TRIP REPORT, CHILE (NUMBER 2)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002300020039-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 11, 1974
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

ApprpvedFFoEr Re Hf+ MI /~~55g MR-IP80R01 731 R0023000
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310
LTG Walters
Deputy Director, CIA
ARMY review(s) completed.
cc {-~ /Clk1 H
.A-- N 10 4 A 0 C Z
Approved For Release 2004/09/15 :
l2 April 1974
HAROLD R. AARON
a D ~ qa F113g 00e230002
 Approveco leR /09/15 McJI 31 R002300020039-7
C~ Al! ~ b3Z APR 74
gi QS O PANAMA
TO SSO Ac S1, DA
,S E C N E T NOFORN PNA 251
F , M COL GERALD H. SILLS
'10 MG A. A otj 9 AC SI , DA
INFO COL MOSES, CHIEF OF STAFF, USARSO, FT AMADOR CZ
BG BERG, JA USSOUTHCOM, QUARRY HTS CZ
SUBJECT: TRIP REPORT, CHILE (NUMBER 2)
A. ICR G-FIS-w3-74
,R U-UCR-32583
I3. IC
C. ICR G-CON-;c5-74
D. ICR C-CR-4-57952
#. (C) THIS REPORT IS BASED ON MY OFFICIAL VISIT TO CHILE DURING
THE PERIOD c4-31 MAR 74. THIS REPORT WILL BE LIMITED TO THE PERU-
VIAN SITUATION AND CHILEAN ATTITUDES PERTAINING THERETO. ~ U7:..fisVONG MILITARY MEN, THE PERUVIAN THREAT SUPERCEDES ALL OF
CHIL ' S OTHER MAJOR PROBLEMS, EVEN THOUGH THE COUNTRY ISWAGI'liG A
tf~ AT BATTLE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL. ONE MUST UNDER-
(9,1 A*3D THE CHILEAN MENTALITY TO APPRECIATE THIS ATTITUDE. IRRESPEC -
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TIVE OF POLITICAL LEANINGS' ECONOMIC STATUS OR EDUCAT.JON LEVEL, THE
CHILEAN, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A MINORITY OF FANATICAL LEFTISTS,
IS INTENSELY PROUD OF HIS NATIONALITY. PATRIOTISM IS INBRED IN THE
CHILEAN PERSONALITY AND TAKES PRECEi)ENNTC'F OVER ALL OTHER VALUES.
MATRICIDE WOULD BE LESS CONDEMNED IN CHILE THAN THE BETRAYAL OF THE
COI'1TRY. ANY THREAT TO THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER
ALL OTHER PROBLEMS.
3a (C) WITH THE RECENT INFLUX OF ARMS INTO PERU FROM VARIOUS PARTS
OF TAE WORLD, TO INCLUDE THE USSR' CHILE' S TRADITIONr.L FEARS THAT
PERU WOULD ATTEMPT THE RECONQUEST OF THE LOST PROVINCE OF TARAPACA
HAVE BEEN GREATLY INTENSIFIED. CHILE' S CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITI-
CAL PROBLEMS MAKE THEIR MILITARY LEADERS FEEL LESS CAPABLE OF ADE-
~QUATELY MEETING THIS THREAT. SOURCES OF ARMAMENTS WITH WHICH TO
f,EET THIS THREAT ARE BEING DENIED TO CHILE, AS A RESULT OF A WOkLD-
W,I DE LEFTIST PRESS CAMPAIGN "CONDEMNING THE REPRESSIVE ACTS OF THE
JUNTA GOVERNMENT AGAINST THEIR POLITICAL ENEMIES." THESE THOUGHTS
HAVE GIVEN RISE TO A FEELING OF DESPERATION AND FRUSTRATION WITHIN
THE MILITARY. A TYPICAL COMMENT IS "HOW CAN WE ADEQUATELY DEFEND
OUR COUNTRY IF WE CANNOT OBTAIN THE EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH TO MEET
THE THREAT."
4. (S/NFD) NEVERTHELESS, THE CHILEAN MILITARY IS DOING EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE WITH THEIR CURRENT LIMITED RESOURCES TO TAKE ADEQUATE
F ~ ECAUTIONS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE COUC?TRY. ON 25 MARCH I WAS
FLOWN TO THE NORTHERNMOST CITY OF ARICA WHERE I REMAINED FOR THREE
nAYS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT WAS TO GIVE ME A BETTER APPRECIA-
TION OF THE CHILEAN SITUATION. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO ARICA WAS A
NOFORN
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q'4 ALL TOWN WITH A POPULATION OF ABOUT 11, 000 TO 12, OOO, IN AN
EFFORT TO "CHILF.ANN?IZIEE" THE AREA, A FREE ZONE WAS ESTABLISHED TO
ATTRACT SETTLERS AND INDUSTRIES. THIS EFFORT WAS SUCCESSFUL, AND
THE POPULATION IS NOW APPROACHING 15~i.9000. ALTHOUGH THE FREE ZONE
N70 LONGER EXISTS, IT IS STILL THE CENTER OF A LARGE INDUSTRIAL COM-
PLEX WHICH PROVIDES EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCES A WIDE VARIETY OF MANU-
FACTURED GOODS FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, THROUGH IRRIGA-
i.IONI ANA ELECTRIFICATION PROJECTS IN THE INTERIOR, THE AREA IS NOT
ONLY SELF SUFFICIENT IN AGRICULTURE PRODUCTS, BUT ALSO SHIPS PRO-
DUCE TO OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE POSSIBILITY OF CHILE EVER
VOLUNTARILY TURNING OVER THIS HIGHLY DEVELOPED AREA IS NILL. THE
CHILEANS CURRENTLY HAVE ONE REINFORCED INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THIS
AREA. THE COMMANDER OF THIS UNIT, COL 0 CBUIER MENA SALINAS IS
IDEALLY SELECTED FOR THIS SENSITIVE POSITION. A WELL QUALIFIED
INFANTRY OFFICER, WHO WAS FORMERLY HEAD OF THE CHILEAN ARMY MILI-
TARY IN'I'Trll.IGENIC E SERVICE (SIN). COL MENA STATED THAT HE MAINTAINS
EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH BG ARTEMIO GARCIA VARGAS, COMMANDER OF
THE PERUVIAN 6TH DIVISION, WHICH IS STATIONED IN TALCA, JUST ACROSS
THY BORDER. COL MENA STATED THAT GENT GARCIA HAS EXPRESSED ANTI -
cOirtllUNIST ATTITUDES ON 'lAN"!Y OCCASIONS AND OPENLY CRITIZES ACTIONS
OF PERUVIAN PRESIDENT GENERAL VELASCO ALVARADO. I HAVE NO DOUBT
THAT COL rENA HAS AN EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE OPERATION GOING ON
IN SOUTHERN PERU, IN THE AREAS ADJACENT TO THE BORDER. A VERY
LIBERAL BORDER CONTROL POLICY EXISTS, AND SINCE THE FRONTIES IT-
SELF IS A SANDY WASTE FOR MANY MILES INTO THE INTERIOR, INFILTRA-
TION. OF AGENTS POSES NO PROBLEMS
(. S/NFD) THE CHILEANS REALIZE THAT WITH THEIR 6TH DIVISION HEAD-
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UARTERS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 150 MILES AWAY IN IQUIQUE, THIS RE-
11NNFORCED REGIME'S?T LOCATED IN ARICA IS AT A DISTINCT TACTICAL DIS-
ADVANTAGE IN THE EVENT OF A PERUVIAN ATTACK. I LAID HEAR STATEMENTS
TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WERE PLANS TO MOVE THE (STH DIVISION HEAD-
QUARTERS FROM IQUIQUE TO ARICA? EVEN WITH THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
OF A CORPS HEADQUARTERS, USING THE 1ST DIVISION LOCATED IN ANTO-
FAGASTA AND THE 6TH DIVISION IN ARICA, REINFORCED WITH UNITS FROM
DIVISIONS IN THE SOUTH, THE CHILEANS FEEL THAT THEY WOULD BE HARD
PRESSED TO BLUNT AN INITIAL PERUVIAN! ATTACK WITHOUT PREPOSITIONED
ANTI -TANK WEAPONS, MODERN ARMOUR EQUIPMENT, AND ARTILLERY IN
ADEQUATE QUANTITIES. THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT IN A WAR OF LONG
DURATION THAT THE SUPERIOR QUALITY OF THE CHILEAN SOLDIER WOULD
PREVAIL, BUT THEIR COMMENT IS "WITH WHAT WE HAVE NTOW, WE WOULD BE
i- LPLESS IN A 5-DAY WAR TERMINATED BY A UN OR OAS CEASE-FIRE* NOTE; THE CHILEAN ARMY DIVISION MORE ADEQUATELY EQUATES IN SIZE
TO A US ARMY REGIMENT, OR AT MOST A BRIGADE. k c) CHILEANS CONSIDER THAT IN ITS DESIRE TO PUNISH THE PRESENT
~.. CHILEAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEFEAT SUFFERED BY INTERNATIONAL COM -
MU?N 1SM WHEN THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT WAS OVERTHROWN, THE SOVIET
1J\?ION AND CUBA ARE CAPITALIZING ON THE PERUVIAN DESIRES TO REGAIN
ITS LOST PROVINCE OF TARAPACA BY PROVIDING ARMS AND ADVISORS TO
THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOURCES FOR MODERN
WEAPONS, THE CHILEANS CLING TO ONE HOPE. THIS IS THAT THERE ARE
ENOUGH OFFICERS WITHIN THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES WHO ARE. AWARE OF
uANTGr_R OF COiiMU IST PENETRATION INTO THE FABRIC OF THEIR NATION-
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AL LIFE, THAT THESE OFFICERS WILL EITHER OVERTHROW PRESIDENT VELASCO
ALVARADO OR CHANGE HIS PRO-LEFTIST POLICIES. A CONSERVATIVE PERU-
VI AN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE TRADIONAL OBJECTIVE OF REGAIN`
INIG THE PROVINCE OF TARAPACA., HOWEVER., IT WOULD NOT BE INFLUENCED
By SOVIET/CUBAN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF REVENGE VIS-A-VIS CHILE.
7. (S) THE ENTIRE DAY OF 26 MARCH WAS DEVOTED TO A 400 KILOMETER
OVERLAND TRIP FROM ARICA TO WITHIN 2 KILOMETERS OF THE BOLIVIAN
13()FR1)ER (ELEVATION 49800 METERS). A STOP OVER WAS MADE IN THE DIS-
TRICT CAPITAL OF PUTRE. THIS IS AN INDIAN VILLAGE WHICH SERVES
AS THE HEADQUARTERS FOR A REINFORCED COMPANY FROM COL MENA' S REGI`
4ENT WHICH THE CHILEANS UTILIZE TO MAINTAIN? SURVEILLANCE IN TI E
BORDER AREA. BECAUSE OF THE ALTITUDE AND CLIMATIC CONDITIONS, THE
COMPANIES ROTATE ON A MONTHLY BASIS. ASSIGNMENT TO THIS AREA I S
CONSIDERED A HARDSHIP TOUR. THE RUGGEDNESS OF THE TERRAIN AND SPARSE
ROAD NET WOULD MAKE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL BOLIVIAN InNVA-
SIONN INTO THIS AREA., IN SUPPORT OF A PERUVIAN ATTACK, VERY UNLIKELY.
n. (S/NFD) IN SANTIAGO, GENERAL GUSTAVO ALVAREZ, AT THE TIME ACTING
CHIEF OF STAFF, RELATED THE"TRUE VERSION" OF THE SOVIET ARMS DEAL
WITH PERU. ACCORDING TO GENERAL ALVAREZ., THE ALLENDE GOVERTNTMENT
HAD ALREADY CONTRACTED TO ACCEPT A SHIPMENT OF SOVIET T-55 TANKS.
SHORTLY BEFORE THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP9 PRESIDENT ALLENDE BECAME
ENRAGED WHEN HE LEARNED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SUBSEQUENTLY MADE
ARRANGEMENTS TO SEND A SIMILAR SHIPMENT TO PERU. IN DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE USSR AMBASSADOR TO CHILE, PRESIDENT ALLENDE RECEIVED NO
SATISFACTION, HOWEVER FIDEL CASTRO PROMISED ALLENDE TO USE HIS
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RE . .
INFLUENCE TO CANCEL THE PERUVIAN ORDER. (AN INDICATION OF CHILEAN
CONCERN REGARDING PERUVIAN INTENTIONS EVEN PRIOR TO THY COUP WAS
INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY PN 090, DATED 26 FEB 73.) PRESIDENT
ALLENDE ARGUED THAT AS A SOCIALIST STATE, CHILE SHOULD NOT BE
STABBED IN THE BACK BY THE USSR (AN EXAMPLE OF CHILEAN NATIONALISM
TAKING PRECEDENCE OVER IDEOLOGY). AFTER THE COUP, THE SOVIET UNION
MADE BOTH SHIPMENTS AVAILABLE TO PERU. CHILEAN MILITARY ESTIMATE
THAT BOTH SHIPMENTS AMOUNT TO ABOUT 2.00 T-55 TANKS. THE CHILEANS
DO THEIR BEST TO MONITOR SOVIET ARMS ENTERING PERU, BUT ADMITTED
THAT PERUVIAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN-COUNTRY IS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE.
THUS FAR, NO CHILEAN HAS CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN THE SOVIET TANKS
IN PERU, ALTHOUGH THEIR INFORMATION REGARDING THE TANIKS AND ADVISORS
ODRRIE;SPONN'DS CLOSELY WITH INFORMATION REPORTED BY USDAO, LIMA.
9. (C/NFD) TO MEET THE PERUVIAN THREAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT I S
DESPERATE TO OBTAIN MODERN WEAPONS, AS EVIDENCED BY TEAMS OF
CHILEAN OFFICERS CURRENTLY VISITING THE US, BRAZIL AND WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR THIS PURPOSE. OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ARE PRE-
FERRED, HOWEVER THE SITUATION IS SO CRITICAL THAT INITIALLY CHILE
WILL BE SATISFIED TO OBTAIN DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. THEY AGREE THAT
THIS IN ITSELF SHOULD CONVINCE SKEPTICAL FOREIGN CRITICS OF
THE NONAGGRESSIVE MOTIVES OF THE CHILEAN JUNTA GOVERNMENT.
geeipients Are R,espensible Ebb Ido RefetwOe S Im \
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