TRIP REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002200100023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 17, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-R
---
Uecutive
Attached is my trip report of the Portuguese
visit. Because the whole issue is so
controversial and because there were so
many different views expressed to us, I
made it a more elaborate report than
otherwise would have been the case.
Thanks again for your introduction to
Gen Da Fontoura.
DIA review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002200100023-6
 THIS IS A COVER SHEET
BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE CONTAINED
IN AR 380-5
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IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) COULD RESULT IN SERIOUS
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1. Exercise the necessary safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure by
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the required security clearance.
3. Obtain receipt whenever relinquishing control of the document(s), as
required by local regulations.
STORAGE
Store as prescribed in AR 380-5.
REPRODUCTION
1. SECRET material originating in an agency outside the Department of
Defense will not be reproduced; copied, or extracted without the consent of
the originating agency.
2. The reproduction, extraction or copying of SECRET material originating
within the Department of Defense is authorized except when the originator
or higher authority has specifically denied this authority.
3. Reproduction of Joint Chiefs of Staff papers is not authorized.
DISPOSITION
This cover sheet should be removed when document(s) are filed in a permanent
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(This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents)
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.JULY 1973 ED
GSA FPMR (41 CPR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
25XEDIA
S--793/SC-2
DATE: 17 June 1975
SUBJECT: Trip Report
1. AUTHORITY: DIA Letter Order Number 106-75 dated 2.1 May 1975.
2. DATES AND PLACES VISITED: 1-4 June 1975 - Lisbon, Portugal.
3. COMPOSITION OF PARTY:
Dr. Wynfred Joshua, DIO for European and Soviet Political./Military
Affairs
25XIDIA
4. PURPOSE OF TRIP: Discussions on the Portuguese situation.
5. PERSONS CONTACTED:
Colonel Peter Blackley, Defense/Air Attache
Colonel Charles Yerkes, Jr., Army Attache
Captain Alexander Thomson, NAal Attache
Captain Francis D. Jordan, Jr., Asst Air Attache
LTC Edward Grubbs, Asst Army Attache
LCDR Charles Ryan, Asst Naval Attache
RADM Frank Corley, COMIBERLANT
25X1
Mr. Herbert Okun, Deputy Chief of Mission
General Da Fontoura, Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal
6. FACTS AND DISCUSSION: To the observer who has not visited post-
April 1974 Portugal the following stand out:
a. The high visibility of the Communist Party (PCP). Upon arrival
at the airport and subsequently throughout Lisbon the observer is
struck by the long rows of posters depicting the hammer and sickle.
Posters of the MRPP, the supposedly-banned Maoist, party also abound.
Communist and Maoist slogans adorn the monuments. Other political
parties, including the Socialist Party (PS), have a low visibility in
Lisbon, although we were told that this was not the case in the village
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and the country. In Lisbon and at the neighborhood level, people
congregate around the PCP headquarters. In the suburbs the PCP was
the only party seen with local party headquarters. We were told that
the PCP promptly complies with requests for financial and other
assistance from Portuguese who turn to the PCP.
b. The high visibility of the Soviet Union. The many Soviet
cultural events are widely advertised on billboards, placards, and
in the media. In contrast, the US was visible only through slogans
identifying the US with imperialism or through slogans rejecting
US and NATO links.
c. The apparent erosion of order. In addition to the nationally-
ordered nationalization measures, we were told that local workers
are taking over restaurants, hotels, apartment buildings, and other
commercial establishments. Local police no longer seek to enforce
regulations. Local services, such as street cleaning, garbage
collection, etc., are provided in a haphazardly fashion or not at
all. Sloppy-looking soldiers and commandoes without any sign of
responsiveness to higher authority can be seen throughout the Lisbon
area. We were told that senior officers can no longer issue orders
with any assurance that these will be implemented; discipline in the
armed forces has almost totally disintegrated.
The discussions with Americans stationed in Lisbon lent
further substance to these surface impressions. Beyond this, however,
it was apparent that there are important differences in view among
the various US officials on significant substantive issues.
The DIO for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs
met separately with the Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal; where relevant
his views are reported.
A. THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (AFM)
Clearly, the armed forces constitute the major power center in
Portugal. The AFM of June 1975, however, is quite different from the
AFM of April 1974. Some 60 percent of the original AFM members have
been purged or are in jail. Yet, some Americans stressed the camaraderie
among the AFM members; reports of sharp power struggles and successful
and failed purges of colleagues appear to contradict the existence of
harmonious relations within the AFM.
Within the AFM, military factions tend to form around individuals.
By and large three power groups can be delineated and are represented
in the Revolutionary Council, the most important organ of the AFM:
2
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a. The moderates who tend to coalesce around Cos1::a Gomes. In the.
Revolutionary Council they form a minority; according to some, they are
a majority in the AFM as a whole. While recognizing that more and more
moderates were being removed from positions of influence, the DATT
believed that the moderates continue to constitute a potential reservoir
of power that could be rallied to the support of a strong moderate leader
who was prepared to exert his power.
Opinions about Costa Comes' role ranged from his being a very
powerful figure to a balancer between the left and moderates, to one
with very little influence. The Brazilian Ambassador believed that
Costa Gomes' role had been reduced to virtually nil. Most Americans
appeared to feel that real power is vested in the Prime Minister's
office rather than in that of the President.
More or less associated with the moderate faction are
Maj Melo Antunes, the Foreign Minister; Major Vitor Alves, Minister
without Portfolio; Gen Mendes Dias, former Chief of Staff of the Air
Force; ADM Crespo, who is returning from Mozambique; and Gen Galvao de Melo,
a leader of the moderate CDS party. Some Americans tended to place
Gen Fabiao, the Army Chief of Staff, in this category, and explained
his more radical pronouncements as the need of a recently promoted
four-star general to establish his left wing credentials. The
consensus was that both Antunes and Alves are currently relegated to
the periphery of the power structure. The Brazilian Ambassador felt
that among leaders with some influence only Antunes and Alves could
be trusted to work with. The members of the DAO held that there were
several moderate officers left who would be receptive to working with
the US and who were out of sympathy with Portugal's current leftist
course. Under the present policy guidance, however, the US attaches
said they had little to offer them but verbal encouragement.
b. A second group of officers consists of power seekers per se.
Some tend to gather around ADM Rosa Coutinho. There was a consensus
that Coutinho is essentially an opportunist who will support whatever
policy or faction promised to enhance his own power position, even
though his personal bias places him at the left of the political spectrum.
He appears to be after the Prime Minister's position. Another ambitious
leader is Otelo de Carvalho, the newly promoted Copcon commander.
Several Americans stressed Otelo's anti-NATO and anti-ITS bias; he
was the man who'orchestrated the attack against the US Ambassador;
he identifies the US with the Salazar regime.
c. A third group of officers consists of radically-oriented ones.
Many are ideologically in sympathy with the Communists; others stress
Portugal's identification with the Third World (as do members of the
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group of power seekers). On most issues the radicals are the dominant
group. Their shared political views notwithstanding, they are not a
closely-knit group.
The consensus was that Vasco Goncalves, the Prime Minister,
is a key member of this group; it was generally agreed that he is a PCP
sympathizer, anti-US, and anti-NATO. Within this third group a major
center of power is the 5th Division, controlled by Colonel Varela Gomes'
strongly pro-Communist faction. Most US observers believed that the
5th Division-constitutes the link between the AFM and the PCP. The
5th Division is responsible for AFM propaganda and the AFM Bulletin;
it runs the cultural dynamization program for the local population at
the country and village level; and it implements the indoctrination
programs at troop level.
Through smear tactics, radicals with or without encouragement
of the PCP are trying to isolate and purge from the AFM the remaining
moderates as well as others who do not share their views.
B. THE ELECTIONS AND THE PARTIES
Comment on the recent elections was conspicuous by its absence.
According to some observers, everyone is now looking ahead to new
elections, later this year perhaps, rather than looking back. On the
other hand, this may be read as a sign that the elections were of no
real significance. It may be of considerable significance that several
political factions are undertaking to arm themse ves.
The Socialist Party demonstrated a higher level of popularity than
the. other parties in the April elections, but it has not been able to
translate this into tangible gains. According to the Brazilian Ambassador,
the Socialist Party had lost the ability to effect any significant
changes in Lisbon's political situation. In Lisbon, few posters were
seen supporting the Socialists and the party maintained a relatively
low level of visibility in the city. The Socialist newspaper Republica
has remained out of circulation for two weeks, closed down by Communist
workers on its printing staff, and the entire Republica, issue has compounded
the split between the Socialists and the Communists and between the
Socialists and the government leaders.
The Communist Party (PCP), in contrast to the Socialists, maintains
a high level of visibility, particularly in Lisbon, as previously
mentioned. The PCP is active at both the grassroots level and as
an influential element in the AFM and the central government.
*The 5th division is a staff division, e.g., like J-5.
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It has garnered control of many of the local governments, the media,
and the labor unions. It has cooperated with the AFM and supported
its program from the beginning. It has taken pains to maintain
cordial relations with key AFM leaders. Party leader Alvaro Cunhal
is doubtless aware that it is through this tie with the military that
the Communists can maintain a level of influence that would otherwise
not be open to them. Some American observers felt, however, that at
some point in the future the PCP and the AFM will inevitably come into
conflict; others, including the Brazilian Ambassador, stressed the
identity of goals between the PCP and the dominant AFM leaders.
Cunhal's relations with Moscow are very good, but Moscow is apparently
letting Cunhal run his own show in Portugal. Cunhal has been described
as more East European and pro-Soviet in his attitudes than other West
European Communist Party leaders. At any rate, the PCP has had the
benefit of Soviet financial assistance -- perhaps $35-40 million in
the last year or so has been sent in. The party also reportedly receives
the receipts from Soviet cultural events in Portugal.
C. ROLE OF THE SOVIETS
There were different views expressed on the extent of Soviet
involvement in Portugal and on Soviet intentions there. Some said
that the Soviets would like to see Portugal move into their orbit,
but they are concerned lest suchja development would scare the West.
With this in mind, the-Soviets are establishing contacts in as many
fields and on as_many levels of Portuguese society as possible.
The Soviets have undertaken an aggressive cultural program with the
Portuguese. Billboards advertising the Moscow circus and the visiting
lady astronaut were much in evidence. There is a poet: exchange and
Soviet cinema program, among others. Discussions have reportedly been
undertaken for Soviet support in improving the outdated Portuguese
fishing industry. Civil air agreements cover regular flights by
Aeroflot into Lisbon and the Azores, while Soviet cargo ships are using
Portuguese ports. Members of the Portuguese government are invited and
travel to the Soviet Union, while Soviet trade and other groups
frequent Portugal. The Soviet Ambassador reportedly meets regularly
with key AFM members and is otherwise quite visible and active along
with the large Soviet embassy staff. The Soviet embassy has a direct
telephone line into.the headquarters of the MDP, a Communist front
movement.
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Some US officials believed that the Soviets do not want the PCP to
take over, even if that would be possible, for fear of repercussions
elsewhere. Nor did these officials believe that PCP leader Cunhal wants
to take control of the government in Lisbon, knowing that the party is
not up to the task. The Brazilian Ambassador did not share this view,
but felt it was too early to say whether the PCP would. be successful
in establishing a Communist Portugal. Other American observers were
of similar persuasion.
D. RELATIONS WITH NATO
Apparently there is little understanding of NATO's role among AFM
officers. Several officers feel that NATO gets more out of Portugal
than Portugal out of NATO. Some key leaders -- Goncalves, de Carvalho were said to be opposed to NATO membership. The Portuguese press is
generally quite hostile. For all these reasons, the Portuguese were
said to be vulnerable to an anti-NATO campaign. Yet the government
has so far supported NATO and has maintained its arrangements with NATO.
Prime Minister Goncalves attended the NATO summit :meeting. Some
Americans said that he went in order to show his power;; others believed
that Costa Comes sent Goncalves to see for himself what NATO was all
about and because Costa Comes believed that Goncalves' attendance would
lend credibility to Portugal's pledge to continue its NATO commitment.
Portuguese protestations to retain the NATO connection notwithstanding,
some American observers were concerned that Portuguese leaders were
distancing themselves from NATO by their statements praising the East,
castigating the US, and identifying Portugal with the bridge to the
third world. It was felt that once the regime in Portugal started to
advocate a neutralist stance, it would have defined Portugal out of NATO.
Discussions at IBERLANT revealed that the question of classified
data had not yet become a problem. While the Portuguese officers at
IBERLANT could not hold any top secret documents, they were permitted
to see these. So far, however, the Portuguese had not asked to see any
top secret material. Any NATO classified data exchange with the
Portuguese Ministry of Defense was a matter beyond the purview of
IBERLANT but between Brussels and Lisbon.
E. THE AZORES QUESTION
The mini-uprising on the Azores during early June prompted consider-
able discussion over what Lisbon would and could do in the face of a
serious challenge of Azorean independence. Most observers agreed that
there would be problems for Lisbon, but there were sharp disagreements
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over the extent and effects of these problems. The first problems
will arise with the initial effort to assemble a military force..
With the current lack of discipline in the military, many soldiers would
probably refuse to go to the islands and it could take days or even
weeks to assemble an expeditionary force.
A second set of problems derives from transporting the troops to
the islands. The Air Force has two Boeing 707 aircraft that could be
used as troop carriers. An airlift could, however, be stopped by
blocking the airfields on the Azores with automobiles or gasoline cans,
thus preventing the aircraft from landing. The possibility of using
paratroops was generally denigrated by US observers, who felt Portuguese
capabilities in this area were seriously deficient.
Most observers agreed that a sealift of troops from the mainland
was the most promising approach. Some believed that with enough.time,
Lisbon could probably assemble some kind of force and transport it to
the islands. Members of the DAO, however, emphasized that the harbors
could be closed with a few fishing boats and tended to discount the
amphibious landing capabilities of the Portuguese armed forces.
Additionally, there is good reason to doubt that troops, once trans-
ported to the Azores, would be prepared to fight against their fellow
Portuguese on the island. The variety of risks in such an undertaking
would, according to some observers, cause the leaders in Lisbon to
hesitate for fear of losing face Others held that Lisbon undoubtedly
would send forces to the Azores to restore the situation..
It is notable that the DAO members favored the view that a
unilateral declaration of independence by the Azores was likely to be
successful, partly because of Lisbon's limited capability to oppose
it effectively; partly because local troops, who were :Largely Azoreans,
would support the move. Others felt, however, that a UDI would attract
only limited support, since the separatist movement was led by a small
wealthy elite without deep roots in the Azores.
F. PORTUGAL'S FUTURE
. All US observers held -- as did the Brazilian Ambassador -- that
Portugal was inexorably moving down the road to socialism. Beyond
this, however, US opinions were :divided. Some felt that the best
case would be a Portugal a'la Nasser's Egypt with a Cuban model as
a more likely worst case. Others argued that Portugal still had a
fair chance to turn into a Western-type social democracy, particularly
if the US and the West Europeans would show their active concern and
compassion for Portugal.
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The suggestion was made to us that the US demonstrate its goodwill
by canceling the US embargo on military weapons to Portugal. In
addition, the US may wish to consider taking the initiative by
offering (1) to provide some T-38 aircraft with the instruments
and equipment to turn them into F-5s; (2) to send US technical training
units to Portugal to upgrade Portuguese technology and training; and
(3) to establish an air mobile brigade. The latter appeared to be more
feasible than the infantry division to which Portugal was committed
under NATO. It was stressed that all three services should be given
assistance at the same time, lest others single out the favored service
as a tool of US imperialism. The rationale given to us for the
suggestions was that a US military aid program would keep lines of
communication open with the Portuguese and increase US influence.
Furthermore, by giving the Portuguese military more sophisticated
equipment than their current antiquated inventory offered, Portuguese
military leaders and the officer corps would have to learn to operate
the new equipment and would eventually be forced to chose between
becoming professional soldiers or remaining political operators.
Finally, by giving the Portuguese appropriate new equipment, the military
could find a mission and thereby start rebuilding armed. forces discipline
and esprit de corps.
Among US observers there are significant differences in perception
of how much influence the US has left with leaders in Lisbon. Those
who saw the moderate elements as remaining strong, saw a greater chance
of the US playing an effective role; those who viewed the moderate
position as that of an endangered species were more skeptical of the
potential for US leverage. Some US observers, moreover, pointed out
that the Portuguese regard US intervention as the greatest threat to
the revolution. We believe nevertheless that the US would be well
advised to use whatever means it has left to try to shore up the
moderate cause in Portugal. Time, however, is clearly working
against the moderates, and opportunities/ for the US to influence the
Portuguese situation are likely to diminish as time goes by.
DIA25X1
WYNFRED JOSHUA
DIO for European and Soviet
Political/Military Affairs
25E1A
cc: BG Thompson
4 ) L 4i j .y i 4.
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