one-third, were CIA.1 6
The 1965 ?intervention, and, all the
desperate, Byzantine machinations that
have followed in order to justify it,
.not only compounded the raw and
;mounting tragedy of the Dominican
people, but achieved the very opposite
of its ?stated ends. Slater writes, cor-
rectly; that "Communist, or, at least,.
radical, and extremist strength in the
Dominican Republic is far higher today
than it was in April 1965, in good part
because of the intervention." Beyond
this, the political regime :that is the
creature of the intervention has proved
to be a revival of the era of Trujillo,
with the apprentices sitting in the
sorcerer's chair and practicing his
brutal powers.
President Balagner, who was placed
in power by US troops and US money,
- pleaded in a speech at a dinner of the.
'American, Chamber of Commerce in
Santo Domingo for an increase in the
republic's quota for sugar exports to
the US: "We depend," he said, "in full
measure on the political and economic
. collaboration of . the Fatherland of
? Washington and Lincoln, and We can-
not allow ourselves the luxury; taken
by other countries of Latin America,
of siltking off the so-called yoke of
North American imperialism to accept
others that are, indeed, igno-
"minious."17 But the Dominican sugar
quota is being cut by Congress, Bala-
guer is running out of money, and his
military and political support is begin-
ning to desert him.
t is a, pity that . the PRD hes
2001/1110V dlAuR1316841/004991t01000090001-6
mystique than a workable political
formula for ruling the Dominican Re-
public. Juan Bosch remains a popular
leader and a man of high principles,
but his erratic character makes it
doubtful that he can provide the
steady leadership that ,the Dominican
people need. Still, if political terror
continues - it will lead to a popular
explosion more violent than that :of
1965.
citurtInueU
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11 refer to Trujillo'0,Aiii.61.virr
people and thus efertide- Min this
comparison the 1936 daughter of some
19,000 Haitian squatters to stop
the illegal migrations Haiti to the
Dominican Republic., By far the best
source on the Trujillo regime is Robert
D. Ciassweller's excellent biography,
Trujillo: The Life aad Times of a
Caribbean Dictator (Macmillan, 1966).
2See "Van 216 Maros," El Nacional,
December 30, 1970. The writer of this
summary told me that after the edition
went to press four more political
killings occurred in tit final thirty-six
hours of 1970, brining the death/
disappearance total to 190.
1
3For example, on.?Miy 16, a fifteen-
'year-old tailor's apprentice,. Belardino
Beras Ortega, who hid arrived from
. the provinces only thee months be-
fore, was detained Ly a navy street
patrol on ? the Duarte Bridge for not
having a license plate on his bike, and
was capriciously tipown over the
bridge to his death bt the patrol. See
"Piden a Balaguer se 1rzvestigue Muerte
Joven," El Nacional, Kay 22, 1971.
4See Miguel Jose Torres, "Transcurre
?
sin. Mcidentes PawActividades Los
Minas," El Caribe, Santo. Domingo,
November 20, 1970.
5 There have been eight different
national police chiefs in the. first five
years of Balaguer's rule. In what waS
described as a major step to purge the
police, Balaguer last January named his
Defense Minister, Gen. Enrique Perez y
Perez, as his newest police chief, but
the paramilitary violence has ? con-
tinued.
? 6See "Admite Ineficacia," El Caribe,
November 19, 1971. .
,
-'See "Miembrbs de Banda Solicitan'
Asflo,"-El Nacional, April 20, 1971.
8See ."Revelan Trama," El Nacional,
June 7, 1971, and "Bosch Ye Escan-
dalo Denunciada Trama," El Nacional,
? June 8, 1971. On page 13 of the June
7 edition, a letter from the warden of
La' Victoria prison to Lt. Nunez is
photographically reproduced, saying
that Sierra y Sierra "was a prisoner
and squeezed the communists very
hard and now they. are persecuting him
in the capital ... so I hope you will
give-him protection for me."
eafte 2d)01/14/48r1 CDIARDR8440849
inato de Manga, Nacional, April
14, 1971. The same edition carried a
statement by National Police Chief '
Perez y Perez that the. killing was done
by PACOREDO (Partido Comunista de
la Republica Dominicana) which is said
to be controlled .by police infiltrators.
'?See "The Poor World's Cities." a
survey, The Economist, December 6,
1969, p. 5.6.
See ? Richard M. Morse, "Recent
Research on Latin American Urbaniza-
tion'," Latin American Research
Review, Fall, 1965, p. 56.
12 Slater writes that "the last detach-
ment of surrendering Caseos Blancos
[riot police), 'having been told they ?
were facing a Communist rebellion,
pleaded for their lives by crying, 'Viva
Fidel! Viva el Comunistno! Viva
&nla car arrived
fdRY1fluffhil"flio`fiY the Mexican embas-
sy. Inside the. ear he found a loyalist
colonel and a CIA agent who took him
at gunpoint to San Isidro [the big air'
force base outside Santo Domingo].
There he found the US official who
had led him into the trap, as .well as
US air attach?IA. Col Thomas B.]
Fishburn, surrounded by Dominican
generals. ? He was forced to read over ?
the. radio an. appeal asking the. rebels to .
surrender their weapons." ?
. ? -
.16From "US -AID in the Dominican
Republic: An Inside View," in NACLA
Newsletter, Vol. IV, Na. 7, New
'lark-Berkeley: North American Con--
gress on Latin America, November,
1970. The AID Public Safety program
regularly sends its officers 'first to
Vietnam before sending them else:-
where in the world, which means that
nearly all US military and police
Cuba!' " One of the 'many ironies of
the revolution was that Col. Francisco
Caarnano; the rebel military chieftain,
had served until a few months before
as chief of the police riot squad.
Antonio Imbert, the last surviving
killer of Trujillo, had been supplying
arms to Castroite groups over the years
and had actually offered his services to
the rebels before being named head of
an anti-Communist junta by the US
occupation forces. See my article "US
Aides Confirm Imbert Aided Reds,"
Washington Post, June 17, 1965.
'3Sec Fernando A. Santana, .Barrios
il,farginados de Santo Domingo: Una
Realidad para- Actuar. Study presented
to the United Nations Conference on
Squatter Settlements, .Medellin, Colorn-
bia,TelaruarY,1970,:p. 3..
14See my "How Trujillo Died," The
New Republic, April 13, 1963.
In his book Barrios in Revolt, Jos?
Moreno illustrates how this relationship
functioned in the early days of the
1965 revolution, before US military.
intervention: "Antonio Martinez Fran-
cisco, a rich businessman, was the
Secretary-General of Bosch's PRD
when the revolutidn broke out. As a
moderate, he sought mediation from
the US embassy when the fighting
started to get out of hand. His plea
.went unheard by US officials. On April
28, Martinez sought political asylum in
the Mexican embassy, where he re-
ceived a phone call from Arthur
Breisky., Second Secretary at the ? US
embassy, who asked him to come to
the embassy to discuss important prob-
lems with [Ambassador] .1,7.T. Bennett.
?
advisers in Latin America
shaped to some extent by
nam experience. However,
Safety programs in the
Republic and Brazil have
back in the laSt two years.
have been
their Viet-
the Public
Dominican
been cut
"The speech is printed in Listin
Diario, May ,),,- 971... ?
,
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,
um= zusx
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2 197/
Congress Turns to the CIA
? Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired
effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of
powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the
Central Intelligence Agency. This is understand-
able, and was to be expected, too. The agency's
powers are great?or so one suspects; no one
representing the public is really in a position to
know. Yet because it operates under virtually
absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that
incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the
Defense and State Departments undergo.
The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA
fall into two categories. Those in the first category
start from the premise that the CIA is essentially
an operations agency and an ominous one, which
Is beyond public control and which must somehow
be restrained?for the good of American foreign
policy and for the health of the American demo-
cratic system alike.
So Senator Case has introduced legislation to
prevent CIA from financing a second country's
military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais
In Laos) and to impose on the agency the same
limitations on disposing of "surplus" military
materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The
thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive
from doing secretly what the Congress has for-
bidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would
restrict Executive flexibility, since the government
would have to justify before a body not beholden
to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The
'advantage to the Executive would be that the
Congress would then have to share responsibility
for the actions undertaken. Since these actions
Involve making war and ensuring the security of
Arnericaas, if not preserving their very lives, we
cannot tee how a serious legislature can evade
attempts to bring them under proper control.
Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA ex-
penditures and appropriations should appear in
the budget as a single line item is another matter.
He -argues that taxpayers could then decide
whether they wanted to spend more or less on
Intelligence than, say, education. We wonder,
though, whether a serious judgment on national
priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be
based on knowing just its budget total. In that
figure, critic's might have a blunt instrument for
polemics but citizens would not have the fine
instrument required for analysis.
In the House, ? Congressman Badillo recently
offered an amendment to confine the CIA to
gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the
traditional rallying cry, of those who feel either
that the United States has no business running
secret operations or that operational duties warp
intelligence production. The amendment, unen-
forceable anyway under existing conditions, lost
172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a
principal reason why concerned legislators despair
of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed
Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the
10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated
complete responsibility to himself. Congressman
Badillo?is now seeking a way to reconstitute the
subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep
in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as
they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately
overseen by the Congress.
Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's,
however, lies a critical difference. Far from re-
garding CIA as an ominous operational agency
whose work must be checked, he regards it as an
essential and expert intelligence agency whose
"conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be dis-
tributed "fully and currently" to the germane
committees of Congress as well as to the Executive
Branch. He would amend the National Security
Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the
most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.
To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but
responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts?
perhaps a bit too readily?that a large part of
national security policy is formulated on the basis
of information classified as secret. If the Congress
is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of
foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available
the same information on which the Executive acts
?and not as a matter of discretion or chance but
of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again
and again put off by an Executive saying, as was
said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only
knew what we knew . .." Otherwise Congress will
forever be running to catch up with Executive
trains that have already, left the station.
The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp
questions of Executive privilege and of Executive
prerogative in foreign policymaking ? to leave
aside the issue of keeping classified information
secure. But they are questions which a responsible
Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper
proposal will become a vehicle for debating them
in depth?and in public, too.
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.1*;4';.14".14_101341 ?13A
Approved Fort, Release 41/1X111819t1A-RDP84-0049941001000090001-6
any in Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant
f Secrets'
:Some Want Information,
But House Voted To
Keep Status Quo
By GENE NMI
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington ? Does Congress
really want to know everything
?the United States government
..does?
. On balance, the answer is
probably no, despite a renewed
drive in Congress to dislodge
foreign policy secrets from the
executive branch..
Resolution Rejected
In fact, the House last week
rejected, 261 to 118, a reso-
lution asking the State Depart-
ment for documents related to
U.S. bombing and CIA opera-
tions in Laos.
? Representative Joe D. Wag-
gonner, Jr., (D., La.) said dur-
ing the debate: "There are
some things that some people in
this country had better not know1
for the security and future well-
being of this country. Therefore,
they [the administration] must
keep some information from me
ond they must keep some infor-
mation from you for the benefit
of the future security of this
. country. It is better that infor-
mation as a rule be overclassi-
fiecl than underelassified."
Mr. Wa .gonr r also ex-
pressed a widely held view that
some members of Congress, if
given secret information, could
not resist the temptation of leak-
ing some of it to the New York
Times or some other whistle
blower."
The debate underscored a tac-
it assumption long held in Con-
gress that the country is better
.served if legiejators?except for
. a select few?are not told of
everything the United States has I
done or is currently doing in the.
field of foreign affairs.
Being Challenged
This assumption, however, is
now being challenged, unsuc-
cessfully in the case of the
House resolution asking for
more information on Laos.
But an even more sweeping
bill has been introduced in the
Senate by John Sherman Coop-
er (R., Ky.), who wants to give
every member of Congress reg-
ular ACCOSS to all intelligeece
reports and analyse re
for the executive briP6,9Ni@
?CIA.
Senate sources indicate that
senators, too, impose a certain
amount of self-censorship during
these intelligence briefings. One
I source said he has never heard
1a question pertaining to the so-
called "dirty tricks" aspect of
CIA operations.
"For example," he said,
"we've never asked, 'Mr.
Helms, how many people did
you lose in your clandestine
service last year?' Maybe we
should ask it, but we never
have."
But it is virtually impossible
to ascertain precisely what even
the select few who attend CIA
briefings know about the agen-
cy's activities.
As Mr. Mahon, the Appropria-
tions chairman, notes, he picks
only those "who won't talk."
Then, he refused to say who
they are.
He said he was opposed to the
Cooper bill, saying, "If you give
it [CIA information] to every
.member of Congress it would be
like giving it to the New York
SENATOR COOPER RICHARD HELMS
Seeks more disclosures Knotos all the secrets
? Mr. Cooper is one of the most Leverett Saltonstall, a Massa-
highly regarded members of the .chusetts Republican, was quoted
I Senate, and this is a factor of recently as saying when he was
some importance in its club-like la member of the Senate: '"They
iatmosphere in which the success lithe CIAI do things I'd just as
I or failure of a bill can hinge on lsoon not know about."
who its sponsor is. I Richard Helms, Director of ,
I But Senator Cooper?a senior 'Central Intelligence, at least !
once a year gives separate intel-
ligence briefings to small groups
within the Armed Services and j
Appropriations committees in
beth houses of Congress and i
even to the full Senate Foreign I
Relations Committee, even 1;
I though it does not have direct 1
jui is iction over the agency.
The annual briefings, accord- 1
ing to congressional sources,
consist of "around-the-world"
assessments of the United
States' military and intelligence
posture. Other special briefings
might deal with such topics as
deployment and strength of
Saviet nuclear missiles.
George H. Mahon (D., Texas),
chairman of the House Appro-
priations Committee, and F. Ed-
ward Hebert (D., La.), chair-
man of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee, said, as did :
Senate sources, that Mr. Helms
has never refused to answer a
question during these briefings. j
member :of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee?must get his
bill through the Armed Services
Committee, which together with
the Appropriations Committee
has jurisdiction over the CIA.
, And even without national secu-
rity considerations, congression-
1 instinctively
re-
sist encroachment upon their
areas of competence.
The last time an attempt was
!made to break the. Armed Serv-
ices Committee's lock on the
:CIA was in 1966, when then Sen-
ator Eugene J. McCarthy (D.,
Minn.) made a comparatively
modest proposal to create a spe-
cial CIA committee, made up of
representatives of Armed Serv-
ices, Appropriations and the
Foreign Relations committees.
The late Senator Richard B.
Russell (D., Ga.), then chair-
man of the Armed Services
Committee, blocked the bill
from coming to a floor vote on a
d 1
emiecuveiy
killing the measure.
The Cooper. bill is not likely to
get far in the legislative process
either. Aside from the jurisdic-
tional problems, most members;
of Congress appear to be ambi-
britReleatseb(2111121.1t/Icl /OS:
much.I crets
? th ? "
;Times."
Chairman Hebert of Armed
Services questioned the need to
know everything.
"I don't know everything," he
said, "and I'm not bitching
about it."
On the other side of the issue,
critics of the present system say
that congress had deliberately
remained ignorant to avoid re,
sponsibility.
Representative Benjamin S.
Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said dur-
ing the House debate last
week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that
many of us did not want to know
all of the facts of our involve-
ment in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968
or even yesterday. I think that
the Congress has remained
much too long in self-imposed
insulation We feared that
more knowledge would mean
more responsibility for us."
Others argued that the infor-
mation the House was seeking
was already well known to the
Mr. Hebert said there as
only one exception, when he Me
structed Mr. helms not to an-'
swer a question put to him by a
member of his panel.
"I took it on my own responsi-
kb
. )9eli ?iej4044din
? enemy so it could not be with-
held for national security rea-
sons. As the House vote indicat-
ed. they represented a minority
view.
For the moment, at least, the
House does not want to sharergt
y0Q900autive branch se-
? what e question was ?
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PROGRAM: DATE:
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STATION OR NETWORK:
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T7r:%.7 0
6:F .*11?
PMSMNTIAL CEYAJ, IJOULYi LIMIT CIA's OP'KftAMNS
HaRY KaASOTM: Polo,1 HcClcskv, the RoDublicnn congres5-
man from. Cal:11o7miay who 07:-.0005 tho.alvaniotation's Viet '&n
e,nnounc,ed fe?mally tolay that wAYI
Ninon net yea-s. DaoJgo tc end the Viet Nan War
conclitioned only on tIke reloo of Anon-:17.can MC?7.2 on
that from ABC's Bill Wo.ze2;2; .An Lc_s (LM CCU')
BILL
Ti: Thoyo's no dm2fot that McC16z1:c7 is mn.in:iy
C0'( 't' about ending tIv...) blqt todrly. he Tcvoalod that
othe,T majo d:1.2ferences uith no Nixon cd:.ilnistratioyA, (TILT44
CLXP)
PAUL McCLOSUY: This .111:;.1 Kot bet-.1 snglo
We soek in addit:Ion to ondin2 tho to tz-TAth in g(,tvorn-
meat; to nc,baevo a re,tun to tA-1...:,1 17J.stoTir... Ropubli.an ;-qoTF,1
dt-
it to racial islmos :ather tha pmsent?sothoy'n sttgy;
an a on of -juJicia:i i-,...e,oDeRdenco and e7:cellonfzo. We ulll
secik to end CIA involvoment in the intonml a-ffai73 of other. natiuns9
and to nnit that a7's cporatAom; to the field of intolligonc*
gathoFing.
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NEW NOM(' Mily,-trotrro,
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V JUL 1971
EXPOSE THE CIA?
Several attacks en-- the Central Intelligence Agency
(Richard Helms, direc or) began Wednesday in the Senate.
Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA funds
he reported in one line of the
federal budget, instead of being
masked as for decades past
other budget items.
Sen. John Sherman Cooper
(R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force.
the CIA to Nrnish Congress inn.-
laxly with intelligence informa-
tion hitherto given only to the
government's Executive branch.
The Cooper proposal, it seems
almost needless to say, got friend-
ly comments from Democratic
Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.),
Mike Mansfield (Mont.), and
Stuart Symington (Mo.).
Sen. Clifford P. Can (R-N.J.) promised to introduce ?
bills to forbid the CIA to sneak money to Thailand. for Thai
troops fighting in Laos.
Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not
to have learned in all the years -of the agency's existence:
The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult,
dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary
work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret
in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effec-
tive. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective
in the future as it has been in the past, then Cod help the
Richard Helms
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LOU13 ,CC;6_
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t) JUL 197/
11
1-1
113 (1)-1;(t
[1 11
I J
C1 a U In senate
By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch
WASHINGTON, July 8 Sen-
ator John Sherman Cooper
(Rep.), Kentucky, has obtained
strong bipartisan backing for a
proposal to require the Central
Intelligence Agency to report to
'Congress as well as to the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Cooper, a moderate opponent
of the Vietnam War and of the
antiballistic missile system, in-
troduced his proposalyesterday
as an amendment to the Nation-
al Security Act of 1947, which
created the Department of De-
f ens e, the National Security
Council and the CIA.
Senators Stuart Symington
(D e m.), Missouri, J. William
Fulbright (D e m.), Arkansas,
and Jacob K. J-a vits (Rep.),
New York, announced t.h e i r
support for the measure on the
Scea Le -Hem:. Fulbrigilt spoke Of
holding hearings on the propos-
al.
Symington, chairman of a for- ?
eign relations subcommittee on
overseas commitments, told of
difficulties he ?had had in ob-
taining full information about
secret U.S. military prepara-
tions and operations abroad, in-
cluding the clandestine warfare
being conducted in Laos.
Symington noted that he was
a member of the Foreign Rela-
tions, Armed Services and Joint
Atomic Energy committees. He
said that his best information
had been obtained from the last
of these, attributing that fact to
a requirement in the Atomic
Energy Act that the Atomic En-
ergy Commission keen Con-
gress' "'fully and currently" in-
formed.
Cooper used that phrase in
his proposed amendment on the
CIA. An aid said that Cooper
had found CIA information gen-.
erally reliable on such matters
as Soviet military preparedness
and the Indochina War but had
noted that it was rendered only
in response to specific ques-,
tons.
Under his amendment, the
CIA wbuld have to take the ini-
tiative in sending Congress its
'analyses of problems of foreign.
policy and national security.
The aid said that Cooperhad
been considering such a plea-
sure for several years. Be said
the publication of the Pentagon
papers had demonstrated once
more the value of CIA reports
a n d probably had broadened
? support in Congress for a re-
quirement to make them availa-
ble.
In a Senate speech, Cooper
proposed that the CIA be re-
quired to make regular and
special reports to the House
Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs committees and to the
Senate Armed Services and
Foreign Relations committees.
Additional special reports could
be requested by the commit-
tees.
Any member of Congress or
designated member of his staff
would have access to the infor-
mation. All such persons would
be subject to security require-
ments such as those in the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Cooper said that the best in-
formation should be available
to the Executive and Legisla-
tive branches as a basis for na-
tional decisions involving "vast
amounts of money, the deploy-
ment of weapons whose purpose
is to deter war yet can destroy
all life on earth, the stationing
of American troops in other
countries and their use in corn-
-bat, and binding commitments
to foreign nations."
Two other Senators offered
proposals relating to the CIA.
George S. McGovern (Dern.),
South Dakota, suggested that
expenditures and appropriations
for the intelligence agency ap-
pear as a single line item in the
budget. Agency funds now are
concealed in other items in the
budget.
Three bills were introduced
by Senator Cliff ord P. Case
(Rep.), New Jersey, to limit
covert use of funds and mili-
tary equipment. by the CIA for
Approved For Release 2001/11/08
fielding foreign troops in Loas
o r elsewhere- without specific
approval by Congress.
Case said they were designed
?"to place some outside control
'oh what has been the free-
wheeling operation of the Exec-
utive Branch in carrying on for-
eign policy and even waging
foreign wars."
Meanwhile, .the House reject-
ed a proposal that the Adminis-
tration be required to tell
I what the military and CIA were
I doing in Laos.
By a vote of 261 to 118, mem-
bers tabled ? and thus killed --
a resolution introduced by Rep-
resentative Paul N. McCloskey
(Rep.), California, that would
have ordered the Secretary of
State to furnish the House with
the policy guidelines given. to
the U.S. ambassador in Laos.
. The ambassador has responsi-
bility for overseeing the clan-
destine -military operations in
Laos aimed at assisting the roy-
al Laotian government in its
struggle with the Pathet Lao.
William B. Macomber Jr.,
deputy under secretary of state,
-clashed yesterday with Mc-!
Closkey over whether the De- ?
partment of State was directing;
U.S. bombing attacks in Laos.
Macomber denied the allega-
tion and suggested that if Mc-
Closkey wanted to pursue the
issue he ought to invite an East
Asia expert from the State De-
partment to testify.
Tb e exchange occurred ? as
Macomber testified bef o re a
House foreign affairs subcom-
mittee on ways to improve de-
classification o f Government
records by the State Depart-
ment.
Macomber said 10 to 12
years' retention ought to be ad-
equate to protect Government
secrets while not being so long
as to c410444,0
:kJa6?06fio
00090001-6
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DATE:
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TIME:
6:00 PM E51
, r r7.1 7" re,. 7 T,
SENATOR. PLANS Lh6AbLAAIOA AO ,,,,Ak.Kk.ASA-2, covt2on OP CIA
CkROLYN LEWIS: Senator STningten released a memo fron
the Pentagon which declares that efforts by Congress to set a money
limit on U. S. military aid to Lao5 would de 051 the President's
authority.as Coaidaandel' in Chief. Visibly annoyed., Sylaington remirlded
the executives that under the Constitution, it is Congress that has
the power to raise and support arios ymington 's complaints of
secrecy surrounding some Alc,:orican lit ary opo ens abroad w:3re
echoed by other senators.
George McGovern charge.s that ARlerioan rood ;or -Peace
Programs have been secretly pr the Chinese Government on Taiwan
to buy votes to keep its seat in the United Nations.
Senator PrOXMiTO made -Nblic forerly classified country
by country figures on AT,erican military ass5?stance. ProNmire calls
the classification unjustified and proses to challenge such action
in the future.
Senator Clifford. Case plans to introdnee legislation to
increase congressional control over the CIA. The Central Intelligence
Agency is now involved in a secret war in Laos for which Congress
has not specifically appropriated money.
All this adds up to a brewing battle in Congress over
secrecy in government. This is Ca'Palyn Lewis.
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Goa
V7VP*1"-- NW1yQJc
f; JUL, 19;1
ei PAT,Einspn5fere.f.TirIftv5A5
?
much better position to make
judgments from a much more
inforn-,ed and ?broader perspec-
tive than is now possible," he
said.
By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Sptclal to The New York Timely
WASHINGTON, July 7 --
John Sherman Cooper of Ken-
tucky, one of the most in-
fluential Senators on foreign
policy matters, introduced
legislation today that would
require the Central Intelligence
Agency to give detailed intelli-
gence- information to Congress
regularly.
Mr. COoper, a Republican,
said that Congress needed this
Senator Cooper, an aide said,
had been considering the legis-
lation for three years but dis-
closures in the Pentagon papers
on United States involvement
in Vietnam had now provided
an impetus.
? The aide referred specifical-
ly to C.I.A. analyses during the
- kind of evaluation and analysis, Johnson Administration that
now available only to the ex- full-scale bombing of North
ecutive branch, to participate Vietnam would not be effective
in the. formation of foreign
Meanwhile, the House re-
jected a series of resolutions
demanding that the Nixon Ad-
ministration provide Congress
with i additional information on
United States operations in
Laos.
, Two other Senators also of-
fered proposals relating to
the C.I.A. 1
Senator George McGovern,
Democrat of South Dakota, sug-
gested that exilenditures and
appropriations for the intelli-
gence agency appear as a
single-line item in the budget.
Agency funds are now con-
cealed in other items In the
budget. ?
Senator Clifford P. Case,. Re-
publican of New Jersey, said
he would offer measures that
would prohibit such C.I.A. activ-
ites as the funding of Thai
troops to fight in Laos.
Senator Cooper emphasized
in a Senate speech that his
proposal was not aimed at any
C.I.A. operations, sources or
methods, but was ? "concerned
only with the end result ? the
facts and analyses of facts."
"Congress would be in a
in halting infiltration or break-
ing the will of Hanoi. ?
Senator Cooper's proposal
was supported on the floor by
Senator J. W. Fulbright, Demo-
crat of Arkansas, the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, and Senator Stuart
Symington, Democrat of Mis-
souri, the only Senator belong-
ing to both the Foreign Rela-
tions and Armed_ Services Com-
mittees.
Mr. Symington said that it
was "no secret that we on
various committees have not
been entirely satisfied with ,the.
intelligence information- we
have obtained. ?
-"If the proper committees
are not acquainted with what
we're doing," Mr. Symington
went on, "how we can func-
tion properly?" ?
Because Senator Cooper is
so influential, it seemed likel
that his proposal would bdthe
subject of hearings and, per-
haps, floor debate this year.
A measure of the respect
said his views came from Mike
Mansfield of Montana, the ma-
jority leader. "Anything John
Cooper says would be given
the most serious consideration
by me," Mr. Mansfield said.
Regular Reports Asked
- Senator Cooper's proposal
would require the .C.I.A.tomake
regular reports to the Senate
Foreign Relations and Armed
Services Committees and to the
House Foreign Affairs and
Armed Services Committees.
The agency would also be re-
quired to make special reports
in response to inquires by these
committees.
Mr. Cooper said that the
agency would have to decide
for itself what information id
present to hte committees, but
he specified that the data wont?
have to he "full and current."
There are now "oversight".
.committees in the House and
Senate, composed of senior
members of the Armed Services
and Appropriations Com-
mittes, that review the C.I.A.
budget and operations. But
.these committees are not con-
cerned with the substance of
? he information the agency
Approved Ftpungelease 2001/11/08 :-CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6
In the Irouse debate today,. _
Ithe majo!' fight came over a
??f:reaolntiort of inquiry? seeking
0 0
documents dealing with opera-
tions of the United States mili-
tary and the C.I.A. in Laos
from 1564 to the present
The resolution, which was
sponsored by Representative
Paul N. McCloskey Jr., .Repub-
lican of California, was set
aside by. a vote of 261 to 118.
Critics of the measure con-
tended that the information was
too sensitive to be given to
Congress.
Following this vote, the
House, without debate, set
0e016ortg1.es,s
aside resolutions seeking in-
formation on bombing opera-
tions in northern Laos and on
the Phoenix program, which is
designed to neutralize the ef-
fect of underground Vietcong
operations. The House also set
aside a resolution seeking an-
other set of the Pentagon
papers that the Administration,
made available to Congress last
week.
The supporters of the resOlu=
tion were, for the most part,
Democrats opposed to, the wa.rp.
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CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES
M - 536,108
S - 709,123
'3UL. 8 1911
By Thomas t3. Ross
--Sun-Times BUICEILI
WASDINGTON ? Legislation was in-
troduced in the Senate Wednesday to require
the Central Intelligence Agency to limit its
covert operations, supply its estimates to
Congress and disclose how it spends its mon-
ey.
Thebills reflected the two-fold reaction in
Congress to the disclosures of the top-secret
Pentagon history of the Vietnam War: praise
for the CIA's 20-year record of sound assess-
ments and concern with its clandestine
maneuverings.
None of the bills is likely to receive the
approval of President Nixon. Since the CIA
was created in 1947, a succession of Demo-
cratic and Republican -Presidents h ave
treated the agency as their private source of
Information and a vehicle Jor performing
- "dirty tricks" outside the knowledge of Con-
gress and the people.
Ever since the United States became in-
volved in Vietnam hr 1950, the CIA has pro-
duced intelligence estimates that would have
been embarrassing to the incumbent Presi-
dent if they had been made available to the
opposition party or leaked to the public.
For example, as The Sun-Times disclosed.
June 20, the CIA provided an estimate in 1969
that Mr. Nixon could have withdrawn imme-
diately from Vietnam and "all of Southeast
Asia would remain just as it is at least for
another generation."
Similar CIA estimates, -.revealed by The
Sun-Times- and other newspapers, showed
that Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 13.
Johnson were consistently warned that the
Saigon regime lacked broad popular support
and that deeper U.S. involvement would be
risky;
0
1 \
? / to.
;
But the Pentagon papers also disclosed
that, while the CIA's intelligence division was
sounding the alarm, its plans division was
conducting clandestine raids in North Viet-
nam and plctting first for and then against
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.
Legislation introduced by Sen. Clifford Case
(R-N.J.) would limit such operations and the
use of covert funds and military equipment to
support them without specific approval by
Congress.
Case said his proposal is designed "to place
some outside control on what has been the
free-wheeling operation of the executive
branch in carrying on foreign policy and even.
waging foreign wars."
Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), only de-
eared presidential contender, offered the bill
to require disclosure of the CIA's budget and
prevent its money from being concealed in
appropriations for other agencies.
It is reliably estimated that the CIA spends
$1 billion a year. An additional $4 billion re-
portedly is spent by the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the code-making and code-breaking
National Security Agency, and the various .
military units that run the spy satellite pro-
gram.
Sen. John .Sherman Cooper (R-Ky ) in-
troduced. the bill to amend the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 so that the CIA would be
required to supply its intelligence estimates
to the House and Senate committees dealing
with foreign affairs and the armed services.
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Approved
110117, llUllS ASKS
? no SITS SECRETS
Calls for Nahie's Of All Those
With Authority to Handle
? Classified Documents
By JOHN IIF.RBERS
special' to The New York TIrn. ?
SAN CLEMENTE, Calif., July
7?The White libuSe said to
. day that it :had ordered the
compilation of a list of all
persons who, have authority to
see top-secret documents.
Gerald L. Warren, assistant
White House press secretary,
said in response to questions
that a confidential memoran-
dum signed by Brig. Gen, Alex-
ander M. Haig Jr., 'Deputy As-
sistant to the President for Na-
tional Security, had gone to
departments and agencies di-
recting them to compile lists
of those having top-secret clear-
ance...
Mr. Warren said the memo-
randum, issued June 30, was
part of a rel., iew of the process
of classification and declassi-
fication ordered by President
Nikon on Jan. 15.
He was vague about the de
tails of the memorandum,
who ekistence was diSclosed
today in The Washington Post.
But other officials said it was
part of an Administration effort
to reduce the number of se-,
curity.clearannes both in and
out of Government.,
Pentagon Is Complying
In Washington, 'a spokesman'
said' that the Department ? of
Defense was compiling its list
The 'spokesman said Secretary
Defense Melvin R. Laird had
ordered the stepabout three
days ago:- ?
? :?The memorandum set this
coming Sunday as a deadline
for compilation or the lists,
but it was considered doubtful
that the departments . could
comply that quickly. Because of
unclear regulations about secu-
rity clearances, there was some
doubt about the ability of the
agencies to compile compre-'
hensive lists at all.
NEVI YORK TIMES
For)T6.1ease 2001/1001PCW-RDP84-004991,801000090001-6
ThereVere indications that no
one in the Government knows
bow many persons have security
Clearance and that Mr. Nixon
is trying to put- the entire dis-
puted matter of classified docu?
merits under central control
for the first time.,
- Various laws and regulations
apply in departments and agen-
cies dealing with sensitive mat-
ters. Estimates of the number
of those with ? some authority
to see top-secret documents
run as high as many thousands.
Members of the armed forces
the Central Intelligence Agency,
the White House, the State De:
partment, the Justice Depart-
ment, defense contractors and
consultants are heavily involved
in security matters.
About the time the White
House memorandum Was
drafted, . Mr. Laird ordered
tightened security at the Rand
Corporation in Santa Monica,
Calif., which conducts defense
research on a contract basis.
Daniel Ellsberg, a former
Rand employe and Pentagon
official, is under indictment for
alleged misuse of top-secret
documents and has said publicly
he passed copies of a study
of the Vietnam war to news-
papers.
Documents published by The
New York Times and other
papers carried top-secret clas-
23tion.
'Immediate Reductions'
The Haig memorandum sa s
in part that "each responsible
department and agency" must
inititate at once "a review and
screening of each top-secret
and compartmented clearance
presently held by individuals
with a view to effecting imme-
diate reductions of all clear-
ances which cannot be demon-
Strated to meet the requirement
of strict need to know."
?. Mr. Nixon arrived at the
summer White House here last
night for a two-week stay, ac-
companied by Secretary of
State :William P. Rogers; the
director. of Central Intelligence,
Richard .Helms; General Haig
and other, officials. .He con-
ferred at length with Mr. Helms
about the latter's. recent trip
to: the Middle East.
The Pentagon spokesman,
Brig. Gen. Daniel James Jr., said
that as of April, 1971 803 ,in
the defense establishment had
authority to classify material as
top secret, But the department
was unable to say how many
had access to top-secret mate
The list of 803 began with the
Secretary of Defense and went
through 12 categories of de-
scending rank, ?.
The last category was: "com-
manders and deputy or vice
commanders and chiefs of staff
of major. field ad fleet com-
mands, forces or activities, as
designated by the chiefs, of the
military services or the com-
manders of the unified and spe-
cified commands concerned.
On Capitol Hill, William B.
Macomber Jr., deputy Under
Secretary of State for Adminis-
tration, told a House Govern,
ment Operations subcommittee
that the State Department now
classified as secret 200,000 doc-
uments a year. Ile said the av-
erage over the last 20 years
had been about 100,000 a year,
Mr. Macomber conceded, un-
der questioning, that too many
documents were classified, and
remained classified for exces-
sive periods.
Asked if the State Depart-
ment had requested that the
Justice Department seek in-
junctions against The New York'
Times and other newspapers to
halt publication of the Penta-
gon study, Mr: Macomber said
it had not. But said that' the
State Department concurred
with the Justice Department be-
cause of "deep concern" over
disclosure of some of the ma-
terial.
Asked if a substantial por-
tion of the Pentagon study
could be declassified without
harming national security, he
replied: "Some of it."
He said that only about 10 to
15 per cent of the material in
the 47-volume study should re;
main classified on the ground
of national security. - ?
Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000090001-6
Approved ForStelease 4.9ffilliiikAW-RDP84-0049?1110101000090001-6
14 JULY 1971
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/7".,! ,
The secret Pentago papers .on
.U.S. involvement in Vietnam are
..not so secret any tno;re. Portions of
them have been discised by the New
York, Times; The Boston Globe;
The Washington Post; The St.
Louis Post-Dispatch; Knight News-
papers; The Los. Angeles Times;
The .Chicago Sun-Times; The
Christian Science :Vonitor and The.
Associated Press, and read to news- -
.men by Sen. Mike Gravel (D.,
Alaska). The fo!loitt? by APs.
Pulit:.;er Price zvinner. Peter Arnett
reviews the highlights of the Pen-
tagon papers, chronologically
front he end of World War II to
1968, the last year of the study.
- By PETER ARNETT
Aszociatcd press Writer
The deliberations leading to critical
American decisions on Vietnam are
being systematically disclosed by publi-
cation of vast portions of the Pentagon
'papers.
?
The documents, memos-, conference
statements and situation analyses which
make up the papers pinpoint the high-
lights of this country's Vietnam commit-
ment with a detail never before avail-
able to the American public. ?
While the gene-ral thrust of Ameri-
can policy had been reported over the
years in ..on-the-scene stories from
Southeast Asia and Washington, from.
congressional debates, leaks and official
statements, the specific details of deci-
sion-ranking were not known until the
papers were made available to newspa-
pers around the country and to con-
gressmen.
HERE ARE SOME of the, main
points of the Pentagon papers as 'dis-
closed through various sources:
Orioius of the War:
tiOI4-Yroi-ed (1945.61)
* 6 ' .
The United States ignored eight di- AFTER HEADING a military mis-
meet appeals for aid froApOPCC46Ctr Rreceetel004/1f/D8MCWIROP84-00499R001000090001-6
in the first five months following World lor in October 1961 advised Kennedy to
-War II. Underlying the American refus-
al to deal with Ho was the uncertainty
about helping a leader known to be a
Communist.
T,he Truman Administration adopted
the "domino principle" after the Nation-
al Security Council was told early in
1950 that ". ..the. neighboring coun-
tries ?of Thailand and Burma could be
expected to fall under Communist domi-
nation if Indochina were controlled by a
Communist-dominated government. The
balance of Southeast Asia would then.
be in grave hazard."
President Eisenhower was told by
the joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954 that the
Geneva Accords endinfr, the French In-
dochina war' permitted America "only
limited influence" in the affairs 'of the
fledgling South Vietnam. The Joint
Chiefs said assisting Vietnam "was oa
risk not worth the gamble" and recom-
mended that the aid earmarked for Sai-
gon bring a greater return if de-
voted to the support of military forces
in other nations."
Secretary of State Dulles successful-
ly urged the commitment of relatively
small American forces to stabilize the
Saigon regime and keep the Commu-
nists out.
order an 8,000-man American task force
to Vietnam.
A month later Defense Secretary
McNamara. told Kennedy that the Tay-
lor program should be adopted "only on
the understanding that it will be fol-
lowed up with more troops as needed,
and with a willingness to attack Viet-
nam:"
. .
Throe days later McNamara reVersed
his. position and no ground troops were
sent:, but "Kennedy's priorities produced
a broad commitment to Vietnam's de-
fense, giving priority to military aspects
of the war over political reforms." ?
. INCREASINGLY optimistic reports
of progress led to McNarnarii's laying
' plans in July 1932 to pull' baCk all
American ground forces in Vietnam
over a five-year period.
The intelligence and reporting sys-
tem for Vietnam during that period
"must bear a- principal 'respobsibility for
the Unfounded optimism of U.S. policy,"
an 'optimism and assessment inaccuracy
uncorrected until IVIcNamara, in a re--
port to Johnson in December 1963,
wrote: "The situation is very disturbing.
Current trends unless. reversed in the
next two to three months will lead to
neutralization at best and more likely to
....a Cominunist-controiled state."
brier ic at n i.rd en t
Widened (1961.63).
The Kennedy Administration trans-
formed the "limited risk gamble" under-
taken by Eisenhower into "an unlimited
commitment," with Kennedy secretly
ordering 400 Special Forces troops and
100 ether military advisers into Vietnam
in the spring of 1961. In May of that
year, he also 'approved programs for co-
vert action in North .Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia.
Kennedy sent Vice President John-
son to Saigon to discuss with President
Diem the possibility of sending in Amer-
ican combat troops and signing a bilat-
'eral treaty. Diem was not then interest-
ed but later in 1961 asked for both.
?
President Kennedy knew and ap-
proved plans for the military coup that
overthrew President Diem, the United
States early giving its support to a
group of army generals bent on remov-
ing the Vietnamese president. By sup-
porting the coup the United States inad-
vertently deepened its involvement,
never seriously. considering an alterna-
tive policy even though at least two ad-
ministration officials in 1963 recom-
mended disengagement
Direct United Rates
havo1venle,r4.1
(1964).
The Johnson Administration decided
in January 1964 to step up American in-
ethatInueet
F
RDP84-0049"1000090001-6
proving correct the intelligence commu-
nity assessment' that the measures
would not cause Hanoi to cease its sup-
port of the Viet Cong insurgency in the
South. ?
American Marine battalions ordered
to Vietnam to protect the Da Nang air-
field were secretly placed in an offen-
sive role on April 1, 1965, with Johnson
ordering that the new mission "will per-
mit their more active use and that "the
actions themselves should be taken as
rapidly as practical but in ways that
should minimize the appearance of sud-
den changes in policy.",
McNamara told Johnson that by his
? .
projections the United 'States might
have 400,000 men in Vietnam by the
end of 1966, and might have to raise the
total to more than 600,000 by the end of
1967. At this time, the McNamara memo
'reflected a major change in American
thinking: it could not get by with rein-
forcements for the South Vietnamezie
army and would have to take over the
:major share of ground fighting itself.
volvement VieLnairOP.M69q)pFe9i
tion plan 3,IA that included South Vlet-
namese commando raids along the
North Vietnamese coast to destroy rail
and highway bridges, parachuting of
sabotage and psychological warfare
teams into the North, and kidnaping of
North Vietnamese to obtain informa-
tion.
In March, McNamara proposed
South Vietnamese raids- into Laos plus
air attacks against North Vietnamese
military and industrial targets flown by
South Vietnamese but backed by an
American squadron,.
In May 1964, :Johnson received a
plan from William Bundy, the assistant
secretary of state for Far Eastern af--
fairs, suggesting increasing pressure on
North Vietnam, culminating in full-scale
bombing by U.S. planes. .
In ? June in a Honolulu meeting. Mc-
Namara raised the possibility of using
nuclear weapons 'at' some point if Chi-
nese. forces entered the ground fighting.
Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander of U.S.
forces in the Pacific, openly argued that
American commanders be given this op-
tion
The Gulf of Tonkin incidents in Au-
gust may have been provoked by Ameri-
can destroyers patrolling near the scene
of South Vietnamese clandestine at-
tacks ?against North Vietnamese shore
installations, attacks which the ?Ameri-
can ships were aware of. The U.S. air
reprisals after the- Tonkin incident were'
an jrnportant threshold in the war,
crossed with virtually no domestic criti-
cism."
At a White House strategy meeting
in September, there was a ?general con-
sensus that air strikes against the North
Vietnamese were necessary early in
.1065, but "tactical considerations" me-
qliired delay, particularly because
Johnson was "presenting himself as a
candidate of reason and restraint" in
the presidential elections.
hir V/77 ?
Spite -onIrvis
Bombing .Stat s (1965)
Johnson resisted repeated urgings to
bomb the North until February 1965,
when strong guerrilla attacks against
American positions at Pleiku led to the
inauguration of the bombing campaign
with the code name "Rolling Thunder."
? Johnson received warnings from the
',CIA that the planned bombing attacks
would not achieve their purpose. The
tactics of grandualism in the air attacks
against the North. enabled the North
Vietnamese to grow accustomed to the
raids. The bombing was tcpproveldE
ily ineffective within a few months,
Tease 2001/11/08 : CIA-
11? ,
01113.bail tn War ,Iny c2,2,,e,c2
Ad n--znes (1966.67).
American military chieftains consis-
tently told their civilian superiors that
victory could be achieved only by oorn-
mitting 500,000 to one million troops
for a period of from ,five to 10 years.
The civilians, however, tended to dis-
regard the estimates and to search for
quicker, less costly solutions to the war.
U.S. military leaders also were con-
stantly pressuring . Johnson to expand
the ground war from South Vietnam
into Laos and Cambodia during 1966
and 1967, including serious discussion
about using Americans to invade North
Vietnam in force. But Johnson, McNa-
mara and other top civilians in the gov-
ernment steadily resisted these requests
from the generals. Johnson did allow
bambini), and the covert use of force in.
Laos and Cambodia.
The Johnson Administration strate;
gists had little' expectation that the
bombing pauses in 1965 and 1966-would
produce peace talks, but did believe the
pauses would help placate domestic and
world opinion.
THEY ALSO argued that North Viet-
namese refusal of the-tough American
demands for peace talks would be a jus-
tification for an escalation of the war.
?
One memo described the lulls as
"ratchets." This would produce "one
more turn of the screw"Io?c)n-leald
orcReleas*20CblalAR;k6ikil
the inside administration::: argument at
the time.
McNamara began giving Johnson in-
creasingly bleak estimates of the war
progress from 1966 on, telling him he
was "disappo?Med" in pacification and.
that he saw "no reasonable way to
bring the war to an end soon." Both
men were publicly sneaking confidently
at the time of progress being made in
the American military escalation. ?
MeNAMAIZA WAS so disappointed
with the military effort by 1067 that he
Proposed to :Johnson in May of that
year that the United States persuade
Saigon to seek an accommodation wfila
the Viet Cong, exploring a ceasefire and
negotiating "with the non-Communist
South Vietnamese who are under the
Viet Cong banner". and if necessary ac-
cepting their individual participation in
the government.
McNamara was fighting constantly
with his generals over the war effort
from 1966 onwards.
McNamara was fighting constantly
With his generals over the war effort
from 1966 onwards.
- ? The last major decision in the rapid
building of American forces was decd-.
Cd in July 1967, with "Program V" pro-
viding for an eventual force level of"
525,000 Americans. At this time the
U.S. military high command in Saigon
again began lookityg to the South Viet-
namese Army as the instrument to win
the wet. Earlier advisory efforts with
the Vietnamese had failed, but with the
upper level for American forces already
determined, the generals had no choice.
VioL,r,naization. Policy
lder (1.96 0e)
IS O s1;
.11,
President Johnson turned down Pen-
tagon requests for more troops after the,
1968 Communist Tet offensive swept
into a score of ?Vietnamese, cities and
towns. He announced a partial end to
the bombing halt, a move that prompted
the State Department to send word to
its allies that it probably would fail and
that full-scale resumption of the air war
was -possible at any time.
The move was successful. Johnson
decided later that year to proceed with
a policy of Vietnamization similar to
that later followed by President NiKon,
4-00499R00100009000Winuea
(711. 4-1 Li 'Nsir
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w AsiiING-TON ? (UPI) Pfesi-
'dent Harry S. Truman_ made the first
crucial step toward U.S. involvement in
Vietnam in 1950, approving shipment of
$10 million in military goods ? to the
French in Indochina, The Washington
Post said Saturday in a dispatch based
on the Pentagon papers.
While the facts of the Roosevelt and? -:
Truman involvement in Indochina -gen-
erally are well known, The Post said,
the Pentagon report includes documen-
tation that sheds new light, on the U.S.
reaction to the fall of mainland China.
When Chinese Communist troops
-reached the borders of Indochina, The
Post said, the NVional Security Council
6 - -
1 /11(11V ,4,0049
V
'
,
fl
t.A/
11.
"The advice added itp to. a rislh.
of itucZear ai)ocalyp:?c. no molter
lethich cozzrf,e he (LB,1 ) took."
issued a paper calling for preparation of
a program of "all practicable measures
designed to protect U.S. security inter-
ests- in Indochina," The United States at
the same time announced its recognition
of the regime of Vietnamese Emperor'
Bao Dai.
The step of providing $10 million for
the French in Indochina soon was fol-
lowed by approval of the concept of fur-
nishing an American- Military Assis-
06/%9.6,911s
j? ?
Lance Advisory Group, the, newspaper
said.
In.another article, the Post said Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson was given con-.
flicting advice in 1964 that left him to
?? inake a decision of a "cataclysmic na- ?
ture.". On the one hand, Johnson was
'told that if the United States failed to
use its power in Vietnam it could end up
in a nuclear war. ? Other advisers .told ,
him, however, that he could trigger a
, nuclear war if he. did intervene massive-
ly. -
'The advice added up to a risk of
nuclear apocalypse no matter which
course he took,." The Post said.
-11 T.17) ."?" ?0 ?
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