INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF CABLE SECRETARIAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000600040129-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 129
• Publication Date: December 1, 1963
• Content Type: STUDY

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MOORANDUM ? Deputy Director of C,21 intelligence
SUBJECT : inspector General's Survey?of Cable Secret alit,
DeeeMber 1963
1. Rewarded herewith is an 1G survey report on the Cable
Secretariat, 0/DGI. Also attached for your signature is a
memorandum to the Cable Secretary with a request for response in
30 days.
2. The Cable Secretariat is a tightly organized office vhith
provides under demanding standards of timeliness, mei security,
dissertnettion of communications to Agency command and working
levels and to other seenciee and departments. The Cable
Secretariat has met its mission so successfully that our recommen-
dations are peripheral to its primary function. WO encountered a
sense of rootlessness on the part of Secretariat personnel that
can be attributed to a combination of the repetitive character of
their work and the continued pressure under which they must
operate. We do not believe that this can ever be eliminated
completely, but we do believe that it can be reduced. Some of our
recommendations, therefore, are aimed at alleviating the tensions
under which Secretariat employees work. As this situation also
has potential security implications we have recommended that the
Cable Secretary give closer attention to the individual problems
of Secretariat personnel.
3. We have noted the fragmentation of the Agency's alerting
and watch mechanism, of which the Cable Seeretaxiat is one, and
have retommended that a special study grew be formed to consider
the feasibility of consolidating these functions.
Inspector General
Cable Secretariat
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INSPECTCR GENERAL S SURVEY
or
CABLE SECRETAR TAT
DECIEMBEM 1963
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TABLE Cir COMMIS
INE.
Introduction. . . . . ........... . . . . ? 1
Organization. . . . ....... ? ? ? ?
Production Manafproent ? . ....... . . . . . . 15
Personnel Management. ........... . . , . 21
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INTRODUCTION
1. This report covers the Inspector General survey of the
Cable Secretariat, a separate component in the Office of the
Director. Three inspectors conducted the survey during the month
of November 1963. They interviewed all employees on duty during
the inspection, reviewed the various administrative arrangements
and records and contacted representative offices served by the
Secretariat.
2. The Cable Secretariat, under the Cable Secretary, has long
had the responsibility for coordinating the processing and dissemine-
tion of CIA cables. It also disseminates within CIA cables of
intelligence interest from other agencies and departments. Certain
categories of specially sensitive material are excepted from handling
by the Secretariat. The latest Agency regulations failed to include
a etatement of the functions of the Cable Secretariat and we have
recommended that this be corrected in the next issuance.
3. Astride the flow of administrative, technical, operational,
and intelligence communications, the successful functioning of the
Secretariat is essential to the Agency's operations. The recogni-
tion of this vital role is evident in every working aspect of the
office. The Secretariat is organized to ensure a continuing timely,
secure, and accurate flow of cables. It is unusually well organized
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and efficient. We have little of significance to recommend con-
cerning its organization. The Cable Secretary is well aware of
trends affecting the operation of his office, such as the continual
increase in the volume of cable communications, and keeps its
administrative organization under continuing review.
4. Over the years the Secretariat has developed a highly
refined system for processing the ever-Increasing volume of material
that passes through it. While its efficiency has increased as a
result of the initiative and resourcefulness of its management
there is good reason to doubt that further refinements can continue
to meet the rising work load without an eventual increase in
personnel. As the Cable Secretary is currently optimistic that
certain new procedures now pending will overcome some of his
present problems in this respect we have made no recommendations on
personnel strength for the present. However, we have recommended
that this problem be reviewed thoroughly by the end of 1.964.
5. we found some personnel problems, which can be attributed
IArgely to the character of the work. The monotony of its repetitive
routine, combined with its unrelieved pressure, produces a sense of
restlessness among certain elements of the Secretariat. The produc-
tion procedures that have served so successfully to help fulfill the
Secretariat's mission have tended to automate the management of
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personnel making the office's command seem remote and aloof from its
personnel. Our recommendations on this point, however, are limited,
although we have suggested a change of emphasis in the techniques
with which personnel are handled.
6. The inspection did not go deeply into the question of the
fragmentation of the Agency's "watch" mechanisms and "watch officer"
functions but because of the Secretariats unique role the issue
arose in discussions with officers both inside and outside the
Secretariat. As the problem exceeded the scope of this inspection
the issue is only noted with the recommendation that it be made the
subject of a special study.
7. The Cable Secretariat is fulfilling its basic mission
admirably. Such recommendations as we have made Should be viewed in
that context. judged by the highest standards of performance it
must be considered a bard hitting organization doing a difficult job
successfully.
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ORGANIZATION
1. The Cable Secretariat was established in 1952 as a pert
of the Office of the Director, to ensure the Director's direct
control of Agency cable communications. While the management
problem that originally led to that development no longer exists,
the administrative subordination of the Secretariat is the same.
We believe that this should be continued, as control of cable
communications is essential to ensure the integrity of command and
the effective direction of intelligence activities.
2. The Secretariat baa long been responsible for coordinating
all policies governing the handling of Agency cables, and for
processing and disseminating them--both incoming and outgoing
traffic?within CIA. Since 1962 it has also been responsible for
dissemination within CIA of cables of intelligence interest from
other agencies and departments, such as State Department political
reporting. Exceptions to these general categories of cables handled
by the Secretariat can be found in reporting on special projects,
such as those in the Office of Special Activities. (OSA) in the
DD/S& T and SIGINT reporting exchanged with the National Security
Agency. These materials have special handling restrictions and we
propose no change in existing arrangements, except such as might
result from Recommendation No. 4 (see page 14). Regulations had
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been specific in outlining the Cable Secretariat's responsibilities
until 16 August 1963 when the revision of
pertaining to the
Executive Director to whom the Secretariat reports directly,
omitted any reference to it. While there have been no repercussions
from this it leaves the status of the Cable Secretariat uncertain.
will require further amendment to reflect the new responsi-
bilities of the Executive Director/Comptroller, and steps should
be taken in that amendment to set forth clearly the missions and
functions of the Secretariat.
It is recommended that: No. 1
The Deputy Director (Support) provide for the amendment
25X1A 00 Ito include provisions outlining the missions and
functions of the Cable Secretariat.
3. The dissemination of cables is conducted in the Wssage
Center, the key organizational feature of the Secretariat.4. The
Message Center can be described as a Large working area in which
analysts, logging clerks, typists, mail and file clerks, multilith
press operators, and archivists engage in processing, reproducing,
disseminating and filing cable traffic The Message Center is open,
and filled with moving people and noise-producing mechanical
equipment. In periods of intense activity the volume of sound and
the movement of people become distracting factors. This adds
measurably, we believe, to the sense of tension that is already a
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part of the continual pressure under which Secretariat personnel
work. Such steps as installing partial partitions around the
analysts, muffling or sound-proofing mechanical equipment,
installing special acoustical tiles on the walls, developing more
salubrious color schemes for the area, and, perhaps, providing
background music (not Rock..and..Roll) could, collectively, improve
the working conditions in the Secretariat and reduce the sense of
tension that pervades the organization. At the time of the inspec-
tion the Cable Secretary initiated a survey looking to a correction
of this problem. We feel that it would be helpful to him to seek
outside advice as some of the problems are technical in nature.
It is recommended that: No. 2
The Cable Secretary seek expert technical assistance
through the Deputy Director (Support) in surveying the steps
that can be taken to improve the physical working conditions
and atmosphere of the Cable Secretariat Message Center.
4. At the time of the inspection approximately 80 of the
Secretariat's 95 employees were assigned to Message Center operations.
Superimposed upon the Message Center organization, but technically
separate from it, are nine Cable Secretariat Duty Officers (CSD0s).
These are the senior and most experienced employees in the
Secretariat s production machinery and, although without direct
supervisory responsibilities for Message Center operation, are
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considered representatives of the Cable Secretary. In addition to
the above, there are six other employees, including the Cable
Secretary, who are responsible for general administration and
management.
5. Prior to October 1962 the Duty Officers had exercised a
supervisory responsibility for Message Center operations. At that
time they were relieved of this responsibility to permit them to
concentrate on the preliminary screening of all cables to ensure
timely dissemination of items requiring prompt attention. This had
the collateral effect of removing the bulk of qualified supervisory
talent from the chain of command and replacing them with a new
level of supervisors titled Message Center Chiefs, This will be
discussed further under the section dealing with personnel manage-
ment.
6. An important factor in Secretariat organization is its
division into three relatively independent shifts to meet the
requirement for 24-hour service. Of these three shifts the day
shift is the largest, with about 40 persons, to cope with both the
flow of cables and the inquiries generated during the day when the
bulk of Agency personnel works.
7. The security of cable traffic is the subject of careful
arrangements in the Secretariat. All incoming traffic arrives by
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tube directly in the CSDO area. Thus the preliminary screening is
by the Secretariat's senior and more experienced production
personnel, Top Secret and other sensitive traffic is flagged and
handled at one isolated desk. The cable indicators limiting dis-
tribution are established by other components--largely in the DD/P
and the Office of the Director--and are honored in detail by the
Secretariat as part of the mechanical processing of traffic. In
those instances, however, where the CSDO feels that indicated
dissemination should be further restricted he will so provide
pending a check with the component concerned.
8. The dissemination process starts with the CSDO. Cables
are then routed to the cable analysts who determine dissemination
to various Agency components on the basis of extensive requirements
with which each analyst must be thoroughly familiar. Changes to
these requirements are posted daily. Whenever incoming C/A cables
contain references to other CIA traffic, the cable analyst prepares
synopses of the references for the convenience of recipients.
Despite the extensive knowledge required about Agency organization,
we feel that this activity is basically more clerical in nature than
analytical in the broader sense. After completion of the cable
analyst's action the cables are printed in predetermined, but by no
means standard, numbers for distribution to the appropriate Agency
components.
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9. We believe that the Secretariat carries out the assigned
function of cable dissemination with outstanding proficiency, while
maintaining security in protection of organizational compartmenta-
tion. We interviewed principal consumers in both the DD/P and the
DD/I and found nothing but commendation for the manner in which
this responsibility--its main mission?is fulfilled.
10. Cable dissemination is a highly specialized activity. In
the Secretariat a career toward the top is tied to selection for
training as a cable analyst, a selection which is based on evalua
tions by the Assessment and Evaluation Staff (Wdical Staff). As
the requirements for this work are unique to the Secretariat it has
developed its own carefully conceived training program, which draws
on the Office of Training for staff support and assistance.
11. For those selected for analyst training advancement is
relatively rapid, when compared with other components of the Agency.
We reviewed files of a number of employees who have moved from
08-3 and GS-4 grades to senior analyst positions 08-9, in three
to four years' time. To keep the normally less desirable night
jobs staffed it is Secretariat policy to offer promotions on the
condition that assignment to the night shift is accepted. Return to
the day shift is based on seniority, as openings occur. In view
of the 24-hour character of Secretariat operation we feel that this
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device is entirely compatible: with good practices of personnel
management. It does tend to inhibit advancement of personnel who
cannot accept night work, e.g., women with families, or persons
whose health restricts their working hours. In any event, advance-
ment to senior analyst is reasonably rapid, although this will
tend to slow down.
12. At the time of the inspection there were 12 persons slotted
against the 16 GS-9 analyst positions, with at least two more
scheduled for slotting against those positions. Candidates for the
two remaining GS-9 slots had not yet been selected. Beyond that
point promotion is subject to attrition in the higher grades. The
next level offers three GS-10 slots as Assistant Nessage Center
chief, and three GS-11 slots as Nessage Center chiefs. Next there
are the nine GS-12 CSDO positions. Because of the slowing down of
promotions at the GS..9 level we scouted the possibility of a career
or training program that might improve the job mobility of
Secretariat personnel to other linPs of work. Our conclusion was
that the general educational level in the Secretariat limited the
results that could be expected from such a program, except in
isolated instances. As it is, the Secretariat encourages training
on the part of its personnel. Lower level supervisory courses,
Clandestine Services Review courses, and similar training have been
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taken: by a nunber of the analysts. &waver,: this has served more
to broaden their understanding of the Agency than it has to open
new career opportunities for them. We believe that the Secretariat
does about all that is reasonable under the circumstances in this
field, and, in fact, that it has a well conceived training program.
13. In 1963 the Signal Center Archives was transferred to the
Cable Secretariat and renamed the Cable Archives. It is the
repository and reference center for Agency cable traffic. This
move is consistent with the Secretariat's responsibility for internal
control of cables, and was in compliance with recommendations of the
Records Management Staff. That staff also recommended termination
of microfilming cables, which it was estimated would save some
$10,000 a year. Under the new system a year's supply of bard-cow
cables will be retained in the Secretariat, copies prior to that
being retired to the Records.- Center at Warrenton. Twenty-four-hour
service on the records at Warrenton is available routinely, and
two-to-three-hour service is available in emergencies. While we
have some reservation about the termination of the readily available
microfilm reference, we are inclined to let time and experience test
this new system. The Cable Secretary is following the effects of
the change and will raise the issue if service seems to suffer
because of it.
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14. We obaerved that among the typists, especially on the day
shift reference was made to the "head typist." Although the Table
of Organization provided for no such slot, all typist positions
having a GS.5 grade, one member of the day shift had been graded on
his Fitness Reports on his performance as a supervisor. It is
apparent that for at least the day shift the volume of work is such
that the typists' work requires a supervisor among them. To the
extent that practice has proven that such is the case it should be
reflected in grade structure.
It is recommended that: No. 3
The Cable Secretary seek the assistance of the Office of
Personnel in establishing that certain typists have super-
visory duties in relation to other typists, with the intent
of upgrading those positions to the extent that their
additional responsibility justifies it.
15. In addition to the Cable Secretariat, there are a number
of watch office activities being carried on in the Agency, and these
will be increased by the establishment of a new mechanism in the
WSW, a Foreign Missile Space Analysis Center, that will have
many of the characteristics of a watch office. Representative
activities are listed below:
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Responsible Office
Office of Current Intelligence, DD/I
Office of Operations, DD/I
Collection Guidance Staff, DD/I
Cable Secretariat, 0/DCI
DD/P
Office of Security, DD/S
Office of Communications, DD/S
STATSPEC
Function
CIA Watch Office
Duty Officer
Operations Center
Clandestine Services Watch
Office
Intelligence Watch
(colocated with Cable
Secretariat but separate)
Night Security Officer
Signal Center Duty Officer
All of these activities are operating with their own rules and
arrangements. Extensive arrangements and continuing contacts have
been established between the various watch mechanisms, but the fact
remains that there is no place in the Agency where all the material
that may prove vital to a single crisis situation may be reviewed
at technical levels. OCI Watch personnel cited instances (the most
recent Berlin crisis being one) in which critical material was "lost"
for hours because erroneous indicators sent traffic to a component
that had no watch officer. In addition reference was made to what
was described as a trend whereby the Departments of State and Defense
were centralizing their respective operational watch functions.
This centralization had permitted such improved communication between
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those departments that CIA now often finds its receipt of material
behind exchanges between those offices.
In fact, instances were
cited in which CIA first learned of certain developments from
watch officers stationed in the White Rouse.
16. Our present inspection did not permit time to explore the
broad and complex field of community watch mechanisms, nor the
problem that would be raised within CIA by a centralization of its
watch mechanism. However, it was sufficient to indicate that
growing alerting responsibilities
increasingly inadequate.
It is recommended that:
The Executive Director appoint
composed of representatives of the
the establishment of a centralized
are making current arrangements
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a special working group
Deputy Directors to explore
CIA Watch Office.
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PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT
1. The central feature of Secretariat activity is its never-
ending flow of cables. Administrative emphasis, perforce has
concentrated on this problem. Over the years the Cable Secretary
has developed detailed statistics on Secretariat production, which
have served as the basis for important managerial decisions within
the Secretariat. Production figures are compiled from the daily
log in which the flow of work is logged upon receipt and upon
completion of processing, by categories of traffic: IN and OUT CIA
cables, non-CIA cables, etc. Statistics based on this information
show production totals for the office as well as for each shift.
This is helpful in developing budget requests.. It also helps plan
the use of personnel. We are satisfied that these statistics are
maintained accurately and present a valid picture of the Cable
Secretariat's work load.
2. While fluctuating from month to month, the Secretariat's
work load has shown a steady trend upward. During 1962 an average
of approximately 38,000 work items was processed monthly. Thus far
in 1963 the monthly average has risen to 45,000. At the time of
the inspection the Cable Secretary estimated that the Message
Center carried an almost continual backlog of 350-450 cables
although there are occasional spells when that backlog is worked
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out. It should be noted that this backlog is comprised of
relatively low priority cables, the more critical ones having been
selected for processing by the mote during their preliminary
screening. At the rate of a cable a minute, the backlog would be
worked through in some six to seven and a half hours. This is not
unacceptable in terms of the importance of the particular traffic
in question. While the presently rising volume can be expected to
level off eventually, there is no indication that this will be in
the foreseeable future.
3. This continual rise in the volume of work will inevitably
confront the Cable Secretary with the problem of determining the
extent to which additional personnel are needed. This is not a
problem that he can control, as his work is the result of the
activities of others. His organization must process what comes to
it. Under present conditions there is little if any slack in the
Secretariat. With it apparently becoming standard practice to carry
an almost continual backlog under normal conditions, it follows
that in time of crisis serious strains will be placed on the
Secretariat's ability to fulfill its mission. In fact, it has been
reported to the inspectors that during the Cuban crisis the
Secretariat fell far behind in processing the heavy flow of traffic.
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4. As the control point for the flow of critical information
the Secretariat is an essential activity. Its operation with too
small a margin in personnel strength could prove critical in future
crises. At the time of the inspection the Cable Secretary was well
along in the exploration of new equipment and the development of
new procedures to increase the production capacity of the office.
He was confident that over the next year these new programs will
contribute to a significant increase in Secretariat productivity.
We are impressed with the new programs, and with the Cable Secretary's
evaluation of their potential, especially in view of his long record
of success in such innovations in the past. However, we hold some
reservations about the extent to which mechanical efficiency can
continue to meet all the demands that may be placed upon the office.
While we accept the Cable Secretary's evaluation at this time, we
still feel that the entire problem of staffing should be reviewed
after completion of the new steps, to determine the extent to which
they meet all the demands levied upon the Secretariat. ;
It is reccmmaend.ed that: No. 5
The Cable Secretary request the Salary and Wage Division
of the Office of Personnel to conduct a full review of
staffing of the Cable Secretariat to determine its adequacy;
that the findings with appropriate recommendations be reported
to the executive Director/Comptroller; that this study be
undertaken no later than January 1965.
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5. we have stated our acceptance of Secretariat production
figures for the whole office as a reliable basis for administrative
planning. We are somewhat less confident that production statistics
on individual performance have the same degree of validity as the
over.all figures.
6. The statistics for analysts require considerable time to
compile and considerable interpretation to be meaningful. For
inst4ce, as between clA IN and OUT cables, the latter can be handled
more expeditiously and tend to raise the production record of those
who happen to handle a larger Share of OUT cables. This is especially
true for the night shift, which has higher production figures partly
because it handles a lftrger proportion of OUT cables. In addition,
figures are subject to manipulation in a variety of ways by the
analysts, the details of which are not pertinent to this report.
The Point is that these statistics have a limited usefulness as
tools for personnel and production management. While instances
cane to our attention in which these figures made possible a check
on the use of various analysts' time, we are inclined to view this
as prinnrily the responsibility of the working supervisor and not
requiring further checking by record.
7. In the case of the press operators, various factors also
tend to invalidate the production figures as a true reflection of
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Individual performance. For instance, statistics are kept on mats
run off and cables processed. A cable which is very short and
requires only three copies would be tallied the same as a very
long cable that also required twenty copies. Further, defective
equipment or specially demanding production standards for certain
consumers tend to affect the final production figures.
8. In view of the dubious reliability of these particular
figures we question their usefulness; as a management instrument. In
fact, we feel that there has been a tendency to use the figures in
place of the exercise of certain essential supervisory initiatives
and judgments. In addition, as we point out in the discussion of
personnel management below, these statistics and their apparent role
in Secretariat management have become an important irritant.
9. We believe that, with the exception of occasional spot
checks, there is value to be gained from the elimination of records
on individual production. We suggest that this be done on a trial
basis, for a period of from one to three months. The continued
review of both shift and over-all office production, coupled with
supervisory leadership, should ensure adequate management control
of individual production.
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It in recommended that: No, 6
The Cable Secretary, on a trial basis, eliminate individual
production statistics as a regular part of Cable Secretariat
administration, and that production figures be maintained on a
shift and office basis during the trial period to determine
what effect, if any, there is on over-all production; that if
production is not affected adversely, these individual pro-
duction statistics be discontinued permanently, to be used in
the future on only a spot check:. basis.
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PERSONNEL NANAGEMENT
1. Special attention was given in this survey to the
personnel management and promotion policies of the Cable Secretariat.
Complaints in this area had come to the attention of the Inspector
General (independent of the current survey) and this inspection pro.
vided an opportunity to evaluate them. This is the one area of
Secretariat management in which we feel changes of administrative
emphasis are desirable.
2. A number of factors combine to create a problem of personnel
management that is unique to the Secretariat. One aspect of this
is similar to that observed in other offices where large volumes of
paper must be processed by repetitive and highly routinized proce-
dures. The essentially clerical character of this work, despite
an element of professional analytical effort, necessarily limits
the grade structure of the organization. As with other offices
where such is the case this tends to produce a vague dissatisfaction
on the part of the employees with both the character of the work
and the opportunities it offers. Superimposed on this is the.
necessary orientation of the Secretariat towards timely and accurate
dissemination of essential communications. In the face of a.
continually rising volume of work this contributes to an atmosphere
of nnrelieved pressure generated by the mission of the office.
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3, The Cable Secretary has been successful in gaining for
the Secretariat employees a better grade structure and greater
opportunity for advancement than is usually available in related
lines of work. This is particularly so in view of the relatively
low educational level in the higher grades of the office. Below the
office of the Cable Secretary there are nine GS-12 positions, only
two of which are held by college graduates. Of the next 23 06-11,
100 and 9 slots only one is occupied by a college graduate.
ironically these extra career opportunities have whetted rather than
satisfied appetites for promotion. in fact it was in this area
that we found the most unrest in the Secretariat. This is due, we
believe, to a coMbination of production management techniques and
loss of communication between Secretariat management and the rank
and file.
4. we have discussed elsewhere in this report the maintenance
of the production records of the individual analysts. These are
available for comparison by the analysts. We have explained why
we feel that these particular statistics are not completely reliable
for management purposes. Undoubtedly they Serve to create a highly
competitive sense among the analysts who are keenly aware of their
respective positions as shown by these figures. How much the
practice actually contributes to increased production, however,
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is speculative. We found the analysts generally conscientious and
susceptible to being led rather than having to be prodded into
production. Because of the way they have come to be used, individual
production records have been made to appear as an essential ingredi-
ent to career performance. Therefore, when a junior analyst with
an undistinguished record was promoted over analysts not only
senior to him, but whose production records and professional standing
in the eyes of their colleagues are superior to his, such a promo..
tion is naturally subjected to critical attention by those who were
passed by.
5. Having been made aware of the general problem in advance,
although not in the detail outlined above, the inspectors reviewed
carefully the personnel files of all employees in the Secretariat.
Specifical4 we have checked the educational backgrounds of the
individual employees, their general abilities as shown by the
clerical aptitude tests given them at the time they entered on duty
with the Agency, and their performance over the years as: reflected
in Fitness Reports. Also we have discussed with the Assessment
and Evaluation Staff (AZAB) that staff's appraisal of a selected
nuMber of employees arrived at on the basis of the results of the
Professional Employees Test Batteries (PETB), which are customarily
taken by Cable Secretariat employees. Our detailed interviews: of
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Secretariat personnel have provided us, we believes with a well-
rounded understanding of Secretariat employees, both individually
and collectively.
6. As a result we are satisfied that the particular promotion
action in question (the junior analyst described in paragraph 4 of
this section) was based on what was considered by Secretariat
management to be the most objective standard available for that
decision. In that instance the AAR Staff bad been requested to
make a relative rating of specified analysts for supervisory
positions and had singled out the analyst in question as having the
greatest potential. Supervisory potential is different from past
performance as an analyst, and it was this point that concerned
Secretariat management. However, the analysts were aware of only
one standard and saw only that a not-outstanding colleagee was
jumped over them. While we feel that Secretariat management relied
too heavily upon the A&E judgment, rather than using it as only
"one datum" in its decision as the ME Staff believed it should be
used, this remains the sort of judgment that is peculiarly within
the realm of command prerogative, so we do not make a recommendation.
7. One of the factors contributing to the restlessness that
we found in some portions of the office is the loss of personal
contact between senior supervisors and the production Levels. This
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already exists in part by the division of the Secretariat into
three shifts to provide round.-the-.clock service. This was com-
pounded in 1962 when the more senior Duty Officers were removed
from positions of supervisory responsibility. Supervision devolved
upon the less experienced Message Center chiefs, who, by their own
descriptions and those of their sUbormieetes, seem to serve more as
production foremen than as supervisors in the normal sense. The
concurrent concentration of the Cable Secretary and his senior
assistants on office administrative detail resulted in a real gap
in personnel management in the Secretariat. Employees do not
"identify" with the front office, and feel themselves cogs in an
impersonal production machine. This intangible factor could assume
increased significance if it were permitted to continue to develop
unabated. We feel this to be sufficiently important that the Cable
Secretary should free himself from much of the detailed review of
cables now carried on by him in order to devote more time to
assuring himself that the Message Center chiefs become more than
production foremen and to make his presence and positive person-
ality better known to those who work in his organization. We are
fully appreciative of the problems of treating with an atmosphere
of dissension among restless lower graded employees, but it was
apparent to us that if this general atmosphere is not changed, it
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could have an unfortunate effect on Secretariat production. We
also realize that the problem is an intangible one that cannot be
dealt with expeditiously and directly. While this is a matter on
which we have such a clear impression it is not subject to the
usual recommendations. It lies peculiarly in the responsibility of
command, and we feel that in this instance the raising of the issue
without specific recommendation is sufficient.
8. Secretariat personnel security procedures conform in general
with applicable regulations. There is one aspect, however, which
gives us some concern. In the recent IG special survey on Agency
personnel security practices, emphasis was placed on the role of
supervisors, particularly in the lower grades, as an essential
element in maintaining an effective over.all security program.
Specifically, we stressed the need for each supervisor to know his
subordinates to the extent that personal behavior patterns indica-
tive of potential security vulnerabilities might be detested and
dealt with at an early stage. We feel, in this connection, that a
certain weakness exists in the Cable Secretariat where supervisors
have minimal knowledge of the off-duty habits and conditions of
livelihood of their employees. This condition is compounded by the
loss of supervisory continuity resulting from rotation of personnel
between shifts. The ssage Center chiefs, who devote the bulk of
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heir time to obtaining maximum production, tend to give limited.
attention to personnel problems other than those directly affecting
the production of their shifts.
It is ,recommended that:
No. 7
The Cable Secretary review personnel management procedures
to ensure that he and his key supervisors have a reasonable
awareness of the attitudes and problems of individual
Secretariat employees which might be indicative of potential
security vulnerabilities.
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