PUCINSKI ASSERTS 'SPY' USED CIA GRAIN DATA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 171
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 20, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

tiA.SliiNC-TON STAR
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ucinski sserts 'S y'
sed CIA Grain D ta
By DON KENDALL
Associated Press
A Midwest congressman
says Centr al Intelligence
Agency reports may have
been used by a so-called in-
ternational grain spy who fed
inside tips to a Kansas City
trade magazine about huge
U.S. wheat sales to the Rus-
sians.
Rep. Roman C. Pucinski,
D-Ill., told The Associated
Press that the CIA earlier this
year furnished the Agriculture
- Department with a detailed
account of Soviet crop failures
which led to the $1 billion sale
of U.S. wheat and other grain
to Moscow.
Further, Pucinski said tele-
phone calls purportedly made
from London in July and Au-
gust to Milling & Baking
News, Kansas City, probably
were placed' by a USDA em-
ploye who had access to the
CIA information.
The grain sales, including
more than 400 million bushels
of wheat, or one-fourth of the
U.S: crop, have prompted alle-
gations by Sen. Greene Mc-
Govern and others that private
American grain companies
were able to reap windfall
profits becauSe of inside infor-
mation fed to them by Nixon
administration farm o'fficials.
A detailed account of a
month-long series of phone
calls to Kansas City by the
mysterious tipster was pub-
lished Oct. 3 by the maga-
zine's editor, Morton Sosland.
The caller, at first identify-
ing himself as "Mr. Smith" of
the London Financial Times,
provided Sosland with
details?later proved to be ac-
curate ? on the timing and
volune of the Soviet wheat pur-
chases.
The calls began July 17,
weeks before the public or the
grain industry was fully aware
of the size of the Russian
sales.
Sosland said his magazine
delayed reports based on the
calls because the informant's
story seemed fantastic, but
carried the stories later.
Pucinski, who is campaign-
ing for the Senate seat held by
Charles Percy, R-111., said lie
is certain the CIA gave the
Agriculture Department a full
report on the Russian crop sit-
. nation, information which Pu-
cinski said the department
suppressed.
Discussing the telephone
calls described by Sosland, the
Illinois congressman said that
of the conceivable possibilities
it seemed most likely that the
information was passed by a
USDA employe.
"One of the insiders who had
access to this CIA report
might have been calling this
editor (Sosland) in order to
jack up grain prices," Pucin-
ski said. "Obviously, the fact
that this information was cor-
rect would indicate it could
have come only from this CIA
report."
There are other possible ex-
planations, Pucinski said.
The caller might have been,
as he eventually told Sosland,
an international grain spy
working out of London; an
American grain trader who,
wanted to leak information to
the public; or an agent of the
CIA itself.
But the possible motivation
for such calls remains a mys-
tery.
Pucinski, however, said he
sticks to his theory that the
calls were made by an Agri-
culture Department employe
with access to CIA reports.
That theory was disputed by
Nathaniel F. Kossack, inspec-
tor general of USDA. Kossack
told a reporter he had read
Sosland's article and thought
"it sounded like somebody
looking into a crystal ball."
He said he doesn't know
whether the FBI or Justice
Department is investigating
the grain-spy calls to Kansas
City.
He said his won agency has
"no jurisdiction" to investi-
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Meanwhile, the Agriculture
Department admits it uses
CIA reports ? along with oth-
er information ? in develop-
ing analyses of the farm sit-
uation in the Soviet 'Union. Of-
ficials deny, however, that re-
ports have been suppressed
except where information in-
volves security.
Fletcher Pope Jr. a special-
ist on Soviet agriculture in the
Economic Research Service of
USDA, told a reporter he rou-
tinely sees CIA reports in for-
mulating estimates about the
Soviet Union.
Informed of Sosland's report
about the grain-spy telephone
calls, Pope at first suggested
the initial call ? made to Sos-
land on July 17 ? may have
involved an educated guess
based on information made
public about then, indicating
Soviet crop output was going
to be down sharply this year.
Also, Pope said, President
Nixon announced July 8 that a
$750 million credit deal to sell
grain to the Soviets had been
signed. That called for mostly
feed grain, according to the
interpretation at the time,
with wheat considered second-
ary.
As it turned out, the Rus-
sians by July 8 'already had
purchased massive quantities
of U.S. wheat from private
American firms, including
Continental Grain Co. of New
York City.
It also became apparent lat-
er that the Soviets had pur-
chased far more grain than
specified in the July 8 agree-
ment announced by Nixon.
After questions over the So-
viet-U.S. grain deal began in
August, the White House or-
dered the FBI to investigate
whether some private grain
companies may have made
large windfall profits.
Charges that job-shuttling
between USDA and the private
grain trade has produced a
"cozy" relationship between
federal farm officials and the
grain industry have been la-
beled "bald-faced lies" by Ag-
riculture Secretary Earl L.
Butz.
Some congressmen say they
will press for further hearings
4gilitti:160eTtletN9
raised then.
tO
NEW YORK TIMES
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Chronology of U.S.-Hanoi Negotiations
Following is 'a chronology
' of the recent private nego-
tiations between the United
States and North Vietnam:
Sept. 26 and 27?For the
15th time since August,
1969, Henry A. Kissinger,
President Nixon's adviser on
national security, meets
privately in Paris with Le
DLIQ Tho, a Hanoi Politburo
member, and Xuan Thuy,
North Vietnam's chief dele-
gate to the Paris peace talks.
Oct. II?Mr. Kissinger be-
gins five days of talks in
Paris with the North Viet-
namese. According to Hanoi,
Le Due 'rho and Xuan Thus'
present "a new, extremely
important initiative" in the
form of a draft agreement.
According to Mr. Kissinger,
North Vietnam drops its de-
mand for a coalition govern-
ment prior to a military
settlement.
Oct. 9 ?According to
Hanoi, the United States
proposes the following sched-
ule: on Oct. 13 American
bombing and, mining of ?
North Vietnam would be
halted; on Oct. 19 both the
United States and North
Vietnam would initial the
text of the cease-fire agree-
ment, and on Oct. 26 the
foreign ministers of both
countries would formally
sign the agreement in Paris.
Oct. 10--Ellsworth Bunk-
er, United States Ambassa-
dor in Saigon, meets with
the South Vietnamese Presi-
dent, Nguyen Van Thieu, for
the third time within a week.
Mr. Kissin,ger's luggage is
taken off a jet at the last
minute, and he remains in
Paris to continue talks with
North Vietnamese-Hanoi says
that President Nixon sends
a message to Premier Pham
Van Dong confirming the
completion of the agreement
but also raising "a number
of complex points."
Oct. 11?Mr. Kissinger
meets again with the North
Vietnamese. According to
Hanoi, the United States pro-
poses a change in the sched-
ule: bombing and mining
would be stopped Oct. 21,
the agreement initiated Oct.
22 and formally signed Oct.
30. Hanoi says it agrees to
the change.
Oct. 12?Mr. Kissinger re-
turns to Washington to brief
President Nixon. In Saigon,
President Thieu tells a youth
rally of his opposition to a
coalition with the Commu-
nists.
Oct. I7?Mr. Kissinger, in
Paris again, is said by Hanoi
to have "reached agreement
on almost all problems."
North Vietnam says only
two unspecified points of dis-
agreement remain. Mr Kis-
singer flies to Saigon.
Oct. 18?Mr. Kissinger be-
gins discussions with Presi-
dent Thieu. In Paris, a
spokesman for the North
Vietnamese delegation, Ngu-
yen Thanh Le, denounces the
United States position as
"erroneous and intransigent."
Oct. 20?Mr. Kissinger con-
fers with President Thieu
again. Hanoi says the United
States asks again for a
change in the schedule, to
which North Vietnam agrees:
a bombing and mining halt
Oct. 23, an initialing of .11:e
agreement Oct. 24 and formal
signing Oct. 31. According to
Hanoi, this schedule was
never officially altered.
Oct. 21 ? Mr. Kissinger
again confers with President
Thieu, then flies to Pnompenh
to brief Cambodia's President,
Lon Nol.
Oct. 22 ? Mr. Kissinger
meets with President Thieu.
_Hanoi says that both the
United States and North Viet-
nam have agreed to the text
of the agreement and the
schedule.
Oct. 23?After another Kis-
singer - Thieu meeting, the
South Vietnamese President
calls in his commanders of ?
the four military regions, the
44 province chiefs and many
of the 559 provincial counci-
lors. Mr. Kissinger returns to
Washington. According to
Hanoi, the United States cites
"difficulties in. Saigon" and
demands continued negotia- ,
tions, but "did not say any-
thing about the implemen-
tation of its commitments
under the agreed schedule,"
Hanoi contends.
Oct. 24?President Thieu, in
a speech, declares the pro-
posals discussed by Mr. Kis-
singer in Paris unacceptable.
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n/HE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
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Prom JOHN GOSHKO, Bonn, Oaober 3
The two . women 'spies
!
: exchanged by West Germany
for more than 100 prisoners
from the East has f 0 an sed
attention on a little known
aspect of commerce bet'ween
the two Germanys ? a lively
tragic in human beings. ,
Such exchanges have bean
going on for nine years. Gill-
coils here say privately that
since 1969 ;they have arranged
the release to the West of about
4,000 people held in East Ger-
man gaols.
Until now the Federal
Government was loth even to
admit its role in these " buying
out '! deals for fear of endanger-
ing these -operations, and the
i \Vest German public has been
i generally unaware of the size of
1 this system of exchanges.
; The practice received
II renewed notice a few days ago
when Government officials here
confirmed nress reports that
ItWO SP,i CS, Lane Lindner, and
;Irene Schultz, had been handed
over to East Germany in
i exchange for more than 100
1 political prisoners. Both women
i had been in "iri.S031 30 months,
I awaiting trial on charges- of
espionage against West
Germany. .
Mrs Schultz had been the
personal secretary to the then
Federal Minister of Science and
Research, and she allegedly had
passed to Mrs Lindner papers
describing the private meetings
of Chancellor 13rancit's Cabinet.
The case was unusual because
the Minister for Inter-German
Affairs, Herr Franke, took pains
to issue a statement confirming
the Government's part in the
exchange. Evidently he
deviated from the usually
discreet diplomatic tactics
because first reports of the
women's release were " highly
inaccurate" and handled by the
opposition press " in a way that
constituted a partisan attack on
the Government,"
Privately Government offi-
cials say that the system of
"buying out " began in 19113
during the chancellorship of Dr
Erhard and was initiated by Dr
Barzel, now the leader of the
Christian Democrat. Opposition,
and an aspiring Chancellor next
month. In 3C'63, Dr riarzel was
)1inister for Inter-German
Af.7airs.
STh-co then the exektines
have been a regular part of thC
uneasy- relations between
two Germanys. .Usu;:ly pri?
sonars held by the two sides are ;
exchanged or West Germany :
" buys" East German prisoners ;
for goads or cash.
One of the more sensational
instances was the release in
February 194 of Heinz Folfe.
S
oviei. agent who had infil-
trated West German intelli- i
gence for 10 years. He was '
released in exchange for three
Heidelberg 'University students
detained in the. Soviet Union on
charges of spying, :for the Cen-
tral intelligence Agencv. Dean's
view is that the East 'Germans :
deliberately stockpile hostages
as a bargaining counter to
secure the release of specific ,1
agents imprisoned in the West.
For this reason senior
members of West Germany's
security services generally
frown on the system on the
grounds that the East Germans
are better able to recruit spies
by promising tem a speedy
"buy out" h' they are caught.
In spite of such objections,';
the Federal Government has
continued to exchange!
imprisoned spies' because, as
ono official, says, " the advan-
tages generally out.veigh the
disadvanta,e,es."
Most of those exchanged are::
little fish to begin \vh:i. Once
they have been cai4;ht and ;
identified, their usefulness to -
East Germany as agents is ;
ended."
Most of those held in East
Germany have been released by
"direct purchase." On occa-
sion, this has involved shipping -
such commodities as CII Is fruit
or medicines. hut for the most
Port Gonna:- Marks are paid
out to satisf,, East German hard
currency demands.
Publicity sui_oundling the
Lindner-Sethi] Is Jam might
depress the chances of l'itr:ner
exchanges for a iimo, PAtt. East
Germany's need for hard
currency and concern for its
agents should allow 'business to
resume soon. ? Wasbingum
Post.
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71 '1
tb. 11.ekiJa.e,
Nc.=-1,./ Delhi Oct. 9,
pRIME MINISTER Indira Gandhi refused to day td give Secretary of State %William P.
Rogers the prooi he is repo:ted to have requested to sustantiata her charges that
?.th,i) U.S. Central Int,:,_,Iiigence Agency is active in India.
cEveryone knows that CIA has been active in Indict csid there is no question cf
.
proving Ito) the Prime Minister told a natio net convention of her Congress Party in
central 1\--,lnuada'r_.,ad city, according to Indian news agencies..
eVirhen any foreign
intelli-
gence agency comes here,
? what does it do ? This does
not need any proof.
mr. roger.; . was understood
to have E1:A:U(1 1 orelgn
Swarm YineTh during a meet-
ing in New York last Thur.,y?
' day for proof of charges that
! the CIA was interfering in
!India's internal affairs ? a
; charge denied ? by the State
!Department.
Opposition politicians and
! leading Indian newspapers also
have urged the government to
back up the charges, which
. were first made three weeks
ago by the Congress Party
President Shankar Al Sharma.
Mrs. Gandhi personally enter-
ed. the controversy last Tues-
day warning partymen in East-
ern Bhar state to be vigilant
against the CIA.
Welcomed assurance
She repeated the. warning
at the national convention.
At the mine time, she wel-
comed Mr. Rogers assurance to
Swaran Singh that .the 'United
States did not want to inter-
fere in the interim!' affairs of
other countries.
?If this signifies a change
in policy, we welcome its she
said,? but we must always be
Vigilant.?
The Prime Minister said that
even foreign scholars had been
Used for CIA purposes. She
did not. elaborate but claimed
her government had informa-
tion that scholars had been
given ?other tasks? beside re-
search.
The 'Indian Government, with
rare exceptions. has stopped
Issuing visas to American scho-
lars in the past ? several
months.? AP.
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Approved *iki Release 201M4/15(P)elA11131D84-00*R001000100005-0
16 OCT 1972
CIA Activity ecomes
Issue in Indian oil-tics
By Lewis Simons
Washinzton,Post Foreign Service
NEW DELHI, Oct. 15 ?
Not a day seems to go by
lately in which every news-
paper front page in town
isn't shouting about the dire
effect the U.S. Central Intel-
ligence Agency is having,
isn't having or may be hav-
ing on India's internal secu-
rity.
"CIA activities on the
rise, warns Mrs. Gandhi,"
the sober and respected
daily Hindu proclaimed yes-
terday across four columns
hi the middle of page one.
There would be "no in-
quiry into. CIA activities,"
countered the equally presti-
gious Statesman on . the
same day, explaining fur-
ther in the sub headline that
"Mrs. Gandhi rejects opposi-
tion demand?'
' "CIA hand in gramo-
phones" was the eye-catcher
on a small but widely used
item distributed by the
Press Trust of India earlier
in the week.
In the tribal areas of
Arunachal Pradesh, readers
were told, CIA agents were
.suspected of passing out
cardboard record players
and plastic discs which, al-
though they had not yet
been translated, "Perhaps
carried messages preaching
Christianity."
The propaganda outbursts
against the CIA were
started by leaders of the rul-
ing Congress Party for as
.yet undisclosed reasons. But
then, as the government
.sought to cool off the issue,
!opposition forces sensed an
opportunity to embarrass
the Congress Party and are
not letting the matter die.
And, as though conceding
the obvious confusion
among government leaders,
politicians, newspaper edi-
tors and just folks, the
rightwing Motherland enti-
tled its latest offering on
CIA: "It's here, it's not here,
it's growing."
'Mat "It's here" is beyond
doubt. Not even officials of
the U.S. Embassy or the
most -ardently provatnalist
members of the j TO,vedaM.VW
or Swatantra parties would ?
deny that the CIA is as
much ? a fact of American
life in India as is the steamy
duck pond in the center of
the embassy building.
But beyond that there is
doubt. No one really knows
the extent of CIA operations
in India except the CIA, and
they're not talking.
Much of the doubt can be
attributed to the on-again,
off-again approach Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi and
her senior ministers have
taken and their refusal to
come forward with any evi-
dence more solid than a
cardboard gramophone to
prove that CIA activities
were detrimental to India.
"Everyone knows that the
CIA has been active in India
and there is no question of
proving it," Mrs. Gandhi
buffed last week. But her
political opponents are not
willing to let it go at that.
During a meeting last Fri-
day of the parliamentary con-
sultative committee, a sort of
mini Parliament in the off-
season, three opposition lead-
ers demanded that the g.ov-
eminent publish a white
paper on CIA activities.
The prime minister re-
portedly refused. According
to opposition members who
attended the session, she first
claimed that CIA activities
were under control but later
said they "are on the in-
crease and we must continue
our vigil."
Thus the confusion.
It all began two weeks ago
when the president of Mrs.
Gandhi's ruling Congress
Party, Dr. Shenker DayaI
Sharma, proclaimed that the
shadowy hand of the CIA
was behind a spreading rash
of student rioting, communal
unrest and other violence in
diverse areas of the country.
Initial reaction was divided
among those who believed
that Sharma, who took over
the party just five months
ago, was trying to make a
name for himself and others
who were convinced he was
acting on orders from Mrs.
Gandhi.
Sharma continued to make
charges. There was specific
evidence, he said. that the
ForARelease,(290392/00g:
disruptive elements, partic-
ularly right-wing, anti-social-
ist political parties. But he
refused to divulge any ev-
idence.
Then, during a visit to the
Bihar town of Ranchi, Mrs.
Gandhi was quoted very
briefly as confirming Shar-
ma's accusation and saying
it was for the CIA to prove
it was not operating in India
rather than for India to
prove it was.
The president of the
Swatantra Party which, in
contrast to the Congress
Party's socialistic approach
strongly favors private enter-
prise, accused. the Congress
a few days ago of raising a
CIA bogey to divert atten-
tion from Soviet ? secret
service (KGB) activities in
India.
The claim that India is
becoming a political and
economic appendage of the
Soviet Union is growing
rapidly among rightwing op-
position parties. - These
organizations lost consider-
able strength in this year's
state elections and some
government analysts claim
they are now following a.
pattern of fomenting violence
in their former strongholds
?with CIA help.
The most accepted general
explanation for the out-
bursts of violence of the last
month or so is that people
are irate over high food
? ..prices, which have climbed
AS a result of this past sum-
mer's inadequate monsoon
rains. In this view, the gov-
ernment needs the CIA for
a scapegoat.
But sophisticated Indian
specialists dismiss this view
?although appealing in its
neatness?as simplistic. For
example, they note that the
so-called language riots now
going on in Assam, in the
far northeastern corner of
the country, are apparently
nothing more than a revival
of the periodic dispute be-
tween Bengali-speaking Mus-
lims and Assamese-speaking
tribal people.
Similarly, violence in New
Delhi last month had appar-
ently unrelated origins and
CeirtRiscipantsmosov4m97eialmiroost
. p pm 9Rocioo
young men who were prob-
ably just looking for some
excitement. In fact. the
Home Ministry, which is
headed by Mrs. Gandhi and
? which controls India's major
intelligence organization,
said it found no evidence of
"outside inspiration" in the
New Delhi violence.
Howver, expert observers
agree, none of this is meant
to suggest. that the CIA?
or the KGB as well AS doz-
ens of other foreign intelli-
gence organizations, both
Eastern and Western?is not
constantly- at work in India.
But the activities of these
- organizations are believed
to be more subtle than the
Congress Party and govern-
ment allege.
"It's in
it's a search for 'friends,'
it's a contest for influence,"
commented one senior In-
dian journalist during a re-
cent private conversation.
Journalists, in fact, find
themselves regular targets
of this "search for friends?'
According to several top re-
'porters on leading New
Delhi and out-of-town jour-
nals, those foreign missions
most lavish in their treat-
ment of Indian journalists
are, on the "Western" side,
the Americans, the West
Germans and the 'South
Koreans. In the Communist
camp, it's the Soviet Union,
the Poles, Czechs and North
Koreans who extend the
greatest "hospitality."
,Concerned over the effect
such influence may have on
newsmen, bureaucrats, schol-
ars and others, the govern-
ment is planning to pass a
bill in the coming Parlia-
ment session which will sev-
erely limit the foreign "hos-
pitality" Indians may accept.
The bill would sharply cur-
tail press junkets, foreign
scholarships and other trav-
el at the invitation of all
foreign countries.
Similarly, the government ?
is phasing out foreign vol-
untary agencies, including the
U.S. Peace Corps, By 1974,
voluntary agencies from the
United States, Japan, West
Germany, Britain, Canada,
Sweden and Australia will no -
longer be allowed to operate
in India.
The government contends
that activity of certain
American scholars are even
more menacing than those
of some Peace Corps volue-
1 0ijoty54omeof these schol-
ars, MI? until the beginning
?? ? Continued
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or this year had their stud-
ies in India paid for by US:
government holdings of ru-
pees under Public Law 480,
have also been gathering in-
telligence for the CIA, the
government maintains.
_There is a certain irony in
the current outburst taking
place during a period of un-
precedented Congress Party
power and government sta-
bility. The last time the CIA
came in for extensive attack
in India was immediately
after the 1907 general elec-
tions, in which the Congress
suffered a major setback..
Some observers see the .
present outburst as an ex-
pression of India's concern
with the Nixon administra-
tion's efforts at friendship
with China; the resulting
feeling that India should
maintain its relations with
the Soviet Union; and a be-
lief here that no improve- ?
ment is in sight in Indian-
American relations.
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Approved 4,IftAgiNniElA-RDP84-004160001000100005-0
SEP 6 1972
SEMI-WEEKLY - 5,977
Should CIA
tell all? '1?Kirc
By CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR.
Third District Congressman
Legislation with important consequences both for the
Congress and for our foreign policy presently is being
considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The bill, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper of
Kentucky, proposes the Central Intelligence Agency submit
regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed
Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and
Armed Services Committees.
This measure would require the CIA to keep the
Committees fully and currently informed "regarding
intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning
the relations of the United States to foreign countries and
matters of national security."
The bill's provisions were patterned after the Joint Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, which specified that the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Defense Department keep the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy fully informed.
Proponents of the legislation argue that it is necessary to be
kept well-informed in order to deal effectively with foreign
policy decisions. The Foreign Relations Committee, in its
report on the measure, said a "right to full information and
analysis.. would strengthen and improve the operation of our
government."
"The bill is needed to enable Congress properly to carry out
its Constitutional responsibilities for the making of foreign
policy and national security."
The State Department opposes the plan. It contends such
legislation would be dangerous to national security and would
allow Congress to overstep its Constitutional bounds.
In my view, complete and accurate information is
necessary for Congress to reassert its Constitutional role as a
participant in the making of foreign policy, and this measure
is needed to provide that information. In order for Congress
to be coequal with the ekecutive branch, it must have the
same right to information that the executive has.
Much of what has happened in Southeast Asia is directly
traceable to information -in Congress. This bill would be
invaluable in avoiding such uninformed judgments in the
future.
To prevent the disclosure of secret information, the
measure would permit only Members of the relevant
Committees, and their staffs, to receive the reports. The
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has already
demonstrateci the success of this practice.
Th' National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA,
proviikd that information gathered by the agency was to be
used 4,nlv by the executive branch. Until now, Congress has
received the information only at the discretion of the
President.
Senator ('per's bill was first studied by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and approved on July 17. The
bill then was rl?.rred to the Senate Armed Services for
further consideraui,n.
I will strongly support this measure when it comes before
the House. With a legal right. to CIA information. Congress
Approved1FOraWeagte 2010N(100-3 ii1Q1ArriiPitatic00.4.19:9R001000100005-0
Had this bill been passed twelve years ago. our recent
history might have bum completely different.
ITS/11C- 4R5.1?)
Approved For .0041 A3111.SCIA)-(Rb08410499R440 000100005-0
Ni41,16-ct 1912
Author's Query
I am interested in obtaining
written reports of personal ex-
periences of civilians involving
the Central Intelligence Agency,
These will be published, with
permission of the contributors,
as part of an anthology con-
cerned with the extent to which
the C.I.A. is involved with
civilian life. L. G. PEDERSEN
U. of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514.
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
Approved Form'Release 2P9Aragl130:1CIARDP84-004901R001000100005-0
4 OCT 1972
A
Mrs. Gandhi
Alleges CIA
Activities
NEW DELHI, Oct. 3 (UPI)
?.Prime Minister Indira Gan-
dhi's attack on the activities of
the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency in India raised fears
in U.S. embassy circles herd
today of further damage to In-
dian-American relations.
, Mrs. Gandhi told a local
Congress Party meeting yes-
terday that she had informa-
tion that the CIA had become
active in India.
. She asked the party workers
to be vigilant and to counter-
act the CIA's activities.
Mrs. Gandhi did not say pre-
cisely what the CIA was doing
in India. "It is not for us to
prove that this agency is work-
ing in our country," she said.
"It 'is for the CIA to prove
that it is not active in India."
? Sniping at the CIA has be-
come traditional in India. ?.
Shankar Dayal ?Sharma, presi-
dent of the Congress Party,
resurrected the issue on Sept.
21 at a news conference. He,
accused the CIA of involv-
ment in recent civil disturb-
ances here.
At the time,- a IT S. embassy '
spokesman said "Such accusa- ?
tions are outrageous and havd
no basis in fact." But the em-
bassy declined to comment on.
Mrs. Gandhi's remarks.
In Washington, State De
partment officials denied her
charges. Department spokes-
man Charles. W. Bray was
asked: 'Are you privy to what
the CIA is doing?" ?
"We are quite satisfied," he.
replied.
----, --1
Tistlic- 9 4"--
---
- pproved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
Approved For_Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
India Swipe at CIA
Could Hurt Tres
NEW DELHI (UPI)?Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi's at-
? tack on the activities of the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agen-
cy in India has raised fears
in U.S. Embassy circles of
further damage to American-
Indian relations, already at an
all-time low.
Mrs. Gandhi yesterday told
a meeting in Ranchi for work-
ers in her ruling Congress
? party that ?she had informa-
ticin the CIA had pecome ac-
tive in India.
She asked the party loyal-
ists at Ranchi, which is in
the northeastern state of
Bihar, to be vigilant of the
CIA and to counteract its ac-
tivities.
Mrs. Gandhi did not say
what the CIA was doing in
India.
"It is not for us to prove
that this agency is working in
our country," she told the
party workers. "It is for the
CIA to prove that it is not ac-
tive in India."
In Washington, State De-
partment spokesman Charles
W. Bray III said that "any
implicatihn that the United
States government is involved
in the internal affairs of In-
dia is quite without founda-
tion."
He said the United States
' would withhold specific com-
ment until the exact allega-
tions of Mrs. Gandhi are re-
ceived here from the embas-
hy in New Delhi.
'Old Hat' Issue
Sniping at the CIA is old
hat in India. Dr. Shankar
Dayal Sharma, president of
. the Congress party, resurrect-
.-
-ed the issue Sept. 21 at a Cal-
. cutta news conference in
which he accused the CIA of
involvement in recent civil
'..,,? 'disturbances in this country.
At the time, a U.S. Embas-
-ay spokesman said "such ac-
cusations are outrageous .and
r'have no basis in fact." The
embassy this time declined
to. comment on_IVIrs Gandhi's
gtved For Release
It was considered likely
that Secretary of State Wil-
liam P. Rogers will raise the
issue when he meets in Wash-
ington on Thurday with Indian
Foreign Minister Swaran
Singh.
It was learned here that
Washington already has told
Indian diplomats privately in
the United States that such
criticism is "not construc-
tive."
The Indian diplomats were
reported to have responded
that India, like the United
States, is "a free country"
and its officials could say
what they pleased.
Watch Russians
It is generally believed here
that the primary mission of
the CIA in India is to 4atch
the activities of the Russians.
Those in a position to know
say the CIA has little or no
interest in the domestic politi-
cal situation in India.
The agents are known to
have Indian contacts, who pre-
sumably are paid and could
infiltrate political organiza-
tions for reporting purposes.
Relations between the United
States and India plunged to
an all-time low when the
United States "tilted" in favor
of Pakistan during Decem-
ber's India-Pakistan war.
(Kuldip Nayar, the Star-
News special correspondent
in India, reports from New
Delhi that after the general
elections in 1967, the Indian
Intelligence Bureau submitted
a report alleging that "fi-
nancial assistance" during
the elections had come from
American sources. It claimed
that the ultimate source of
funds was the CIA.
Two Steps Seen
(Two courses of action were
then considered appropriate:
One, not to permit the work-
ing of those U.S. foundations
and organizations which were
suspected to have originated
intelligence agencies such as
the CIA. Two, the receipt of
donations and other forms of
financial assistance from
American sources would be
subject to more rigorous con-
26ififillighlit6YA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, October 3, 1972
(The government of India
has already begun implement-
ing both steps. Most U.S.
. organizations have wound up
their activities in India and
one of the recent' ones phasing
out its activities is CARE
Similarly, legislation is being
brought forth to enable the
government to approve of in-
vitations received by individ-
uals and organizations from
America before they are ac-
cepted.)
ApprovevlaFor Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-X99R001000100005-0
c>!-i
2 OCT 1-,172
us. major held by Syria
e
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
Beirut, Lebanon
The case of Maj. Richard Barrett, the
United States diplomat who has been held by
the Syrian Government since Sept. 9, shows
signs of slowly building into a couse celebre.
The major, who is from Wyoming, is the
assistant ? military attache in the United
States Embassy in Amman, Jordan. He wan
traveling by road from 'Amman to Beirut, to
visit his wife and child, when he was taken
into custody at the intervening Syrian fron-
tier post of Deraa.
Nothing was said about the incident till
Sept. 19 when the news broke in an Arabic
language newspaper in Beirut. The United
States State Department then said it had
maintained silence because it had been using
?quiet diplomacy to obtain Major Barrett's
release. It also then became known that both
Italy, which has been looking after United
States interests in Syria since 1967, and
Lebanon had tried, and failed, to get more out
of Syria than a bare acknowledgement of the
arrest. ?
Syria now has been put off limits for United
States officials, And the State Department
has twice expressed its concern at Major
Barrett's imprisonment.
There' are three theories concerning the
arrest. The first and least likely is that the
major defected to Syria taking important
documents with him. This seems very im-
probable to say the least.
The second theory is that he is being held on
espionage charges, and one Beirut publica-
tion predicts he will be put on trial as Gary
Powers of the U-2 incident was in the Soviet
The arguments favoring the espionage
' theory are that the major is said to be fluent
in Arabic, a dubious accomplishment that is
always likely to arouse suspicion here; that
he made unusually frequent trips- by road
across Syria, and showed partictiar interest
in the frontier area where Palestinian com-
mando units are stationed; that, according to
one story, he had two passports on him ?
diplomatic and ordinary; and that, above all,
there was that strange gap of silence of 10
days, which suggests embarrassment in
.Washington. ? ?
? The third and perhaps most probable
theory is that Major Barrett is being held as a
hostage by Syria kVA
Pressure Israel Tritr iCttaWS14,14P
q 5-01
17
1 ..)N r
.111)e)Iii77.67':1`Fri T1
A
GTh(rj
?F
i
Syrian officers who were kidnapped by Israel
from Lebanese territory on July 21. ?
When Lebanon and Syria took the matter to ?
the UN Security Council the United States
abstained on a resolution that was passed
ordering Israel to return its prisoners. Israel
has ignored the resolution, saying that it
would liberate its hostages only in return for
' all Israeli prisoners held by all Arab ..coun-
tries, especially including Egypt
The argument here is that if the United
States thus condones the situation where
? country "A" can kidnap hostages from
country "B" on the territory of country "C" -
to obtain the release of prisoners in country
"D," then it is surely permissible for country
"B" to take a hostage on its own territory
from country "E" (America) to get back its
prisoners from country "A." ?
Th'e Middle East policy of the United States
has been profoundly pro-Israel and anti-Arab
for the past 25 years, it is said here, yet
United States interests and individual United
States citizens have seldom suffered harm
from the Arabs. The case of Major Barrett
shows that Arab tolerance may be changing.
If the major were innocent, the argument
goes, would not Washington have been the
first to announce the news and to raise a hue
and cry instead of leaking the information
belatedly to a Lebanese newspaper?
003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
Approvedliter Release 260h2/08 :'-aA-RDP84-0(44619R001000100005-0
1 OCT i;72
1
S'? -
1!
Moscow (Reuter) ? The
memoirs of Gordon A. Lens-
dale, a Soviet master spy,
have run into a mysterious'
delay after beginning publica-
tion here almost a year ago.
Lonsdale, alias Konon Mo-
lody, alias Georgi Lonov, died
in October,. 1970, while picking
mushrooms in the woods near
Moscow. _
A professionally edited ver-
sion of his memoirs began
appearing a year later in
the monthly magazine Molo-
daya Gyardiva [Young Guard-I,
Three installments appeared at
intervals, but there have been
none since last March.
Lonov ? this was his real
name according to the maga-
zine?was, sentenced to 25
years in prison by a British
court in 1961 for his part in a
spy ring seeking British naval
secrets.
He was known in Britain as
Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, and
he even published what pur-
ported to be his autobiography
there after being released in a
swap for ? Greville M. Wynne, a
British businessman convicted
of spying against Russia in
1963.
"Not our fault"
But Lonsdale's story. has not
done too well in the country
which honors him as one or its
most distinguished agents.
. A member of Molodaya
Gpardiya's staff said the jour-
nal hoped to continue publish-
ing the memoirs, but it would
not be until the new year.
Asked why they had been .
held up, she explained that
"the reasons are complicated
.. But one thing is clear, the
delay in continuing publication
is not ?lir fault."
So far the memoirs have
described how Lonov went to
Canada to establish his cover
as a Canadian citizen, then
moved to Britain where he set'
himself up in the vending ma- I
chine business. I
The last installment, which'
ended on. Chapter 18, told how
Lonov met his British contact,
airifeea v1ost,o1v
Harry F. Houghton, in Loden
It suggested that Houghton':
friend, Ethel E. Gee, who ob-
tained secret papers for Lons-
dale, was under the impression
the spy was an American
naval officer named Alec John-
son.
Describing Lonsdale's first
? meeting with her, the account
said that to judge by all ap-
pearances she had no doubt
I she was helping an American
Inaval officer.
I The installment concluded by
saying that Houghton was gen-
erously rewarded for his
services "as Assistant Naval
Attache Alec Johnson had
promised him when they first
met."
Houghton and Miss Gee later
served 10 years in English
prisons. for espionage.
The -reason for the delay in
continuing the memoirs is not
likely to become known, but
the following installments
could be expected to cover"'
Lonov's arrest, interrogation,
trial and imprisonment.
Possibly the man who has ,
been putting the memoirs into',
publishable form, Trofim Po
dolin, has simply failed to turn
out the sequel yet, but it is more',
probable that it has been held
back for other, less easily ex-
plained reasons, by Lonov's old
employers, the Soviet security
forces.
da..-01 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
11.2/IIC- 70
, ,
VIENTIANE, Laos ? Still savoring "They were
but I just pinch myself daily when
being paid for doing this."
?G. Mclifurtrie Godley
WAFTS, IIGTON POST
Approved Forlease 2003/11/0C1Afc7-14op84-0049,3941 cool 000050
n't ten deep for the Laos- assignment,
I think I'm
his cigar after a three-course
luncheon washed down with French
wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered
the telephone, postponed his tennis
game, dashed to his sedan and was
driven off at top speed.
"Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner
Base," he intoned into the car's radio-
telephone, "heading for airport ? ten-
four." The rush .mission of American
Ambassador Godley on an otherwise
sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian
capital turned out to be a false alarm
of sorts. There was just a chance that
three captured American pilots North
. Vietnam had- agreed to release might
be on board the regular weekly Aero-
flot flight which was arriving from
Hanoi ahead of schedule. And "Mac"
Godley wanted to be on hand just in
case the men accepted his personal
- suggestion they disembark and accept
r, U.S. government transportation home
rather than continue in the company
of their antiwar chaperones.
? While Russians in sports shirts and
North Vietnamese in pith helmets and
business suits streamed off the Ilyu-
. shin 18, Godley saw that the pilots
were not among the passengers, got
back into the ear and headed home to
. change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes
Is about all the tennis I can take in
? this age anyway."
At 55, Godley has been going at this
pace for more than three years in Laos
and, for that matter, ever since he
graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part
proconsul, part traditional striped-
pants diplomat and part general, God-
ley personally directs the no longer
quite so secret American war in Laos
,and loves every minute of it.
He has no doubts about his job or
-how- to carry it out even though his
critics suspect he is more Defense Sec-
retary Melvin Laird's man in Vienti-
ane than Secretary of State William
Rogers.' "Call me field marshal if it
makes you feel better," he is inclined
to say. "I don't care. But please note
I've got no troops."
."Uncle Sugar',
INVOLVED in undercover work since
World War II when he dealt
with American prisoner of war prob-
lems while based in Switzerland, one
of the first U.S. diplomats to work
closely with the military, activist am-
bassador to the Congo during the
"Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley be-
lieves in the American world mission
In uncomplicated terms uncomfortable
to more doubting Americans.
So big and burly that Congolese
called him "The Bear that Walks Like
a Man" when he was ambassador in
Leopoldville, Godley maintains, "I
think I've had the vApPEgtmstdhEWR!lease
Foreign Service" and "if I end up
being the fall guy I couldn't care less."
in Vie tiane
? By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service
Godley is given to pithy, direct lan-
guage of a nature which an earlier age
would not have found repeatable in
mixed company. Pure product of the
Cold War in warm climates, he invaria-
bly refers to the United States as
"Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting
the persuasiveness of American power
in underdeveloped countries.
Even with a staff of 1,200 diplomatic,
military and CIA men, as ambassador
to this Oregon-sized country Godley
has his hands full:
? Requesting and approving all
American air strikes against North Vi-
etnamese and Pathet Lao troops?who
numbered over 100,000 just before the
Easter invasion of South Vietnam?in
northern Laos and along the Ho Chi
Minh supply trails leading south to
Cambodia and South Vietnam.
? Directing CIA military operations
and the activities of some 230 military
attaches whose tasks include supplying
arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao
army, Meo tribesmen and Thai volun-
teers in the Plain of Jars north of Vi-
entiane and in the southern Laos pan-
handle.
? Keeping able neutralist Premier
Souvanna Phouma in office despite re-
peated right-wing efforts to dislodge
him, to ensure that the tatty facade on
the 1962 accords remains intact for an.
other effort to neutralize Laos in the
event of an Indochina-wide peace set.
tlement, a task even the North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao representa-
tives here privately concede he per.
formed brilliantly in the past month.
? Maintaining the precarious and ar-
tificial Laotian economy within the
limits of a congressional aid ceiling of
$350 million annually, a far from easy
task since most of the money goes for
military spending. Indeed, the annual
threat of the fall of the CIA's base at
Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is
feared less than the economic crisis re-
flected by the fall in value of the Lao-
tian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar
in the past year.
Dropping the Veils
ILIOR MOST of Godley's first year as
I: ambassador, and indeed since the
1962 Geneva accords were broken first
by North Vietnam and then by the
United States, American military in-
volvement was kept as secret as possi-
ble. But in the past year or so, Wash-
ington has progressively dropped the
principal fiction imposed by the Ge-
neva accords which set up the tripar-
tite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing
government under big power auspices:
a promise to avoid any foreign military
establishment in Laos except for a
small French training mission.
As early as 1964, the United States
was deeply committed to the Souvanna
Phouma government, providing aid, a
stabilization fund for the kip and mili-
tary help. In return, Souvanna
Phouma allowed the United States to
bomb North Vietnamese positions on
the strength of a verbal understanding
which even now remains the only basis
for American military operations here.
In March, 1970, President Nixon
started lifting the secrecy after a Sen-
ate Foreign Relations subcommittee
headed by Stuart Symington held
hearings on 'ins as part of its investi-
gation of U.S. commitments abroad.
Whatever major mystery was left dis-
appeared last December when U.S. of-
ficials a guided ur of
2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499Reggpfiga put on to LonglOfit0rs of Gen. Vang
Continued
Approved Forftease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499O1000100005-0
operation," recalled one of dodley's
Congo Mafia. "Our military aid started
at $3 million and ended up costing $9
million for the entire year 1964."
"A Frustrated Soldier"
y IKE MANY OTHERS who served
Li there, Godley is nostalgic about
the Congo and likes to wear a brightly
colored print shirt depicting President
Joseph Desire Mobutu. Such sentiment
is all the more touching since Godley
had to have himself withdrawn as am-
bassador in October 1966, after he
Pao's CIA-paid mercenaries on the rim
of the Plain of Jars. The base was in
danger of falling to the North Viet-
namese and it was apparently deemed
wiser to let the press see the base
rather than learning about it from
triumphant enemy propaganda.
The "Congo Mafia"
PE RH AP S UNDERSTANDABLY,
Godley's staff has drawn heavily on
men who served in the Congo in the
earl and middle Sixties. Indeed at one
point the deputy chief of mission, CIA
station chief and several important dep-
uties, a U.S. Information Service staffer
and several young diplomats all were
part of what is known as Godley's
"Conga Mafia."
Although ambassadors are allowed
wide latitude in choosing their staffs,
Godley swears he hand-picked only
one of his former Congo associates:
Monteagle Stearns, until recently the
deputy chief of mission, who left a soft
berth in the London embassy when
"Godley offered him a chance to "rejoin
the real Foreign Service." The others,
Godley feels, logically ended up here
because of the similarity of the skills
and experience which stood them in
good stead in the Congo.
"You look at the State Department's
personnel structure and of 1,500 offi-
cers there may he 250 with facility in
= French," Godley explained, "then 75
without family problems of one sort or
another, perhaps 50 who are gung-ho,
dedicated and not yellow, and then you
choose the best. It's only normal that
two out of three have been in the
other, similar area,"
In the Congo, one of the most sue-
? cessful ? some would say just plain
lucky ? exercises of American. mili-
tary and political power, the United
States was instrumental in holding the
country together. From 1960 to Janu-
ary 1963, the United States provided
the muscle behind the United Nations
effort to repress rebellions in the cen-
ter, northeast and southeast of the
country.
But less than 18 months after the
United States helped the U.N. troops
scatter mercenary soldiers, end the se-
cession of copper-producing Katanga
province and send its leader, Moise
? Tshombe, off to European exile, he
was back again as prime minister of
. the entire country in July 1964. Faced
with a Chinese-backed uprising which
I spread across the country, Godley
backed Tshomhe, brought in CIA-paid
Cuban pilots to fly T-28 fighters, World
War II B-26 bombers and U.S. Air
Force C-130 transports which flew
Belgian-financed white mercenaries
around the country.
Within a year of its inception the re-
bellion collapsed AtcprovedrigineRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
U.S.-Belgian paratroop drop on Stan- ?
leyville which rescued hundreds of Eu-
rnnaari rofIlopac "Ti wng st Simpctrincr
grounded the Congolese air force to
keep Mobutu from napalming rebel-
lious white mercenaries in Stanley-
vile.
G-odley rates his Congolese experi-
ence as "invaluable" in teaching the
practical application of limited mili-
tary and diplomatic operations. He fig-
ures he spent 20 per cent of his time
on military problems in the Congo but
now devotes as much as 70 per cent of
Ins efforts to them here. Only part of
his long days is spent with large war
maps on the walls of his windowless
ground-floor embassy office.
"I'm a frustrated soldier," Godley
concedes in noting his active military
service is limited to two years' naval
duty from 1939 to 1941, when he went
into government work. But for Godley,
who admits to being intrigued by such
weaponry as M-79 grenade launchers,
doing his job is "getting the hell out
into the field. You cannot do anything
sitting behind a desk and reacting."
Flying in helicopters and light
planes of the U.S. government-chart-
ered Air America or Continental Air
Service, Godley likes to put down on,
dirt strips and see for himself. "I try
to get out as much as possible, partly
for morale purposes to see my field
hands who risk their lives--and to en-
courage Laotian officials to do like-
wise," he said, "but, also because I
never go out without learning some-
thing from the military attaches and
.CIA teams, some of whom have been
here 8, 10, 12 years."
Godley's appreciation of the military
dates back to a tour as first secretary
in the Paris embassy in the early Fif-
ties, where he worked on NATO infra-
structure and on securing French
agreement for American bases to be
built for the alliance in the then
French Morocco. Back in Washington
in 1958 after a tour in Cambodia, he
was involved in planning the U.S. land-
ing during the Lebanese civil war.'
"I was horrified by the vacuum be-
tween both sides of the Potomac," he
recalled. He later was instrumental in
-
setting up an exchange program for
State and Defense Department offi-
cers.
2
An Earlier Breed
BOTH IN THE CONGO and Laos,
he believes the United States has
' been successful in "careful orchestra-
tion of U.S. military might under tight.
political controls."
' "With a minimum of equipment and.
zero commitment we are killing 30
North Vietnamese a day," he added, as
well as tying up large enemy units
which otherwise could be used against'.
South Vietnam. Yet with much of the-
air support coming from nearby bases
in Thailand, Laos remains a sideshow
to the South Vietnamese theater and
there is no really independent Ameri-
can pc licy for Laos.
Even critics among the Laotians and
his fellow diplomats credit Godley
with smooth crisis management al-
though they decry U.S. policy here and
throughout Indochina.
"A classic diplomat couldn't and
wouldn't do this kind of job," said a
diplomat in a backhanded compliment:
He described Godley's role as falling
somewhere short of the total powers of
a Marshal Louis Lyautey who built
French Morocco with a free hand, or a
Lt. Gen. Sir Sidney Clive, who ex-
panded British power in India unfet-
tered by the restraints of modern in-
stant communications.
But there is something of an earlier,
breed about Godley and the men who
work for him here.
A Congo veteran who also served in
Vietnam took a perverse pride in the
Nixon administration's attitude to-
wards Laos. "Here we've done more
with less," he said. "Maybe some
places have had too many assets for
their own good."
Godley works with Congress looking
over one shoulder. "We cannot afford
to jettison a single rocket pod here
without accounting for it under the
Symington restrictions," one American' .
said.
Moreover, the Laos war is conducted
with strange ground rules under which
the North Vietnamese hold much of
the country?if not the population'
but do not seek to take over the rich.
plain around Vientiane or other cities
further to the south along the Mekong,
River. Hanoi's forbearance is appar-
ently based on fears that Thailand.
would intervene were its borders along
the Mekong threatened.
bbntinued
Approved FoNagilease 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-004994001000100005-0
"I Pinch Myself Daily"
dABSERVEES BELIEVE GodleY'S
.j main problem is less defending the
Long Chong base?which once again
under threat of enemy capture in the
upcoming dry season?than in stabiliz;
ing the increasingly critical economic
situation. His critics complain that-
more than a decade of American lar-.
gesse has produced a thin crust of
Mercedes owners but overall pauperi-
zation, corruption and no sign of effi.
cient administration. But even an am,
bassador who opposes Godley eon-
ceded that "given American policy here
I don't think he has had much choice."
The critics worry that Godley's close
relations with Souvanna Phouma have
caught the Laotian leader in a vise:
"Souvanna Phouma uses American
support to bolster his own bargaining
power, but that means his government
is dependent on the United States?
quite a tightrope act."
Yet on a recent Sunday, in between
playing with his wife, Betty, and their
two adopted young Greek children,'
Godley managed to confer twice with
the premier, read four hours of reports
, and discuss the military situation with
an aide.
Godley is not one to reflect on the
justifications of United States policy?
at least not in public. But a man who
.worked with him in the Congo put it in
one-dimensional terms that so many
Americans have come to reject in -the.,
past decade. "It sounds corny," tho
man said, "but those of us here be-
lieve in our country and believe what
we are doing is right for the world." .
For Godley, there are more nuances.
"They weren't ten deep for the Laos as-
signment," he said in characteristically
admitting he bucked for the job, "but I
just pinch myself daily when I think_
I'm being paid for doing this."
Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
6.?*
NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For114elease 2003/1 000100005-0
Tribesmen's Drive in Laos Slows
By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times
LONGTIENG, Laos, Sept. 27
?Maj. Gen. yang Pan's irreg-
ular army of hill tribesmen has
opened its 'annual rainy-season
offensive against the Commu-
nists around the Plaine des
Jarres.
' But despite some successful
thrusts behind the enemy's
? lines, American. officials here
are concerned that the irreg-
ular's campaign has stalled,
bedeviled by exhaustion after
;many years of war and un-
usually stiff North Vietnamese
resistance.
As a result, these Americans
fear that when the rains stop
in another month, the North
Vietnamese will still be in a
good position to threaten the
important .base at Longtieng
and the 132,000 refuges who
live in valleys just to the south.
"Militarily the loss of Long
Tieng wouldn't mean the end
of the war," said one high-
ranking American officer at
this once7secret center for the
irregular army, "but it would
be a major catastrophe for the
hill people who have been re-
treating for four or five years
and would have to move on,
again."
Farther south lies only the
hot, humid and already crowd-
ed Vientiane plain, which the
hill people, mostly members of
the Men tribe, consider unin-
habitable.
The chief hope of the Lao-
tians and Americans is that,
when the roads become pass-
able again in November, the
North Vietnamese, preoccupied;
by their offensive in., Southu
Vietnam, will not sul,itially
reinforce the estimatem 6,000
troops they have ...v-attered
around the Plaine tie Jarre and
just north of Long Tieng.
Last spring the Communists
wiithdrew one of their two di-
visions?the 312th?from the
fight for Long Tieng, transfer-
ring it across the border to
Quangtri Province.
"If the North Vietnamese,
don't bring in a lot morel
and Fears for Base Rise
troops we can hold Long Tieug,"
said another American who
has watched the Communists
gradually push General Van.,
Pao's forces south over the
past five years. "It all depends
OD Hanoi."
Long Tieng itself, nestled in
a narrow mountain valley 83
miles northeast of Vietntiane,
has been largely rebuilt since
Long Tieng has ended, Ameri-
cans here still use only faci-
tious names and newsmen were
not allowed to photograph
them. Foreign military aid to
Laos and the presence of for-
eign troops or advisers is
banned by the 1962 Geneva ac-
cord on Laos.
The irregulars' offensive be-
the devasting three-month ?an
North Vietnamese- siege last in mid-August with four
separate task forces totaling
about 5,000 men being lifted
by helicopter onto the heights
the tribal soldiers have re- around the plain des jarres,
"supplies which lies 20 miles north of
turned after being evacuated.
Americ aand Continental Air .
Long Tieng. Their objective
Planes belonging to Air was to cut in behind the en-
I d North Vietnamese fac-
Services bring for the ing Long Tieng and force them
irregulars. A squadron of tinyto retreat.
T-28 fighter planes manned by ' '
But General Vang Pao's
Royal Lao Air Force pilots alsotr??Ps
reportedly exhausted by
use the paved airstrip, which
last spring's fighting and afraid
spring. General Vang Pao once
again has his headquarters
here and many dependants of
ends abruptly in a series of
jagged limestone cliffs that
look like the scenery in a Chi-
nese landscape painting.
Because of the Communists'
offensive in South Vietnam,
American air support for the
fighting here in northern Laos
has been drastically reduced,
authoritative American sources
say. It is down from an average
of 200 sorties a day last year
to only about 20 sorties a day.
of the Communists' newly in-
troduced 130-mm. long-range
guns, moved slowly.
In one of the columns, Amer-
ican officers say, almost 500
men had to be evacuated with
trench foot after they had
failed to dry their feet during
the monsoon rains. Another
column lost its commanding of-
ficer on the first day.
Even more disastrous, the
There are still a number of I North Vietnamese did not pull
Americans here, agents of the back this year as they have in
Central Intelligence Agency, the past to shorten their sup-
which finances and helps train; ply lines during the torrential
and direct General Vang Po'. rains. Instead they have clung
forces. Several could be seen to heavily fortified positions in
today during a visit sponsored the mountains and blasted the
by the American Embassy, irregulars with their artillery.
some of them in jungle camou- General Vang Pao appears
flage uniforms carrying M-16' as energetic and determined as
rifles and boarding helicopters in the past. Despite years of
with the irregular troops. ?, bitter fighting and defeat, the
Although much of the se-
crecy. ; that once surrounded,:
sturdily built 43-year-Old me.
leader spends almost all his
time these .days at Long Tieng
and gives his officers a tongue.-
lashing over lunch in his quer-
iter, Americans who work with.
him report.
But the number of Meos
among his 30,000 soldiers has
steadily decreased as they have
been killed or became disillu-
sioned. They have been replaced
by other bill tribesmen; particu-
larly upland Loa, and by _so-
called volunteers from Thai-
land, who are also paid and,
equipped by the United States:!
The number of Thais is a
closely guarded secret, but one
well-informed source estimates
that ther are "wellover" the
4,800 figure used in a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee re:,
port last year.
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
WASHINGTON POST
Approved For lease 2003/12/031:Rt-IME84-004994e1000100005-0
STENOS/TYPISTS:
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
HAS INTERESTING POSITIONS IN
NORTHERN
VIRGINIA
No interviewing for winter openings
$5828-$7319
TO START
All Normal Government Benefits
Interested candidates should call
522-7759
for appointment
An Equal Opportunity Employer
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WASHINGTON POST
Approved For%Jai:lease 2003/12/Q3 ? CIA-RDP84-00499$1001000100005-0
7 7 qI) 1972
he Moratagnar s:
fir
By Thomas W. Lippman -
? Washington Post Foreign Service -
AIGO N?South Vietnam's moun.
tain, tribesmen--the primitive and
gentle folk known collectively as the
Montagnards--are losing two wars..
One is the war against the North Vi-
etnamese,- who have occupied Or de-
stroyed hundreds of Montagnard vil-
lages seized their lands, used them as
hostages to American bombs, forced
them into ?service as laborers and
killed them in combat. .
The other is the war against the
South Vietnamese, themselves victims
of war and privation, who are steadily
encroaching on the Montagnards' tra-
ditional lands and forcing them to con-.
front a harsh 20th-Century reality for
Which they are ill prepared.
Throughout the Montagnard home-
land in the Central Highlands of South
-Vietnam, there are people fighting a
rear-guard action trying to help the
tribes keep their families, villages and
way of life intact. The U.S. Special
Forces soldiers, who developed a close
relationship with the Montagnards and.
for whom the Montagnards retain an
affection they dot not feel for the Viet-
namese, have all gone home. But there
remain medical missionaries, volunteer
nurses, U.S. Agency for International
Development field workers, a few
trained Montagnard civil servants and
a handful of Vietnamese who have
dedicated themselves to the interests
of the tribes.
The Montagnards, however, are a
,dark-skinned ethnic minority, they are
primit iv e and unsophisticated,
and they control a .disproportionate
amount of land in a country where
there should be more than enough to
go around but the dislocations of the
.war have created a shortage.
As a result, any contest between the
.tribes and the Vietnamese?whether
over policy matters in Saigon or over
the ownership of a few acres in the
Highlands?is unequal. These conclu-
sions which confirm the findings of
many other journalists, anthropolo-
gists ana sociologists who have looked
into the problem, are the result of a
four-day tour of the Highlands and in-
terviews with U.S., Vietnamese and
IVIontagnard officials there and in Sai-
gon, as well As.skajks w..14 umgficial
es famili M IRPi
PYVAY rte5hse9#
on.
rs
Montagnards was the French term
for the group of more than two dozen
linguistically distinct tribes and groups
who lived in an arc running from
Quangtri Province south through the
sparsely populated Central Highlands
to within about 50 miles of Saigon.
Many of the men still wear breech.
clouts and many of the women still go
barn-breasted, as they have for centu-
ries. That, is part of the reason for the
low esteem in which they are held by
the Vietnamese, who regard them as
almost prehistoric. They are smiling,
pipe-smoking and friendly, and the
Americans who know them well praise
them for their honesty and forthright-
ness, in pointed contrast to the Viet-
namese.
A government decree signed five
years ago was intended to ease the dis-
satisfaction of the Montagnards and
give them both a special semi-autono-
By Joseph Mastrangelo?The Washington Post
Historically, the Montagnards have
trog.i6ggcogOozei)
in thiee provinces.
mous status and representation in the
central government. But improvements
on paper have done little to alter the
basic situation. Even if the Saigon gov-
ernment genuinely desired to protect
the Montagnards and their land, to let
them live in their ancestral homes and
farm in their traditional ways and
attend their own schools, this is a na-
tion of Vietnamese at war, not moun-
tain tribesmen at peace, and the Viet-
namese interest comes first.
By government statistics, 100,000
Montagnards, or more than one of
every eight in the country, were driven
from their villages by this year's North
Vietnamese offensive and the massive
bombing raids that came with it. For
some, it was the third or fourth dislo-
cation of the war. Thousands more, ac-
cording to government officials in the
Highlands, were killed or captured.
Most of the refugees are barely sub-
siding on government allotments and
private donations in stark, barren,
muddy, disease-infested camps where
the mental suffering is worse than the
physical. Officially, they are waiting to
go home, but in fact most of them are
to be permanently resettled far from
their native villages, which are in
areas the Saigon government does not
control.
In the Highlands, as elsewhere in
the country, there have been com-
plaints that even the meager allot-
ments of rice and fish to which the ref-
ugees are entitled were not being de-
livered in full because of corruption
along the supply line.
In Darlac Province, for example, a
senior U.S. adviser who said that "in
general the government here has done
a pretty good job of giving them the
benefits they are entitled to, and then
some," went on to say that there had
been "no systematic shortchanging" of
the refugees, just. random incidents.
Y Jut Buon To, a Montagnard who is
the ethnic minorities service chief for
the province, said he instructed the
people at one large camp to refuse one
shipment of rice because all the 1,000-
kilogram sacks weighed in at 100 kilo-
grams each. He also said that there
were four camps in the area and only-
one?where a Montagnard was in
charge?was giving its refugees their
full allotment. From the others, he
said, people were forced to go into the
streets of Banmethout, the province
capital, to beg,
Losing Men- and Land
BESIDES the new wave of refugees,
about 40,000 more Montagnards
- are living unhappily in bleak resettle-
ment villages to which the government
001043010000eaDist their will a year
and a half ago for security reasons.
nnntinued
Approved FilisRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00411141001000100005-0
Montagnard militiamen, who were
- supposedly exempt from service in the
-regular South Vietnamese army be-
cause they arc in the military and be-
cause they . are members of an ethnic
minority, are being grabbed up to fill
the depleted ranks of some South Viet-
namese divisions.
The request of Monta.gnard leaders
that they be allowed to form their
own regiments, instead of being dis-
persed among the Vietnamese, has
been -turned down, a fact ?attributed by
some authorities to a lingering suspi-
cion in the Saigon government that the
? tribes, who. rose in armed revolt in the
? mid-1960s, remain less than fervent in
their ideological commitments to
South Vietnam,
A land reform law enacted five
years ago to give highland villagers
title to their traditional lands?in
other words, to give them on paper
. what they always had in fact until
President Ngo Dinh Diem allowed eth-
nic Vietnamese to begin moving to the
Highlands 20 years ago?has had only
scattered success.
Many of ?the lands involved are no
longer controlled by South Vietnam,
and in the more secure areas, close to
cities and along principal highways,
ethnic Vietnamese moving up from the
? crowded, -refugee-swollen coast ? have
begun to take over, -
The result of all this, according the
gloomier sources among those inter-
viewed, is that the Montagnard waY of
life is doomed to extinction. -
Three Montagnards have earned
U.S. college degrees, and a handful
were trained for the French civil serv-
ice. Almost 200 are enrolled at the
Montagnard Training Center in Pleiku,
a kind Of community college for the
hill tribes.
But most still spend ?their lives in
the inefficient, land-consuming slash-
and-burn agriculture that is part of the
problem they face in their struggle to
keep their traditional territories.
In the fertile Mekong Delta, the gov-
ernment estimates that a peasant can
produce enough food for his family on
71/2 acres, which is his maximum allot-
ment under the land reform program.
But a Montagnard family needs up to
50 acres because of the semi-nomadic
farming system that leaves parts of
each family's land fallow all the time.
That is why the Montagnards, who
seem to have so much land, are so ap-
prehensive about encroachments on it
and about plans to concentrate them in
smaller areas than they now consider
theirs.
In the words of a Montagnard civil
servant in Darlac, "there will be blood-
shed over land before the issue is set-
tled."
Frequent Relocations
TAY LUETT, a Montagnard who is
the government's minister for eth-
nic minorities development, said. in an
interview that "all that you saw, .all
you tell me about what you heard in
the Highlands, is true."
President Nguyen Van Thieu, he
said, "has instructed me to push Very
hard" to meet the demands of the
Montagnards and carry out programs
designed to help them, but. "the per-
centage of.Vietnamese who really want
to 'assist the Montagnards is very
Small."
?Furthermore, in .Luett's view, "It
will be very hard for the people ever
to go back into the hills" as they de-
sire to do. 'They must be where they
can escape bombs, escape death."
Luett said he hopes to Move all Mon-
tagnards out of the country's four
northern provinces and resettle them,
along with refugees frOm Communist-
held parts of Kontuin province, in
three provinces of the Highlands:
Pleiku, Darlae and Quangduc. That is
an area the size of Vermont with a cur- ?
rent permanent population of less than
half a million. Bananas, coffee, rubber, .
vegetables and upland rice grow there
in abundance. a
But as maps on display in govern,;
melt offices in those provinces show,
there are already Vietnamese who.
have begun to farm large tracts in the
secure arcas--"Vietnamese with their
tractors," as one official said?while
the Montagnard refugees remain hud-
dled in their camps waiting for their
allotments of land.
"Without land the Montagnards can-
not live," Nay Lima said. But he did
not deny that the dwindling amount of
land still available is being taken over
by the Vietnamese while the Montag-
nards wait helplessly for the 'flood tq
recede.
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HOUSTON. POST
Approved Forraaielease 2003/y/ft:61101F84-0009111601000100005-0
\Sovie
By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst
Evgeniy Sorokine, 24, an
emtiloye of the GRU Reziden-
' tura in the Soviet Embassy in
Vientiane, Laos, has defected
to the United Stales.
- According to AP and UPI
reports, Sorokine and his- wife
' Tatiana were posted to Laos
In 1971, where he was as-
signed duties as driver and
?French interpreter for COI.
:Vladimir P. Gretchanine.
Gretchanine was listed as a
Soviet military attache. In the
early 1960s, Gretchanine was
?posted to Washington, and
'was expelled in the course of
a quid pro quo reprisal for
several U.S. diplomats ex-
'pelted from Moscow at the
time:
ON SEPT. 10 Sorokine's car
Was found crashed into a tree
...halfway between the Soviet
Embassy and Vientiane Air-
Imre That evening he re-
quested political asylum at
*f44-11
assv e
the IIS. Embassy. and the
following day he was flown
out of Laos, probably on a
chartered Air America flight
Sorokine is now reported to
be in the United States. Ta-
tiana Sorokine ? remains in
Vientiane.
These are the bare outlines
of a story that will not be ex-
panded - on ? by official U.S.
sources, at least for some
time to come. Several con-
clusions, however, may be
drawn.
Sorokine was an employe
of the Soviet military in-
telligence service, the GRU;
he was not attached to the
KGB. All personnel attached?
to the Soviet military attache
office are employes or offi-
cers of the GRU, and never
of the KGB. Gretchanine is,
and always was, a GRU offi-
cer.
softomme WAS, most
likely, not an officer, but an
employes whose dillies were
exactly as given; driver-inter.
propr to Ccl. Greteho nine,
whose rank indicates he was
probahly the GRU Tlesident
? the officer in command' of
the GRU Rezidentura.
Although -riot an agent han-
dler. Sorokine will he no-
netheless valuable. He will he
able to provide a complete
breakdown of the GRU Rezi-
dentura, including those offi-
Post analysis
131 Ye
defects
cers under other covers out-
side of the Military Attache
Office. Ile will undoubtedly be
ahle to identify a goodly pro-
portion of the KGB Rezi-.
dentua as well. His duties
would also have enabled him
to identify a number of GRU
agents, developmental cases
and spotting leads as well.
Several aspects of the story
hint that Sorokine may be.
something of a handling prob-
lem. More than twenty offi-
cers of :ie Soviet intelligence
services have defected to
Western countries. It is the
art of a deeply maladjusted
man, R misfit in his own
society ho is, by cutting off
: his entire past life with no
hope of return, in effect, tak-
ing what may be the only al-
ternative to suicide open to
h i m . For complex psy-
chological reasons, defection
almost never occurs before
middle age, and Sorokine, at
24, is quite possibly the
youngest GRU defector to
reach the West.
Laotian Foreign 711inistry the
same day he was flown out ol
the country. They dropped
their standard garrthit in such
cases, which was to charge
that the defector had ab-
sconded with the embassy
petty cash fund and should he
treated as a -common crimi-
nal. Either they placed little
reliance in the Laotian police,
or they knew he was out of
the country when they report-
ed his absence.
THE CIA Is to be com-
mended for the _ speed .with
which Sorokine was evac-
uated; even in Laos such op-
erations pose administrative
problems, especially with a
sudden walk-in. Over the
years, they have been able to
count on such a defection ev-
ery 18 months or so. to imple-
ment the knowledge gained
front their independent pen&
trations of the Soviet services.-
- Sorokine, in far!, may be
astonished to fihd that. his
:hosts know niore ahout the
GRU than he does.: It has
happened before.
THE CRASHED car in-
dicates further agitation and
at spur-of-the-moment deci-
sion::Under no circumstances
_ Would this be some form of
window-dressing to mislead
the Soviets; the CIA eschews
such James Bondish dramat-
ics,
Sorokine's desertion of his
wife may be still further evi-
dence of disturbance; had the
defection been planned in ad-
: vance with CIA assistance
? she could easily have been
evacuated as well. (But sev-
eral 'detections have been
triggered by the urge to es-
cape an impossible marital ;
situation.)
Tim Soviets reported that
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Approved Far. Release 2003/O2r: I(ZIPIRDP84-004080001000100005-0
20 SEP 1972
By ERIK BERT
fir the last few years "dissid-
ent" Soviet authors have found a
good market in the United States.
Their books are assured uni-
formly of favorable reviews, and
these conduce to larger sales.
Sales are helped along by a
good press which is provided by
the U.S. corps in Moscow. The
bureau reporters for the New
York Times, the Washington Post,
the Christian Science Monitor, as
well as visiting firemen, make
sure that every squeak, or snarl.
of a "dissident," every onion-skin
manifesto, is reported at length.
In the absence of a squeak or snarl
or manifesto, some enterprising
re-porter can be counted on to sug-
gest one.
This leads to other things,
among, them to Radio Liberty
headquarters in Munich, West
Germany, whence the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency broad-
casts anti-Soviet propaganda to the
Soviet Union.
The story of this broadcasting
is told in the Library of Congress
study of Radio Liberty, made pu-
blic earlier this year by .Senator
J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.
The study was prepared by Jo-
seph G. Whalen, a CIA agent in
1951 and since then an employe
of the Library of Congress. He
has made anti-Communism hig
life's work.
"Dissident" books and their
authors offer important possibili-
ties for exploitation by the CIA.
But books are, in the nature of
things, long in respect to broad-
casting technique. Nevertheless
the CIA has used them.
Since May 1969 Radio Liberty
has broadcast, in "unpublished
Works of Soviet Authors," works
by Marchenko, Bulgakov, Plata-
nov, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and
N. Ya-Mandelshtam, according
to the Library of Congress study.
During February 19-24, 1971,
Radio Liberty broadcast Andrei
Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union
Survive until 1934?" in six parts;
from March to Jul
Boris
Pasternak's "kuppygicia r melease 2003/12/03
16 parts; from July to Decem-
II
o
r p n
afti ,0
her, 1970. 1970, Aleksandr Solzhe-
nitsyn's "The First Circle," and
in late 1971, Solzhenitsyn's "Aug-
ust 1914," in 62 parts.
Solzhenitsyn's "First Circle"
was read over Radio Liberty three
days a week over a five-month,
period.
One of the 'brightest lights in
the "dissident" firmament is An-
drei Sakharov,. Soviet.'physicist,
who burst on the U.S. and inter-
national scene with publication
of his "Progress, Coexistence
and Intellectual Freedom."
Between August 5 and 13, 1971,
"Progress, Coexistence and In-
tellectual Freedom" was broad-
cast by Radio Liberty's North
-Caucasian Service in the Russian,
Karachai, Ossetian and Avar lan-
guages, according to the Library
of Congress study.
The CIA and its broadcasting
technicians are not convinced that
broadcasting "dissident" books
in their entirety is the most ef-
fective use that can be made of
them.
This was discussed last year
at a meeting of Radio Liberty's
"Russian Service" in the Munich
headquarters.
Robert Tuck, director of RL's
Program Operations Division,
"suggested that books of this na-
ture should be an-alyzed, discus's-
ed and reviewed extensively in
broadcasts, rather than being
read in toto."
In the "dissident" market, lite-
rary standards are .secondary to
political criteria, of course. Most
notorious in this area was the
award of the Nobel prize for lit-
erature last year to Solzhenitsyn.
His literary quality was not the
reason he was chosen. The sub-
sequent anti-Soviet brush fire set
by the U.S. press about Solzhe-
nitsyn's receiving the award show-
ed that literature was low on
the list of its concerns.
Literary judgment has become a
matter of controversy on occasion
even within the CIA broadcasting
fraternity.
The Library of Congress study
of the CIA's Radio Liberty oper-
ations reports that an "incipient
issue began' to emerge in Octo-
ber (1971) over the handling of
Solzhenitsyn's novel 'August 1914'."
"Some staff (in Munich--EB)
did not share the enthusiasm of
some Western observers over the
high literary quality of this work.
At an informal discussion the
issue arose in the form of a
question as to how RI, should ,
report these mixed views.
. "Our group felt that negative
observations should be reported:
another group . . . felt this
would be unfair to Solzhenitsyn."
"Moreover, it was pointed out
that it would be .counterproduc-
tive to RL's purposes to report
sharp criticism of Solzhenitzyn's
stature in the eyes of the Soviet
people..." .
With the publication of Saklia-
rov's book in the summer of 1968,
"the parameters of dissent ex-
panded" and the "movement en-
tered a new phase." the Library
of Congress declares.
The reasons for the CIA's in-
terest in Sakharov's "freedom"
cry are simple:
"The publication of criticisms
by Sakharov . was the first pro-
grammatic document that brought
into question some of the basic
tenets of the Soviet system."
The non-literary, anti-Soviet cri-
terion for judging 'dissident' lite-
rature has its quirks. Thus, Ar-
thur Miller, playwright, writing
in the New York Times, Dec. 10,
1971, complained:
"Solzhenitsyn's works never
brought charges against the cur-
rent regime but only against that
of Stalin."
: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
"continued
Approved For Atase 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004991461000100005-0
The following day David Sidor-
sky, professor of philosophy at
Columbia, replied (his letter to
the Times wasn't published until
Dec. 26) "... how limited is Ar-
thur Miller's interpretation of
Solzhenitzyn's writings as not
against the current regime but
only against that of Stalin.' "
? The criterion is clearly not lite-
rary, on either side, but an argu-
ment as to whether Solzhenitzyn
is an enemy only of Stalin as
Miller complains, or of the whole
Soviet system, as Sidorsky insists
and Miller demands.
Another problem arises for the
CIA in broadcasting "dissidence."
What will the Soviet people think
of books about the Soviet Union
broadcast by the CIA, even if the
authors are Soviet citizens?
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Approved For Release2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0014Q0100005-0
FRENCH SECRET AGENTS SAID TO BE SPYING FOR CIA
L'EXPRESS Paris in French 11-17 Sep 72 p 49 X
[Text] In addition to drugs, the H SDECE now risks becoming involved
in an affair concerning the sale of some special photogrAphs. An in-
vestigating committee has just arrived in Tahiti, where it has been
discovered that French secret agents responsible for keeping an eye
on distinguished visitors to the Pacific Nuclear Test Center were al-
so working for the American CIA.
A number of cameras camouflaged in hotel rooms..made it possible to
photograph certain persons while in the company of female companions
as the former profited by their stay in Tahiti to cary out "research"
that had nothing to do either with the national defense or nuclear
energy.
This kind of operation is not new, but about a month ago, the SDECE
correspondent in Washington found out that his American colleagues
were also receiving copies of these photos. Some 15 agents belonging
to various services are the subject of the newly opened investigation:.
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Approved FollIrlaelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049*601000100005-0
11????????00?.???=0...ramose m???????????..???mmwm?????111?11t
CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS
-- 434,849
sEr23 197
COMPANY MAN ,1i1.-3i)e lag-
gto (Putnam,
By George Harmon
THE late Alien Dulles, quar-
terback of our World War Ii
spies and later chief of the CIA,
scoffed at the notion of the
American diplomat or spy
being a closed-mind blunderer
? too cynical to play by any
rules but his own. He criti-
cized such novels as Graham
Greene's "The Quiet Ameri-
can" and Burdick and Lede-
rer's "The Ugly American"
for promoting "mischief-creat-
ing prejudices."
Dulles wrote that he pre-
ferred "taking the raw mate-
rial which we find in America
? naive, home-grown, even
homespun ? and training such
a man to be a good intelligence
officer, however long ihe pro-
cess lasts." Those homespun
11S/I1C2-
1._
x4NA anan's
boys, if we are to believe re-
cent news accounts, are trav-
eling much farther afield than
Dulles seemed willing to send
them.
THE BACKBONE of CIA ac-
tivity apparently remains the
clandestine listening posts and
purloined letters which Dulles
so loved. But. now the charge
is often made that the CIA
tries to foment change rather
than merely report it; in
Uganda, for example; in Chile,
In Laos.
So much is being written
about the CIA, in fact, that its
argot is creeping into Ameri-
can slang: a spy is a spook, to
kill is to "terminate with ex-
treme prejudice."
Now arrives Joe Maggio, a
mercenary-turned-writer, who
says he worked off and on for
the CIA in places like Africa
and Laos.
Ms novel tells of Nick Mar-
[mated -Hail egg
tin, a sort of comic book super-
hero and former Green Beret
A "home-grown" boy whom
Dulles would have liked, be is
recruited off a Florida campus
by "the Company" (in-group
slang for the CIA), and works
part time, training Bay of
Pigs invaders and shooting
up Africa and the Tonkin Gulf.
There is enough bad writing to
fill three pulp magazines
("steel split the . air over-
head").
BUT MAGGIO'S book has an
aura of authenticity about it,
and few readers know enough
about the CIA to dispute him
? even though the question al-
ready has been raised: Is Joe
Maggio the Clifford Irving of
the barracks set?
W. E. Colby, executive direc-
tor of the CIA, disputes the
publisher's contention that
"Company.Man" is "a novel of
facts," proclaiming it a "taw-
dry fabrication" filled with
"lurid writing and innate con-
tradictions." He denies that
the CIA ever has carried out
assassinations or has traf-
ficked in drugs, as Maggio as-
serts.
Colby also says Maggio was
"terminated for cause" during
a six-month CIA training pro-
gram and never went overseas
for the CIA or undertook any
of the "assignments" Maggio
says he performed. But Mag-
gio has obtained a government
letter quoting the CIA as say-
ing that he worked for the
agency on contract.
In any event, Maggio writes
enough like a soldier to con-
vince the reader he has been
one. Ile has produced an un-
professional but good example
of thriller fiction.
George Harmon is a Daily
News editor and writer.
?4..4001
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Approved FAbgetrasignaCklin(OWEBSIMRDP84-004kilif001000100005-0
SEPT 1972
r1,,A
Dq-
'-w
A virtual news blackout has been
deelared by the nation's press concerning
the major legal challenges that have been
launched against' the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The August 10 filing of a suit in Wash-
ington against CIA Director Richard helms
and other-government officials was a mat-
ter of court record and easily accessible to
the news media. In addition, a news re-'
lease containing essential facts about the -
story was hand delivered to the Washing-
ton Post, the Evening Star, the Associated
Pres.s.and United Press International.
A week later, not one line concerning
it had appeared anywhere in the country.
11161%4A1
V L.. ,,46V \dr. sca3
*Special to the Virginia Weekly
America's "invisible government,'' the
Central Intelligence (CIA), owes its exist-
ence to a piece of legislation that is uncon-
stitutional.
This is the likely import of 'recent ac-
tions in Federal Courts in Washington and
Philadelphia.
In a suit filed August 10;in the' U.S.
District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, three Washingtonians challenged the
secrecy of the CIA:s funding and account-
Approved For ReleaserMatitt2ier3PIcei*-ROPWRWM*001000100005-0
.funds."
?we Etsm
Earlier'this year on July 20, an import-
ant decision in the U.S. Third Circuit
Court of Appeals guaranteed that the CIA
would be brought to court on a challenge
that had been in process since 1968.
America'S greatest newspaper "of record"
the New York Times, igno. red the story,
as did the Washington Evening Star and
most other papers. The Washington' Post
i?
carried the story as a small item on page
ten. .
It was confirmed that editors were well
aware of the story and its importance.
A call to one of Washington's two-dail-
ies produced this comment from a leading
reporter: "Yon can call it a 'press con-
spiracy' if you like, but we're not going to
print it and Prn-sure no one else is either."-
The Washington suit followed closely
a trail-blazing decision on July 20 of this
year by the U.S. Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Philadelphia. In that decision
a majdrity of the court held that there
was a serious legal question concerning
the 'constitutionality of the CIA act of
1949'which established a secret procedure
or financing the agency.
A VIRTUALLY IGNORED CLAUSE
Both court cases are based on a virtnally
ignored clause of the United States Con-
stitution specifically requiring that "a.
regular Statement and Account of the
Receipt and Expenditures of all public
money shall be published from time to
time." The CIA act of 1949 just as expli-
citly states "....Sums made available to
the Agency may, be expended without
?
The spy agency receives somewhere
between four and twenty billion dollars
each year in public funds (how much is a
closely guarded secret) that are carefully
hidden _throughout the appropriations
figures for the entire federal government.
The new suit also asks for a state-by-
state and nation-by-nation breakdown of
CIA expenditures, as well as separating
the money into, categories by functions.
CIA Director Richard IIelms and Eliot
Richardson, Secretary of the Department
of IIealth, Education and Welfare are
brought into the local suit.
cant insuod
Approved For Rase 2003/12/03 :.CIA-RDP84-004991411t1000100005-0
C1) 5111 S.
. The National Security Act whiCh
created the CIA states that it shall not
have "police, subpoena, law-enforcing
powers or internal security functions."
The CIA has been operating in violation .
of this law for at least fifteen years and
probably longer.
. ?
In early 1966 Richard Helms, the Direc-
tor of the CIA, in testimony to the Senate,
Foreign Relations Committee stated flatly
that the CIA does not operate in the Uni-
ted States.
Yet in 1964 in a coda case involving
? two Estonian emigres the CIA presented
to the court a secret document authorizing
it to engage in certain domestic activities.
This authorization was in the form of
an executive order which seems to be in
direct violation of the act creating the
CIA. ?
As a matter of fact the domestic opera-
tions of the CIA were so large by 1964 That
that it set up a Domestic Operations Divi-
sion with headquarters at 1750 Pennsyl-
vania Avenue, about a block and a half
from the White House.
Major breaks in CIA secrecy in 1966..
and 1967 resulted in disclosures that the
CIA was very heavily involved in financ-
ing all types of programs .at such major
.universities as Michigan State and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology..
. In addition, it was revealed that the
CIA had subsidized mliny dornestic.organi-
zations including the major American
student organization, The National Student
Association. CIA money also found its
way into at least twenty foundations, as
well as Radio Free Europe, a large publish-
ing house, and various other organizations.
have the CIA's domestic operations .
ceased? A simple inspection of telephone
books discloses that today the CIA has
offices in at least twenty American cities;
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2
Approved Fcirsjitelease 2003/12/03 CIA-RDP84-0049a10001000100005-0
MAN' s MAGAZINE
September 1972
-41
THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced But he managed to drop down ana
?
and yawed in the violent turbulence as contour fly the valley floors, below the
s twin engines strained to maintain 160 ." . Red radar, and just after dawn they
its American pilot gripped the 'landed back at their base. They climbed
controls with every ounce of strength he ,from the plane, their gray uniforms
'could muster, arid his eyes ached from soaked through with sweat, and the pilot
the strain of searching the darkness- s:`. muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta
o avoid the towering Himalayan
he an easier way to make a buck."
mountains on each side. The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished
ey'd taken off from a secret base over to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were
three hours ago and were threading small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The
heir way east of the Tibetan capital of -. , only other identifying marks were the fresh
,
-
Lhasa, long occupied by the forces 7mrn.holes in the left wing panels.
of Red China. Their mission: drop
ents and supplies to a band of Tibetan? .
guerrillas who were still fighting .
? the Communists. .
e copilot, sweating over the air chart
in his lap, tried to guide them to the in the gray Air force-type uniforms, crushed caps,
ro Pzone that a mysterious American : _ . ''.- ?cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their
i
., civilian" at their base had earlier ' - sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy
.described. "Hold your course," he .--,l, s ''' _Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor
elled.,:"Another,twO minutes should bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the
put us right on." - _ : girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane.
hey're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air
rnerica, one of the world's least known airlines.
' - -, Many are "old China hands" who first
began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland
' .China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're
hroughout Asia, people have come to recognize
these strange aircraft and their even stranger
meric.an pilots Especially the pilots. You learn to
spot them wherever you are.-TheYre the guys
&pilot reached up: flicking on the
get-ready light to alert the Tibetan
'agents who'd be jumping, and the
lane crew who would kick the supplies
t .-"Go!" he yelled and switched
on the buzzer, the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune,
List as the last chute opened, the old - ,and these devil-may-care Mercenaries will
lane was suddenly rocked by deadly
ommUnist 37rnm antiaircraft fire and.
,-the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam? continued
`ambilgt513ilfiQuallittMlkelW6g4003/itiip3 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
,.bzstartds?were waiting for us:'
y cl_Fpr Rill,...ase,;093/1Z/03,,:.PIA-RDP84-00499^ 000100005-0 2
s a wou s oc any ordinary
airline. For instance, every time CAT
' they were
bund d ed n
flew avnicinfiitryoof Pobry R
t Arthur,
hu w
planes: Ironically, they were American-
made Bell P-63s given to the . Russians
during World War Two under Lend Lease.
In return, the CAT boys would take on
a load of 500-pound bombs and "just
happen to lose" them over enemy ? land.
There was no such thing as standard
. procedure, and the pilots learned to sur-
vive any way they could?like the time
Captain Bob Rousselot lost an engine
on his C-46 over the mountains of central
China. He ordered his crew to kick the
cargo out to lighten the plane enough to
4
t
Vi SAt,
' : ' ? tt
It looks like any other plane, but that Air America marking spells one thing: CIA."
'CIA'S WAR
continued
, -
',literally, fly anything, anywhere, anytime
--if the price-is right. And they earn every
penny of their tax-free paychecks.
"Sometimes no one can tell if a site is
closed or open," one of them explains.
"You get there and circle the place, look-
ing for any suspicious sign. If no one
shoots, you take your chance and land
and keep the engines running until a
friendly face glows up."
The planes are usually unidentified ex-
cept for the discreet "Air America" mark-
Now , that the Air Force is doing it, they
think they need all kinds of armor plate gain altitude on his sivle good engine ?
and fighter cover. Of course, they were all Out went over 40 bales of Chinese cur-
bonus flights for us. We were paid pretty rency, worth $4,000,000. .
well." Felix Smith used to fly out of Shanghai's
The pilots average $25,000 a year, tax =- Hungjao airport, hauling ? medicine 'to
free, for their hair-raising work and claim,Kumming in the interior. He regularly
"So long as we get paid, we don't care returned with .50 caliber machinegun holes
what the customer puts in the back or in his wings and fuselage, a tribute to the
where we have to haul It: skill of Mao's gunners. , .
A list of "typical" Air America jobs
reads like a page out of Terry and the Stuart Dew was piloting his C-47 to
Pirates?airdrops of ammo, artillery spot- Lanchow in northwest China when it
tins, insertion of saboteurs and agents, became so cold that his engines simply
flying a fresh group of concubines to a froze solid on him.
lonely Asian warlord, transporting super- But thefl favorite story among CAT
secret prisoners, refugee hauling (often. pilots concerns Sterling Bemis of Mel-
plucking them from under Communist rose, Mass. Running into a blinding sand
noses) and, recently, lifting Thai troops storm over an unexplored area of the
into Laos to reinforce the Meo General, Gobi Desert, he was blown off course
Vang Pao, and ran out of gas. Forced down, he
If it all sound like an unusual role for a figured he'd bought the farm until he
stumbled across a hut and inside found
an Army field phone! "Man, that was the
hairy part," he remembers. "I stared at that
damned phone for 10 minutes, wondering
if it was connected to anything, before I
ings, but they've been around long enough
to earn the nickname "CIA Airlines" be-
cause of the type of jobs they take.
Officially, 'Air America is a private air-
line operating in Asia under charter to the
. . government, but the bulk of is
operations, are, to say the least, closely
connected with the CIA's spook opera-
tions. Officials say only that the outfit
?does "government contract flying," and
when one 'of their planes is shotown,
the release typically reads, "Names are
beingwithheld by authorities until the next
of kinar uy notified. Spokesmen
de-
clined to disclose the plane's point of
.origin or destination."
Behind all this official double-talk is
the most colorful, mysterious and roman-
tic airline. 'in the world, complete with
enough shady deals, "dragon ladies," and
international intrigue to keep their sheet-
metal repairmen busy patching bullet
holes. Try as tit?), may to remain secret,
more is becoming known about these
airborne Soldiers of fortune. Air America's
very size makes it difficult to conceal. It is
one of the world's largest airlines, ranking
between National and Northeast in num-
'ber of planes and personnel. All told, it
operates some 200 aircraft, employs about
600 pilots and, in an average year, these
daredevils will haul 27,000 people and
6,000 tons of cargo, as well as air drop
millions of dollars worth of supplies to
anti-Communist troops behind enemy
lines all over Asia. ?
"We air drop so much rice in Laos,"
. says one of the pilots, "there's a whole
generation of Meos who are going to be
surprised when someone tells them rice
doesn't grow in the sky."
Another Air America pilot told this
author in a Danang bar one night, "Hell,
we were doing the dirty work over here
before Uncle Sam would even admit there
was a Vietnam. Back in the early Sixties,
we used to y search ancLrescue missions
into North Wtl cUleRei lecit$10/ 2
and nothing but an MI6 for protection.
"civilian" airline, remember that Air
America's father was the famous Civil Air
Transport founded ? by Flying Tiger
General Claire Chennault.
Chennault originally went to China to
forge an air force for Chiang Kai-shek and got the nerve to pick it up." ?
formed the Flying Tigers to fight the Bemis was lucky and found himself
Japanese- before the United States got talking to an operator who connected him
Involved in World War Two. The deal was
simple?join up as a mercenary, get $600
a month and $500 for every Jap plane you
Shot down. After America entered the war,
most of the Tigers joined 'Chennault's
14th Air Force, swapping their Chinese
insignia for Uncle Sam's and ran up a kill
ratio of about 16 to 1.
After the war, Chennault retired from
the service and returned to China as a
civilian. There, the real war was just
beginning as Chiang and Mao began their
massive battle for control of the country.
' Chennault saw that the Nationalists need-
ed dependable air transportation more
than anything else, and he quickly stepped
in to fill the gap. With Chiang's blessings,
he gathered a small group of his ex-Flying
Tigers in his office at Shanghai's Broadway
Mansions Hotel, and Civil Air TranspOrt
was born,
with CAT in ?Lanchow. His convenient
"phone booth" turned out to be a remnant
of Chennault's wartime early-warning net
that had never been disconnected.
In site of the hazards, the pilots
wouldn't have worked for anybody except'
CAT. In many ways, they were misfits,
men who couldn't stand military discipline
or the spit and polish demanded by state-
side airlines. Others were on the run from
nagging wives or pregnant girlfriends.
Many had served with Chennault during
the war and were still drawn by his per-
sonal magnetism and the glory and adven-
ture of it all. Whatever the reason, all of
them were more than happy when payday
rolled around. They earned a base pay of
$800 a month for 60 hours in the air and
$10 for each additional hour. In CAT
lingo, a city was "$20 away." ?
Certain runs.were dangerous even for
CAT and became buaus flights. One of
Quickly dubbed CAT, his planes became these was CATs famous Taiyuan airlift
a familiar sight throughout China, and in which they kept that north China
even today the stories of his pilots are industrial city completely supplied for
legendary. To keep beleaguered National-
nine months as the Reds drew a siege line
ist troops supplied, most of the CAT routes tighter and tighter around it. Old Marshall
were flown over Communist-held tern-
Yen kept building airfields for the CAT
,?
tory, and all the CAT men were on the planes and the Communists kept capturing
Communists' list of wanted war criminals, them. BY the end, they had run through
with a price on their heads (Bob Buol was 15 landing strips, each one closer to the
captured by ChiCom troops and held ' heart of the city, and were making 30
prisonerfor five years. Six months after his flights a day into the place, all dangerous
003 2/03,:c0tAdilDEM141404099R0010001i00085r-Derved as the model for the
'ire, Jig died a broken man). - enough to warrant $100 bonuses (the oper-
than any other company, but under con- Berlin airlift). ?
To add to thea ? si 4rikiVAtitiirase-3102/
called on to set ? I
.or to make last-minute evacuations. Bill ;77..;.:
Severtrecalls his last days as CATs station
manager in Mukden, Manchuria. "I was
on the last plane out, and the lead Chi-
Corn troops were already in sight on the
airport road. Men offered fantastic sums
in American money to get their families
out." The, plane crew had to blind the
crowd with a spotlight to get their C-46's
hatch shut. Then ,"they tried to drive a
truck in front Of us to block our takeoff.
We gunned our engines down the runway,
leapfrogging. Chinese who knelt in our
path, still wringing their hands and plead-
ing to be saved.
Anyone who stSends time in Asia will
hear tale of CAT pilots auctioning off
"tickets" on the last plane out of any city
and making hundresds of thousands of
dollars on a single 'refugee flight, but these
stories have never been proved.
, The Communists steadily pushed ahead,
and in 1949 the "world's most shot at
airline" began evacuating Chiang's forces
to Formosa. In Shanghai, pilot Felix
Smith salvaged an old Navy LST from
the bottom of the Whangpoo River, load-
ed her with CATs machine shops, and set
sail for Formosa where she still sits today.
The last official
CAT flight from
the Chinese main-
land was on Janu-
ary .15, 1950, when
they flew the final
t, load of tin from
? the Mengtze mines
in,Yunnan to Hai-
phong. Since that
time, CAT and Air
America have fre-
quently returned
"EARTHQUAKE' to Yunnan but in
flaming end a very unofficial
' manner.
At that point, it looked as though CAT
was doomed to go broke. Formosa was
primitive, with only five motor vehicles on .?
the whole island, and CAT was an airline 'raise 'the necessary financial arid diplo- Russian dancing girls in a poker game and
without routes or passengers. Then war matic support, he took CAT to Indo- finally tapped the admiral's electricity to
broke out in Korea and CAT was back in China to fly cargo for the French in their light his all-night parties.
business hauling military cargo for the UN war against Ho Chi Minh. The Foreign
forces. They eventually flew nearly 30% Legion was bottled up inside of Dien The official CAT hana?out was Pop
of all the Korean airlift and were back on Bien Phu and the French desperately Gingle's bar in Hong Kong. Pop had taken
their feet. ' needed CATs cargo-carrying talents to his Navy retirement there years ago, got
into a poker game, and woke up with the
During this peribd, CAT. also went supply pilots
them. Twenty-four CAT p deed to the joint. Anybody who ever met
landed, at Haiphong's Cat Bi Airport to
deeper into the spook business for both do the "dirty work" for $3,000 a month him said that he looked like Sidney Green.
Uncle Sam and Chiang Kai-shek. It is plus bonus. Their planes were C-119 Fly- street?fat, heavy jowls and squinty eyes,
said that Richard Fectean, recently re- ing Boxcars whose U. S. Air Force Panama hat and cane. He always had
leased by Red China, was on a CAT vlane insignias still showed through the hastily steaks, beer,' baseball scores and country
shot down while attempting to deposit brushed on gray paint. music for his CAT boys, and Chennault's
CIA and Nationalist agents on the main- picture F hung in the back room. But Mc-
land. ? , , . It was here that CATs most famous Goon was his favorite; some claimed that
When the Nationalists had evacuated pilot, James B. McGovern, ran the show. Pop was the only man in all of south China
to Formosa, their 93rd Division had been A huge, 300-pound mountain of a man, who could beat Mac in .a belly-bumping
cut off in southwest China and they fled he was called "Earthquake McGoon" (after pontest. McGoon usually parked his enor-
south into Burma. There, they remained the Lil Abner character) by one and all. mous bulk in an easy chair in Pop's back
intact as a'. fighting unit, due to Chiang's A booming extrovert openly contemptu- room, drinking gallons of beer and
direction from Formosa and, they say ous of anyone timid, McGoon was no threatening, "Someday I'm gonna quit
CATs clandestine supply flights into aboa stranger to the Orient. As a fighter pilot coming here and ruin your business."
doned World War Two airstrips. By P, 'oc? Chennault, he had been one of the Mac almost made good on his threat
CAT had resupplied them to the poir uar's last prop aces. Instead of going when he ran out of gas over, Communist
they were able to launch a 12.0Vd-man c me to Elizabeth, New Jersey, he went lines in December, 1949. His feet were al-
raid back into China's Yunnan Province. work for CAT when if was first formed ways bothering him, as if complaining
Chennault continually worried about and rented a house in Tsingtao, next door about the load they were forced to carry,
the Communist advances throughout Asia te dmiral Badger, CO of the US 7th and he would tell Bill Welk that he'd
and, in 1954, tried to form an International FI As reported in the Saturday Evening "never bail out because I'd only have to
Volunteer Group similar to his old Flying P _? he first stole barrels of the admiral's walk." True to his word, he rode his C-46
Tigers, to wage an air wag against the Reds driaking water to fill the swimming pooldown onto a dry riverbed and was immedi-
caA1130I'VNTICif kWatge 11561/112/13111: rAl5 gal-b al 9 90(501 a lalcata0
inued
? Film still depicts downed U.S. pilot captured by VC, a fate met by many, CIA airmen.
on a strictly
?
i20013/4211r: latztopg44010499ritletriffset long months as
Approved For std
aouble flying this t ing.ph
' ter see-sawing ? a 'a t o u ar . '
all over the sky on his trim tabs, he made
it back to Haiphong to tell his ground
crew, "Now I know what it's like to ride a
,
As soon as Pop heard about it, he raised
$100,000 and gave it to Chennault with
instructions to "Use it all if you have to,
but get my boy hack."
No one knows if it was Pop's ransom
money that did the trick or not, but six
months later, Mac walked into Gingle's
screaming for a beer. He didn't remember
until 24 hours later to notify CAT that he
was all right and that "the goddarn Com-
mies couldn't afford to feed me." As the
news flashed:, throligh the Orient, beer
glasses were raised from Tokyo to Singa-
pore- .
? a' , ? ? ?
The` firit to volunteer for Ind;-China,
Mac and? Eric Shilling flew into Haiphong
together and calmly wheeled an icebox
out of their C-46. "After they said,
"you got to haveeblci beer if you're going
to fight a war." ;
SO fat that he couldn't pull' the yoke
all the way back, Mac was known for his
tail-high landings, but twice a clay he
squeezed himself into a C-1 l9 to deliver
sevpn-ton loads of ammo to General De-
Castries. It was 'a 90-minute flight follow-
ed by a couple of minutes of sheer terror
as they went into "the slot," a gauntlet of
Communist anti-aircraft fire, and dropped
their loads from 'only 1500 feet to insure
'getting them , into the.' ever-shrinking
F.-Tench lines. ' -
At night, the CAT crews hung out at
paiphong's La Marseillaise bar, unwind-
:in g from the day's runs and trying not to
.think about their mounting,casualties.
.;.Although they were supposed to stick
to flying cargo, they began to feel for the
French troops on the ground and on April
20954, they loaded one of their C-119's
with napalm and used the lumbering cargo
'plane for a dive bomber to drop their
deadly load on the Communist lines dur-
ing a particularly crucial battle.
One day toward the end of April, Mac
'looked over Wallace Buford's flak-riddled
plane at Haiphong and joked; "Somebody
most have been carrying a magnet," A
week later, enemy machine-gun fire
'severed McG oon's elevator controls as
he flew through the slot, and he called over
' kangaroo." ?
Buford met him with a grin and asked,
"You borrow my magnet?"
The afternoon of May 6, one day before
Dien Bien Phu fell, Mac took off in Bird
2 of a six-plane flight. His copilot was Bu-
ford and Mac couldn't resist telling him,
."Now maybe we'll find out which one of' us
carries the magnet."
Steve Kusak, called "the Polock" by
McGoon, was first through the slot. Just
as he looked back to check on Earthquake,
Mac called out, "I've got a direct hit. Where
the hell are the fighters?"
' His port engine was out and the leading
"e.dge of his wing was torn up. A second
shell exploded against his right tail boom
and he called to Kusak, "Steve, tell me
.which way the mountains are lowest." ,
.
"Turn right. Can you make it? Bail out."
, "No sweat," Mac answered. "We'll ride
her."
. He headed for a valley along the Nam
Dinh river, fighting for control of his shot-
up plane. Then, slowly and horribly, his.
C-119 skidded toward the hills, and Kusak
heard Mac say, "Looks like this is it, son,"
His left wingtip dug into the hillside and the
? plane turned a perfect cartwheel before
bursting into a ball of flame. Less than an
eighth of a mile ahead was a clearing where.
- he could have safely put clown.
When Pop's phone rang just after mid-.
, night, he answered and said, "You don't
have to tell me. It's Mac, isn't it?"
down over the Plain of JPars. The copilot
?-? After Dien Bien Phu fell, most of the turned out to be the son of C. Hollington
? planes were shifted to flying anti-Corn- Tong, Nationalist ? China's ambassador
munist refugees south to Saigon, but a' to Washington, a ?
young CAT pilot named Richard Pope Air America quickly became the un-
was packing to leave. War correspondent official air force of the Laotian govern-
Richard Tregaskis had ridden the slot ment for a few reasons. The Laotians didn't
several times With Pope and asked him have a prayer Of forming an air force of
where he was going now. ? 'their own, and Americans can't serve in
"I don't know. I guess I'll ,do a little the armed forces of a foreign government
, tiger hunting," he answered. A few mlonths without losing their citizenship. Also, if
' later, it became apparent what kind of an American military plane is shot down
"tigers" Pope and a handful of other CAT ' over a hostile country, the enemy has a
, pilots were hunting, They turned up in an ,marvelous. "incident" to publicize. If a
.'anti-Communist rebellion in Indonesia,. "civilian" plane goes down, the enemy
flying B-26 bombers for the rebels. Pope can't complain to anyone but the corn-
Most people speculate that it was about
this time that,,the CIA stepped into the
picture. Among other things, CAT was'
reorganized to give birth to the offshoot
called Air America. The old CAT stayed
legitimate for the most part, flying corn-,
mercial passenger traffic throughout the
Pacific, and Air. American took over the
undercover part of the operation. The ;
whole operation is such a tangle of phony.
corporations that it's hard to tell just who
controls what, but it appears that both the
Nationalists and the CIA were involved
for a while and one rumor even has it
that Madame Chiang,. has a, ;personal
interest in the deal. . ? . ?
Chennault died of cancer and Control
,
passed to a group- of ex-Pan Ain pilots
headed by George Doole in Washington ?
and Hugh Grundy in Taipei. Air America
got deeper and deeper into the secret wars'
being fought .in Southeast Asia . and, in
1958, North Vietnam began 'complaining
about civilian planes invading their air-
space. It is' claimed that these were Air
America C-47s on CIA missions. At the
'same time; China complained of U.S.-
- supplied Nationalist Chinese special forces
camps in Yunnan Province. Again, Air
America is mentioned as their, source of
men and munitions. ' -?
In 1959, retired Admiral Felix Stump
took over as board chairman of. Air
America and moved the operation into
Laos, where a new war was starting to
brew. As far as is known, the .first Laos
casualty, for the -company occurred in
. 1960 when one of their lanes was shot
pany. The easiest 'solution to the whole
'mess was to hire the Air. America gang,
do?anything as ,Iong as ? the price
-was right.' ? ? ,'? ' ? .
Things really got spooky in Laos and the
Company had a hard time maintaining
",their civilian cover. They flew a large fleet
.,of choppers and one of their pilots
'Plaims, -"Most of ray missions were given
a to Me directly by CIA agents in Vientiane."
As the scale of operations grew, the origina
group of former CAT pilots had moo.
,apusiness than they could handle and the
Ompany began recruiting pilots.. Or, as
Fane say,, shanghaiing pilots. ,
?1, was a Marine chopper pilot based on
Okinawa," explains a blond, 30-year-old
Air America man. "CAT came through,
lookingbrn for flyers;! thought I was going to
( ecoe an airline pilot when they hired me.
- I 'resigned my commission, went to Taipei
full of dreams about being a civilian jet
jockey, and a couple of weeks later, found
myself hedge-hopping a Sikorsky through
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049901a01460 I orfet6541 Vientiane. Sure, I
,.could have quit on my three-year contract,
but I came .out Of the service broke. s^
here; t. stay, fl ngAthgrOi*dWiirafie
ordered.", ? ,
Laos is a strange place, populated by
different tribes who all believe they came
out of a pumpkin thousands of years ago.
The country's major exports are gold and
opium, and palace revolts are so common,
the pilots often don't know who will be
paying them. ? ? .,
One of the old CAT men tells, "Half the
time when we heard shooting, it meant
combat. The other half was for local'
festivals. I Woke up one morning in Vien-
tiane with all hell breaking loose. I grab-
bed my .45 thinking the Pathet Lao (PL)
had finally taken the city, but it was only
the start of the three day Boun Banx
festival. Naturally, both sides completely
slopped the war to celebrate it. And the
Army'fired thousands of rounds of star
shells to illuminate the festivities, It al-
most would have been safer flying against
PL flak."-
?The really strange Thing is that, at one
point, the Russians were also flying trans-
ports into the Plain of Jars to supply. the
.PL side, and they'd often pass Air America
planes along the way'. On one occasion, an
Air America pilot was searching for a hole
in the monsoon cloud cover to make his
drop when he spotted ai Russian doing the
same thing. The American spoke a little
Russian and asked them for an altimeter
setting. They willingly gave him a reading
and both went on to make their drops so
the troops below could kill each other for
another day.
Wattay Airport outside of Vientiane
began 'to look like Air America head-
quarters until part of the operation was
shifted to the Long Chieng base of General
? Vang Pao. An Air Force officer who flew
in there once told this author that some of
the planes he saw on the strip had sets of
insignia and the crews swapped ahem like
license plates on a car so that the plane
could claim any of several identities.
The Air?Arnerica crews have done their
best to make themselve at home in this
out-of-the-way spot. The Vieng Rattay
bar has good booze and the city is full of
lithe, young prostitutes. "Even if you had
a mission in the morning, you drank be-
cause you knew that at least the booze
was pure," says one veteran of the scene.
"The local drinking water from the muddy
Mekong was so lousy, we paid a dollar a
quart for imported, tinned drinking water.
Everything in town closed up by 10 PM
except bars and opium dens."
On' duty,. even the country itself is an
enemy: Mountains are often a thousand
feet higher than the charts show and sud-
den monsoon" storms spring up out of
nowhere. Pilots, regularly have to cope
with shot-out engines, emergency evacua-
tions, and making takeoffs while 2,000
pounds overweight with an es ping Lao
general, his staff and Concubines and PL
mortars, hammering the strip. ? _
? One pilot trying to get out of Ban Nam
Boc was horrified to find a PL artillery
barrage open up just as ha began to taxi.
The Lao ground troops panicked and rush-
ed the plane trying to get aboard. "We had
to taxi right through them to get out," he
says.
The chopper pilots earn their pay the
hard way, often flying behind enemy lines
to rescue people. In the early days, they
used old Sikorsky HAllaaalasafaka FiWo iRgi
had already worn out before they got them.
The book says that the 11-34 can go to
4NritIPENVAIV5M01104-
o
PniVIAMIntrgegytfrgrs.
pay much attention to the book. Joe Maggio, a fiercely aggressive ex-
"I've had my bird up as high as 14,000 CIA spook and Congo mercenary, claims
feet," says a nervous, chain-smoking pilot, Ito have been part of a team that was trans-
"and as many as 20 guys in the cabin. I ported into North Vietnam by Air America
Sometimes, the only way I could get in the early Sixties. "We were taken in by
airborne was by bouncing the ship ups, like one of their choppers, and after we'd com-
a kid getting higher and higher off a pleted our mission, they picked us up and
trampoline. I constantly flew with engine took us. back out," he says. "Those guys
RPMs way past the red line. were flying all over North Vietnam in,
"It's no wonder we lost so many ships unarmed choppers and old C-46s." ?
in Laos. Our navigational checkpoints
used to be 'this crashed sopter here' or 1 erryWolkerstorfer, an ex-Special Forces
that one over there.' captain with two tours in Vietnam's delta,
"When we hauled troops in, they'd pile talks Of the CIA-run Special Operations
out with rifles, machine guns, sacks of Groups, bands of spooks made up of both
rice, cooking pots, loaves of bread?while U.S. and foreign agents. "They carried
the PL fired away at us. It was a helluva Swedish K submachirii-guns with silen-
job, let me tell you." cers and were, hauled around behind the
Even refueling is ticklish in this part of. lines by Air America. The whole outfit is
weird. They say that one of their agents
the world. They use C47s to spot 55-gallon
fuel drums at all the isolated strips. If you cracked and went over 'the hill 'a while
back. He completely disappeared. But. a
must put down at one, you have to hand
few months later, an?Ain America guy was
pump the gas into your bird while local
tribesmen watch. . and yoti wonder, are doing a job in the Congo and spotted this
deserter working there as a mercenary. He
they friendly or enemy? Are they civilized
or are they some of the head hunters that knew too 'much to be running around
still roam the region? loose; so they quietly kidnaped him. and
?
Casualties -have mounted as the Corn-' shipped him back to the States.
=mists teach the PL to sit on mountain- When Air America began recruiting
tops with 20-and 40-mm AA guns and Pilots from the military,. they added new
fire down at low flying Air America planes. skills to the "company" that were put to
Their instructions are "to kill the metal Work in the Laotian fighting as far back as
birds." ? 1964, At that time, the U.S. still wasn't
officially involved, and sOme Of the Air
Of the many Air America crews listed America pilots' abandoned their cargo
among the missing, only one is known to planes to fly T-28 fighter-bombers in corn-
have survived.capture to return. In 1961, bat for.the Laotian government. .
Ed Shore's plane developed engine trouble Perhaps the most interesting "work"
and went down near Ban Vieng San. They that Air America has undertaken, how-
were quickly captured by the PL and led ever, was their involvement in the rebellion
off to .a jungle prison where they were kept in Tibea Bob Miller, an old hand in Asia,
tied to posts and displayed to the natives told this author, "As recently as 1966 the
for 15 months. . CAT-Air America boys were regularly
"We were treated like wild animals, lock- running to Tibet in C-46s to resupply,
ed in stocks, and held while Meos fired rebels there that Chiang had stirred up.
their guns at our cell for amusement," re- The recently published Pentagon Papers
calls one of Shore's passengers. . ? confirm this story. General Ed Lansdale,
Finally released at Wattay Airport dur- an experienced Asian CIA man, said,
irsig a truce, the Air America men were "CAT has ... more than 200 overflights of
quickly hustled aboard a plane 'for the mainland China and Tibet..." It appears
States and have never talked about their that .the Nationalists grand scheme was to
ordeal. . a coordinate and lead twin rebellions, in
' Tibet and Yunnan.
Although Air America is highly visible The deeper you look, the more you
wherever you go in Asia, its pilots' most realize that the Air America organization
daring exploits are cloaked in official is into almost every aspect of Asian air
secrecy: Yet, if you hang around that area operations. They provide plane crews for
long enough, you begin to put the pieces Air Vietnam, and columnist Jack Ander-
together. An Air Force officer speculates, son claims that the planes of another
"North Thailand is dotted with airstrips Asian outfit, Southern Air Transport,
that are beautifully maintained. I wouldn't are actually Air America craft with a new
be surprised if they were flying right into
China from some of them." paint. job.
Most Air America planes are old C-46s
Although some 23 years have passed, ?
and C-47s built during World War Two,
the shadowy Chinese Nationalist General
butthey re beautifully maintained and
Li Mi still commands several thousand
troops from his old mainland 93rd prized for their durability. Others are
.
Division. They operate in the triangular specially built jobs that can land on grass
strips only 250 feet Ion C-123 cargo
area formed by the junction of ? Burma,
planes of the type used by the Air Force,
Thailand and Laos and are regularly
a fleet of.Huey helicopters and a recently
accused of crossing over into China's
spotted iour-engine Constellation with
Yunnan Province (remember, they are
"strange humps" in the fuselage that looks
officially still at war with Mao) and raiding
very much like the electronic spy plane
ChiCom camps?with Air , America
the Navy uses. Unusual- aircraft for a
support. . civilian airline
Experienced observers go even further D le has just been replaced as head of
' in their listing of Air America activity, Air Zmerica but before he left, he hedd
crediting the,rn with flying agentS in and his answers 'ce
when questioned about -his
out Of North Vietnam, putting U. S. company's business. "I don't know all of
Special Forces teams behind the lines in our customers' private business and re-
ealeelt20 2103:3 MARDI:454-604199R061,0001011005V0 carry people and
boom., an suppiyiiig a myriad or secret things?whatever the customer has for us."
base camps along toe North Vietnam?
. , . ? ?
continued
5
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Others in the company are less cagy
about what they do. Saigon station chief
E. J. Theisen says, "I guess we carry about
everything except bombs under our
wings." Even-that is doubted by some,
but Theisen does, admit that the super-
secret SOG groups use Air America for
their in-country transportation. These are
the guys you see getting out of a plane on
some God-forsaken strip, dressed in uni-
forms without insignia, and carrying gun
bags that take a form suspiciously like that
of the Swedish K.
Vietniane station manager Jim' ,Cun-
ningham will only say, "We operate on a
you-call, we haul basis. We don't, go into
details.", ? '
Oe, .
trangely, one of the1 member of Air
America's board of directors is, a very
? prominent . Boston lawyer. Ah ex-Air
Force officer, he says that he "got to know
some of the CAT operating personnel and
was invited to join the board, Air America
handles mostly CIA charter work.,, it's a,
very well run airline." Evidently, it's a
damned' well run airline. They supposedly
show a $10,000,000 profit every year,
, So America's flying foreign legion flies
on. In fact, as the official U.S, pres6ice in
Asia shrinks, Air America is stepping in to
fill the void in its "unofficial" manner, and
they're busier than ever before.
, Wherever, they, go, whatever, they. do,
they earn their keep by doing what nobody.
. else would touch with a ten-foot pole. In
Taipei, a statue of the "old man,". Claire,
Chennault., looks out over New Park 'and,
he has a satisfied look on his face as though
he knows that the outfit he left behind will
always live up to .its motto: "Anything,
anytime, anywhere--;professionally:" , A
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WaRLD pt:Felt
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Typical of the battles over land N.'vas a
proposal to create a 230-acre park out of
, some wooded green hills along the Vir-
ginia bank of the Potomac River near
? Washington, D. C. ?
The tract was owned by the Federal.
Jlighway Administration, which wanted
to retain the land for future expansion of
its research laboratory. Opposition to the
. plan also was expressed by the Central
Intelligence Agency next door, which,
preferred to keep the public as far away
as possible from its headquarters.
Under the compromise finally reached,
some of the land was transferred to the
National Park Service for public recrea-
tion, while other portions were divided
between the highway Administration
and the CIA. ?
In Virginia, woodlands adjacent to the Central Intelligence
Agency recently were turned into a public park. Surplus
'!property in 39 States has been acquired for recreation areas.
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
RADIOAipvvglatt*sg.2Q03/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049W01000100005-0 ?
!Nu,
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540
FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Eyewitness News
DATE
August 24, 1972 5:30 PM
? STATION WTOP TV
CITY
Washington, D.C.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR CIA EMPLOYEES
MAX ROBINSON: Twenty-two-year-old Joseph Hamm was
fired from the FBI in April because his hair is too long.
The American Civil Liberties Union fought for his reinstatement
with the Civil Service Commission. And Ramm has been ordered
back to work.
Eyewitness News correspondent Steve Gendel reports.
STEVE GENDEL: Joseph Hamm was a night fingerprint
clerk with the FBI. He rarely came in contact with the public.
as part of his job. But FBI officials said his image, which
does not conform to their standards, could lessen public confidence
in the FBI. Hamm. was fired when he refused to cut his hair.
In ?a letter to the Civil Service Commission regarding
this case, the FBI defended its hair-grooming requirement,
saying the American public compares agents against "Inspector
Erskine" of The FBI tv series.
.The ACLU said this ruling infringes on basic constitutional
rights. They filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission,
who. ordered Hamm reinstated.
MAN: What is basically involved here is a right of
an individual in the absence of some compelling governmental
interest to be let ,alone, to decide how he will dress, how
he will conduct what is essentially his private life.
GENDEL: The FBI is in most circumstances exempt from
Civil Service review. Hamm's case was an exception because
'he's a Vietnam veteran and entitled.to protection under the
Veterans Preference Act.
But ACLU attorneys.say this is the closest thing to
a precedent, breaking what they call FBI operations as a separate
[risiiic- Vo
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OFFInr IPJ, vvent-iirstn-nn?d n ? Iflfl awJetr, 1,0M ? NIVW ...onnie ? nc.1-zat-fs, ? lb..m.uu et,arai A ton ? e.g..", An eh.,
Approved For Pftase 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499A1000100005-0
enclave insulated from constitutional requirements. The ACLU
says if asked to do so they'll try and extend' the principle
won here to FBI special agents themselves, and possibly the
military and the CIA.
This is Steve Gendel, Eyewitness News.
. 0
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AijoiiN, TEX,
AM-En:CAN
M 48 05u Approved Folelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049,001000100005-0
,
AMERICAN-STATESMAN
9 - 76,680
AUG 2 019721
ko-t One Trench Coat
Austin
By DAVE MA YES
Staff Writer
You almost have to do -a little
cloak-and-dagger work yourself
to find the Austin office of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Go to the Federal Building on
East 8th and you won't find it
listed in the office index.
Neither will you see its name
posted on any office door.
As in most spy thrillers,
however, the nlystery can be
solved if one does the
unexpected but .obvious thing.
In this case look it up in the
telephone book. ,
A woman will answer your
STATI NTL
DCT .
ffiee Has 'Low Profile)i
call by repeating the phone
number, but don't be uncertain
you've found it. -
"We try to maintain a low
profile," began William B.
Wood of the CIA. It's his name
that appears in the index at the
Federal Building and beside the
door of Room 520.
The door, complete with
peephole and nightlatch, opens
into a green-carpeted two-room
office share'd by Wood and his
secretary.
But here the James Bond
scenario ends. The impression
quickly registers that neither of
these CIA folk has ever clicked
a picture with a camera hidden
in a cigarette lighter, or
smuggled microfilm anywhere.
They probably don't even own
trench coats.
Wood, An' at f able,
well-polished man, is one of. the
dozen CIA representatives, in
the country who does recruiting
for the agency.
The CIA tries not to be
obvious in Austin, he continued,
because as a recruiting office it
has no reason to be otherwise.
' "We don't really have to
advertise ourselves," lie said,
because the agency has
never had to worry about getting
enough applications.
It seems the CIA is more
concerned with caps and gowns
than cloaks and daggers.
Wood Said he receives
resumes from many people with
backgrounds in law
enfcircement because there is a
popular but mistaken notion
that the CIA is some kind of law
enforcement arm of the
government.
He maintains that the CIA has
no such duties, in fact has no
domestic responsibilities, but
works exclusively in gathering
foreign intelligence for the
National Security Council.
Consequently, the CIA is
looking for people with
highly-developed intellectual
skills in virtually all fields of
social and physical science and
technology.
The most fertile grounds for
recruiters are the university
graduate schools, Wood said.
For this reason, the agency in
1965 'located its recruiting office
in Austin where the University
of Texas maintains the largest
graduate School in the South..
Wood's recruiting territory
includes Texas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma and part of New
Mexico'. ,
The recruiter said he prefers
to work with applicants on a
one-to-one basis, in an effort to
make a "personalized analysis
of an individual."
If the applicant seems
promising and does well on a
test similar to the graduate
record exam, he fills out a
lengthy application, goes , to
Washington, D.C. for further
screening, and undergoes a
thorough security check.
"The entire process may take
between four and six months,"
Wood said.
The number of - people
employed by the CIA is
classified, but Wood
characterized it as on of the
"smaller" ? go v or nm en t
agencies:.
Most of them work at CIA
headquarters in Washington, he
added.
Wood points out with pride
that the CIA has the lowest
turnover rate of any
government agency, attributing
this to the "esprit de- corps"
that exists among staff
members.
Himself a career CIA man,
Wood joined the agency in early
1950's, not long after it was
created under the National
Security Act of 1947.
The University of Texas
graduate said he specialized in
Russian studies before
becoming a recruiter in 190.
"The CIA is a unique place in
which to work, he said. "For an
understanding of the total
dimensions of a foreign
problem, there is no other pin
to get it."
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1? AUG 1972
HS/HC-
, Attempt to hide role of ex-CIA agent
" WASHINGTON?The revelation that an .ex-CIA ? agent is on the
payroll of Action, the government agency which includes the .Peace
Corps, was deleted from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-
port after a personal plea by Action direct& Joseph H. Blatchford,
United Press International reported.
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Approved NMI Release 2smrsIA-RDP84-0439R001000100005-0
U 1g7
r-DOMINICANS UNDER.
CIA SURVEILLANCE
? SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican
? Republic ? The U.S. Central In-
tellignce Agency (CIA), which
maintains.a- network .of espionage
in the Dominican Republic, is
centraliiing its or eraticns in the
postal service and in Las Ameri-
can International Airport, accord- ?
ing to news media here.
The CIA, say these sources,
uses traffic inspectors in post
offices and national guard agents
in the airport, commanded by Lt.
Jose Ramon Gomez Quezada, who
formally apcears as a representa-
tive of IN'PERPOL (International
Police). ?
The postal "inspectors" censor
correspondence entering and leav-
ing the country, and confiscate
books, magazines and newspa-
pers.
KThe airport team is official-
ly stated to be fighting the drug
traffic, but its basic concern is to
watch those suspected of opposing
the regime of President Joaquin
-Balaguer, and censor correspond-
ence and literature.
It is estimated that at least
10,000 letters fell into the hands
of these agents in the past 14
monthsin the airport alone.
The Goinez Quezada group be-
gan work nearly tivo years ago..
The Dominican press has re-
ported that most Dominicans liv-
ing abroad prefer to send their
mail through friends.
? Compiled by Jose Perez
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( .
Approved 1:446,Releavea0SMIOPOSIUDEMEN/D049441001000100005-0
30 July 1972
Denounces
AID Link
With CIA
By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
, A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch
WASHINGTON, July 29?Sen-
ator 'Stuart Symington (Dem.),
Missouri, denounced Saturday
the A g en cy for international
Development's involvement i n
Laos with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
"The activities and funds of
these two agencies in Laos are
now so mixed," he said, "that
it must be impossible for Lao
officials to know whether they
are dealing. with AID or with
the CIA."
Symington, chairman of the
S en a te foreign relations sub-
committee on security agree-
ments and corn tn t men ts
abroad, made the statement in
a preface he wrote for a declas-
sified version of hearings over
which he presided last April 13.
He criticized the Executive
Branch , of the government for
making extensive deletions in
the hearing record, made public
Saturday. He said the deletions
were made "on alleged grounds
of security."
T h e hearing transcript was
scissored so- severely, Syming-
ton said, that his panel was at
first reluctant to make public
what remained. Ho w e v e r, it
was decid e d that the report
would add to information avail- ?
able about Laos.
Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordi-
nator of AJD's bureau for sup-
porting assistance, appeared be-
fore, the subcommittee in re-
sponse to a letter Symington
wrote March 21 to John A: Han-
nah, administrator of the Agen-
cy for International Develop-
ment.
Symington's letter had asked
Hannah a series of questions
about the relationship in Laos
between AID, which adminis-
ters foreign assistance, and the
CIA, which finances irregular
troops fighting Communists.
In' a separate statement is-
s Ire d Saturday with the cen-
sor ed but now declassified
hearing r e co r d, the Missouri
Senator said the facts now com-
ing out "raise serious questions;
about the legality of some Unit-.
ed States expendituresin;
Laos . . ."
The facts also disclose, Sym-
ington said, "a pattern of de-
viousness, if not actual decep-
tion, which has characterized
the conduct of our policy in
Laos for the last decade."
O'Connor told the subcommit-
tee that AID was not now fi-
n a n ;e i n g, and never had fi-
nanced, military or intelligence
operptions in Laos, as such. He
conceded that AID's assistance
had helped the royal Lao gov-
ernment carry its defense bur-
den.
In fiscal 1972, the witn eSs
said, the CIA is reimbursing
AID in the amount of $2,500,000
for medical services and sup-
plies for paramilitary forces or
their dependents in Laos.
O'Connor said AID supplied
certain services in the health
and humanitarian f ie Ids for
"anybody in Laos who is ill,
sick, or wounded." S.
r
tr
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nal INION PQST
Approved FOr Rkik',ease 20Ci312fit:Via-RDP84-00499%0000100005-0
,Court to Act
On, Secret
CIA Costs
PHILADELPHIA, July 21
1(AP)--.The Third U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals has ordered
a three-judge court set up to
decide the constitutionality of
a. law exempting the Central
,Intelligence Agency from re-
vealing its expenditures.:
In a 4-to-3 decision, the ap-
peals court told the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Erie, Pa., to em-
panel the special court.
The ruling Thursday was
made on a request filed, by
William B. Richardson, 52, of
Greensburg. He charged the
government's failure to dis-
close CIA expenditures- vio-
lates the constitutional require-
ment for ah accounting of all
government financial dealings.
Richardson appealed to the
Circuit Court after a District
Court judge in Erie rejected
his plea.
In the appeals court deci-
sion written by Judge Max
Rosen, the court said a citizen'
has the right to know how his
tax money is being spent.
The CIA Act of 1949 ex-
empts the agency from "the
provisions of. law and regula-
tions relating to the expendi-
tures of government funds."
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RADIOArilnPvP4EihroNirisSNIMMO3 : CIA-RDP84-00448P001000100005-0
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM CBS Evening News STATION WTOP TV
DATE
July 28, 1972 7:00 PM
CIA REPORT
CITY
CBS Network
Washington, DC
ROGER MUDD: The propaganda war over allegations that American
bombs have destroyed North Vietnamese dikes heated up today on two sides
of the Atlantic.
In Paris the North Vietnamese charged Mr. Nixon with trying to
elude responsibility when he denied yesterday the dikes were being bombed
deliberately.
But in Washington the State Department backed up Mr. Nixon's .
denial when it took the highly unusual step of releasing a report com-
piled by the super secret CIA.
MARVIN KALB: Senators began to. leak details of the report, so
late today the State Department under increasing pressure, released it,
but without any photographic evidence.
The report claims that only 12 of North Vietnam's major dikes
have been struck by American bombs, presumably since the air war inten-
sified last May.
The 12 dikes are all located south and southeast of Hanoi in what
is called the Lower Red River Delta, the same area which experienced severe
flooding last August when approximately 600 persons died.
The report further claims that damage is minor, no major dike
has been breached and there has been no flooding.
Hanoi claims 58 dikes have been hit, part of a systematic American
campaign against the entire dike system of North Vietnam.
? US officials say that is .a total fabrication. There is no syst-
ematic campaign of that kind.
The report says in an almost plaintive way that there are so many
dikes in North Vietnam, 2,700 miles of them, that any major air campaign al-
most inevitably results in damage to some of the dikes; officials adding
that if North Vietnam hopes to avoid major flooding next month it had best
repair the dikes now.
'1141'
?
late yesterday It was shown ate to Senators Fu
annd b1y2.
to
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON. D. C. ? LOS ANGELES ? NEW YORK ? DETROIT ? NEW ENGLAND * CHICAGO
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2
?
the CIA. Today the leaks began. The report was sprung. And there is
little doubt the dike controversy will continue.
Marvin Kalb, CBS News, the State Department.
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IIIS/HC-
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PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER
M - 463,503 ?
- 867,810
ralt .2 2 1972._
fluting Asked
On Secrecy in
CIA Spending
Tfinrd U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals here has ordered
that a three-judge court be set
,up to decide the constitution-
ality of a law that exempts
the Central Intelligence
Agency from revealing its ex-
penditures.
In a 4-3 decision, the ap-
peals court told the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Erie to empanel
the special court.
The ruling Thursday was
made on a request filed by
William B. Richardson, 52, of
Greensburg, Westmoreland
County. lie charged the gov-
ernment's failure to disclose
CIA expenditures violates the
Constitutional requirement for
an accounting of all govern-
ment financial dealings.
Richardson appealed to the
circuit court after a district
court judge in Erie rejected
his plea.
In the appeals court deci-
sion written by Judge Max.
Rosen, the court said a citizen.
?has the right to know how his
' tax money is being spent.
The CIA Act of 1949 ex-
, empts the agency from "the
. provisions of law and regula-
tions relating to the expendi-
? tures of government funds."
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Ea XcaK TIgES
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Key Egyptian-Soviet Moves Since '55
.y United rren Intern& t lonAl
Following is 'a list of major
events in relations between
Egypt, and the Soviet Union:
Sept. 27, 1955?Premier Ga-
mal Abdel Nasser an-
nounces that the Soviet
Union agreed to supply
Egypt with weapons in ex-
change for Egyptian cotton
and rice.
March 14, 1957?Soviet Un-
ion announces agreement
to deliver 500,000 tons of
oil in exchange for Egyp-
tian goods.
Nov. 19, 1957?A communi-
qu?t the conclusion of a
visit by Egypt's Defense
Minister, Field Marshal Ab-
del Hakim Amer, to Mos-
cow reports agreement on
matters of political and
economic cooperation as
well as on military mat-
ters. .
April 29 to May 15, 1958?
Mr. Nasser, then President,
visits Moscow for talks on
the Middle East situation.
Oct. 23, 1958?The Soviet
Premier; Nikita S. Khrush-
chev, announces Soviet
economic and technical as-
sistance in the construc-
tion of the Aswan Dam.
Jan. 28, 1961?Sdviet Union
agrees to contribute almost
$30.5-million toward con-
struction of steel-rolling
mill and other factories.
Dec. 12, 1961?The Egyptian
press reports shipments of
submarines, destroyers and
other warships from Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia.
June 18, 1963 ? Marshal
Amer ends official visit to
,Moscow, and a communi-
qu?nnounces Soviet
agreements to provide
further industrial credits
and economic and military
aid.
May 9 to 24, 1964 ? Mr.
Khrushchev. arrives for in-
auguration of first stage of
Aswan High Dam. Mr.
Nasser announces ' that
Moscow has agreed to lend
Egypt nearly $280-million
for a second five-year plan.
Aug. 27, 1965?Mr. Nasser
arrives in Moscow on of-
ficial viAit. New trade
agreement is initialed.
May 10, 1966?The Soviet
Premier, Aleksei N. KOsy-
gin, and a high-level Gov-
ernment and party delega-
tion 'visit Cairo to hold
talks on economic and
other assistance.
June 21 to 24, 1967?The So-
viet President, Nikolai V.
Podgorny, talks with Mr.
Nasser in Cairo, and a
joint communiqu?ledges
both nations to "further
collaboration" against Is-
rael.
Sept. 29, 1970--Mr. Nasser
dies in Cairo and is suc-
ceeded as President by An-
war el-Sadat. Mr. Kosygin
remains in Cairo after the
funeral for talks with Mr.
Sadat nd the new Egyptian
leadership.
May 27, 1971?Mr. Sadat and
Mr. Podgorny yign a 15
year, treaty of friendship
and cooperation in Cairo.
Feb. 3 and 4, 1972 ? Mr.
Sadat visits Moscow ,and
Arab reports say that he
sought more military aid.
Feb. 18 to 20, 1972-A joint
communiqu?ssued after
the visit to Egypt by the
Soviet Defense Minister,
Marshal Andrei A. Grech-
ko, says that Moscow
agreed to increase Egypt's
combat capabilities.
July 15, 1972?The Egyptian
Premier, Dr. Aziz Sidky
cuts short a scheduled
three-day visit to Moscow .
after one day .of talks
with leaders.
July 18, 1972 ? *Official
? sources in Cairo report
. that Mr. Sadat asked the
Soviet Union to withdraw
all military advisers from
Egypt.
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tali le 19i:4''6it Pe ce E
By Tim O'Brien and John Thorner
Washington.P,ost Mat! Writers
The Seahorn "Initiative"
Between junc, 1961, and June,
1965, J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian
member of the international Control
Commission in Southeast Asia, met
five times with North Vietnamese
? officials. He :carried, according to
the official diplomatic history of the
.period, "unusually substantive and
dramatic" messages.
".-.. . The main subject stressed
repeatedly by each (side) was its
determination to do and endure
whatever might be necessary to see
the war to a conclusion satisfactory
to it.
"TO the extent they believed each
?: other, the two sides were amply fore-
warned that a painful contest; lay
ahead. Even se, they were not in-
clined to compromise their way out."
Accordingly, nothing came of the
.Seaborn missions.
*
'Project Mayflower
- In May, 1965, President Johnson
? ordered a pause in the bombing of
North Vietnam in an effort to per-
suade the North Vietnamese to take
Their
tions for (a) solution" could be cre-
ated if the U.S. would accept the
"Four Points" or North Vietnam's
announced position.
There was no reply from the
Americans until August, 1965, when
Edmund Gullion, a retired foreign
service officer who is now at Tufts
University, was sent to Paris to talk
with Mai Van Bo. They met four
times and their discussions, the
diplomatic history says, represented
"the most serious mutual effort to
resolve matters of substance be-
tween the U.S. and DRV before and
since:"
Gullion (known as "X") and Bo
("R.") discussed the possibility for
reconvening the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference on Southeast Asia and
:seemed to be heading toward agree-
ments on some of the Hanoi "Four
Points." Then suddenly Bo failed to
show up for a scheduled meeting
(Sept. 7, 1965) and the initiative
ended. The diplomatic section of
the Pentagon papers called the epi-
sode "as mysterious in its ending
as it was fruitful and suggestive in
its beginnings."
* * *
Pinto,: the Rangoon Contact
some reciprocal action toward de- On Dec: 24, 1965, the U.S. began
escalation. U.S. Ambassador Foy a 37-day bombing pause. It came
Kohler in Moscow was instructed after Soviet Embassy Counsellor
to inform the North Vietnamese Zinchuk in Washington told White
Ambassador there that the halt House aide McGeorge Bundy that
would be indefinite and could lead Hanoi was unlikely to respond, al-
to .."a permanent end to . . a attacks though a pause might possibly im-
on North Vietnam." prove the atmosphere for the long
run.
During the pause, the U.S. met
with the North Vietnamese counsel
general in Rangoon, Burma, and sub-
mitted an aide memoire. No reply
came until 12 hours after the bomb-
ing was resumed. It amounted to a
rebuttel of the U. S. position,
* *
The Ronning Missions
Retired Canadian diplomat Ches-
ter Henning visited Hanoi in March
and June of ,1966. Henning had
friendly relations with the Chinese
and was known to be critical of U.S.
policies toward China and Vietnam,
but the U.S. nevertheless gave its
formal support.
During his first visit Ronning was
unable to sway North Vietnamese
leaders from their 'insistence on the
tween May, 1965, and February, previously announced "Four Points"
1966. :as the only basis for settling the
The first contact was through the war. Pham Van Dong did tell him,
French government o '64 ON, ektfrolioRotra0a200c3namsotAliRD
The French notified U.S. that to enter into some form of prelim-
Ho believed that "favorable condi- inary contact with the United States
The Ambassador of ? the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
refused to transmit the message to
Hanoi and suggested it be turned
over, to the Soviet government. The
Soviets refused to act as intermedi-
aries and "lectured Kohler at length
upon the U.S. misconception of the
conflict in Vietnam."
The failure of this initiative had
been anticipated by the CIA and
other Administration officials but
was regarded within the, government
as a productive gesture toward
world and domestic opinion even
If it failed.
* ,* *
The XYZ Channel
Mai Van Bo, head of the DRV
delegation In Paris, had three con-
tacts with the U.S. government be-'
?
ode N
If the U.S. \you'd cease bombing and-
all other acts of war against North
Vietnam.
Neither the U.S. nor North-Viet-
nam was enthusiastic about a return
trip but Henning did arrange to visit
Hanoi again in June. He was not
permitted to see Pham Van Deng
this time, and was told by a lesser
official that there would be no mil-
itary reciprocity for a U.S. bomb-
ing halt. ? -
*. *
Marigold:- The Polish Channel
Marigold was the code name for
negotiating efforts that involved
Janusz Lewanclowski, the Polish
member of the International Con-
trol Commission in Vietnam. These
efforts began in June 1966 in Sai-
gon and also involved the Italian
Ambassador there.
Lewandowski made several visits'
to Hanoi in succeeding months,
carrying with him a 10-point formu-
lation- of his own interpretation of
the American attitude. toward a
settlement. ,
- North Vietnam agreed to meet a
U.S. representative in Warsaw, but
canceled all further discussion of
the matter after U.S. bombing raids
on Hanoi. ?
The Pentagon history concluded
that -Marigold gave each side a
glimpse of possible areas of negotia-
tion. It added that the Poles "acted
as friends of Hanoi, not neutrals"
and "applied pressure in good faith
by the ever-present threat of dis-
closing their version of the matter
to influential world leaders or the
public at large." Nothing came of
the Marigold exercise and it did leak
out to the world.
* * * *
Packers: The Romanian Channel
From October 1966 through Feb-
ruary 1968 the Remanians made ef-
forts to take a part in the negotiat-
ing picture, Acting on the suggestion:
of Ambassador Averell Harriman;
Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe
Macovescn went to Hanoi in Decem-
ber, 1967, and came to Washington
early in January, 1968, to convey
North Vietnam's position. In an ef-
fort to seek clarification, he return.'
ed to Hanoi in the third week of,
January ? just before the Com-
munist launched the Tet Offensive.,
His report reached Washington often,
Tet.
In hindsight, according to t h e..
P44060499RINYI NO Olt rs'
the Romanians were 'very. poor re-.oont imied
porters; they did not pick up distince
tions such as talks, 11:etApictrantecicforffaime NPit1glit3Niritkr13DP84-004991001000100005-0
settlement terms. . . It is likely that cially interested in Algards initial
Hanoi did not take the Romanians report that the . North Vietnam-
seriously," ese were prepared to be "very
* *
. flexible" in any negotiations and a
Aspen: The Swedish Channel later report from Loan that reunifi-
From November, 1966, through cation of the two Vietnams could be.
February, 1968, the Swedish govern-, "postponed to an indefinite point of
ment (Aspen) played "a continuing time in the future."
though minor role" in attempting to The Pentagon papers say that
bring about a settlement of the war. while the Nerwegian role was not
The Pentagon papers said "The treated with great importance by.
Swedes were more active over time Washington, "in retrospect the ex-
than any other. intermediary?and changes between Algard and Loan
produced .the least amount of in- were probably the most reliable of
formation." all . ? ? Algard seems to have been a
?, At one point in May of 1967 Aspen careful note-taker, and his messages.
went so far as to say it would "take look like he *as using Hanoi turns
responsibility for a position they of phrase."
felt convinced about" ? in other *
Words, to be a broker as Well as a Pennsylvania: Henry Kissinger
message carrier. But the Pentagon and the Frenchmen
historian concluded that the Swed- ' The Pennsylvania channel w a s
i.sh role was dominated by that na- activated in June, 1967, by Kissin--
tion's domestic politics. Finally on .ger and two Frenchmen -- Herbert
Nov. 4, 1967, the Swedish govern- Marcovich and Raymond Aubrae.
ment publicly denounced U.S. policy
Aubrac had personal ties to the
in Vietnam. North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi
. * *
Minh, which enabled the two.
Sunflower: The Wilson-Kosygin
Frenchmen to visit Hanoi and set up
Channel a channel of communications in
From February 7 to 13, 1967, an
Paris.
intensive round of talks involving
There was hope on the American
British Prime Minister Harold WI' sidethat Hanoi might accept the-
son and Soviet Premier Aleksei
terms for halting the bombing
Kosygin took place in London.
which were passed to North Viet-
Through the British, "the U.S. ad- nam through the Pennsylvania
van(eecl) 'various de-escalatory pro- channel in August, 1967. The hope
? posals, none of which (were) accept- was frustrated and in October the
ed." channel was closed.
The key proposal was a halt in The Pentagon papers say that the
'US. bombing of North Vietnam in exchanges "seemed to have been
return for a cessation of North Viet- handled with great care and accu-.
?namese infiltration of men and sup- racy. While the two Frenchmen .
plies to South Vietnam. A halt in the were clearly committed to getting
U.S, military buildup in South Viet- the U.S. to stop the bombing, there
nam also was contemplated. is no evidence that their reporting,
At a critical moment in the pro- or message carrying, was adversely
cedings, the United States changed affected. Kissinger for the U.S.
the wording of the final versison of handled the play with consummate
the proposal. The effect of the skill, clarifying points and making
change was to require North Viet- interpretations that could lead to a
nam to stop its infiltration be- continuing dialogue. Both Hanoi
fore the bombing halt, rattier than and Washington treated this chan-
merely give assurance that infiltra- nel as a major one and yet little
tion would stop after the bombing was accomplished . . ."
halt took place. The British, as the * * * *
Pentagon papers note, took "strong Killy: The Italian Channel
exception" to the change. Giovanni cl'Orlandi, an Italian
Hanoi had not replied to the pro. diplomat, met with the DRY Ambas-
posal by the time Kosygin left Lon- sador to Czechoslovakia in Prague
don and a ,temporary U.S. bombing in Febrary and March, 1968.
suspension ran out. After the bomb- According to the Pentagon Pap-
ing was resumed, Hanoi rejected ers, the North Vietnamese sought
the plan and broke off DRY embassy out d'Orlandi who had played a
contacts with the U.S. in Moscow. major role in "Marigold," a role-
The Norwegian .Contacts respected by both Sides. The history
notes that d'Orlandi believed the
? Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, two sides should negotiate about the
016.:Algard, met six times with the future of South Vietnam?the es-
Wirth Vietnamese Ambassador .to sential issue ? rather than focus
Peking, Ngo Loan, between June, solely on cessation of U.S. bombing.
1967, and. February,' 1968. In early "Only when the future of South
March 1968, Algard went to Hanoi Vietnam could be foreseen, d'Or-
and met several times with North landi argued, would the two sides
Vietnamese- Foreign Minister Ngu- sit down and genuinely and serious-
yen Duy Truth. A final meeting be.. ly negotiate.
tween Algard and Loahr
ndibsiMieg
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WASHINGTON FOST
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Lain"
March 2, 1965?Sustained .U.S. air
attacks on North Vietnam; code-name
"Rolling Thunder," begin: -
- March 2, 1965?Two U.S. Marine
Corps battalions sent ashore at Dan-
ang, South Vietnam, for "limited se-
curity duty."
Jan. 31, 1966?President Johnson an-
nounces resumption of air strikes
after 37-day bombing "pause," saying
Hanoi failed to respond to peace cam-
paign. - ?
,
June E, 1966?Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge in Saigon begins secret
meetings, code-named "Marigold," with
Polish envoy Lewandowski and Italian
[Ambassador -d'Orlandi.
e ;rt. C
S I \V lenrn faaarniet
Dec. 2-5, 1966?U.S. bombers begin
intensive air attacks in Hanoi region;
Poles quickly protest that "Marigold"
diplomatic track is endangered.
Dee. 13.14, 1966--American planes
pound targets around Hanoi. China
and Romania later claim their Hanoi
embassies hit.
Feb. 7, 1967?Secret talks code-
named "Sunflower" start in London
with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygirt,
during bombing "pause." Talks col-
lapse on Feb. 13.
July 21, 1067?French scientists Her-
bert Marcovich and Raymond Aubrae
arrive in Hanoi with U.S. messages
transmitted to them through Henry A.
Kissinger?operation "Pennsylvania."
Aug. 3, 1967?President Johnson an-
nounces authorized ceiling of 525,000
troops in South Vietnam.
Jan. 30-31, 1968?Communist forces
launch TeL offensive in South Vietnam.
March 31, 1966L?President Johnson
announces cessation of all air and -
naval bombardment of North Vietnam
above 20th Parallel.
April 3, 1968?North Vietnam offers
to meet U.S. representatives to dis-
cuss "unconditional cessation" of all
"acts of war" against its territory.
Oct. 31, 1968?President Johnson an-
nounces cessation of all air and naval
activity against North Vietnam.
?
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Approved For Release31i0iiiiii-RDP84-00499R00100100005-0
2 5 JUN 1972
Trn
5 o1 * ,,.-
gs ti, 1auiltes k9
.13111 9. and Herter
for Fall of Cult)
BY GEORGE BEEBE
[Knight NewsPaPers)
ESTORIL, Portugal, June 2-1! Keeps Mind Alert ?
ormer Cuban President ? He keeps his mind alert by
Fulgencio Batista is still puz-
zled and resentful that "the
three sick men in Washington"
ignored his warnings that Cas-
tro was a dangesous Commu-
nist.
.; President Eisenhower and
Secretaries of State John Fos-
ter Dulles and Christian Hert-
er thought "I was crying wolf,
and now the wolf controls
Cuba," he said at his hillside
villa here where he has spent
most of his exile since 1939.
He noted that all three Unit-
reading eight daily newspa-
pers?in four languages, Poe-
toles?, Spanish, English, and
French.
He and his attractive wife,
Marta, live a comparatively
quiet life in this Portuguese
resort community.
- When they go to their apart-
ment in Madrid every few
week, they are swept into a
social whirl that includes
many other Cuban exiles.
Batista once again empha-
sized that he is retiring from
ed States leaders were preoc- politics.
eupied with physical ailments "I am too old to have any
and "showed not one bit of political aspirations. It is time
interest in what was happen- now for young leadership
ing in the Caribbean." -among the exiles."
The former Cuban leader
U. S. Arms Embargo -? 'shows no bitterness. He be-
The State Department dur- :lieve.s he brought considerable
ing the Eisenhower adminis- progress to his homeland in
tration in 1953 slapped an the pre-Castro years.
arms embargo on the Batista
government, 'while making no
effort to halt the flow of arms
to the Castro insurgents.
"It is. unfortunate that the
United States in its attempt to
help defend the world against
the spread of Communism has
gone so far from the Western
Hemisphere to do so," Batista
said.
He implied that the U. S.
effort in Viet Nani would have
been better spent on Cuba.
. The one-time army sergeant
who became Cuba's strongman
when President Gerardo Ma-
chado was overthrown in 1933,
and who twice was his coun-
try's dictator-president, still is
a powerful man physically.
Batista is robust and vigor-
ous at 71. A daily exercise PC.
vied is part of his unchanging
.schedule.
have kept my weight at
-180 pounds thru the many
? - He said that he has given up
lhope of ever visiting the U. S.
-again. His previous requests
for visas have been denied.
"But if I did go, I fear my
friends and followers would
think that I had come with a
' magic plan to restore Cuba to
the people," he said. ?
"What would I say to them?
I would not want to raise their
hopes for I do not have the
answer."
Nostalgic Note
Batista disgressed briefly
with a nostalgic note: -
"I greatly miss Cuba, and.
particularly the friends with ,
whom I have .lost contact?
perhaps forever. No one likes
to die outside the country he
loves. This is soniething you
can't comprehend until it hap- ?
pens to you. It is difficult to
spend the .last years of your
life away from the land of
your birth.'"
He keeps well informed
-tears," he comments ?441), pfs /4141e6eit wiwi?
-00499R001000100005-0
note of achievement. PPr9vtut naruraTly entafb mei oirtr:
rect word for inside Cuba."
It is obvious, that if Premier
Fidel Castro dies that another
Communist will take his place
Fulgencio Batista: "I was
crying wolf, and now the wolf
controls Cuba." .
"and conditions will be the
same, or possibly worse," he
said.
Batista has written three
books since his overthrow by
Castro,
Ile now has 70 chapters
completed on the history of
Cuba.
"But I doubt that I ever will
finish it. This is about the
country; not about my memo-
ries. Unfortunately, I do not
have access to the documents
that would help me ? finalize
such a volume."'
Approved F-Silielelease 2003/12/03 ?: CIA-RDP84-004*9 001000100005-0
EPIIRATA, WASH.
GRAUN.T CO. JOURNAL
JN 2 2 1372
SEMI-WEEKLY - 3,439
uvuovvvyvymuxivt, ....... .............fvvUvuOuvuuvuAyvvuol.vvvvyw .....
Secret Documents Shouldn't
Hide Stupid Blunders
?...LLULLSISULSULULUSL2.11112.31..
The illegal release of the Pentagon Papers
and the more recent use of secret documents
by columnist Jack Anderson has re-opened
the problem of what should and should not be
classified.
During a conversation a few' years ago with
the late Senator Richard Russell I asked why
the CIA reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's
tralIefrfiMaxico had to remain classified as
Secret and why they had to stay secret for
amity years to come. ?
The senator was at that time, and had been
for more than a decade, chairman of a special
appropriations ? sub-committee which con,
trolled all CIA funds. There wasn't anyone
who was in a better position to answer the
question than Russell.
.He gave me a plausible reason for the
secrecy. The senator noted, and it's true, that
we have people in every country in the world
who are friendly to the U.S. and though not
citizens of this country they often supply our
intelligence people with information. Some
are businessmen, some fishermen, artists,
students and so forth. They are basically loyal
to their own country, but still willing to help
us. The CIA report on Oswald's travels in
Mexico contains not only the facts about his
movements in that country but the names of
the individuals who provided those facts. If
the report was made public at this time some
of the contacts would end up, facing a firing
? squad and if they weren't shot or imprisoned,
they would no longer be of any value as
contracts. Their future services would be nil.
Since they are still needed it makes good
sense to keep their identity unknown.
But what about thirty years from now? This
11S/IIC-
is the time frame being recommended by the
National Security Council as a reasonable
time to keep papers secret yet there are
opponents around who want the lid to stay on
far beyond three decades.
That's pretty hard to buy even from the
individuals who claim diplomatic or military
secret codes can be endangered by releasing
thirty year old data. It seenis illogical to
assume that -code's aren't changed in more
than thirty years and even more illogical to
believe any nation can keep a code unbroken
for thirty years. If this is happening it is' a
first for all time. A recent rash of non-fiction
books have pretty well dispelled the idea that
unbreakable codes exist. If a man or woman
can conceive them sooner or later another
man or woman will be able to unravel them.
Anyone who reads my columps very long
knows I am pro-military, but I've long been
aware of the military's inclination to 'nark
anything and everything secret and keep that
tag on forever. In some cases this practice
can be defended, but not for 50 or 100 years.
While true military secrets should be
carefully guarded military blunders should
not. Time doesn't erase stupidity, but it hides
it and that's wrong.
During World War II many a bulletin board
was so plastered with memos that it was a
standard joke that if one dug deep enough
he'd find a KP order from Valley Forge still
tacked up. If one could actually dig deep'
enough in Pentagon records there's a chance
that some of George Washington's actual
orders are still* stamped secret. In a free
society that's no joke.
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
Approved Foi*klilease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004990601000100005-0
CiiiCAGO, ILL.
TRIBUNE
M - 767,793
S 1,016,275
JUN 1 5 1972
mand
?
Y, WAYNE THOM IS
[Aviation 'Editor]
ichicago Tribune Press Servicel
SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14
??Hanoi broadcasts infrequent-
ly mention "works of sabo-
teurs" in North Viet Nam's
panhandle, and Saigon's ver-
nacular press occasionally re-
port odd little aircraft acci-
dents with nonmilitary planes
in mountainous regions of
:Laos, Northwestern South Viet
--Nam, and sometimes in North-
eastern Thailand.
These are mere peeks by the
general public at a tremen-
dous submerged "iceberg" of
clandestine operations continu-
ously and now increasingly
carried out against the Com-
munist North.
These actions probably nev-
er will be disclosed in full de-
tail but it can be said respon-,
sibly that today they constitute
an important phase of this
Southeast Asia battle.
It is a silent war, It is car-
ried out by special forces and
by mercenaries. It is a hit-
and-run war in which units are
- airlifted or sea borne deep into
North Viet Nam for demolition
Missions, for seizure of prison-
ers, for probing forays, and?it
now is understood?for accu-
mulation of information on
American prisoner of war camp
locations.
This type of action has been
taking place in the North Viet-
namese panhandle f r o in the
Demilitarized Zone to well
north of Vinh during the lag
60 days..
An increasing series of such
raids have come from the sea-
coasts and from helicopter air-
bridge links in Laos and Thai-
land to paints wherc damage
can be done or information oh-
tamed from the North Viet4
namese, it was learned from
reliable sources.
Communist broadcasts from
Hanoi in ,the past. have used
"saboteur" in an ideoligical
sense. Now they are referring
to actual dynamitings by these
raiders. They specialize in tar-
gets which are too difficult for
bombers to identify from the
air, or are too well hidden to
be spotted by aerial photogra-
phy.' They also carry out a
traffic in agents not otherwise
possible under present condi-
tions.
Size, Duration Vary
? Reports filtering from Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and
associates military establish-
ments indicate such raids may
vary from 20 to several bun-
died men. They may stay in
North Viet Nam from a few
minutes to 24 hours. . ?
Mercenaries enlisted for
such secret actions include
Europeans, Chinese, Malays,
Japanese and Americans. T h e
oerations are car of u 11 y
planned and surrounded by the
tight security.
The CIA now believes the
large-scale American attempt
to free prisoners from a tamp
near Hanoi a year ago failed
because of a security leak
T 1U. 2
which resulted in a prisoner
shift.
The raiders are heavily, ar-
med. Not one operation has
failed, and none of the raiders
have been trapped, according
to informed sources.
Casualties among these spe-
cial forces have been low. Pay
scales are said to be "quite
high" and morale among these
specialists in demolition, elec-
tronics sabotage, and interro-
gation is very high. The men
regard themselves, as an -elite
corps.
Financed by CIA
The mysterious, CIA4inanced
Air America civil flying fleet
seems to operate on a super-
national basis across Cambo-
dian, Thai, Laotian, and South
Vietnamese borders. It has
had a part in some of this
work. However, much of the
work is being done by mil-
itary detachments, temporarily
'misted to the special forces. .
The military establishment
here generally - attempts to
suppress mention of this side
of the war for a number of
reasons, with security against
enemy knowledge being the
least important. The North Vi-
etnamese are fully aware of
the nature of the CIA-directed
and financed --special opera-
tions.
It is known that ,after each
such raid all civilians and mil-
itary personnel in the North:
who have had contact with the
raiders are subjected to rigor-
ous and lengthy questioning by
Communist secret police and
commisars.
The U. S. forces seek to hide
the clandestine side of the war
to prevent embarassment to
Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian
governmental departments.
It is recognized by American
-leaders that such concealment
is merely "token" but is re-
quired in certain diplomatic
relationships which the coun-
tries fringing South Viet Nam
maintain. ?
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vit3FINGTON 20S1
Approved For heease129036V/R2 CIA-RDP84-00499l000100005-0
Air.Drops Asian Guerrillas
Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam
By D. E. Ronk
enecial to The,WaEhington.Post
VIENTIANE, Laos, June
14?Use of Laotian territory
;and spegially recruited, As-
ian mercenaries for CIA-
sponsored espionage a n d
sabotage missions in North
Vietnam has been confirmed
here by American sources
close to the operation.
: The missions are originat-
ing from a number of small
mountaintop sites in north-
ern Laos within 30 miles of
the North Vietnamese bor-
der, The guerrilla "troops are
transported by unmarked
,Air America planes,
The existence of the guer-
rilla mission. inside North
Vietnam was first reported
in Saigon earlier this week.
Such missions were known
to have been initiated in
early 1960s, hut were not re-
garded at the time as very
effective and were apparent-
ly suspended after the 1968
bombing halt.
Highly trained mountain
tribesmen from northern
Laos and some Thai mercen-
aries with long experience
in special operations are
said here to make up the
teams. Most , of the guerril-
las are said to speak Viet-
namese, some fluently.
Officially,. the Air Amer.
lea management in Vienti-;
? ane is unaware that the com-
pany's pilots or planes are
flying such .missions. Air
? America is a quasi-private
? airline under contract with
U.S. government agencies.
Pilots used On the espio-
nage-sabotage mission flights
are carefully selected and re-
ceive special pay for hazard-
ous duty by a "white envelope
system." This means that the
money received is not account-
able or traceable, even for tax
purposes, sources say.
, Official U.S. spokesmen in
Vientiane decline to comment
on the operation, hut informa-
tion pieced together from
American anch r
here indicates Wt. I
inaccessible r CIA - maintained
bases in Laos are used to
train, house, and transport the
guerrillas.
Nam Yu, the CIA's most se-
cret base in Laos, situated in
northwestern Laos near the
town of Ban Houel Sal, is re-
ported to be the primary train-
ing center.
Nam Yu was formerly a
base for intelligence 'teams
being sent into South China
to report on telephone and
road traffic, a program dis-
continued last year when
President Nixon accepted an
invitation to visit China.
From Nam Yu, the guerril-
las are moved to the Long
Cheng area 80 miles north of
Vientiane where they continuel
to train,- -making forays into
the surrounding mountains in-
side Laos on lower-level recon-
where they conduct sabotage,
espionage a n d propaganda
missions in that country's least
inhabited and defended areas.
Precise information on targets,
and types of guerrilla action
is not available here.
It is known, however, that
the CIA is distrustful of many
claims made by the guerrilla
infiltrators and frequently
equips the units with cameras
so they can photograph them-
selves at targets, The photo-
graphs prove the missions
were carried out, and provides
intelligence data for CIA
analysts.
Each mission uses at leastl
one specially equipped twin-,1
engine Otter plane, said to '
carry half a million dollars
worth of radio and electronic
gear for pinpoint navigation
and locating of ground forces.
naissance missions for season- Because of the twin Otter's
lug and practical expprian'ae virtual silent operation as it
in avoiding capture and inflict- Passes close over the ground,
ing, narrn on Communist its short take-off and landing
forces, capability, and the load it can
carry, its basic function has
. Many -of the potential North ! been the clandestine inser-
Nietnamese infiltrators are tion, pickup and resupply of
"weeded out" during this' guerrilla missions.
training period, sources say. There are also reports of
, Resident newsmen here have i
been unable to visitLong gtieeirn?ryillas being snatched from
eli
Cheng in recent months. occupied territory by a
Jump-off points for the hook dangling from rescue
guerrillas are considerably aircraft. The guerrilla on the
ground inflates a large balloon
east and northeast of Long
C with lighter-than-air gas, at-
Cheng, according to the sour- taches it to a thin line which
ces, most being tiny hilltop
is then attached to a harness
positions hardly known to
. he fastens to himself. The res-
exist. A major point of de. cue craft passes over- the bal-
parture is said to be at Bouanl
loon, hooks on and hauls him
Long, sometimes called "the up.
fortress in the sky," about 40 :Qualified sources here say,
miles northeast of Long Cheng,"
a base the Communists have meantime, that they believe
that such espiowe missions
never been able to wrest from
I its Meo defenders, will be increased at northern
Laos, and may be resumed
' Practica1 training exercises inside China itself, to sabotage
are also connuctect at Bouam
Long. Communist radio broad-
casts frequently note the pres-
ence, capture or killing of
commandos from Bouam Long
in the Sam Neua area of north-
east Laos, Caves in nearby
mountains contain the head-
quarters of the Communist-
supported Laotian rebels.
The highest priority, how-
ever, is given to missions that
war material that?because of
the mining of Haiphong?is
expected to flow increasingly.
through China's Yunan Prov-
ince and the Laotian Province
of Phong Saly on its way into
North Vietnam.
-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
..c
Approved ?all(Release 20072/1:011eik i4TOTAAAMCRIF00005-0
1
"u8fDA,
L.Ani-au 11E-a
p
ulf
\ 6
'rt.\
by Colin fileGlashart
He was his adopted country's Minis-
ter of Industry, and a roving ambassa-
dor for revolution, but he was no
? statesman; for one thing, he could
never hide what was on his mind.
Addressing the U.N. General As-
sembly, he mixed a new anger with
the familiar cold analysis of colonial-
Faded newsreel" film: 7iTinost rue
only evidence of Che Guevara's
secret visit to the Congo in 1965
ism. "Western civilisation," he told
them, "disguises under its showy
front a scene of hyenas and jackals.
That is the only name that can be
applied to those who have gone to
fulfil 'humanitarian' tasks in the
Congo. Bloodthirsty butchers who
feed on helpless people . . The free
men of the world must be prepared
to avenge the crime committed in the
Congo." Three weeks later, on
January 2, 1965, as Cubans cele-
brated the sixth anniversary of their
revolution, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara
was in Brazzaville planning his second
war: the battle for the Congo.
The stakes were high. Like
Bolivia, the Congo was the key to a
continent: its borders touched nine
nations. Victory would throw a
socialist girdle around Africa. The
rebels against Moise Tshombe's cen-
tral government had lost Stanleyville
in November to Belgian paras and
mercenaries in U.S. planes, but still
controlled most of the northern half
of the country, an area twice the size
of France. The big powers were
quietly moving in for what looked like
the start of an African Vietnam: the
Congolese Air Force acquired some
elderly fighter-trainers and B-26s
from the U.S., with the CIA's Cuban
exiles, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, to
fly them, plus herf?copters and 14 huge
C-130 transports with American
crews. Russian and Chinese arms
were coming by sApplromed
vile, in Ilyushin transports from
Algeria, in trucks through the Sudan.
At Heliopolis, outside Cairo, 3000
Congolese trained under Algerian in-
structors; others trickled home from
Havana and Peking.
Guevara toured the diplomatic
and physical boundaries of the grow-
ing struggle: Ghana, Guinea, Al- '
geria, Peking; and met rebel leader
Gaston Soumaliot in Dar es Salaam
for a tour of bases and supply lines
around Lake Tanganyika. On March
15 Fidel Castro embraced Guevara at
Jose Marti Airport in Havana; but
the exact date on which he joined
the struggle in the Congo is un-
known; he may have spent several
months as a_strategist, away from
the con fl-;?.--: .. tot---trebruary on,
Tshoree.' ric-.17;iiet- a, ,''w deter-
mi d esistarte in the"nA-east;
, r, .
c ,.
l: -, ruary 9 tkilumn of GO..,: on-
?fete troors'6J'trli0V men\et - ries
ls[repeclly_ambed widl f, ,,avy
casualties by rebels with bazookas
who came up close and stood their
ground. A week later 750 government
troops were chased out of a small
town. For the first time, roads were
mined, and Tshombe's River Congo
supply lines thrown into chaos by the
sabotage of marker buoys. Armoured
cars fell into pits that had let lighter
traffic pass over them, a classic trick
from Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare.
But the struggle in the north-east
was waning: supply lines were being
closed, Nasser was losing interest.
In June, Guevara secretly joined
Soumaliot's rebels in their last stand
in some of Africa's most savage and
inaccessible country just ti the west
of Lake Tanganyika.
The rebels had plenty of arms, but
Congolese army gunboats, with U.S.
advisers, were harassing supply lines
across the lake; Colonel Mike Hoare
was moving north with a strong new
force of mercenaries. No account of
what happened has been published,
although Tshotnbe's forces found a
Cuban's diary, and the Foreign
Ministry in Havana is said to have
two rolls of film that Guevara took
at the time. The official biographies
leEttillk 204311126118d:iCREIRE4L0
mention- the Congo struggle. At the
start, some determined ambushes car-
ried the signature of the Sierra
Maestra, but by September it was as
good as over. Nasser, almost certainly
following CIA pressure, stopped arms
shipments to the rebels. Guevara
probably returned to Havana in
November to tell Castro Cuban sup-
port should be withut,..w.:
What went wrong? Ciro Roberto
Bustos, the Argentinian captured with
Regis Debray, was later to tell the
Bolivians that Guevara had said of the
Congo rebellion: "The human de-
merit failed. There was no will to
fight. The leadens were corrupt." The'
way the rebels treated prisoners dis-
gusted him: the butchers were not
all on the other side. In a last message
- read to the TricontinentaI confer-
ence in Havana in April 1967 - he
wrote: "There are no great popular
upheavals. In the Congo these charac-
teristics appeared briefly ... but they
have been losing strength." The
Congo rebels had controlled half the
country; for guerrilla theory and its
leading practitioner it was a little-
known but disastrous defeat.
Cohn McGlashan, who has visited
Cuba, has written articles on
guerrilla warfare.
499Roco9oolbo465-o
BOSTON, MASS Approved For?lVelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049,461000100005-0
GLOBE
JUN 41972'
- 237,967
S - 566.377
Ex-CIA man will give White
By Fred Pillsbury
"? ?
liaison with police
_;,Globe Staff
WASHINGTON For
Months Robert Kiley, a 37-
;;.year-old former Central ing that lircsupported the Boston and it didn't hap-
(Intelligence Agency (CIA)
National Student Associa- pen." Today, Boston's po-
man turned police expert, tion of which he was vice lice force still has a
Z. has been shuttling back President. "strong neighborhood tra-
,
1: and forth between the P0- "I suppose if I were ?a dition," which is just the
t. lice FoundaHall. tion here and student today and heard sort of thing police admin-
'Boston CR
about it (CIA fund sup- istrators are adVocating
Y
- Tomorrow morning he port) I would react with today. Other cities, which
horrori" he said. "Howev-
centralized, are rebuilding,
'^ - will move permanently
into an office down the er, in the 50s government while Boston, Kiley feels,
? corridor from Mayor White help was the popular, has a good foundation.
"
where he will start a new democratic thing. ' When people talk to him
? career in city government. He describes the CIA as, about the police in Boston,
?
Kiley will be a key as- a "first rate government Kiley said, they inevitably
iistant to the Mayor. Un- bureaucracy." But it was a ask him about police cor-
.
? like the other six staff per- bureaucracy, and last year ruption He does not feel
it ? .knowledgeable enough to
sound white x e E,n t 1 Y he decided that, "leaving make an assessment at this
point, but his guess?is that
police corruption is a prob-
lem, as it is in many other
big cities
were far more important.
? He lists only three or
He went to work for the four large American cities
Foundation, which funnels ? Los Angeles, Kansas
Ford Foundation money to City, Cincinnati ? as hay-
police departments, as ing clean police forces.
sociate director and since "The corrupt list is much
then has acquainted him- longer."
self . with polieemen and But a lot depends on
police departnients one's definition of corrup-
throughout -ale country. tion, he pointed out.
For someone who has
is the city's chief re- "A businessman would
hired, 'he will also head a
0.^ department the Office
'
I?.of Public Service, which
administrates ' Whit e's
-
k...'proudest innovation, the
? tittle City Halls. ' ?
? His assignment as Public
t ?
Service. director, however,
? re,'
.will be second in impor-
tance to his duties as a link
?' between the mayor and the
??
:police department, al-
though $25,000 of his $32,-
-
000 salary will come from
!.Public Services. -?
aside moral judgments,"
the Vietnam war was
wrong and that the coun-
try's domestic problems
never lived or worked in
cruiter for a new police think nothing of being
commissioner who will Boston he appears to have taken out for lunch," he
a fairly detailed impres- I said. "but there are some
take over the job recently
vacated by Edmund L. Mc-,sion of what the depart- people who would say that
ment is like,
Na'mara: He will also work ' if a policeman accepts a
closely with the new corn-
Boston may have ? the cup of coffee, he's corrupt-
missi oner in? bringing oldest police force in the ing himself. On the other
about a substantial over-
country (sergeants average hand, we can say that
haul of the police depart-
about 51), and it has few there is one man in a de-
ment. blacks or Spanish-speak- partment who is -involved
? ing officers. Kiley made in any drug traffic, and if
Why would the execti.- those points and then he.
tive assistant to Richard said that Boston was lucky
'Helms, the CIA director, that it has resisted reforms
decide to get involved in of the 50s made by so
citk government? ' many other big cities.
Kiley, who studied gov- The vogue, he said, was
ernment at Harvard for to centralize police opera-
two years after graduating tions, "but, somehow, the
-from Notre Dame, talked wave just washed ?ovel:.,!
about it In his Washington
office.
He became invAlyptoved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
with the .giaoafttrlearn-
there is knowledge of his
actions, the whole depart-
ment stinks. There has,
been evidence of that
going on in New York."
. The police of the future,
and he specifically means
Boston's police, must be-
come -involved in new
areas. They must also be-
come involved in fighting
"white collar" crime.
Boston's police force he
hopes, will also be young-
er, employ more blacks
and be better educated and
more specialized.
However, Kiley said that
he is "delighted" that
White "is trying to under- .
stand the role of the police
in the city."
Kiley has been sending ,
police professionals and.
experts "ostensibly" to
give him the benefit of
their opinions on what the
new commissioner should
be and which direction the ;
department should take. It
is quite possible, he ad-
mitted, that an adviser
could become a candidate.
"Unless we go inside the
city, that's probably how
the commissioner will be
chosen, Kiley said..
The list of candidates
with the proper qualifica-
tions is short, but the
mayor has not ruled out
choosing somebody from
within the department, he
said.
Vtird
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499*1000100005-0
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he explores for the first time the human side of
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McGarvey believes that intelligence operations
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believes that our agencies need a complete over-
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Pairick McGarvey was a member of the United
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9 Stateak-ad Do- fi d Don
About Attaaking Eraiphong
DOCULlientS from Nixon's secret Study of the War;
National Securitygtudy Illemora
QUESTION 28d
What are current views on the proportion
of .war-essential imports that could come
into North Vietnam over the rail or road
lines from China, even if all imports by
sea were 'denied 2ind a strong effort even
made to interdict ground transport? What
Is the evidence?.
The IDefense
Department's Answer
Land Import Capacity
In 1968, NVN imported an average of
6,800 STPD (short tons per day); 6,000
STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land.
Imports by land were higher in 1967,
amounting to about ? 1,100 STPD. flow-
ever, the land lines of conimunication
from China were not used to capacity. It
is estimated that the two rail lines from.
China have a theoretical uninterdicted
capacity. of, about 8,000 STPD and the
road network could provide an additional
7,000 STPD during the dry season
(normally June-September) and about
2,000 STPD during the poor weather
months. The combined capacity of the
land, routes (9,000-15,000 STPD) is more
than enough to transport North Vietnam's'
total import requirements of about 7,000
STPD. If all seaborne imports were to
come through China, considerable logistic
problems would have to be solved by the
Chinese regime.
Interdiction of Imports from China '
If seaborne imports can be denied to
NVN, her ability to successfully pursue
the war in SVN would be dependent on
:land imports from China.
A strong' effort to interdict road and
rail transport from Communist China
through North Vietnam would require a
concerted and coordinated air interdiction
campaign against all transportation:. mili-
tary support; petroleum oil, and lubri-
cants power; industrial; air defense, and
communications target systems. The inter-
relationship of the effects of destruction
of targets in one, category to the effec-
tiveness of others is such that a cumula-
tive impact is achieved. The air campaign
would be conducted in such a manner as
to be free of the militarily confining
constraints which have characterized the
'conduct of the war in the north in the
past. The concept would preclude attacks
on population as a target but would
accept high risks of ckmu.cootobrinR
ordet to achieve deTtViglion a war-
ndum No.1
North Vietnam
supporting targets. ?
An interdiction campaign as described
above, when employed in conjunction
with denial of sea imports, would, in
large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong
,from each other and from the rest of the
country. Isolation of Hanoi, the focal
point of the road and rail system, would
be highly effective in reducing North
Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggres-
sion in South Vietnam. Importation of
war-supporting material would be seri-
ously reduced. Road capacities would be
reduced by a factor well in excess of the
estimated 50 percent believed to have'
been accomplished during the summer
months of 1966 and 1967. Over time,
North Vietnam's capability to cope with
the cumulative effects of such an air
campaign would be significantly curtailed.
Has repaired all major
road and railway bridges, constructed
additional bypasses and alternative routes
and expanded the railroad capacity by
converting large segments from meter to
dual gauge truck. These improvements
would make even more ?difficult pro-
longed interdiction of the overland lines
of communication.
We currently fly approximately 7,000
sorties per month against two primary
roads in Laos without preventing through-
put truck traffic; the road network from
China has 7;10 principal arteries and
numerous bypasses. Finally, the mon-
soonal weather in NVN would make it
difficult to sustain interdiction on the
land lines of communication. Poor visi-
bility would prevent air strikes during
25-30% of the time during good weather
months and 50-65% of the time during
poor weather Months. Thus, it is not
possible to give a definitive amount to
the question of how much war-essential
imports' could come into NVN if sea
imports are denied and a strong air
campaign is initiated.
A ,
/Attention would also have to be given
to interdiction of supplies coming into
SVN from Cambodia. Over the past 2'
'years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a.
supply base and a place of refuge has
become more pronounced. During the
period October 1967 to September 1968,
10,000 tons of munitions transited
Sihanoukville and a're suspected of having
been delivered to enemy forces in the
Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border
regions. This , amount represents - more
than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms
and ammunition requirements. for all
enemy forces in South Vietnam during
the same period. Thus, the act of sealing
off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines
must be considered as an integral part of
any plan to prevent supplies from reach-
ing enemy foices in the Republic of
Vietnam. ?
The State
Department's Answer
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
resumption of an interdiction campaign
similar to that carried, ,o-ut in Route
Package I between July and 1 November
1968 would assure almost total interdic-
tion of truck and waterborne movement
of supplies .into the demilitarized zone
and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and
interdiction of Regional Package II to
Thanh Hao would further enhance this
effort.
Commitment of B-52 forces following
heavy and ? unrestricted suppression of
defenses by fighters, could reduce the
amount of time to accomplish the above.
Although the North Vietnamese have
established a significant by-pass capability,
the transportation nets remain vulnerable
at many key points. The locomotive
population could be attrited quickly if all
buffer restrictions were removed near the,
Chinese border.
There is not sufficient data available at
this time on either the cost or the
effectiveness of an air campaign against'
these land lines to reach a firm conclu-
sion as to the chances of isolating NVN
from her neighbors. Past attempts to eut
rail, road, and water networks in NVN
have met with considerable difficulties. It
has been estimated that a minimum of
6,000 attack sorties per month would be
required against the two rail lines from
China. Even at this level of effort, the
North Vietnamese could continue to -use
the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they
were willing to devote sufficient man-
power to repair and tran;thiprnent opera-
tions Interdiction of the road system
OIARIS@e2Q913/4a0411iICK-RWEtlic
?
bombing halt north-of 19? in April 1968,
The crux of this question is the defini-,
tion of "war-essential imports." There is
room for considerable disagreement on
this subject; but in our judgement, the
category of war-essential imports should
include most of the economic aid pro-
vided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well
as nearly all of their purely military aid.
ligaVbilcdOitoelotir,
ntaonmtiethaaind
military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a
"; ff
going concern. (During 1968, economic kriss"' tually unlimited 'capacity for this It shou" e noted, .in conclusion, that
aid- totaled some $340AppErawhia Efar Eve20@atilV034iCIAADP84-G04$ 1100(10080690the advisa-
tary aid about $540 million). In fact, it ical considerations of transport capacities bility ? of closing Haiphong, nor the ques-
can probably be assumed that all North and did not give adequate weight to the tion of the Soviet and Chinese responses.
Vietnamese imports in the past few years very real difficulties the North Viet- These matters, clearly the most central
have been directly related to the war names? have experienced in handling im- problems, lie outside the terms of refer-
effort. The regime would not have used ports even when Haiphong was relatively ence of Question 28 (d).
its sparse funds and credits, or burdened untouched. It is true that these diffi-
its .strained transport system, with non- culties were overcome; but to our knowl-
essential goods. edge there is no evidence that Hanoi
Food imports constitute a growing would be able to deal as. successfully with
percentage of total imports, in 1968 the closing of Haiphong and heavy
All of the war-essential imparts could be
brought into North Vietnam over rail
China. We therefore believe that inter-
largest category of imports. This reflect. lines or roads from China in the event
diction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on
. the steady decline in crop acreages and that imports. by sea were successfully
the rail lines from China would over time
yields that began in 1965 and has denied. The disruption to imports, if
prevent North Viet-Nam from receiving
continued through the present. The. P. seaborne imports were cut off, would be
sufficient economic and military aid to
importance of food imports can hardly be widespread but temporary. Within two or
continue the war effort. But it would be
overstated; even with them, North Viet- three months North Vietnam and its allies
difficult to quantify this, since it depends
Nam. has been forced to strictly ration would be able to implement alternative.
on the type and intensity of interdiction.
-foodstuffs on the official market and procedure's for maintaining the flow of
On. the other hand, one important
progressivelY to reduce the composition essential economic and military imports.
point should be kept in mind. The North .
of the rice ration so that at present it The uninterrupted capacities of the rail-
Vietnamese surprised many observers, and
consists .60 percent of rice substitutes
such as domestic corn ? and imported confounded many predictions, by holding
the North together and simultaneously
wheat. In -addition,, a thriving black
sending ever-increasing amounts of sup-
market has grown up, dealing in food-
personnel into the South during
stuffs (and other 'items as well) and plies' and
31/2 -years of bombing. It is clear that the
. involving large numbers of D?RV. lower
bombing campaign, as conducted, did .not
level. officials and cadres, as well as
live up to the expectations of many of
average citizens. ?
proponents. With this experience in
Economic aid has been essential in its
mind, there is little reason to believe that
keeping North Viet-Nam afloat; under
new bombing will accomplish what pre-
? present conditions it is extremely doubt- new
bombings failed to do, unless it is
ful that Hanoi could dispense with any
conducted with much greater intensity
substantial portion of this aid.
and readiness to defy criticism and risk
The question becomes, therefore,
of escalation. .
"Could North Viet-Nam continue to re-
aid and nearly all of the military aid it is T
?ccive and distribute most of the economic
his brings us to .the second part of
the question, "What would happen if
now obtaining from foreign suppliers if
Hanoi could not obtain sufficient war-
Haiphong and . other keY ports were
essential imports, as defined earlier?"
closed and if the road and rail lines from
Here again, there does not seem to be
? China were heavily bombed?" A second
any quantifiable answer; we- are reduced
question is: "What would happen if it
,to educated estimates. If we arbitrarily
could not?"
that . 'nearly all military aid
To begin with, it must be noted that assume
reached North Viet-Nam (because it is
In practical terms it would be impossible
relatively compact and? could be trans-
to deny all imports by sea. Even if the
ported by a small number of freight cars
one principal port (Haiphong) and the
or a larger number of trucks, and because
two secondary ports (Cam Pha and lion
it a high priority) but that only. Off
Gai) were closed, there would still be
of the economic aid did, we think- that
twelve minor ports as well as numerous
strenuous exertions and considerable
coastal Aransshipment points suitable for by
belt-tightening the North Vietnamese
over-the-beach off-loading. , Lightering
could continue on their present course
operations would permit an indeterminate
for perhaps at most two years more.
amount of supplies to enter North Viet" for
that time, barring a ceasefire or
Nam from the sea. It is nearly certain,
protracted lull in the fighting in South
however, that these minor ports and Viet-Nam (either of which would greatly
transshipment points Could not handle ease Hanoi's burdens), we would estimate
imports
anything like the present volume of that Hanoi would be forced (1) to make
going into Haiphong. is
concessions e..ions to the US in order to get
estimated that '85 percent of the total aid Haiphong reopened, ? or (2) at least to
to Hanoi arrives ? by sea, i.e., through reduce the scale of the war in the South
Haiphong. Almost all of this is economic to manageable proportions, perhaps by
aid,. since military supplies are generally reverting to .political struggle backed by
believed to come overland via China.) terrorism and selected guerrilla operations
We do not believe that the capacity of vs,hich did not require' Northern aid 'and
the DRV-CPR road and rail network is personnel. Of course, other factors such
great enough to permit an adequate flow as manpower shortages would figure in
The CIA's Answer
replacing general cargo as the single attacks on lines of communication from
road, highway, and river connections with
China are about 16,000 tons per day,
more than two and a half times the
6,300 tons per. day of total imports
overland and by sea in 1968, when the
volume reached an all-time high. Ex-
perience in North Vietnam has shown
that an intensive effort to interdict
ground transport routes by air attack
alone can be successful for only brief
pe'riods because of the redundancy of
transport routes,' elaborate and effective
countermeasures, and unfavorable flying
weather.
Almost four years-of air war in North
Vietnam have shown?as did the Korean
War?that, although air strikes will destroy '
transport facilities, equipment, and sup-
plies, they cannot successfully, interdict
the flow of supplies because much of the
damage can frequently be repaired within
hours. Two principal rail lines connect
Hanoi with Communist China, with .a
? combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a
day. Eight primary highway routes cross
the China border, having a combined.
capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In
addition, the Red River flows out of
China and has a capacity averaging 1,500
Cons per day.
An intensive and sustained 'air interdic-
tion program could have a good chance
of reducing the northern rail capacity by
at least half. However, roads are less
vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways
even less so. In the June-August 1967 air
attacks?a previous high point of US
interdiction efforts against targets in the
northern part of North. Vietnam?the
transport system Was able to function
effectively.* Strikes. in August 1967
against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line
were effective in stopping through service
for a total of only ten days. Strikes
during this period against the highways
that parallel the Dong Dang line showed
no insignificant [sic] or sustained reduc-
of supplies in the face of an intense da ? tion of capacity. The Hanoi-Lao CM rail
Y the same time-frame.
and night bombing ApprovedinForrRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499001,0004100130840on of the
view, earlier analyses which have claimed
1-nue'd
?
. .4 or parachuted operations agai--
the Soviet Union. HeApjareivactE
dispatched a large team of agents .into
Hungary when Imre Nagy took power
in October, 1956, accompanied by "a
well-armed shock unit from the CIA's
private army in Germany." During the
1953 uprising in East Germany, ac-
cording to Cookridge, Gehlen directed
the movement of his East Berlin agents
from street to street by radio. He used
tire facilities of Radio Free Europe,
both the staff and the equipment, for
bis own purposes whenever it suited
him, with the diligent ? support of
American. officers from the "Office of
Policy. Co-Ordination." He spied elab-
orately on Britain and France and,
through American military installations
in WeSt Germany; on the United States
itself. '
Mr. Cookridge takes a robust, un-
'critical view .of the cold war. If the
Reds get it in the neck, he cheers, and,
being a sportsman, he gives some
applause to the best-managed triumphs
? of the other side. This approach misses
some points. For instance, he gives a
dcsagreeably lip-smacking aecount of
the huge sentence handed out to
Teodor Szczendzielorz, a member of a
Polish spy ring who was the first agent
to be tried by a West German court. It
would have done Mr. Cookridge credit
not to have gloated over this case. The
agent, like his master Colonel Kowal-
ski, was a noncommunist Pole who had
been in his country's service before the
war. 'Wet Germany was rearming with
the declared intention of seizing back a
third of his country's territory. In such
Circumstances, Szczendzielorz and his
colleagues deserve . some . honor or at
least understanding for what they did.
But .in the later Fifties, Gehlen's
outfit began to show signs of age. The
East Germans methodically infiltrated
and rolled up his best networks there,
and agent after BND agent appeared?at
East Berlin press conferences to con-
fess , his sins. Gehlen's reports became
wilder and less reliable, and his organi-
zation became dangerously cozy (Pro-
fessor Trevor-Roper, in his preface to
Time General Was a 'Spy, points out
that all intelligence services require
constant change and renewal if they
are not to fossilize). There followed
two _disasters.
In 1962, as Defense Minister, Strauss
arranged for the arrest of the Spiegel
editors for alleged disclosure of mili-
tary 'secrets, and had the Spiegel
building searched. Gehlen, who disliked
Strauss, had to sonhe_ still cliippted
degree been in touMPRFRIYeV-
moreover, an emissary from head-
ease 2008/1112/03 halArgQ&'84T90.1910PCRIlig01PRPP50 blamed for
authors with the series of articles in everything. Allied spooks, who after all
question. ?Adenauer had Gehlen put him at the head of the BND, have
brought to Bonn and, in a moment of been almost equally hysterical about
fury, ordered his arrest. Cehleta, stut- the Soviet menace and the Ostpolitik.
tering with terror, managed to argue Not long after Gehlen retiree, the CIA
his way out of this, but his relation. asked Pullach for surveillance on Her-
ship.with Adenauer never recovered. bert Wehner, a senior Social Democrat
The second disaster was the dis- minister whom the CIA supposed to be
covery that Felfe, one of ,Gehlen's a KGB agent (the request was thrown
senior desk officers at Punch, had into the shredder, which at least shows
been for years an East German agent. that the BND's sense, of political
Felfe was a German hero of his times. realism Is improving). And when the
He and his accomplices, Clemens and Social Democrats came to power in
?
Tiebel, were old SS men from Dresden, 1969, the Allied intelligence services
now in the East, who regarded both temporarily ' stopped sharing informa-
half-states of Germany as impostors tion with the BND on the assumption
with fat wallets. In his long career as a that the new government would leak it
double agent, Felfe sold the East to East Berlin or Moscow. Suggestively,
Germans tens of thousands of secret that story appears in the proof copy of
documents (confirming one's suspicion Hohne and Zoning's book, but has
that both Germanies know so much been removed from the bound copy.
about each other that they are unable Part of the trouble lay in the
to make sense out of the mass of original deal with the Americans. They
information, a common intelligence allowed an intelligence service to be
paradox). His trial in 1963, with its headed by a professional who was
revelations of corruption and incom- politically illiterate. This did not mat-
petence, and its suggestion that Pullach ter, perhaps, while the CIA used
was a nature reserve 'for old Nazis, Gehlen simply as a source Of raw
brought the whole liberal press down information. But when he became
on Gehlen. Ad en auer's full-blown intelligence
The Felfe affair was a terrible blow, chief, this weakness was catastrophic.
from which Gehlen's reputation never Much extraordinary information came
recovered. While the BND continued to to Gehlen in the. postwar years, only
subvert Middle Eastern scientists, pre- to be evaluated by .middle-a,ged,...gentle-
pare "glowing pictures of Latin Ameri- men whose outlook on the world had
can military dictatorships," and send been formed in the service of the
the government intelligende digests full Third Reich. One of the sanest coin-
of information that ministers had al- ments on the cold war' is, that such
feady seen in their morning papers, the evaluations could seem reasonable to
decision was gradually taken that Geh- the leaders of the West.
len must go. This itself turned into a
long, dirty fight. Chancellor Erhard
threw the BND men out of the
Chancellery, where they had lodged
themselves like bats in an 'attic. Chan-
cellor Kiesinger ordered a full report
into the BND, which revealed among
other facts that Gehlen had given no,
fewer than sixteen of his relations
posts in the service. The old man's
intelligence career drew to an ignomini-
ous close. Ambitious to the end, he
now runs a Protestant church mission
in Catholic-Bavaria.
Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
0
. HARPER'S
Approved Fc$1446lease 26TYMATCIA-RDP84-004S401000100005-0
DI LOMATIC
NOTES
The Ten Commandments of
the foreign-affairs bureaucracy
by Leslie H. Gelb
and Morton H. Halperin
Ill HE AVERAGE READER of the New
U. York Times in the 1950s must
have asked: why don't we take some
of our troops out of?Europe? Ike him-
self said we didn't need them all
there. Later, in 1961, after the tragi-
comic Bay of Pigs invasion, the
readvr . asked: how did President
Kennedy ever decide to do such a
? damn fool thing? Or later about Viet-
nam: why does President Johnson
keep. on -bombing North , Vietnam
when the bombing prevents negotia-
tions and doesn't get Hanoi to stop
the. fighting?- ?
Sometimes the answer to these
questions is simple. It can be attrib-
uted squarely to the President. He
thinks it's right. Or he believeslie has
no choice. As often as not, though,
the answer lies elsewhere----in the spe-
cial -interests and procedures Of the
bureadcracy and the convictions of
the bureaucrats:
If you look at foreign policy as a
largely: rational process of gathering
information, setting the alternatives,
defining the national interest, and
making- decisions, then much of what
the President does will not make
sense. But if you look at foreign.
policy as bureaucrats pursuing orga-
nizational, Tessonal, and, domestic
political interests, as well as their own
beliefs about what is right, you can
explain much of the ,inexplicable.
In pursuing these interests and be-
liefs, bureaucrats (and that means
?everyone from Cabinet officials to
political appointees to .career ? civil
servants) usually follow their own
version of the Ten Commandments:
1. Don't discuss domestic 'pol-
itics on issues involving war and
peace'. .
.
On May 11, 1948, President if
? Truman held a meet PPRYV
r r
?ssst.t..,
t.
------
7 1
new. state of Israel. Secretary of State
George Marshall and State Under-
secretary Robert Lovett spoke first.
They were' against it. It would un-'
necessarily alienate forty million
Arabs. Truman next asked Clark
Clifford, then Special Counsel to the
President, to speak. Arguing for the
moral element of U.S. policy and
the need to contain Communism in .
the Middle East, Clifford favored rec-
ognition. As related by Dan Kurzman
in Genesis 1948, Marshall exploded:
"Mr. President, this is not a matter to
be determined on the basis of politics.
Unless politics were involved, Mr.
Clifford would not . even be at this
conference. This is a serious matter
of foreign policy determination . . ."
.Clifford remained at the meeting, and
after some hesitation, the U.S, rec-
ognized
The moral merits of U.S. support
of Israel _ notwithstanding, no one
doubts Jewish influence on Washing-
ton's policy toward the Middle East.
And yet, years later, in their memoirs,
both Truman and Dean Acheson de-
nied at great length that the decision
to recognize the state of Israel was
in any way affected by U.S. domestic
? politics.
A powerful myth is at work here.
It holds that national security is too
important, too sacred, to be tainted
by crass domestic political considera-
tions. It is a matter of lives and the.
defend themselves? Yet the myth
makes it bad form for government
officials to talk about domestic poli-
tics (except to friends and to repor-
ters off the record) or even to write
about politics later iii their memoirs.
. And what is bad form on the inside
would .be politically disastrous if it
were leaked to the outside. Imagine
the press getting hold of a secret goV-
enunent document that said: "Presi-
dent Nixon has decided te visit China
to capture the peace issue for the '72
elections. He does not intend or ex-
pect anything of substance to be
achieved by his trip?except to scare
the Russians a little." Few things are
more serious than the 'charge otplay-
ing politics with security.
Nevertheless, the President pays ?a
price for the silence imposed by the
myth. One cost is that. the President's
assumptions about what public opin-
ion will and will not Support are never
questioned. No official, for example,
ever dared to write a scenario for
President Johnson showing him how
to forestall the right-wing McCarthy-
ite reaction he feared if the U.S.
pulled out of Vietnam. Another cost
is that bureaucrats, in their ignorance
of Presidential views, will use their
own notions of ?domestic politics to
screen information from the. Presi-
dent or to eliminate options from his
consideration.
safety of the nation. Votes and in- 2. Say what will convince, not
fluence at home should count for- what you believe.
nothing. Right? Wrong. National se- In the early months of the Kennedy
curity and domestic reactions are in- Administration, CIA officials respon-
separable. What could be clearer than sible for covert operations faced a
the fact that President Nixon's Viet- difficult challenge. President Eisen-
nam.trodp reductions are geared more hower had permitted them to begin
to American public opinion than to training a group of Cuban refugees
the readiness of the Saigon forces .to for an American-supported invasion
3(iR lidaset243031121/001 .141.4A5-RDIa844304991I(Cr 161?6510 order to carry
irt e
House .to discuss recognition .of the national-security hureauaraci. proval from a skeptical new President
Institution and form fir f theout t p an, they then had to win ap-
 4", ?
whose entourageNitliffdivedornikeffie d'ablagoitymbioatix loAdRumat4,o0449" ogoldootistike was "in feasibljf'
mend rejection because it will lead
to a Communist victory in Vietnam.
Option B?Bomb a little more each
time and seek negotiations (even
though the bombing was preventing
negotiations). Turn more of the fight-
ing over to the 'Saigon forces and
send more U.S. troops (even though
the American buildup obviated the
need for the South Vietnamese to
shoulder more of the burden). Press
Saigon for reforms and give them all
they want for the war effort .( even
though aid without conditions gave
Saigon no incentive to reform). Op-
tion B triumphed.
Option B solves a lot of problems
for the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats do
not like to fight with each other. Op-
tion B makes everybody a winner (by
letting everyone do the essence of
what he wants), preserves the policy
consensus, and provides ultimate
comfort to the bureaucrat?deference
to his expertise and direct responsi-
bility. Very few will be.so dissatisfied
as to take their case to. the public.
Unfortunately, while this process
allows the President to keep his house
happy, it also robs him of choice.
The alternatives he is .given are of-
ten phony, two ridiculous extremes
and a jumbled, inconsistent "middle
course." Unless a President knows
enough and has the time to peel off
the real alternatives from within Op-
tion B, he ends up being trapped by
the unanimity of advice.
erals" likely to oppose it. The CIA
director, Allen Dulles, and his assist-
ant, Richard Bissell, both veteran
bureaucrats, moved effectively to iso-
late the opposition. By highlighting
.the extreme sensitivity of the opera-
-Lion, they persuaded Kennedy to ex-
clude from deliberations most of the
experts in State and the CIA itself,
and many of the Kennedy men in the
White House. They reduced the ef-
fectiveness of others by refusing to
leave any papers behind to be an-
alyzed; they swept in, presented their
case, and swept -out; taking every-
thing with them. But there remained
the problem of the skeptical Presi-
dent. Kennedy feared that if the
operation was a complete failure he
would look very bad. Dulles and Bis-
sell assured him that complete failure
was impossible. If the invasion force
could not establish a beachhead, the,
refugees, well-trained in guerrilla
warfare, would head for the nearby
mountains. The assurances were per-
suasive, the only difficulty being that
.they were false. Less than a third of
the force had had any guerrilla train-
ing; the nearby mountains were sep-
arated from the landing beach by
an almost impenetrable swamp; and
none of the invasion leaders was in-
structed to head for the hills if the
invasion failed ( the CIA had prom-
ised them American intervention).
Kennedy was told what would per-
suade him, not the truth or even what
the CIA believed to be true. Bureau-
crats like Dulles and Bissell are con-
fident that they know what the na-
tional security requires. The problem
is to convince an uninformed and
busy President. To do that you do not
carefully explain the reasoning that
leads to your position, nor do you
reveal any doubts you may have.
Rather you seek to figure out what the
President's problem is as he sees it
and to convince hip that what you
want to do will solve it.
?
3. Support the consensus?
Option B.
Vietnam policy under President
Johnson exemplified the concept of
Option B. The papers to the President
?went something like this: Option A?
Use maximum force (bomb Hanoi
and Haiphong and invade North
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia ). Rec-
4. Veto other options.
*Former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, summoned by President
Kennedy to join the Executive Com-
mittee of the National Security Coun-
cil debate on Soviet missiles in Cuba,
favored a "surgical strike," a limited
air attack designed simply to destroy
the missiles before they could become
operational. Each time the military
was asked to come in with a plan for
a surgical strike, they asserted that a
limited air strike could not destroy all
the missiles?despite their having the
capability to do so. Instead, they pro-
duced a plan for their favored optien
?an all-out air assault on Cuba cli-
maxed by a ground invasion. Their
plan had something in it for each ser-
vice?the Air Force and Navy would
pound the island by sea and air, the
Marines would storm ashore as the
tit part because they assumed that
Soviet missiles were "mobile" (i.e.,
capable of being moved in a few
hours) rather than "movable" (i.e.,
their actual capability of being
moved in a few days). Kennedy was
intrigued by the surgical-strike op-
tion and met with the commander of
the Tactical Air Command. 'When the
commander solemnly assured the
President face-to-face that the option
was "infeasible," Kennedy with great
reluctance abAndoned it.
"Infeasibility" is one technique to
disqualify an option; demanding full
authority is another. Early in his ad-
ministration, Kennedy confronted a
deteriorating situation in Laos. He
was reluctant to commit any Ameri-
can forces, but neither was he pre-
pared to have ?Laos overrun. At a
critical White House meeting he
asked the military What could be done
with various levels of force. The
Joint Chiefs' answer was clear. They
would not recommend any landing of
American forces and couldguarantee
nothing unless the President was pre-
pared to authorize the use of nuclear
weapons whenever, in their judg-
ment, that use was required. Kennedy
reluctantly decided not to send any
forces' to Laos.
5. Predict dire consequences.
With the Chinese Communist guns
firing at the. tiny island of Quemoy
three miles from the mainland and
an invasion' expected momentarily,
President Eisenhower's principal ad-
visers met to frame a recommenda-
tion. The problem, as they saw it, was
to formulate an argument that would.
persuade the President that the U.S.
must defend Quemoy. The advisers
resorted to the prediction of dire con-
sequences, recognizing that only if
the alternative could be shown to be
'very adverse to American interests
would Eisenhower agree to the use of,
force. They warned the President
that, in their unanimous judgment, if ,
he permitted Quemoy to be captured,
"the consequences in the Far East
would be more far-reaching and cata-
strophic than those which followed
when the United States allowed the
Chinese mainland to be taken over
by the Chinese Communists."
Did Eisenhower reject this predic-
tion as absurd? On the contrary,- he
ommend rejection on the ground that Aria rratroopers descended----and acce ted it and defended Quemoy.
the Soviets anhaPiRPM iNRPsqI; A 113IPA44IPWRI?liEtalle9Q49AR0011 1iK1495ricIties of international
respond. Option C?Immediate uni- . as they chose. The military insisted politics are so great that it is difficult
nedy authorized Air Ktwiegbf eiriAe
Soviet ships. And despite the Presi-
dent's order to halt all provocative in-
telligence, an American U-2 plane
entered Soviet airspace at the height
of the crisis. When Kennedy began to
'realize that he was not in full control,
he asked his Secretary of Defense to
see if he could find out just what the
Navy was doing. McNamara then.
made his first visit to the Navy com-
mand post in the Pentagon. In a ,
heated exchange, the Chief of Naval
Operations suggested that McNamara
return to his office and let the Navy
run the blockade.
Bureaucrats know that the Presi-
dent and his principal associates do
not have the time or the information
to monitor compliance with all Presi-
dential orders-. Often, the bureaucrats
can simply delay or do-nothing, and
no one will notice. If the President is
actively involved, they may find it
necess'ary to obey the letter, but not
the spirit, .of his orders. As Henry
inger observed to a journalist
the problem is not to know
at to do,. but rather to figure out
how to get the bureaUcracy to do it.
9. Don't tell likely opponents
about a good thing.
The cOmmandments discussed
thus far have all dealt with relations
between ' the gepartments and the
White House. When issues get that
far, one of the. fundamental rules has
already been violated: keep issues
away from the President. Bureau-
crats prefer to be left alone to do their
own thins. They Will not voluntarily
bring issues to the attention of the
President (or senior officials) unless
they conclude that he is likely to rule
in their favor in a conflict with an-
other agency. Consider the case of
surplus and long supply arms trans-
fers to other countries.
One of Secretary McNamara's
goals in the Pentagon was to reduce
the level of militziry assistance, par-
ticularly to countries that did not
need the weapons and could -afford to
pay for what they needed. A prime
objective was Taiwan. McNamara
and his office of International Secu-
rity Affairs engaged in a yearly bat-
tle with the State Department and
the military over the level of aid to
Taiwan. The White House was drawn
in because a number of influential
Congressmen were Atrorrisa o
mprteisei
Of to Taiwan. un year in the
1960; a battle raged over whether
?
elkalia,200/3M/P $fIliAnRIDR84-00.4,4140%101/4111111005vOre not persuasive
million in military assistance. During either, but he did not resign over?
the ? same Year, the military quietly Vietnam and did not take his case to
shipped to Taiwan more than $40 the public. No one resigned over Viet-
million worth of military equipment, nam policy. Indeed, there seems to be.
which the Pentagon had labeled "ex- no evidence that any civilian official
cess or long supply." No senior has resigned over any foreign-policy
civilian .official was aware of the fact matter.sinee World War II.
that these transfers were taking place, The only officials with a record for
and no junior official aware of what resigning are the professional mill-
was going on felt obliged to report tary. Generals Ridgeway, Taylor, and
up. Thus while senior officials argued Powers are notable examples. What is
over irrelevant ceilings on expendi- more, they toui? the hustings, write
tures, Taiwan got more aid than any- books, and complain out loud. Mili-
one realized. tary officers feel strongly about the
Observers sometimes assume that interests of their military organiza7
the bureaucracy bucks the hard tion and often believe that if the
choices to the President. Nothing people of the Country only knew. "the:
could be further from the truth. Left truth," they would support the mili-
alone, the bureaucracy will settle as tary's position. With this record on
many issues as it can by leaving each resigning and going to the public,- it
organization free to act as it chooses, is no wonder.' the military has been so
When and if the President learns of influential in Presidential decisions.
an issue, bureaucrats will try to in- But again, it is the President and
corporate current behavior into "Op- the nation who ultimately suffer. If-
tian B." the President remains confident that-
? none of his civilian advisers will re-
sign and take their, case to the public,
he has little incentive ever-to question
his own. assumption's.
10. Don't fight the consensus and
don't resign over policy.
If . an official strongly disagrees
with a . consensus or dislikes a key
man behind the consensus, he might
chance-a leak to the press. But frontal rpm TEN COMMANDMENTS POSE a
assaults on a consensus happen only serious problem for a President,
rarely. In the summer of 1965, who is after all the one who got
Undersecretary . of ? State George Ball elected . and has the responsibility.
wa$ among the first to confirm this Truman understood the problem but
fact with respect to the poliey of feared that Eisenhowd would not.
bombing North Vietnam. Ball thought But evidence abounds that ,President
-U.S. bombing of the North was folly Eisenhower, precisely because of his
?and worse than that, would only background in Army politics and in-
stiffen Hanoi's will: But he did not ternational military negotiations, was
propose a unilateral cessation. In a far from a novice. President Kennedy
TV interview last year, Ball explained, was quite expert and- attuned .to the
himself as follows: "What I was ways of the bureaucracy?especially
proposing was something which I after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. His fa-
thought had a fair chance of being mous calls to State Department desk
persuasive . . . if I had Said let's pull off cials made the point well. Presi-
out overnight or do something of this dent Johnson was a master of such
kind, I obviously wouldn't have been maneuvering. Even as he stepped up
persuasive at all. They'd have said the bombing of North Vietnam he
'the man's mad.' " would ?say, "I won't let those Air
Ball's remarks express at once the Force generals bomb the smallest out-
futility of resisting agreed policy and house north, of the 17th parallel With-
the bureaucrat's concern for his per- out checking with me. The generals_
sonal effectiveness. Ball knew he know -only two words?spend and
could not convince anyone if he re- bomb."
vealed. his true beliefs. He knew. he The Nixon-Kissinger team is
wonld have been dismissed as "mad" second to none in its sensitivity to
and would not have been in a position bureaucratic behavior. The elaborate
to argue another day. So, he tem- National Security Council decision-
pered his arguments and went along, making apparatus they established is
T ag Aatilygowea,4fAa_kpliy8k_o66499Brabwa, ptiv,k4kti,White House con-
preserve his drat weness. Imene bytifMaIley. Their system
As it turned out, Ball's More mod- is designed to neutralize, narrow or-
nt)
4-
to disprove any ippriliokied FniAr20&3912i103UCIA4RD14440049
puts the President in a bind. If he troops would be to risk political dis-
fails to act and things go badly, the
overruled advisers are likely to leak
their warnings. In fact, much of the
dialogue within the government is in
terms of worst cases. An advocate
who does not warn of extreme con-
sequences is often viewed as not
seriously supporting his prediction.
6. Argue timing, not substance.
Although the advocates of the Bay
of Pigs landing had convinced Presi-
dent Kennedy that the invasion of
Cuba was worth a try, they recog-
nized that they were not yet in the
cleai: they still had to persuade the
President to act immediately. Presi-
dents arc, in the eyes of bureaucrats,
notorious for putting off decisions or
changing their minds. They have
enough decisions ? to, make without
looking for additional ones. In many
cases, all the options look bad and
they. prefer to wait. The Bay of Pigs
plan called for .an effective "now or
never" 'argument, ? and the CIA rose
to the occasion. The agency told Ken-
nedy that the invasion force was, at
the peak of its effectiveness; any de-
lay, and it would decline in morale.
and capability. More important, it
warned the President that a liast.ship-
meat of Soviet arms was on the way
to Cuba; the Castro forces would soon
have such superior weapons that sub-
stantial American combat involve-
? ment would be necessary to bail
out the anti-Castro Cuban invaders.
Faced with these arguments, Ken-
nedy gave the order to proceed.
ConyerSely, when a President
wants to act, bureaucrats can stymie
him by arguing that "now is not
the time." President Eisenhower re-
ported. in his memoirs that he came
into office believing, after having
served ? as commander of the allied
forces in Europe, that the United
States should withdraw most of its
forces there; he left office eight years
later still believing that the U.S. had
far too many troops assigned to
NATO. Seeretary of State John
Foster Dulles knew better than to
argue with the military substance of
General Eisenhower's position. In-
stead he argued timing. Each time
Eisenhower raised the issue, Dulles
pointed to some current NATO diffi-
culty. This was, he would argue, a
integration. The moment for troop
withdrawals never arrived. To this
day, pressures for some American
withdrawals from Europe have been
headed off by the same ploy.
7. Leak what you don't like.
We had a glimpse of this phenome-
non last January with the publication
of the Andergon Papers, in ,which we
read about Henry Kissinger warning
his State, Defense, and CIA col-
leagues: "The President does not be-
lieve we are carrying out his wishes.
He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan.
He feels everything we do comes out
otherwise." And, "The President is
under the 'illusion' that he is giving
instructions; not that he is merely be-
ing kept apprised of affairs as they
progress." The President's subordi-
nates disagreed with the President's
policy toward the India-Pakistan
crisis. They were undermining him
by resisting his orders and then by
leaking his policy. He knew it and
did not like it; but apparently could
not do much about it.
Although leaking the. texts of
many documents, ..a la Pentagon and
Anderson papers, is relatively rare;
much classified information regularly
makes its way into the press. Presi-
dents are surprised not when some-
thing leaks but rather when any hot
item remains out of the press for even
a few days. Providing- information to
the press?whether in press confer-
ences, backgroumders, or leaks?is
the main route by ? which officials
within the executive branch bring
their supporters in the Congress and
the interested public into action.
Only bureaucrats with potential out-
side support are tempted to leak. In
some cases, it is sufficient to leak the
fact that an issue is up for decision:
in others, what is leaked is informa-
tion on the positions of key partici-
pants. In many instances sufficient
factual material must be leaked to
convince Congressmen and others to
join the fray.
Presidents don't like leaks ? by
others and complain, about them
whenever they occur, often asking the
FBI to run down the culprit. Such
efforts almost always fail. ?
8. Ignore orders you don't like.
critical moment in the life of the alh- On March 20, 1918., President
ance in which one 4PRE91,10 filArliaelEIMPry2M-YriCgs-AATAR1845901.9
country was experiencing a domestic.
9a"RIVIRR?and began scan-
ning the morning newspapers. He
,was astonished to read that his am-
bassador to the United Nations, War-
ren Austin, had told the Security
Council the previous day that `.`there
seems to be general agreement that
the plan [for the partition of Pales-
tine] cannot now be implemented by
peaceful means." Truman had agreed
to no such thing. He was firmly com-
mitted to partition and on the pre-
vious day had reiterated his support
in a private meeting with Chaim
Weizmann, the leader of worldwide
Zionism. Austin and the Arabists in
the State Department did not know
about the meeting with Weizinann,
but they knew that the President
wanted partition and believed that it
could be carried, out peacefully. Aus-
tin and his associates had no doubts
about what. the President wanted;
they simply felt no obligation to do
what he wanted them to do.
At the end of his term in office,
Truman was acutely conscious of the
limited ability of Presidents to .have
their orders obeyed; and he worried
about his successor. "Poor Ike," he
was heard to muse, "he'll sit here and
say do this and do that and nothing
will happen." And so it continues.
During the first week of the Cuban
missile crisis, in October 1962, an
adviser warned Kennedy that the
Russians were likely to demand that
the United States withdraw its mis-
siles from Turkey in return for the
Soviet withdrawal of its Missiles from
Cuba. Kennedy was astonished.
Months before, he had ordered the
missiles removed from .Turkey and
could not believe they were still there.
Most students of the Cuban missile
crisis have emphasized the qegl..ce to
which Kennedy controlled every de-
tail of what the American Govern-
ment did. However, a closer look by
Graham Allison, in Ms book on the
crisis, Essence of Decision, has shown.
that the, bureaucracy was behaving'
otherwise, choosing to obey the
orders it liked and ignore or stretch.
others. Thus, after a tense argument
with the Navy, Kennedy ordered the
blockade line moved closer to Cuba
so that the Russians might have more
time to draw back. having lost the
argument with the President, the
Navy simply ignored his order. Unbe-
knownst to Kennedy, the Navy was
94kboaltooffemcfmr..big Soviet sub-
marines to surface long before Ken-
ed
A
Approved Rao Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00410/12001000100005-0
ganizational interests (meaning the
viewpoints of State and Defense),
force the bureaucracy to suggest real
alternatives and provide more accu-
rate information (meaning, as has.
been done, to centralize the intelli-
gence functions around Kissinger).
While this new system has been an
improvement in some respects over
The past, it has decisive costs and
limitations. It has totally demoralized
the State Department. The Depart-
ment's expertise has been for naught,
and its exclusion had led to a rash
of pointless leaks from disgruntled
Foreign Service Officers. With all its
reins on the bureaucrat, the new sys-
tem did not prevent part of the
bureaucracy from tilting the "wrong
way" (meaning against the President,
as revealed in the Anderson papers)
in the recent India-Pakistan crisis.
The problem, then, boils down to
this: given the fact that the President
cannot either chain the system or en-
tirely work around it without serious
costs, and given the judgment that a
President strong enough to collar the
bureaucracy would be too strong for
the good of the n'ation, is there a
better way to make foreign policy?
The answer is yes?probably. The
President, we think, should make a
determined effort, to use the system.
The personal and organizational in-
terests of the bureaucrat are a reality.
So are the different viewpoints on
what is good policy. Tic President's
main 'theme of operation should be to
force bureaucratic difference out
into the open. Pick strong and able
men to lead State and Defense. Let
them use their judgment and be advo-
cates for their organizations. Encour-
age debate and contention rather than
asking for agreed upon recommenda-
tions. Such tactics may be the only
way for the President to ferret out
hidden or conflicting information
and to leave himself with real choices.
Perhaps, in tbe. end, neither this
suggested system nal' any system will
produce better kcisions. Perhaps
better decisions really depend on be-
liefs and events .and guesses. But a
fuller, more honest and open treat-
ment of the bureaucracy might make
.for more honest and open treatment
of the American people. Presidents
might be less inclined to spend a good
deal of their time denying differences
and hiding policy. This would mean
less deception and IARIVo4d1ftosnRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
What better reason for trying it? 0
WORM REPORT
Approved Fotrtilkelease 2003/12/0 :ZU-1413?)84-0040a1001000100005-0
HOW. U. KE
N 'THE R
Thanks to aerial surveillance
and space-borne cameras, the
world is now virtually an open
book to U.. S. They've become
vital tools of American policy.
? President Nixon, directing war moves
in Southeast Asia and peace moves with
Russia, has at his -fingertips a major
weapon brought to a peak of reliability
during his Administration.
The weapon is this: a constant flow of
aerial photographs providing, in minute
detail, the kind of intelligence informa-
tion that no previous President was able
to Count on.
? Over. North Vietnam, reconnaissance
pilots flying at altitudes of 10 miles or
more are able to. take pictures that can
distinguish between tank models, show
the types of trucks and artillery pieces,
expose troops in camouflaged bunkers?
and even count rifles.
Over Russia, reconnaissance satellites
orbiting at 100 miles up?or more. than
300 miles?can detect the construction
of rocket sites- and the firing of missiles.
From .their pictures, aircraft at- landing
strips can be identified. The most ef-
fective cameras, from 100 miles, can
depict objects two feet' in diameter and
show the writing on billboards.
"Silent army." Such surveillance
intelligence?when properly interpreted
?is seen as a major key both to the fight-
ing in Vietnam and the possibility of an
arms-control pact with Russia. Behind
the information fed to the President is a
silent army of intelligence specialists
using ricw advances in photography,
aeronautics and space technology.
Southeast Asia, these technicians
depend heavily on reconnaissance planes
and pilotless drones for the pictures they
aced. Space satellites are used for back-
up material.
Worldwide, however, the important
business of keeping tabs on the Russian
and Communist Chinese nuclear-missile
build-up rests primarily with the space
satellites. Aircraft give better pictures at
lower cost. But, since the incident in
which a U-2 spy plane was shot down
over Russia, . aircraft reconnaissance of
. the Soviet Union has been ruled out.
How they work. Reconnaissance
planes and drones have been flown roti-
S TABS
RLD
ed States first began bombing North
Vietnam in 1.965.
The drones have their cameras turned
on to take wide-angle pictures contin-
uously while in flight. Reconnaissance
pilots, after studying earlier drone pho-
tography, can pinpoint their cameras on
suspected military activity for closer,
more detailed pictures.
The photos are analyzed within min-
utes at U. S. bases in Southeast' Asia.
Jr some cases, the photos are also sent
to Washington?cither by air or by radio
beam, depending on whether the priority
is secrecy or speed.
Over the past decade, the U. S. has
kept watch on the Soviet Union and Red
China with a series of "search and find"
satellites whose, very names are classi-
fied. They are equipped to phoT
tograph and radio back to
"Sky spy" model is readied for
testing. Satellite cameras can
photograph most of the world,
ground stations prints that
be put together to depict
entire country.
Ground stations for receiving
these pictures are located at
New Boston, N. II.; Vandenberg
Force Base in California; Oallti Hawaii.;
Kodiak Island, Alaska; on Guam; on the
Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean,
and in Ethiopia. In addition, six ship-
board stations, each with a 30-foot an-
tenna, can be deployed around the
world to fill blank spofs in the network.
The photos are radioed from the satel-
lites and wind up at Sunnyvale Calif.
can
the
Another series of "close look" satel-
lites is used to focus on known or sus-
pected subjects of military significance.
These photos, of a much higher quality,
are dropped by parachute to be re-
trieved and seiit on to the National
Photographic Interpretation Center in
Washington, U. C.
What's ahead. New and improved
reconnaissance satellites, officials say, are
in the offing. One, dubbed the "Big
Bird," is expected to have an orbital
life of several- months and to carry a
quantity of film packs that can be re-
turned at frequent intervals.
Success of the sky spies has been
credited with removing an important
hurdle to a U. S.-Russian agreement on
limiting arms. Without the satellites, it
Gemini V photo shows African airfield from
100 miles up. Sky spies give much more detail.
is argued, no significant agreement could
be possible because of the Kremlin's
steadfast opposition to on-site inspection
teams to enforce a treaty.
Even before arms-control talks started,
U: S. officials say the satellites have
helped to stabilize relations between' the
U. S. and Russia?through increased
knowledge?and at the same time have.
significantly reduced U. S. defense spend-
tinely over Southeast Asia since the Unit- ? or in Washington for interpretation. ing to protect against the unknown. IEND]
Approved-For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
ALBANY, GA. Approved FcXelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004,0001000100005-0
HERALD
taf 1972
E ? 30,407
S 31,092
WHO MISJUDGED IN VIETNAM?
For months in advance of the
savagely successful Communist offen-
sive in South Vietnam, American
military and diplomatic and intelli-
gence sources had been predicted
that an enemy blow would fall. For
months these sources noted a buildup
of hien and supplies in this staging
area and that -- of North Vietnam,
of Laos, of Cambodia, and even in
the demilitarized zone. Our planes
were assigned the task of interdic-
tion, and they bombed away, ton aft-
er ton after ton of high explosives.
flow, then, did the enemy gain.
the advantage that lies with major
tactical surprises on the battlefield?
How did he advance for virtually the
first five days unimpeded and seize
the entire province of Quang Tri, in-
cluding the provisional capital of the
same name?
No one is saying at this juncture;
of course. Too many faces are too
red at this point -- and in Washing-
ton no less than at the American
military headquarters in Saigon.
The question that no official is
discussing openly is this: Were we
Caught with our intelligence down?
Generally speaking, there are two
? schools of thought on this score.
The first is to the effect that, on
the contrary, intelligence reported all
too accurately what the enemy was
doing where he was massing, with
what armament, et cetera. This data,
in turn, was relayed to the higher
commands, and from the higher com-
mands to the area of the policy-
makers in Washington. What the
policy-makers made of this intelli-
gence ? or what they failed to do
This theory, if it in fact fits the
reality, validates the general philos-
ophy of intelligence-gathering as ex-
plained to the members of the Amer-
ican Society of Newspapers Editors
in April 1971 in Washington by Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Director
Richard Helms. It is not the task of
the intelligence community to make
policy and, indeed, it eschews this .
role altogether, Mr. Helms stressed.
The CIA, and its military and other
counterparts throughout the Federal
Government, must operate like a well-
drilled newspaper city room, it un-
earths facts, it reports them ? but
as a reporter does not make policy
kir. a newspaper, neither does an in-
telligence agent do so for the Gov- .
ernment of the United .States.
The second school of thought
about our Vietnam intelligence is a
.contra view. It argues that our in-
telligence failed utterly, because while
it may have known of the enemy con-
centrations, it misjudged the direction
.which the Communist thrusts finally
took. That may have been because
the North Vietnamese divisions, com-
mitted to fighting set-piece battles
with tanks and infantry and co-ordi-
nated artillery for the first time since
the American intervention, dropped
all pretense at "infiltration" and
- struck boldly down main transporta-
tion arteries. . In this case it was
coastal Highway 1.
Nor, says the second school of
thought, did intelligence estimate cor-
rectly the vast' stores of huge and
complex weapons and their firing sys-
tems which the enemy succeeded in
emplacing and deploying.. The fact
that the North Vietnamese were able
with it ? was noteth ?to lob 2,000 artillery shells into the
resnonsibi iiv
rovea rorircelegfAi290/114/(niegtA-RW4-9p4RF001000100005-0
of the intelligence establishment.
-Loc in a 'single day quite obviously
astonished not only military intelli-
gence but the Abrams' headquarters
in Vietnam. And all this despite the
presence in the American technologi-
cal arsenal of such devices as acous-
tical "sensors," sky-spy aerial tech-
niques, infrared ,photography and
who knows what other super-snooper
devices and systems. So sophisti-
cated have the North Vietnamese be-
come in warfare that they actually
employed counter-measures which
the Americans, to say nothing of the
South Vietnamese, did not know they
Possessed,
As a consequence, whether Amer-
ican intelligence was at fault, or
whether Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's
National Security Council intelligence
Committee failed to anticipate the
enemy's movements and his strength
despite good intelligence, the result
on the -battlefields of South Vietnam
has been the same: Once again,, we
have grossly underestimated our fo'
For that error, we?are payil
price. It is high indeed.
WAVINGTON STAR
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r
rep
By MICHAEL SATCHELL
Star Start Witter
Three Marine Corps corpo-
rals have been charged with
" trespassing after breaking
into the Central Intelligence
Agency compound in Langley-
and getting to within BOO feet
of the power plant. ,
Some authorities say they
think the Marines entered the
highly guarded spy headquar-
ters on a dare. But Richard
Helms' CIA director, said he
did not rule out the possibility
of a sabotage attempt.
, The incident occurred be-
tween 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. on
' May 6. Security guards spot-
ted a car ' parked on George-
town Pike near the CIA head-
quarters and requested assist-
ance from Fairfax County po-
llee.
After a search of approxi-
mately 45 minutes, according
to a police sergeant who par-
ticipated, the Marines were
found and arrested.
? FAIRFAX POLICE identl-
god the three arrested as Lar-
ry, Peter Kreps, 21, Charles
'Stephen Huff, 24, and Terry
Wayne Weatherly, 22.
In a letter to Dr. William S.
arines Seize
un s
Hoofnagle, chairman of the
Fairfax Board of Supervisors,
CIA boss Helms wrote in part:
"I have been informed of an
incident which occurred early
in the morning on 6 May 1972
a n d involved unauthorized
physical penetration of this
agency's headquarter com-
pound. Although the case is
still under investigation, a re-
view of the facts available to
us now does not rule out the
possibility of sabotage."
?
The letter goes on to thank
members of the Fairfax police
department for their assist-
ance.
An officer who participated
in the search said the Marines
were carrying a flashlight and
a pair of pliers. They had
scaled a four-foot outer fence
and then had climbed the
main perimeter fence, which
is eight feet ?high and tipped
with barbed wire. They were
climbing a third inner fence
guarding the power plant
when they were captured, the
efficer said.
ASKED HOW three men
would have penetrated -z.o far
into the compound and re-
,
mained undiscovered for near-
ly an hour without being spot-
ted by security guards, a CIA
spokesman said yesterday. the
intrusion was not regarded as
a major breach'of security.
"The whole tring was mi-
nor," said the spokesman.
"Nothing happened.
The Marines were taken by
Fairfax police to the McLean
substation and charged with
trespassing ,on federal proper-.
ty, a state offense. They were
released on $1,000 bond each,
police said. The men were
questioned at length by federal
authorities but no federal
charges have been filed.
A Marine Corps public infor-
mation officer said the men
were members of A Company
attadhed to battalion head-
quarters at Henderson Hall in
Arlington.
. "They have been returnedto
a normal work routine and
they are under no restraint,"
the officer said. "It is a civil
matter at this point and no
Marine Corps action is antici-
pated until after the civil ac-
tion is completed."
Weatherly was reached by
telephone yesterday but re-
fused to discuss the incident.
- ? _
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Approved %Wr Release 2003A 2/N)ICVAIDP84-0a7K9R001000100005-0
Convict in Spy Case Slain
In Prison by Visiting Son
LEWISBURG, Pa., May 19
?A former Army sergeant
serving a 25-year term for con-
spiring to give secrets to the
Russians was stabbed to death
Thursday by his son who vis-
ited him at the federal peni-
tentiary.
Robert Lee Johnson, 56, was
brought into the prison's open
visiting quarters to see his son
for. the first time in years,
prison officials said. As be en-
Aered the room, his son, a Viet-
nam war 'veteran, lunged at
his father with a knife, stab-
bing him in the chest.
? Johnson died an hour later
in the emergency room. at
Geisinger Medical Center.
Robert L. Jr., 22, of Green-
wood, Ind., was disarmed im-
mediately by prison guards
He was taken to Williamsport,
Pa., by FBI agents where he
was arraigned on a first de-
gree Murder charge.
"It was just one of those
things," Warden Noah All-
dredge said. "It happened al-
most instantaneously. His
father came into the visiting
room and the incident oc-
curred right then.
"I don't know a lot about
the man. I do know that he
hadn't seen his son for a long
time and he didn't get Many
letters from him."
The warden said visitors
were never searched, and
rooms for them were set up in-
formally.
"It's just like meeting in a
living room, very informal."
Alldredge, who described
Johnson as a model prisoner,
said to his knowledge this is
the first time "anything like
this has ever happened at a
federal penitentiary."
As a Pentagon courier In.
the sixties, Johnson collabo-
rated with. the Soviet govern-
ment in a scheme which in-
volved embarrassing the U.S.
government by baring out-
dated American defense proj-
ects.
The Soviet KGB intelligence
service "disinformation" 'sec-
tion obtained the plans from
Johnson.and James Alan Mint-
kenbaugh, once a real estate
agent in Alexandria, Va., .and
leaked them to the West 'Ger-
man news publications. -
The document that attracted
the most attention was known
as "Plan 10-1." It detailed a
purported Defense Depart- ?
ment strategy to drop atom
bombs on German cities in the
event of a nuclear war. The
Pentagon never acknowledged -
the authenticity of the docu-
ments.
Mintkenbaugh and Johnson
both pleaded guilty to charges
of conspiracy to commit espio-
nage and received ? identical .
25-year terms in July, 196&
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.1r21.55
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Alleged Spy May
Return to Russia
NEW YORK 01)--A U.S.
district judge in Brooklyn
ruled Friday night that
Valeriy I. Markelov, a
Russian accused of trying
to steal plans for the Na-
vy's neNV supersonic fight-
er, may return to the So-
viet Union while his case
is pending.
Markelov, a translator in
the U.N. secretariat, was
arrested on espionage
charges Feb. 14 outside a
Patchogue,. N.Y., restaur-
ant.
A federal indictment ac-
cuses him of trying to get
plans for. the F-114A fight-
er from an engineer at the
Grumman plant on Long
Island where the plane is
being .cleveloped.
In a two-minute hearing
held after nermal court
hours, Judge Mark A. Con-
stantino extended the
travel limits' of Markelov's
$100,000 bail to include
Russia.
. "I don't want this yelled
from the rooftops," the
.judge *added.
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7rawka.i.aul-yri
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1 9 MAY 1972
Son Held in Killing
Of Red Spy in Prison
? LEAV1SBURG, Pa. Al') ?
A former U.S. Army sergeant
who was serving a 25-year
'prison term for passing gov-
ernment secrets to the Rus-
sians was stabbed to death in
the U.S. federal penitentiary
here, allegedly by his own son.
? An FBI spokesman said
Robert Johnson, 22, of Green-
wood, Ind., has been charge-0
with murder in the death of
?his father, Robert Lee John-
'son, 52, of Alexandria, Va. The
son was held without bail in
Wilhamsort, Pa.
Prison officials said the knif-
ing occurred yesterday in the
prison visiting room, just 100
feet away from the warden's
office.
As a Pentagon courier in the
1960s, Johnson collaborated
with the Soviet government in
a scheme which involved em-
barrassing the U.S. govern-
ment by baring outdated
American defense projects.
The Soviet KGB intelligence
service "disinformation" sec-
? tion obtained the plans from
Johnson and James Alan Mint-
kenbaugh, an Alexandra real
estate agent, and leaked them
to West German news publica-
tions. ?
The document that attracted
the most attention was known
as "Plan 10-1." It detailed a
purported Defense Depart-
ment strategy to drop atom
bombs on German cities in the
event of a nuclear war. The
Pentagon never acknowledged
the authenticity of the docu-
ments.
Mintkenbaugh and Johnson
pleaded guilty to charges of
espionage and conspiracy and
received identical 25-year
terms in July 1965.
The government claimed
during their trial that Johnson
was recruited by the Soviets
while serving with the Army
in Berlin in 1953. He in turn
enlisted Mintkenbaugh, who
was also an Army sergeant at
the time:
The younger Johnson is a
veteran of the Vietnam War.
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WiU?Jjii.L7S AMERICAN
111 MNI 1972
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Whose Intelligence Failed?
? . NOTHING beats hindsight when choosing where
to kick for making a mistake?the mistake in this in-
stance being wrong about where, when and with how
much the North Vietnamese would aitack.
The military intelligence community says that
Washington's strategists?meaning the National Se-
curity Council led by Henry Kissinger?took the in-
telligence reports and decided an attack would come,
if it came at all, west from Cambodia to cut South
Vietnam in half.
U.S. intelligence flights were curtailed. The elec-
tronic surveillance devices employed on the ground
couldn't tell a truck from a Soviet-built tank. But our
intelligence: knew that something was moving on the
supply trails and that the North Vietnamese had
strengthened their forces north of the demilitarized
zone. '
Intelligence reports predicted an attack in Feb-
ruary or March. When it didn't come some credibil-
ity was lost. When it did come?in April?from an.
unexpected direction with unexpected force,. Wash- ?
ington was stunned.
? It's difficult to run a war from the banks of the
Potomac, 9,000 miles from the battlefield. But if in-
telligence" reports are weighed in Washington and
the decisions are made in Washington, the. blame be-
longs n Washington. As the long-distance strategist,
the NSC took responsibility for the conduct .of the
War. ??
If intelligence. officials are correct in claiming
that we were .caught off guard .because of NSC mis-
interpretation of their reports, it doesn't take much
hindsight to know exactly where to kick.
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THE LONDON
Approved For Release 2003/12/03119V
?A
I
MiNifig00100005-0
, By. DAVID FLOYD and STEPHEN CONSTANT
HARDLY A MONTH goes by with them will be condemned
in the Soviet Union without for ? all time, during their life
the official celebration of some , and after their death."
kind of anniversary, jubilee'or The institute is in fact under
Centenary. , the orders of the ,K GB, the
Rut only a brief . un-
secret police. Gen. Pyotr Grigar-
. '
cnko, the 'prominent Russian
. signed article in the Soviet campaigner for civil rights,
journal Socialist Legality just described in an account: which
, published revealed that last reached the West how, when he
' --;year was the 50th anniversary himself was being kept at the
of the Serbsky Institute in institute, he saw the notorious
.11/loscow, or to :give it its full head of department, Prof. Lunts,
:official title, the Central Scien- arriving tO work in the uniform
?tific Research Institute of of a K G B colonel. But inside
the building he changed into a
, Legal 'Psychiatry, named after white. coat. He also, saw other
Professor Serbsl